

**HEIDELBERG INSTITUTE FOR  
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT RESEARCH**  
at the Department of Political Science, University of Heidelberg


# **CONFLICT BAROMETER 2009**

**Crises - Wars - Coups d'État  
Negotiations - Mediations - Peace Settlements**

**18th ANNUAL CONFLICT ANALYSIS**



# High-Intensity Violent Conflicts in 2009



- 4 Severe crisis
- 5 War

The countries affected by more than one conflict are marked according to the highest intensity.

Name - conflict item(s)

## Europe - severe crises

- 1 Russia (Islamist rebels/Chechnya) - secession, system/ideology
- 2 Russia (Islamist rebels/Ingushetia) - secession, system/ideology

## Sub-Saharan Africa - severe crises

- 3 Chad (various rebel groups) - national power, resources
- 4 DR Congo (FDLR) - regional predominance, resources
- 5 Ethiopia (ONLF/Ogaden) - secession, resources
- 6 Nigeria (Boko Haram) - system/ideology
- 7 Nigeria (MEND, Itaw/Niger Delta) - autonomy, resources
- 8 Sudan (Darfur) - regional predominance, resources
- 9 Sudan (various ethnic groups) - regional predominance
- 10 Uganda (LRA) - national power, resources

## Sub-Saharan Africa - wars

- 11 Somalia (Islamist groups) - system/ideology, national power

## The Americas - severe crises

- 12 Colombia (FARC) - system/ideology, regional predominance, resources
- 13 Mexico (drug cartels) - regional predominance, resources
- 14 Peru (Shining Path) - system/ideology, regional predominance, resources

## Asia and Oceania - severe crises

- 15 India (Naxalites) - system/ideology
- 16 Myanmar (KNU, KNLA/Karen State, Kayah State) - secession
- 17 Pakistan (Sunniites - Shittes) - system/ideology, regional predominance
- 18 Philippines (Abu Sayyaf/Mindanao) - secession, system/ideology
- 19 Philippines (MILF/Mindanao) - autonomy, system/ideology, resources
- 20 Thailand (Muslim separatists/southern border provinces) - secession, system/ideology

## Asia and Oceania - wars

- 21 Pakistan (Taliban - various tribes) - system/ideology, regional predominance
- 22 Pakistan (various Islamist militants) - system/ideology, national power
- 23 Sri Lanka (LTTE/northern and eastern Sri Lanka) - secession

## The Middle East and Maghreb - severe crises

- 24 Iran (PUAK/Kurdish areas) - autonomy
- 25 Iraq (AQI) - system/ideology, national power
- 26 Iraq (insurgents) - system/ideology, national power
- 27 Saudi Arabia (al-Houthi rebels) - system/ideology, regional predominance
- 28 Turkey (PKK/KONGRA-GEL/Kurdish areas) - autonomy

## The Middle East and Maghreb - wars


- 29 Afghanistan (Taliban) - system/ideology, national power
- 30 Israel (Hamas/Palestine) - secession, system/ideology
- 31 Yemen (al-Houthi rebels) - system/ideology, regional predominance

# Global Conflict Panorama

## Global Development

A total of 365 political conflicts was counted in 2009. Among those were seven wars and 24 severe crises, amounting to 31 conflicts fought out with the use of massive violence. Sporadic violent incidents occurred in 112 conflicts, which were therefore classified as crises. Nevertheless, the majority of all conflicts were conducted non-violently, with 108 cases being classified as latent and 114 as manifest conflicts. Compared to the previous year, the total number of conflicts rose slightly from 353 in 2008 to 365. The total number of non-violent conflicts rose by ten, as did the number of crises. In contrast, the number of highly violent conflicts decreased considerably from nine wars and 30 severe crises, i.e. a total of 39 highly violent conflicts, in 2008 to 31 highly violent conflicts in 2009.

Global Conflict Intensities in 2009 compared to 2008



Four of the seven wars had already been fought out on this level of intensity in the previous years: Afghanistan (Taliban), Somalia (Islamist groups), and Sri Lanka (LTTE/northern and eastern Sri Lanka) all seeing war for the fourth year running, while Pakistan (various Islamist militants) saw a war for the third year running. The remaining three wars, Israel ( Hamas/Palestine), Pakistan (Taliban - various tribes), and Yemen (al-Houthi rebels) had all been classified as severe crisis in 2008. Thus, their escalation to wars indicated an intensification of already massive violence. Of those five of last year's nine wars which were not again fought out on this level of intensity, three deescalated to severe crises, i.e. remained highly violent, whereas in two, violence ceased: Iraq (al-Sadr) and Russia - Georgia deescalated to manifest conflicts. The overall number of severe crises dropped considerably from 30 to 24: Only two of 2008's severe crises escalated, while eleven deescalated to crises and five to manifest conflicts. The remaining eleven severe crises of 2008 were still fought out on this level of intensity in 2009. Of the remaining severe crises of 2009, three - already mentioned above - had been wars, while eight had been crises in 2008, and one a manifest conflict [→ Nigeria (Boko Haram)]. Another one was classified as a severe crisis in the very year of its beginning: In Saudi Arabia, the infiltration of Yemeni al-Houthi rebels [→ Yemen

(al-Houthi rebels)] sparked a large-scale army offensive [→ Saudi Arabia (al-Houthi rebels)].

The total number of conflicts rose by twelve, as 16 new conflicts emerged in 2009, while only four had ended in 2008. In addition, five conflicts were considered to have ended in 2009 so far. With eight, the majority of the new conflicts arose in sub-Saharan Africa. Three of these new conflicts related to the presidential line of succession: One in Gabon following to the death of President Omar Bongo [→ Gabon (opposition)], another in Niger, as President Mamadou Tandja attempted to extend his mandate beyond the constitutional maximum of two terms [→ Niger (opposition)], and the third in Madagascar, where military forces ousted President Marc Ravalomanana [→ Madagascar (TGV - TIM)]. Furthermore, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb extended its operations to Mali and Niger, sparking violent conflicts with the respective governments [→ Mali (AQIM); Niger (AQIM)]. In addition, a new interstate conflict emerged between Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), as both countries claimed possession of a presumably oil-rich maritime territory [→ Angola - DRC]. Another two new conflicts emerged between ethnic groups in the DRC [→ DRC (Enyele - Boba)] and rival Islamist groups in Somalia [→ Somalia (al-Shabaab - Hizbul Islam)], respectively. Four new conflicts flared up in the Middle East and Maghreb, among them the severe crises with Yemeni al-Houthi rebels in Saudi Arabia, three in the Americas, and one in Europe. Of the five conflicts that ended in 2009 so far, one ended in Europe, none in sub-Saharan Africa, one in the Americas, two in Asia and Oceania, and one in the Middle East and Maghreb.


In order to reveal a long-term trend, the five intensity levels were categorized into three groups: The two non-violent levels were summarized as low intensity

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conflicts, crises as medium intensity conflicts, and severe crises and wars as conflicts of high intensity. The graph also displays the total number of conflicts observed. As the graph shows, the number of conflicts observed per year rose more or less continuously from 82 in 1945 to 365 in 2009. However, this increase must partly be considered as a statistical artefact, as the scope and quality of available information on current conflicts augmented considerably in recent years. Most of the observed conflicts were low-intensity conflicts. With regard to high-intensity conflicts, their number increased - for the most part - continuously and regularly until 1992, shortly after the decline of the Soviet Union, when an all-time high was reached with 51 high intensity conflicts. Afterwards, their number dropped sharply, but rose again until 2004. The last five years were marked by an oscillation of the number of highly-violent conflicts between 30 and 40, i.e. on a medium level, as well as by a sharp increase of crises. For these two reasons, this year's decrease of high-intensity conflicts might rather be interpreted as only a short downwards amplitude than as a trend towards a world-wide deescalation.

**Global Conflicts of low, medium and high Intensity 1945 to 2009**




### Analysis intrastate - interstate

As in the past years, a clear majority of the conflicts monitored were intrastate conflicts: 273 of 365, i.e. roughly three quarters, in contrast to 92 interstate cases. Only six of the 112 crises, i.e. sporadically violent conflicts, were fought out between two states. Four of these had already been crises in the previous year: Armenia - Azerbaijan, Chad - Sudan, Pakistan - India, and Thailand - Cambodia. The fifth interstate crisis of 2009 occurred in the decades-long conflict between North and South Korea, when a North Korean naval vessel clashed with South Korean warships in a disputed maritime area [→ North Korea - South Korea]. The sixth interstate crisis erupted between the Dominican Republic and Haiti, when their new conflict concerning illegal immigration turned violent in the very year of its beginning [→ Dominican Republic - Haiti]. All 31 highly-violent conflicts in 2009 were intrastate, none was fought out between states; last year's interstate war between Russia and Georgia deescalated to a manifest conflict. One of


the high-intensity conflicts, the fight between al-Houthi rebels and the Saudi Arabian army, could be termed transnational, as the al-Houthi rebels mainly originated from Yemen [→ Saudi Arabia (al-Houthi rebels); Yemen (al-Houthi rebels)]. Since the structure of transnational conflicts resembles the structure of intrastate conflicts, they are subsumed under this category here.

**Number of Intra- and Interstate Conflicts in 2009 by Intensity Level**



The long-term analysis, for which severe crisis and war were summarized in one group, clearly showed that the predominance of highly violent intrastate conflicts was observable from the very beginning of the examination period.

**Intra- and Interstate Conflicts of high Intensity 1945 to 2009**




### Regional Development

With 113, almost one third of all conflicts were located in Asia and Oceania, the highest number among the five regions. Africa ranked second with 85, followed by Europe with 66, the Middle East and Maghreb with 55, and the Americas with 46 conflicts. Asia and Oceania and Sub-Saharan Africa accounted for nine highly violent conflicts each; among these, however, were three wars in Asia, while only one was counted in Africa. The Middle East and Maghreb ranked second with eight high intensity conflicts - among them, however, three wars. Three highly violent conflicts, all being severe crises, were counted in the Americas, and two, also severe

crises, in Europe.

Compared to the previous year, the number of high-intensity conflicts both in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia and Oceania decreased by three each. While, however, the number of wars among these conflicts sank from three to one in sub-Saharan Africa, it augmented from two to three in Asia and Oceania. In the Middle East and Maghreb, the number of wars remained the same, only one severe crisis less was counted. While Europe's two severe crises represented a clear deescalation compared to 2008, when three severe crises and a war had been fought out in this region - the highest number since 1998 -, the three severe crises in the Americas signified an escalation, as only two severe crises had been counted in this region in 2008.

**Distribution of all Conflicts in 2009 by Region and Intensity Type**



If the number of conflicts is related to the number of states in a region, the Middle East and Maghreb instead of Asia and Oceania clearly was the region both with most conflicts in general (2.6 per state) and with most highly violent conflicts (0.38 per state). Sub-Saharan Africa ranked second with 1.8 conflicts in general and 0.19 high-intensity conflicts per state, Asia and Oceania third. From this relative point of view, neither Asia and Oceania nor sub-Saharan Africa were the region worst affected by conflicts and severe violence, but the Middle East and Maghreb - as in previous years.

## Dynamics within individual conflicts

As in the past years, approx. two thirds of all conflicts, i.e. 225 out of 365, remained at the same level of intensity from 2008 to 2009. A total of 41 conflicts escalated, while 83 deescalated. Among the escalating cases, 23 conflicts crossed the threshold to violence: 20 manifest conflicts escalated by one level, i.e. to crises, and three escalated by two levels, thereby turning from non-violent to violent or even highly violent. The latter were set as follows: Two latent conflicts escalated to crises, as the pastoralist communities of Oromo and Somali skirmished over scarce resources in Ethiopia [→ Ethiopia (Oromo - Somali)], and Shiite pilgrims clashed with religious police in Medina, Saudi Arabia [→ Saudi Arabia (Shiites)]. In addition, the manifest conflict between the Boko Haram sect and the Nigerian government esca-

lated to a severe crisis [→ Nigeria (Boko Haram)].

In contrast to the cases that intensified, 83 conflicts deescalated. More than half of them, 42, thereby went from violent to non-violent, as, firstly, 34 crises deescalated by one level to manifest conflicts.

Change of intensity	Number
Escalation by four levels	0
Escalation by three levels	0
Escalation by two levels	3
Escalation by one level	38
No change	225
Deescalation by one level	75
Deescalation by two levels	6
Deescalation by three levels	2
Deescalation by four levels	0


Secondly, two conflicts deescalated by three levels: The international power conflict between Russia and Georgia [→ Russia - Georgia], as well as the national power and system between the al-Sadr group and the Iraqi government [→ Iraq (al-Sadr)] both turned from wars to manifest conflicts, after the military defeats Georgia and the al-Sadr group, respectively, had suffered in 2008. Thirdly, in all of the six conflicts deescalating by two levels, violence ceased for the period under review. Five of those deescalated from severe crises to manifest conflicts, among them the Islamist insurgency in India [→ India (Islamists)], which had cumulated in the Mumbai bombings in late November 2008. Another case was the power struggle between opposition and government in Kenya, where post-election violence had claimed about 1,500 fatalities [→ Kenya (opposition)]. A power-sharing deal, though fragile, succeeded in halting the violence. In addition, last year's crisis on the Comoros deescalated to a latent conflict after a military intervention of African Union troops had forced the secessionist Anjouan president Mohamed Said Bacar into exile in 2008 [→ Comoros (Anjouan, Moheli)].

## Conflict Items

As in the years before, the most frequent conflict item in 2009 was system/ideology, with 111 cases. This item signifies that the respective conflicts were conducted in order to change the political or economic system or concerned ideological differences, e.g. striving for a theocracy as opposed to a secular state, religious differences, seeking democracy in an autocracy, or striving for a socialist economic order. Resources ranked second with 80 cases, closely followed by national power with 77. As conflicts very often involve more than one item, one and the same conflict might feature two or more times in this analysis. Combinations of the three most frequent items were common, as was the combination of territory and resources, regional predominance and resources, or international power and system/ideology. All of the three most frequent items were quite violence-prone. Conflicts concerning resources were conducted

violently in 35 cases (i.e. 44 percent of all resource conflicts), and were even highly violent in ten cases (13 percent). National power was pursued violently in 39 conflicts (51 percent), among them seven highly violent conflicts (nine percent). Struggles over question of system or ideology were fought out violently in 63 cases (58 percent), in 19 conflicts even with the use of massive violence (17 percent). Another very violence-prone item was secession, i.e. the will to separate a territory from an existing state in order to create a new state or to join another, with 35 cases (69 percent) being conducted violently, and eight secession conflicts (16 percent) being highly-violent. In contrast, autonomy demands, i.e. the will of a group or region to gain more political or cultural rights within an existing state, were only about half likely to turn violent as secession demands: They sparked violence in 18 cases (38 percent) in 2009, and massive violence in four cases (eight percent). The least violent items in 2009 were territory or international power, indicating that interstate conflicts were much less likely to turn violent or even highly violent than intrastate ones.

Global Frequency of Conflict Items in 2009 by Intensity Groups




Concerning the frequency of the various items, there are remarkable differences between the various regions of the world, indicating different regional patterns of conflicts. In Europe, the most frequent item was secession with 19 cases; system/ideology, the globally most frequent item, ranked fourth, while resources and national power were rather rare with seven and six cases, respectively. Most strikingly, regional predominance - an item usually marking power struggles between two non-state actors - was unknown in Europe, whereas it was observed 26 times in Asia and Oceania and 22 times in sub-Saharan Africa. In the latter region, the predominant items were resources with 33 cases and national power with 26, while few conflicts concerned system/ideology (eight cases). In contrast, system/ideology was the most frequent item in Asia and Oceania (35 cases), as well as in the Middle East and Maghreb (32 cases); in the Americas, system/ideology and resources shared the first place with 23 cases each. For more detailed information, see the respective introductions to the regions.

## Coups d'état

The number of coups d'état augmented considerably: Six attempted or successful coups were observed in 2009, while only three had been counted in 2008, and only one in 2007. Three of the six coup attempts were successful. Moreover, some of the coups caused dozens of civilian fatalities. With four, the majority of the observed coups or attempted coups was undertaken in Sub-Saharan Africa: In Guinea, a group of army officers led by Captain Moussa Dadis Camara seized power only hours after longtime President Lansana Conté died on 12/22/08. The new military government killed more than 150 protesters in September [→ Guinea (opposition)]. Guinea-Bissau witnessed another coup attempt following last November's attack on the presidential residence. On March 1, President Joao Bernardo Vieira was shot by soldiers seeking revenge for the death of army chief General Batista Tagme na Waie, who had been killed in a bomb explosion only hours before. After army officials had declared to respect the constitution, Guinea-Bissau's National Assembly speaker Raimundo Pereira was sworn in as interim head of state on March 4, and new elections were announced. Ex-defense minister Helder Proenca and another leading candidate for the presidential election were killed on June 5. According to statements of the intelligence service, they had been plotting a coup. After peaceful elections on June 28, a runoff election was called between Malam Bacai Sanha, chairman of the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde [→ Guinea-Bissau (PAIGC)] and Kumba Yala of the Partido Renovacao Social on July 26. Sanha won the ballot with 63 percent. In Madagascar, the capital Antananarivo's mayor Andry Rajoelina, supported by the military, seized power in March after months of violent demonstrations had claimed at least 135 lives [→ Madagascar (TGV - TIM)].

Coups d'État and Attempted Coups d'État 1945 to 2009



In Togo, soldiers stormed the house of President Faure Gnassingbé's brother Kpatcha in a three-hour shoot-out around on April 14. Several senior military officials and civilians were arrested for plotting a coup. Kpatcha Gnassingbé, who had escaped the shoot-out, was arrested as he tried to enter the US embassy on April 15. Faure Gnassingbé himself had succeeded his father

Eyadéma Gnassingbé in 2005 in a take-over classified as a coup d'état by the African Union.

In addition to these coups, accusations of plotting coups sparked crack-downs on the opposition, e.g. in Ethiopia [→ Ethiopia (opposition)], and an oppositional website reported an assassination attempt on Eritrean President Issayas Afewerki on August 13, allegedly committed by members of the security forces. While the presidential guard shot dead the assailant, Afewerki survived.

The remaining two attempted or successful coups were staged in the Americas. In Bolivia, police forces killed three foreign nationals, among them a former mercenary leader in the Yugoslav civil war, and arrested another two in Santa Cruz on April 16 [→ Bolivia (opposition)]. In Honduras, military forces toppled President Manuel Zelaya on June 28, flew him out of the country, and replaced him by Roberto Micheletti. At least twelve people were killed in protests in the following months [→ Honduras (opposition)].

## Terrorism

Terrorist attacks remained an important means of conflict conduct in 2009, and were employed in all regions and for a variety of goals. On the one hand, terrorist means were used by local actors to pursue their relatively mundane aims of self-determination or national power. Organizations such as the Real Irish Republican Army and Continuity Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland [→ United Kingdom (IRA et al./Northern Ireland)] or the Basque Euskadi Ta Askatasuna [→ Spain (ETA, PNV/Basque Provinces)] intensified their attacks in 2009. In Chile, Anarchist groups staged a series of bomb attacks, injuring several people. Since 2006, about 60 bombings of this type had been reported in Chile, committed by at least ten different groups. In August, a bomb exploded in front of a Chilean Airline office, causing moderate damage but no injuries.

On the other hand, the transnational terrorist network al-Qaeda and its affiliated groups, motivated by fundamentalist religious faith, committed numerous attacks of varying scale which caused scores of casualties and severe damage. Al-Qaeda was particularly active in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Maghreb [→ Iraq (AQI); Algeria (AQIM); Mauretania (AQIM)] as well as on the Arabian Peninsula. In early 2009, Yemeni and Saudi al-Qaeda branches merged to form al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula [→ Saudi Arabia (AQAP); Yemen (AQAP)]. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) spread to Mali and Niger [→ Mali (AQIM); Niger (AQIM)]. Somalia's main Islamist insurgent group al-Shabaab was also allegedly linked to al-Qaeda [→ Somalia (Islamist groups)].

Nevertheless, Islamist terrorism was not confined to the Global South, but continued to be a key feature of the secession conflicts in Russia's North Caucasus republics [→ Russia (Islamist rebels/Chechnya) et al.]. Western Europe, in contrast, did not see any Islamist terrorist attacks in 2008 and 2009. Tensions remained high, however, as both state prosecution against alleged offenders and terrorist threats continued. On 12/09/08, a Ger-

man court sentenced a native Lebanese to life in prison for two failed bomb attacks targeting passenger trains in July 2006. In mid-December 2008, Belgian authorities charged six people with membership in a terrorist group with alleged links to al-Qaeda, accusing at least one suspect of planning a suicide bombing. Also in mid-December, a UK court found the first al-Qaeda suspect guilty of directing terrorism. On 12/19/08, a Moroccan man was sentenced to 20 years in prison for his part in the 2004 Madrid train bombings, which had killed about 200 people. Following the accidental revelation of classified material, British security forces detained twelve people with alleged links to terrorist organizations on April 8, among them ten Pakistani nationals. On April 22, German authorities commenced the trial against four alleged members of the Islamic Jihad Union. The defendants made broad confessions, stating that they had been planning to kill as many members of the US military as possible. Two French nationals arrested in 2008 for illegal immigration were suspected of being key al-Qaeda figures by Italian authorities in mid-May. On July 20, the British Home Office lowered the terror threat level for the UK from severe to substantial. On September 9, a British court found three militants with alleged links to al-Qaeda guilty of plotting to kill thousands of people with liquid bombs which were to be detonated on flights from the UK to the USA. In the run-up to Germany's national elections on September 27, al-Qaeda's media production arm launched videos threatening terrorist attacks in Germany if German troops did not withdraw from Afghanistan. Subsequently, airport and railway security were tightened significantly, and German police arrested a 25-year-old Turkish citizen who had allegedly posted the videos on the internet. On October 1, German security forces detained a German-Turkish citizen for preparation of explosive devices and posting al-Qaeda propaganda on the internet. On October 8, French security forces arrested two Algerians, one of them working for the European Organization for Nuclear Research (Cern), for suspected links to al-Qaeda and the planning of terrorist attacks in France.


## Measures of Conflict Resolution

### Negotiations and Treaties

In at least 65 of the current 365 conflicts, talks, negotiations, or conferences were held between at least some of the conflict parties. Altogether, the number of successful and unsuccessful talks in these conflicts amounted to 148. Among these, at least nine rounds of talks were held in highly violent conflicts, 81 in conflicts marked by the sporadic use of violence, and 58 in non-violent conflicts. The majority of these talks, i.e. 108 rounds, did not result in the conclusion of an agreement. E.g., Armenia and Azerbaijan met to negotiate a peace treaty on at least 13 occasions, but failed to agree on a peace deal. Five or more rounds of unsuccessful talks were also held between Georgia and the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, respectively, as

well as between Turkey and Iraq [→ Georgia (Abkhazia); Georgia (South Ossetia); Turkey - Iraq]. Also, the talks between North and South Korea, India and Pakistan, as well as Iran and the USA, respectively, did not result in the conclusion of a signed agreement.

Number of Negotiations in 2009 by Intensity



Nevertheless, of the nine rounds of talks observed in high-intensity conflicts, only the ceasefire negotiations between the Sudanese government and the Darfur rebel groups Justice and Equality Movement in February ended without an agreement. In August, two rounds of talks on the unification of numerous Darfur rebel factions led to the conclusion of unity accords. These talks had been mediated by Libya and the USA, respectively, in order to facilitate peace negotiations [→ Sudan (Darfur)]. In addition, a peace agreement was signed in Tripoli, Libya, between the recently formed rebel coalition National Movement and the government [→ Chad (various rebel groups)]. In Pakistan, government officials as well as tribal leaders signed a peace treaty with local Taliban leaders on March 11 [→ Pakistan (various Islamist militants); Pakistan (Taliban - tribes)]. Previously, the parties had concluded a temporary ceasefire in February. However, these agreements failed to halt the violence. Both Hamas and the Israeli government unilaterally declared a ceasefire in January, after "Operation Cast Lead" in Gaza had claimed more than 1,000 fatalities [→ Israel (Hamas/Palestine)].

Altogether, the conflict parties signed at least 40 treaties in 30 conflicts. Besides the above-mentioned eight agreements reached in highly violent conflicts, 19 were concluded in sporadically violent cases, and 13 in non-violent conflicts. With respect to the nature of the 40 agreements, they can be distinguished into nine peace deals, seven ceasefire treaties, and six deals concerning the disputed items. The remaining agreements referred to the regulation of procedures, were court rulings or of a more general nature like memoranda of understanding. Concerning the regional distribution, four of the observed treaties were concluded in Europe, 25 in Sub-Saharan Africa, three in the Americas, seven in Asia and Oceania, and one in the Middle East and Maghreb. With the exception of the above-mentioned Pakistani deals, all peace agreements were concluded in Sub-Saharan Africa: In Chad, as mentioned before; in Burundi between the last remaining rebel faction, which had been

militarily defeated in 2008, and the government; in the Central African Republic, between two rebel groups and the government, foreseeing the formation of a consensus government to rule until the scheduled presidential elections in 2010 and an amnesty law covering violations committed during the conflict; between Tuareg rebels and the respective governments in Mali and Niger; in the Democratic Republic of the Congo between Mayi-Mayi militias and the government as well as between the Tutsi rebel group formerly led by Laurent Nkunda and the government [→ Burundi (Palipehutu-FNL); Central African Republic (various rebel groups); Mali (Tuareg/Kidal); Niger (Tuareg/Agadez); DR Congo (CNDP); DR Congo (Mayi-Mayi)].

## International Organizations

By early 2009, the United Nations (UN) Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) administered 18 missions across five continents. While 16 were peacekeeping missions, two were DPKO-administered political missions of the UN Department of Political Affairs (UNDPA). The latter comprised the UN Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB). In addition, the UNDPA directed ten special political missions and peace-building support offices, among them the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL), which had succeeded the DPKO-administered UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL). One peacekeeping mission, the UN observer mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), came to an end on June 15, after Russia had vetoed an extension of the mandate in the UN Security Council [→ Georgia (Abkhazia)]. UNOMIG had been deployed to the border regions of Abkhazia and Georgia in 1993 to verify the ceasefire agreement signed by both sides in the same year. No new mission was deployed in 2009.

The peacekeeping missions amounted to a total of 97,569 personnel by October, consisting of 12,645 police, 82,658 troops, and 2,266 observers. This represented the highest number since 1995. Moreover, 6,000 international civilian personnel, some 15,000 local civilian staff, and about 2,200 UN volunteers from more than 160 countries were employed. By November 30, UN mission's fatalities amounted to a total of 98 in 2009, compared to 136 in 2008. Between 1948 and 2009, a total of 2,659 people died while deployed in a UN mission. The main contributors to UN operations among the 116 countries sending military and police personnel in 2009 were once again Pakistan (10,605), Bangladesh (10,282), and India (8,705). While the Global South, therefore, shouldered the largest share of the peacekeeping burden in respect to personnel, the Global North did the main funding. By April, the three main financial contributors to the annual budget of approx. USD 7.1 billion for peacekeeping missions were the USA with 25.96 percent, Japan with 19.62 percent, and Germany with 8.58 percent. The allocated budget represented some 0.5 percent of global military spending.

As in previous years, sub-Saharan Africa constituted the region with the most UN missions, with MINURCAT in



the Central African Republic and Chad, UNAMID in the Sudanese Darfur region, UNMIS in Sudan, UNOCI in Côte d'Ivoire, UNMIL in Liberia, MONUC in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the political mission BINUB in Burundi. Five peacekeeping missions were deployed in the Middle East and Maghreb: MINURSO in Western Sahara, Morocco, UNDOF in the Golan Heights between Israel and Syria, UNIFIL in Lebanon, the political mission UNAMA in Afghanistan, and UNTSO in Israel. Although the highest number of conflicts was observed in Asia and Oceania, only two UN mission were deployed in that region: UNMIT in Timor-Leste, and UNMOGIP in Pakistan and India. With UNFICYP in Cyprus and UNMIK in Kosovo (Serbia), the UN maintained as many missions in Europe as in Asia and Oceania. MINUSTAH, the Stabilization Mission in Haiti, was the only mission in the Americas.

Although the UN's peacekeeping missions depended for the most part on robust mandates, the international community also applied non-military measures to maintain or restore peace and security, such as sanctions. The UN maintained eleven sanction committees in 2009; the same number as in the two previous years. These included sanctions against seven states of sub-Saharan Africa (Côte d'Ivoire, DR Congo, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan) and an arms embargo against North Korea introduced in 2006. Furthermore, these sanctions comprised a travel ban and assets freeze against individuals suspected of involvement in the 2005 terrorist bombing in Lebanon that had killed

Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and 22 others, as well as against al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated individuals or entities. On June 12, the UN Security Council (UNSC) unanimously adopted resolution 1874, thereby tightening sanctions on North Korea after a rocket launch on April 13 [→ North Korea - USA, South Korea, Japan]. On October 29, the UNSC renewed the arms and diamond embargo on Côte d'Ivoire for another year.

Besides the UN, several regional organizations maintained field missions in 2009. For example, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) employed about 3,500 personnel in a total of 18 field operations, comprising, among others, seven missions on the Balkans and one in Moldova.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) maintained the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, the NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I), Active Endeavor in the Mediterranean, the Kosovo Force (KFOR), the Military Liaison Office in Belgrade, Serbia, the NATO Headquarters Sarajevo in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the NATO Headquarters Skopje in Macedonia, and the NATO Headquarters Tirana in Albania. In addition, NATO continued its support for the African Union's troops in Darfur, Sudan. After the NATO had terminated its naval operation in the Gulf of Aden in December 2008, the organization launched a new counter-piracy operation around the Horn of Africa in March. On April 1, Albania and Croatia became members of the NATO.

## Overview: Current UN Missions led or supported by DPKO

Mission Acronym	Name of Mission	Start	Country
<b>Europe</b>			
UNMIK	UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo	1999	Serbia
UNFICYP	UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus	1964	Cyprus
UNOMIG	UN Observer Mission in Georgia	1993	Georgia
<b>Sub-Saharan Africa</b>			
BINUB	UN Integrated Office in Burundi	2007	Burundi
MONUC	UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo	1999	Congo (Kinshasa)
UNMIS	UN Mission in the Sudan	2005	Sudan
UNAMID	UN/AU Hybrid operation in Darfur	2007	Sudan
UNMIL	UN Mission in Liberia	2003	Liberia
MINURCAT	UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad	2007	Chad
UNOCI	UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire	2004	Côte d'Ivoire
<b>The Americas</b>			
MINUSTAH	UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti	2004	Haiti
<b>Asia and Oceania</b>			
UNMIN	UN Mission in Nepal	2007	Nepal
UNMOGIP	UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan	1949	India, Pakistan
UNMIT	UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste	2006	Timor-Leste
<b>The Middle East and Maghreb</b>			
MINURSO	UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara	1991	Morocco
UNIFIL	UN Interim Force in Lebanon	1982	Israel
UNDOF	UN Disengagement Observer Force	1974	Syria
UNTSO	UN Truce Supervision Organization	1948	Israel, Jordan

By late October, the Council of the European Union, as part of its European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), maintained 14 active missions: five in the Western Balkans, Caucasus and Eastern Europe, four in the Middle East, and five in Africa. One of the missions to Africa, EUFOR CHAD/RCA transferred its tasks to the UN mission MINURCAT on March 15. While two of the remaining missions, EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the naval mission EU NAVFOR along the Somali coastline, were military operations, all others were civilian missions.

The African Union (AU) administered the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) as well as the hybrid UN-AU mission in Darfur (UNAMID), which had succeeded the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in 2007. In early January, the AU and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) suspended Guinea's membership after army officers had seized power in the aftermath of President Lansana Conte's death [→ Guinea (opposition)]. Furthermore, ECOWAS, AU, and EU imposed sanctions and an arms embargo on Guinea in October. On October 16, ECOWAS imposed an arms embargo on Niger and suspended its membership three days later for violating ECOWAS pacts on democracy [→ Niger (opposition)]. On March 11, the AU Peace and Security Council extended AMISOM's mandate in Somalia for a further three months [→ Somalia (Islamist groups)]. On June 3, the Organization of American States (OAS) passed a resolution that annulled a 1962 resolution excluding Cuba from participation in the organization. Two days later, OAS suspended Honduras' membership, after its ultimatum for the reinstatement of the deposed President Manuel Zelaya had expired [→ Honduras (opposition)].

### Authoritative Decisions by the ICJ

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled cases filed by states, so-called contentious cases, and rendered advisory opinions, so-called advisory proceedings, submitted by other authorized bodies of the UN. In the period under review, fourteen cases were pending and two cases were being heard before the ICJ, all but one being contentious cases. The ICJ rendered judgment in two contentious cases. On February 3, the court rendered its judgment in the case between Romania and Ukraine concerning the border delimitation in the Black Sea. Romania had instituted proceedings in 2004, after years of failed bilateral negotiations about the disputed area in the gas- and oil-rich part of the Black Sea. Both countries agreed that the judgment was fair and binding, and expressed their willingness to respect the Court's ruling [→ Romania - Ukraine]. On July 13, the ICJ settled the longstanding dispute between Costa Rica and Nicaragua concerning navigational and fishing rights on the San Juan River. Costa Rica had submitted an application before the UN Court in September 2005. The ICJ held hearings in the case from March 2 to 12 [→ Costa Rica - Nicaragua (Rio San Juan)]. Apart from these two judgments, on January 19, the ICJ rejected


Mexico's request for an interpretation of the Judgment of 03/31/04 in the case concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals, after Mexico had asked for the indication of provisional measures on 06/05/08 [→ USA - Mexico (border fence)]. With regard to the UN General Assembly's request for advisory opinion on Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence from Serbia in February 2008, thirty-five member states of the UN submitted written statements and contributions within the fixed time-limit on April 17. The ICJ set public hearings from December 1 to 11 [→ Serbia (Kosovo)].

In the period under review, three new cases were submitted to the Court. On 12/23/08, Germany instituted proceedings accusing Italy of failing to respect Germany's jurisdictional immunity as a sovereign state under international law. On April 29, the court fixed the time limits for the filing of initial pleadings. On February 19, Belgium instituted proceedings against Senegal at the ICJ and requested the indication of provisional measures. Belgium accused Senegal of violating its obligation to prosecute former president of Chad, Hissène Habré, and failing to extradite him to Belgium under the Convention Against Torture. On July 17, the court set the time limits for the filing of the initial pleadings. On October 28, the Honduras Ambassador to the Netherlands submitted an application to institute proceedings against Brazil to the ICJ. The application accused Brazil of violating the UN Charter, providing for non-intervention in the domestic affairs of another state respectively, and the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. In particular, it alleged that the Brazilian embassy in Honduras had been hosting Manuel Zelaya, ousted president of Honduras, since September 2009 [→ Honduras (opposition)].

Two cases were being heard or under deliberation in the period under review: After Macedonia had taken Greece to the ICJ on 11/17/08, the ICJ held first hearings. Macedonia alleged Greece had violated its obligations under the UN-brokered Interim Accord of 1995 by objecting to Macedonia's application to join the NATO in April 2008. On January 20, the court set the time-limits for the filing of the initial pleading [→ Greece - Macedonia]. From September 14 to October 2, the ICJ held public hearings in the case between Argentina and Uruguay concerning the authorization by Uruguay to construct pulp mills on the river Uruguay and subsequently began its deliberation [→ Uruguay - Argentina (Uruguay river)].


In addition, the court fixed time limits in three cases: Concerning Georgia's plea for the application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination against Russia submitted in August 2008, the court fixed the time limits for the filing of Georgia's memorial and Russia's counter-memorial on 12/02/08 [→ Russia - Georgia]. In the territorial and maritime dispute between Nicaragua and Colombia, the ICJ on 12/18/08 fixed the time-limits for submitting a reply and a rejoinder, respectively [→ Nicaragua - Colombia (sea border)]. The same day, the court set 03/22/10 as the time-limit for the filing of Serbia's counter-memorial in the case between Croatia and Serbia concerning the application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

# Europe




The total number of conflicts monitored in Europe was 66. One conflict was terminated in 2009 [→ Macedonia (Kosovo)], and one new conflict emerged [→ Moldova (opposition)]. As in 2008, altogether 18 conflicts were judged violent. Two highly violent conflicts were registered in 2009, compared to four in 2008. This decrease of violence was due to the deescalation of Georgia's secession conflicts [→ Georgia (Abkhazia); Georgia (South Ossetia)] to crises as well as the deescalation of Georgia's conflict with Russia, fought as a war in 2008, to a non-violent level [→ Russia - Georgia]. However, the conflict in Chechnya turned highly violent again [→ Russia (Islamist rebels/Chechnya)]. Despite the partial improvement of its security situation, the Caucasus remained the most volatile and conflict-ridden sub-region within Europe with 17 registered conflicts and accounted for eleven of Europe's violent conflicts, among them the two severe crises. The most frequent conflict item in Europe was secession, followed by an almost even number of conflicts concerning autonomy, territory, system/ideology, and international power. The two severe crises, both Islamist insurrections in the North Caucasus, were fought over secession and system/ideology [→ Russia (Islamist rebels/Chechnya); Russia (Islamist rebels/Ingushetia)]. The 16 crises observed dealt with secession in the majority of cases, followed by system/ideology. Whereas all 15 autonomy conflicts in 2009 were conducted non-violently, 13 out of 19 secession conflicts were violent. This was mostly the case in the Caucasus, but also in certain western democracies [→ France (FLNC/Corsica); Spain (ETA, PNV/Basque Provinces); United Kingdom (IRA et al./Northern Ireland)]. In contrast, international power and resources were disputed rather peacefully. Only one violent territory conflict was counted [→ Armenia - Azerbaijan]. Southeast Europe experienced an upsurge of violence with three crises [→ Greece (leftwing militants); Moldova (opposition); Serbia (Kosovo)], compared to two in 2008. The situation in the Balkans, formerly most volatile European sub-region, still accounting for 16 conflicts, eased further, with two conflicts deescalating [→ Serbia (Wahhabite separatists/Sandzak); Slovenia - Croatia] and one ending [→ Macedonia (Kosovo)].

Conflict Intensities in Europe in 2009 compared to 2008



Frequency of Conflict Items in 2009 in Europe by Intensity Groups



## Overview: Conflicts in Europe in 2009

Name of conflict <sup>1</sup>	Conflict parties <sup>2</sup>	Conflict items	Start	Change <sup>3</sup>	Int. <sup>4</sup>
Armenia (opposition)*	opposition vs. government	national power	2003	↘	2
Armenia - Azerbaijan	Armenia vs. Azerbaijan	territory	1987	•	3
Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh)*	Nagorno-Karabakh Republic vs. government	secession	1988	•	3
Azerbaijan (opposition)*	opposition vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2003	•	2
Belarus (opposition)	opposition vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1994	•	2
Belarus - Poland*	Belarus vs. Poland	international power	1994	↘	1
Belgium (CD&V/Flanders)*	CD&V, N-VA vs. government, Walloon parties	autonomy	2007	↘	1
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnian Croats/Herzegovina)*	Bosnian Croats, Croat parties vs. Bosniak parties, government	autonomy	1992	•	2
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnian Serbs/Republic of Srpska)	Republic of Srpska vs. central government, Bosniak-Croat Federation	secession	1995	•	2
Croatia (Croatian Serbs/Krajina, West and East Slavonia)*	Croatian Serbs vs. government	autonomy	1991	•	2
Cyprus (Northern Cyprus)	Northern Cyprus vs. central government	secession	1963	•	2
Cyprus - Turkey*	Cyprus vs. Turkey	territory, international power, resources	2005	•	2
Denmark - Canada (Hans Island)*	Denmark vs. Canada	territory	1973	•	1
Estonia (Russian-speaking minority)*	Russian-speaking minority vs. government	autonomy	1991	•	2
France (FLNC/Corsica)	FLNC vs. government	secession	1975	•	3
France (rioters)*	rioters vs. government	other	2005	•	3
Georgia (Abkhazia)	Abkhazian separatists vs. government	secession	1989	↘	3
Georgia (Armenian minority)*	Armenian minority vs. government	autonomy	2004	↗	2
Georgia (Azeri minority)*	Azeri minority vs. government	autonomy	2004	•	1
Georgia (opposition)	opposition vs. government	national power	2007	↗	3
Georgia (South Ossetia)	South Ossetian separatists vs. government	secession	1989	↘	3
Greece (leftwing militants)	leftwing militants vs. government	system/ideology	1973	•	3
Greece - Macedonia*	Greece vs. Macedonia	other	1991	•	1
Hungary - Romania*	Hungary vs. Romania	international power	1990	•	1
Hungary - Slovakia (minority)*	Hungary vs. Slovakia	international power	1993	•	2
Hungary - Slovakia (resources)*	Hungary vs. Slovakia	resources	1989	•	1
Italy (Lega Nord/northern Italy)*	Lega Nord vs. government	autonomy	1991	•	1
Italy (Red Brigades)*	Red Brigades vs. government	system/ideology	1970	↗	2
Latvia (Russian-speaking minority)*	Russian-speaking minority vs. government	autonomy	1991	↘	1
Macedonia (Albanian minority/northwestern Macedonia)*	Albanian minority vs. government	autonomy	1991	•	2
Macedonia (Kosovo)	Kosovarian government vs. Macedonia	territory	2001	END	1
Moldova (opposition)	opposition vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2009	NEW	3
Moldova (Transdniestria)	Transdniestrian separatists vs. government	secession	1989	•	2
Montenegro - Croatia (Prevlaka)*	Montenegro vs. Croatia	territory	1991	•	1
Romania (Hungarian minority/Transylvania)*	Hungarian minority vs. government	autonomy	1989	•	1
Romania - Ukraine*	Romania vs. Ukraine	territory, resources	1991	•	1

Name of conflict <sup>1</sup>	Conflict parties <sup>2</sup>	Conflict items	Start	Change <sup>3</sup>	Int. <sup>4</sup>
Russia (Islamist rebels/Chechnya)	Islamist rebels vs. government	secession, system/ideology	1989	↗	4
Russia (Islamist rebels/Dagestan)	Islamist rebels vs. government	secession, system/ideology	1999	•	3
Russia (Islamist rebels/Ingushetia)	Islamist rebels vs. government	secession, system/ideology	2004	•	4
Russia (Islamist rebels/Kabardino-Balkaria)	Islamist rebels vs. government	secession, system/ideology	2004	•	3
Russia (Islamist rebels/Karachay-Cherkessia)*	Islamist rebels vs. government	secession, system/ideology	2001	•	3
Russia (Islamist rebels/North Ossetia-Alania)*	Islamist rebels vs. government	secession, system/ideology	2006	•	3
Russia (opposition)	opposition vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2001	•	2
Russia - Estonia*	Russia vs. Estonia	international power	1994	•	2
Russia - Georgia	Russia vs. Georgia	international power	1992	↓	2
Russia - Kazakhstan et al. (Caspian Sea)*	Azerbaijan vs. Iran vs. Kazakhstan vs. Russia vs. Turkmenistan	territory, international power, resources	1993	•	1
Russia - Latvia*	Russia vs. Latvia	territory, international power	1994	•	2
Russia - Norway (Barents Sea)*	Russia vs. Norway	territory, resources	1947	•	2
Russia - Norway et al. (Arctic)*	Russia vs. United States vs. Canada vs. Norway vs. Denmark	territory, resources	2001	•	2
Russia - Ukraine	Russia vs. Ukraine	territory, international power, resources	2003	•	2
Serbia (Albanian minority/Presevo Valley)	UCPMB, Albanian minority vs. government	autonomy	2000	•	2
Serbia (Bosniak minority/Sandzak)*	Bosniak minority vs. government	autonomy	1991	•	2
Serbia (Hungarian minority/northern Vojvodina)*	Hungarian minority vs. government	autonomy	1998	•	1
Serbia (Kosovo)	Kosovar government vs. central government	secession	1989	•	3
Serbia (Wahhabite separatists/Sandzak)*	Wahhabite separatists vs. government	secession, system/ideology	2007	↘	1
Serbia (ZzV/Vojvodina)*	ZzV vs. government	autonomy	1989	•	1
Slovakia (Hungarian minority/southern Slovakia)*	Hungarian minority vs. government	autonomy	1993	•	2
Slovenia - Croatia	Slovenia vs. Croatia	territory	1991	↘	1
Spain (Catalan nationalists/Catalonia)	ERC, CiU, Catalan regional government vs. central government	secession	1979	•	1
Spain (ETA, PNV/Basque Provinces)	ETA, Basque regional government vs. central government	secession	1959	•	3
Spain - United Kingdom (Gibraltar)*	Spain vs. United Kingdom	territory	1954	•	1
Turkey - Armenia	Turkey vs. Armenia	international power, other	1991	•	2
Turkey - Greece*	Turkey vs. Greece	territory	1973	•	2
United Kingdom (IRA et al./Northern Ireland)	IRA, Real IRA, Continuity IRA, Sinn Féin, SDLP vs. government, UDA, UVF, DUP, UUP, RHC	secession	1968	•	3
United Kingdom (SNP/Scotland)*	Scottish regional government vs. central government	secession	2007	•	1
USA - Russia (missile system)	USA vs. Russia	international power	2007	•	2

<sup>1</sup> Conflicts marked with \* are without description

<sup>2</sup> Mentioned are only those conflict parties relevant for the period under review

<sup>3</sup> Change in intensity compared to the previous year: ↑ or ↗ escalation by one or more than one level of intensity; ↓ or ↘ deescalation by one or more than one level of intensity; • no change

<sup>4</sup> Levels of intensity: 5 = war; 4 = severe crisis; 3 = crisis; 2 = manifest conflict; 1 = latent conflict

## Armenia - Azerbaijan

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: •	Start: 1987
Conflict parties:	Armenia vs. Azerbaijan territory	
Conflict items:		

The conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the region of Nagorno-Karabakh (NK), internationally recognized as Azerbaijani territory but predominantly populated by ethnic Armenians, continued. Conflict mediators, among them the OSCE Minsk Group, repeatedly voiced hopes for a possible breakthrough in the peace talks between the conflict parties, despite several cease-fire violations. Between December 2008 and March, Armenian troops killed six Azerbaijani soldiers. In March, Azerbaijan claimed to have killed three Armenian soldiers. According to Armenian sources, an officer of the NK Defense Army, which was deeply integrated with Armenian forces, was killed by Azerbaijani fire on March 13 [→ Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh)]. The same day, Azerbaijani troops violated the Line of Contact between Azerbaijan and NK. On September 10, five Armenian soldiers were killed in a fight with Azerbaijani forces in Agdam, a district bordering NK. At the OSCE foreign ministers meeting in Helsinki on 12/04/08, the Minsk Group urged the conflict parties to finalize a comprehensive agreement within the coming months. Armenian President Serge Sarkisian and his Azerbaijani counterpart Ilham Aliyev met in St. Petersburg for the fifth time on June 4 to discuss a conflict resolution. On August 7, Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) pledged to support Armenia in case of an Azerbaijani attack. On August 15, Azerbaijan declared it would be in favor of US and EU peacekeepers if a peace agreement was reached. In September, Azerbaijani athletes participated in a sporting event in Armenia for the first time since the decline of the Soviet Union. In September, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan set the resolution of the NK-issue as precondition for the reopening of Turkey's border with Armenia [→ Turkey - Armenia]. On October 1, the OSCE Minsk Group met in the Armenian capital of Yerevan to start a fresh round of NK talks, followed by further talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Ahead of a meeting between the conflict parties in Munich, Germany, late in November, Aliyev threatened with a military intervention if talks failed. (jd)

## Belarus (opposition)

Intensity: <b>2</b>	Change: •	Start: 1994
Conflict parties:	opposition vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, national power	

The system and national power conflict between the opposition and the government of President Alexander Lukashenko continued. Opposition groups staged rallies on a weekly basis. Throughout the year, the authorities repeatedly detained opposition activists. International organizations urged Lukashenko to implement democratic reforms. In the run-up to March 25, marked by activists as Freedom Day, authorities increasingly exerted pressure on opposition activists. Artur Finkevich, leader of the unregistered Young Belarus movement, was de-

tained after he had allegedly threatened policemen. In Minsk, the capital, some 2,000 opposition supporters demonstrated against the regime on March 25. Police detained over 100 activists. On October 10, a Minsk court found opposition activist Andrey Bandarenko of the United Civic Party guilty of theft and sentenced him to seven years in prison, which he denounced as a politically motivated decision. On October 17, some 50 opposition activists demonstrated in Minsk. Police dispersed the protesters and detained about 30. On January 22 and 23, Janez Lenarcic, director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), met officials as well as leading opposition activists in Minsk to discuss possible amendments to the election law. Late in January, the Presidential Office announced the establishment of a consultation council for human rights, asking for assistance of NGOs. Belarus was included in the EU Eastern Partnership program, formally established on May 7. The program entailed demands for democratic reforms. Lukashenko signaled his readiness to implement these reforms. In September, he emphasized the importance of Belarusian-Russian ties. (fn)

## Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnian Serbs/Republic of Srpska)

Intensity: <b>2</b>	Change: •	Start: 1995
Conflict parties:	Republic of Srpska vs. central government, Bosniak-Croat Federation	
Conflict items:	secession	

The conflict regarding a more unitary political order between the Bosniak-Croat Federation (FBiH) and Republika Srpska (RS), the two entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), continued. Milorad Dodik, Prime Minister of the RS, repeatedly called for a separation of the two entities. On 12/22/08, political representatives of the Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats, and Bosniaks in BiH initiated talks on potential constitutional reform to overcome the political deadlock. However, these were terminated on February 21 as Dodik insisted on the RS's right of secession. Around the same time, the Bosnian State Prosecution accused RS officials, including Dodik, of abuse of office, corruption, and organized crime activities. In reaction, he threatened to withdraw Bosnian Serb officials from joint institutions and hold a referendum on independence of RS. In early May, Dodik proclaimed that any amendments to the Bosnian constitution were to be achieved through regular parliamentary procedures. On May 14, the RS parliament issued a declaration demanding the High Representative Valentin Inzko to cease using his governing powers, including the right to pass laws and create administrative bodies. Furthermore, the declaration stated the RS parliament would start proceedings before local and international courts to return competencies to the entity level. Inzko stated that this violated the constitution. RS ignored an ultimatum to withdraw the declaration, which was finally abolished by Inzko on June 20. A round of EU- and US-sponsored meetings between main leaders of Bosniak, Bosnian Serb, and Bosnian Croat parties in late-October achieved no tangible results. In a move that sparked outrage among Bosniaks, Dodik officially welcomed former

Bosnian Serb leader Biljana Plavsic on November 13. Plavsic had been released from prison in October after serving two thirds of her sentence for war crimes committed in the 1992-95 Bosnian war. (sim)

### Cyprus (Northern Cyprus)

Intensity: <b>2</b>	Change: •	Start: 1963
Conflict parties:	Northern Cyprus vs. central government	
Conflict items:	secession	

The secession conflict between breakaway Northern Cyprus and the government of the Republic of Cyprus continued. In early December 2008, the de-facto president of Northern Cyprus, Mehmet Ali Talat, sent a letter of complaint to UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon to protest Greek Cypriots' oil exploration missions in the Mediterranean sea [→ Cyprus - Turkey]. The conflict parties held a fresh round of peace talks overseen by UN Special Envoy Alexander Downer from early September 2008 until August 2009. President Demetris Christofias and Talat held 40 main meetings. Concluding the first round of peace talks on August 6, the conflict parties issued a joint document listing understandings and disagreements. While agreeing to a notable extent in the fields of EU and governance, excluding the executive, property rights and the role of the Turkish guarantee power remained among the most controversial issues. The right-wing National Unity Party (UBP), which preferred a two state solution, won parliamentary elections in Northern Cyprus on April 19. On May 29, the UN Security Council extended the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) until December 15. On June 22, Greek Cypriot opposition party Democratic Rally and Talat's Republican Turkish Party announced they would join forces to support the ongoing peace talks. Also in late June, leaders of the divided island reached an agreement on the opening of the Limnitis/Yesilirmak border crossing. The second round of UN-mediated peace talks started on September 10 after the Greek Cypriot side had delayed them for some days, following the failure to open the Limnitis/Yesilirmak border on September 2. Peace talks suffered a blow in late September as Talat criticized Christofias' speech to the UN General Assembly. Christofias had rejected Talat's offer of a trilateral meeting with Ban on the grounds that it was not included in the UN resolution, and he had reiterated that the departure of Turkish settlers in Northern Cyprus was a precondition for reunification. On October 13, Turkey cancelled its annual military exercise in Northern Cyprus to facilitate a favorable climate for ongoing negotiations. (smg)

### France (FLNC/Corsica)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: •	Start: 1975
Conflict parties:	FLNC vs. government	
Conflict items:	secession	

The secession conflict between the separatist Corsican National Liberation Front (FLNC) and the government continued. On January 5, the FLNC splinter group Unión des combattants (FLNC-UC) issued death threats against members of Corsica's ruling political class and

claimed responsibility for 14 attacks in the previous six months, e.g. the attacks on French-owned private houses as well as on three company buildings. However, marking a three-decade low, 24 assaults and four assassination attempts by different FLNC factions were reported in the period from January 1 to July 5. On March 27, a court in the French capital, Paris, sentenced a Corsican to at least 22 years prison, the maximum possible punishment, for the murder of Claude Érignac in 1998, Corsica's prefect at that time. On July 22, a car bomb detonated targeting police barracks in Vescovato and caused some material damage. In its first official appearance, the Unified FLNC claimed responsibility for the attack on August 9. The authorities continued to assure the population that they would take a firm line against militant separatists. (elo)

### Georgia (Abkhazia)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: ▾	Start: 1989
Conflict parties:	Abkhazian separatists vs. government	
Conflict items:	secession	

The conflict between the breakaway region of Abkhazia, which had declared its independence in 2008, and Georgia deescalated. After Russia and Nicaragua had recognized Abkhazia's independence in 2008, Venezuela followed on September 10. Negotiations between the conflict parties continued within the framework of the "Geneva talks" co-mediated by the UN, EU and OSCE. The negotiations led to few tangible results with the exception of the establishment of an Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) including regular meetings between representatives of the conflict sides to jointly prevent and investigate incidents in the border areas. In January, the Georgian Ministry of Defense signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM) to unilaterally restrict the movement of troops and the deployment of heavy weapons systems in areas adjacent to Abkhazia and the second breakaway region of South Ossetia [→ Georgia (South Ossetia)]. However, the mandate of the UN Observer Mission (UNOMIG), which had been deployed to the border regions of Abkhazia and Georgia since 1993, was terminated in June following a Russian veto on the extension of its mandate. Several people were killed in violent incidents, particularly shootouts between Georgian police forces and Abkhazian militiamen along the de facto border as well as mine explosions. Abkhazia's de facto authorities blamed Georgian special forces for blasts in Gagra and the Abkhazian capital of Sukhumi, which killed two people on August 12, the day the Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin visited Abkhazia. Russia expanded its security cooperation with Abkhazia, stationing Russian border and coast guard units under a treaty signed in April. Another treaty on military cooperation envisaged the permanent deployment of 1,700 Russian servicemen to a Gudauta military base. From August onwards, tensions increased when the Georgian coast guard, under the provisions of Georgia's law on occupied territories, started detaining vessels traveling to and from Abkhazia. Russia announced its coast guard would escort commercial craft in Abk-

hazia's territorial waters and would detain ships violating its maritime borders [→ Russia - Georgia]. On November 11, Russian soldiers detained five Georgians fishing in waters near the Abkhazian coastline. (mak)

### Georgia (opposition)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: ↗	Start: 2007
Conflict parties:	opposition vs. government	
Conflict items:	national power	

The conflict between several opposition groups and the government of President Mikheil Saakashvili turned violent. Dozens of anti-government protesters briefly scuffled with police outside the parliament on March 10, leaving four people slightly injured. Tensions between opposition and government further rose following the arrest of nine members of the Democratic Movement - United Georgia (DMUG) for alleged possession of illegal weapons. The DMUG had been founded in late 2008 by Nino Burjanadze, ex-parliamentary speaker and former Saakashvili ally. From April 9 to July 24, opposition supporters demonstrated in Tbilisi, the Georgian capital, demanding Sakaashvili to resign. While 50,000 people took part in the initial demonstration on April 9, their numbers reportedly decreased in rallies held the following four days. Unidentified assailants committed several attacks on opposition activists. On May 6, tensions reached a climax, when dozens of opposition supporters clashed with the police near Tbilisi's main police station, leaving 22 protesters and six policemen injured. Following the riots, Saakashvili and opposition leaders held talks on May 11, yielding no tangible results. On May 17, the opposition lifted its traffic blockade in front of the office of the Public Broadcaster in central Tbilisi, which had been in effect since the mid-April demonstrations. Up to 55,000 people gathered at a soccer stadium in Tbilisi on May 26 to reinforce their demand of Saakashvili's resignation. The Georgian Orthodox Church's Patriarch Ilia II urged the government to either call for pre-term elections or embark on a dialogue with the opposition. On July 24, during a final rally, opposition activists announced the temporary suspension of their protests. Police forces cleared a roadblock on Tbilisi's central avenue in effect since April. Throughout the year, the opposition increasingly aligned in two main camps, both demanding new presidential elections, but differing on issues of time and means. On October 14, opposition leaders met in Tbilisi to discuss tactics, without reaching an agreement on a coordinated course of action. (jd)

### Georgia (South Ossetia)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: ↘	Start: 1989
Conflict parties:	South Ossetian separatists vs. government	
Conflict items:	secession	

The conflict between the breakaway region of South Ossetia, which had declared its independence in 2008, and Georgia deescalated. After Russia and Nicaragua had recognized South Ossetia's independence in 2008, Venezuela followed on September 10. Negotiations between the conflict parties continued within the framework of the "Geneva talks" co-mediated by the UN, EU

and OSCE. The negotiations led to few tangible results with the exception of the establishment of an Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) including regular meetings between representatives of the conflict sides to jointly prevent and investigate incidents in the border areas. In January, the Georgian Ministry of Defense signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM) to unilaterally restrict the movement of troops and the deployment of heavy weapons systems in areas adjacent to Abkhazia and South Ossetia [→ Georgia (Abkhazia)]. The OSCE Mission to Georgia ended at the end of June 2009 after Russia had blocked the extension of its mandate in late 2008. In late April, Russia expanded its security cooperation with South Ossetia, including the issue of border control. A treaty on military cooperation signed in September 2009 envisaged the permanent deployment of 1,700 Russian servicemen to a military base to be built in Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia. The situation at the de facto border between Georgia and South Ossetia remained volatile with frequent shootouts including mortar fire, mine blasts and abductions. A Georgian police officer was killed by a single sniper shot in the village of Knolevi on January 16. Another officer was fatally wounded in a mine blast in the village of Dvani on March 29. Unarmed OSCE and EUMM patrols occasionally came under fire, for instance in Kvemo Khviti on 12/10/08. South Ossetian militias detained two OSCE monitors respectively in Adzvi on February 10 and in Nikozi on April 21. In both cases, the monitors were released the same day. South Ossetian militias also abducted civilians, e.g. four Georgians in the Kareli district. By late October, a total of 21 Georgians were held on charges of illegal border crossing by South Ossetian de facto authorities. In September the EU's independent international inquiry mission on the causes of the August 2008 war between Russia and Georgia [→ Russia - Georgia] concluded that the Georgian attack on Tskhinvali in the night of 08/07/08 had triggered large-scale military hostilities. While the report saw no evidence of a genocide against South Ossetians, Russia's justification for intervening, it confirmed cases of ethnic cleansing against Georgians in South Ossetia. (mak)

### Greece (leftwing militants)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: •	Start: 1973
Conflict parties:	leftwing militants vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology	

The system and ideology conflict between leftwing militants and the government continued. Massive riots broke out after a policeman had shot a 15-year old in a demonstration in Athens on 12/06/08. In the following days, leftwing rioters damaged about 500 shops, banks, and administrative buildings. Violent clashes between rioters and police forces left about 40 people injured. Turmoil rapidly spread across the country, e.g. to Thessaloniki. Abroad, sympathizers of the demonstrators attacked the Greek embassy in London and occupied the Greek consulate in Berlin. Among others, the far left militant groups Revolutionary Struggle (EA) and Sect of Revolutionaries claimed responsibility for



several assaults. After the occupation of the Acropolis by rioters on 12/17/08, further demonstrations by up to 10,000 people resulted in extensive violence. Rioters threw petrol bombs at the parliament building. Seventy people were injured and about 400 detained. On 12/23/08, two gunmen opened machine gun fire on a police car. On January 5, militants shot a policeman, injuring him severely. From February to April, militant groups conducted a number of bomb attacks and assaults, including an attack on Greek trade union leader Christos Polyzogopoulos, who was severely wounded. On May 9, right- and leftwing extremists engaged in serious clashes, which left 34 people injured. Three days later, a car bomb detonated in front of a bank in Athens. On June 17, a policeman was shot dead by unknown assailants while on guard duty outside the house of a witness in a terrorism trial against EA. The small anarchist group Conspiracy of Fire Nuclei claimed responsibility for a June 11 bomb attack on former deputy minister of interior, Panagiotis Hinofotis. In June and July, militant groups engaged in a series of bomb and firebomb attacks, targeting state institutions and officials. Further acts of violence followed on October 27, when gunmen attacked a police station in an Athens suburb and injured six policemen. Severe riots broke out again on November 18, when 12,000 demonstrators commemorated the 1973 uprising. Thirteen policemen were injured and about 200 rioters arrested. (rdi)

### Macedonia (Kosovo)

Intensity: <b>1</b>	Change: <b>END</b>	Start: 2001
Conflict parties:	Kosovarian government vs. Macedonia	
Conflict items:	territory	

The conflict over border demarcation between Macedonia and the government of Kosovo, a neighboring breakaway republic of Serbia, ended. The conflict had begun following a border demarcation agreement between Macedonia and Yugoslavia on 02/23/01, which foresaw the transfer of approx. 2,400 acres of territory to the Macedonian side. Despite Macedonia's recognition of Kosovo's independence in October 2008 and a common border agreement from 10/24/08, the status of the border remained unclear. In a move seen as an attempt to balance between Serbian and Kosovar interests [→ Serbia (Kosovo)], Macedonia did not invite Fatmir Sejdiu, Kosovo's President, to the inauguration of its newly elected President Gjorgje Ivanov on May 12. Later that month, Sejdiu canceled a planned visit to Macedonia after it had been downgraded from "official" to "working" by the Macedonian government. However, the rapprochement of Macedonia and Kosovo, which commenced in late June, was followed by their parliaments' ratification of a border demarcation agreement on October 17, resolving the eight-year border dispute. Furthermore, the countries announced the establishment of full diplomatic relations the following day. (jd, gm)

### Moldova (opposition)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: <b>NEW</b>	Start: 2009
Conflict parties:	opposition vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, national power	

A new system and power conflict between the anti-communist and pro-western opposition and the government erupted on a violent level. Ahead of the parliamentary elections scheduled for April 5, the situation between oppositional activists and the government became increasingly tense. On two separate occasions in late February and March, police forces raided an independent TV station. In the elections, the ruling Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM) won 61 of 101 seats, thereby securing the majority necessary to elect the president. Following accusations of electoral fraud, the opposition engaged in three-day long protests which turned violent. The protests climaxed on April 7, when protesters stormed and ransacked the offices of the president as well as the parliamentary building. The same day, some 10,000 protesters clashed with security forces. Police used water cannons and batons to disperse the demonstrators, who were throwing rocks at them. In the protests, two demonstrators were killed. Additionally, dozens of people were injured and some hundreds arrested. The subsequent recount of the vote left the ruling PCRM with only 60 seats. After two unsuccessful attempts to elect a new president, outgoing President Vladimir Voronin of the PCRM scheduled new elections for July 29. The newly formed oppositional Alliance for European Integration (AEI), consisting of the four major oppositional parties, secured 53 seats. AEI formed a government, but was not able to elect a new president. (gm)

### Moldova (Transdnistria)

Intensity: <b>2</b>	Change: <b>•</b>	Start: 1989
Conflict parties:	Transdnistrian separatists vs. government	
Conflict items:	secession	

The secession conflict between the Russian-backed breakaway region of Transdnistria and the government continued. On 12/08/08, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Iurie Leanca proposed replacing the Russian peacekeeping mission in Transdnistria with an internationally mandated multinational civilian mission. From February 23 to 24, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov visited Moldova for the first time since taking office in 2004 to prepare the ground for a trilateral meeting between Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin, and Transdnistrian leader Igor Smirnov. In the meeting, held in the Russian capital, Moscow, on March 18, the leaders agreed on a possible replacement of Russian peacekeeping troops by an OSCE-led international mission in the conflict zone once a peace deal was reached. They also demanded the resumption of conflict resolution talks within the 5+2 framework comprising the two conflict parties as well as representatives of Russia, Ukraine, OSCE, EU, and USA. A further meeting, to be held in the Transdnistrian capital of Tiraspol on March 25, was canceled by Voronin. On

July 2, Smirnov accused the government of having imposed trade constraints and refused talks with Voronin that had been demanded by the OSCE. The breakaway region largely boycotted the parliamentary elections on July 29. On October 26, Transdniestria demanded that Russia deploy more peacekeeping troops, which was rejected by the newly formed pro-Western central government. (vk)

### Russia (Islamist rebels/Ingushetia)

Intensity: <b>4</b>	Change: •	Start: 2004
Conflict parties:	Islamist rebels vs. government	
Conflict items:	secession, system/ideology	

The secession and system conflict between Ingush Islamist insurgents, on the one hand, and both the regional and national government, on the other, continued. Shootings, bombings, and ambushes against security forces and government authorities occurred on an almost daily basis. Responsibility for the attacks was uncertain in many cases but usually attributed to Islamist rebels. The security situation further deteriorated as 59 people, 21 of whom were civilians, 18 security forces, and 20 militants, were killed in the first four months of 2009. In April, self-proclaimed Emir of the Caucasian Emirate, Dokka Umarov, announced the revival of the Riyadh-us-Saliheyn, a unit of suicide bombers disbanded by Umarov's predecessor Abdul Khalim Sadulayev in 2006. Subsequently, the number of targeted suicide assassinations increased in 2009. In a series of assassinations in Nazran from June 8 to 22, three high-ranking officials were killed, among them Deputy Prime Minister Bashir Aushev and deputy chairperson of Ingushetia's Supreme Court Aza Gazgereyeva. In the last of the attacks, on June 22, Ingush president Yanus-Bek Yevkurov was seriously wounded in a suicide car bomb assassination attempt. Chechen president Ramzan Kadyrov announced he had been ordered by the Russian government to conduct "counter-terrorist operations" in Ingushetia. On August 17, a suicide bombing targeting the district police headquarters in Nazran killed 21 policemen and injured 260 people. Umarov claimed responsibility for the Nazran bombing as well as the assault on Yevkurov on behalf of the Riyadh-us-Saliheyn. Security forces, including Russian Interior Ministry troops and Federal Security Service (FSB), conducted numerous special operations against militants, reportedly 15 in the first half of 2009. In May, Yevkurov and Kadyrov agreed to conduct a joint military operation in the respective districts near their common border [→ Russia (Islamist rebels/Chechnya)]. On July 14, Ingush interior minister Ruslan Meiriev claimed that more than 40 militants had been killed or detained in operations in the Sunzha border district. In a major attack, militants ambushed a convoy of Chechen policemen in Sunzha district on July 4, killing nine policemen and wounding ten. In mid-August, additional heavily armed Russian troops were deployed to Ingushetia. On October 12, a day-long battle in the district of Sunzha between Ingush and Chechen security forces on the one hand and rebels on the other left seven insurgents and two officers dead. By late November, the year's death

toll had risen over 200, at least 68 of whom were security personnel, 85 militants, and 30 civilians. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev visited Ingushetia along with Alexander Bortnikov, director of the Federal Security Service (FSB) on January 20. Medvedev promised an additional EUR 700 million to the smallest North Caucasian republic to eliminate the insurgency's social base. (jd)

### Russia (Islamist rebels/Chechnya)

Intensity: <b>4</b>	Change: ↗	Start: 1989
Conflict parties:	Islamist rebels vs. government	
Conflict items:	secession, system/ideology	

The secession conflict between Islamist rebels in the North Caucasus republic of Chechnya and the Russian government escalated. On January 15, the early release of former Russian army commander Yuri Budanov, imprisoned for murdering a Chechen woman in 2003, sparked outrage in Chechnya. Although former Chechen rebel and incumbent Chechen President Ramzan A. Kadyrov had proclaimed the successful containment of the Islamist insurgency in Chechnya on 11/15/08, frequent clashes between security forces and insurgents were reported. On January 17, Russian forces killed an emissary of Akhmed Zakayev, Prime Minister of the internationally unrecognized Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (ChRI), the separatists' name for the Russian federal republic of Chechnya. Zakayev had opposed the abolishment of ChRI and its replacement with the Caucasus Emirate by Dokka Umarov, the erstwhile Chechen rebel leader and, since October 2007, self-proclaimed Emir of the Caucasus Emirate. On April 16, Russia officially ended its ten year "counter-terrorism" operation against Chechen rebels and announced a troop reduction in the republic from 23,000 to 3,000 by the end of 2009. However, Russia reintroduced operations due to the ensuing upsurge of violence, which caused at least 208 fatalities by November 3, 120 of whom were militants, 71 security personnel, and 17 civilians. In May, Kadyrov and Ingush President Yanus-Bek Yevkurov agreed to conduct a joint military operation in the respective districts near their common border [→ Russia (Islamist rebels/Chechnya)]. On May 15, a suicide bomb blast in front of the interior ministry in Grozny left two policemen dead. Russian troops clashed with up to 50 militants believed to have entered from Ingushetia [→ Russia (Islamist rebels/Ingushetia)] in western Chechnya the following day. Kadyrov visited Ingushetia and Dagestan [→ Russia (Islamist rebels/Dagestan)] to promote cooperation between the republics. On June 8, rebel leader Dokka Umarov was severely injured in a special operation. Late in June, Russia launched the large-scale operational-strategic military exercise "Caucasus 2009", which targeted still existent rebel groups and militant activities in the volatile regions of Chechnya, Dagestan, and Ingushetia, and involved about 8,500 military personnel and 200 tanks. On August 21, the Islamist group Riyadh-us-Saliheyn, responsible for a suicide bomb attack in Nazran on August 17 [→ Russia (Islamist rebels/Ingushetia)], also claimed responsibility for an explosion at a Siberian hydroelectric plant, killing 26

people. The authorities denied the claim. Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin visited the region to demonstrate support for Kadyrov on August 24. In a special operation under the command of Kadyrov near Shalazhi on November 13, security forces killed 20 militants, among them three close associates of Umarov. On November 27, a bomb attack on a train running between the capital of Moscow and the northwestern city of St. Petersburg left 26 people dead and some 100 injured. The assault was blamed on Islamist rebels. In 2009, the Russian government spent over EUR 600 million on developing Chechnya and Russia's southern regions. (jd, vi)

### Russia (Islamist rebels/Dagestan)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: •	Start: 1999
Conflict parties:	Islamist rebels vs. government	
Conflict items:	secession, system/ideology	

The system and secession conflict between the Islamist insurgents of the Shariat Jamaat and the government continued. On 12/05/08, Dokka Umarov, self-proclaimed Emir of the Caucasus Emirate, appointed Omar Sheikhlukayev aka Emir Muaz as commander of the Dagestan Front of the armed forces of the Caucasus Emirate. He replaced Ilgar Malachiyev alias Abdul Madzhid, who had been killed on 09/08/08. Sheikhlukayev was killed in an encounter with security forces in Makhachkala on February 5. In early December 2008, the Shariat Jamaat announced it would concentrate its attacks on police officers and Federal Security Service (FSB) operatives. Subsequently, armed Shariat rebels committed numerous assassination attempts and clashed with security forces, resulting in the deaths of at least 41 security forces and 31 civilian by early October. Among them was Dagestani Interior Minister Adilgeri Magomedtagirov, assassinated by Shariat rebels on June 5, the highest-ranking official killed in the Islamist insurgency so far. Security forces conducted several large-scale military operations against the Shariat Jamaat. From March 19 to 21, the Russian army, FSB, and Dagestan's Interior Ministry conducted a joint operation involving military aviation, artillery, and armored vehicles, aimed at eliminating a group of militants in the Karabudakhkent district. Three days of heavy fighting and bombardments left at least 16 militants and five government troops dead. Another large-scale military operation, targeting the Khasavyurt group of Shariat, was carried out near Endyrei from May 13 to 14, leaving four rebels and at least one member of the elite Alfa special force dead. In total, at least 78 militants were killed in encounters and special operations throughout the year. On August 13, a group of 10 to 15 militants opened fire on a police checkpoint killing four policemen and then shot dead seven female employees of a nearby sauna center in Buinaksk. A week earlier, Shariat had warned sauna owners of possible punishment for their violation of Sharia law. In Makhachkala, police forces were targeted in three separate sniper attacks which left several police officers injured. In Derbent district, security forces killed three alleged insurgents in a police control. In mid-October, FSB claimed to have evidence of Dagestani rebels' ties to al-Qaeda. (jd)

### Russia (Islamist rebels/Kabardino-Balkaria)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: •	Start: 2004
Conflict parties:	Islamist rebels vs. government	
Conflict items:	secession, system/ideology	

The system and secession conflict between the Islamist insurgents of the Yarmuk Jamaat and the government in Russia's North Caucasus republic of Kabardino-Balkaria continued. On February 11, Russian Interior Ministry troops killed seven suspected members of the Yarmuk Jamaat in a raid in a forested mountain area in the Cherkesk district. In a retaliatory assault, rebels killed a police investigator in the town of Tyrnyauz. On March 19, police killed four gunmen in a three-hour shoot-out in Baksan. On April 24, interior ministry troops killed two Yarmuk members, one of whom was high-ranking Zeitun Sultanov, in a joint special operation with the Federal Security Service in the village of Khasanya. In May, several clashes between security forces and Yarmuk insurgents left six militants and one security officer dead. For instance, Yarmuk leading figure Musa Mukozhev was gunned down by special forces on May 10. Unidentified gunmen opened fire on a police car near the settlement of Neitrino, leaving two policemen injured on June 2. On October 2, as police forces stopped a car in Prokhladny, the occupants opened fire, killing one policeman and injuring four. Ingush opposition leader and businessman Maksharip Aushev was killed by unknown attackers near Nartan on October 24. In mid-November, unknown insurgents staged a series of attacks. On November 17, bombs exploded at an electric power substation in the Adyl-Su Gorge and at the Azau-Krugozor cable line. Unidentified attackers opened fire and launched grenades at an Elbrus district police post. The following day, police thwarted a bombing attempt targeting the Aushiger hydropower plant, which provided 20 percent of the republic's electric power. Two electric power line pylons were blown up in Malka on November 19. (jd, fph)

### Russia (opposition)

Intensity: <b>2</b>	Change: •	Start: 2001
Conflict parties:	opposition vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, national power	

The conflict between the opposition and the government continued. On 12/12/2008, some 300 opposition activists founded the opposition movement Solidarnost. Despite a demonstration ban, Solidarnost members staged protests in Moscow on 12/14/08. Special Purpose Police Unit OMON broke up the demonstrations, detaining about 50 people. On January 19, unknown perpetrators shot dead Stanislav Markelov, former attorney of Anna Politkovskaya, as well as critical Novaya Gazeta journalist Anastasia Baburova in Moscow. In early November, two suspects were arrested. In late April, unknown assailants severely injured journalist Vyacheslav Yaroshenko, who had investigated corruption in the local authorities in Rostov. Yaroshenko died of his injuries on June 29. On June 30, Rim Shaigalimov, activist of the oppositional movement Other Russia, died in a Krasnoyarsk prison. Other Russia accused the au-

thorities of murder. Three men charged over the 2006 murder of Anna Politkovskaya were acquitted in February. On June 25, however, the Supreme Court ordered a retrial, which was opened on August 4. In the municipal elections on October 11, President Dmitry Medvedev's United Russia party won a vast majority at almost every polling station. Opposition groups staged protests claiming election fraud in several Russian cities. In Moscow, opposition protests were dispersed by the police on October 12, more than 30 activists were detained. On October 14, oppositional MPs left the national parliament Duma, protesting against alleged election rigging. On October 31, riot police detained at least 50 opposition protesters demonstrating for freedom of assembly in Moscow. Further protests were held after Other Russia leader Eduard Limonov was sentenced to ten days prison for organizing the October 31 demonstration. (lo)

### Russia - Georgia

Intensity: <b>2</b>	Change: ↓	Start: 1992
Conflict parties:	Russia vs. Georgia	
Conflict items:	international power	

Last year's war between Russia and Georgia deescalated to a manifest conflict. Although the conflict parties did not restore diplomatic relations, Switzerland concluded agreements to take over the diplomatic representation in the respective other country. On 12/12/08, Russia withdrew its troops from Perevi, a village situated on the Georgian side of the administrative boundary line of South Ossetia [→ Georgia (South Ossetia)] after having stayed there for over four months, despite demands on part of Georgia and the EU to withdraw. However, Russia returned after a few hours, forcing Georgian police to pull back. In January, Russia imposed an arms embargo on Georgia and threatened countries that continued to supply military equipment to Georgia with economic sanctions. From May 6 to June 1, NATO conducted joint training activities at the Georgian military base in Vaziani, outside the Georgian capital of Tbilisi, within the framework of the Partnership for Peace program, involving over 1,000 military personnel from sixteen NATO and partner countries. On May 10, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin criticized NATO for supporting Georgia's undemocratic regime, which suppressed opposition activists [→ Georgia (opposition)]. Russia carried out the large-scale operational-strategic military exercise "Caucasus 2009" in the North Caucasus from June 29 to July 6. Both sides accused each other of provocative behavior. On August 4, Saakashvili expressed fears that Russia still intended to crush Georgian statehood. On August 18, Georgia finally withdrew from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). An independent international inquiry mission into the August 2008 war, launched by the EU on 12/02/08 and headed by Swiss diplomat Heidi Tagliavini, concluded in September 2009 that no evidence of a large-scale Russian incursion into South Ossetia prior to the start of hostilities was found. However, according to the report, Russia had used disproportionate force and violated international law in its retaliatory attacks on Georgia outside South Ossetia. (mak)

### Russia - Ukraine

Intensity: <b>2</b>	Change: •	Start: 2003
Conflict parties:	Russia vs. Ukraine	
Conflict items:	territory, international power, resources	

The conflict between Russia and Ukraine concerning territory, resources, and international power continued. After both sides had disagreed over a contract for gas deliveries in 2009 as well as Ukrainian debts for gas delivered in 2008, the Russian state-run gas monopolist Gazprom cut off its gas supplies to Ukraine on January 1. Gazprom restored gas supplies to Ukraine on January 20, after both sides had agreed on a contract for gas deliveries in 2009. In May, Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko unsuccessfully demanded a revision of the contract. In June, the Russian foreign ministry refused talks concerning the withdrawal of the Russian Black Sea Fleet from Sevastopol on the Ukrainian Crimea peninsula, after it had insisted on a prolonged lease contract for the Russian naval base in Sevastopol a few weeks earlier. In September, Yushchenko accused Russia of destabilizing the situation on the peninsula and underlined the necessity of a NATO membership for national security reasons. Russia strongly disapproved of Ukraine's possible NATO accession. On October 23, Ukraine's Foreign Minister Petro Poroshenko and his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov met in the Russian capital, Moscow, and emphasized their willingness to resolve the conflict through negotiations. The same day, the Russian parliament adopted a law strengthening the president's powers to use armed forces to defend Russian interests and protect Russian citizens abroad. Ukrainian officials voiced fears of a Russian attack given Crimea's Russian majority population. In November, Russia warned EU president Sweden of possible disruptions in Russian gas deliveries due to problems concerning Ukraine's energy payments. Furthermore, Russia threatened to cut gas deliveries if Ukraine unilaterally channeled off gas supplies designated for Europe. The same month, Yushchenko demanded a revision of January's agreement on gas deliveries and payments, while Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko reiterated Ukraine's determination to fulfill the deal. (mag)

### Serbia (Albanian minority/Presevo Valley)

Intensity: <b>2</b>	Change: •	Start: 2000
Conflict parties:	UCPMB, Albanian minority vs. government	
Conflict items:	autonomy	

The autonomy conflict between the Albanian minority in Presevo Valley and the government continued. In a series of raids on 12/26/08, the police arrested ten ethnic Albanians accused of committing war crimes during the 1999 Kosovo War. Several thousand ethnic Albanians protested against the arrests in the following weeks. On February 16, two bombs planted by unknown assailants detonated in the town of Presevo, causing only material damage. In mid-March, an agreement on the reconstruction of the Coordination Body for Presevo, Bujanovac, and Medveda was signed by the Minister for Public Administration and Local Self-Government, Milan Markovic, Riza Halimi of the Albanian Party for Demo-

cratic Action (PDD), and OSCE Head of Mission, Hans Ola Urstad. On April 19, the Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA) left the coalition with the PDD in the local Presevo assembly, primarily due to Halimi's unilateral agreement on the reconstruction of the Coordination Body. The newly-formed coalition between the DPA and the Democratic Union of the Valley agreed to participate in the Coordination Body for the South in late June. Two bomb attacks by unknown assailants in July left two Serbian policemen, an ethnic Albanian woman, and a child injured. Following the incidents, police forces increased raids, arresting one ethnic Albanian accused of smuggling arms across the administrative line with Kosovo. Ethnic Albanian leaders demanded the unconditional withdrawal of special forces, accusing them of excessive brutality. In early August, ethnic Albanian leaders declared their intention to establish the Presevo Valley region, albeit as part of the Serbian state. This declaration was rejected by Serbian officials. In August and September, Serbian special forces discovered two major illegal arms depots near the administrative line with Kosovo and the Macedonian border. On October 28, Defense Minister Dragan Sutanovac termed recent calls for demilitarization of southern Serbia by ethnic Albanian leaders unacceptable, especially in light of the formation of the Kosovo Security Forces in neighboring Kosovo (→ Serbia (Kosovo)). The following month, ethnic Albanian parties of Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja initiated a National Council, which was to enhance the ethnic Albanian communities' chances of influencing language usage, culture, and national symbols. On November 24, the local governments of Presevo and Bujanovac opposed the opening of a Serbian army base near the town of Bujanovac. Ethnic Albanians' celebrations of the Albanian Flag Day on November 28 passed without any incidents. (gm)

### Serbia (Kosovo)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: •	Start: 1989
Conflict parties:	Kosovar government vs. central government	
Conflict items:	secession	

The secession conflict between the Kosovar government, supported by the Albanian majority in Kosovo, on the one hand, and the central government of Serbia and parts of the Serbian minority in Kosovo, on the other, continued. The Serbian government insisted on Kosovo as an integral part of Serbia, whereas Kosovo viewed itself as an independent state after its unilateral declaration of independence on 02/17/08. The EU launched its Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) on 12/09/08, after months of delay due to disagreements between Serbia and Kosovo over the mission's neutral status. Serbia only accepted the UN Interim Administration Mission (UNMIK) as legitimate negotiation partner, while Kosovo government officials repeatedly called for the UN to end its mission. The inauguration of NATO-sponsored Kosovo Security Forces on January 21 was strongly opposed by Serbia and the ethnic Serbian minority in northern Kosovo. The first anniversary of Kosovo's declaration of independence passed without violent incidents. Kosovska Mitrovica, a town divided between ethnic Alba-

nians and ethnic Serbs, was the site of frequent protests by radical ethnic Serbs, some of which resulted in violent incidents. For example, on 12/30/08, some hundred ethnic Serbs rioted after a Kosovo Serb youth was stabbed by two Kosovo Albanians. From April 24 to May 12, groups of ethnic Serbs rallied against the reconstruction of Albanian homes destroyed in the 1999 war, leading to stand-offs with ethnic Albanians. EULEX, KFOR, and police forces separating the protesters were targeted a few times with automatic guns and hand grenades in Mitrovica. Security forces dispersed the protesters with tear gas and stun grenades, KFOR deployed tanks. No casualties were reported. Despite an agreement on the reconstruction of five Serbian homes reached by UNMIK, sporadic violent protests against reconstruction efforts by ethnic Albanians continued throughout the year, leaving an unspecified number of people injured. Some thousand ethnic Serbs in different parts of Kosovo suffered power cuts due to their refusal to pay bills issued by the Kosovo electricity supplier, precipitating further protests. Violent clashes between radical ethnic Serbs and Kosovar police ensued in March and May, leaving at least 70 people injured. Following the September 11 signing of an agreement on police cooperation by EULEX and Serbia's interior ministry, some 1,000 Albanians demonstrated in Prishtina, demanding EULEX to leave Kosovo. Protests escalated in late September, when unknown assailants threw firebombs at EULEX vehicles. On October 15, the UN Security Council demanded a dialog between the conflict parties. In the run-up to Kosovo's first local elections on November 15, Kosovar Prime Minister Hashim Thaci's convoy was attacked by demonstrators throwing stones. Although Serbia called on Kosovo Serbs to boycott the elections, which were meant to facilitate Kosovo's decentralization of power, some Serb parties nevertheless participated and won the majority in three new municipalities, according to preliminary results. Amid allegations of electoral fraud, the municipal building of Gjakova/Djakovica came under fire on November 24. On June 9, NATO defense ministers decided to reduce forces from 14,000 to 10,000 by early 2010 due to the improved security situation. On June 29, Kosovo became IMF and World Bank member. The International Court of Justice received 21 declarations by states in favor of Kosovo's independence and 13 opposing it. Public hearings on the question of the legality of Kosovo's declaration of independence were scheduled to begin on December 1. On November 27, Serbian President Boris Tadic stated that Serbia would need a new and more flexible approach towards Kosovo. By late November, 63 states had recognized Kosovo as an independent state. (gm)

### Slovenia - Croatia

Intensity: <b>1</b>	Change: ↘	Start: 1991
Conflict parties:	Slovenia vs. Croatia	
Conflict items:	territory	

The maritime and land border dispute between Slovenia and Croatia, which has slowed Croatia's EU accession talks, deescalated. On February 9, the Slovenian parliament voted in favor of a law concerning Croatia's

NATO accession, nevertheless emphasizing that the issue at hand differed from Croatia's EU accession, since national interests were not endangered in the first case. After Slovenia's President Danilo Turk ratified the law in late March, Croatia officially became a member of NATO on April 1. In late April, the EU Commission proposed using international arbitration to settle the border dispute, which was welcomed by Croatia but rejected by Slovenia on May 13. On September 11, Slovenia announced its readiness to lift the block on Croatia's EU bid as border talks continued under international mediation. Despite Croatian President Stjepan Mesic's continued opposition to Slovenia's access to open sea, Slovenian and Croatian prime ministers signed a deal on November 4, allowing international arbitrators to resolve the border dispute. The agreement was followed by protest by Croatian fishermen fearing a loss of fishing grounds. On November 11, the Slovenian government announced its plans to hold a non-binding referendum on the border agreement in early 2010, a move strongly criticized by Croatia. The Croatian parliament ratified the arbitration border agreement on November 20. (sth)

### Spain (Catalan nationalists/Catalonia)

Intensity: <b>1</b>	Change: •	Start: 1979
Conflict parties:	ERC, CiU, Catalan regional government vs. central government	
Conflict items:	secession	

The secession conflict between the Catalanian regional government, the Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC) party, and the Convergence and Union (CIU) party, on the one hand, and the central government, on the other, continued. On 12/07/08, marking the 30th anniversary of the constitution, the ERC proclaimed anti-monarchy slogans against King Juan Carlos and burned down a casket representing the constitution. On September 12, the Catalanian community of Arenys de Munt near Barcelona held a referendum on the independence of Catalonia. A court ruled that the referendum could not be organized by the administration of Arenys de Munt. Accordingly, a citizens' group including the pro-separation mayor of Arenys de Munt initiated and conducted the referendum. At least 130 Catalanian townships announced they would carry out similar referenda on December 13. The central government feared this could have precedent character for the Basque region as well [→ Spain (ETA, PNV/Basque Provinces)]. Late in the year, the Constitutional Court announced it would review the Catalan autonomy statute. (dh)

### Spain (ETA, PNV/Basque Provinces)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: •	Start: 1959
Conflict parties:	ETA, Basque regional government vs. central government	
Conflict items:	secession	

The conflict concerning independence for the Basque provinces remained violent. Throughout the year, activists of the militant organization Basque Homeland and Freedom (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, ETA) committed more than 15 assaults. On 12/03/08, three ETA

members shot dead a Basque businessman in Azpeitia whose company was building the new Basque High Speed Train. ETA car bombs killed an inspector of the National Spanish Police involved in ongoing ETA investigations in Bilbao on June 19. A car bomb near a police station in Burgos left some 50 people slightly injured on July 29. Two further bomb attacks within 48 hours killed two Civil Guard Officers in Palmanova, Mallorca. In response, the police closed ports and airports of the island in order to prevent the culprits from escaping. On May 5, the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) and the People's Party (PP) agreed to form a governing coalition in the Basque region, the first non-nationalist government in 30 years. New government leader Patxi López of PSOE succeeded Juan José Ibarretxe. ETA declared López a "priority target". Spanish and French police arrested more than 30 ETA militants throughout the year, including military head Aitzol "Gurbita" Iriondo in December 2008, his successor Jurdan Martitegi Lizaso in April 2009, as well as Ekaitz Sirvent Auzmendi, another top ETA leader. Additionally, police forces detained 36 suspected ETA supporters and 34 members of the banned ETA youth group Segi on November 24 and 26, respectively. In the meantime, several ETA weapon arsenals were discovered in Guipuzcoano and Madrid, as well as in Agen, Montpellier, and Toulouse in France. On March 23, forty-four members of banned nationalist Basque party Batasuna, the Basque Nationalist Action (EAE/ANV), and the Communist Party of the Basque Homelands (EHAK/PCTV), including prominent party leaders, were indicted for alleged links to ETA. Furthermore, five Batasuna members were arrested on October 13. In mid-November, Batasuna called for a peaceful dialogue between Basque militants and the government, stopping short, however, of condemning ETA's use of violence. On May 15, the Supreme Court banned the Iniciativa Internacionalista-La Solidaridad entre los Pueblos (II-SP) due to suspected ties to the banned Batasuna. Nationalist and separatist unions responded with protests in San Sebastián and Bilbao. However, as no confirmable connection between II-SP and Batasuna was found, the II-SP was allowed to participate in the European elections on May 22. The Batasuna party ban was confirmed by the European Court of Justice in Strasbourg on June 30. (dh)

### Turkey - Armenia

Intensity: <b>2</b>	Change: •	Start: 1991
Conflict parties:	Turkey vs. Armenia	
Conflict items:	international power, other	

The conflict between Turkey and Armenia over international power and Turkey's denial of the Ottoman Empire's genocide of Armenians between 1915 and 1917 continued. Early in April, Turkey's Foreign Minister Ali Babacan proclaimed progress in ongoing talks with Armenia. Armenian President Serge Sarkisian said he expected the reopening of the border with neighboring Turkey by October. On April 22, Turkey and Armenia agreed on a road map to normalize their relations following bilateral discussions mediated by Switzerland. This sparked protests among several thousand Armenian nationalists.

On April 24, Sarkisian announced that the recognition of the genocide by Turkey was not a precondition for establishing official Turkish-Armenian relations. After Azerbaijan warned of rising regional tensions due to a non-consideration of the Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) issue, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan made a resolution of the NK conflict precondition for the reopening of Turkey's border with Armenia in May [→ Armenia – Azerbaijan]. On October 10 in the Swiss city of Zurich, the Armenian and Turkish foreign ministers signed two protocols to open the border between their countries and establish diplomatic ties. Furthermore, the agreement called for the establishment of a joint commission of independent historians to investigate the genocide issue. On October 21, Turkey's parliament began debating the protocols, leading to a boycott of the session by opposition parties. On November 20, Armenia announced that no further negotiations would be held between the two countries until the agreement had been ratified by parliaments in both countries. Azerbaijan firmly criticized the signing for considering neither the NK dispute nor the Armenian occupation of its territory. On October 14, Abdullah Gül, Turkish president, and his Armenian counterpart Sarkisian watched a soccer match between their countries' national teams side by side in Bursa, Turkey. (sh)

### United Kingdom (IRA et al./Northern Ireland)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: •	Start: 1968
Conflict parties:	IRA, Real IRA, Continuity IRA, Sinn Féin, SDLP vs. government, UDA, UVF, DUP, UUP, RHC	
Conflict items:	secession	

The conflict between the two antagonistic communities over the secession of Northern Ireland from the United Kingdom continued. On March 4, the House of Commons passed a bill to devolve policing and justice powers to Northern Ireland. However, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), Sinn Féin, and the republican Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) were unable to reach an agreement on its implementation. On October 21, Prime Minister Gordon Brown offered a EUR 1.1 billion package to fund the transfer of policing and justice powers. While Sinn Féin accepted the financial offer, the DUP rejected the deal. Paramilitary activity continued. The Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) claimed responsibility for the deaths of two British soldiers on March 7 in County Antrim and threatened to conduct further attacks. The Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA) claimed responsibility for the death of a constable in Craigavon, County Armagh, on March 9. Four alleged dissident republicans exchanged gunfire with police forces in Garrison, county Fermanagh, on November 21. The same day, a 180 kg car bomb partially exploded outside the policing board's headquarters in Belfast. Officials blamed dissident republicans for the assault. On


June 27, the Loyalist paramilitary groups Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and Red Hand Commando (RHC) declared they had completed their decommissioning in advance of the August deadline set by Shaun Woodward, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. The Loyalist Ulster Defence Association (UDA) confirmed it had started to decommission on the same day. On July 14, Sinn Féin blamed the RIRA for firing a shot at police forces in Belfast riots and for inciting other clashes during Orange Order parades across Northern Ireland. The Republican paramilitary group Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) announced the end of its armed struggle on October 11. In early November, the Independent Monitoring Commission reported dissident Republican activity was at its highest level in nearly six years. The Commission noted that groups such as the Republican Action Against Drugs in Derry and Concerned Families Against Drugs in Belfast were partly responsible for the increase in paramilitary attacks. The report documented a sharp increase of Loyalist paramilitary assaults and revealed that factions of the UVF/ RHC and UDA were engaged in a range of criminal activities. (jb)

### USA - Russia (missile system)

Intensity: <b>2</b>	Change: •	Start: 2007
Conflict parties:	USA vs. Russia	
Conflict items:	international power	


The conflict over international power between the USA and Russia eased. In mid-January, US President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev pledged to improve their countries' relations, after Obama had refused to commit to the installation of the missile defense system in eastern Europe, as planned by the previous US government. Although not confirmed by officials, Russian news agency Interfax reported a halt in Russia's plans to deploy short-range missiles to its Baltic enclave Kaliningrad. In early March, foreign ministers of NATO member states resumed high-level contacts with Russia. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton signaled willingness to improve US-Russian ties. On March 18, the Czech government temporarily withdrew treaties committing the country to the US missile defense shield from parliament. Obama held talks with his Russian counterpart Medvedev in Moscow on July 6, focusing on a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (Start) by the end of 2009, in line with the upcoming renewal of the 1991 Start I treaty in December. The latter foresaw a reduction of US and Russian nuclear warheads to 6,000 in addition to a total of 1,600 launcher systems. On this occasion, Russia pressed the USA to drop its European missile defense plans. The USA stated the missiles were to be directed against possible Iranian attacks, not against Russia [→ Iran - USA]. On September 17, Obama shelved plans for controversial bases in Poland and the Czech Republic. In turn, Russia froze plans to deploy short-range missiles to Kaliningrad. (jd)

# Sub-Saharan Africa




In 2009, the number of conflicts in Africa rose to 85. 2008 had seen 79 conflicts, two of which had ended that year, while eight new conflicts erupted in 2009. Altogether, 30 conflicts were classified as crises and nine as highly violent, compared to 31 crises and twelve highly violent conflicts in 2008. While the war in Somalia [→ Somalia (Islamist groups)] remained at the highest intensity, last year's wars in Chad and Sudan abated to severe crises [→ Chad (various rebel groups); Sudan (Darfur)]. The most frequent conflict item in the region was resources with 33 cases, oftentimes combined with the second-most frequent item, national power (26 cases), or regional predominance (22). Two areas of interrelated highly violent conflicts, often transcending national borders, characterized the region. The first reached from Nigeria over Chad, Sudan, and Ethiopia to Somalia. The second was the Great Lakes region with the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Uganda, and the Central African Republic. In the former region, al-Qaeda was increasingly active [→ Mali (AQIM); Niger (AQIM)]. In Somalia, the conflict between allegedly al-Qaeda-affiliated rebel groups and the government was fought out as a war for the fourth year running [→ Somalia (Islamist groups)]. In contrast, the level of violence slightly decreased in Sudan's Darfur region. However, ahead of the 2010 elections, violence flared up in southern Sudan [→ Sudan (SPLM/A / Southern Sudan); Sudan (various ethnic groups)]. In neighboring Chad, the rebel conflict deescalated but remained highly violent. In the Great Lakes Region, the persistence of trans-border rebel groups caused the DRC and Rwanda as well as Uganda, the DRC, and South Sudan to join forces in two major military operations. The first was directed against Hutu and Tutsi rebel groups in the eastern DRC [→ DR Congo (FDLR); DR Congo (CNDP)]. The other targeted the Ugandan rebel group Lord's Resistance Army's strongholds in the border triangle of the DRC, the Central African Republic, and southern Sudan [→ Uganda (LRA)]. Three new conflicts [→ Gabon (opposition); Madagascar (TGV - TIM); Niger (opposition)] erupted over the transfer or extension of the president's powers, illustrating a declining effectiveness of constitutional arrangements.

**Conflict Intensities in sub-Saharan Africa in 2009 compared to 2008**



**Frequency of Conflict Items in 2009 in sub-Saharan Africa by Intensity Groups**





## Overview: Conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa in 2009

Name of conflict <sup>1</sup>	Conflict parties <sup>2</sup>	Conflict items	Start	Change <sup>3</sup> Int. <sup>4</sup>
Angola (FLEC/Cabinda)*	FLEC vs. government	secession, resources	1975	• 3
Angola - DR Congo*	Angola vs. DR Congo	territory, resources, other	2009	NEW 2
Botswana (Basarwa)*	Baswara vs. government	system/ideology, resources	1997	• 2
Burundi (Hutu - Tutsi)*	various Hutu parties vs. various Tutsi parties	national power	1962	• 2
Burundi (opposition)*	FRODEBU, UPRONA, FNL-Icanzo, MSD, CNDD-FDD-Radjabu vs. government	national power	2006	• 3
Burundi (Palipehutu-FNL Rwaswa)	Palipehutu-FNL faction led by Agathon Rwaswa vs. government	national power	2005	↘ 3
Burundi - Rwanda (border)*	Burundi vs. Rwanda	territory	1960	• 1
Cameroon (insurgents/Bakassi)*	LSC, NDDSC, BAMOSD, BFF, BSF vs. government	autonomy	2006	• 3
Central African Republic (various rebel groups)	UFDR, APRD, FDPC, CPJP vs. government	national power	2005	• 3
Chad (ethnic groups)*	Arab ethnic communities vs. African ethnic communities	regional predominance	2003	↘ 2
Chad (opposition)*	opposition vs. government	national power	1990	↘ 1
Chad (various rebel groups)	UFR, MN vs. government	national power, resources	2005	↘ 4
Chad - Sudan	Chad vs. Sudan	international power	2003	• 3
Comoros (Anjouan, Moheli)*	regional government of Anjouan vs. government on Grande Comore	autonomy	1997	↓ 1
Congo-Brazzaville (CNR, Ninja militias)*	Ninja militias vs. government	autonomy, national power	1997	• 2
Côte d'Ivoire (rebels)	FN vs. government	national power	1999	↘ 2
DR Congo (Bundu dia Kongo)*	Bundu dia Kongo vs. government	autonomy, system/ideology	2000	↓ 2
DR Congo (CNDP)	CNDP vs. government	regional predominance, resources	2004	↓ 2
DR Congo (Enyele - Boba)	Enyele vs. Boba	regional predominance, resources	2009	NEW 3
DR Congo (FDLR)	FDLR vs. government	regional predominance, resources	1997	↗ 4
DR Congo (Hema - Lendu)*	Hema vs. Lendu	regional predominance, resources	2000	• 2
DR Congo (Ituri militias)*	Hema militias, Lendu militias vs. government	regional predominance, resources	1999	• 3
DR Congo (Mayi-Mayi)	various Mayi-Mayi groups vs. government, CNDP	regional predominance, resources	2004	• 3
DR Congo (MLC, RCD, UPDS)*	MLC, UPDS, RCD, MPDC vs. government	national power, resources	1997	↘ 2
DR Congo - Rwanda*	DR Congo vs. Rwanda	international power, resources	2002	↘ 1
DR Congo - Uganda*	DR Congo vs. Uganda	international power, resources	1999	↘ 1
Equatorial Guinea - Gabon*	Equatorial Guinea vs. Gabon	territory, resources	1970	• 1
Eritrea - Djibouti	Eritrea vs. Djibouti	territory	1995	↘ 2
Ethiopia (EPPF)*	EPPF vs. government	national power	1998	↘ 2
Ethiopia (OLF/Oromiya)*	OLF vs. government	secession	1974	• 3
Ethiopia (ONLF/Ogaden)	ONLF vs. government	secession, resources	1984	↗ 4
Ethiopia (opposition)	CUD, UEDF, Ginglo 7 vs. government	national power	2005	• 2
Ethiopia (Oromo - Somali)*	Oromo vs. Somali	regional predominance, resources	2005	↑ 3
Ethiopia (TPDM)*	TPDM vs. government	regional predominance	2002	↘ 2
Ethiopia - Eritrea*	Ethiopia vs. Eritrea	territory, international power	1998	• 2
Gabon (opposition)	opposition vs. government	national power	2009	NEW 3
Guinea (opposition)	opposition, unions vs. government	national power	2006	• 3
Guinea-Bissau (MFDC-Sadio)*	MFDC-Sadio vs. government	regional predominance	2006	• 1
Guinea-Bissau (PAIGC)*	PAIGC, PRS vs. government	national power	1998	↘ 1

Name of conflict <sup>1</sup>	Conflict parties <sup>2</sup>	Conflict items	Start	Change <sup>3</sup>	Int. <sup>4</sup>
Kenya (ethnic groups)	Garre vs. Murule vs. Pokot vs. Turkana, Sambaru vs. Somali, Borana vs. Nyabasi vs. Buirege	regional predominance, resources	1991	•	3
Kenya (Mungiki sect)	Mungiki sect vs. government	national power, regional predominance	2002	•	3
Kenya (opposition)	ODM vs. PNU	national power	1999	↓	2
Kenya (SLDF)*	Soy, Ndorobo, SLDF vs. government	regional predominance	2002	↓	2
Madagascar (TGV - TIM)	TGV vs. TIM	national power	2009	NEW	3
Mali (AQIM)	AQIM vs. government	regional predominance	2009	NEW	3
Mali (Tuareg/Kidal)	various Tuareg rebel groups vs. government	autonomy, resources	1989	↘	3
Niger (AQIM)*	AQIM vs. government	regional predominance	2009	NEW	2
Niger (opposition)	opposition vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2009	NEW	2
Niger (Tuareg/Agadez)*	MNJ vs. government	autonomy, resources	1999	•	3
Nigeria (Boko Haram)	Boko Haram vs. government	system/ideology	2004	↑	4
Nigeria (Christians - Muslims)	Christian groups vs. Muslim groups	system/ideology	1960	↘	3
Nigeria (MASSOB/Biafra)*	MASSOB vs. government	secession	1967	•	2
Nigeria (MEND, Ijaw/Niger Delta)	MEND, Ijaw, NDV vs. government	autonomy, resources	1998	•	4
Nigeria (MOSOP, Ogoni/Niger Delta)	MOSOP, Ogoni vs. government	autonomy, resources	1990	↘	1
Nigeria - Cameroon (Bakassi)	Nigeria vs. Cameroon	territory, resources	1961	•	1
Rwanda (various Hutu rebel groups)	FDLR, ex-FAR, oppositional Hutu groups vs. government	national power	1990	•	3
Rwanda - France*	Rwanda vs. France	international power, other	2004	•	2
Rwanda - Uganda*	Rwanda vs. Uganda	international power, resources	2000	↘	1
Senegal (MFDC-Sadio/Casamance)	MFDC-Sadio, MFDC-Badiate vs. government	secession	1982	•	3
Sierra Leone (AFRC, RUF)*	RUF, AFRC vs. government	national power, resources	1991	↘	1
Somalia (Al-Shabaab - Hizbul Islam)	Al-Shabaab vs. Hizbul Islam	system/ideology, regional predominance	2009	NEW	3
Somalia (Islamist groups)	Hizbul-Islam, Al-Shabaab vs. Transitional Federal Government	system/ideology, national power	2006	•	5
Somalia (Maakhir - Puntland)*	Maakhir vs. autonomous region of Puntland	other	2007	↘	1
Somalia (Puntland - Somaliland)	autonomous region of Puntland vs. regional government of Somaliland	territory, regional predominance, resources	1998	•	3
Somalia (Puntland)*	autonomous region of Puntland vs. Transitional Federal Government	autonomy	1998	•	1
Somalia (Somaliland)*	regional government of Somaliland vs. Transitional Federal Government	secession	1991	↘	1
Somalia (various rebel groups)*	warlords vs. Transitional Federal Government	national power	1980	•	2
South Africa (KwaZulu-Natal)*	IFP vs. ANC	regional predominance	1990	•	1
South Africa (xenophobes - immigrants)*	xenophobes vs. immigrants	regional predominance	2008	•	3
South Africa - Namibia*	South Africa vs. Namibia	territory, resources	2000	•	1
Sudan (Darfur)	JEM, SLM/A-AW, SLMA-Unity, SLM/A-United Leadership, SLM/A-Leadership, SLM/A-Mainstream, SLM/A-Juba Unity, SLM/A-Democratic Front, SLM/A-Unity Leadership, SLM/A-RF, URF, DJEM, URFF vs. government, Janjaweed, SLM/A-MM	regional predominance, resources	2003	↘	4
Sudan (Eastern Front)*	Eastern Front vs. government	autonomy, resources	2005	↘	1
Sudan (LRA - SPLM/A)	LRA vs. SPLM/A	regional predominance	1994	•	3
Sudan (SPLM/A / South Sudan)	government of South Sudan vs. government of Sudan in Khartoum	territory, secession, resources	1955	↘	3

Name of conflict <sup>1</sup>	Conflict parties <sup>2</sup>	Conflict items	Start	Change <sup>3</sup>	Int. <sup>4</sup>
Sudan (various ethnic groups)	Murle vs. Lou-Nuer vs. Jikany-Nuer	regional predominance	2008	↗	4
Sudan - Uganda*	Sudan vs. Uganda	international power, other	1994	•	1
Swaziland (opposition)	SWAYOCO, PUDEMO vs. COSTATU	system/ideology	1998	•	3
Swaziland - South Africa*	Swaziland vs. South Africa	territory	1902	•	1
Tanzania (CUF/Zanzibar)*	CUF vs. regional government	secession	1993	•	2
Togo (opposition)*	UFC, CFC vs. government	national power	2002	•	1
Uganda (ADF, NALU)*	ADF, NALU vs. government	national power, resources	1987	↘	2
Uganda (Baganda/Buganda)	Kingdom of Buganda vs. government	autonomy, resources	1995	↗	3
Uganda (LRA)	LRA vs. government	national power, resources	1987	↗	4
Uganda - DR Congo (Lake Albert)*	Uganda vs. DR Congo	territory, resources	2007	•	2
Zimbabwe (MDC-T, MDC-M, civil society groups - ZANU-PF)	MDC-T, MDC-M, civil society groups vs. ZANU-PF	national power	2000	•	3

<sup>1</sup> <sup>2</sup> <sup>3</sup> <sup>4</sup> cf. overview table for Europe

### Burundi (Palipehutu-FNL Rwsa)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: ↘	Start: 2005
Conflict parties:	Palipehutu-FNL faction led by Agathon Rwsa vs. government	
Conflict items:	national power	

The power conflict between the Palipehutu - Federation for National Liberation (Palipehutu-FNL) led by Agathon Rwsa and the government deescalated. President Pierre Nkurunziza and Rwsa signed a peace treaty on 12/04/08, mediated by Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni. They agreed on the immediate demobilization and disarmament of the Palipehutu-FNL. Furthermore, Rwsa agreed to change his groups' name, thereby dropping its ethnic connotations. The change of the rebels' name to FNL was announced on January 9. President Nkurunziza agreed to provide the rebels with 33 government positions and to release all FNL prisoners. The first prisoners were released on January 3. Among other violent incidents, several FNL activists were detained and beaten by local government officials and members of the ruling National Council for the Defense of Democracy - Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) in Ngozi province, in December 2008. On January 7, one of the ringleaders of this incident was shot dead. Four suspects, among them two alleged FNL members, were arrested two days later. Starting on April 21, around 3,500 FNL combatants were to be integrated into the army and police and another 5,000 were to participate in the demobilization program. Reportedly, some former rebels joined various rebel groups in the DR Congo [→ DR Congo (FDLR); DR Congo (CNDP)]. Some 3,000 rebels started to assemble in the demobilization camps in March. On April 18, Rwsa handed in his AK-47 and military uniform, declaring the official end of the war in Burundi. Three days later, FNL was accredited as a political party. The former rebels' integration into the security forces began on April 22 under AU supervision. Museveni initiated the Partnership for Peace in Burundi on May 29, comprising, among others, regional initiatives and the UN mission BINUB. The latter's mandate had been extended until December

31. At a congress on October 4, dissident FNL members proclaimed Jacques Kenese the new FNL leader. Rwsa immediately rejected the move, declaring he was still the FNL's leader. As the congress was held under special authorization from Interior Minister Edouard Nduwimana, Rwsa's deputy accused the CNDD-FDD of being behind the split. On October 30, Rwsa warned the government that a formal recognition of the splinter group could lead to a resumption of the civil war. (bs)

### Central African Republic (various rebel groups)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: •	Start: 2005
Conflict parties:	UFDR, APRD, FDPC, CPJP vs. government	
Conflict items:	national power	

The national power conflict between the Popular Army for the Restoration of the Republic and Democracy (APRD), the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR), the Democratic Front of the Central African People (FDPC), and the Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (CPJP), on the one hand, and the government, on the other, remained violent. Despite a peace deal reached between some of the parties in 2008, fighting continued. The government was supported by MICOPAX forces, a mission by the Economic Community of Central African States. The UN mission MINURCAT took over command of the EU mission EU-FOR CHAD/CAR [→ Chad (various rebel groups)]. From 12/08/08 till 12/20/08, President Francois Bozizé hosted UN-backed peace talks between various opposition and rebel leaders, including Central African Republic's former President Ange-Felix Patassé. On 12/19/08, a peace deal between the government, APRD, and UFDR was signed. The agreement foresaw the formation of a consensus government to rule until the scheduled presidential elections in 2010 and an amnesty law covering violations committed during the conflict. On January 12, the government reinforced its border forces to prevent raids on civilians by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) [→ Uganda (LRA)]. Bozizé presented a largely unchanged cabinet on January 20. Subsequently, further violent acts were committed. On January 30, the

government and rebels of the northern region reached an agreement providing for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. On February 12, the previously unknown rebel group CPJP claimed responsibility for an attack on the town Bossembele. FDPC rebels attacked the remote town of Batango on February 23, destroying a police station and liberating 19 detainees. Four days later, FDPC rejected the agreement for the formation of a consensus government and announced a new rebel alliance, the National Resistance, to oppose the government. On June 1, former UFDR rebel leader Abakar Sabone returned to Bangui after four years in exile, announcing the disarmament of his troops and the participation in the national peace process. Five days later, UFDR dissidents of the Kara ethnic group attacked a UFDR outpost in Birao, close to the Chadian border, killing at least 30 people, among them a staff member of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The Kara rejected the UFDR's participation in the peace process. On June 15, government forces clashed with CPJP rebels near Akoursoulbak in the northeastern Ndele region; at least 20 people were killed. Fighters from the Kara ethnic group attacked a UFDR base located in the northeastern town of Birao on June 21; ten people died. The two ethnic factions within the UFDR had already clashed in February, causing approx. 6,000 people to flee to neighboring Chad. On July 15, the FDPC announced it would join the disarmament process. On August 8, President Bozizé launched a disarmament process intended to demobilize between 6,000 and 10,000 ex-rebel combatants. APRD reportedly released 182 child soldiers. Patassé returned from his exile in Togo on October 30. In late November, the CPJP raided the town of Ndele in the northern CAR. (ng)

### Chad (various rebel groups)

Intensity: <b>4</b>	Change: ▾	Start: 2005
Conflict parties:	UFR, MN vs. government	
Conflict items:	national power, resources	

The conflict over national power between several rebel coalitions and the government deescalated from a war to a severe crisis. While a peace agreement was signed between the rebel coalition of the National Movement (MN) and the government, heavy fighting continued between the army and the Union of Resistance Forces (UFR). In addition, the EU mission EUFOR CHAD/RCA transferred its tasks to the UN mission MINURCAT. On January 14, the UN Security Council authorized the deployment of 5,200 military personnel to replace the 3,300 EUFOR troops in eastern Chad and northeastern Central African Republic by March 15. By October, the mission had reached the strength of 2,675 troops. UFR rebels claimed to have killed 15 soldiers in clashes near the border village Birak in eastern Chad, on April 18 and 19, which was denied by the government. On May 4, the UFR launched an attack in the eastern Chad-Sudan border region, starting its operations from their Sudanese rear bases in the Darfur region. Intense fighting on May 7 and 8 in Goz Beida and Am-Dam region left at least 220 rebels and dozens of government soldiers dead. The army captured 212 rebels. In pur-

suit of the UFR rebels, the government conducted air strikes on both Chadian and Sudanese territory, and reportedly entered Sudanese territory, remaining there until May 19 [→ Chad - Sudan]. According to Sudan, Chad launched air raids against presumed bases of Chadian rebels in the Sudanese Darfur region in June and July. MN leader Ahmat Hassaballah Soubiane signed a peace deal with the government in the Libyan capital, Tripoli, under Libyan auspices on July 25. Representatives of the EU, France, Spain, Sudan, Qatar, as well as the 28-member Community of Sahel-Saharan States witnessed the signing. The deal provided an end to hostilities and the integration of the rebel fighters into the army or civil service. The agreement was similar to an accord concluded in 2007, which, however, had not yielded lasting results. In the second half of August, former Chadian President Goukouni Weddeye was mandated to mediate in the conflict with the remaining rebel groups. (jk)

### Chad - Sudan

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: •	Start: 2003
Conflict parties:	Chad vs. Sudan	
Conflict items:	international power	

The conflict between Chad and Sudan over the support of rebel groups as well as the violation of sovereignty through cross-border military operations remained violent. Diplomatic relations were restored in late 2008, and the parties agreed to deploy a joint 2,000-strong military contingent to the common border. Relations deteriorated on January 29, when both countries accused each other of backing recent attacks by their respective rebel groups. Sudan accused Chadian forces of entering its western Darfur region to transport supplies to Sudanese rebel movements in Darfur [→ Sudan (Darfur)]. Chad denied this claim, accusing Sudan of harboring Chadian rebels [→ Chad (various rebel groups)]. Between March and May, tensions along the common border increased. At talks in Doha, Qatar, from April 29 to May 4, both countries signed the Doha Agreement providing for an end to violent activities directed against each other, as well as cross-border military operations. Various agreements on these issues had already been concluded in previous years. However, on May 5, Chad accused Sudan of having conducted cross-border military operations, including air raids in the village of Umm Dukhum in western Darfur, when pursuing Chadian rebels. On May 19, Chad reportedly withdrew its troops from Sudanese territory. Sudan filed a complaint against Chad with the UN Security Council on July 20, though stating it would stick to previous agreements unless threatened further. That same day, Chad repeated its accusations that Sudan was fuelling the conflict in Chad by providing small arms and ammunition to the rebels. (jk)

### Côte d'Ivoire (rebels)

Intensity: <b>2</b>	Change: ▾	Start: 1999
Conflict parties:	FN vs. government	
Conflict items:	national power	

The national power conflict between the rebels of the New Forces (FN) and the government, led by Presi-

dent Laurent Gbagbo of the Ivorian Popular Front (FPI), continued. In April, FN members and MPs demanded the resignation of FN leader Guillaume Soro, appointed prime minister in 2007, in protest of the delay of elections. Presidential elections had originally been scheduled for early 2008. On May 14, the government eventually announced presidential elections to be held on November 29. A few days later, FN rebels handed over ten northern zones to the civilian administration as part of the 2007 Ouagadougou Peace Agreement. In June, the government declared the voter's registration process complete. In the same month, the UN Security Council extended the mandate of its peacekeeping mission UNOCI for six more months in order to support elections, although its strength was reduced by some 700 soldiers. At the same time, France announced to reduce its force "Opération Licorne" working alongside UNOCI from 2,000 to 900 troops. In addition, France pressured the government to hold elections. On October 29, the UN Security Council renewed the arms and diamond embargo for another year; both sides were accused of rearmament. On November 12, the government announced that the election would be postponed due to delays in the voter's registration process. (kvo, fs)

### DR Congo (CNDP)

Intensity: <b>2</b>	Change: ↓	Start: 2004
Conflict parties:	CNDP vs. government	
Conflict items:	regional predominance, resources	

The conflict over regional predominance and resources between the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP) and the government abated considerably. On 12/05/08, after mediation efforts by UN special envoy and former President of Nigeria Olusegun Obasanjo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) agreed to direct negotiations with the CNDP. Talks commenced in Nairobi, Kenya, on 12/08/08 but were adjourned shortly after their start and finally suspended on 12/21/08. Earlier, Rwanda and the DRC agreed to join forces against the DRC-based Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda [→ DR Congo (FDLR)], integrate the CNDP into the Congolese army, and depose of then CNDP leader Laurent Nkunda. Rwanda had previously supported the Tutsi-dominated CNDP whereas the DRC's armed forces FARDC had collaborated with the Hutu-dominated FDLR in its fight against the CNDP. On January 5, CNDP's chief of staff, Bosco Ntaganda, wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for war crimes, signed a peace agreement with the government, a move which was rejected by Nkunda. On January 16, CNDP and FARDC announced an end of hostilities and the conclusion of an alliance to fight FDLR. Nkunda was arrested by Rwandan authorities near Rubavu district in Rwanda on January 22 after he had crossed the border. The DRC immediately called for Nkunda's extradition. Rwanda, rejecting this, kept Nkunda under house arrest. New CNDP leader Bosco Ntaganda signed a peace deal with the DRC on January 29, agreeing to integrate CNDP troops into the FARDC. He later became deputy commander of the UN-backed FARDC "Operation Peace II" against the FDLR. On February 5, CNDP announced

its transformation into a political party. Negotiations between CNDP and the government commenced in Goma, leading to a preliminary agreement on February 22 and the signing of another peace deal on March 23. The accord confirmed CNDP's transformation into a political party and the integration of its troops into the FARDC. Integrated CNDP fighters committed a massacre against the Hunde ethnic group in May [→ DR Congo (Mayi-Mayi)]. (sk)

### DR Congo (Enyele - Boba)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: <b>NEW</b>	Start: 2009
Conflict parties:	Enyele vs. Boba	
Conflict items:	regional predominance, resources	

A new violent conflict concerning fishing and farming rights between the ethnic communities of the Enyele, also known as Lobala, and the Boba, also known as Bamboma or Munzaya, erupted. Both communities resided in the Democratic Republic of the Congo's (DRC) northwest Équateur province, close to the border to Congo-Brazzaville. Allegedly, ex-rebels of Équateur-based Jean-Pierre Bemba's Movement for the Liberation of Congo were entangled in the violent upsurge [ DR Congo (MLC, RCD, UDPS)]. Violent clashes between the two communities ensued in March when Enyele attacked the Boba village of Munzaya and burned at least 200 homes, prompting more than 1,200 Boba to flee to neighboring Congo-Brazzaville. In late October, Enyele youths attacked the town of Dongo, reportedly killing some 60 Boba as well as at least 47 policemen. Subsequently, the fighting spread to surrounding villages. At least 16,000 fled to Congo-Brazzaville. On November 7, the Congolese National Police recaptured Dongo and arrested some 100 assailants. However, Enyele youths attacked two more villages in the Bomboma district on November 18, prompting more Boba to flee over the border. On November 26, Enyele militias tried to capture Dongo again but were repelled by the police. On the same day in Dongo, a helicopter of the UN mission MONUC was shot at and five of its passengers were injured. A group named Resistance Patriots of Dongo (PRD) claimed responsibility for the attack, accusing MONUC of colluding with Congolese and Rwandan armed forces. According to the PRD, Rwandan forces were active in Équateur with the government's consent. UN Secretary Ban Ki-moon condemned the incident on November 27. By the end of November, the number of displaced had risen to some 54,000 in Congo-Brazzaville and about 38,000 in the DRC. (sk)

### DR Congo (FDLR)

Intensity: <b>4</b>	Change: ↗	Start: 1997
Conflict parties:	FDLR vs. government	
Conflict items:	regional predominance, resources	

The conflict over regional predominance and resources between the rebels of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and the government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) escalated after Rwanda and the DRC had started a joint military operation in the eastern DRC. The FDLR was a Hutu rebel

group that emerged from the Interahamwe, which had been held responsible for the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 [→ Rwanda (various Hutu rebel groups)]. FDLR operated in the eastern DRC, claiming to protect Congolese Hutu against Congolese Tutsi [→ DR Congo (CNDP)]. On 12/05/08, the foreign ministers of Rwanda and the DRC signed an agreement in Bunia, capital of Ituri province, to join forces against the FDLR as well as the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP), a Tutsi rebel group operating in the eastern DRC. In the past, Rwanda had supported the CNDP whereas the DRC had collaborated with the FDLR against the CNDP. On January 20, Rwandan troops crossed the border with the DRC and joined the five-week military operation "Our Unity" of the Congolese armed forces (FARDC). Both countries deployed 2,000 to 5,000 troops. Some 40 FDLR fighters were killed in air strikes in the first half of February. According to the joint military command, over 90 rebels were killed and 140 surrendered. The FDLR rebels avoided direct military engagements, retreating to adjacent areas. Rwanda started to withdraw its troops on February 25. Shortly afterwards, FDLR retook its positions and started reprisal attacks against civilians. The rebels killed more than 100 civilians in the two Kivu provinces between January 20 and February 8. In March, FDLR started regrouping in North Kivu. Several Mayi-Mayi militias joined forces with the FDLR [→ DR Congo (Mayi-Mayi)]. Attacks displaced some 30,000 in North Kivu. Assaults on civilians continued in March and April, leaving at least 24 dead. On May 1, DRC announced a military campaign backed by the UN mission MONUC called "Peace II", which began at the end of the month. This announcement was followed by attacks of the FDLR in which at least 120 civilians were killed. More than 30 FARDC fighters were killed in an FDLR attack near Hombo in North Kivu on May 6. After several clashes in June, FARDC expanded its offensive to South Kivu on July 12, displacing some 35,000. Thereby, the total number of displaced people rose to 536,000 in South Kivu and over 1.8 million in east DRC. Sporadic clashes in the Kivus continued from July to September, leaving at least 65 dead. According to FARDC sources, the FDLR's command headquarters was captured on July 27. The FDLR killed at least 701 civilians between late January and September. Human Rights Watch reported that FARDC and Rwandan troops had killed at least 201 civilians in their joint operation and FARDC another 531 in their "Peace II" offensive, sometimes with machetes or clubs. According to a UN investigation, FARDC troops committed a massacre in Lukweti in North Kivu, prompting MONUC to suspend its cooperation with FARDC's 213th brigade on November 1. In November, an unpublished report by a UN Group of Experts stated that FARDC commanders were still cooperating with the FDLR in South Kivu and accused Tanzania of delivering arms to FDLR as well as Uganda and Burundi of facilitating the recruitment of new combatants. On November 17, German authorities arrested Ignace Murwanashyaka, FDLR's president and supreme military commander, and Straton Musoni,

FDLR vice-president and president of its high command. (sk)

### DR Congo (Mayi-Mayi)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: •	Start: 2004
Conflict parties:	various Mayi-Mayi groups vs. government, CNDP	
Conflict items:	regional predominance, resources	

The conflict concerning regional predominance and resources between several Mayi-Mayi militias and the government remained violent. Mayi-Mayi was a general term describing various self-organized local defense units in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). In late 2008 and early 2009, most Mayi-Mayi groups fought against the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP) [→ DR Congo (CNDP)], and were loosely allied with the CNDP's adversary, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) [→ DR Congo (FDLR)]. After a change of leadership, the CNDP declared its integration into the DRC's armed forces (FARDC). Subsequently, on January 17, the umbrella Mayi-Mayi group Coalition of Congolese Resistant Patriots (PARECO) announced they would end their armed struggle against CNDP and integrate into the FARDC. On February 6, one day after the CNDP had declared its transformation into a political party, PARECO also declared it would transform into a political party. By March, 5,000 PARECO Mayi-Mayi had integrated into the FARDC. On April 18, eighteen rebel groups, including Mayi-Mayi militias, signed a peace deal with the government. However, the Mayi-Mayi's integration into the FARDC caused tensions within the FARDC as both Mayi-Mayi and their former enemies of the CNDP were now integrated into the same army. At the same time, this move pitted the Mayi-Mayi against their former ally, FDLR. However, some Mayi-Mayi groups defected or declined to integrate into the FARDC and fought alongside the FDLR against the FARDC from March onwards. Among these groups unwilling to integrate were the PARECO Mayi-Mayi faction led by Colonel Sikuli Lafontaine, the Mayi-Mayi Kifwafwa group, and a Mayi-Mayi militia of the Hunde ethnic group called Alliance of Patriots for a Free and Sovereign Congo (APCLS). For example, on May 18 and 19, Mayi-Mayi militias attacked a FARDC camp and a police station in North Kivu province. APCLS, the strongest non-integrated Mayi-Mayi faction, accused the integrated CNDP of targeting both Mayi-Mayi groups and civilians, e.g. committing a massacre in mainly Hunde-populated Lukweti in North Kivu. Other Mayi-Mayi factions clashed with the FDLR, e.g. in South Kivu in mid-September, leaving eleven dead. (nh, sk)

### Eritrea - Djibouti

Intensity: <b>2</b>	Change: ▾	Start: 1995
Conflict parties:	Eritrea vs. Djibouti	
Conflict items:	territory	

The border conflict between Eritrea and Djibouti deescalated but remained unresolved. The conflict centered on an un-demarcated border in an area known as Ras

Doumeirah, where armed forces of the two countries had clashed in June 2008. On January 14, the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 1862, welcoming Djibouti's withdrawal to its positions before the dispute and condemning Eritrea's refusal to follow suit. The UNSC gave Eritrea a five-week ultimatum to withdraw its forces from the disputed border region. Eritrea, however, missed the deadline and did not withdraw its forces to pre-conflict positions. In October, Djibouti's Foreign Minister accused Eritrea of arming and training militias to carry out sabotage acts in Djibouti. Eritrea repeatedly denied the accusations. (ahe)

### Ethiopia (ONLF/Ogaden)

Intensity: <b>4</b>	Change: ↗	Start: 1984
Conflict parties:	ONLF vs. government	
Conflict items:	secession, resources	

The conflict between the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and the government escalated. The ONLF fought for the independence of the predominantly Muslim-inhabited Ogaden region bordering on Somalia. Repeatedly, the rebels warned oil companies against exploring oil and gas in Ogaden. The ONLF accused the government of shelling areas near the towns Gebo Gebo and Farmadow with combat helicopters for several days, starting on 12/05/08. Government forces clashed with ONLF fighters in Dannod district, Wardher region, in eastern Ethiopia on 12/10/08, leaving at least ten people dead. A week later, the ONLF claimed that government forces had killed 50 civilians in an attack on Moohaya, a village in southeast Ethiopia. The government denied this. On January 22, the government claimed to have killed a senior ONLF leader. Clashes broke out between government forces and ONLF rebels on February 20, and the ONLF claimed 140 soldiers had been killed. The government denied this, saying 40 rebels had been killed by local clan militias. On March 6, the regional administration announced that at least 20 soldiers had been killed in heavy clashes with ONLF fighters in the Dhagax-buur region. The ONLF said the fighting had started on February 4 and was still going on, adding that the troops engaged in combat had been redeployed to Ethiopia from southern Somalia. The Ethiopian military denied these claims and any involvement in combat actions, saying the fighting had taken place between local militias and local terrorists. On March 8, the ONLF claimed victory in a fight with government troops in Mustahil town. The following day, the ONLF announced its capture of Mustahil and that fighting for the towns of Wardher and Khalavo was in progress, saying 80 soldiers had been killed. ONLF officials rejected government claims that ONLF rebels had been defeated in recent fights. On April 9, the ONLF refuted government claims that it had been weakened by a military offensive. On July 7, the Ethiopian government adopted a new anti-terrorism bill criticized by human rights groups for its broad definition of terrorism. The same day, the ONLF claimed to have killed 90 soldiers in combat operations in the Korahe, Jarar and Jijiga regions. On August 2 the ONLF accused government forces of committing massacres against civilians in the Ogaden region. On

September 1, the ONLF called upon the African Union to include the Ogaden conflict in the continent's conflict issues agenda. Several soldiers were killed in clashes with ONLF fighters between late August and early September. Police forces attacked alleged ONLF rebels on a train near the Djibouti border on September 24; several policemen were killed. On October 1, the government announced the ONLF was no longer active, and there was no risk for oil and gas exploring in the Ogaden region. The ONLF claimed to have killed dozens of soldiers in early October. On October 17, the government announced the surrender of an ONLF leader, leading to the seizure of some four tons of explosive material. This claim was denied by the ONLF. On October 21, ONLF announced it had won a battle with government troops in the Ogaden region, and killed over 100 soldiers. On November 12, ONLF claimed the capture of several military bases and freeing of seven towns in the Ogaden region. Allegedly, the ONLF was also active in Somalia. Islamist insurgents in December 2008 announced an attack on ONLF fighters in the Dobl district, lower Jubba Region of Somalia. The ONLF denied this, as it had no troops in Somalia. In September the ONLF also denied reports that its rebels had helped Al-Shabaab insurgents seize the town Yeed in southwestern Somalia [→ Somalia (Islamist groups)]. On October 8, Ethiopian troops and Puntland security forces arrested suspected ONLF members in a raid in Gaalkacyo, central Somalia. On November 16, a spokesman of the local administration accused ONLF rebels of conducting joint attacks with Hizbul-Islam fighters in the Xagar district in lower Jubba region, southern Somalia. (ng)

### Ethiopia (opposition)

Intensity: <b>2</b>	Change: •	Start: 2005
Conflict parties:	CUD, UEDF, Ginglo 7 vs. government	
Conflict items:	national power	

The conflict over national power between the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) and United Ethiopian Democratic Forces (UEDF), one the hand, and the government, on the other, continued. The UEDF was part of the opposition block Ginglo 7. On April 24, the government accused Ginglo 7 of plotting a coup d'état. Subsequently, several members of Ginglo 7 were indicted for being involved in the plot. Among the indicted were Berhanu Nega of the CUD, Melaku Tefera, and General Tefera Mamo. Denying the charges against its members, Ginglo 7 accused the government of having fabricated the alleged coup in order to crack down on the opposition ahead of the elections scheduled for 2010. In November, the Federal High Court found 39 defendants guilty and acquitted five. Amid the tense relations between the government and opposition groups, reports indicated an ethnic dimension of the conflict. Allegedly, almost all military commanders of Amhara descent, among them alleged coup plotter General Mamo, were replaced with officers of northern or Tigrayan descent, the ethnic group of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. (rs)

## Gabon (opposition)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: <b>NEW</b>	Start: 2009
Conflict parties:	opposition vs. government	
Conflict items:	national power	

A new violent power conflict erupted between opposition groups and the government. On June 8, President Omar Bongo died after ruling for 41 years. According to Transparency International and opposition groups, huge parts of the national budget had been embezzled. Omar Bongo's son Ali succeeded him as head of the ruling party Gabon Democratic Party (GDP) and announced to run for presidency in the elections on August 30. The opposition movement strongly criticized this move. In the run-up to the elections, Bongo was accused of massive electoral fraud, especially the implausibly high number of voters in the election list, and corruption. In the morning of September 3, police forces violently dissolved a gathering of several thousand opposition followers waiting for the upcoming election results with tear gas and police batons in the capital, Libreville. Opposition leader and presidential candidate Pierre Mamboundou was seriously injured, and two of his bodyguards were killed. The same day, after Bongo had been declared winner of the election, street battles erupted between government forces and members of the opposition movement in Libreville and Port Gentil. In Port Gentil, opposition supporters torched the French consulate, a depot of the French oil company Total, and a police station. Later on, several hundred protesters attacked a prison, freeing detainees, and seized the town centre. In reaction, a curfew was imposed on Port Gentil. On September 4, France put its troops stationed in Gabon on alert. The following day, protesters blocked main roads in the eastern part of Port Gentil. At least three protesters died, and 300 were arrested. On September 7, the government rejected a proposed AU mission to ease the situation in Gabon, and, three days later, imposed a travel ban on opposition leaders. On September 11, the opposition movement called for a general strike. The opposition demanded an international investigation into the security forces' crackdown in Port Gentil, and accused the security forces of having dumped the corpses of their victims into the sea. On October 12, the Supreme Court upheld Bongos' election victory. The opposition rejected the decision of the court and called for civil disobedience. On October 16, Bongo was sworn in as president. (ng)

## Guinea (opposition)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: •	Start: 2006
Conflict parties:	opposition, unions vs. government	
Conflict items:	national power	

The conflict over national power in Guinea remained violent. Following years of illness, President Lansana Conté died on 12/22/08, putting an end to his 24 year reign. Hours after his death, a group of mid-ranking army officers seized power and established the National Council for Democracy and Development (CNDD), led by Captain Moussa Dadis Camara. In early January, the African Union (AU) and the Economic Council of

Western African States (ECOWAS) suspended Guinea's membership due to the coup. On January 14, Camara appointed his new cabinet, which included both military and civilian personnel, under civilian Kabine Komara as Prime Minister. The International Contact Group on Guinea (ICG-G), consisting of numerous representatives from regional and international organizations, proposed a four-step transition process aimed at restoring constitutional rule at its first meeting with the junta in February. On March 28, Camara set the date for presidential and legislative election for late 2009, excluding members of the junta from running for office. Junta members and representatives of political parties, unions, and civil society agreed to establish a National Transition Council, which, however, was eventually blocked by military leaders. The CNDD arrested numerous key figures of the old regime, among others former Prime Minister Tidiane Souaré. On April 23, two army officers and more than 20 soldiers were arrested for an alleged coup. In August, Camara postponed elections, now scheduled for January and March 2010. Camara did not rule running for presidency out. After rising protests in September, the armed forces violently suppressed large scale demonstrations in the capital Conakry on September 28, killing 157 civilians. Human rights groups reported mass rapes and systematic sexual violence. Camara denied any involvement in the incident, accusing army dissidents of being responsible for the massacre, and called for a national unity government. This was rejected by the umbrella group of Guinean opposition parties, Le Forum des Forces Vives de Guinea, calling on the junta to step down, and refusing to negotiate until an investigation into the bloody crackdown was undertaken. In October, ECOWAS, AU, and EU imposed sanctions as well as an arms embargo. The International Criminal Court and the UN began to investigate. In November, reports indicated the junta was establishing militia forces, recruited from the ethnic group Camara belonged to and trained by South African mercenaries. (som)

## Kenya (ethnic groups)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: •	Start: 1991
Conflict parties:	Garre vs. Murule vs. Pokot vs. Turkana, Sambaru vs. Somali, Borana vs. Nyabasi vs. Buirege	
Conflict items:	regional predominance, resources	

The violent conflict over resources between various ethnic groups continued. Drought led to increased cattle-rustling in Kenya's northern regions. At least eight people were killed and dozens displaced in a livestock raid by 300 members of the Pokot ethnic group against members of the Turkana ethnic group in the northwestern district of Turkana Central on 12/01/08. In January, at least 40 people died in fighting between Somali and Samburu pastoralists as well as between Orma and Wardei communities in drought-affected pastoralist areas of north-eastern Kenya. In late February, police forces and paramilitary troops were deployed to northern Kenya. Dozens of civilians were injured and more than 2,000 people displaced in their operation against cattle-rustlers in early March. On June 2, at least nine people were



killed and several injured in a livestock raid and clashes between Borana and Somali communities, on the one hand, and Samburu and Turkana, on the other, along the northern Isiolo-Samburu district border. Some 815 cattle, 500 goats and 36 camels were allegedly stolen by Turkana. Tensions flared up from 27 to 28 June, when Pokot clashed with other communities in the northeastern Sipilii area. Five people were killed and hundreds of families displaced. Tensions over water and pasture led to fighting between Borana and Somali communities, on the one hand, and Samburu and Turkana communities, on the other, near the northern town of Isiolo on 18 July, leaving 20 dead and at least 1,700 families displaced. Large numbers of security forces were deployed to the district. On August 7, three people were killed in fighting over pasture and water resources in northeastern Samburu Central district. On August 11, over 500 Pokot youths armed with AK47 rifles struck Kalimngorok village in northeastern Turkana South District, killing 16 people. Tensions also flared up in the southwestern district of Kuria East near the Tanzania border in late May. After two people were killed in a cattle-rustling incident between the Nyabasi and Buirege clans of the pastoralist Kuria ethnic community, a retaliation attack left two other people dead and several houses burned. At least 6,000 people were displaced and over 700 houses burned by the end of June. (kaa)

### Kenya (Mungiki sect)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: •	Start: 2002
Conflict parties:	Mungiki sect vs. government	
Conflict items:	national power, regional predominance	

The conflict over regional predominance between the banned traditionalist Mungiki sect and the government remained violent. After an attack in late November 2008 had left ten people dead, President Mwai Kibaki ordered a crackdown on the sect on 12/06/08. A special anti-Mungiki unit was deployed to the town of Othaya to search for the sect's leaders. In the following weeks, the squad arrested 21 suspected Mungiki members as well as one of the alleged leaders. On February 22, a spokesman of the sect's political wing, the Youth Alliance Council, claimed that police forces had killed more than 1,000 youths since June 2006. Two days later, the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights claimed to have evidence of an anti-Mungiki operation in which police had killed 500 youths. On February 25, Philip Alston, UN rapporteur on mass killings, recommended the dismissal of Attorney General Amos Wako and Police Commissioner Major General Hussein Ali over widespread extra-judicial killings of suspected sect members in 2007. On March 5, protests of the Mungiki sect disrupted public transport in Nairobi and Central Province. Two Mungiki members were killed by residents in Thika town, and 50 were arrested. On March 5, two prominent activists against police killings were assassinated by unknown gunmen in Nairobi, only hours after the government had accused their organization of having links to Mungiki. On April 11, residents of Kirinyaga District, central Kenya, lynched three alleged sect members who demanded protection fees. On April

21, Mungiki members hacked to death 29 people in a retaliation attack. Police forces arrested over 60 suspects in connection with the attacks. Local vigilante groups started searching for suspected Mungiki members in central Kenya, killing least 15 suspected members from April 11 to 23. On April 22, Prime Minister Odinga announced the government would take action against criminal gangs. On April 24, the government sent in a new squad to Kirinyaga West and Nyeri East districts to persecute sect members. From April 24 to 25, shootouts between police forces and sect members left at least ten people dead. On April 29, the government launched a major security operation aimed at arresting the Mungiki sect's main leaders and compiled a list of politicians and businessmen involved in Mungiki activities. In the course of this operation, police in Nyandarua District arrested 98 Mungiki suspects on May 4. The clashes between Mungiki and vigilantes in the Kirinyaga and Nyeri regions continued unabatedly until end of June. Allegedly, more than 80 people were killed. On October 24, police released Mungiki leader Maina Njenga from jail after he had been acquitted of murder charges for the killings in April. Njenga appealed to his followers to practice peace. On November 5, Mungiki spokesman Njuguna Gitau was shot dead by unknown gunmen after indicating he would disband the movement. (kaa)

### Kenya (opposition)

Intensity: <b>2</b>	Change: ↓	Start: 1999
Conflict parties:	ODM vs. PNU	
Conflict items:	national power	

The power conflict between the two coalition parties, the Party of National Unity (PNU) and the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), deescalated. While PNU was mainly supported by members of the Kikuyu ethnic group, ODM was supported by Luo and Kelanjin. On 12/17/08, President Mwai Kibaki, from PNU, and Prime Minister Raila Odinga, from ODM, signed an agreement to set up a special tribunal to try suspects responsible for the post-election violence in early 2008. The Waki commission, established by parliament to investigate the violence, had posed a March 1 deadline for setting up the tribunal. Otherwise, a sealed list of suspects, presumably featuring high-rank government officials, would be forwarded to the International Criminal Court (ICC) by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. On 12/17/08, the parliament formed a committee under a PNU chairman to develop a constitutional reform and an independent electoral commission. A week later, Kibaki disbanded the electoral commission of Kenya (ECK). Later, however, he nominated ECK officials for the interim election commission, sparking protest by ODM. In February, the government failed to pass the amendment to entrench the tribunal into the constitution. On February 17, Odinga stated that Annan had indicated he would wait with forwarding the list of suspects until Kenya had exhausted its options to set up the tribunal, even if this should mean missing the deadline. UN special envoy on mass killings Philip Alston visited Kenya to investigate the post-election killings. He accused the security forces of systematic extra judicial killings since 2007 [→

Kenya (Mungiki Sect)]. ODM called for coalition renegotiations on March 3, which was rejected by PNU. In April, Kibaki accused Odinga of planning a coup. On June 18, Annan extended the deadline until the end of August. He handed over the suspect list to ICC prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo on July 9 to increase pressure on the government. On August 31, Kibaki unlawfully ordered the reappointment of Aaron Ringera as director of the anti-corruption commission, sparking protests by ODM MPs and demonstrations. For the first time in its history, the parliament voted against a presidential order and Ringera resigned at the end of September. President Kibaki restructured senior police ranks due to international condemnation of police violence following Alston's report. At the end of September, the US threatened to impose visa ban on 15 top government officials and to block aid if they continued to hinder reforms. After no agreement on the tribunal could be reached, ICC prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo on September 30 called for an ICC prosecution of the worst offenders, a special tribunal set up by parliament for other perpetrators, and a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. On November 5, Moreno-Ocampo formally requested ICC judges to open investigation. (kaa)

### Madagascar (TGV - TIM)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: <b>NEW</b>	Start: 2009
Conflict parties:	TGV vs. TIM	
Conflict items:	national power	

In January, a violent power conflict between Andry Rajoelina, mayor of the capital Antananarivo, and his party Young Malagasies Determined (TGV), on the one hand, and President Marc Ravalomanana and his party I Love Madagascar (TIM), on the other, ensued. In late December 2008, Rajoelina's TV network Viva was shut down after airing an interview with ousted ex-president Didier Ratsiraka. On January 26, some 40,000 participated in anti-government protests called for by Rajoelina. Attacks on state media stations and businesses linked to Ravalomanana on January 26 and 27 caused at least 69 deaths. Rajoelina declared himself in charge of national affairs on January 31. The government dismissed Rajoelina on February 3 after the latter had announced plans to appoint an interim government. On February 7, the presidential guard opened fire on a crowd demonstrating in front of the presidential palace. At least 25 protesters were killed and 167 wounded. Defense Minister Cecile Manorohanta resigned in protest on February 9. Despite talks between the two contenders, mass demonstrations continued. By March, at least 135 people had been killed in protests and riots. On March 16, dissident troops allied with Rajoelina replaced the military leadership and took control of the presidential palace and the central bank. The following day, Ravelomanana handed over power to high-ranking military officers, who in turn transferred official duties to Rajoelina. On March 20, the AU suspended Madagascar's membership in protest, followed by the SADC on March 30. States of the region as well as the USA and the EU denounced the takeover as a coup d'état. Ravelomanana went into exile in Swaziland. In early April, Rajoelina ap-

pointed the members of a new government called High Authority of Transition (HAT) and announced a constitutional referendum for September 2009, as well as legislative and presidential elections for March and October 2010, respectively. Ravalomanana reiterated his claim to be the legal president and appointed a parallel prime minister on April 16. The latter was arrested on April 29, and a warrant was issued for Ravalomanana. On April 20, two protesters were killed in clashes between Ravalomanana supporters and the police in the capital. The same day, the HAT banned all public demonstrations. However, protests by pro-Ravalomanana activists persisted throughout the next months. In the second half of June, an Antananarivo court sentenced Ravalomanana to four years in prison and a USD 70 million fine for corruption. UN, SADC, and the International Francophone Organization formed an International Contact Group to mediate between the conflict parties. Beginning on May 20, the group mediated talks between Ravalomanana and Rajoelina, as well as former presidents Ratsiraka and Albert Zafy. However, the four parties could not agree on the composition of a transitional government. On June 16, the talks collapsed as Rajoelina rejected an amnesty clause for Ravalomanana and Ratsiraka. New talks were held in Maputo, Mozambique, from August 5 to 14. On August 9, the four parties agreed to form a power-sharing transitional government by September 8 and to hold national elections within 15 months. Again, no agreement could be reached on the leadership of the government. A second round of talks held from August 25 to 28 yielded no results. On September 8, Rajoelina unilaterally formed a government immediately rejected by the other parties. On October 6, Rajoelina agreed to cede the post of prime minister to Ratsiraka's camp and the post of vice president to Zafy's camp. However, Ravalomanana rejected Rajoelina's presidency. Another round of talks held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, started on November 4 and ended with the signing of an agreement on November 7. Under this agreement, Rajoelina stayed president, while there would be two additional co-presidents hailing from the Ravalomanana and the Zafy camps, respectively. As stipulated before, the post of prime minister went to Ratsiraka's camp. The new Prime Minister Eugene Regis Mangalaza took office on November 13. Four days later, the UN Security Council endorsed the agreement and urged the four parties to proceed with the creation of a power-sharing government. However, the inauguration of the Unity Government scheduled for November 21 was postponed since the parties could not agree on a distribution of the government portfolios. On November 30, Rajoelina declined to take part in talks aiming at the resolution of the deadlock scheduled for December 3 and 4 in Maputo. (sk)


### Mali (AQIM)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: <b>NEW</b>	Start: 2009
Conflict parties:	AQIM vs. government	
Conflict items:	regional predominance	

A new violent conflict erupted between the al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the government. AQIM militants used the northern Malian

desert as a staging area and support base. AQIM repeatedly abducted tourists in the Malian desert bordering Mauritania [→ Mauritania (AQIM)], Algeria [→ Algeria (AQIM)] and Niger. On January 23, AQIM abducted four tourists near the border between Niger and Mali. On February 23, security forces detained an Islamist preacher allegedly involved in the abduction. On February 25, Mali customs seized weapons destined for AQIM. On March 16, security chiefs and government ministers from Sahel states met in Mali, discussing plans for joint measures to fight insurgent groups. On March 23, a Nigerien, who had been kidnapped alongside with a UN special envoy and his aide in Niger in 2008, was released in Mali by AQIM. On March 28, AQIM demanded the release of 20 of its members detained in Mali and other countries as a precondition for the release of six Western hostages. On April 22, two Canadian diplomats, one of them UN Special Envoy Robert Fowler, and two European tourists were released by AQIM. On April 26, government forces skirmished with suspected AQIM members in northern Mali; four people were arrested. On May 5, Algeria sent military equipment to support Mali in preparation for a joint operation of states around the Sahara desert to engage AQIM militants. On May 9, the government launched an operation against AQIM militants close to its borders with Algeria and Niger. On May 31, a British hostage was killed by AQIM militants. A senior intelligence officer was killed by suspected AQIM militants in Timbuktu on June 5. Reportedly, the officer had played a significant role in the arrest of several AQIM members. On June 7, the government declared an all out war against AQIM. On June 17, the government claimed to have captured a suspected al-Qaeda base near the Algerian border. At least 16 militants died and five soldiers were killed by landmines. From July 3 to 4, government forces clashed with AQIM militants near Tessalit, leaving dozens of people dead and about 20 soldiers missing. On July 8, AQIM claimed the killing of 28 soldiers and the abduction of three captives in the clashes near Tessalit. On July 12, the last Western hostage was released by AQIM. On July 20, the Alliance for Democracy and Change [→Mali (Tuareg/Kidal)] agreed to support the army in tackling AQIM. Three soldiers were released by AQIM on August 12. The same day, the army chiefs of Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger held a security meeting in Tamanrasset, Algeria, on a common strategy against AQIM. On September 16, security forces intercepted arms traffickers allegedly supplying AQIM. On October 20, the US government announced plans to boost military assistance to Mali against AQIM. (ng)

### Mali (Tuareg/Kidal)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: 	Start: 1989
Conflict parties:	various Tuareg rebel groups vs. government	
Conflict items:	autonomy, resources	

The conflict between various Tuareg rebel groups and the government deescalated. The Tuareg, who demanded greater autonomy as well as a reallocation of resources, were mainly located in the Kidal region, on the Niger border. Niger also faced a Tuareg insurgency

[→Niger (Tuareg/Agadez)]. On 12/14/08, Mali's president Amadou Toumani Touré called on northern Tuareg rebel groups to lay down arms, or sign the ceasefire agreement of September 2008. However, the Northern Mali Tuareg Alliance for Change (ATNMC), led by Ibrahim Ag Bahanga, still refused to sign the deal. On 12/20/2008, the ATNMC raided an army base in Nampala, close to the Mauritanian border. At least 20 people were killed and several taken hostage. On January 2, two people were reportedly killed when ATNMC rebels shelled the house of an MP in Gao with grenades. In late January, the government claimed to have destroyed the ATNMC's main and three other bases around the northern town Tinsalak between January 12 and 23, leaving 31 people dead. The ATNMC stated the base had been abandoned. On January 23, Ag Bahanga fled to Libya. On February 17, some 600 Tuareg rebels laid down their arms in a demobilization ceremony in Kidal, northern Mali. On March 15, the head of the African Union, Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi called on Tuareg rebels in Niger and Mali to disarm and join the peace process. In late July, the Tuareg rebel group Alliance for Democracy and Change (ADC) signed a new peace deal with the government under Algerian auspices. The ADC agreed to support the government in counter-insurgency operations against Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb [→Mali (AQIM)], which was active in the northern regions of Mali. On October 6, a peace deal mediated by Gaddafi was signed between the governments of Mali and Niger on the one hand and Tuareg rebels on the other. On the following day, dozens of Tuareg rebels from Mali and Niger laid down their arm at a demobilization ceremony in Lybia. (ng)

### Niger (opposition)

Intensity: <b>2</b>	Change: <b>NEW</b>	Start: 2009
Conflict parties:	opposition vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, national power	

A new conflict between opposition groups and the government emerged when President Mamadou Tandja attempted to extend his mandate beyond the constitutional maximum of two terms. On May 26, Tandja dissolved the parliament, which had opposed his plans of another term in office. On June 12, the constitutional court rejected Tandja's plan to hold a referendum on a new constitution, which did not set a term for the president. On June 26, the court reaffirmed this ruling. Three days later, Tandja dissolved the court and granted himself extra-constitutional powers. In protest to this move, the Democratic and Social Convention party left the government. On July 5, tens of thousands demonstrated in the capital, Niamey, against the planned referendum on a new constitution. Twenty political parties and civil society groups formed an anti-referendum coalition. The referendum, which was held on August 4, was boycotted by opposition movements. According to the government, the new constitution was approved of in the referendum. On October 16, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) imposed an arms embargo on Niger. On October 19, parliamentary elections were held, which were boycotted by the opposition. ECOWAS

suspended Niger's membership on October 20 for violating ECOWAS pacts on democracy. In addition, the EU suspended development programs with the country on November 6, demanding a return to constitutional order.

(rs)

### Nigeria (Boko Haram)

Intensity: <b>4</b>	Change: <b>↑</b>	Start: 2004
Conflict parties:	Boko Haram vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology	

The system conflict between an Islamist sect led by Us-taz Mohammed Yusuf and the government escalated in Northern Nigeria. The sect, referred to as Boko Haram, was radically opposed to Western education and wanted the Sharia to be adopted all across Nigeria. Following to the authorities' non-approval of a Boko Haram demonstration, hundreds of sect followers, armed with machetes, home-made hunting rifles, and petrol bombs, destroyed a police station in Bauchi, capital of Bauchi state, on July 26. The ensuing fighting between sect members and deployed security forces caused at least 200 fatalities, mostly Boko Haram followers. On July 27, violence spread to Boko Haram's main residence Maidiguri, capital of Borno state, as well as to Yobe, Gombe, and Kano states, as hundreds of the sect's followers attacked state and religious facilities. In Maidiguri, Boko Haram members armed with bows and other weapons attacked the state police headquarter as well as the central prison, and burnt down churches and mosques. Sect followers razed houses and vehicles, causing scores of civilian fatalities. Subsequent heavy clashes with joint military and police forces claimed more than 200 lives. Borno State Governor Ali Modu Sheriff ordered a night curfew in the city. In Kano state, Boko Haram members attacked several police stations. More than 50 people were killed. In Potiskum, Yobe state, police forces shot dead at least 33 sect followers after they had attacked police posts and churches. Nigerian President Umaru Yar' Adua ordered a crackdown on the sect the same day. On July 28, military and police patrols searching for Boko Haram followers freed around 95 women and children from a sect compound in Maidiguri. Two days later, police forces arrested Boko Haram leader Yusuf. He was shot dead the same day. According to official statements, he had been trying to escape custody, whereas Human rights groups condemned the incident as an extrajudicial killing. On August 4, President Yar'Adua ordered an investigation in the circumstances of Yusuf's death. Altogether, more than 700 people were killed in the five-day upsurge. (de)

### Nigeria (Christians - Muslims)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: <b>↘</b>	Start: 1960
Conflict parties:	Christian groups vs. Muslim groups	
Conflict items:	system/ideology	

The conflict between Christian and Muslim communities in northern Nigeria deescalated but remained violent. On February 20, disputes between two Muslim groups over the ownership of a mosque in Bauchi, capital of the northern Bauchi state, sparked violence against civil-

ians, especially Christian residents. The following two days of clashes claimed at least 14 lives and displaced over 4,500 people. Various youth groups looted shops, set houses on fire, and burnt several mosques as well as churches in Bauchi. The government put security forces on alert in several northern states to prevent violence from spreading to neighboring states, especially to Plateau's capital Jos, where massive inter-religious clashes had left more than 600 dead in November 2008. On April 12, clashes erupted when a group of Muslims in Gwada, Niger state, allegedly disrupted a procession by local Christians. The unrest resulted in scores of injured, two burnt churches, and a burnt mosque. Police forces charged 115 suspects with disturbance of the public peace, arson, and theft. On September 18, at least one protester was killed and twelve were injured in clashes with police forces after a religious celebration of Shiites had turned violent in Zaria in the northern state of Kaduna. (de)


### Nigeria (MEND, Ijaw/Niger Delta)

Intensity: <b>4</b>	Change: <b>•</b>	Start: 1998
Conflict parties:	MEND, Ijaw, NDV vs. government	
Conflict items:	autonomy, resources	

The conflict in the Niger Delta over autonomy and the distribution of oil revenues between various Ijaw rebel groups and the government remained violent. On 12/26/08, security forces arrested Sobomabo Jackrich, a leader of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). On January 31, MEND called off a unilateral ceasefire that had been announced in September 2008. In February, militants launched three attacks on oil facilities in the Niger Delta, which were repelled by security forces. In response, the army raided a MEND camp in Bayelsa State on February 27, killing several MEND fighters. On April 13, MEND rebels attacked a navy position close to a Royal Dutch Shell flow station in the southern state of Bayelsa, killing three soldiers and abducting four. Government soldiers repelled an attack against an army patrol on April 22, shooting three militants. On May 14, MEND announced an all-out offensive against oil installations and staff, and hijacked two oil vessels, killing at least one person and abducting 22. In reaction, the government launched a 10-day major offensive involving several hundred soldiers, combat helicopters, and gunboats near Warri, the capital of Delta State. The main target of this, the biggest military campaign since 2006, was the MEND faction led by Government Tompolo. Allegedly, the offensive caused hundreds of casualties and displaced several thousand. On May 25, MEND fighters blew up Chevron oil pipelines, causing the shut-in of 100,000 barrels a day. In early June, Nigerian forces destroyed two more of Tompolo's camps in Western Niger Delta. MEND fighters carried out seven attacks on oil installations and pipelines in the same month. On June 25, President Umaru Yar'Adua offered an amnesty to Niger Delta gunmen who lay down their weapons and took part in rehabilitation programs by October 4 at the latest. The offer was accepted in principle by four main MEND leaders on June 26. However, the detailed conditions of disarmament remained con-


tested. In early July, ten attacks on oil facilities mostly in the Western Niger Delta, conducted by MEND, reduced the oil output by at least 300,000 barrels a day. On July 9, imprisoned MEND leader Henry Okah accepted the amnesty offer. On July 13 in the city of Lagos, MEND fighters carried out an attack on a loading dock for oil tankers, killing five people, its first attack outside the Niger Delta. The same day, Okah was released from prison. In reaction, MEND declared a 60-day ceasefire. In August, MEND-leader Ebikabowei Victor Ben alias Boyloaf accepted the amnesty offer together with around 1,700 fighters, and disarmed. The factions of MEND leaders Ateke Tom and Farah Dagogo accepted the amnesty offer on October 3, and Tompolo followed on October 4. Along with their leaders, 15,000 fighters laid down their arms. Remaining MEND members threatened to resume attacks in early October but finally declared an indefinite ceasefire on October 25. In early November, hundreds of former gunmen protested in Port Harcourt due to the delay in the payment of their demobilization fee. The ex-militants looted shops, raided houses, and attacked the university. On November 14, peace talks between President Yar'adua and MEND representatives started. (de)

### Nigeria (MOSOP, Ogoni/ Niger Delta)

Intensity: <b>1</b>	Change: 	Start: 1990
Conflict parties:	MOSOP, Ogoni vs. government	
Conflict items:	autonomy, resources	

The conflict between the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) and the government over the allocation of oil revenues continued. On June 8, the oil company Shell agreed to pay USD 15.5 million to settle several lawsuits in a US court. In the lawsuits, Shell was accused of abusing human rights, e.g. in connection with the 1995 hangings of prominent activist Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other protesters by the then military government. In a statement, Shell explained it provided the money as a humanitarian gesture, but reiterated Shell had had no part in the violence that took place. USD 5 million would go into a trust for the benefit of the Ogoni people. The rest of the money would go to lawyer's fees and compensation for the families. MOSOP leader Ledum Mitee said on June 9 that it would take much time and effort for Shell to calm the anger of the Ogoni people. (de)


### Nigeria - Cameroon (Bakassi)

Intensity: <b>1</b>	Change: 	Start: 1961
Conflict parties:	Nigeria vs. Cameroon	
Conflict items:	territory, resources	

The conflict concerning the Bakassi peninsula and the sea border between Nigeria and Cameroon continued. On June 17, officials of both countries met with UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in New York to discuss the steps remaining to the handover of the Bakassi peninsula to Cameroon, focusing on the dispute over the demarcation of their common border. On October 12, Prince Bola Ajibola, leader of the Nigerian delegation to the Nigeria-Cameroon Mixed Commission, lodged a

formal complaint against the continuing harassment of Nigerians by Cameroonian gendarmes in the Bakassi area [→ Cameroon (insurgents/Bakassi)] and appealed to the International Observer Group to visit all the peninsula's areas. Later in October, Director-General of the Cross River State Border Communities Development Commission Leo Aggrey accused Cameroon of violating the Green Tree Agreement, which set the terms for the handover of the Bakassi peninsula. He announced his intention to seek a review of the ICJ judgment in line with court procedure. (jos)

### Rwanda (various Hutu rebel groups)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: 	Start: 1990
Conflict parties:	FDLR, ex-FAR, oppositional Hutu groups vs. government	
Conflict items:	national power	

The conflict between oppositional Hutu-groups and the Tutsi-dominated government remained violent. On 12/05/08, the foreign ministers of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) signed an agreement to join forces against the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) [→ DR Congo (FDLR)]. The FDLR originated from Rwandan Hutu-militants, partly involved in the genocide of 1994, who had fled to eastern Zaire, now DRC. On January 20, Rwandan troops crossed the border with the DRC for a joint five-week military operation with the Congolese armed forces (FARDC) against the FDLR. Rwanda began withdrawing its troops on February 25. According to the joint military command, more than 90 FDLR rebels had been killed and 140 had surrendered. On February 27, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) prosecutor, Hassan Jallow, identified 13 key genocide suspects in the region, who still remained free. Gregoire Ndahimana, indicted by the ICTR for his role in the Rwandan genocide, was captured by FARDC troops on August 9 and handed over to the court on September 20. The UN mission in the DRC, MONUC, announced on October 16 that 1,126 FDLR combatants and 1,622 of their dependents had been repatriated to Rwanda since the beginning of 2009. Over the course of the year, at least 19 people were injured in grenade attacks on the Gisozi Genocide Memorial Centre in the capital, Kigali, e.g. on 12/28/08 in an assault allegedly connected to the FDLR. During the Genocide Remembrance Week in April, Hutus allegedly killed two people for ethnic reasons. According to the Rwandan army, the FDLR bombed Rwandan territory on March 23. On 12/30/08, the secretariat of the Gacaca-Tribunals, established in 2001 in the wake of the genocide, declared it would have completed all 10,581 cases by its expiration at the end of 2009. According to the government, about 300 Hutus fearing the Gacaca jurisdiction fled to Burundi between July and October. On June 14, the Rwandan chief prosecutor called on the ICTR to focus on the completion of the remaining cases instead of pursuing an extension of the mandate. In early July, the Rwandan government expressed its discontent with the ICTR's decision to transfer nine convicts to Benin. (sw0)

### Senegal (MFDC-Sadio/Casamance)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: •	Start: 1982
Conflict parties:	MFDC-Sadio, MFDC-Badiate vs. government	
Conflict items:	secession	

The secession conflict between the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) and the government continued. The assassination of Guinea-Bissau's President Joao Bernardo Vieira and Army Chief of Staff Na Wai [→ Guinea-Bissau (opposition)], who had defeated the MFDC's southern faction, raised fears about the reemergence of this faction. From early May to mid-June, suspected MFDC rebels carried out more than 20 car-jackings and lootings in the northwestern region of Casamance, leaving at least four persons injured. Two attacks in Kataba on June 4, northwest of the regional capital Ziguinchor, claimed at least three civilians' lives. The army started two operations against rebel hideouts near Ziguinchor on August 21 and 25 employing grenade launchers and artillery. Scores of people fled their homes. The same day, two people were killed and two others injured when MFDC fighters opened fire on a bus near Badiana in the northwestern part of Casamance. On September 3, MFDC rebels carried out an attack on a military post in Diabir, killing one soldier and injuring another. The following day, a military jet bombed MFDC bases near Ziguinchor in retaliation. At least 600 people were displaced. On September 6, a group of public officials called for new talks between government and rebels. In one of the worst attacks in recent years, MFDC rebels attacked an army patrol near the border to Guinea-Bissau on October 2, killing six soldiers and wounding three. On October 26, army forces clashed with suspected rebels when they intervened in a raid on Bessire village, northwest of Ziguinchor. (she)

### Somalia (al-Shabaab - Hizbul Islam)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: <b>NEW</b>	Start: 2009
Conflict parties:	al-Shabaab vs. Hizbul Islam	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, regional predominance	

A new violent conflict between Islamist rebel movements al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam, an umbrella organization of four Islamist groups led by hard-line cleric Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys [→ Somalia (Islamist)], over the control of territories in southern Somalia erupted, leaving 165 people dead. Al-Shabaab, an al-Qaeda inspired hard-line group, fought for the implementation of a strict form of Islamic law. The group had already imposed strict Sharia law in the areas under their control, i.e. in large parts of the capital Mogadishu and most of central and southern Somalia. In August, the two movements jointly conquered the city of Kismayo, about 300 km south of Mogadishu. The groups then agreed to share power, with each governing the city for six months alternately. However, relations between the conflict parties deteriorated in September when al-Shabaab unilaterally declared a new administration in Kismayo which excluded Hizbul Islam members. On October 1, fighting erupted between the conflict parties. The next day, al-Shabaab claimed its victory. Reportedly, the groups also clashed

in other parts of southern Somalia. In talks on October 7, the conflict parties agreed on a ceasefire. Nevertheless, further fighting erupted on October 21 when Hizbul Islam attacked Al-Shabaab near Kismayo. Reportedly, the group's fighting in September and early October caused 165 fatalities. In mid-October, several hundred insurgent fighters reportedly defected to the government as a consequence of the infighting among the Islamist groups. (jk)

### Somalia (Islamist groups)

Intensity: <b>5</b>	Change: •	Start: 2006
Conflict parties:	Hizbul-Islam, al-Shabaab vs. Transitional Federal Government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, national power	

The system and power conflict between the Islamist rebel groups Hizbul Islam and al-Shabaab, on the one hand, and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), on the other, was fought out as a war for the fourth year running. On 11/25/08, the TFG and the Djibouti-based faction of the Alliance for the Reliberation of Somalia (ARS-D), led by Sheik Sharif Ahmed, reached a power-sharing agreement. The accord envisaged the establishment of a national unity government, presidential elections in January, and an increase of parliamentary seats from 275 to 550, 200 of which were reserved for ARS-D and 75 for civil society groups. In July 2008, the Alliance for the Reliberation of Somalia (ARS), founded in September 2007 as political successor of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), had split into moderate ARS-D and ARS-Eritrea (ARS-E) led by hard-liner Sheik Hassan Dahir Aweys. Opposing the power-sharing agreement, ARS-E merged with three other Islamist groups, namely Jabhatul Islamiya, Ras Kamboni Brigade, and Muaskar Anole, into Hizbul Islam in January 2009. Hizbul-Islam cooperated with al-Shabaab, founded by Aweys as the UIC's militant youth organization in 2004, in fighting the TFG. On 12/29/08, TFG President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed resigned. The speaker of parliament, Sheikh Adan Madobe, was named interim president. The last of the Ethiopian troops, which had backed TFG between 2006 and 2009, left Somalia on January 26. The same day, al-Shabaab took control of Baidoa, the seat of parliament. On January 30, the extended parliament, holding its session in Djibouti for security reasons, elected Ahmed president. On February 13, Ahmed appointed Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmake prime minister. al-Shabaab continued its attacks against the African Union (AU) mission AMISOM troops on February 12. In a major attack on an AMISOM base in Mogadishu, the Somali capital, on February 22, eleven Burundian peacekeepers were killed. From February 24 to 27, AMISOM-backed TFG troops clashed with Hizbul Islam. At least 80 people were killed. Ethiopian forces reportedly returned to Somalia for single combat operations. On March 11, the AU Peace and Security Council extended AMISOM's mandate for another three months. After its return from Djibouti, the Somali parliament held its first meeting in Mogadishu on March 12. On March 20, TFG demanded the UN Security Council send peacekeeping troops. A roadside blast on March

26 injured Interior Minister Sheikh Abdulkadir Ali Omar and killed three others. Further attacks were reported in April. After Awey returned to Mogadishu, Hizbul Islam started an offensive on May 7, taking control of large parts of the capital and nearby strategic points. On May 23, Hizbul Islam fighters opened mortar fire on the presidential palace, killing 200 people and displacing some 46,000. In early June, 123 were reportedly killed in Webho, a town north of Mogadishu, in Hizbul Islam attacks. On June 17, heavy fighting in Mogadishu left 22 people dead, among them the Mogadishu police chief and the director of Shabelle radio station. The next day, Omar Hashi Aden, minister of national security, and 25 others were killed in an al-Shabaab suicide bombing in the strategically important town Beledweyn in central Somalia. The parliament spokesman declared a state of emergency and called for international assistance. Heavy fighting of AMISOM-backed TFG forces against fighters of al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam continued in July, killing 51 people, among them the TFG security director. The TFG declared Beledweyn retaken. The offensive displaced 122,000 people between May and August. In mid-August, TFG troops sought to advance to al-Shabaab controlled territory. During the holy month of Ramadan, August 21 to September 19, the number of clashes increased all over the country, especially in Mogadishu. On September 3, several senior Hizbul Islam figures signaled their readiness to join the TFG administration. However, heavy fighting continued in Mogadishu and southern Somalia. US Special Forces entered southern Somalia in a helicopter raid on September 14, killing alleged al-Qaeda leader Saleh Ali Nabhan and several al-Shabaab insurgents. In an al-Shabaab attack on an AMISOM base in Mogadishu on September 17, twenty peacekeepers and a TFG police chief were killed. Seventeen people died in clashes between TFG forces and al-Shabaab outside the town of Yeed on the Ethiopian border on September 20. Al-Shabaab attacked President Ahmed's plane at Mogadishu airport on October 22. While Ahmed remained unharmed, over 30 people were killed. On October 1, fighting between members of Hizbul Islam and al-Shabaab erupted in the coastal city of Kismayo [→ Somalia (Al-Shabaab - Hizbul Islam)], which they had invaded in a joint operation in August. (jd, ng)

### Somalia (Puntland - Somaliland)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: •	Start: 1998
Conflict parties:	autonomous region of Puntland vs. regional government of Somaliland	
Conflict items:	territory, regional predominance, resources	

The conflict between the self-proclaimed independent state of Somaliland and the autonomous region of Puntland over regional predominance in the Sool and Sanaag territories remained violent. In December 2008, Somaliland installed ballot boxes in Sanaag territory. As a reaction, Somaliland and Puntland deployed troops to the region, near the city of Ceerigaabo, then controlled by Puntland. On January 8, the newly-elected President of Puntland, Abdirahman Mohamud Farole, pledged to re-take control of the disputed territories, and demanded

that Somaliland withdraw its troops. On August 2, Farole announced the start of military operations. At the same time, Somaliland increased the number of its troops in the Sool territories. After a visit of Somaliland officials to the contested Xin Galo District and troop movements in the same area, fighting erupted on October 27. In the aftermath of the violent confrontation, protests against Somaliland flared up in Laas Canood, the main city of the Sool and Sanaag territories. On November 1, three senior military officials of Somaliland were killed by a roadside attack in Laas Canood. However, no one so far claimed responsibility for this attack. (mlu)

### Sudan (Darfur)

Intensity: <b>4</b>	Change: ↘	Start: 2003
Conflict parties:	JEM, SLM/A-AW, SLMA-Unity, SLM/A-United Leadership, SLM/A-Leadership, SLM/A-Mainstream, SLM/A-Juba Unity, SLM/A-Democratic Front, SLM/A-Unity Leadership, SLM/A-RF, URF, DJEM, URFF vs. government, Janjaweed, SLM/A-MM	
Conflict items:	regional predominance, resources	

The conflict over regional predominance and resources in the Darfur region between several rebel movements, on the one hand, and the government and Janjaweed militias, on the other, remained highly violent. The rebel faction of Minni Minawi's Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A-MM), formerly part of the insurgency in Darfur, fought alongside the government. Despite an unconditional ceasefire declared by the Sudanese Government on 11/12/08, fighting flared up in southern Darfur in early 2009. On January 14, Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) clashed with rebels of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) near El-Fasher. The next day, JEM conquered Muhajirya in southern Darfur. The fighting around Muhajirya, including heavy SAF air raids, killed 30 people and displaced 46,000. On February 5, JEM withdrew from Muhajirya. According to the UN, from February 6 to 13, SAF conducted air raids on at least 14 villages in North and South Darfur, violating a UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution that banned offensive military flights in this region. On February 10, peace talks between the government and JEM, the strongest Darfur rebel movement, resumed in Doha, Qatar. Although the conflict parties agreed upon the exchange of prisoners, no ceasefire agreement was reached. Eleven soldiers and 17 rebels were killed in fights between the SAF and JEM in southwestern Darfur on February 19. On the previous day, the SAF had bombed suspected JEM positions near Al-Fasher and attacked positions of the SLM/A-AW in the eastern Marra region. On March 4, the ICC's Pre-Trial Chamber issued an arrest warrant against President Omar al-Bashir for war crimes and crimes against humanity, but rejected charges of genocide. However, the prosecutor general submitted further material to the ICC appeals chamber on July 7, applying for an additional indictment of Al-Bashir on accounts of genocide. In reaction to the indictment of al-Bashir, the government expelled ten humanitarian organizations from Darfur, accusing them of espionage for the ICC. At the African Union (AU) summit on July 3 in

Sirte, Libya, the AU rejected al-Bashir's indictment and decided not to cooperate with the court in the case of al-Bashir, demanding regional solutions to the problems in Darfur. In this respect, the AU had already inaugurated the AU High-Level Panel on Darfur (AUPD) on March 18, led by former South African President Thabo Mbeki. On October 19, the ICC commenced a confirmation hearing against Bahar Idriss Adu Garda, leader of the rebel movement United Resistance Front (URF), who had turned himself in to the court on May 18. Abu Garda was suspected of being responsible for the 2007 attack on a contingent of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in the town of Haskanita, leaving twelve peacekeepers dead. On May 5, fighting intensified when JEM conquered the town of Umm Baru in northern Sudan, held by the SLM/A-MM, a rebel faction allied with the government since it had signed the Darfur Peace Agreement of 2006. After fierce fighting leaving 60 dead and 85 wounded, SAF and SLM/A-MM forces recaptured the town on May 9. The government accused Chad of having directly supported the rebels in their military campaigns around Muhajiyah and Umm Baru [→ Chad - Sudan]. On May 17, the JEM seized control of the Korno military base. SAF conducted air raids against positions of the SLM/A faction of Abdel Wahid al-Nur (SLM/A-AW) in Hashaba, northern Darfur, on June 28. On July 31, the UNSC extended UNAMID's mandate for another year. By the end of the year, 14,600 UNAMID peacekeepers and 3,900 police were deployed to Darfur, out of the projected 19,500 troops and 6,400 police. Several UNAMID peacekeepers were killed, increasing the mission's death toll to 46. Whether these incidents were directly linked to the conflict or result of criminal violence remained unclear. Besides the Doha peace negotiations, mediation efforts tried to band together the numerous rebel factions to larger rebel-blocks, capable of taking a coherent stance in negotiations. On August 30, under the auspices of Libya, the rebel groups SLM/A-Unity, SLM/A-United Leadership, SLM/A-Leadership led by Khamis Abaker, SLM/A-Mainstream, the United Revolutionary Forces (URF), the SLM/A-Juba Unity, and the SLM/A Democratic Front signed the Agreement of Tripoli (AoT), forming the Sudan's Liberation Revolutionary Force (SLRF). Allegedly, the SLRF was later renamed to SLM/A-Revolutionary Force (SLM/A-RF). Already on August 21, the rebel factions SLM/A-Unity Leadership, led by Abdallah Yahya, SLM/A-Juba, led by Abdal Shafi, and United Resistance Front (URF) had already agreed to unite in an Addis Ababa meeting organized by the US Special Envoy to Sudan, Scott Gratian. However, the two biggest rebel movements, JEM and SLM/A-AW, refused to cooperate with these new rebel blocks, claiming the constituting groups were not endowed with any significant forms of popular support or military capabilities. On October 29, the AUPD presented its proposals for a regional approach in dealing with human rights violations committed in Darfur. It called for reforms of the legal justice system in Sudan, a truth and reconciliation commission, and the establishment of hybrid Sudanese-AU courts. These courts were supposed to deal with cases otherwise referred to the

ICC. The government agreed to consider the proposals. (rs)

### Sudan (LRA - SPLM/A)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: •	Start: 1994
Conflict parties:	LRA vs. SPLM/A	
Conflict items:	regional predominance	

The conflict between the Ugandan rebel group Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), constituting the autonomous South Sudan's government, continued. On 12/14/08, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and the SPLM/A launched a joint operation against LRA bases in the DRC-Sudan border region [→ Uganda (LRA)]. The SPLM/A declared the prevention of LRA rebels from infiltrating southern Sudan its main responsibility in the operation. However, retreating LRA rebels repeatedly attacked villages in the southern Sudanese state of Western Equatoria in January, killing 120 people and abducting another 100. On January 5, LRA rebels raided villages in southwest Sudan, killing more than 50 people, abducting at least nine and displacing some 7,300. In reaction, local residents set up self-defense groups in a move backed by SPLM/A State Minister of Security and Police, Col. Samuel Bati. These so-called Arrow Boys were armed with traditional hunting nets, spears, bows, and arrows. In February and March, LRA fighters continued their attacks on villages in southern Sudan and repeatedly clashed with local vigilante groups in Ibba and Ezo county, leaving 24 people dead. Throughout May, LRA fighters raided and looted several villages close to Yambio town, where residents of LRA areas affected had fled to. In response, the SPLM/A promised to reinforce its troops at the DRC border. LRA attacks on villages in Western Equatoria continued throughout July, August, and September. In early September, the SPLM/A deployed special forces to Western Equatoria to fight the LRA, in addition to the 3,000 soldiers already operating in the area. From January to November, LRA rebels killed at least 220 civilians, abducted 157, and displaced some 80,000. In mid-September, a SPLM/A spokesman stated that LRA leader Joseph Kony had relocated from Western Equatoria to Raja town in Western Bahr-al-Ghazal state. On October 25, SPLM/A forces freed 45 LRA abductees in the Bahr-al-Ghazal state. According to the SPLM/A, fifty-six LRA fighters surrendered in November. Three LRA attacks were carried out the same month. (dbr)

### Sudan (SPLM/A / South Sudan)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: ▾	Start: 1955
Conflict parties:	government of South Sudan vs. government of Sudan in Khartoum	
Conflict items:	territory, secession, resources	

The conflict concerning the future status of southern Sudan between the government of autonomous South Sudan (GoSS), led by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), and the central government in Khartoum, led by the National Congress Party (NCP), remained violent. This year saw heavy clashes between



SPLM/A and the central government's Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in the towns of Abyei and Malakal, the release of national census results, and the ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration on the boundaries of the oil rich district of Abyei. In addition, the SPLM/A and northern opposition groups declared their preconditions for their participation in national elections in April 2010. No consensus was reached on the modalities of the 2011 referendum on South Sudan's independence and the affiliation of Abyei district. On 12/12/08, the conflict parties clashed in the town of Abyei in Abyei district. Subsequently, both parties withdrew their forces from the town. However, massive military mobilization in the South Kordofan region did not end before March. On February 24, heavy fighting involving tanks erupted in the town of Malakal among members of the Joint Integrated Unit (JIU) consisting of SAF and SPLM/A troops, leaving 62 people dead and 94 injured. The SAF contingent involved in this JIU mainly consisted of members of a former southern militia, led by Tang Ginya, which had been allied with the SAF during the civil war. The fighting was sparked by Tang Ginya's visit to Malakal. In July, the results of a census conducted in April and Mai 2008 were finally released. According to the census, South Sudan amounted for 21 percent of the national population. The power and wealth sharing agreements of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) had been based on the assumption that the South accounted for 28 percent. The SPLM/A contested the results. On July 22, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague revised the Abyei Border Commission's demarcation of the Abyei district's border in 2005. The PCA reduced the size of the district, redefining its eastern and western borders, and assigning some oilfields to northern Sudan. Both parties accepted the decision as legally binding. However, the Heglig and Bamboo oilfields remained contested. The issue of the nomadic Misseriya's participation in the 2011 referendum on Abyei's affiliation also remained unresolved. UNMIS intensified its patrols in the region. The consensus about elections in 2010 and the 2011 referendum remained fragile. On June 30, the Sudan National Election Commission postponed the polls to April 2010, citing the impact of the rainy season and the late release of census data. On August 8, GoSS threatened to unilaterally declare independence if the central government did not agree to key demands concerning the 2011 referendum. In a conference held in Juba on September 30, the SPLM/A and several northern opposition parties announced their preconditions for participating in the national elections, such as changed security laws, independent media coverage, and a truth and reconciliation commission. Rebel movements from Darfur [→ Sudan (Darfur)] participated in the conference. On October 16, the GoSS and the central government agreed upon 51 percent as the majority in the referendum necessary to declare independence. The government previously had demanded 90 or 66 percent. However, the issue of the turnout necessary for the referendum to be valid remained contested, as GoSS rejected the 66 percent demanded by the central government. As in the previous year, the GoSS continued its

efforts to disarm ethnic militias. However, massive ethnic clashes erupted in Jonglei state [→ Sudan (various ethnic groups)]. In addition, the fragile security situation in southern Sudan deteriorated due to the Lord's Resistance Army [→ Sudan (LRA - SPLM/A)]. (dbr)

### Sudan (various ethnic groups)

Intensity: <b>4</b>	Change: ↗	Start: 2008
Conflict parties:	Murle vs. Lou-Nuer vs. Jikany-Nuer	
Conflict items:	regional predominance	

Tensions between the ethnic groups Murle, Lou-Nuer, and Jikany-Nuer in Jonglei State, southern Sudan, concerning grazing rights, cattle, and the distribution of land intensified. In the course of the year, up to 2,000 people were killed and 250,000 displaced. Adding to the tensions were the different orientations of the respective ethnic groups towards either the Southern People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) or the central government in Khartoum, capital of Sudan, dating back to the Civil War [→ Sudan (SPLM/A / South Sudan)]. On January 29, Murle groups raided Lou-Nuer villages, killing 15 people and taking 3,000 head of cattle with them. From March 5 to 13, Lou-Nuer groups retaliated, attacking Murle camps in Gumuruk Payam, in Pibor county, and in the town of Lekwangole, thereby killing up to 1,000 people and destroying large parts of the urban infrastructure. Murle groups accused the SPLM/A of colluding with the Lou-Nuer, citing the inactivity of SPLM/A troops stationed nearby. The SPLM/A on their part accused the central government of fueling tensions by handing out ammunition to Murle groups. On April 18, Murle attacks on Lou-Nuer communities in Akbo County left between 170 and 300 people dead. In May, the UN mission UNMIS and SPLM/A reinforced their presence in Akobo and Pibor county after clashes between Lou-Nuer and Jikany-Nuer in Torkech village had claimed 71 lives. On June 12, Jikany-Nuer militias attacked a ship convoy of the World Food program on the river Sobat, suspecting the boats were transporting weapons to ethnic groups hostile to them. Forty soldiers of the SPLM/A escorting the convoy died in the assault. On August 2, at least 185 people, mainly women and children, were killed when Murle fighters attacked a Lou-Nuer fishing camp at Geni River. Armed Lou-Nuer targeted SPLM/A troops in the village of Duk Padiet on September 20, causing at least 167 fatalities. In a subsequent SPLM/A military operation, 85 people were killed. (dbr)

### Swaziland (opposition)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: •	Start: 1998
Conflict parties:	SWAYOCO, PUDEMO vs. COSTATU	
Conflict items:	system/ideology	

The conflict between oppositional groups and the government of King Mswati III concerning the constitutional powers of the absolute monarch remained tense. On January 23, Zodwa Mkhonta, a leading female activist of the People's United Democratic Movement (PUDEMO), was taken into police custody along with other activists because her son had distributed party leaflets at a hospital. The arrest was based on the Suppression of Terror-

ism Act, implemented in November 2008, which had led to the ban of PUDEMO and civil society organizations on 11/14/08. On February 28, the President of the Swaziland Youth Congress (SWAYOCO) Wandile Dlodlu was arrested and charged under the new act. On June 4, the representative head of PUDEMO Thulani Maseko was arrested, but a court dismissed the charges of sedition and subversive activities on June 29. He was released on bail. On September 21, journalists and PUDEMO activists awaiting the release of former PUDEMO leader Mario Masuku were assaulted by wardens at a demonstration in front of Matsapha Central Prison in Manzini. In this incident, the head of PUDEMO's youth wing was seriously injured. Masuku was finally released on September 23, some 10 months after his arrest on terrorism charges. (jek)

### Uganda (Baganda/Buganda)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: ↗	Start: 1995
Conflict parties:	Kingdom of Buganda vs. government	
Conflict items:	autonomy, resources	

The autonomy conflict between the kingdom of Buganda and the government turned violent. Buganda kingdom represented the country's largest ethnic group, the Baganda. The four traditional monarchies of Uganda were recognized as cultural institutions without political rights by Yoweri Museveni's government, whereas Buganda demanded a federal system granting the kings formal political power. Other issues of contention were a proposed land reform and the question of returning kingdom property seized by the Obote regime in 1966. The Bugandan king - the so-called Kabaka - Ronald Muwenda Mutebi II planned to attend a youth ceremony in Kayunga on September 12. In the Kayunga region, the Banyala minority had declared its autonomy from Buganda. As the Banyala threatened to prevent the visit by force if the Kabaka did not formally notify their cultural leader, whom the Kabaka did not recognize, the government also advised the Kabaka to seek the Banyala's permission. Buganda accused the government of inciting these protests. On September 7, riot police fired in the air and shot teargas at ethnic Baganda preparing for the visit, amongst them ministers of Buganda kingdom, and arrested several persons. Bugandan MPs walked out of parliament in protest. Buganda's Prime Minister John Baptist Walusimbi was prevented from entering Kanyuga by military police on September 10. In reaction, hundreds of Kabaka supporters took the streets in the capital, Kampala, setting up burning barricades. The police, soon reinforced by army units, responded with massive violence, using tear gas and live ammunition. The government took Buganda's Central Broadcasting Station (CBS) and three other radio stations off the air. Early on September 11, the government urged the Kabaka to cancel his visit, while the clashes in Kampala continued and spread to at least five other districts. He finally consented in the evening. According to official numbers, 27 people were killed in the three days of violence. Scores were injured, and 846 people arrested. Beginning on September 13, the arrested, among them some Bugandan MPs, were charged with inciting violence, some with

terrorism. In a speech in parliament five days after the riots, Museveni stated that cultural institutions should be further separated from politics. Government MPs proposed to abolish the kingdoms. On September 30, Museveni and the Kabaka met for the first time in nearly four years to diffuse tensions. However, CBS remained shut down. (hlm)

### Uganda (LRA)

Intensity: <b>4</b>	Change: ↗	Start: 1987
Conflict parties:	LRA vs. government	
Conflict items:	national power, resources	

The power conflict between the Lords' Resistance Army (LRA) and the government escalated. While the conflict had originated in Uganda, in recent years, the LRA mainly operated in the border triangle of southern Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and the Central African Republic (CAR). In order to fight the LRA, the government conducted major cross-border military operations in the region with the consent of the affected countries. On 12/14/08, in response to LRA leader Joseph Kony's refusal to sign the Juba Peace Agreement, Uganda, DRC, and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army launched the joint operation Lightning Thunder. The operation, involving air and ground forces, targeted LRA bases located in northeastern parts of the DRC. The United States supported Uganda with military resources. The LRA's main stronghold was destroyed, along with other bases. According to Uganda, 149 LRA rebels were killed and five LRA commanders captured. Six soldiers were reportedly killed in the operation. On 12/22/08, the UN Security Council issued a statement in support of the operation, strongly condemning the LRA's preceding attacks in the region. From 12/14/08 to 12/26/08, retreating LRA rebels killed numerous civilians and displaced some 30,000 in the border area between DRC and southern Sudan. The LRA burned 80 people alive in a church in Batande, DRC, on 12/25/08. Furthermore, the rebels attacked approx. 30 villages in the provinces of Haut and Bas Uélé, DRC, killing approx. 1,000 people and abducting some 160 children. In an LRA attack on Ugandan forces in Bas Uélé, two soldiers were reportedly killed in mid-April. DRC forces clashed with LRA fighters on July 12. Two days later, local self-defense groups engaged LRA rebels in northeastern DRC, freeing 15 children. Beside the DRC, the CAR was also massively affected by LRA attacks. On January 12, the CAR decided to reinforce its border forces to prevent raids by retreating LRA rebels. On February 25, LRA rebels ambushed CAR government forces patrolling on the southeastern border of the CAR. Seven rebels reportedly died in the attack. Between May and October, LRA forces raided several towns in the eastern Obo region, CAR. In late July, Ugandan forces attacked LRA rebels in the CAR. As in previous years, the LRA also attacked civilians in southern Sudan [→ Sudan (SPLM/A - LRA)]. While operation Lightning Thunder failed to kill LRA leader Kony, Uganda succeeded in capturing several high ranking rebel commander in the course of the year. On January 28, Uganda claimed to have captured Okot Odhiambo,

the LRA's second-in-command, together with 45 fighters and ten abductees. Ugandan forces also arrested LRA leaders, Thomas Kwoyelo in the DRC on March 5 and Okot Atiak in the CAR in August. On November 5, LRA commander Charles Arop surrendered to Ugandan forces in the DRC. The government claimed to have killed several LRA commanders and to have freed some 100 youths. On November 11, the UN announced that the military operations had reduced the number of LRA fighters in DRC to 100, stressing, however, that the majority of the LRA's remaining forces had relocated to the CAR. Ugandan forces continued operations against the LRA, claiming to have killed LRA commander Okello Okutti in the CAR on November 17. (ng, kwi)


### Zimbabwe (MDC-T, MDC-M, civil society groups - ZANU-PF)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: •	Start: 2000
Conflict parties:	MDC-T, MDC-M, civil society groups vs. ZANU-PF	
Conflict items:	national power	

The power conflict between the former opposition parties Movement for Democratic Change faction led by Morgan Tsvangirai (MDC-T) and Movement for Democratic Change faction led by Arthur Mutambara (MDC-M), on the one hand, and the government of President Robert Mugabe and his party Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), on the other, remained violent. The severity of violence, however, abated slightly compared to last year's anti-opposition campaign. On January 30, MDC-T's national council agreed to join a government of national unity with ZANU-PF after mediation by the Southern African Development Cooperation (SADC). MDC-M had already been integrated into the government. On February 5, parliament approved a constitutional amendment creating the new post of prime minister. In accordance with a power sharing agreement of 09/15/08, this post was to be held by MDC-T leader Tsvangirai, while MDC-M leader Mutambara became deputy prime minister and Mugabe remained president. Tsvangirai was sworn in as prime minister on February 11, and the cabinet two days later. Roy Bennett, MDC-T treasurer and deputy agriculture minister appointee, was arrested at the same time and later charged with treason. Bennett and Jestina Mukoko, a rights activist, were released on bail in March, Mukoko bearing signs of torture. Members of the MDC, human rights activists, and journalists remained in prison although Tsvangirai had demanded their release before being sworn in. On June 24, hearings started for a constitutional review process to be completed by July 2010. On July 13, ZANU-PF activists interrupted the constitutional review conference, beating up MDC members. Persecution of MDC supporters continued throughout the year. ZANU-PF militias operated torture camps throughout the country and


attacked MDC supporters as well as members of civil society groups. For example, ZANU-PF activists attacked MDC supporter Ebba Katiyo twice in early July. On July 22, ZANU-PF activists hit Athanacia Mliilo, mother of MDC-T's international spokesman Nqobizitha Mliilo, with an iron bar. Furthermore, authorities filed criminal charges against members of civil society groups, MDC supporters, as well as MDC MPs. On May 5, seventeen rights activists and MDC supporters were arrested. Throughout July, four MDC MPs were sentenced to jail, forcing them to vacate their seats. On November 8, Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions President Lovemore Matombo and two of his staff were arrested in the town of Victoria Falls. In early August, South Africa's President Jacob Zuma blamed Mugabe for making little effort to implement the reforms. On October 16, Tsvangirai and MDC-T declared their disengagement from government, in reaction to Bennet's renewed imprisonment two days before. However, on October 23, Tsvangirai stressed that while MDC-T would boycott cabinet meetings, this did not mean MDC-T's indefinite withdrawal from government. MDC-T's move was followed by a sharp increase in violence, intimidation of MDC members, and invasions of white-owned farms. On October 28, UN special rapporteur on torture, Manfred Nowak, was hindered from entering the country by immigration officials at Harare Airport and was sent back the following morning. Nowak had been invited by the government to investigate allegations of human rights abuses. However, he was disinvented one day before arriving in Harare, although a meeting with Tsvangirai had been scheduled for the next day. On November 5, Tsvangirai called off his party's boycott of the unity government during a SADC meeting. Tsvangirai demanded Mugabe to reverse his unilateral appointments of the head of the central bank, the attorney general, and provincial governors. SADC urged all parties to respect the power-sharing agreement, giving them 30 days to resolve outstanding issues. SADC also called for western nations to lift their sanctions targeted at key figures of Mugabe's regime. Over the year, the divides within ZANU-PF over Mugabe's succession widened. Disgruntled members of the old Patriotic Front - Zimbabwe African People's Union had already met on 12/13/08 to elect an interim executive, thus marking their split from ZANU-PF. The Patriotic Front had been coerced to unite with Mugabe's ZANU to form ZANU-PF in 1987. The separation was endorsed by some 1,000 delegates on May 15. Senior former ZANU-PF members, members of civil society groups, and the two MDC factions attended the convention. On July 7, ZANU-PF vice president John Msika died. The party failed to meet the deadline to nominate a new vice president set for October 7. In mid-November, fierce battles over the nomination of a new leadership broke out between two rivaling factions. (nwi, sk)

# The Americas




In the region of the Americas, the total number of conflicts increased by two from 44 to 46. While one conflict ended in 2009 [→ Costa Rica - Nicaragua (Rio San Juan)] and one conflict had already been settled in 2008, three new conflicts erupted on the level of a crisis [→ Dominican Republic - Haiti; Guatemala (various drug cartels); Honduras (opposition)]. Compared to 2008, the number of highly violent conflicts increased from two to three [→ Colombia (FARC); Mexico (drug cartels); Peru (Shining Path)]. In total, the conflicts in the Americas clearly escalated as the number of violent conflicts rose considerably. Especially the use of sporadic violence within the monitored conflicts saw a 45 percent increase, as the number of crises went up from eleven in 2008 to 16 in 2009. Moreover, violence was even employed in an interstate conflict [→ Dominican Republic - Haiti], a case which had not been observed in the Americas for many years. Altogether, eight conflicts escalated and four deescalated in comparison to 2008. Five non-violent conflicts turned violent in 2009, whereas only one violent conflict turned non-violent. The level of crime as well as drug-related violence rose even further, e.g. in Guatemala [→ Guatemala (various drug cartels)], Brazil, Colombia [→ Colombia (AUC, paramilitary groups, drug cartels)] and especially in Mexico [→ Mexico (drug cartels)]. The power of these transnationally operating drug cartels as well as the concomitant violence constituted the main security issue in most countries of the Americas. In order to face this challenge, the Mexican government, for example, once again significantly increased its military and police forces in the Americas' most violent conflict. Nevertheless, most violent conflicts were observed in Colombia: three crises and one highly violent conflict [→ Colombia (FARC)]. FARC violence considerably increased due to the strategic aims of "Plan Rebirth" by new FARC leader Alfonso Cano. As in previous years, the insecure and tense economic situation in various countries of Central and South America presented the main source of instability in the Americas. Consequently, system/ideology remained the dominant conflict item, immediately followed by resources.

**Conflict Intensities in the Americas in 2009 compared to 2008**



**Frequency of Conflict Items in 2009 in the Americas by Intensity Groups**



## Overview: Conflicts in the Americas in 2009

Name of conflict <sup>1</sup>	Conflict parties <sup>2</sup>	Conflict items	Start	Change <sup>3</sup>	Int. <sup>4</sup>
Argentina (Piqueteros)*	Piqueteros vs. government	system/ideology	2001	•	1
Argentina - United Kingdom (Falkland Islands)	Argentina vs. United Kingdom	territory, resources	1945	•	1
Argentina - Iran (AMIA)*	Argentina vs. Iran	other	1992	•	1
Bolivia (opposition)	opposition vs. government	autonomy, system/ideology, national power, resources	1983	•	3
Bolivia - Chile (border)*	Bolivia vs. Chile	territory, resources	1945	•	1
Brazil (MST)*	MST vs. government	resources	1995	•	2
Canada (AFN)*	AFN vs. government	resources, other	1995	•	1
Canada (Bloc Québécois/Quebec)*	Bloc Québécois vs. government	secession	1945	•	1
Chile (Mapuche/Araucanía)	Mapuche groups vs. government	secession, resources	2008	•	3
Chile (opposition)*	opposition vs. government	system/ideology	2006	•	1
Chile - United Kingdom (Antarctica)*	Chile vs. United Kingdom	territory, resources	2007	•	1
Colombia (AUC, paramilitary groups, drug cartels)	AUC, paramilitary groups, drug cartels vs. government	regional predominance, resources	1995	•	3
Colombia (ELN)	ELN vs. government	system/ideology, regional predominance, resources	1964	↗	3
Colombia (FARC - ELN)*	FARC vs. ELN	system/ideology, regional predominance, resources	2006	•	3
Colombia (FARC)	FARC vs. government	system/ideology, regional predominance, resources	1964	•	4
Colombia (various indigenous groups)*	various indigenous groups vs. government	system/ideology, resources	2005	↘	2
Colombia - Ecuador*	Colombia vs. Ecuador	international power	2005	•	2
Colombia - Venezuela (Monjes Islands)*	Colombia vs. Venezuela	territory, resources	1945	•	1
Colombia - Venezuela (system)	Colombia vs. Venezuela	system/ideology, international power	2004	•	2
Costa Rica - Nicaragua (Rio San Juan)	Costa Rica vs. Nicaragua	territory, resources	1945	END	1
Dominican Republic - Haiti	Dominican Republic vs. Haiti	other	2009	NEW	3
Ecuador (opposition)*	opposition vs. government	system/ideology	1980	↗	3
Guatemala (various drug cartels)	drug cartels vs. government	regional predominance, resources	2009	NEW	3
Guatemala (various opposition groups)*	rightwing militant groups vs. leftwing militant groups	system/ideology, national power	1960	•	2
Guatemala - Belize (territory)*	Guatemala vs. Belize	territory	1981	•	1
Haiti (opposition)	Aristide followers vs. government	national power	1986	•	3
Honduras (opposition)	opposition vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2009	NEW	3
Mexico (APPO)*	APPO vs. government	system/ideology	2006	•	2
Mexico (drug cartels)	drug cartels vs. government	regional predominance, resources	2006	•	4
Mexico (EPR/Guerrero)*	EPR vs. government	autonomy, system/ideology	1995	↗	3
Mexico (EZLN/Chiapas)*	EZLN vs. government	autonomy, system/ideology, resources, other	1994	↗	3
Mexico (opposition)*	opposition vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2006	↘	1
Nicaragua (various opposition groups)*	various opposition groups vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2008	•	3
Nicaragua - Colombia (sea border)*	Nicaragua vs. Colombia	territory, resources	1945	↘	1
Panama (opposition)*	opposition vs. government	system/ideology	2008	↘	2
Paraguay (various opposition groups)	various farmer organizations, various indigenous groups, EPP, landless people vs. government	system/ideology, resources	1989	•	3
Paraguay - Bolivia*	Paraguay vs. Bolivia	territory	1945	↗	2
Peru (opposition)	opposition vs. government	system/ideology, resources	2008	•	3

Name of conflict <sup>1</sup>	Conflict parties <sup>2</sup>	Conflict items	Start	Change <sup>3</sup>	Int. <sup>4</sup>
Peru (Shining Path)	Shining Path vs. government	system/ideology, regional predominance, resources	1980	↗	4
Peru - Chile (border)*	Peru vs. Chile	territory, resources	1945	•	2
Uruguay - Argentina (Uruguay River)*	Uruguay vs. Argentina	resources	2006	•	1
USA - Cuba (Guantanamo)*	United States vs. Cuba	territory	1959	•	1
USA - Cuba (system)	United States vs. Cuba	system/ideology	1959	•	2
USA - Mexico (border fence)*	United States vs. Mexico	other	2001	↗	2
USA - Venezuela (system)*	United States vs. Venezuela	system/ideology	2001	•	2
Venezuela (opposition)*	opposition vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2000	↗	3

<sup>1 2 3 4</sup> cf. overview table for Europe

### Argentina - United Kingdom (Falkland Islands)

Intensity: <b>1</b>	Change: •	Start: 1945
Conflict parties:	Argentina vs. United Kingdom	
Conflict items:	territory, resources	

The conflict between Argentina and the United Kingdom over the territory of the Falkland Islands and resources continued. Different opinions on the issue and the demands persisted. On March 28, the British Prime Minister Gordon Brown rejected an Argentine invitation to talks. Brown stated that sovereignty was not a discussable issue. Argentina not only renewed its demand for the islands, but on April 22 insisted on a vast expanse of ocean territory in the disputed area. Finally, Argentinean president Cristina Fernández de Kirchner criticized the attitude of the British government, which had called on the UN to mediate in the sovereignty issue. (seb)

### Bolivia (opposition)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: •	Start: 1983
Conflict parties:	opposition vs. government	
Conflict items:	autonomy, system/ideology, national power, resources	

The system conflict also concerning autonomy, the new constitution, and the reallocation of profits from the country's resources between the opposition movement of the wealthy eastern lowland departments, on the one hand, and the government of President Evo Morales and its supporters, on the other, continued. In a gun battle on April 16, police forces killed an Irishman, a Romanian-Hungarian and a Bolivian-Hungarian, and arrested a Hungarian as well as a Croatian citizen in a hotel in the provincial capital Santa Cruz. Later on, security forces uncovered an arsenal of high-caliber sniper guns, explosives, and documents outlining plans to assassinate President Morales and other government officials. The government accused Santa Cruz's opposition movement of being behind the plot, while members of the opposition claimed it had been staged by the government to discredit the regional opposition. While the government attempted to transfer the subsequent trial to the de-facto capital, La Paz, on August 15 the Supreme Court (CSJ) ruled the case to be tried in Santa Cruz. Thereupon the central government, permanently accusing the judiciary of conspiring with the opposition, started impeachment proceedings against seven magistrates. Together with

the resignation of the last Constitutional Court magistrate, Silvia Salame, and the suspension of CSJ President Eddy Fernández in May, the impeachment left the upper echelons of the judiciary vacant. The congress repeatedly failed to agree on the appointment of successors because of the mutual vetoes by the government-led parliament and the opposition-led senate. The divergence between the government and the judiciary also became visible in the Pando case. The investigation reports on the massacre in Pando in September 2008, presented by the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and Bolivia's human rights ombudsman in early December, hold the oppositional local authorities responsible for the violence. However, the trials against imprisoned main defendant, Leopoldo Fernández, ex-prefect of Pando, and other allegedly responsible people did not start due to disagreement over the proceedings between the government and the opposition. Fernández, by then running mate of the main opposition candidate, Manfred Reyes Villa, was formally charged with six different crimes connected to the case in the first week of October. The new constitution was approved in a referendum held on January 25 by more than 61 percent of the electorate nationwide and about 38 percent in the oppositional departments. However, the prefects of Beni, Santa Cruz, Tarija, and Chuquisaca refused to participate in the National Autonomy Council. Autonomy minister Carlos Romero nevertheless established the council on February 17, also incorporating three municipalities from Tarija. On March 5, the lower chamber approved the electoral framework bill. It proposed holding referenda on autonomy in municipalities of the Chaco region in July, which was strongly opposed by opposition prefects concerned about losing control over the gas fields. The senate blocked the bill arguing it included at least 21 violations of the new constitution. After a long negotiation process in congress and President Morales' five-day hunger strike, the electoral framework bill passed on April 14. On August 12, two letter bombs exploded in La Paz, injuring seven people. Morales' ruling party, the Movement for Socialism (MAS), immediately blamed the rightwing opposition for the attacks. Denying the accusations, opposition politicians claimed the bombings resulted from an internal power struggle in the MAS. On November 12, an event of Morales' election campaign at Santa Cruz was cancelled due to clashes

between MAS supporters and opponents. Five people were injured and the stage was set on fire. (hef, sag)

### Chile (Mapuche/Araucanía)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: •	Start: 2008
Conflict parties:	Mapuche groups vs. government	
Conflict items:	secession, resources	

The secession conflict between Mapuche groups and the government remained violent. Throughout the year, the public prosecution service received 144 complaints about acts of violence conducted by Mapuche groups, nearly five times as many as last year. On February 14, Miguel Ángel Tapia Huenulaf, a leader of the radical Mapuche organization Coordinadora Arauco Malleco (CAM), was charged with alleged violent attacks under the anti-terrorism law. On August 12, police forces clashed with Mapuche activists protesting for their demands, killing one of the protesters. Three days later, 60 Mapuche communities set up the Territorial Mapuche Alliance, a new organization aimed at representing 120 Mapuche communities. On August 23, Aucán Huilcamán Paillama, a prominent Mapuche leader, called for an autonomous region in the south and an indemnity for the Mapuche. In September, Mapuche protesters attacked several farms, thereby injuring one police officer, and occupied a town council building in southern Chile. After police forces killed a Mapuche activist in the southern Araucanía department, CAM declared war on Chile on October 20, rejecting political autonomy as a solution and pledging to establish an independent nation state. (kcr)

### Colombia (AUC, paramilitary groups, drug cartels)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: •	Start: 1995
Conflict parties:	AUC, paramilitary groups, drug cartels vs. government	
Conflict items:	regional predominance, resources	

The conflict over regional predominance and resources between the paramilitary forces of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), newly emerging paramilitary groups, and drug cartels, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, remained violent. Around 30,000 paramilitary forces demobilized in 2007 as a result of a peace process between several AUC factions and the government. Since then, however, former AUC fighters had continually rearmed and regrouped within the boundaries of newly emergent paramilitary groups and drug cartels. By November, an estimated 11,000 paramilitias had regrouped. Economically these groups mainly depended on drug trafficking, while extortion and kidnapping played a minor role. These armed groups targeted local authorities as well as civilians and fought each other intensely over the control of territory. In effect, the state's authority and sovereignty seemed to be affected in some regions and cities, such as the northwestern department of Córdoba or the city of Medellín. Paramilitary forces and drug gangs recruited new fighters in poor neighborhoods. Those unwilling to enlist were threatened or even killed. Moreover, paramilitary factions established local alliances with other groups in

order to fight competitors in the drug trafficking business. In the southwestern Cauca department, local paramilitaries and drug gangs collaborated with factions of the ELN [→ Colombia (ELN)] to fight FARC [→ Colombia (FARC), Colombia (FARC - ELN)], the latter being the main drug-related and political rival of paramilitary forces. Throughout the year, dozens of indigenous people were killed and thousands of civilians displaced. On August 27, for example, twelve indigenous Awa were killed by a drug gang in the southwestern Nariño department. In the first week of April, 31 people were killed in Medellín in clashes between various drug gangs. President Álvaro Uribe reacted instantly on April 8, sending 500 special forces onto the streets of Medellín to end the violence. Nevertheless, around 1,500 people had died in acts of drug-related violence in Medellín by October 20. On January 9, members of the Black Eagles, one of the newly emerging paramilitary groups, attacked a police patrol in Antioquia department, killing two police forces and wounding another four. On January 23, Daniel Rendón alias Don Mario, one of the most powerful drug lords in Antioquia department, had offered USD 1,000 for each police officer killed. He was captured by security forces in mid-April. On May 21, in a military and naval operation, 112 heavily armed members of the Rastrojos were arrested. The Rastrojos dominated drug trafficking in the Chocó department, controlling huge parts of the Pacific coast. (jjh, fbl)

### Colombia (ELN)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: ↗	Start: 1964
Conflict parties:	ELN vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, regional predominance, resources	

The conflict concerning regional predominance and the orientation of the political system between the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the government turned violent again. The ELN, said to have at least 1,500 fighters, was the second largest Marxist guerilla group after the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia [→ Colombia (FARC)]. After having killed nine police officers in an ambush on 12/05/08, 18 ELN rebels surrendered to military forces in the department of Chocó two days later. On May 16, four soldiers died in a minefield apparently laid by the ELN in the northeastern department of Norte de Santander. On October 7, masked ELN rebels attacked a prisoner convoy in order to free high-ranking ELN commander Carlos "Pablito" Marín. The latter had harshly criticized the preliminary peace negotiations between the government and some ELN factions in the capital of Cuba, Havana, between 2005 and 2007. After having ambushed the convoy, killing one police officer and wounding another, the rebels and Marín fled to Venezuela. Only four days later, ELN rebels abducted twelve civilians near the Venezuelan border. Their corpses were later found in the Venezuelan region of Tachira on October 24. On August 31, ELN published an open letter to the president of Ecuador, Rafael Correa, then president of the United South American Nations (UNASUR), to mediate a peace process between the ELN and the authorities. (jjh)

## Colombia (FARC)

Intensity: <b>4</b>	Change: •	Start: 1964
Conflict parties:	FARC vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, regional predominance, resources	

The conflict over regional predominance and the orientation of the political system between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the government remained highly violent. Despite having suffered significant losses in 2008, FARC consolidated its military strength and gained new momentum under its new commander-in-chief Guillermo León alias Alfonso Cano. After succeeding FARC founder and former leader Pedro Antonio Marín alias Manuel Marulanda, who had died on 03/26/08, Cano released "Plan Rebirth" in early 2009, determining the rebel group's new military, political and financial strategy. FARC's new strategy aimed at retaking the initiative by launching a new military offensive comprising roadside bombings, landmines, snipers, and anti-aircraft missiles. The offensive aimed at increasing the number of army and police casualties, taking guerrilla warfare to urban centers and sabotaging public infrastructure. Using mortars and small arms, FARC rebels attacked a police station in Roberto Payán, a town in the southwestern Nariño department on January 13. Four people were killed and twelve wounded by the rebels. Two weeks later, a FARC bomb left two people dead in the capital, Bogotá. Another bomb blast in the city of Cali in the Valle del Cauca department killed two people and injured 17 in front of a police station on February 1. FARC rebels killed at least 27 members of the Awa indigenous tribe on February 11 and 12, accusing them of cooperating with the government. At the same time, a bomb blast in the town of Convención in the northeastern department of Norte de Santander killed three police officers and three civilians, leaving at least ten wounded. On February 27, military forces killed ten FARC rebels and captured another eight in a military offensive in the central Cundinamarca department. While only one soldier died, the military forces captured Bernardo Mosquera alias El Negro Antonio, a FARC leader. Moreover, the operation blocked a strategic movement corridor towards Bogotá. On March 1, government forces discovered a FARC underground tunnel system in the Meta department. The hideouts had provided shelter and space for weaponry and medical treatment for at least 500 rebels. On April 29, FARC clashed with military forces in the northeastern Guajira department, killing eight troops. In another FARC ambush in the southwestern Nariño department on May 10, seven troops died and four were wounded. On June 22, a broad military campaign including air force bombings killed at least 25 FARC rebels near Buenos Aires, a town in the southwestern Cauca department. Among the victims was Juan Carlos "El Enano" Usuga, a regional FARC leader. The offensive was immediately answered by a FARC attack leaving seven police officers dead. Heavy fighting continued in the following weeks. On July 25, the air force bombed a FARC base in Meta, killing at least 16 rebels. The bombing was part of a wider campaign to hunt down FARC's military chief and

head of the powerful Eastern Bloc, Jorge "Mono Jojoy" Briceño. In mid-October, heavy clashes resulted in the deaths of 13 rebels and five soldiers. Using mortars and other heavy armament, around 200 FARC rebels launched an offensive against a military post on November 10, trying to take over Corinto, a town in the southwestern Cauca department. Military forces repelled the attack, killing 30 rebels. In addition, nine troops died and four sustained injuries. In "Plan Rebirth", FARC reiterated its political claims already issued in previous years. FARC repeatedly expressed its interest in a prisoner exchange, and it did not mention a demilitarized zone as a precondition for talks, unlike previous years. In early February, FARC unilaterally released three police officers, two politicians, and one soldier. Yet, the rebel group was still believed to hold at least 500 people hostage. President Álvaro Uribe responded on April 1, saying he was ready for peace talks under the condition of a three-month ceasefire. Moreover, the government offered conditional freedom and a reward to rebels who surrendered or helped to free hostages. As at least 3,500 rebels had handed in their weapons since 2008, FARC was believed to have about 9,000 fighters left. However, FARC continuously recruited new fighters, especially in poor neighborhoods and rural areas. Finally, "Plan Rebirth" stressed the importance of continued political indoctrination inside and outside the country, as well as extortion and drug-trafficking as the main financial sources. (jjh)

## Colombia - Venezuela (system)

Intensity: <b>2</b>	Change: •	Start: 2004
Conflict parties:	Colombia vs. Venezuela	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, international power	

The system and international power conflict between Colombia and Venezuela continued. On 12/02/08, Colombia recalled its consul from the city of Maracaibo in Venezuela after Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez had threatened to expel him. The diplomat had made critical comments concerning regional elections in Venezuela. On March 3, a Colombian radio station mentioned an intelligence report stating at least nine leaders of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) possibly lived in Venezuela [→ Colombia (FARC)]. In reaction, on March 8 Chávez warned Colombia he would retaliate militarily if Colombian troops strayed into Venezuelan territory. On October 30, Colombia and the United States signed a treaty formalizing US presence at seven Colombian military bases for ten years. Before the treaty was signed, Chávez had already harshly criticized its political objective. In July, Colombia claimed its military forces had found Swedish-produced AT-4 anti-tank rockets in a FARC camp. The rockets had been sold to Venezuela in 1988. Chávez denied the claim, froze diplomatic and commercial relations with Colombia, and withdrew all diplomatic personnel from Colombia. On August 9, Chávez stated Colombian troops had made an incursion into Venezuelan territory and ordered the army to prepare for armed conflict. The Colombian authorities denied the accusations. On November 2, two soldiers of Venezuela's National Guard were killed by unidenti-



fied gunmen at a roadside checkpoint in Táchira. After the shooting, parts of the border between both countries were closed for a few hours. On November 5, Chávez deployed an additional 15,000 troops along the border, telling the armed forces to get ready for war. In reaction, Colombia sent a protest note to the UN Security Council on November 11. About a week later, Venezuelan forces blew up two pedestrian bridges crossing the border. (fbl)

### Costa Rica - Nicaragua (Rio San Juan)

Intensity: <b>1</b>	Change: <b>END</b>	Start: 1945
Conflict parties:	Costa Rica vs. Nicaragua	
Conflict items:	territory, resources	

The longstanding conflict between Costa Rica and Nicaragua over navigation and fishing rights on the Rio San Juan was settled by a ruling of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on July 13. Both conflict parties accepted the court's judgment. The two parties had disagreed over the Cañas-Jerez Treaty from 1858, which had acknowledged Nicaragua's sovereignty over the river. However, the treaty had also granted Costa Rica the right of free navigation for commercial purposes. Nicaraguan officials claimed this did not include passenger transport and fishing. Due to increasing tensions, Costa Rica's former president Abel Pacheco had turned to the ICJ in September 2005. The ICJ confirmed Costa Rica's right to free commercial navigation, including tourism, and allowed Costa Ricans to engage in subsistence fishing on their side of the river. Nevertheless, Costa Rica was not allowed to carry out police functions on the river and Nicaragua preserved the right to regulate the river's traffic. (mgm)

### Dominican Republic - Haiti

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: <b>NEW</b>	Start: 2009
Conflict parties:	Dominican Republic vs. Haiti	
Conflict items:	other	

A new conflict between the Dominican Republic and Haiti over illegal immigration erupted on a violent level. On November 7, one Haitian was killed and two people were injured in a shootout between members of the Dominican armed forces and Haitian civil police. The clash followed the arrest of two Haitians illegally crossing the border by a Dominican border control. The UN Peace Keeping force (MINUSTAH) [→ Haiti (opposition)] intervened to stop the exchange of fire. Before the incident, widespread concern about illegal immigration from Haiti had been uttered in the Dominican Republic. Additionally, tensions increased over the last months when Haitians crossed the border to steal cattle or chopped down trees to produce charcoal. In early September, the Dominican national assembly voted against granting citizenship to children born to foreign parents in the Dominican Republic. The proposal would have allowed the children of illegal Haitian immigrants to legalize their status. The deputy for the southwestern province of Bahoruco, Luis José González, advocated the construction of a wall between the two countries and the expulsion of all illegal Haitian immigrants. In early October, Dominican

authorities deployed another 600 troops and 120 police officers to the border. (ank, mgm)

### Guatemala (various drug cartels)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: <b>NEW</b>	Start: 2009
Conflict parties:	drug cartels vs. government	
Conflict items:	regional predominance, resources	

A new conflict between various drug cartels and the government over regional predominance erupted on a violent level. Various Mexican drug cartels including Los Zetas, Sinaloa Cartel, and the Golfo Cartel [→ Mexico (drug cartels)] were active in the country. In early December 2008, President Álvaro Colom claimed the violence in the border region between Mexico and Guatemala was an attempt by the Golfo Cartel to take over power in some of the country's regions. Later that month, Colom stated the Golfo Cartel controlled the department of Huehuetenango, some areas in Alta Verapaz, Quiché, Petén, and parts of the Caribbean coast. Carlos Castresana, head of the UN International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala, warned the drug cartels could take over Guatemala City in two years' time if the authorities did not stop their infiltration. Guatemala deployed thousands of soldiers to the northern border on 12/20/08 and captured 16 cartel members. On March 5, 15 Los Zetas fighters raided a police patrol in the department of Alta Verapaz, killing two police officers and wounding two. In addition, three cartel gunmen died. The chief of the national police, Porfirio Pérez Paniagua, was sacked on August 7, after he had sidelined 117 kg of 855 kg cocaine seized by the police on August 6. The government made several major cocaine seizures of up to five tons on November 21. On March 1, Los Zetas threatened to kill Colom. On July 30, the governor of Petén department, Rudel Mauricio Álvarez, survived an assassination attempt by cartel gunmen. (fhr)

### Haiti (opposition)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: <b>•</b>	Start: 1986
Conflict parties:	Aristide followers vs. government	
Conflict items:	national power	

The national power conflict between followers of former president Jean-Bertrand Aristide, who had been removed from office in February 2004, and the central government, backed by the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), continued. Aristide's supporters consisted of gangs from Cité Soleil, a shanty town located in the capital, Port-au-Prince. Since 2004, MINUSTAH had been trying to establish security and stability in the country. On 12/16/08, supporters of Aristide demonstrated, demanding the resignation of the President René Préval as well as measures against the rising food prices. Protesters trying to make their way to the presidential palace clashed with police forces. On February 6, the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) disqualified 40 of 105 candidates running for the senatorial elections, including all candidates of the Fanmi Lavalas (FL) party of Aristide. On February 16, the FL accused the CEP of political discrimination with regard to the disqualifications and, later on, called for a boycott of the

senate election. On February 28, thousands of FL supporters demanded Aristide's return. Hardly any violence was reported in the run-up to the elections on April 19. However, the CEP canceled polling in the Central Department after protesters had destroyed ballot papers. No candidate achieved an outright majority and the voters' turnout reached 11.8 percent. The FL demanded the elections be annulled. In the run-up to the second round of elections in mid-June, several violent clashes between protesters and the police as well as between political parties took place, leaving at least two people dead. On October 13, the UN Security Council extended MINUSTAH's mandate for another year. On October 30, the senate removed Prime Minister Michèle Pierre-Louis from office. Both chambers confirmed Jean-Max Belerive as new prime minister on November 7. In late November, the CEP banned the FL from next year's legislative elections. (mgm)

### Honduras (opposition)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: <b>NEW</b>	Start: 2009
Conflict parties:	opposition vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, national power	

A system and power conflict between the opposition and the government erupted when military forces deposed of the left-wing president, Manuel Zelaya of the Partido Liberal (PL), and forced him to leave the country on June 28. The following day, the Congress, backed by the Supreme Court, legalized the take-over and swore in Roberto Micheletti of the PL as new president. He was to remain in office until re-elections scheduled for November 29. Zelaya initially had planned a referendum in order to change the constitution, attempting to run for another term in office. Both the military and Congress had refused the referendum and the Supreme Court had declared it illegal. Even though new President Micheletti imposed a 48-hour curfew to end tensions in the capital, Tegucigalpa, thousands of Zelaya supporters started demonstrating on June 29. While the international community rallied behind Zelaya, Micheletti gained support from the domestic conservative rightwing and some regional trade organizations. On July 1, the Organization of American States (OAS) issued an ultimatum demanding Zelaya be reinstated within three days. After the ultimatum had expired, the OAS finally suspended Honduras' membership. Furthermore, the UN denounced the coup and insisted on Zelaya's return. Meanwhile, at least one person was killed at the airport of Tegucigalpa on July 5 when Zelaya made an unsuccessful attempt to return and regain power. This incident further increased tensions between Zelaya's supporters and opponents and led to mass demonstrations. On July 24, Zelaya made another attempt to reenter Honduras from Nicaraguan soil. His stay, lasting less than an hour, triggered further violent riots. On July 30, police forces arrested over 100 Zelaya supporters in a clash in Tegucigalpa; at least one person was killed. On September 22, Zelaya reentered Honduras for the third time and was granted shelter by the Brazilian embassy in Tegucigalpa. Zelaya's return was followed by riots in the capital. Eighty-three people were injured, 200 arrested and

at least ten were killed in a week of violence. On October 30, Zelaya and Micheletti finally signed the San José-Tegucigalpa Accord under US mediation. The agreement envisaged the restoration of the executive power to its status quo ante prior to June 28 - meaning Zelaya's restitution. However, no deadline was given to Congress to make this decision. On November 14, Zelaya said he refused to regain the presidency, claiming that this meant legitimizing the coup. On November 30, Porfirio Lobo, one of Zelaya's political opponents, won the presidential elections. The presidential elections were accompanied by protests by Zelaya supporters. However, the protests remained mainly non-violent as some 30,000 police and military forces had been procured earlier on to guarantee a secure electoral process. (ivg)

### Mexico (drug cartels)

Intensity: <b>4</b>	Change: •	Start: 2006
Conflict parties:	drug cartels vs. government	
Conflict items:	regional predominance, resources	

The regional predominance conflict between the main drug cartels Sinaloa, Golfo and Los Zetas, La Familia, Beltrán Leyva, Baja California Tijuana cartel also called Arellano Félix, Carillo Fuentes organization, the Jefe de Jefes, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued on a highly violent level. The majority of fatalities resulted from inter-gang violence, not from fighting between security forces and the cartels. Drug gangsters and security forces clashed heavily almost every day. As last year, most of the clashes were located in the northern part of the country. However, an increasing number of heavy clashes were reported from other parts of the country. For example, nine soldiers were killed in armed gangster attacks in the southern state of Guerrero on 12/07/08 and 12/21/08. Eight of them were handcuffed, tortured, and shot. On January 24, security forces arrested Santiago "Stew Maker" Meza, who had been dissolving 300 bodies in chemicals near Tijuana. On June 8, two hundred soldiers conducted an operation against members of the Beltrán Leyva cartel in a tourist compound in the southern city of Acapulco de Juárez. The gangsters used automatic weapons, hand grenades, a grenade launcher, and portable bazookas. Two soldiers and 16 cartel members were killed. On August 19, fifty-seven people were killed in 24 hours, the highest death toll up to this point; most of them were killed in the northern state of Chihuahua. On the same day, Alan Cristian Domínguez, the police commander of Ciudad Juárez, a town in Chihuahua, was assassinated by gangsters. Earlier, they had threatened to kill at least one police officer every 48 hours as long as his predecessor, Roberto Orduna Cruz, remained in office. After a series of killings, Cruz retired on February 21. The following day, gangsters tried to assassinate the governor of Chihuahua, José Reyes Baeza. On February 12, gangsters killed Ramón Jasso Rodríguez, head of the homicide investigation department in the northern city of Monterrey. Mauro Enrique Tello, a retired general and security advisor, was assassinated in the southern city of Cancún on February 3. In reaction, the army took over the police headquarter and arrested all senior security

staff. In January and February alone, more than 1,000 people were killed in gang violence, most of them in Ciudad Juárez. In reaction, the government deployed 5,300 troops to the state in addition to the 2,026 already based there. On July 16, President Felipe Calderón announced plans to send 5,500 more federal security forces to Michoacán state. In total, the government deployed another 12,800 troops over the course of the year, amounting to 35,000 security forces in the field. On January 24, demonstrations against gang-violence prompted the army to move in and dismiss all 42 local police officers in the city of Villanueva. The army disarmed the local police forces and took over their function. Subsequently, the situation eased. After the arrest of Arturo Beltrán Leyva, a senior drug-baron, gangsters attacked the police convoy transporting him to prison on April 19, trying to free Leyva. Eight police officers were killed. On May 17, members of the Golfo cartel freed 59 prisoners from a high-security prison in northern Mexico in a three-minute operation involving a helicopter. Security forces arrested Arnoldo Rueda Medina, a high-ranking member of La Familia, on July 11. In a series of killings, dozens of people died, among them twelve federal police officers. On July 15, Servando Gómez Martínez, a leader of La Familia, offered the federal government a peace deal which was immediately rejected. In the following weeks, security forces arrested several top members of the cartel, among them Miguel Ángel "La Troca" Beraza, a senior smuggler of crystal methamphetamines. In late October, Héctor Saldaña Perales, senior boss of the Beltrán Leyva gang, was killed in Nuevo León state by the newly emerging cartel Jefe de Jefes. The organization claimed responsibility for 121 killings in October alone. On August 11, security forces arrested Dimas Díaz Ramos, a senior figure of the Sinaloa gang, suspected of planning to assassinate President Calderón. While the US government strongly supported Mexico's fight on drugs with funds and military equipment, her department of justice classified Mexico as a national security threat. In spring, the US doubled the security forces at the border to Mexico. On February 26, President Felipe Calderón denied allegations that Mexico was a failed state. In another statement on March 30, Calderón accused some US authorities of complicity in the drug trade. The government prolonged the army's operations against drug-related violence until 2013. From late May to late June, security forces arrested about 3,000 officials, some of whom were high ranking, for alleged cooperation with drug cartels. On August 18, the government decided to remove 700 customs personnel. Throughout the year, the army seized more than 15 tons of cocaine and more than 46 tons of crystal methamphetamines. In the state of Durango, the army raided a drug laboratory comprising 22 buildings, power plants and the capacity of producing 100 kg of drugs a day. In two crackdowns on US territory against Sinaloa and La Familia on February 26 and October 22, about 1,000 people were arrested. Moreover, security forces seized USD 62 million in cash and 14 tons of cocaine. The government accused Los Zetas and other cartels of illegal oil smuggling, depriving the state of several hundred million USD per year. Al-

together, more than 6,900 people were killed in drug-related violence in 2009, most of them, however, in inter-gang violence. (fs)

### Paraguay (various opposition groups)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: •	Start: 1989
Conflict parties:	various farmer organizations, various indigenous groups, EPP, landless people vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, resources	

The conflict over land reform between several farmer organizations, the newly emerged left-leaning People's Army of Paraguay (EPP), indigenous groups, and landless people, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued on a violent level. These groups voiced disappointment about the lack of progress being made by President Fernando Lugo's government in fulfilling his promise of an integral agrarian reform. On 12/01/08, some 2,000 members of social and indigenous groups took the streets of the capital, Asunción, and clashed with police forces after protesters attempted to cross a barrier protecting the presidential residence in the capital. A series of protests both by landowner and peasant organizations culminated in the killing of an Argentine soy farmer and his agronomist in the northeast of Paraguay near the Brazilian border on 12/18/08. On 12/31/08, four EPP guerrillas raided a military post in Tacuatí, San Pedro department. Subsequently, the authorities deployed 400 soldiers and 200 police officers to the area. Six people were arrested within four days. Furthermore, the EPP claimed responsibility for another two attacks on ranches and on the house of a journalist between October and December 2008. On April 29, a bomb exploded outside the Supreme Court. The authorities investigated a possible link to the EPP. In another incident in mid-May, one person died when some 350 land invaders clashed with police forces. In early August, EPP rebels abducted a farmer. On September 12, they were successful in obtaining USD 300,000 ransom for his release. In another incident on October 15, ten members of the EPP kidnapped a rancher in the north-eastern department of Concepción. (ank)

### Peru (opposition)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: •	Start: 2008
Conflict parties:	opposition vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, resources	

The conflict between various opposition groups consisting of farmer and mining unions as well as indigenous tribes, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued to be carried out violently. The opposition groups protested against the free-market policy of President Alan García, rising food prices, and environmental pollution. They also demanded higher wages and fair tax redistribution. On January 15, farmers blocked roads throughout the country, demanding the congress repeal laws possibly leading to the privatization of water resources and subsequent price increases. On the same day, indigenous Awajun and Wampi took four mining workers captive, fearing contamination and defor-

estation through the planned exploration of metals in the region. The hostages were released on January 23. On January 20, three police officers were killed when they tried to remove landless protesters from a national park in Lambayeque. On April 4, a wave of protests started, mainly organized by the Asociación Interétnica de Desarrollo de la Selva Peruana (Aidesep). Aidesep demanded the repeal of several legislations, which they said curtailed or eliminated the rights of indigenous communities. Aidesep organized marches, blocked highways as well as airports, and occupied oil installations. Following several clashes between protesters and police forces, on May 9, the government declared a 60-day state of emergency in five Amazonian districts. Six days later, the president of Aidesep, Alberto Pizango, declared the beginning of an insurgency. On May 18, the government authorized the army to support the police in the Amazon districts for 30 days. The largest labor organization, the General Confederation of Peruvian Workers (CGTP), held a nationwide strike on May 27 in order to support the indigenous populations. On June 6, at least 24 police officers and nine indigenous people were killed when some 400 police forces tried to break up a roadblock near Bagua Grande. After the police had cleared the road, protesters torched government buildings, looted offices, and attacked the town's police station. In reaction, the army set up checkpoints and imposed curfews. (mgm)

### Peru (Shining Path)

Intensity: <b>4</b>	Change: ↗	Start: 1980
Conflict parties:	Shining Path vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, regional predominance, resources	

The conflict between the left-wing rebel group Shining Path (SP) and the government over regional predominance escalated. The remaining rebels were divided in two factions. The first faction was the Comité Regional Huallaga (CRH) numbering around 100 fighters and operating in the Upper Huallaga valley about 250 km northeast of the capital, Lima. The second faction was the Comité Regional del Centro (CRC), active in the two main river valleys in the region Apurímac and Ene (VRAE), and consisting of an estimated 300 to 600 fighters. Both factions were accused of being involved in drug-trafficking and providing gunmen for drug cartels. On 12/23/08, Comrade Artemio, the leader of CRH, called on the government for a political solution of the conflict. Rejecting Artemio's suggestion, the Chief of Peru's Armed Forces, Francisco Contreras, stated on January 2 that the military's aim was the definite defeat of SP. There were about one dozen deadly ambushes in 2009, mainly conducted by the CRC. On 12/28/08, suspected SP remnants killed one soldier and wounded two in an attack on a supply helicopter. On February 27, one


marine was killed and two were injured in a joint operation of the armed forces against SP. Using grenades and dynamite, SP insurgents killed 14 soldiers in two different ambushes on April 4. On April 28, CRC guerrillas used RPG-7 bazookas to attack the helicopter carrying Contreras. One soldier died and four more were wounded in a CRC attack against a military base in the province of Ayacucho on June 7. On August 1, about 50 SP guerrillas attacked a police station in the same province, killing three police officers and two civilians. On August 26, two soldiers and four guerillas were killed in a clash in VRAE. On September 2, SP rebels shot down an army helicopter, killing two people and wounding three others. One army sergeant was killed by SP guerrillas near the city of Satipo on October 12. Another soldier was killed on November 5. The CRC conducted several attacks against the military's Operación Excelencia, consisting of 1,200 troops in southern Peru, and announced plans to extend its guerrilla operations to other areas in the country. However, the CRH was weakened by a wave of arrests of its top commanders. On June 2, police forces arrested Alejo Teodossio "Comrade Rocky" Tolentino, and on August 11, Félix Mejía Ascencios Artemios, presumed security chief of the CRH. In February, CRH guerrillas blew up an electricity transmission tower in Tingo María province. On October 26, Elena Iparraguirre, former second-in-command of the SP, announced the political wing of the SL, the Partido Comunista del Perú, was going to take part in the 2011 local and regional elections. (mgm)

### USA - Cuba (system)

Intensity: <b>2</b>	Change: •	Start: 1959
Conflict parties:	United States vs. Cuba	
Conflict items:	system/ideology	


The system conflict between the USA and Cuba continued. On 12/05/08, Raúl and Fidel Castro signaled they were willing to negotiate with the US government. On March 19, US President Barack Obama decided to ease the entry requirements to Cuba. From that point onwards, Cuban exiles were allowed to visit their families in Cuba once a year and stay for an unlimited period of time. On April 14, the US government annulated all travel restrictions and allowed unlimited and free money transfer to Cuba. Seven congressmen of the Democratic Party visited Cuba on April 6. This meeting was the first time ever Raúl Castro met with senior US politicians. However, on April 20, Fidel Castro demanded the termination of the economic embargo against Cuba. On July 9, the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton demanded fundamental changes in Cuban politics as a precondition for an unlimited dialog. Nevertheless, high-level talks on confidence building measures were held between representatives of both countries in Havana on September 30. (deh, lar)

# Asia and Oceania




With a total of 113 conflicts, the region of Asia and Oceania accounted for nearly a third of the world's conflicts. Most conflicts concerned system/ideology, followed by regional predominance, national power, and secession. The most violent conflicts were fought over system/ideology and secession, while conflicts regarding territory and international power were comparatively peaceful. In 2009, three wars were observed in the region: In Sri Lanka, the civil war between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the government ended with the military defeat of the LTTE in mid-May [→ Sri Lanka (LTTE/northern and eastern Sri Lanka)]. The fighting displaced some 130,000 Tamils. Pakistan was the region's most conflict-ridden country with two wars [→ Pakistan (various Islamist militants); Pakistan (Taliban - various tribes)] and six further violent conflicts. In late March, US President Barack Obama presented the Af-Pak strategy, thereby expanding the USA's focus on Pakistan in its fight against al-Qaeda and Taliban insurgents in neighboring Afghanistan [→ USA - Pakistan; Afghanistan (Taliban)]. US drone attacks in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas sharply increased, killing more than 500 people. All in all, six severe crises were fought out in Asia in 2009. Besides two in South Asia [→ India (Naxalites); Pakistan (Sunnites - Shiites)], the remaining four severe crises were observed in Southeast Asia [→ Myanmar (KNU, KNLA/Karen State, Kayah State); Philippines (Abu Sayyaf/Mindanao); Philippines (MILF/Mindanao); Thailand (Muslim separatists/southern border provinces)]. Both highly violent conflicts in the Philippines were fought in the south between heavily armed government forces and Islamist militants. With 62 and 41 conflicts, respectively, South and Southeast Asia were the subregions most affected by political conflict. Gaining wide media coverage, violent Uighur mass protests occurred in Urumqi, the provincial capital of Xinjiang province, leaving between 197 and 600 people dead [→ China (Uighurs/Xinjang)]. In Bangladesh, the newly elected government took stringent measures to curb militant activity [→ Bangladesh (JMB)], forcing Indian militant groups fighting for secession in Tripura to leave their Bangladeshi-based camps, contributing to a series of surrenders in Tripura [→ India (Tripura)].

**Conflict Intensities in Asia and Oceania in 2009 compared to 2008**



**Frequency of Conflict Items in 2009 in Asia and Oceania by Intensity Groups**



## Overview: Conflicts in Asia and Oceania in 2009

Name of conflict <sup>1</sup>	Conflict parties <sup>2</sup>	Conflict items	Start	Change <sup>3</sup>	Int. <sup>4</sup>
Bangladesh (AL - BNP)*	AL, government vs. BNP	national power	1991	•	2
Bangladesh (JMB)	JMB vs. government	system/ideology	2005	↗	3
Bangladesh (PCJSS - UPDF)*	PCJSS vs. UPDF	regional predominance	1997	↗	2
Bangladesh (PCJSS, UPDF/Chittagong Hill Tracts)*	UPDF, PCJSS, tribes in the Chittagong Hill Tracts vs. government	autonomy	1971	•	2
Bangladesh - India*	Bangladesh vs. India	territory, resources, other	1971	↘	1
Bangladesh - Myanmar*	Bangladesh vs. Myanmar	resources, other	1991	↗	2
Cambodia (CFF)*	CFF vs. government	national power	2000	•	1
Cambodia (opposition)*	FUNCINPEC, SRP vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1997	↗	2
Cambodia - Vietnam*	Cambodia vs. Vietnam	territory	1969	•	1
China (Falun Gong)*	Falun Gong vs. government	system/ideology	1999	•	2
China (Hong Kong pro-democracy parties)*	Hong Kong pro-democracy parties vs. government	autonomy, system/ideology	1999	↘	1
China (Hui)	Hui vs. Han, government	regional predominance	2000	↗	3
China (Taiwan)	government of the People's Republic in Beijing vs. government of the Republic of China in Taipei vs. pro-Taiwan independence groups	secession	1949	•	2
China (Tibet)	Tibetan government-in-exile, Tibetan separatists vs. government	secession, system/ideology	1912	•	3
China (Uighurs/Xinjiang)	ETIM, Uighurs, WUC vs. government, Han	secession, system/ideology	1990	•	3
China - Vietnam et al. (Spratly Islands)*	China vs. Vietnam vs. Malaysia vs. Philippines vs. Brunei vs. Singapore vs. Indonesia	territory, resources	1945	•	1
Fiji (indigenous Fijians - Indo-Fijians)*	indigenous Fijians vs. Indo-Fijians	regional predominance	1970	•	2
Fiji (traditionalist - non-traditionalist indigenous Fijians)	traditionalist indigenous Fijians vs. non-traditionalist indigenous Fijians	system/ideology, national power	2006	•	2
India (ATTF, ULFA, NLFT - Biharis, Bengalis)*	ATTF, ULFA, NLFT vs. Biharis, Bengalis	regional predominance	1981	↘	2
India (Bodos - Santhals)*	Bodos vs. Santhals	regional predominance	1994	↘	1
India (DHD - HPC-D)*	DHD vs. HPC-D	regional predominance	1986	•	1
India (Hindus - Christians)*	VHP, Bajrang Dal, Hindus vs. Christians	regional predominance	1999	↘	2
India (Hindus - Muslims)*	Hindus vs. Muslims	regional predominance	1853	•	3
India (Hmar/Mizoram, Manipur, Assam)*	HPC-D, HNA vs. government	autonomy	1986	↘	2
India (HNLC, ANVC, PLFM/Meghalaya)*	ANVC, HNLC, PLFM vs. government	secession	1995	•	3
India (JeM, LeT, HM et al./Kashmir)	JeM, LeT, HM vs. government	secession	1947	↘	3
India (LTTE)*	LTTE vs. government	other	1987	•	1
India (MPLF, ZRA, KCP/Manipur)	MPLF, ZRA, KCP vs. government	secession	1964	↘	3
India (Nagas - Kukis)*	KNF, KLA, KNA vs. NSCN, UNPC	regional predominance	1947	•	3
India (Naxalites)	CPI-M vs. government	system/ideology	1997	•	4
India (NSCN-K - NSCN-IM)*	NSCN-K vs. NSCN-IM	regional predominance	1988	•	3
India (NSCN/Nagaland)*	NSCN-IM, NSCN-K, NSCN-U vs. government	secession	1947	•	3
India (PULF)	PULF vs. government	autonomy, system/ideology	1993	•	3
India (Sikhs - DSS)*	Sikhs vs. DSS	regional predominance	2007	↘	2
India (Sikhs/Punjab)*	Akali Dal, KLF, BKI vs. government	autonomy	1929	↘	1
India (Tripura)	ATTF, BNCT, NLFT vs. government	secession	1980	•	3
India (ULFA, NDFB, Black Widow, DHD/Assam)	ULFA, NDFB, BW, DHD vs. government	autonomy	1979	•	3

Name of conflict <sup>1</sup>	Conflict parties <sup>2</sup>	Conflict items	Start	Change <sup>3</sup>	Int. <sup>4</sup>
India (various Islamist militants)	JeM, HuJI, LeT, IM, SIMI vs. government	system/ideology	2001	↓	2
Indonesia (Dayak - Madurese)*	Dayak vs. Madurese	regional predominance	1997	END	1
Indonesia (GAM/Aceh)	GAM, Partai Aceh, KPA vs. government	autonomy, resources	1953	•	3
Indonesia (Jemaah Islamiyah)	Jemaah Islamiyah vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1981	↗	3
Indonesia (Muslims - Christians/Moluccas)*	Muslims, Laskar Jihad vs. Christians	regional predominance	1998	↗	3
Indonesia (Muslims - Christians/Sulawesi)*	Muslims vs. Christians	regional predominance	1998	•	2
Indonesia (OPM/Papua)	OPM vs. government	secession, resources	1949	•	3
Indonesia (RMS, FKM, Laskar Jihad/Moluccas)*	RMS, FKM, Laskar Jihad vs. government	secession	1950	•	2
Indonesia - Timor-Leste*	Indonesia vs. Timor-Leste	other	2002	•	1
Japan - China (Senkaku / Diaoyutai Islands)	Japan vs. China (Republic of China / Taiwan), China (People's Republic of China)	territory, resources	1972	•	2
Japan - Russia (Kuril Islands)*	Japan vs. Russia	territory	1945	↘	1
Japan - South Korea (Dokdo / Takeshima Islands)*	Japan vs. South Korea	territory	1948	•	2
Kazakhstan (opposition)	opposition vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2004	•	2
Kyrgyzstan (opposition)	opposition vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2005	•	2
Laos (Hmong, Royalists)*	Hmong, Royalist vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1975	•	3
Malaysia (KMM)*	KMM vs. government	system/ideology	1998	•	1
Malaysia (Malays - Chinese and Indian minorities)*	Malays vs. Chinese minority, Indian minority	regional predominance	1946	•	1
Malaysia (opposition)	Hindraf, Pakatan Rakyat, DAP, PAS, PKR vs. government	national power	1998	•	2
Malaysia - Indonesia, Philippines (immigrants)	Malaysia vs. Indonesien, Philippines	other	1998	•	2
Maldives (MDP)*	MDP vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2003	END	1
Myanmar (Arakan Army, NUFA/Rakhine State)*	Arakan Army, NUFA vs. government	secession	1948	•	2
Myanmar (CNA, CNF/Chin State)*	CNA, CNF vs. government	secession	1988	•	2
Myanmar (KIA, KIO/Kachin State)*	KIA, KIO vs. government	autonomy	1961	•	2
Myanmar (KNPP, KnA, KNLP/Kayah State)*	KNPP, KnA, KNLP vs. government	autonomy	1948	↘	2
Myanmar (KNU, KNLA/Karen State, Kayah State)	KNU, KNLA vs. government, UWSA, DKBA	secession	1948	↗	4
Myanmar (MNLA, NMSP, MRA, HRP/Mon State, Karen State)*	MNLA, NMSP, MRA, HRP vs. government	secession	1948	•	2
Myanmar (opposition)	NLD, NCGUB, ABFSU, ABSDF, NULF, AABBM vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1962	↘	2
Myanmar (Rohingyas, ARNO/Rakhine State)*	Rohingyas, ARNO vs. government	other	1948	•	2
Myanmar (SSA-S, SSNA, SSA-N/Shan State)*	SSA-S, SSNA, SSA-N vs. government	autonomy	1952	↘	2
Myanmar (UWSA, UWSP, MNDAA/Shan State)	UWSA, UWSP, MNDAA, NDAA-ESS vs. government	autonomy	1988	↗	3
Nepal (CPN-M)*	CPN-M vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1990	↗	3
Nepal (Madheshis/Terai)	Madheshi armed groups, Madheshi political parties vs. government	autonomy	2006	•	3
Nepal (NDA, RS)	NDA, RS vs. government	system/ideology	2007	•	3
Nepal - Bhutan*	Nepal vs. Bhutan	other	1985	•	2

Name of conflict <sup>1</sup>	Conflict parties <sup>2</sup>	Conflict items	Start	Change <sup>3</sup>	Int. <sup>4</sup>
North Korea - South Korea	North Korea vs. South Korea	system/ideology, international power	1948	↗	3
North Korea - USA, South Korea, Japan	North Korea vs. United States, South Korea, Japan	system/ideology, international power, other	1990	•	2
Pakistan (BLA, BRA, BLF/Baluchistan)	BLA, BRA, BLF, BLUF vs. government	secession, resources	1998	↘	3
Pakistan (Mohajirs - Sindhis, Pathans)*	MQM, Mohajirs vs. Sindhis, Pathans	regional predominance	1947	•	3
Pakistan (Muslims - Christians)	Muslims vs. Christians	regional predominance	1998	•	3
Pakistan (opposition)	opposition vs. government	national power	1998	↗	3
Pakistan (Sunnites - Shiites)	Shiite groups vs. Sunni groups	system/ideology, regional predominance	1998	•	4
Pakistan (Taliban - various tribes)	Taliban vs. various tribes	system/ideology, regional predominance	2001	↗	5
Pakistan (various Islamist militants)	various Islamist militants vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2001	•	5
Pakistan - India	Pakistan vs. India	territory, international power	1947	•	3
Philippines (Abu Sayyaf/Mindanao)	Abu Sayyaf vs. government	secession, system/ideology	1991	↗	4
Philippines (CPP, NPA)	NPA, CPP vs. government	system/ideology	1968	↘	3
Philippines (MILF/Mindanao)	MILF vs. government	autonomy, system/ideology, resources	1977	•	4
Philippines (MNLF/Mindanao)*	MNLF vs. government	autonomy, system/ideology, resources	1969	•	3
Singapore (Jemaah Islamiah)*	Jemaah Islamiah vs. government	system/ideology	1999	•	1
Singapore - Malaysia	Singapore vs. Malaysia	territory, international power	1963	•	1
Solomon Islands (ethnic groups)*	Islanders of Guadalcanal, IFM vs. Islanders of Malaita, MEF	regional predominance, resources	1978	•	2
Sri Lanka (Buddhists - Hindus, Muslims, Christians)*	Buddhists vs. Hindus, Muslims, Christians	regional predominance	1948	↘	1
Sri Lanka (Jamiyathul Ulama - Sufis)*	Jamiyathul Ulama vs. Sufis	regional predominance	1978	↘	1
Sri Lanka (LTTE - EPDP)*	LTTE vs. EPDP	regional predominance	1986	↘	1
Sri Lanka (LTTE - JVP)*	LTTE vs. JVP	other	1976	↘	1
Sri Lanka (LTTE - LTTE-East)*	LTTE vs. LTTE-East (Karuna Faction)	territory, regional predominance	2004	•	3
Sri Lanka (LTTE - PLOTE)*	LTTE vs. PLOTE	regional predominance	1979	↘	1
Sri Lanka (LTTE, Tamils - SLMC, Muslims)*	LTTE, Tamils vs. SLMC, Muslims	regional predominance	1976	↘	1
Sri Lanka (LTTE/northern and eastern Sri Lanka)	LTTE vs. government	secession	1976	•	5
Sri Lanka (Sinhalese nationalists)*	Sinhalese nationalists, conservative Buddhist clergy, JHU vs. government	system/ideology, other	1948	•	1
Sri Lanka (SLMC)*	SLMC vs. government	other	1981	•	1
Sri Lanka (Upcountry Tamils)*	Upcountry Tamils vs. government	other	1948	•	1
Tajikistan (opposition)*	opposition vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1997	↘	1
Thailand (Muslim separatists/southern border provinces)	Muslim separatists vs. government	secession, system/ideology	1902	•	4
Thailand (Northern Hill Tribes)*	Northern Hill Tribes vs. government	other	1955	•	1
Thailand (opposition)	PPP, PTP, UDD vs. PAD, government	national power	2006	•	3
Thailand - Cambodia (border)	Thailand vs. Cambodia	territory, international power	1954	•	3
Thailand - Myanmar*	Thailand vs. Myanmar	territory, other	1948	•	1
Timor-Leste (Loromonu veterans)*	Loromonu veterans vs. Lorosa'e, government	national power	2006	↘	2



Name of conflict <sup>1</sup>	Conflict parties <sup>2</sup>	Conflict items	Start	Change <sup>3</sup> Int. <sup>4</sup>
Timor-Leste (opposition)*	FRETILIN vs. CNRT	national power	2006	• 2
Timor-Leste - Australia*	Timor-Leste vs. Australia	resources	2002	• 1
Tonga (opposition)*	opposition vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1970	↘ 1
USA - Pakistan	USA vs. Pakistan	international power	2003	↘ 2
Uzbekistan (IMU)	IMU vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1998	↗ 3
Uzbekistan (opposition)*	opposition vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2005	↘ 1
Vietnam (Montagnards)*	Montagnards vs. government	autonomy, other	1958	• 2

<sup>1 2 3 4</sup> cf. overview table for Europe

### Bangladesh (JMB)

Intensity: **3**      Change: ↗      Start: 2005  
 Conflict parties: JMB vs. government  
 Conflict items: system/ideology

The system conflict between the banned Islamist group Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) and the government escalated. In the run up to the general elections on 12/29/08, the interim government intensified its raids against JMB activists. The newly-elected government of Sheikh Hasina of the Awami League arrested several JMB members, seized weapons and explosives, and convicted JMB cadres. Prime Minister Hasina stated her government would not hesitate to take strict measures to curb militancy. Members of various Indian insurgent groups, mainly of the Borok National Council of Tripura, fled their training camps in Bangladesh [→ India (Tripura)]. In May, the government confirmed its zero-tolerance policy against militancy and terrorism. Nevertheless, JMB continued to regroup and reorganize. They stepped up their activities, reportedly carried out from makeshift camps located in remote villages in Sirajganj and adjoining districts. On January 3, JMB threatened to blow up two schools in Jessore town on January 7. The conflict turned violent when an arrested JMB cadre exploded a grenade at a police station in Gazipur, injuring at least 13 people on February 20. (cs)

### China (Hui)

Intensity: **3**      Change: ↗      Start: 2000  
 Conflict parties: Hui vs. Han, government  
 Conflict items: regional predominance

The conflict between the Muslim Hui minority, on the one hand, and the government as well as the ethnic Han majority, on the other, turned violent. On February 11, hundreds of Hui clashed with Han from a neighboring village in Mengcun Hui Muslim Autonomous County, Hebei province, after Han and Hui children had quarreled the previous night. The county administration deployed 2,000 riot police officers to the villages, calming the riots. According to officials, the number of people injured amounted to three, while the Hong Kong Center for Democracy and Human Rights estimated 100. Some 500 riot police remained in the area. From March 31 to April 2, hundreds of Hui protested in Luohe, Henan province, against religious discrimination by Han and recent incidents involving land requisition. Some protesters attacked government buildings. (jd)

### China (Taiwan)

Intensity: **2**      Change: •      Start: 1949  
 Conflict parties: government of the People's Republic in Beijing vs. government of the Republic of China in Taipei vs. pro-Taiwan independence groups  
 Conflict items: secession

The conflict between the Chinese government in Taipei on the island of Taiwan and the Chinese government in Beijing continued. While the government of the People's Republic of China continued to claim to be the only legitimate government of all China, the government of the Republic of China strove to maintain the status quo. Although there were indications of the Republic of China upholding its de jure claim over mainland China, the government in Taipei recognized the de-facto restriction of its authority to the island of Taiwan. However, opposition groups in Taiwan continued to demand the explicit recognition of Taiwan's independence. In April, the third meeting between the Straits Exchange Foundation chairman Chiang Pin-Kung and the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Straits chairman Chen Yunlin was held in Nanjing. The parties signed agreements regarding supplementary air transport, crime fighting, mutual legal assistance, and financial cooperation. In addition, a consensus was reached to open Taiwan to investment from the mainland. On May 18, Taiwan, under the name of "Chinese Taipei", participated at the World Health Assembly meeting for the first time, as an observer. On August 30, the Dalai Lama, the spiritual leader of Tibetan Buddhism and Tibet's head of state in exile, visited Taiwan but was not received by President Ma Ying-jeou [→ China (Tibet)]. The visit was denounced by the Chinese government in Beijing but caused no major disruption. On October 15, the president of the People's Republic of China, Hu Jintao, appealed for a peace agreement between the two governments and additional confidence-building measures. As a precondition for such talks with the government in Beijing, the government in Taipei demanded the removal of missiles facing Taiwan. Meanwhile, their number increased to 1,500, according to the Taipei-based Ministry of National Defense, who called this a threat to peace in the Asia-Pacific region. (mr)

## China (Tibet)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: •	Start: 1912
Conflict parties:	Tibetan government-in-exile, Tibetan separatists vs. government	
Conflict items:	secession, system/ideology	

The secession conflict over the province's status between Tibetan separatists and the Tibetan government-in-exile, on the one hand, and the central government, on the other, remained violent. In December 2008, a diplomatic row between the EU and China followed an address by the spiritual leader of Tibetan Buddhism and Tibet's head of state in exile, the Dalai Lama, to the European Parliament. China suspended high level diplomatic ties with France, which then held the European Council Presidency, until April, after French President Nicolas Sarkozy had met with the Dalai Lama. In January, Chinese authorities detained 81 people and questioned nearly 6,000 ahead of the March anniversary of the 1959 Tibetan uprising. As of February, the government deployed additional security forces to Tibetan areas and closed the Tibet Autonomous Region to foreign tourists. Tibet was reopened to tourists after a two-month closure. On February 14, police detained 21 people after pro-Tibet protests in Litang county, Sichuan province. Some 1,000 Buddhist monks gathered on February 27 in Aba, Sichuan province, protesting against the central government. One of the monks set himself on fire but was rescued by policemen. On March 9, two bombs damaged two vehicles including one police car after a dispute between police and local people in Golog, a Tibetan autonomous prefecture in Qinghai province. The province was subsequently closed to foreigners. While Tibetans commemorated the 1959 uprising on March 10, the government marked the flight of the Dalai Lama in that year with the new "Serfs' Liberation Day" national holiday on March 28. On March 21, a group of at least 100 Buddhist monks attacked a police station in Qinghai province; 93 of them were detained. On April 8, two men were sentenced to death for deadly arson attacks in March 2008. In August, the Dalai Lama declared the Tibetan issue to be a Chinese domestic problem. On November 8, thousands of people welcomed the Dalai Lama, who was visiting a Buddhist monastery in Tawang, India, close to the Tibetan border. Abroad, pro-Tibet activists demonstrated against China's Tibet policy throughout the year. (jd)

## China (Uighurs/Xinjiang)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: •	Start: 1990
Conflict parties:	ETIM, Uighurs, WUC vs. government, Han	
Conflict items:	secession, system/ideology	

The conflict between the Uighurs, the Muslim minority in the Chinese autonomous region of Xinjiang, and the government remained violent. On April 4, China executed two Uighurs found guilty of killing 17 people in the August 2008 assault in Kashgar, a city in Xinjiang. Uighur workers from Xinjiang clashed with Han in Shaoguan, Guangdong province on June 30, leaving two Uighurs dead and 118 people injured. On July 5, about 1,000 Uighurs gathered in Urumqi, the provincial capital of Xinjiang, de-

manding fair investigation in the deaths. The protests turned violent when thousands of Uighurs attacked Han and rampaged through Urumqi. Riot police dispersed the crowds with tear gas and water cannons, but riots continued until security forces locked down the city with roadblocks and patrols with armored vehicles. According to state media, the riots left 197 people dead and 1,721 injured, while the World Uighur Congress (WUC) estimated that as many as 600 died. On July 6, officials blocked internet and mobile phone services in Xinjiang and police arrested some 1,434 people. In Kashgar, police violently dissipated a protest of 200 Uighurs. On July 7, riot police quelled protests of 200 Uighur women who demanded the release of their husbands and sons. Thousands of Han, some of them armed, staged large-scale demonstrations, dissolved by riot police using tear gas. Sporadic ethnic violence between radical Han and Uighurs was reported. A night curfew was imposed. In Kashgar, Uighur protesters clashed with police. Around 50 people were arrested. On July 8, security forces succeeded in separating the antagonist ethnic communities. However, inter-ethnic violence erupted sporadically. President Hu Jintao cut short his attendance at a G-8 summit in Italy to deal with the crisis. On July 10, police dispersed a demonstration of hundreds of Uighurs. Thousands of Urumqi's inhabitants fled the city, which remained under heavy police and military presence for weeks. Authorities blamed exiled WUC leader Rebiya Kadeer for inciting the unrest, which she rejected. On July 18, police killed twelve Uighurs attacking civilians in Urumqi. In mid-October, a court sentenced a Han to death for his role in the Guangdong clashes. Twelve people were sentenced to death in relation to the Urumqi riots, nine of whom were executed on November 9. As of mid-August, a series of attacks with hypodermic syringes on some 500 people, mostly Han, was reported in Urumqi. Blaming Uighurs for the stabbings, thousands of Han staged protests on September 3. Riot police intervened; the ensuing riots left five people dead and 14 injured. Later that month, a court sentenced seven people to up to 15 years prison for the attacks. Since December 2008, the upcoming release of 17 Uighur Guantanamo prisoners led to a diplomatic row between China and the US. Throughout the year, China repeatedly urged the prisoners - alleged members of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) - be repatriated to China. However, the USA refused to hand them over. Four Uighurs were resettled to Bermuda in June, another six to Palau in October. (jd)


## Fiji (traditionalist - non-traditionalist indigenous Fijians)

Intensity: <b>2</b>	Change: •	Start: 2006
Conflict parties:	traditionalist indigenous Fijians vs. non-traditionalist indigenous Fijians	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, national power	

The conflict over the orientation of the political system between traditionalist indigenous Fijians and non-traditionalist indigenous Fijians continued. The latter constitute the military government of Prime Minister Commodore Ratu Josaia Voreqe Frank Bainimarama,

himself an indigenous Fijian of chiefly rank. Australia and New Zealand increased pressure on Fiji because two years after the military coup of December 2006 the military regime had not reinstated democracy as promised. On April 9, the Appeal Court, Fiji's second highest court, ruled Bainimarama's government illegal, prompting the prime minister to resign. The following day, in response to this, President Ratu Josefa Iloilo abrogated the constitution, dismissed all judges, and imposed a state of emergency. Subsequently, Iloilo reinstalled Bainimarama as prime minister. A tightening of military control, media censorship as well as house arrests for journalists and lawyers followed. Iloilo set a 2014 deadline for democratic elections to take place. On July 30, Iloilo retired from office and was replaced by Vice President Brigadier-General Ratu Epeli Nailatika. Australia and New Zealand called the 2014 deadline unacceptable and threatened Fiji with sanctions. The South Pacific nations suspended Fiji from the Pacific Island Forum regional bloc in May. In July, Bainimarama revealed plans to introduce a new constitution in 2013, intending to abolish the system in which the island's main populations, the indigenous Fijians and the Indo-Fijians, vote for separate candidates of their own ethnic group. When the government determinedly refused to call elections by 2010, the Commonwealth of Nations fully suspended Fiji's membership on September 1. The UN barred Fiji's military troops from joining any new UN peacekeeping forces, and the EU suspended aid. After Australia's and New Zealand's high commissioners had been expelled, both countries reacted in the same manner one day later on November 4. (nch)


### India (JeM, LeT, HM et al./Kashmir)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: 	Start: 1947
Conflict parties:	JeM, LeT, HM vs. government	
Conflict items:	secession	

The secession conflict in the Indian-administered state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) between Kashmiri and Pakistani insurgent groups, on the one hand, and the Indian government, on the other, continued. The most important separatist groups were Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM). On 12/30/08, security forces started a ten-day operation, targeting about a dozen commanders and some 350 militants of the Jaish-e-Mohammed in the Bhati Dhar forest of Mendhar in the Poonch District. Two army soldiers, a special police officer, and at least four militants were killed in the operation. The operation was the longest anti-militant operation in Jammu in two decades, and ended with the escape of most of the militants. At the end of March, in a ten-day gun battle at the Line of Control (LoC) in the Kupwara District, 32 militants and government forces were killed. On April 21, five people were killed and seven wounded in an explosion in the Poonch District. The LeT claimed responsibility for the attack. Nine people, including four policemen, were injured in a grenade attack at Medina Chowk in the capital, Srinagar, on July 6. On the same day, militants fired two rifle grenades in the direction of the Sopore police station in the Baramulla district. On August 18, the


LeT enforced a diktat in parts of J&K, imposing a ban on the 'un-Islamic' activity of watching TV. In addition, they issued an ultimatum to impose an Islamic dress code in all colleges in Jammu and Kashmir. The Assembly elections in J&K, which ended in May, were accompanied by strikes and boycotts, as well as clashes between anti-poll protesters and security forces. During the election process, 37 people, including security force personnel, election commission staff and civilians, were killed. In spite of the separatists' threats against voters, election participation reached approx. 62 percent. (kld, ar, thw)

### India (MPLF, ZRA, KCP/Manipur)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: 	Start: 1964
Conflict parties:	MPLF, ZRA, KCP vs. government	
Conflict items:	secession	

The secession conflict between various separatist groups in the Indian state of Manipur and the Union Government continued. The different ethnic Meitei groups United National Liberation Front (UNLF), People's Liberation Army (PLA), and People Liberation Army of Kangleipak (PREPAK), united under the label Manipur People's Liberation Front (MPLF), aiming at establishing an independent Manipur state. The Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP) strove for an egalitarian society in independent Manipur, while the Zomi Revolutionary Army (ZRA) was fighting to unite all Zomi people in one state of the Indian Union. Frequent clashes between government forces and the rebel groups continued. On 12/08/08, the police killed five PREPAK rebels in Thoubal district. The same day, the All Manipur Petroleum Association protested against extortion by rebel forces and turned off all oil pumps. Several bomb attacks were conducted in February, March, and early April, in the run-up to the parliamentary elections in mid-April. Offices of the Congress Party and other official buildings were main targets. The KCP claimed responsibility for some blasts. On June 4, after four rounds of talks starting in December 2008, the Manipur State Government, the Union Government, and the Military Council Fraction of the KCP declared that they were ready to sign a ceasefire agreement as soon as possible. In addition, a ceasefire monitoring group was formed. However, KCP conducted further bomb attacks, e.g. on June 16 in Imphal West District, as a warning against illegal liquor business. Two people were injured. Paramilitary Assam Rifles troopers killed a KCP member in the same region two weeks later. On September 9, 200 militants of various groups destroyed a health center in Thoubal to disturb a vaccination program. On October 15, MPLF called for a strike in memory of the annexation of Manipur by the Indian Union in 1949, disrupting public life. (pas, ar, thw)

### India (Naxalites)

Intensity: <b>4</b>	Change: 	Start: 1997
Conflict parties:	CPI-M vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology	

The ideological conflict between the Communist Party of India - Maoist (CPI-M), also called Naxalites, and the government continued on a high level of violence. The

Naxalites, reportedly comprising approx. 3,500 militants, controlled large parts of Indian rural areas from Nepal and Bangladesh in the northeast down to central India, an area known as the "Red Belt". There they collected taxes and recruited fighters for their combat operations. Their activity centered on the states of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, West Bengal, Maharashtra, Orissa, Bihar, Andhra Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh. Especially in Chhattisgarh and West Bengal Naxalite violence increased sharply, whereas the situation in Orissa and Andhra Pradesh eased. Since November 2008, almost daily encounters between security forces and the Naxalites, as well as frequent bomb attacks, claimed around 900 lives. On April 6, seventeen people were killed in a clash between 300 CPI-M cadres and 30 policemen in Maharashtra. In June, the Naxalites declared a two day strike in five states and violently freed four cadres in Bihar. Subsequently, the Union Government declared the CPI-M a terrorist group, thereby expanding the rights of executive forces. On July 12, thirty policemen died in a CPI-M ambush in Chhattisgarh. In the following days, the police fought about 300 suspected Maoist militants. In reaction, the Union Government deployed some additional 600 troops to the area. (ar, thw)

### India (PULF)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: •	Start: 1993
Conflict parties:	PULF vs. government	
Conflict items:	autonomy, system/ideology	

The conflict between the People's United Liberation Front (PULF), fighting for an autonomous Muslim region in Manipur in the northeast of India, and the government continued. On January 19, the PULF officially announced their support for the Isak-Muivah faction of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-IM). In late July, the Director General of Tripura Police stated that the PULF had links with the Pakistani intelligence service, ISI, and had been formed by the NSCN-IM [→ India (NSCN / Nagaland)]. Throughout the year, many PULF members were arrested in joint operations by state police and Assam Rifles (AR), a paramilitary force. In one of the arrests in mid-September, a PULF militant was detained while extorting money from the local population. In four operations in February, March, and August, explosives, detonators, hand grenades, rifles, and ammunition were confiscated from PULF members. Between the end of February and mid-March, several PULF members were killed in encounters with government forces. On February 27, police and AR killed a PULF militant in a clash near Iribung police station. On March 4, another PULF member was shot dead in Phabakchao village. Three days later, two leading cadres of the Azad faction and two militants of the PULF were shot dead by police and AR. Two more PULF leaders were arrested on March 9. Six days later, two PULF militants were shot dead by police in the city of Keirao. (pas, thw)

### India (Tripura)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: •	Start: 1980
Conflict parties:	ATTF, BNCT, NLFT vs. government	
Conflict items:	secession	

The conflict in Tripura, a state in northeastern India, eased but remained violent. The All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF), the Borok National Council of Tripura (BNCT), and the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) fought for a separate state. Following a food crisis in their Bangladesh-based training camps [→ Bangladesh (JMB)], reportedly some 50 NLFT members, some 119 BNCT members as well as some 40 ATTF militants surrendered to the authorities or were arrested throughout the year. On January 5, two top ATTF cadres surrendered in West Tripura. Five days later, 22 members of the NLFT laid down their arms. More than 100 BNCT cadres fled their camps on February 14. However, violent incidents occurred. On February 10, one police officer was injured in the West district by ATTF militants. On May 21, two Border Security Forces were injured in an ambush by NLFT militants in the North district. On September 28, NLFT militants abducted six villagers in the Dhalai District. Suspected NLFT militants shot dead one farmer in the West district on November 7. Two days later, eight people affiliated with NLFT militants, having surrendered, were killed in Kanchanpur in North Tripura. NLFT claimed responsibility for the killings on November 15. On November 18, a security officer was killed in a gunfight with NLFT militants. (ve)

### India (ULFA, NDFB, Black Widow, DHD/Assam)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: •	Start: 1979
Conflict parties:	ULFA, NDFB, BW, DHD vs. government	
Conflict items:	autonomy	

The autonomy conflict between the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), the two Dimas groups Dima Halim Daogah (DHD) and its breakaway faction Black Widow (BW), on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued. The government forces intensified counter-insurgency operations after nine serial explosions across four western districts had killed more than 80 people and injured over 200 on 10/30/08. The government action included approx. 130 arrests and combat operations killing 56 ULFA militants in several encounters throughout the year. On January 14, the state government also declared a "zero-tolerance" policy towards militancy in Assam and demanded the disarmament of all armed groups as a condition for peace talks. The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) also examined the involvement of the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI) in the October bombings. Despite increased government pressure, ULFA bomb attacks continued. On January 1, ULFA militants conducted a series of bomb attacks in three areas of Guwahati city, killing five people and injuring another 50. On April 6, ten people were killed and approx. 59 injured in four bomb attacks carried out by ULFA militants in Guwahati. However, on October 29, the Union government started talks with the

pro-talks faction of the ULFA. ULFA subsequently announced that it was giving up its demand for independence and instead wanted greater autonomy. Though the NDFB and the government had extended the cease-fire agreement for a period of six months on January 6, NDFB militants carried out several attacks against civilians, killing 25 people in eight assaults between January and October. On October 23, police forces killed two NDFB militants in Kokrajhar district. In a single attack of the NDFB's anti-talks faction on October 4, fifteen people died. In reaction to the ongoing assaults, security forces conducted combat operations, killing more than 60 NDFB militants between January and October. More than 30 people were abducted by the NDFB. In July, the government ruled out the establishment of a separate Bodo State. Both Dimasa groups were less active. On October 22, the DHD and the Union Government held two-day talks in the capital, Delhi. Nevertheless, the DHD renewed its demand for a separate state. However, DHD and government forces repeatedly clashed. In late April, eight troops and eight civilians were killed in two ambushes conducted by BW cadres in North Cachar Hills District (NCHD). On May 22, BW militants attacked a goods train in NCHD, injuring twelve people. After the Union Government had set an ultimatum to surrender arms on September 15, 373 BW members surrendered. On October 2, in the aftermath, the Chief Minister of Assam, Tarun Kumar Gogoi, announced financial assistance worth 500 million rupees for the NCHD, indicating higher assistance in case of further surrenders. (ds)

### India (various Islamist militants)

Intensity: <b>2</b>	Change: ↓	Start: 2001
Conflict parties:	JeM, HuJI, LeT, IM, SIMI vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology	

The system and ideology conflict between several Islamist groups and the government deescalated. After the 11/26/08 Mumbai terror attacks, which had caused almost 200 fatalities and left more than 300 people injured, the government implemented several anti-terrorism measures. On April 4, the case against the main suspect and only surviving gunman, Pakistani Mohammad Ajmal Amir Qasab, began. On June 23, the trial court issued warrants against 22 fugitive suspects. Among these were two alleged plotters of the attacks as well as Hafeez Saeed, the chief of Jamaat-ud-Dawa, and the head of operations of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), Zaki-ur-Rehman Laqvi [→ Pakistan (Islamists)]. According to UN sources, the Jamaat-ud-Dawa is a charity organization financing the LeT. Furthermore, the government set up the first of four planned regional hubs for the National Security Guard. However, after the Mumbai attacks, the peace talks between Pakistan and India came to a halt [→ India - Pakistan]. India claimed that Islamist militant groups from Pakistan had taken part in the attacks and urged Pakistan to take action against terrorist groups. On February 12, Pakistani Interior Minister Rehman Malik admitted that the Mumbai attacks had been partly planned in Pakistan. Subsequently, Pakistan arrested a number of suspects associated with the banned LeT. On July 14, on the sidelines of a summit

of the Non-Aligned Movement in Egypt, Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani and his Indian counterpart Manmohan Singh met and agreed upon closer cooperation. (are)

### Indonesia (GAM/Aceh)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: •	Start: 1953
Conflict parties:	GAM, Partai Aceh, KPA vs. government	
Conflict items:	autonomy, resources	

The autonomy conflict between the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) with its political wing, the Partai Aceh (PA), and its armed wing, the Aceh Transitional Committee (KPA), on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued on a violent level. In the run-up to the national parliamentary and presidential elections on April 9, buildings and venues of the PA/KPA and other major parties up for election suffered from a total of 32 arson or grenade attacks. Reportedly, a network of ex-combatants against the peace process was behind most of those incidents. In February and March, five PA and KPA cadres were killed in gun attacks by unidentified perpetrators. The military assaulted a KPA cadre in Bener Mariah district on February 11 and pulled down PA flags in Aceh Utara district on March 2. Ten days later, soldiers severely beat up a PA candidate on Simeulue Island. Throughout the year, PA/KPA members repeatedly tried to hinder other local and national parties from campaigning by extorting, threatening and beating up their respective supporters. However, violence decreased significantly after the elections, which were supposedly rigged. The PA was able to secure the majority of seats in the provincial parliament as well as in most of the district legislatures. (nr)

### Indonesia (Jemaah Islamiyah)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: ↗	Start: 1981
Conflict parties:	Jemaah Islamiyah vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, national power	

The conflict between Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), an Islamist militant network fighting for a pan-South Asian Islamic state, and the government escalated to a violent level. On July 17, simultaneous suicide bombings directed at two luxury hotels in Jakarta killed nine people and injured at least 50. The attackers had allegedly been linked to a JI splinter group led by Noordin Mohammed Top, Indonesia's then most wanted suspected insurgent. He was accused of plotting, amongst other attacks, the 2005 bombings on Bali Island. On August 7 and 8, special police forces killed four and arrested seven militants loyal to Noordin in two coordinated raids in central and east Java. The police had falsely reported Noordin himself to have been among the militants killed. However, he remained fugitive until he was shot dead in another police crackdown on a house near Solo city, central Java, on September 17. In a shoot-out three weeks later, police forces killed two of Noordin's closest collaborators, allegedly involved in planning the July hotel bombings. (nr)

## Indonesia (OPM/Papua)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: •	Start: 1949
Conflict parties:	OPM vs. government	
Conflict items:	secession, resources	

The secession conflict between the Free Papua Movement (OPM), fighting for the independence of Indonesia's resource-rich province of West Papua, and the government continued on a violent level. In the run-up to the elections on April 9, sporadic violent clashes between pro-independence groups and security forces left two civilians and a soldier dead. On March 24, over a thousand protesters took to the streets in Jayapura, the provincial capital, and demanded a referendum on independence instead of the elections. In the days ahead of the elections, violent clashes erupted. On April 6, police shot dead eleven demonstrators at another pro-independence rally in Nabire city. Three days later, a protester was killed when security forces fired back at a crowd of 100 attacking a police post in Jayapura. Another four civilians died in clashes with the police in the remote city of Wamena. Two months after the elections, on June 7, special forces stormed an isolated airstrip which had been occupied by a group of gunmen allegedly affiliated to the OPM rebels. The following shootout left at least two rebels dead and several police officers seriously wounded. (nr)

## Japan - China (Senkaku / Diaoyutai Islands)

Intensity: <b>2</b>	Change: •	Start: 1972
Conflict parties:	Japan vs. China (Republic of China / Taiwan), China (People's Republic of China)	
Conflict items:	territory, resources	

The territorial conflict over the Senkaku / Diaoyutai Islands between Japan, on the one hand, and the Chinese governments in Beijing and Taipei, on the other, continued. While all three governments involved reaffirmed their territorial claims on the islands situated on the edge of the East China Sea, all sides displayed a more considerate approach when dealing with the issue. On February 20, two People's Liberation Army fighter jets intercepted three Japanese fighters flying close to the contested islands, locking their missiles onto the Japanese fighters, which returned to Japanese air space after a short stand-off. Mainland Chinese ships repeatedly entered the territorial waters near the archipelago. In June, the Japanese coastguards warned Taiwanese fishing boats to leave the area. Considerations by the parting Japanese government to deploy Ground Defense Forces on the archipelago were tempered down after the newly elected government took office. (kaz)

## Kazakhstan (opposition)

Intensity: <b>2</b>	Change: •	Start: 2004
Conflict parties:	opposition vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, national power	

The system and national power conflict between the opposition and the government of President Nursultan Nazarbayev persisted. In February, ahead of taking over the OSCE Chairmanship in 2010, the government im-

plemented a package of legislative amendments to liberalize the political system. However, the opposition criticized the alterations as not being in line with OSCE standards. Meanwhile, a criminal case against three opposition leaders was launched. Three independent journalists were attacked and beaten up in Almaty, the former capital, in January and February. Also in February, the opposition called on the government to resign and dissolve parliament. In 2007, the presidential Nur Otan party had gained 100 percent of parliamentary seats with 88 percent of the vote. In June, opposition parties and movements formed the bloc "For a Fair Kazakhstan". On October 24, the two biggest opposition parties united to form the Azat NSDP. Following the implementation of a more restrictive media law, a journalist was jailed in July for charges of divulging state secrets. In early November, the deputy chairman of the ruling Nur Otan Party agreed to engage in a dialogue with Azat NSDP. (em)

## Kyrgyzstan (opposition)

Intensity: <b>2</b>	Change: •	Start: 2005
Conflict parties:	opposition vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, national power	

The conflict over national power and the orientation of the political system between the opposition and the government of President Kurmanbek Bakiyev eased slightly. Following opposition protests in November 2008 demanding the resignation of the incumbent president, several opposition headquarters were searched without legal legitimization. On 12/24/08, eleven major opposition parties and organizations united to form the United People's Movement (UPM). Between January and May, peaceful opposition rallies were held all over the country calling for the president to resign and denouncing the suspension of an independent radio station. Opposition members were detained on a regular basis. Pre-term presidential elections were held on July 23. However, the opposition criticized the poll and called for new elections. One week after the ballot, more than 120 opposition supporters were arrested in countrywide protests. In September, the authorities abolished the immunity of an oppositional member of parliament. The opposition accused the government of increasing repressions. In support of the president's fundamental reform plans to restructure the government, Prime Minister Igor Chudinov resigned on October 20. By law, this step triggered the entire cabinet's resignation. The UPM criticized the planned reforms for concentrating power in the hands of the president. (em)

## Malaysia (opposition)

Intensity: <b>2</b>	Change: •	Start: 1998
Conflict parties:	Hindraf, Pakatan Rakyat, DAP, PAS, PKR vs. government	
Conflict items:	national power	

In the national power conflict between the pro-democracy opposition and the government, the government released several oppositional figures that were imprisoned under the Internal Security Act (ISA), but also

used massive police force in order to crack down on an anti-ISA demonstration in the city centre of the capital, Kuala Lumpur. After new Prime Minister Najib Razak had taken office on April 1, he announced the immediate release of 13 ISA detainees – including two leading members of the Hindu Rights Action Force (Hindraf) movement – and lifted the ban on two opposition publications. Furthermore, another 13 ISA detainees were released in May, including three Hindraf leaders. In addition to that, the government expressed its intention to conduct a comprehensive review of the ISA. However, on August 1, police forces cracked down on a peaceful anti-ISA demonstration in the city centre of Kuala Lumpur, using tear gas and chemical-laced water. A total of 589 people were detained. All of them were released shortly afterwards. This police approach resembled an incident earlier this year, in which police forces used water cannons against ethnic Indian demonstrators. The trial of opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim, charged with sodomy, continued without judgment so far. (sg)

### Malaysia - Indonesia, Philippines (immigrants)

Intensity: <b>2</b>	Change: •	Start: 1998
Conflict parties:	Malaysia vs. Indonesien, Philippines	
Conflict items:	other	

The conflict concerning illegal immigration to the Malaysian state of Sabah and Sarawak between Malaysia, on the one hand, and the Philippines and Indonesia, on the other, continued. Immigrants from the Philippines continued to cross the waters between Malaysia and the Philippines, causing significant worries on the Malaysian side. Though officials from the Philippines tried to convince immigrants from the Philippines to obtain valid travel documents, Malaysia estimated that more than 200,000 Filipinos were still working and living in Malaysia without valid visas. Furthermore, the Indonesian Consulate on Borneo issued 4,300 Indonesian workers with travel documents. However, Indonesian officials emphasized that the majority of Indonesian workers declined to obtain valid documents. Therefore, Malaysia continued its actions against illegal immigrants and imprisoned large groups of illegal immigrants from both countries. As a result, nearly 3,000 Filipinos were in jail, awaiting their deportation. (sg)

### Myanmar (KNU, KNLA/Karen State, Kayah State)

Intensity: <b>4</b>	Change: ↗	Start: 1948
Conflict parties:	KNU, KNLA vs. government, UWSA, DKBA	
Conflict items:	secession	

The conflict between the Karen National Union (KNU) and the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), organized in seven brigades assigned to their respective operational areas, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, escalated. The United Wa State Army (UWSA) and the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) fought alongside the government. On January 3, the DKBA moved in against the KNLA Brigade 6. The two groups clashed repeatedly from January 16 to 19, leaving at least nine people dead. On April 17, the DKBA and government troops attacked the KNLA, caus-

ing several fatalities. In May and June, the joint forces of the DKBA and the government launched a large-scale military offensive against the KNLA Brigades 6 and 7. At the end of June, army forces seized the headquarters of the KNLA Brigade 7, losing seven soldiers. Altogether about 100 people were killed, and 4,000 Karen fled to Thailand. In the offensive, the army systematically abused civilians, raping and murdering Karen women, recruiting men by force, and gunning down at least two Karen villagers on Thai territory on June 23. On June 26, DKBA commander San Pyote and seven fighters were ambushed and killed by an unknown armed group. The DKBA blamed the KNLA for this attack, who denied the allegation. On October 19, after almost 100 DKBA soldiers had defected to the KNU, leaders of the KNU and the DKBA held ceasefire talks, but reached no agreement. In early November, about 700 DKBA members were deployed to fight against KNLA Brigades 5 and 3. In the fights, several KNLA outposts were seized. (prü)

### Myanmar (opposition)

Intensity: <b>2</b>	Change: ↘	Start: 1962
Conflict parties:	NLD, NCGUB, ABFSU, ABSDF, NULF, AABBM vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, national power	

The system and national power conflict between various opposition groups and the government deescalated. Nonetheless, tensions rose when the leader of the National League for Democracy (NLD), Aung San Suu Kyi, was arrested on May 5, following the visit of US journalist John Yettaw at her house, where she was held under house-arrest. Although Suu Kyi claimed that Yettaw was neither invited nor welcomed at her house, she was put on trial for state security law violations and, on August 11, sentenced to an additional 18 months of house arrest. The initial house arrest would have had expired on May 27. Opposition groups claimed that this was to keep Suu Kyi from participating in the general elections to be held in 2010. The conviction was condemned by several states and organizations, including the EU and the UN, urging the government to release all political prisoners. On September 12, founding NLD member and close aide to Suu Kyi, Win Tin, was arrested and interrogated by police intelligence, but was released later that day. Despite her latest conviction, Suu Kyi was allowed to meet with UN Special Envoy Ibrahim Gambari as well as US Senator Jim Webb and US Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell. Webb met military leader Than Shwe on August 15 and was able to achieve Yettaw's release. On September 29, the government met with US officials on the margins of the UN General Assembly, discussing human rights issues and Suu Kyi's treatment. Suu Kyi asked for a meeting with government representatives and the permission to speak to foreign officials to mediate a softening of the international sanctions against Myanmar. (lr)

### Myanmar (UWSA, UWSP, MNDAA/Shan State)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: <b>↗</b>	Start: 1988
Conflict parties:	UWSA, UWSP, MNDAA, NDAA-ESS vs. government	
Conflict items:	autonomy	

The conflict between the United Wa State Army (UWSA) with its political wing, the United Wa State Party (UWSP), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and the National Democratic Alliance Army-Eastern Shan State (NDAA-ESS), on the one hand, and the government, on the other, escalated. The MNDAA, of the Kokang ethnic group, and the UWSA cooperated in the drug business. On 12/05/2008, Brigadier General Kyaw Phyo called on the UWSA to withdraw its fighters from the area and surrender their arms in order to achieve a peaceful solution. However, the proposal was rejected by the UWSA. In early January, the UWSA designated the territory under their control, the Shan State Special Region 2, Wa State Government Special Region, to underline their self-rule. On January 19, the UWSA forced a 30-strong government delegation to disarm. In response, the army reinforced its troops in the region by 2,000 soldiers. In May, government soldiers gang-raped a 15-year-old girl and arrested and tortured villagers. In late May, the UWSA rejected the government's proposal to transform the UWSA into an official border guard. In June, the government again reinforced its troops. At the end of July, government soldiers forced more than 10,000 people in central Shan State to leave their villages and torched about 500 homes. At least three villagers were killed, and 100 arrested. On August 23, about 100 government soldiers raided the house of Kokang leader Peng Jiasheng, searching for drugs. The following day, 1,000 soldiers moved into Laogai, the capital of the Kokang area in northern Shan State. Three days later, government troops engaged in fights with allied UWSA, MNDAA, and NDAA-ESS forces in the area. On August 29, UWSA and MNDAA fighters ambushed an army convoy in the same area, killing more than a dozen soldiers. Fighting stopped abruptly when 700 MNDAA fighters handed over their weapons to Chinese officials at the border on August 29. The UWSA relocated to Wa-controlled territory. The fighting had forced more than 30,000 Kokang to flee to China. At least 48 people had been killed. From October 24 to 28, five Wa leaders met with Major General Than Htut in Lashio and staged talks over the UWSA's role as a border guard. At the same time, the government reinforced its troops.

(prü)

### Nepal (Madheshis/Terai)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: <b>•</b>	Start: 2006
Conflict parties:	Madheshi armed groups, Madheshi political parties vs. government	
Conflict items:	autonomy	

The autonomy conflict between the Madheshi, inhabitants of the Nepali lowlands, and the government continued on a violent level for the third year running. In February, the new republican regime declared some 8,000 people who had been killed during the Maoist conflict,

the 2006 democratic peoples' uprising, and the Madheshis' movement martyrs. The government succeeded in bringing some of the armed groups in Terai to the negotiation table. In December, talks were held with the Madheshi Virus Killers. The government reached an agreement with the Samyukta Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha and signed a truce deal with the Rajan Mukti faction of the Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha (JTMM) on January 10. On February 22, an agreement was reached with the Liberation Tigers of Terai Elam and one month later with the Madheshi Mukti Tigers. In preparation to a second round of talks, the government held an informal meeting with some of the armed groups in August. On September 17, the Jwala Singh faction of the JTMM declared a 36-day ceasefire for the festival season, and, in October, it signaled its readiness for talks with the government. Other armed groups like the Akhil Terai Mukti Morcha (ATMM) or Prithvi Singh faction of the JTMM were not willing to participate. The Prithvi Singh faction bombed a sawmill in Birgunj on January 10, and an office building in Sarlahi on March 24, injuring two people. On May 27, they abducted and killed a female teacher from Bara district. ATMM shot dead a member of the Madheshi Janadhikar Forum (MJF) on January 13 and abducted two people on January 20. The three major political Madheshi parties, the MJF, the Terai-Madhesh Democratic Party (TMDP), and the Nepal Sadbhawana Party's Anandi Devi Singh faction (NSP-A), were part of two subsequent coalition governments. The TMDP withdrew its support for the first coalition government in January, stating there was no progress concerning Madheshi demands. After the first coalition under the leadership of the Communist Party of Nepal - Maoist had dissolved in May, the MJF, TMDP, and NSP-A joined a new coalition with the Nepali Congress and the Communist Party of Nepal - United Marxist-Leninist. In September, the government published a list of 109 armed groups in Nepal, many of them in the Terai region, declaring 70 of them criminal organizations, and announced strong measures against them. (ls)

### Nepal (NDA, RS)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: <b>•</b>	Start: 2007
Conflict parties:	NDA, RS vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology	

The conflict between the two Hindu extremist armed outfits Ranabir Sena (RS) and Nepal Defense Army (NDA), on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued. The NDA and the RS violently agitated against the Constituent Assembly's decision to declare Nepal a secular and republican country. NDA detonated two bombs on 12/14/08 and two additional bombs on April 4 and August 11 respectively in the city of Biratnagar. On May 23, NDA set off a bomb during the Saturday morning prayer in the Catholic Church of Assumption in Lalitpur, killing at least three people and injuring some 13. Ten days later, the police arrested the prime suspect, Sita Thapa Shrestha. On September 5, police forces arrested NDA leader Ram Prasad Mainali and NDA regional commander of Morang, Pulin Biswas, in Jhapa district. The next day, police detained RS leader Binod



Pandey in Morang. Between 12/27/08 and January 1, RS detonated three minor bombs in the capital, Kathmandu. One person was injured. On February 4, police took into custody president of the Reporters' Club Rishi Dhamala and three other people on charges of connections with RS and possession of illegal arms. Dhamala was released in April as evidence provided by police was considered insufficient. (ls)

### North Korea - South Korea

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: ↗	Start: 1948
Conflict parties:	North Korea vs. South Korea	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, international power	

Tensions in the system and international power conflict between North Korea (NK) and South Korea (SK) remained severe, with signs of slight harmonization as well as military provocations occurring in the course of the year. In January, the Communist North accused the South of hostile intentions and canceled military as well as political agreements with the South. On May 25, NK conducted a second nuclear test and launched several missiles [→ North Korea - USA, South Korea, Japan]. Relations deteriorated when SK joined the US-led Proliferation Security Initiative on May 26 in reaction to NK's nuclear ambitions. NK considered this a declaration of war and threatened the South with military strikes in the case of any North Korean ship being searched for nuclear weapons. The following day, the North Korean military announced its withdrawal from the 1953 armistice concluded at the end of the Korean War. Meanwhile, the North reactivated its nuclear reprocessing plant in Yongbyon and started the production of arms-grade plutonium. In early July, several official South Korean websites including those of the Department of Defense and the National Assembly were not accessible. The SK intelligence service voiced the possibility of NK being responsible for the disturbances. However, tensions eased when Kim Dae-jung, former President of SK and Nobel laureate for his "Sunshine Politics" died on August 18 and a North Korean delegation visited the South to pay their respects. After almost two years without direct bilateral contact, the SK reunification minister and the head of the NK intelligence service held talks on August 22. The following day, SK president Lee Myung-bak received the NK delegation and talked about chances of improving relations between the two Koreas. Later that month, North and South Korea arranged the reunion of several separated Korean families. Consequently, on September 26, some South Korean families were able to meet their relatives in NK. In October, the two Koreas agreed on further family reunions in 2010. In a meeting between SK and NK officials on October 24, Kim Jong-il, the leader of the North, made a summit offer to the South. Two days later, SK offered the first official food aid to NK since the conservative government had come to power in Seoul, the capital of SK. Nevertheless, tensions on the Korean Peninsula persisted. Amidst the rapprochement attempts, on October 15 NK accused SK of violating its unilaterally declared maritime border with warships. On November 10, SK warships and a NK naval vessel traded fire in the Yellow Sea. While NK accused


SK of violating its sea border, SK stated the NK vessel had crossed the border, ignoring verbal warnings as well as warning shots. In the subsequent fire exchange, the NK vessel was set ablaze, according to SK officials. No casualties were reported. Both sides demanded an apology for the incident. (are)

### North Korea - USA, South Korea, Japan

Intensity: <b>2</b>	Change: •	Start: 1990
Conflict parties:	North Korea vs. United States, South Korea, Japan	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, international power, other	


In the system and international power conflict between North Korea (NK), on the one hand, and the USA, South Korea (SK), and Japan, on the other, tensions increased. On February 24, NK made known preparations for launching a satellite. As announced earlier, a NK Taepodong-2 missile flew over Japan and fell into the Pacific Ocean on April 5. While NK declared it had launched a satellite, the USA, Japan, and SK termed the action a disguised test of a long-range missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. Consequently, the UN Security Council unanimously condemned the rocket launch on April 13 and threatened to expand sanctions on NK. The following day, NK announced its withdrawal from the Six-Nations Talks on the nuclear program and ordered International Atomic Energy Organization inspectors to leave the country. In addition to three further missile launches, NK conducted its second underground nuclear test on May 25, which was considered much more powerful than the first in 2006. The following day, the UN unanimously condemned the test. NK, however, proceeded to launch two more short-range missiles. In response to SK joining the US-led Proliferation Security Initiative on May 26, NK threatened military strikes in case of SK searching any NK ships for nuclear weapons [→ North Korea - South Korea]. Meanwhile, NK restarted its nuclear reprocessing plant for the production of arms-grade plutonium in Yongbyon and test-fired another missile. Subsequently, on June 12, the UN Security Council (UNSC), including NK ally China, unanimously tightened sanctions on NK. On July 7, the UNSC condemned further NK missile tests executed on July 2 and July 4. On September 4, NK informed the UNSC that it was on the brink of completing its uranium enrichment program and was producing weapon-grade plutonium. At the end of the month, after pressure from China, Kim Jong-il expressed his willingness to engage in international talks on his country's nuclear program. On October 5, NK's leader indicated he was willing to restart the Six-Nations Talks canceled earlier this year. As a crucial precondition, NK named direct bilateral negotiations with the USA. Shortly afterwards, China, SK, and Japan urged an early resumption of the talks and declared their commitment to a denuclearized Korean peninsula. On November 3, NK completed the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel rods, thereby extracting weapon-grade plutonium. (are)

### Pakistan (BLA, BRA, BLF/Baluchistan)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: 	Start: 1998
Conflict parties:	BLA, BRA, BLF, BLUF vs. government	
Conflict items:	secession, resources	

The conflict between various Baloch insurgent groups and the government about the status of the Balochistan province continued on a highly violent level, claiming more than 200 lives. On January 4, three armed groups, the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), the Baloch Republican Army (BRA), and the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF), announced the end of a four-month unilateral ceasefire in response to the Pakistani security forces' continued military engagement in the province. In the following months, members of these groups as well as unknown militants frequently attacked the military, government officials, and civilians. Their means included the detonation of roadside bombs, the bombing of buildings, hand grenade attacks, targeted killings, and the destruction of gas pipelines. Throughout the year, numerous explosions of landmines planted by insurgents killed and injured predominantly civilians. On February 2, the head of the UN refugee agency's office in Balochistan, John Solecki, was taken hostage by a previously unknown militant group called Balochistan Liberation United Front (BLUF) and released on April 4. BLUF demanded the release of prisoners and the change of the province's status to an independent Balochistan. President Asif Ali Zardari's announcement on March 27 to increase investments in the province's infrastructure was rejected by several Baloch nationalist groups denouncing this as an attempt to plunder Balochistan natural resources. The death of three prominent Baloch nationalist party leaders, Ghulam Muhammad Baloch, Lala Munir Baloch, and Sher Muhammad Baloch, sparked riots and violence throughout Balochistan. The three leaders had allegedly been arrested in city of Turbat by intelligence agencies on April 3. On July 30, BRA militants kidnapped police personnel and workers, killing 22 of the police forces in the aftermath. The militants demanded the release of detained Baloch nationalist leaders. On October 25, unidentified gunmen assassinated the Baloch Minister for Education Shafiq Ahmed Khan outside his residence in Quetta. (sdi)


### Pakistan (Muslims - Christians)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: 	Start: 1998
Conflict parties:	Muslims vs. Christians	
Conflict items:	regional predominance	

The conflict over regional predominance between local communities of Christians and Muslims continued. The conflict erupted in 1998 when Islamist extremists attacked a Christian family in Nowshera, a town in the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan, leaving nine Christians dead. Local Islamist extremists had accused the family's father of practicing spiritual healing. However, a leading Pakistani bishop, Samuel Ezrayah, rejected the allegations and led a demonstration with hundreds of Christians in Lahore, the capital of Pakistan's Punjab province. In 2009, violence broke out on July


30, reaching its peak on August 1 when a mob of Muslim extremists attacked the Christian colony in the Punjabi town of Gojra, leaving some seven Christians dead and setting ablaze more than 40 houses. Two men were killed in a shootout between the two communities in the aftermath of the incident. The clash occurred several days after rumors surfaced that one of the community members had desecrated the Quran at a wedding. Minorities Minister Shahbaz Bhatti claimed the banned Sunni Muslim extremist group Sipah-i-Sahaba was involved in the incident. Punjab Law Minister Rana Sanaullah condemned the attack on the Christian community, stating the rumors about the desecration were false. When President Asif Ali Zardari visited Italy and the Vatican in early October, Pope Benedict XVI urged him to guarantee the protection of the Christian minority in Pakistan. (ar)

### Pakistan (opposition)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: 	Start: 1998
Conflict parties:	opposition vs. government	
Conflict items:	national power	

The conflict over national power between the Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N), the main opposition party led by former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, and the government, led by President Asif Ali Zardari of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), escalated to a crisis. Especially in February and March, the situation was tense. In August 2008, Sharif had withdrawn from the ruling coalition with the PPP; he accused Zardari of failing to reinstate former Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry. On February 25, the Supreme Court disqualified Sharif and his brother Shahbaz Sharif, Chief Minister of Punjab province, from holding and contesting public offices, while Zardari imposed governor's rule in the Punjab province. Supporters of the PML-N, many of them anti-government lawyers, perceived this decision as an abuse of power by the government and incited nationwide protests. In order to pressure the government to reinstate the judges sacked by former President Pervez Musharraf, protesters started the "Long March" from different Pakistani cities to the capital of Islamabad on March 12. Demonstrators and police forces clashed with increasing intensity from March 14 onwards. While many protesters threw stones, the police used tear gas and batons in order to crack down on demonstrations. An unknown number of people were injured and around 1,800 protesters were arrested. Nawaz Sharif was put under house arrest the following day. On March 16, the government agreed to reinstate Chaudhry as Chief Justice. (sdi)

### Pakistan (Sunnites - Shiites)

Intensity: <b>4</b>	Change: 	Start: 1998
Conflict parties:	Shiite groups vs. Sunni groups	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, regional predominance	

The regional predominance and system conflict between Shiite militants and Sunni militants including Taliban continued on a highly violent level, claiming almost 200 lives. The most affected areas were the North West Frontier

Province (NWFP) and Quetta, the capital of Balochistan. From January 9 to 11, intense sectarian clashes erupted in the Hangu district of the NWFP, claiming the lives of 30 people and injuring some 50. Heavy weapons, including rocket launchers, mortar shells, and small missiles, were employed. On February 20, a suicide attack on a Shiite funeral procession in Dera Ismail Khan, NWFP, killed 32 persons and injured 145. Subsequent riots claimed the lives of two people. On September 18 in Kohat district, at least 30 people were killed in a suicide attack, for which the banned Sunni militant organization Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) claimed responsibility. Most incidents of sectarian violence in Quetta involved targeted killings of individuals as well as families. The LeJ claimed responsibility for numerous killings of Shiites in this area. In the week before March 3, sectarian attacks in and around Quetta claimed twelve lives. Occasional outbreaks of violence were also reported from the city of Karachi, where a leading member of the banned Sunni militant organization Sipah-e-Sahaba was assassinated on November 20. Meanwhile, violence in the Kurram Agency, located in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, deescalated compared to the previous year. Yet, in one clash between rival groups on June 16, three people were killed and four injured. (sdi)

### Pakistan (Taliban - various tribes)

Intensity: <b>5</b>	Change: ↗	Start: 2001
Conflict parties:	Taliban vs. various tribes	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, regional predominance	

The regional predominance and system conflict between Taliban insurgents and several tribes in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the North Western Frontier Province (NWFP) escalated to a war. Throughout the year, more than 750 people were killed. After the USA had attacked the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 2001 [→ Afghanistan (Taliban)], thousands of Afghan Taliban infiltrated Pakistan's FATA. In order to impose their interpretation of Sharia law in FATA, Taliban insurgents had killed several hundreds of tribal leaders and members, both Sunnites and Shiites. In reaction, tribes had started to form militias and to fight the Taliban. In the fight against Islamist militants [→ Pakistan (various Islamist militants)], the government built alliances with some of the tribal militias. Constellations frequently changed. On February 4, pro-Taliban militant forces of Lashkar-e-Islam (LeI) clashed with police and the pro-government Quami Lashkar, leaving nine militants dead. The militants used mortars, small missiles, and rockets. On February 24, government forces announced a four-day ceasefire in FATA's Bajaur agency, following a request by the local tribal leaders who negotiated a permanent ceasefire with the Taliban. On March 11, government officials and some 1,400 tribal elders on the one hand and the local Taliban leaders on the other signed a peace agreement. On March 7, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the umbrella organization of the Pakistani Taliban, expressed their full support for LeI in Khyber agency. In the same area, the Taliban launched a suicide bombing on a mosque on March 27, killing 83 tribesmen. On April 7, twenty-one people

were killed in Buner district when local militia and policemen attacked militants who had infiltrated from neighboring Swat district. Two months later, a Taliban suicide bomber killed 49 people in an attack on a mosque in NWFP's Upper Dir district, whose majority opposed the Taliban. In retaliation, Upper Dir villagers formed an approx. 1,000 men strong militia and started an all-out offensive against some 300 Taliban, which was backed by army jet fighters, helicopter gunships, and artillery, causing more than 150 fatalities within the next month. Other tribal militias were also formed in several FATA agencies, and Taliban-affected districts of NWFP. During the second half of June, tribal militia attacked Taliban hide-outs in FATA's Kurram agency, reportedly killing some 150 people. On July 14, some 23 militants were killed in an hours-long shoot out between Taliban forces and tribal militia in Mohmand agency. On August 13, a tribal elder who led a militia fighting against foreign militants, especially al-Qaeda and Uzbek militants [→ Uzbekistan (IMU)], was killed by a remote-controlled bomb of the Taliban in South Waziristan agency. Five days later, tribal militia from Mohmand agency captured TTP spokesmen and Bajaur commander Maulvi Omar and subsequently handed him over to government authorities. Taliban militants killed seven tribal leaders in NWFP's Bannu district on September 24. On October 20, the army negotiated a deal with Mullah Nazir, a powerful tribal chief in South Waziristan, and Gul Bahadur, leader of TTP's North Waziristan faction, not to attack government forces fighting in South Waziristan. (ar)

### Pakistan (various Islamist militants)

Intensity: <b>5</b>	Change: •	Start: 2001
Conflict parties:	various Islamist militants vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, national power	

The war over national power and system between Islamists and the government continued for the third year running, killing more than 4,500 people by November and displacing approximately 3.5 million. Following the siege of Red Mosque in 2007, militants of the Tehrik-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), operating under the umbrella group Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), fought for the control over the Swat valley in the North-Western Frontier Province. By the end of 2008, Maulana Fazlullah, leader of the TNSM, controlled approx. two thirds of the Swat area. By early January, the Swat faction of the Taliban had destroyed more than 200 girls' schools in the district. TNSM replaced the state judicial system and administration by Sharia courts, drawing international condemnation. The TNSM banned female education and set January 15 as ultimatum for the complete shutdown of all girls' schools located in Swat valley. Ten girls' schools refusing to close down were destroyed in Mingora, the capital of Swat district, and political opponents were beheaded publically. In order to quell the violence, the NWFP regional government, led by the secular Awami National Party (ANP), urged the central government to release Fazlullah's father-in-law and TNSM founder Sufi Mohammed, presuming he was more open for a political solution. Following Mohammed's release, a temporary ceasefire was con-

cluded on February 16. The ANP agreed to introduce Sharia law in the whole Malakand division, on the condition that Taliban violence ended. However, the TNSM made the implementation of Sharia the precondition to stop fighting. Fazlullah declared a preliminary ceasefire on February 24. Following the approval by the National Assembly through a non-binding resolution, Pakistan's President Asif Ali Zardari signed the Nizam-e-Adl Regulation into law on April 13, thereby putting Sharia law into force in Malakand. Afghanistan, USA, and NATO expressed serious concerns about the possible creation of safe havens for Afghani Taliban [→ Afghanistan (Taliban)]. Beginning in mid-April, TNSM militants invaded the neighboring districts of Swat valley Buner, Lower Dir, and Shangla, only some 100 km away from Islamabad, Pakistan's capital. Subsequently, the international community, especially the USA, expressed deep concern about a potential Taliban coup and put the central government under strong pressure to take action against the Taliban. In early May, the Pakistani military, led by General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, launched Operation "Black Thunderstorm" in Swat valley and other districts of Malakand. The military started the operation with heavy artillery and aerial bombardment, followed by infantry incursions and large-scale offensives. 15,000 military troops and over 300 Special Service Group elite forces engaged in intense fighting with approx. 5,000 militants throughout May, June, and July. Alongside military means, Kayani established a rehabilitation centre for young men who were indoctrinated by the Taliban. According to government sources, more than 128 military forces and 1,800 militants, among them more than 300 foreigners, mostly Uzbek [→ Uzbekistan (IMU)] and Tajik nationals, were killed by late August. On July 26, the government announced the arrest of Sufi Mohammed, founder of the TNSM. More than 2.2 million people were forced to leave their homes, bringing the number of internally displaced persons to almost three million. In reaction, the UN appealed for urgent international assistance of USD 543 million in mid-May. However, only USD 88 million were granted until the end of May. On October 15, US President Barack Obama signed the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009, also known as the Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill, into law. Obama pointed out that the USD 7.5 billion non-military aid package over the next five years was to foster the strategic partnership between the USA and Pakistan. However, an earlier draft, the Kerry-Lugar bill, was strongly criticized by parts of the Pakistani population and several political parties. They voiced concern about a possible stronger US influence through conditions coupled with the aid package. Taliban repeatedly attacked the NATO's supply lines into Afghanistan. For instance, they torched more than 160 vehicles destined for the allied forces on 12/08/08, and blew up a bridge at the Khyber Pass, thereby cutting the main supply line. Throughout the year, the US military sharply increased the number of drone attacks on suspected militant hideouts in FATA, killing more than 500 people in over 40 missile strikes. On August 5, Baitullah Mehsud, the chief of TTP, his wife, and three other people, were killed in Zangara village in South Waziristan

in a US drone attack. Hakimullah Mehsud succeeded him as TTP chief. In retaliation for the Pakistani military offensive in Bajaur, Swat, and FATA, and the killing of Baitullah Mehsud, the Taliban launched numerous attacks all over the country in October and November. Throughout the year, militants conducted more than 75 suicide attacks in NWFP, FATA, as well as in the major cities and the capital, Islamabad, claiming more than 800 lives. On October 5, a bomb attack killed five UN employees in the UN World Food Program office in Islamabad. On October 9, some 53 people were killed and 100 injured when a militant blew himself up in a market in Peshawar. 23 people died when ten Taliban members attacked the General Headquarters, the central base of the Armed Forces of Pakistan, in Rawalpindi on October 10. Five days later, militants conducted a coordinated attack on three high-profile police buildings in Lahore, namely the Elite Police Academy, the Manawan Police Training School, and the Federal Investigation Agency, leaving 19 people, among them 14 police men, dead. In mid-October, the Pakistani military launched another military offensive against the TTP in South Waziristan, "Operation Path to Salvation". More than 30,000 military forces and an estimated 8,000 Taliban as well as more than 1,000 foreign militants were involved in the battles. According to military sources, more than 500 insurgents and about 100 government forces lost their lives so far. On October 17, infantry incursions backed by helicopter gunships, F-16 jets, and artillery entered South Waziristan. More than 300,000 civilians fled the area. (ar)

### Pakistan - India

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: •	Start: 1947
Conflict parties:	Pakistan vs. India	
Conflict items:	territory, international power	

The territory and international power conflict between Pakistan and India over the Kashmir region continued. Last year's development concerning the "grand reconciliation" was undermined by the Mumbai attacks on 11/26/08. Indian authorities blamed Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), a Pakistan-based Islamist insurgent group, for the incident. Since then, talks between India and Pakistan came to a halt as India accused Pakistan of being directly involved in the attacks. Throughout the year, intensive troop movements and several ceasefire violations took place at the Line of Control (LoC). On June 29, an Indian soldier was killed in the Poonch sector in an exchange of gunfire across the LoC. However, it remained unclear who was responsible for the killing. On September 11, Indian forces fired across the LoC after explosions near the Wagah border. According to Indian officials, Pakistani troops had fired rockets on Indian territory. However, Pakistani troops did not answer the firing. India strongly protested against the alleged firing. On October 24, one Indian soldier was wounded in a short exchange of gunfire across the LoC in Mendhar sector. An Indian army spokesman blamed Pakistan for the alleged ceasefire violation. Pakistan denied the allegations. The Indian Foreign Secretary, Shiv Shankar Menon, and his Pakistani counterpart, Salman Bashir, met in the Egyptian city of Sharm el-Sheikh on July 14 as

a part of renewed efforts by the two countries to restart the dialogue process. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and his Pakistani counterpart Yousaf Gilani met the day after. Their talks were limited to issues concerning the threat of terrorism. The dialogue continued when the two foreign secretaries met on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in September. On October 28, Singh criticized Pakistan for not doing enough against terrorism. (kld)

### Philippines (Abu Sayyaf/Mindanao)

Intensity: <b>4</b>	Change: ↗	Start: 1991
Conflict parties:	Abu Sayyaf vs. government	
Conflict items:	secession, system/ideology	

The secession and ideology conflict between the Islamist Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), supposedly linked to al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah, and the government escalated. Throughout the year, heavily armed troops clashed in fierce fighting with ASG rebels. On January 15, the ASG kidnapped three Red Cross workers on the island of Jolo. In the pursuit operations against the ASG kidnapers, soldiers clashed with the rebels several times and were engaged in heavy fighting. On February 9, two ASG fighters were killed as soldiers backed by helicopter gunships attacked the kidnapers in an area near the town of Akbar. Nine soldiers were wounded in the operation. Two days later, civilians were ushered out of a hamlet in the area when government forces closed in on the Islamist kidnapers. Intense clashes broke out one month later between troops and the Muslim kidnapers, leaving three soldiers and six guerillas dead. In reaction, ASG rebels threatened to behead the hostages if troops did not stop pursuing them. On April 3, a Filipina hostage was released. Two weeks later, a Swiss hostage was left behind by fleeing ASG fighters in a remote area of Indanan town. In the pursuit of the last hostage, an Italian, fighting between government troops and ASG rebels escalated in June, leaving more than 20 rebels and a dozen of soldiers dead. The last hostage was released on July 12. On May 7, troops encountered with ASG fighters, killing nine people. Four days later, 20 ASG rebels were killed in fierce fighting in retaliatory attacks following the gunning down of a local police chief. On May 27, ten Muslim militants were killed in a fierce firefight with government troops on the island of Basilan. Troops continued to hunt down members of the ASG who had been behind the kidnapping of three local school teachers four months ago. On September 21, the military over-ran one of the ASG's main strongholds in the south of the country. Following ground and air assaults, the soldiers took control of the camp. The troops fought an estimated 100 ASG rebels, killing at least 34 of them. Local officials on Jolo Island said hundreds of families from remote villages around Indanan had fled their homes and farms during the combats. On November 3, troops clashed with ASG militants in Sitio Bohe Kimeh village of Tuburan town, killing five rebels. (sg)

### Philippines (CPP, NPA)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: ↘	Start: 1968
Conflict parties:	NPA, CPP vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology	

The ideology conflict between the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its military wing, the New People's Army (NPA), on the one hand, and the government, on the other, remained violent. Peace talks, initiated by Norway in June and scheduled for September, were postponed. The NPA rebels were weakened by killings, surrenders, and captures throughout the year. On January 7, the NPA clashed with government troops in Quezon province. On February 9, NPA rebels raided the home of Helen de Castro, the mayor of Sorsogon. Several NPA leaders were arrested, as in Aurora province on April 9. The next day, five soldiers were wounded in an NPA ambush in the municipality of Trento in Agusan Del Sur province. On June 10, two NPA rebels were killed by government soldiers in the municipality of Santa Fe. On June 30, the government launched an operation against NPA rebels in Capiz. Two clashes left five soldiers wounded. On the same day, NPA rebels attacked a group of five soldiers in Sitio Karagatan. The army raided a NPA camp, killing ten rebels in Agusan on July 9. NPA rebels were accused of murdering a village district chairman and two allegedly unarmed soldiers in Compostela Valley on July 22. NPA denied the allegation. In the following days, another two people were killed, reportedly by the rebels. On August 29, government troops clashed with the rebels in Southern Iloilo, following the discovery of at least two guerrilla camps. One soldier and a number of rebels were wounded. On September 8, NPA rebels raided the construction site of the Catanduanes' power plant in Solong, San Miguel. On October 11, four policemen and one NPA rebel were killed in an ambush after government troops had launched a rescue operation for an abducted policeman in Sorsogon. On November 11, security forces killed one NPA member in an encounter in Northern Samar. Two days later, NPA guerilla raided a logging company. In the subsequent shootout between government forces and rebels at least twelve people were killed. According to an army spokesperson, an additional eleven rebels were killed after the army had sent reinforcements. One week later, NPA rebels attacked a military post in Davao City, leaving two security forces dead. (ve)

### Philippines (MILF/Mindanao)

Intensity: <b>4</b>	Change: •	Start: 1977
Conflict parties:	MILF vs. government	
Conflict items:	autonomy, system/ideology, resources	

The conflict between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the government concerning autonomy, ideology, and resources continued. On 12/18/08, two people were killed and at least 53 wounded in two separate bomb attacks in two shopping malls in Iligan City. The explosions had occurred one day before President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo visited the city. The military blamed MILF commander Bravo for the explosions. The MILF

denied responsibility. On January 5, clashes erupted between the military and a MILF battalion led by commander Jikiri. The military launched air strikes against about 100 rebels who, according to the military, had attacked a military base in Sultan Kudarat and occupied the villages of Paril and Sangay. The rebels had already stormed the villages on 12/24/08 but were pushed back by the military some days later. On March 27, at least 20 rebels and seven soldiers were killed in fierce fighting in Maguindanao as Arroyo visited the provincial capital in Shariff Aguak. About 80 MILF fighters under Commander Ombra Kato clashed with government forces on patrol in Mamasapano. Eid Kabalu, MILF civil-military affairs chief, said that the MILF had not initiated the attack. He accused the military of having started the skirmish by attacking a community where some of the rebels' families lived. From March 31 to April 1, according to the military, at least twelve MILF rebels and one soldier were killed and several were wounded on both sides in clashes in Alamada, North Cotabato. The air force used helicopters with night-flying capabilities. On April 11, 40 MILF rebels led by Benjie Andanum Lucsadata surrendered to the army in the southern province of Lanao del Norte, after a series of negotiations. According to the military, at least ten of about 100 rebels were killed while more than 20 others were wounded in clashes with government forces in Maguindanao on Independence Day, on June 12. The military used artillery and mortar fire. Meanwhile, the military launched a mortar attack near the village of West Patadon in Matalam against a band of MILF rebels, who had attacked the North Cotabato provincial jail on June 9. On July 29, both parties unilaterally announced ceasefires. However, 23 soldiers were killed in Basilan province in an ambush by the Abu Sayyaf group coordinated with some members of the MILF on August 13 [→ Philippines (Abu Sayyaf/Mindanao)]. On September 15, peace efforts between the government and the MILF reached a breakthrough as both parties agreed to form an International Contact Group (ICG) in order to build mutual trust for the resumption of peace talks. (sus)

### Singapore - Malaysia

Intensity: <b>1</b>	Change: •	Start: 1963
Conflict parties:	Singapore vs. Malaysia	
Conflict items:	territory, international power	

The conflict between Singapore and Malaysia continued, with diplomatic relations between the two neighboring countries improving further. The new Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak visited Singapore and met his Singaporean counterpart Lee Hsien Loong on May 21. The two prime ministers discussed several possible solutions for a new bridge linking the two countries, an issue that had caused some controversies in the past. Furthermore, both governments agreed to step up bilateral cooperation while trying to resolve territorial and other issues dating back to their separation in 1965. In order to achieve these goals, the prime ministers of both countries agreed that their foreign ministers should meet in a bid to resolve these unsettled issues. (sg)

### Sri Lanka (LTTE/northern and eastern Sri Lanka)

Intensity: <b>5</b>	Change: •	Start: 1976
Conflict parties:	LTTE vs. government	
Conflict items:	secession	

The secession conflict between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the government was carried out as a war until mid-May, when the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) defeated the Tamil Tigers militarily. The defeat ended LTTE's long-lasting control over large areas in Sri Lanka's north and east. The SLA's offensive was allegedly supported by the LTTE's splinter group Tamileela Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP), also known as LTTE-East or Karuna Group, which was announced at the end of June to be integrated in the SLA as a Tamil regiment [→ Sri Lanka (LTTE - LTTE-East)]. In December 2008, the SLA launched three offensives against the LTTE's administrative center Kilinochchi in northern Sri Lanka and seized control on January 2. In the offensive, which involved ground troops, artillery, and the Sri Lankan Air Force, some 279 Sri Lankan soldiers were killed according to the LTTE and some 57 according to SLA claims. The SLA stated to have killed some 147 Tamil Tigers, while the LTTE gave no information about own casualties. In January, the government formally pulled out of the 2002 Norwegian-brokered ceasefire agreement and reimposed a ban on the LTTE. On January 9, the SLA captured the Elephant Pass, a strategic causeway linking the Jaffna peninsula with the mainland, thereby gaining control over the Jaffna-Kandy highway for the first time in 23 years. At the end of January, the SLA offensive was carried further towards the LTTE's then political center, Mullaitivu, in northeastern Sri Lanka. According to reports from the Ministry of Defense, at least 20 LTTE cadres were killed in the fierce fighting. In the attacks, helicopter gunships supported the ground offensive conducted by some 50,000 troops. The navy assisted the operation by imposing a sea blockade to prevent Tamil Tigers from fleeing. After the fall of Mullaitivu on January 25, the SLA moved into the nearby jungle areas the LTTE had retreated to. Tamil media blamed the army of committing genocide. The UN accused the Tamil Tigers of having used civilians as human shields by preventing them from leaving the fighting zone. On January 30, an estimated 250,000 civilians were trapped in rebel-held territory, according to the Red Cross. On February 21, two LTTE light planes bombed a government building in Colombo, killing two and wounding up to 40 people. Shortly after the attacks, the aircrafts were shot down. In early February, government troops captured the Chalai base of the Sea Tigers, the LTTE's naval unit. According to the military, at least four senior Sea Tigers and eight other rebels were killed. Thereafter, the territory controlled by the Tamil Tigers was reduced to around 20 square kilometers. On February 24, soldiers attacked Puthukkudiyiruppu, the last town under rebel control. On April 5, the SLA declared they had finally taken the town and thereby confined the LTTE to a coastal strip and a patch of jungle. According to the conflict parties, hundreds of rebels, soldiers, and civilians were killed in the heavy fighting between Febru-

ary and April. An estimated 100,000 refugees fled to a small coastal strip. In the final stage of the war, and after weeks of ferocious fighting, the battle zone was limited to this pocket of land on the coastline. On May 9, at least 378 people were killed and 1,122 others injured by the army's fierce shelling. On May 11, UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, expressed his deepest concerns about the killings of civilians in the area. The International Committee of the Red Cross spoke of a humanitarian catastrophe. On May 16, President Mahinda Rajapaksa declared military victory over the LTTE. Selvarasa Kumaran Pathmanathan, head of the rebels' Department of International Relations, admitted defeat the following day. On May 18, the government announced the death of Velupillai Prabhakaran, the founder and leader of the LTTE. Thillaiyampalam Sivanesan, head of the Sea Tigers, Pottu Amman, head of the Black Tigers as well as of the LTTE's intelligence wing, and Balasingham Nadesan, the Tigers' Political Chief, were also killed. On July 21, Pathmanathan was stated to have been appointed as the LTTE's new leader. He was arrested by Sri Lankan intelligence in a Southeast Asian country on August 5. A total of some 130,000 Tamils who had fled from the fighting zone in the final stages of the war were detained in special camps. On November 21, Basil Rajapaksa, special advisor to the president, announced the camps would be opened. Ten days later, the camps were opened up, enabling people to leave temporarily. The LTTE's complete military defeat as well as the death of its pivotal leader, Prabhakaran, raised the question of the future character of the conflict. (ps, sp, thw, ct)

### Thailand (Muslim separatists/southern border provinces)

Intensity: <b>4</b>	Change: •	Start: 1902
Conflict parties:	Muslim separatists vs. government	
Conflict items:	secession, system/ideology	

The secession conflict in the southern border provinces Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat continued on a high level of violence. On January 30, the newly elected government under the leadership of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva [→ Thailand (opposition)], set up a council of ministers to design an economic development policy in the region and promised compensation payments for victims. Throughout the year, the Muslim separatists attacked representatives of the central government, Buddhist monks, and civilians on a nearly daily basis. For instance, on January 12, three policemen, one of them a deputy chief of the local police station, were killed and another critically injured in a bomb attack in Pattani. One month later, on February 2, two rangers were killed and beheaded by suspected rebels who then set fire to their bodies. In three days at the end of the month, gangs ambushed, killed, and beheaded four people. A bomb attack injured nine soldiers in Yala on March 28, while several weapons and items used for attacks were seized in separate raids on insurgent hideouts in the region. On the same day, suspected rebels shot dead four villagers and injured three in separate attacks in Pattani and Yala. At the end of April, eleven coordinated at-

tacks by Muslim separatists hit five districts. The assaults ranged from bombings of electrical transformers to school arson on the evening of the fifth anniversary of the Krue Se mosque massacre. Throughout the year, security forces and the Muslim separatists clashed repeatedly. For instance, on November 17, six suspected Muslim insurgents were killed by security forces in Pattani. In early June, gunmen killed at least ten people and wounded twelve in an assault on a mosque. A Thai military spokesman denied any possibility of the army being responsible for the attack on the mosque. Earlier this year, Amnesty International had reported that systematic torture against Muslim residents was taking place in military camps. However, Prime Minister Vejjajiva denied the accusations. On June 8, on a visit to neighboring Malaysia, he asked for diplomatic assistance in the conflict. In September, General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, former prime minister, pushed the idea of giving the southern provinces Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat special administrative status. The emergency rule over the region, imposed in 2005, was maintained throughout the year. With 400 casualties this year, the conflict's death toll rose to 3,900. (sg, ml)

### Thailand (opposition)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: •	Start: 2006
Conflict parties:	PPP, PTP, UDD vs. PAD, government	
Conflict items:	national power	

The national power conflict between the People Power Party (PPP), the Puea Thai Party (PTP), and the National United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD), on the one hand, and the government, supported by the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD), on the other, persisted. In December 2008, the then ruling PPP was dissolved by the Supreme Court over charges of electoral fraud. Prime Minister Somchai Wongsawat was ousted and banned from politics for five years together with other important PPP members. Expecting the PPP's dissolution, some members had already founded the PTP in September 2008. However, former coalition partners of the PPP decided to change sides, thus forging a new alliance with the Democrat Party. The leader of the Democrat Party, Abhisit Vejjajiva, became new prime minister on 12/15/08. The "red-shirted" PPP supporters, backing former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, demonstrated against Vejjajiva's election with sit-in protests in front of the government building, hindering the cabinet from meeting. On April 11, the demonstrators disturbed the ASEAN meeting in the city of Pattaya, which therefore had to be postponed. A day later, "red-shirted" protesters broke into the interior ministry and blocked traffic roads in the capital of Bangkok. Tens of thousands camped around Government House, where the prime minister's office was based. Vejjajiva imposed a state of emergency in Bangkok. On April 13, protestors clashed with the army in the capital, leaving 77 people injured. Apart from tear gas and water canons, the army also used rubber bullets. Two members of neighborhood watch groups were shot dead in a clash with the "red-shirted" demonstrators during the protests. In September, Thaksin was appointed an economic advi-

sor by Cambodia. Thailand demanded the extradition of Thaksin but Cambodia did not comply. The "yellow-shirted" PAD supporters protested against this decision at the disputed Prasat Prah Viham/Prasat Preah Vihear temple [→ Thailand - Cambodia (border)]. As a result, both countries withdrew their ambassadors. (ml)

### Thailand - Cambodia (border)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: •	Start: 1954
Conflict parties:	Thailand vs. Cambodia	
Conflict items:	territory, international power	

The border and international power conflict between Cambodia and Thailand persisted. On April 3, days before a meeting of the Joint Boundary Commission, troops were involved in two skirmishes triggered by a land mine explosion in which a Thai soldier was wounded. The meeting of the Boundary Commission on April 6 and 7 produced no tangible results concerning troop withdrawal or border demarcation. Differing opinions on the appellation of the temple Prasat Preah Vihear/Prasat Prah Viharn as well as on the name and the mandate of a surveillance group to be stationed in the area continued to stall negotiations. Cambodia demanded USD 2.1 million compensation for the April incident in which Thai forces allegedly damaged the temple. However, Thailand rejected this demand. In August, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen announced his willingness to withdraw paratroopers from the area and the conflict eased. Yet, members of the People's Alliance for Democracy, a Thai pro-government group, rallied in the temple area and clashed with Cambodian police and villagers in September. In early November, the two countries withdrew their ambassadors after a diplomatic spat over former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. The Cambodian government had appointed Thaksin economic advisor to Prime Minister Hun Sen and refused to extradite him to Thailand, claiming that the legal charges against him were politically motivated. Thailand suspended talks regarding the maritime border and reviewed bilateral agreements. (som)

### USA - Pakistan

Intensity: <b>2</b>	Change: ▼	Start: 2003
Conflict parties:	USA vs. Pakistan	
Conflict items:	international power	

The international power conflict over violations of Pakistan's sovereignty by the USA continued. Early in March, US diplomat Christopher Dell stated that Pakistan posed a bigger security threat to the USA than Afghanistan. On April 8, US Admiral Mike Mullen accused Pakistan's main military intelligence agency, the ISI, of supporting militants including the Afghan Taliban. Pakistan's Army Chief of Staff, General Ashfaq Kayani, denied the charges. According to media reports in mid-February, the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) used Shamsi airfield in the province of Balochistan as a base for US drone attacks in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas [→ Pakistan (Islamists)]. Pakistan denied these reports. Throughout the year, Pakistan's President Asif Ali Zardari criticized US airstrikes on Pakistani soil, stating that it further destabilized the country. On April 28,

Pakistan urged the USA to share drone technology so that Pakistan would be able to launch airstrikes independently. The USA rejected technology transfer and opposed joint drone operations. On March 27, US President Barack Obama presented the Af-Pak strategy, linking the fight against the insurgency in Afghanistan to al-Qaeda and Taliban militancy in Pakistan [→ Afghanistan (Taliban)]. In late August, the USA accused Pakistan of modifying US-built missiles for a possible war with India. However, Pakistan denied these allegations. On September 14, Pervez Musharraf, former president of Pakistan, admitted that under his presidency the army had invested US aid meant for the fight against the Taliban into weapon systems against India. According to a US official, the USA was not aware of such embezzlements. On October 15, Obama enacted a USD 7.5 billion non-military aid package, the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act 2009, spread over the next five years. Moreover, US lawmakers passed a USD 1.6 billion defense spending bill for 2010 on October 23, including spending restrictions. Pakistani army officials as well as opposition parties argued that the aid packages impinge on Pakistan's sovereignty due to several conditions tied to it. (ar)


### Uzbekistan (IMU)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: ↗	Start: 1998
Conflict parties:	IMU vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, national power	

The conflict between the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the government about the creation of a pan-Islamic state under Sharia law in Uzbekistan and neighboring countries turned violent again. After years of relative calm, the IMU resurfaced. On May 26, four police officers were shot dead by assailants attempting to cross the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border. Kyrgyz authorities denied the attackers had come from Kyrgyzstan. At the same time, five to 25 militants attacked a local Interior Ministry building in Khanabad. The same day, at least one policeman was killed and several others wounded by a suicide bombing in Andijan in the Fergana Valley. Uzbek authorities initially blamed the IMU for the incidents. Later, the Islamic Jihad Union, a presumed offshoot of the IMU, claimed responsibility for the attacks. A prominent imam was attacked in Tashkent in late July by a supposed member of the IMU. The co-founder and leader of the IMU, Tahir Yuldashev, was reported to have been killed in a US drone attack in South Waziristan Agency (Pakistan) on August 27 [→ Pakistan (Islamists)]. On the night of August 29, at least three people were killed and three wounded in a half-hour shootout between police and foreign-trained militants in the capital, Tashkent. On October 18, four suspected members of the IMU were killed in a gunfight in the Tajik city of Isfara and four others arrested in the Tajik municipality of Vorukh in Kyrgyzstan. Later that month, Pakistani troops reportedly surrounded a key stronghold of Uzbek militants in South Waziristan. The recent anti-Taliban offensive in Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province and in Waziristan forced Uzbek Islamists fighting there to return to Uzbekistan [→ Pakistan (various Islamist militants), Pakistan (Taliban - various tribes)]. (dfr, ct)




# The Middle East and Maghreb




The total number of conflicts monitored in the Middle East and Maghreb increased from 51 in 2008 to 55 in 2009, as four new conflicts emerged. Out of the seven conflicts which were classified as wars worldwide, three were fought in the Middle East and Maghreb. The war in Afghanistan [→ Afghanistan (Taliban)] had already been fought on this level of intensity since 2006 and once more increased in violence, causing the most overall victims since 2001. Last year's severe crisis in the Gaza Strip [→ Israel ( Hamas/Palestine)] escalated to a war when Israel launched Operation "Cast Lead" against Hamas. The third war emerged in northern Yemen, where another severe crisis turned into a war [→ Yemen (al-Houthi rebels)]. High-intensity violence also spilled over to Saudi Arabia in November [→ Saudi Arabia (al-Houthi rebels)]. Furthermore, Yemen was destabilized by a new secession conflict in the south [→ Yemen (SMM/South Yemen)] as well as continuing violence by al-Qaeda [→ Yemen (AQAP)], whose Yemeni and Saudi branches merged to form al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in early 2009. These developments made Yemen one of the countries in the region most affected by violence. AQAP activity increasingly began to destabilize the southern parts of Saudi Arabia as well. Last year's war in Iraq between the government and the al-Sadr group deescalated to a non-violent level [→ Iraq (al-Sadr group)]. Nevertheless, Iraq remained strongly affected by high-intensity violence [→ Iraq (insurgents); Iraq (AQI)]. Furthermore, last year's war between PKK/KONGRA-GEL and Turkey, which had been fought in southeastern Turkey as well as northern Iraq, slightly deescalated but remained highly violent. Six out of the eight highly violent conflicts were fought over questions of ideology or the orientation of the political system, among other items. System/Ideology was clearly the most prevalent conflict item in the region with 32 cases, followed by national power with 17 cases. One of the most momentous national power conflicts turned violent after the opposition in Iran had accused the government of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of massive electoral fraud in the presidential elections in June [→ Iran (opposition)].

**Conflict Intensities in the Middle East and Maghreb in 2009 compared to 2008**



**Frequency of Conflict Items in 2009 in the Middle East and Maghreb by Intensity Groups**



## Overview: Conflicts in the Middle East and Maghreb in 2009

Name of conflict <sup>1</sup>	Conflict parties <sup>2</sup>	Conflict items	Start	Change <sup>3</sup> Int. <sup>4</sup>
Afghanistan (Taliban)	Taliban vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1994	• 5
Algeria (AQIM)	AQIM vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1989	• 3
Algeria (Berbers/Kabylia)*	Berbers vs. government	autonomy, system/ideology	1963	↘ 2
Bahrain (Shiite opposition)	Shiite opposition vs. government	national power	1975	↗ 3
Egypt (Islamist groups)	Islamist groups vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1992	↗ 3
Egypt (opposition)	Muslim Brothers, secular opposition vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1977	• 3
Egypt - Sudan*	Egypt vs. Sudan	territory	1958	• 1
Iran (opposition)	opposition vs. government	national power	1993	↗ 3
Iran (People's Mujahideen)*	People's Mujahideen vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1965	• 1
Iran (PJAK/Kurdish areas)	PJAK vs. government	autonomy	1979	• 4
Iran (PRMI/Sistan-Balochistan)	PRMI vs. government	autonomy, system/ideology	1979	• 3
Iran - Israel	Iran vs. Israel	system/ideology, international power	1979	• 2
Iran - UAE*	Iran vs. United Arab Emirates	territory	1970	↘ 1
Iran - USA	Iran vs. USA	system/ideology, international power	1979	• 2
Iraq (al-Sadr group)	al-Sadr group vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2004	↓ 2
Iraq (AQI)	AQI vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2003	• 4
Iraq (insurgents)	insurgents vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2004	• 4
Iraq (Kurdish Regional Government)	KRG vs. central government	regional predominance, resources	2009	NEW 2
Iraq - Iran*	Iraq vs. Iran	international power	1969	↘ 1
Iraq - Kuwait*	Iraq vs. Kuwait	territory, resources	1961	• 1
Iraq - Syria*	Syria vs. Iraq	system/ideology, international power	2003	• 1
Israel (al-Fatah - Hamas)	al-Fatah vs. Hamas	system/ideology, regional predominance	1994	• 3
Israel (Hamas - Salafist groups)	Salafist groups vs. Hamas	system/ideology, regional predominance	2009	NEW 3
Israel (Hamas/Palestine)	Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Popular Resistance Committees vs. Israeli government	secession, system/ideology	1988	↗ 5
Israel (Hezbollah)	Hezbollah vs. Israel	system/ideology	1982	• 2
Israel (PNA, PLO, al-Fatah, PFLP/Palestine)	PNA, al-Fatah, PFLP, PLO vs. Israeli government	secession, system/ideology, resources	1920	• 3
Israel - Jordan (West Bank)*	Israel vs. Jordan	territory	1967	• 1
Israel - Lebanon*	Israel vs. Lebanon	territory, international power	1967	↘ 2
Jordan (al-Qaeda)*	al-Qaeda vs. government	system/ideology	2005	↘ 2
Jordan (militant group)*	militant group vs. government	system/ideology	2006	• 1
Jordan - Israel (water)*	Jordan vs. Israel	resources	1945	• 1
Lebanon (Fatah al-Islam)*	Fatah al-Islam vs. government	system/ideology	2006	↘ 2
Lebanon (March 14 Alliance - March 8 Alliance)	March 14 Alliance vs. March 8 Alliance	system/ideology, national power	1975	↘ 3
Lebanon - Israel (water)*	Lebanon vs. Israel	resources	2001	• 1
Libya - USA*	Libya vs. USA	system/ideology, international power	1964	• 1
Mauritania (AQIM)	AQIM vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2007	• 3
Mauritania (coup plotters)*	military vs. government	national power	2003	↘ 1
Morocco (AQIM)*	AQIM vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2003	↘ 2
Morocco (POLISARIO Front/Western Sahara)	POLISARIO Front vs. government	secession	1975	• 2
Morocco - Algeria*	Morocco vs. Algeria	territory, international power	1963	↘ 1
Morocco - Spain (Ceuta and Melilla)*	Morocco vs. Spain	territory	1956	• 1

Name of conflict <sup>1</sup>	Conflict parties <sup>2</sup>	Conflict items	Start	Change <sup>3</sup> Int. <sup>4</sup>
Morocco - Spain (Parsley Island)*	Morocco vs. Spain	territory	2002	• 1
Saudi Arabia (al-Houthi rebels)	al-Houthi rebels vs. government	system/ideology, regional predominance	2009	NEW 4
Saudi Arabia (AQAP)	AQAP vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1990	↗ 3
Saudi Arabia (reformers)*	reformers vs. government	system/ideology	2001	• 1
Saudi Arabia (Shiites)	Shiites vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1979	↑ 3
Syria - Israel*	Syria vs. Israel	territory, international power, other	1967	• 2
Syria - Lebanon*	Syria vs. Lebanon	international power	1976	↘ 1
Syria - USA*	Syria vs. USA	system/ideology, international power	2003	• 2
Turkey (PKK/KONGRA-GEL/Kurdish areas)	PKK/KONGRA-GEL vs. government	autonomy	1920	↘ 4
Turkey - Iraq*	Turkey vs. Iraq	international power	1979	↘ 1
Turkey - Syria*	Turkey vs. Syria	resources	1983	END 1
Yemen (al-Houthi rebels)	al-Houthi rebels vs. government	system/ideology, regional predominance	2004	↗ 5
Yemen (AQAP)	al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1994	• 3
Yemen (SMM/South Yemen)	SMM vs. government	secession	2009	NEW 3

<sup>1 2 3 4</sup> cf. overview table for Europe

## Afghanistan (Taliban)

Intensity: <b>5</b>	Change: •	Start: 1994
Conflict parties:	Taliban vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, national power	

The war between the Taliban and the government, supported by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and US forces, concerning national power and the orientation of the political system continued. Civilian and international troop casualties reached the highest number since 2001. The international troop fatalities peaked at 483, 297 of whom had been killed between July and October in large-scale Taliban offensives. The number of civilian casualties rose sharply, exceeding the number of 1,000 for the first time. A US air strike on May 4 killed over 100 civilians in Farah province. Despite the deployment of additional 17,000 US troops along with the increasing military engagement of other NATO countries, the Taliban managed to regain a permanent presence in 80 percent of Afghanistan by September. In the first half of the year, the number of attacks involving explosive devices rose some 60 percent compared to 2008. On February 2, a suicide bomber attacked a police station in the city of Tirin Kot, killing 21 police officers. On February 11, seven Taliban fighters attacked government facilities in the capital of Kabul, killing 27 people. On August 25, the Taliban's deadliest bombing of the year killed 43 and injured another 60 civilians in Kandahar. On September 2, a Taliban attack on a mosque in the town of Methar Lam killed 22. On October 8, a Taliban suicide bomber killed 17 people in the Indian embassy in Kabul. ISAF and US forces launched several large-scale operations to counter Taliban insurgency. In December 2008, ISAF carried out "Operation Red Dagger" in Helmand province capturing four Taliban strongholds and killing some 100 insurgents. In early

2009, several senior Taliban commanders were killed, including Muhammed Bobi, Mullah Abdul Rasheed, Mullah Patang, Haji Adam, and Mullah Dastagir. Mullah Mansoor was killed by British troops on June 1. On June 19, British troops launched "Operation Panther's Claw" in northern Helmand, employing Apache and Harrier jets as well as Spectre gunships. Some 200 militants were killed in the operation. In July, over 4,000 US forces launched "Operation Strike of the Sword" in southern Helmand, employing AC-130 gunships, fighter jets, and helicopter gunships, which encountered fierce Taliban resistance. Violence reached a peak on August 20, the day of the presidential elections, with 400 attacks. Before the runoff election, Taliban militants attacked UN facilities in Kabul, killing six UN personnel and causing some 600 UN employees to pull-out from the region. On October 4, US forces countered a large-scale Taliban attack in Nuristan province with air strikes killing 100 insurgents. In addition to heavy insurgency in the south and east of Afghanistan, the northern province of Kunduz also experienced fierce fighting leading joint German ISAF and Afghan troops to launch the Chahar Dara District Offensive in April. Fourteen coalition soldiers as well as 260 insurgents and some 50 civilians were killed by November. On November 5, US forces joined the operation, killing 130 insurgents, including the high-ranking Taliban leader Kari Bashir. A NATO-led airstrike in Khost province killed some 30 insurgents on November 26 after Taliban had attacked an Afghan police station. In 2009 the US rapidly increased the frequency of strikes by unmanned aerial vehicles into Pakistani territory [→ USA - Pakistan], killing several high-ranking Taliban commanders as well as a large number of civilians throughout the year. In addition to military operations, international troops increasingly focused on poppy eradication. By the end of June, the USA announced a new tactic for mini-

mizing drug trafficking, intending to spend more money on encouraging farmers to grow crops instead of poppy. (et)

### Algeria (AQIM)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: •	Start: 1989
Conflict parties:	AQIM vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, national power	

The conflict between the al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the government over national power and ideology remained violent. Throughout the year, more than 130 AQIM members were killed in government operations. On February 13, an AQIM attack claimed the lives of seven civilians in the province of Boumerdes. On February 23, al-Qaeda militants killed nine security guards working for a state-owned gas and electricity distributor at a camp near Jijel, east of the capital Algiers. On May 22, government forces launched an air strike in the Mizrana forest, killing two al-Qaeda militants. In late May, al-Qaeda killed eight soldiers in an ambush in Biskra. Two civilians and eight policemen were assassinated by AQIM in the province Boumerdes on June 1. On June 16, security forces dismantled an al-Qaeda cell in the city of Boukadire in western Algeria, arresting all seven members. In the deadliest single attack, AQIM killed 24 policemen in an ambush south-east of Algiers on June 17. On June 22, AQIM killed five policemen and kidnapped two others in an ambush in Khenchela province. The next day, armed forces killed eleven AQIM members, including those who had carried out the attack on June 17. On July 15, Algerian, Libyan, Mauritanian, Nigerien, and Malian heads of the army agreed on a tight military cooperation to combat AQIM in the region [→ Mauritania (AQIM); Mali (AQIM); Niger (AQIM)]. AQIM killed 14 soldiers using roadside bombs and automatic weapons to ambush a military convoy in the province of Tipazaon on July 29. On October 22, seven police officers were killed by AQIM militants in an ambush in the region of Tizi Ouzou. On October 30, some 20 AQIM members kidnapped a business owner at his workplace in Tizirt in the Tizi Ouzou province. (im)

### Bahrain (Shiite opposition)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: ↗	Start: 1975
Conflict parties:	Shiite opposition vs. government	
Conflict items:	national power	

The manifest conflict over national power between the Shiite opposition and the Sunni government escalated to a crisis. On 12/17/08, authorities arrested 14 Shiite protesters on charges of planning bomb attacks at the national day celebrations. The same day, Shiite protesters clashed with police forces in Shiite villages near the capital Manama. On January 30, some 10,000 Shiite protesters demonstrated against political repression and the government's naturalization policy regarding Sunni migrants; the country is predominantly Shiite. Hassan Mushaimaa, Secretary General of the Shiite Haqq opposition movement, and Shiite cleric Sheikh Mohammed Habib al-Moqdad were detained along with 33

protesters on charges of planning bomb attacks to destabilize the country in February. Subsequently, protests intensified and demonstrators clashed with police forces on a nearly daily basis throughout the year. According to human rights organizations, police operations to disperse demonstrations became increasingly violent, with protesters being repeatedly injured in March and April. On April 11, King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifah pardoned 178 Shiite prisoners, including Mushaimaa, al-Moqdad, and other leading members of oppositional movements. Street protests were temporarily dampened. Opposition demands for institutional amendments regarding political participation were officially rejected by the government in May. (ak)

### Egypt (Islamist groups)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: ↗	Start: 1992
Conflict parties:	Islamist groups vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, national power	

The conflict between various Islamist groups and the government over the orientation of the political system and national power escalated to a crisis. A bomb exploded near the Khan al-Khalili bazaar in the capital of Cairo on February 22. One French citizen was killed and at least 24 other tourists were injured. Another bomb, which did not explode, was discovered close to the central al-Hussein Mosque. On May 23, seven members of the Islamic Army of Palestine, a group with links to al-Qaeda, were detained. They were charged with carrying out the February 22 bomb attack, allegedly in reaction to the government's decision to keep the border to Gaza closed during Israel's operation in the Gaza Strip [→ Israel (Hamas)]. On July 9, a group of at least 24 members with alleged links to the Islamic Army of Palestine were arrested under the suspicion of having planned an attack on the Suez Canal. One day later, 700 kg of explosives were seized in a mountainous area near the border to Israel. (vs)

### Egypt (opposition)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: •	Start: 1977
Conflict parties:	Muslim Brothers, secular opposition vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, national power	

The national power and system conflict between the opposition, consisting of secular opposition groups as well as the Muslim Brothers, and the government continued. On 12/31/08, thousands of protesters clashed with the police in demonstrations organized by the Muslim Brothers in the capital, Cairo. While the opposition claimed that several hundreds had been detained, government sources spoke of around 50. Ayman Nour, president of the oppositional Ghad party, was released on February 18 after three years in prison. Also in February, police forces violently cracked down on an oppositional rally in defiance of a ban on demonstrations. Between May and September, another 27 members of the Muslim Brothers were arrested. On June 28, a court released 13 senior members of the group. At the beginning of April, the oppositional April 6 Movement, a group of young ac-

tivists formed last year, organized large-scale demonstrations which were supported by the oppositional Kifaya Movement and the Muslim Brotherhood. Ahead of those protests, more than 30 people had been arrested. Thousands of Central Security Soldiers monitored the protests. In July, supporters of the detainees demonstrated in front of the Public Prosecutor's Office, demanding a fair trial. (vs)

### Iran (opposition)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: <b>↗</b>	Start: 1993
Conflict parties:	opposition vs. government	
Conflict items:	national power	

The conflict over national power between the opposition and the government of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad escalated to a crisis. After Ahmadinejad's clear victory in the presidential elections on June 12, followers of the opposition candidate, Mir Hossein Mousavi, accused the government of systematic electoral fraud and staged mass protests against the results in major cities such as Isfahan, Shiraz, and Tabriz as well as the capital of Teheran. On June 13, heavy street riots broke out in Teheran between thousands of demonstrators, on the one hand, and the police, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and the Basiji militias, on the other. Hundreds were arrested, among them former government members, and at least four people killed. On June 15, more than one million protesters, among them Mousavi, gathered in the capital. Eight demonstrators were killed in clashes with the police. The same day, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei ordered an investigation into the claims of election fraud. However, a proposal to recount ten percent of the votes was rejected by Mousavi on June 27. Protests continued despite a nationwide ban. On June 20, at least 20 demonstrators were killed in clashes with security forces in Teheran. While government sources spoke of 26 casualties, the opposition released a list with the names of 69 casualties of the June and July street riots. Over 4,000 were detained, at least 200 of which remained in prison and awaited trials. On July 17, the opposition-affiliated leader of the Assembly of Experts, Ayatollah Ali Rafsanjani, openly criticized Khamenei and Ahmadinejad and demanded the release of the detainees. On August 23, however, Rafsanjani called on the opposition to comply with the government of Ahmadinejad, who had been inaugurated on August 5 amid new demonstrations. At the same time, mass trials against detained protesters began. Five detainees were sentenced to death while the majority of protesters, among them foreigners, received long prison terms. On November 4, when Iran celebrated the 30th anniversary of the revolution, followers of the opposition protested again in the major cities of the country. Several were injured and over 100 arrested in the violent clashes between protesters, the police, and the Basiji militias. (ptr)

### Iran (PJAK/Kurdish areas)

Intensity: <b>4</b>	Change: <b>•</b>	Start: 1979
Conflict parties:	PJAK vs. government	
Conflict items:	autonomy	

The autonomy conflict in the Kurdish areas of north-western Iran between the Party of Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK) and the government continued. PJAK was considered an offshoot of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK/KONGRA-GEL) [→ Turkey (PKK/KONGRA-GEL/Kurdish areas)]. In January, government sources stated that the PJAK had laid down arms. On February 5, the same sources claimed that the USA had added the PJAK to a list of terrorist organizations. On April 24 and 25, the PJAK attacked two police stations in the cities of Ravansar in northern Kermanshah province and in Sanandaj, the capital of Kordestan province, killing eleven police officers. More than ten PJAK members were reportedly killed. On May 2 and 4, the government conducted air strikes against three villages in the Panjwin district in Sulaymaniyah province in northern Iraq in a cross-border attack on PJAK positions [→ Iran - Iraq], supported by artillery. On May 13, the pro-government Basij militias, which are affiliated with the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC), killed five PJAK members in the border area of the Iranian province of West Azerbaijan. On July 19 and 20, four police officers and two PJAK-members were killed in several clashes near Orumiyeh, the capital of the same province. On July 22, the Intelligence Ministry claimed the dissolution of a PJAK cell in Orumiyeh. The IRGC claimed to have killed 26 PJAK members in operations in the provinces of Kordestan and West Azerbaijan on August 23. On October 17, official sources stated that a security officer was killed in a PJAK attack. (ptr)

### Iran (PRMI/Sistan-Balochistan)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: <b>•</b>	Start: 1979
Conflict parties:	PRMI vs. government	
Conflict items:	autonomy, system/ideology	

The conflict in Sistan and Balochistan Province concerning autonomy and ideology between the Sunni Balochis, organized in the People's Resistance Movement of Iran (PRMI) aka the Iranian Army of God (Jundullah), and the Shiite government continued. On 12/29/08, Abdol Ghafoor Rigi, brother of PRMI leader Abdolmalek Rigi, carried out a suicide attack in the city of Saravan, killing four and wounding twelve. This was the first time the PRMI employed suicide attacks. On March 4, the death penalties of two PRMI members were executed. On March 7, up to 60 PRMI members clashed with police forces in the Zabol-Zahedan border region after the militants had entered the country from Afghanistan, according to Iranian sources. At least 15 PRMI members were killed. In a separate incident on March 9, fifteen PRMI members were killed and six police officers injured when the two sides clashed after PRMI members had entered the town of Tasuki. On May 28, a bomb killed 25 people and wounded about 125 at a mosque in Zahedan, the capital of Sistan and Balochistan province. PRMI

claimed responsibility for the attack. On May 30, three men were executed after being sentenced to death for their involvement in the attack. In June, Rigi pressured Sunni clerics to dissuade Sunni Muslims from voting in the presidential elections on June 12 [→ Iran (opposition)]. In June and July, several PRMI members were executed. On October 18, at least 47 people were killed in a PRMI suicide attack in the region of Pishin, among them at least six senior leaders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), including the deputy commander of the IRGC ground forces. The PRMI claimed responsibility for the bombing. The attack occurred when IRGC leaders met with Sunni and Shiite tribal leaders. On October 23, Interior Minister Mostafa Mohammad Najjar met his Pakistani counterpart Rehman Malik and urged him to extradite PRMI leaders also active in the Balochi regions of Pakistan [→ Pakistan (BLA, BRA, BLF/Balochistan)]. On November 5, Pakistan arrested three alleged members of the PRMI in southeastern Pakistan. In early November, Iran executed a PRMI member in the main prison of the provincial capital Zahedan. (ptr)

### Iran - Israel

Intensity: <b>2</b>	Change: •	Start: 1979
Conflict parties:	Iran vs. Israel	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, international power	

The manifest conflict between Iran and Israel continued. Iran denied Israel's right to exist while Israel perceived Iran's nuclear program as a threat [→ Iran - USA]. On January 29, an Iranian ship carrying arms was detained off Cyprus for violating a UN arms embargo against Iran. Israel accused Iran of supplying Hezbollah and Hamas with arms, which Iran denied [→ Israel (Hezbollah); Israel (Hamas/Palestine)]. On November 5, Israel intercepted a ship carrying 300 tons of military hardware, intended for Hezbollah according to Israeli sources. Throughout the year, Iran repeatedly tested medium-range missiles capable of reaching Israel. Consequently, Israel conducted a naval exercise in the Red Sea on July 14 and launched a joint USA-Israeli missile defense training on October 21. On November 24, Iranian military tested the capabilities of its air defense systems in a nationwide military exercise. While US Vice President Joe Biden implied that the US would not restrain Israel if it attacked Iran, President Barack Obama stated on July 7 that the USA would not approve of an Israeli attack on Iran over its nuclear program. On September 21, Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon reiterated that Israel had not ruled out the military option. However, during a non-proliferation conference in the Egyptian capital of Cairo in late September, senior Iranian and Israeli officials met for the first time since 1979. (ho)

### Iran - USA

Intensity: <b>2</b>	Change: •	Start: 1979
Conflict parties:	Iran vs. USA	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, international power	

The conflict between Iran and the USA over Iran's nuclear program continued. While the USA accused Iran of

trying to build nuclear weapons, Iran denied the accusations, stating its nuclear program was for civil purposes only. On February 2, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) stated Iran could gain the capability to produce a nuclear weapon within two to five years. The Iranian satellite launch the same day caused great concern about the potential development of Iranian intercontinental missiles. On February 7, US Vice President Joe Biden announced a change in US policy towards Iran. On February 25, US armed forces shot down an Iranian drone aircraft which had ventured inside Iraq, about 60 miles northeast of Baghdad, the capital of Iraq. In previous years, the USA had accused Iran of supplying Shiite militias in Iraq with military hardware [→ Iraq (insurgents)]. On April 9, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad stated that Iran had mastered the nuclear fuel cycle and tested more advanced machines for enriching uranium. On September 2, IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei stated Iran was not going to produce a nuclear weapon in the near future. On September 25, Iran revealed the existence of a second uranium enrichment plant near the city of Qom. On September 27, Iran tested mid-range Shabab III missiles, which the USA called provocative the following day. On October 1, Iran met with the permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany in Geneva, Switzerland. Iran agreed to open its new plant to IAEA inspections and to send the majority of its low-enriched uranium to Russia for reprocessing in order to re-import it as fuel rods. IAEA inspected the Qom plant on October 25. Iran had also granted the IAEA access to the other uranium enrichment plant in Arak on August 25, for the first time in almost a year. In line with the US position, Russian President Dmitrij Medvedev increased pressure on Iran [→ USA - Russia (missile system)]. On November 18, Iran stated that it would exchange all its uranium for an equivalent amount of enriched nuclear fuel only on its own territory. (ho)

### Iraq (al-Sadr group)

Intensity: <b>2</b>	Change: ↓	Start: 2004
Conflict parties:	al-Sadr group vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, national power	

The conflict over the orientation of the political system and national power between the group of Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr and the government, supported by US-led coalition forces, further deescalated over the year. After the Mehdi army, the armed wing of the al-Sadr group, had suffered a military defeat in 2008, al-Sadr regrouped his organization, strengthening the political and social wings. On January 7, al-Sadr called for reprisal attacks on US forces in Iraq in retaliation for US support of Israel in the Gaza conflict between Israel and Hamas [→ Israel (Hamas/Palestine)]. On May 1, on his first official foreign visit, al-Sadr conducted talks about security issues with Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Recep Erdogan and Turkish President Abdullah Gül in Turkey. On July 20, al-Sadr also visited Damascus, the capital of Syria, and held talks with the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. In late August, the political party of al-Sadr, the al-Sadr bloc, joined a coalition mainly with other Shi-

ite parties, among them the influential Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, with regard to the national elections scheduled in January 2010. (db)

### Iraq (AQI)

Intensity: <b>4</b>	Change: •	Start: 2003
Conflict parties:	AQI vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, national power	

The severe crisis over national power and ideology between al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and the government, supported by US-led coalition forces, continued. Throughout the year, AQI suicide bombers twice attacked ministries and other high-profile official buildings in central Baghdad, the capital of Iraq. Iraqi security forces and the US army detained or executed several high-ranking AQI leaders. In northern Iraq, AQI was said to increase the tensions between Kurdish and Arab Iraqis [→ Iraq (Kurdish Regional Government)]. On January 24, AQI attacked a police convoy in Anbar governorate, assassinating five police officers. Iraqi security forces arrested 74 alleged AQI members in a series of raids in the northern city of Mosul late in February. On April 10, US military stated that a suicide bomber detonated a truck packed with explosives outside an Iraqi military base in the city of Mosul, killing five US soldiers and two Iraqi policemen. On April 23 and 24, four AQI suicide bombers, targeting Shiite mosques and Iranian Shiite pilgrims, killed up to 145 people, mainly Shiites, in Baghdad and in the city of Muqadiyah in Anbar governorate. On June 20, at least 72 people were killed in the northern city of Kirkuk in the deadliest bomb attack of the year in northern Iraq. Iraqi officials blamed the AQI. After US troops had pulled out of city centers by the end of June [→ Iraq (insurgents)], bombs and suicide attacks in Baghdad and the northern city of Tal Afar in volatile Nineveh governorate killed more than 50 people on July 9. Government officials blamed AQI. Almost 100 people were killed in two suicide bomb attacks on the Foreign and Finance Ministries near the Green Zone in central Baghdad on August 19, which AQI claimed responsibility for. In a four-day operation in early October, authorities detained more than 150 alleged members of AQI and other insurgent groups in the area of the city of Mosul. On October 13, a suicide bomber killed at least eight people in the town of Bihruz in Anbar, apparently targeting the local leader of the Awakening Council, which mainly consisted of Sunni pro-government paramilitary groups that had been founded to fight AQI. On October 16, a suicide bomber killed at least 15 people and wounded 90 in a Sunni mosque in northern Iraq whose imam had criticized AQI. In the deadliest assault since April 2007, two coordinated bomb attacks killed up to 155 people and wounded more than 500 in central Baghdad on October 25. Two vehicles loaded with large amounts of explosives detonated in front of Ministry of Justice and provincial government buildings. One day later, AQI claimed responsibility for the attacks. On November 16, thirteen members of a tribe opposing AQI in the local Awakening Council were shot dead by unknown gunmen in Saidan district near Baghdad. (val)

### Iraq (insurgents)

Intensity: <b>4</b>	Change: •	Start: 2004
Conflict parties:	insurgents vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, national power	

The conflict over national power and the orientation of the political system between several insurgent groups and the government, supported by multinational forces, remained a severe crisis. The overall security situation improved throughout the year. While ethnic tensions between Sunnis and Shiites did not rise, violence against minorities in the north of the country remained at a high level. US and Iraqi officials blamed al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) [→ Iraq (AQI)] and several other Sunni insurgent groups for deliberately fueling the ethnic tensions between Arabs, Kurds, and other ethnicities in the areas disputed by the central government and the Kurdish Regional Government [→ Iraq (Kurdish Regional Government)]. On 12/04/08, the central government approved the US-Iraqi security pact, the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), committing the US to withdraw its troops from Iraq by the end of 2011. With the withdrawal of British, Australian, and Romanian troops by the end of July, the US forces remained the last foreign troops in Iraq. The SOFA took effect on January 1, although it still needed the approval of a national referendum scheduled for January 2010. On the same day, the US transferred security control over the heavily-fortified Green Zone in central Baghdad, capital of Iraq, to the authorities. In the run-up to the provincial elections in late January, unidentified gunmen killed five Sunni candidates in several provinces. On February 27, US President Barack Obama set out a plan to withdraw the majority of US combat troops by August 2010. On March 29, Iraqi security forces arrested a local Awakening Council leader in the central Baghdad neighborhood of Fadel for alleged connections to the banned Baath party of former President Saddam Hussein. The Awakening Councils are mostly Sunni militant groups, founded in 2006 to fight AQI. Subsequently, four civilians were killed when clashes erupted between the members of the local Awakening Council and Iraqi forces, continuing until the next day. The Shiite insurgent group Asaib al-Haq claimed to have attacked at least ten US army patrols over the year, killing several soldiers in roadside bombings. On April 24 and 25, some 150 mostly Iranian Shiite pilgrims were killed by unknown insurgents in a string of bomb attacks in Baghdad and Baquba, the capital of Diyala governorate. Iraqi security forces killed 30 Islamist insurgents in an operation in Diyala on May 5. In the mostly Shiite-inhabited district of Shula in northwest Baghdad, 35 civilians were killed and 72 wounded on May 20. On July 22, the police reportedly arrested 300 suspected insurgents in Anbar province. In early October, an additional 200 suspects were arrested near the northern city of Mosul. In late August, the police found several caches of new Iranian-manufactured weapons in the south of the country and implicated Shiite militias with having stored them. The police accused different Shiite militias of recruiting fighters in the run-up to the national elections in early 2010. (db)

## Iraq (Kurdish Regional Government)

Intensity: <b>2</b>	Change: <b>NEW</b>	Start: 2009
Conflict parties:	KRG vs. central government	
Conflict items:	regional predominance, resources	

A manifest conflict between the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and the central government over resources and regional predominance in northern Iraq emerged. The Kurdish Autonomous Region (KAR) consists of the three northern governorates Sulaymaniyah, Irbil, and Dahuk. The KRG demanded the incorporation of the oil-rich city of Kirkuk and other disputed areas along the intrastate border into the KAR. According to the constitution, a referendum on the status of the governorate of Kirkuk would have had to be held in 2007 already, but this was thwarted due to demographic distortions. The demographic composition of the disputed areas had been severely affected by the "Arabization" policy of former President Saddam Hussein. After the overthrow of his regime in 2003, thousands of Iraqi Kurds returned to these areas. In the provincial elections on January 31, a Sunni Arab nationalist party defeated its Kurdish rivals in the disputed northern parts of Ninewa province. However, elections in the governorate of Kirkuk were indefinitely postponed despite a KAR governorate poll on July 25. On May 24, the KRG Minister of Peshmergas, Sheikh Jaafar Sheikh Mustafa, accused the army of aiming to displace the Kurdish population of the Kirkuk governorate. Since the Iraqi army had relocated the headquarters of a division to the area in 2008, the total number of security forces had increased to some 9,500 by June 2009. From April 22 on, the US army doubled the number of soldiers deployed in the city of Kirkuk to 10,000 in an attempt to ease the growing tensions. Assaults by al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and several other insurgent groups in the disputed areas were said to be aimed at raising ethnic tension since many of those attacks targeted ethnic and religious minorities [→ Iraq (AQI); Iraq (insurgents)]. On June 1, the KRG and the central government eased tensions concerning oil exports from the KAR, signing a contract stating that sales revenues were to be deposited into a federally managed fund. This allowed the KRG to export oil for the first time. In early August, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki met with KRG President Masoud Barzani for the first talks in over a year. Iraqi parliament passed a revision of the election law on November 8, settling week long controversies over the special modalities for the city of Kirkuk in the 2010 national elections. However, Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi vetoed the law.

(val)

## Israel (al-Fatah - Hamas)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: •	Start: 1994
Conflict parties:	al-Fatah vs. Hamas	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, regional predominance	

The system conflict over regional predominance between the Palestinian National Liberation Movement (al-Fatah) and the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) in the Palestinian territories continued. On January 2,

thousands of Palestinians in the West Bank protested in support of demonstrations in the Gaza Strip against the Israeli military "Operation Cast Lead" [→ Israel (Hamas/Palestine)]. On February 26, leaders of the rival Palestinian factions Hamas and al-Fatah met in the Egyptian capital of Cairo for talks. Hamas agreed to lift the house arrest of some al-Fatah members in the Gaza Strip, while al-Fatah released about 80 Hamas members. Furthermore, delegations from each side and other Palestinian groups agreed to set up committees with the intention of forming a unity government and holding elections. A first round of meetings took place on March 10. Also, on March 7, Palestinian National Authority Prime Minister Salam Fayyad resigned. This had been demanded by Hamas as a precondition for a national unity government. However, Hamas and al-Fatah suspended their reconciliation talks for three weeks on April 2 after they had failed to agree on a unity government. On May 31, the Palestinian police tried to arrest Mohammed al-Samman, the commander of Hamas's armed wing, in the town of Qalqilya in the northern West Bank. This resulted in an exchange of fire killing three policemen, two Hamas members, and a bystander. On September 6, Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal, exiled in Damascus, visited Egypt for talks with mediators aiming at a possible reconciliation with al-Fatah. On October 28, Hamas called upon Palestinians in the Gaza Strip to boycott presidential and parliamentary elections announced by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. Hamas considered the elections set for January 2010 illegal. On November 11, Abbas declared he would not run for reelection. The PNA's electoral commission recommended the next day that the elections should be postponed. (hl)

## Israel (Hamas - Salafist groups)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: <b>NEW</b>	Start: 2009
Conflict parties:	Salafist groups vs. Hamas	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, regional predominance	

A new ideological conflict, also concerning regional predominance, emerged between Hamas, the de facto authority in the Gaza Strip, and various Salafist groups. The Salafist groups were said to be closely affiliated to al-Qaeda, but only the group Jaysh al-Ummah admitted such a link. On May 22, Hamas accused these groups of undermining its de facto authority in the Gaza Strip by fighting Israel on their own. After the Salafist group Jund Ansar Allah proclaimed an Islamic emirate in the Gaza Strip on August 15, Hamas raided a mosque in the city of Rafah in order to arrest the group's leader, Abd Al-Latif Moussa. Apart from Moussa and the Hamas military chief for the southern Gaza Strip, 24 people were killed, including five policemen, and at least 120 people wounded. On August 29, Jund Ansar Allah allegedly bombed Hamas security installations in Gaza City in two retaliation acts. Hamas security forces arrested Jaysh al-Ummah leader Abu Hafs al-Maqdisi on September 4. A spokesman of the group threatened Hamas with attacks in the Gaza Strip. On October 2, Hamas demanded the Salafist groups to disband in return for an amnesty. The Salafists rejected this offer. (hl)



## Israel ( Hamas/Palestine)

Intensity: <b>5</b>	Change: ↗	Start: 1988
Conflict parties:	Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Popular Resistance Committees vs. Israeli government	
Conflict items:	secession, system/ideology	

The conflict between Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and other militant groups, on the one hand, and the Israeli government, on the other, concerning the creation of a sovereign Palestinian state escalated to a war in late 2008. Hamas accused Israel of having failed to ease its blockade on the Gaza Strip while Israel demanded the ending of all rocket fire in its border region, the release of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, abducted by Hamas in 2006, and the stop of arms trafficking as prerequisites for lifting the blockade. On 12/17/08, members of the Islamic Jihad fired a barrage of about 15 rockets at Israel, wounding two civilians. The army launched "Operation Cast Lead" with air strikes against key targets in the Gaza Strip such as security compounds, smuggling tunnels, and militant bases on 12/27/08. According to official sources, the air force conducted no less than 700 combat missions within the next five days and a total of 2,700 by the end of the operation on January 21. In spite of this operation, Hamas and other Gaza Strip-based Palestinian militant groups fired 550 rockets and 200 mortar shells into Israel during the same period of time. On 12/29/08, Israel declared the areas around the Gaza Strip a closed military zone. By January 2, the number of Palestinian fatalities reached 450. On January 3, the government conscripted tens of thousands of reservists and launched a ground offensive of 10,000 forces and hundreds of tanks, supported by helicopter gunships. At least 40 people were killed and 55 injured in artillery shelling near a UN-run school in the Jabaliya refugee camp near Gaza City on January 7. On January 11, thousands of reservists joined the offensive. On January 15, an air strike killed the Hamas de facto Interior Minister Said Siyam. On January 9, the UN Security Council passed a resolution urging an immediate ceasefire, with the US abstaining. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert announced a unilateral ceasefire on January 17. The following day, Hamas declared a one-week ceasefire to allow Israeli soldiers to withdraw. Israel concluded the withdrawal on January 21. While NGOs estimated a total number of 1,417 Palestinian casualties, among them 330 militants, Israeli official sources reported a number of 1,166 casualties, among them 709 militants. Thirteen people were killed on the Israeli side. Nearly USD 2 billion worth of infrastructure were destroyed in the Gaza Strip. On January 19, Egyptian mediators held separate talks with the government and Hamas about extending the unilateral ceasefires by at least a year. On May 28, government forces killed a Hamas leader near the city of Hebron in the West Bank. Palestinian militants from the Salafist group Jund Ansar Allah launched an attack on Israeli troops at the Gaza border on June 8, killing four. In the second half of the year, in response to ongoing violence, Israel repeatedly bombed tunnels under the Gaza Strip's border with Egypt, considering them the main weapon supply route for militant groups in the Gaza Strip. In the heaviest raids since January, the Is-

raeli air force bombed such smuggling tunnels as well as several alleged weapons-manufacturing facilities in the Gaza Strip on November 22. On September 6, mediators held talks with Damascus-exiled Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal in Egypt, trying to broker a prisoner-swap between Israel and Hamas that would include captured Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit. On November 5, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution, based on the UN Goldstone Report published on September 15, calling for independent inquiries by Israel and the Palestinians into war crime claims. (hl)

## Israel (Hezbollah)

Intensity: <b>2</b>	Change: •	Start: 1982
Conflict parties:	Hezbollah vs. Israel	
Conflict items:	system/ideology	

The conflict concerning the orientation of the political system between Hezbollah, operating from Lebanese territory, and Israel remained manifest. Against the background of the war between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip [→ Israel (Hamas/Palestine)], Hezbollah placed its fighters on alert. On several occasions, unidentified militants fired rockets on Israel but Hezbollah denied responsibility. On April 11, Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah admitted that several members of his group were operating from Egypt to support the Palestinian resistance. The day before, a group of 49 Hezbollah members had been detained for planning hostile operations in Egypt, according to Egyptian sources. On April 23 in the Egyptian capital of Cairo, a further group of 22 alleged Hezbollah-linked militants was charged with plotting attacks in Egypt, e.g. on ships in the Suez Canal and on holiday resorts in the Sinai Peninsula popular with Israeli tourists. Two suspected Hezbollah weapons stockpiles in southern Lebanon detonated in July and October. According to Israel, their existence had posed a serious violation of UN resolution 1701. On November 4, Israeli forces seized a ship in the Mediterranean Sea loaded with almost 300 tons of military hardware [→ Iran - Israel]. (hl)


## Israel (PNA, PLO, al-Fatah, PFLP/Palestine)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: •	Start: 1920
Conflict parties:	PNA, al-Fatah, PFLP, PLO vs. Israeli government	
Conflict items:	secession, system/ideology, resources	

The conflict mainly concerning the creation of a sovereign Palestinian state between the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), al-Fatah, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), on the one hand, and the Israeli government, on the other, continued. The Israeli government accepted the PLO and al-Fatah as the only negotiation partners in a possible peace deal and ruled out any negotiations with Hamas [→ Israel (Hamas/Palestine)]. On 11/30/08, the Israeli government released 250 Palestinian prisoners, including members of al-Fatah, in the West Bank. On 12/24/08, the al-Aqsa Brigades, the militant wing of al-Fatah, claimed responsibility for launching a rocket at the Is-

raeli city of Sderot from the Gaza Strip. On January 2, thousands of Palestinians in the West Bank demonstrated against the major Israeli offensive in the Gaza Strip [→ Israel ( Hamas/Palestine)]. On March 19, Israeli artillery killed two al-Aqsa militants in the Gaza Strip. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu agreed to peace talks but refrained from endorsing a Palestinian state during talks with US President Barack Obama in the US capital of Washington DC on May 18. In June, Netanyahu refused to halt Israeli settlement activity in the West Bank despite strong US pressure. Since 1967, Israel settled more than 450,000 citizens in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. The Israeli government approved the construction of 50 new housing units in an Israeli settlement in the West Bank on July 29. On August 4, al-Fatah convened for a three-day congress in the West Bank town of Bethlehem for the first time in twenty years. The 2,000 delegates reiterated al-Fatah's willingness for peace, emphasizing, however, its right for violent resistance at the same time. On September 1, Palestinian protesters clashed with Israeli security forces in a demonstration near the city of Ramallah, leaving one Palestinian dead. In response to a rocket attack in the northern Gaza Strip, Israeli soldiers killed a PFLP member on September 20. (hl)


#### Lebanon (March 14 Alliance - March 8 Alliance)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: 	Start: 1975
Conflict parties:	March 14 Alliance vs. March 8 Alliance	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, national power	

The national power and system conflict between the anti-Syrian March 14 Alliance and the pro-Syrian March 8 Alliance deescalated. While the March 14 Alliance was led by the Future Movement of Saad al-Hariri, son of former prime minister Rafik al-Hariri, the March 8 Alliance mainly consisted of Hezbollah, the Free Patriotic Movement, and the Amal Movement. On February 14, hundreds of thousands of supporters of the March 14 Alliance marked the fourth anniversary of Rafik al-Hariri's assassination. One demonstrator was killed in clashes with rival party supporters. Two days later, Hezbollah held a mass rally in its stronghold in the southern parts of the capital of Beirut to mark the anniversary of the assassination of top military commander Imad Mughniyeh in 2008. On March 1, a UN court was set up in The Hague, Netherlands, to investigate the bomb attack which had killed Rafik al-Hariri and 22 others in February 2005. On February 28, the government released three of seven suspects detained over the assassination of al-Hariri. On April 29, four Lebanese generals held over the killing since 2005 were released after the UN court had ruled that there was not enough evidence. In a visit to Beirut on May 22, US Vice President Joseph Biden announced that future US support depended on the outcome of the parliamentary elections on June 7, prompting Hezbollah officials to accuse the US of meddling in domestic affairs. Ahead of the elections, tensions between rival parties rose after Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah had called the military takeover of West Beirut on 05/07/08 a glorious day. On June 2, the rival political leaders adjourned talks aimed at forging a national de-

fense strategy to an unspecified date. While the March 14 Alliance wanted armed groups to be integrated into the national security forces, Hezbollah sought to stay a militarily independent actor. A dialogue regarding this issue had been started on 12/22/08. In the elections, the March 14 Alliance won 71 of 128 seats, the March 8 Alliance 57, thirteen of which won by Hezbollah. On June 27, Christian President Michel Suleiman entrusted Future Movement leader Saad al-Hariri with forming a national unity government. On June 28, one person was killed in clashes between supporters of al-Hariri, a Sunni Muslim, and followers of the Shiite Amal Movement of the March 8 Alliance in the Aisha Bakkar neighborhood of Beirut. A soldier was reportedly injured by sniper fire. On September 7, al-Hariri proposed a new cabinet unilaterally, which was criticized by Hezbollah and the Christian parties of the March 8 Alliance. Al-Hariri blamed the March 8 Alliance for thwarting his attempt to forge a unity government. On September 10, al-Hariri decided not to form a government but was reassigned the task by Suleiman six days later. On November 10, the parties agreed to assign 15 cabinet posts to the March 14 Alliance, ten to the March 8 Alliance, and five to be appointed by Suleiman. On November 26, the newly-established cabinet agreed on a policy statement that acknowledged Hezbollah's right to use its weapons to liberate all Lebanese territory, despite disagreement by some members of the March 14 Alliance. (db, sz)

#### Mauritania (AQIM)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: 	Start: 2007
Conflict parties:	AQIM vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, national power	

The conflict between the al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the government concerning national power as well as system and ideology continued. After last year's massive violent encroachments of AQIM, on July 21, Algeria, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger declared to build up a cooperative military collaboration in order to fight AQIM together [→ Algeria (AQIM); Mali (AQIM); Niger (AQIM)]. On June 23, a US citizen was shot dead by members of AQIM in the capital of Nouakchott. On August 9, two French security employees were injured in a suicide attack outside the French embassy. AQIM claimed responsibility. (sl)

#### Morocco (POLISARIO Front/Western Sahara)

Intensity: <b>2</b>	Change: 	Start: 1975
Conflict parties:	POLISARIO Front vs. government	
Conflict items:	secession	

The manifest conflict concerning the secession of Western Sahara between the Popular Front of the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro (POLISARIO Front) and the government continued. While the government endorsed an autonomy plan, the Algeria-backed POLISARIO Front issued a call for referendum on independence. On April 11, about 1,400 supporters of POLISARIO Front crossed the border from Algerian camps into a closed military zone for a pro-independence demonstration and fired shots in the air. On April 13, the POLIS-

ARIO Front denied it had violated a ceasefire, claiming the protest had been peaceful. The UN Security Council extended the mandate of the UN mission MINURSO for another year on April 30 and endorsed a shift to small-scale informal peace talks between the POLISARIO Front and the government. On June 11, local elections were extended to Western Sahara for the first time. The POLISARIO Front denounced this and called on the UN to intervene. On October 7, seven leading POLISARIO activists were detained after visiting the Algerian province of Tindouf. Moroccan authorities denied the Westsaharan activist Aminatou Haidar to re-enter Morocco after a visit to Spain and sent her back on November 13, where she stranded in the airport of Lanzarote. In protest, Haidar began a hunger strike on November 16. (sl)

### Saudi Arabia (al-Houthi rebels)

Intensity: <b>4</b>	Change: <b>NEW</b>	Start: 2009
Conflict parties:	al-Houthi rebels vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, regional predominance	

In early November, a new conflict between the Shi'ite Yemeni al-Houthi rebels and the government of Saudi Arabia over ideology and regional predominance emerged in the border region between Yemen and Saudi Arabia on the level of a severe crisis when government forces started to attack the rebels seizing Saudi Arabian territory. The leader of the al-Houthi rebels, Abdel Malik al-Houthi, accused Saudi Arabia of assisting the government of Yemen in its fight against his group [→ Yemen (al-Houthi rebels)]. Furthermore, the rebels accused Saudi Arabia of assisting Yemeni Sunni religious movements in conversion attempts. From late October on, Saudi Arabia noted a sharp increase of infiltrators from Yemen. On November 3, rebels killed one Saudi Arabian soldier and injured eleven in an attack on a border post at Dukhan Mountain in Jizan province and seized Saudi Arabian border areas. Two days later, the government evacuated several villages and closed schools in the border region. The same day, the army started an offensive against al-Houthi positions deploying F 15 and Tornado jets as well as artillery. According to officials, at least 40 rebels were killed in the operation. On November 10, the rebels accused the government of using phosphorous bombs in airstrikes. The government claimed to have killed and injured many rebels and taken 250 prisoners, while three soldiers and four civilians were killed and 15 soldiers wounded. On November 11, Deputy Defence Minister Prince Khalid bin Sultan announced that the army would set up a 10 km buffer zone inside Yemen to prevent rebels from crossing the border. Thereupon, ground forces backed by combat helicopters and artillery recaptured the border areas in a large-scale offensive the following days. Large quantities of weapons were found in the occupied border area. Subsequently, government fighter jets shelled a fort east of Jebel Dukham, an alleged rebel stronghold, as well as Yemeni border villages. On November 10, the government had imposed a naval blockade on northern Yemen's Red Sea coast in order to stop weapon supply for the rebels. The blockade was further extended with 4,000 additional navy per-

sonnel mobilized in mid-November. In an open letter on November 16, the rebels called on the Arab League to mediate. On November 25, the army claimed to have killed some 100 and detained at least 40 rebels in the previous three days. Up to 11,000 Yemeni citizens were forced to leave their homes due to the fighting in the border region. (hm)

### Saudi Arabia (AQAP)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: ↗	Start: 1990
Conflict parties:	AQAP vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, national power	

The conflict between al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the government over the orientation of the political system and national power increased to the level of a crisis. In late January, the Yemeni and Saudi Arabian branches of al-Qaeda announced to merge [→ Yemen (AQAP)]. On April 8, the government announced the divestiture of an AQAP cell which, according to government sources, had planned to carry out attacks. The eleven members of the cell were arrested; however, none of the detained matched a list of 85 AQAP members which had been published in February. In the first terrorism trial in the history of the country, verdicts were issued over 330 suspects on July 8. 323 suspects were sentenced to prison terms, while one suspect received capital punishment. On August 4, security forces broke up another al-Qaeda cell and arrested its 44 members. Only a week later, on August 27, Prince Mohammed Bin Naif, Deputy Minister of Interior for Security Affairs, escaped an assassination attempt with only minor injuries in his own house in Jeddah. The suicide bomber obtained access to the prince under the pretense of turning himself in to enter the country's popular rehabilitation program. On October 13, two suspected al-Qaeda members and one police officer were killed in a shootout at a police checkpoint in Jizan province. A third passenger was arrested. (ak)


### Saudi Arabia (Shiites)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: ↑	Start: 1979
Conflict parties:	Shiites vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, national power	

The system and national power conflict between the Shi'ite minority and the Sunni government turned violent. For decades, the Shiite minority had been demanding equal participation opportunities as well as freedom of worship. On February 20, Shiite pilgrims clashed with the religious police in Medina during a ritual visit to a holy Shiite grave. The religious police used batons to disperse the demonstrators. On February 23, the religious police and 3,000 Shiite protesters clashed again. On February 24, two policemen were injured and many protesters arrested when Shiite pilgrims attacked police forces. Although King Abdullah Bin Abd al-Aziz decided to release the prisoners, tensions remained. In mid-March, the unrest reached the eastern part of the country when Shiite cleric Sheikh Nimr Baqer Al-Nimr called for the secession of the oil-rich and predominantly Shi'ite inhabited region of Qatif. Some 30 Shiite protesters

were arrested. On April 9, however, around 60 senior Shiite leaders swore their loyalty towards the kingdom. To ease tensions in the eastern and southern provinces, 17 Shiite prisoners were pardoned on August 24, and in mid-September, Shiite leader Ahmed Turki al-Saab was released from prison. (ak)


### Turkey (PKK/KONGRA-GEL/Kurdish areas)

Intensity: <b>4</b>	Change: 	Start: 1920
Conflict parties:	PKK/KONGRA-GEL vs. government	
Conflict items:	autonomy	

The conflict over autonomy between the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK/KONGRA-GEL) and the government deescalated but remained highly violent. Fighting between Kurdish militants and the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) continued on Turkish as well as on Iraqi soil [→ Turkey - Iraq]. At least 54 members of the Turkish security forces and 69 insurgents were killed throughout the year. The government granted Turkish Kurds more cultural and political rights and initiated steps to strengthen ties with the northern Iraqi Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). From December 2008 to March 2009, Turkish warplanes repeatedly bombed PKK/KONGRA-GEL targets in northern Iraq, mostly in the Qandil region. Between April 10 and 16, four soldiers and seven PKK/KONGRA-GEL fighters were killed in TSK military operations against PKK/KONGRA-GEL militants in Diyarbakir and Sirnak provinces. On April 14, PKK/KONGRA-GEL declared a unilateral ceasefire but fighting continued. Nine soldiers were killed in a roadside bombing in Lice district in the province of Diyarbakir on April 29. Subsequently, a widespread military operation was launched in the northern Iraqi regions of Zap and Avasin-Basian, including air strikes against PKK/KONGRA-GEL targets which killed at least ten of their fighters. In early May, Murat Karayilan, acting leader of PKK/KONGRA-GEL, announced that his organization was not seeking a separate state but demanding equal rights for Kurds. Throughout the rest of the month, however, at least eleven government security forces and three civilians were killed by mines planted by Kurdish militants. In several military operations in mid-June, the army reportedly killed three PKK/KONGRA-GEL members and captured 16 others. In late June, as part of a government democratization initiative in order to find a peaceful solution to the conflict, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan met with a delegation of the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP). Kurdish language rights were gradually expanded by legislations to broadcast Kurdish radio and television programs and to teach the Kurdish language at a university for the first time. On October 19, eight Kurdish militants surrendered to the army in support of the government initiative. On November 13, the government formally presented its plan to expand the rights of the Kurdish population, which included the creation of an independent body to investigate cases of torture and the loosening of restrictions on the Kurdish language. However, in early September, the army suffered its heaviest losses when Kurdish militants conducted several attacks killing ten soldiers and injuring 13 in the southeast of the country.

On October 6, parliament extended the TSK mandate to launch cross-border operations against Kurdish rebels in Iraq. Military operations against the PKK/KONGRA-GEL continued in late October. (sw)

### Yemen (AQAP)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: 	Start: 1994
Conflict parties:	al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, national power	

The conflict concerning ideology and national power between several al-Qaeda-affiliated groups and the Yemeni government continued to represent a violent crisis. On January 27, the al-Qaeda branches of Yemen and Saudi Arabia announced to merge, forming the so-called al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) [->Saudi Arabia (AQAP)]. On January 18, security sources reported the killing of two suspected al-Qaeda members during a police raid in Sanaa, the capital of Yemen, including one Saudi citizen. On February 24, the government jailed four al-Qaeda members over a bomb plot in order to avenge the killing of prominent leader Hamza al-Qaiti in 2008. On March 15, four South Korean tourists and their Yemeni guide were killed in a suicide attack near the city of Shibam in Hadramawt district. Three days later, another suicide bomber near the airport of Sanaa, attempted to attack a convoy carrying the South Korean ambassador and other officials who wanted to examine the killing of the four fellow citizens. By mid-March, Yemen brought 16 militants, including four Syrian and one Saudi Arabian citizen, to trial for several terrorist attacks dating back until 2007. In late March and early April, up to 66 alleged AQAP members were arrested by security forces, mainly in southern Abyan province. On March 30, Yemen issued a list of 38 wanted AQAP-linked persons, bringing the number of militants sought by security forces in Yemen and neighboring Saudi Arabia to 154. On July 13, six al-Qaeda activists were sentenced to death and ten to long-term imprisonment for several assaults committed in previous years, including an assault on the US embassy in Sanaa last year. By mid-July, Yemeni intelligence reported high activity of al-Qaida and enforced security measures around the US embassy in Sanaa. On July 31, three soldiers and one alleged AQAP member were killed in a firefight in Marib province. On November 3, AQAP claimed responsibility for the killing of up to seven Yemeni security officials in an ambush near the Saudi border in the eastern province of Wadi Hadramawt. (hm)

### Yemen (SMM/South Yemen)

Intensity: <b>3</b>	Change: <b>NEW</b>	Start: 2009
Conflict parties:	SMM vs. government	
Conflict items:	secession	

A new conflict emerged between the separatist Southern Mobility Movement (SMM) and the government over secession of the former territories of the Peoples' Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen). The SMM developed from a revisionist Southern Yemeni elite group into a broader secessionist movement that aspired to

revive South Yemen as an independent state. While SMM demonstrations in 2008 only had a few hundred attendees in the former South Yemen capital of Aden, protests in 2009 often turned violent, with dozens of civilians and security forces killed. On April 27, the police arrested up to 25 demonstrators in the southern city of Mukalla, when one of several pro-secessionist rallies on the anniversary of the 1994 secessionist war turned violent. On May 3, three people were killed in clashes between security forces and anti-government protesters near Aden. On May 21, on the anniversary of the country's unity, the SMM mobilized thousands of demonstrators throughout the Southern Yemeni provinces. Three demonstrators were killed in clashes with security forces in Aden. In a speech the same day, President Ali Abdullah Saleh signaled the prospect of strengthening the provinces' competencies. On July 7, security forces detained around 250 anti-government demonstrators in Aden. On July 23, at least 16 people were killed and 24 injured in clashes between security forces and armed men at an opposition gathering in the southern city of Zinjibar, the capital of Abyan province. In an ambush in Abyan province, unknown gunmen killed four police officers on July 28. Three protesters and two police officers were killed when a pro-secessionist rally turned violent in the southern city of Ataq in Shabwa province on November 25. (hm)

### Yemen (al-Houthi rebels)

Intensity: <b>5</b>	Change: ↗	Start: 2004
Conflict parties:	al-Houthi rebels vs. government	
Conflict items:	system/ideology, regional predominance	

The conflict between the al-Houthi rebels and the government over system and regional predominance escalated to a war in August, when the army started "Operation Scorched Earth" in order to break up the al-Houthi insurgency. The Shiite al-Houthi rebels mainly operated in Saada province in northern Yemen. In early November, the conflict spilled over to Saudi Arabia [→ Saudi Arabia (al-Houthi rebels)]. While the al-Houthi rebels repeatedly accused Saudi Arabia of assisting Yemen in operations against them, Yemen accused Iran of supporting the al-Houthi rebels. In late January, the rebels released some 30 soldiers they had detained just the day before in a skirmish with security forces. On March 7, the government accused the insurgents of carrying out an attack on a military vehicle in Saada City, killing three soldiers. When the government accused the rebels of abducting nine foreigners in mid-June, the rebels denied the charges. On July 5, the government tried 190 al-

Houthi rebels for last year's fighting and sentenced ten to death. By the end of July, the conflict had escalated from occasional skirmishes to systematic violence, starting with heavy rebel attacks on military bases throughout Saada province on July 24, in which at least seven soldiers had been killed. Subsequently, on August 11, military launched the major "Operation Scorched Earth", shelling and bombing rebel strongholds across Saada province. Artillery, fighter jets, and main battle tanks were deployed in the offensive leading to the heaviest fighting since the start of the conflict in 2004. One day later, a state of emergency was imposed on the province. The following days, the fighting expanded further south to Amran province and heavy fighting was also reported from several other front lines. On the third day of "Scorched Earth", the government put forward ceasefire conditions, among them the withdrawal of the rebels from all regions of Saada. According to government information, at least 200 rebels, including several field commanders, were killed in a further push of the army into the Harf Sufyan district of Amran province beginning on August 23, whereas the rebels claimed to have repelled the offensive. On August 22, the beginning of holy month of Ramadan, President Ali Abdallah Saleh again offered a ceasefire, rejected by the rebels. The fighting spread to al-Jawf province in late August, as pro-government tribesmen clashed with the rebels. Saleh accused Iran of supporting the rebels, since the army claimed to have discovered stored Iranian military hardware after taking over parts of Harf Sufyan district. Again, on October 26, the government claimed to have captured an Iranian arms-laden ship off the coast of Midi in Hajjah province. On September 5, a ceasefire collapsed after just a few hours. Thereupon, government air strikes and bombardment killed 20 rebels. The rebels killed an army general at Harf Sufyan district on September 14. At least 250 insurgents were killed and some 280 injured when the army repelled two attacks on a government palace in Saada City in September and October. At least 87 civilians were killed on September 16 and 26, when the air force struck displaced persons camps in Harf Sufyan district. The International Committee of the Red Cross estimated a total number of people displaced internally since the beginning of the fighting in August of up to 55,000, adding to the 145,000 persons internally displaced since 2004. In October, the rebels claimed to have shot down at least two government fighter jets. On October 20, thirty-three rebels and up to 80 soldiers were killed when the insurgents captured an airfield near the city of Razez at the Saudi Arabian border. (hm)

# Methodology

## Conflict definition

We define conflicts as the clashing of interests (positional differences) over national values of some duration and magnitude between at least two parties (organized groups, states, groups of states, organizations) that are determined to pursue their interests and achieve their goals.

## Conflict items

- Territory
- Secession
- Decolonization
- Autonomy
- System/ideology
- National power
- Regional predominance
- International power
- Resources
- Others

## Conflict intensities

State of violence	Intensity group	Level of intensity	Name of intensity	Definition
Non-violent	Low	1	Latent conflict	A positional difference over definable values of national meaning is considered to be a latent conflict if demands are articulated by one of the parties and perceived by the other as such.
		2	Manifest conflict	A manifest conflict includes the use of measures that are located in the stage preliminary to violent force. This includes for example verbal pressure, threatening explicitly with violence, or the imposition of economic sanctions.
Violent	Medium	3	Crisis	A crisis is a tense situation in which at least one of the parties uses violent force in sporadic incidents.
	High	4	Severe crisis	A conflict is considered to be a severe crisis if violent force is used repeatedly in an organized way.
		5	War	A war is a violent conflict in which violent force is used with a certain continuity in an organized and systematic way. The conflict parties exercise extensive measures, depending on the situation. The extent of destruction is massive and of long duration.

## Guideline

**Regions:** The HIIK is aware of the ongoing academic debates that pertain to the construct-character of regions in scientific research. Thus, the five research regions employed by the HIIK are not to be construed as entities. They are merely functional constructions as they reflect empirically observable conflict dynamics and linkages between conflicts. In their dynamic aspect, the regions are not rigid in their composition and can change over time with shifting conflict dynamics.

**Intensities:** In this publication, the intensity of each conflict as shown in the tables is the highest intensity reached in the course of the year. Therefore, conflicts may, for instance, be classified as severe crises although there may have been no more fighting in the second half of the year.

**Comparability:** The present Conflict Barometer 2009 reflects our current state of research. Because conflict data even of previous years is continuously reviewed, this edition's data might differ from older editions. Therefore, if you wish to trace a conflict over time, please contact us in order to receive up-to-date time series evaluations.

**Disclaimer:** The HIIK assumes no liability for the accuracy of the data printed in this publication.

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## Database: CONIS

The CONIS database contains all the data the Conflict Barometer is based on. CONIS comprises information on all forms of inter- and intrastate political conflicts from 1945 until today. It aims with more than 12,000 conflict-year data on comprehending the dynamics of conflict and war. CONIS was developed on the basis of KOSIMO in the course of two research projects at the University of Heidelberg co-financed by the European Union and in collaboration with the HIIK. More information on CONIS, containing data on affected countries, conflict parties, conflict items, and annual intensities, can be accessed at [conis.uni-hd.de](http://conis.uni-hd.de)

# Imprint

The **Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIC)** at the Department of Political Science, University of Heidelberg is a registered non-profit association. It is dedicated to research, evaluation and documentation of intra- and interstate political conflicts. The HIIC evolved from the research project 'COSIMO' (Conflict Simulation Model) led by Prof. Dr. Frank R. Pfetsch (University of Heidelberg) and financed by the German Research Association (DFG) in 1991.

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