



CONFLICT BAROMETER | 2013

Heidelberg Institute for
International Conflict Research



disputes
non-violent crises
violent crises
limited wars
wars

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Heidelberg Institute for
International Conflict Research

CONFLICT BAROMETER | 2013

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PREFACE

With the Conflict Barometer 2013, the HIIK presents its 22nd annual overview of political conflicts worldwide. In this publication, we offer extensive information on actors, items, intensities, and the regional distribution of a total of 414 observed conflicts. In our Global Conflict Panorama, we give an overview of the developments in 2013, followed by sections for each of the five world regions. Prior to a selection of conflict descriptions, we provide maps, tables, and graphs on all ongoing conflicts in the particular region.

For the first time, we provide extended conflict maps for a selected number of wars, including intensities for all months and subnational units. Thereby, the maps allow for a better understanding of conflict dynamics. Please note: The maps provided in this edition of the Conflict Barometer feature a user-friendly resolution. For a high-resolution version, please visit our website www.hiik.de/en/downloads.

We would especially like to thank our 152 dedicated researchers who made it possible to once again maintain the quality of our data and conflict descriptions. Moreover, we would like to express our gratitude to numerous regional experts for their valued suggestions.

Our further gratitude goes to all those who participated in the Fundraising Campaign 2013, which will hopefully enable us to realize the creation of new interactive conflict maps on our website.

The present Conflict Barometer 2013 reflects our current state of research. Because conflict data even of previous years is continuously reviewed, this edition's data might differ from older editions. Therefore, if you wish to trace a conflict over time, please contact us in order to receive up-to-date time series evaluations.

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METHODOLOGY


METHODOLOGY

Since 1991, quantitative conflict research at the HIIK has analyzed political conflicts by focusing on conflict processes rather than e.g. purely quantitative thresholds of casualties of war. Thus, the HIIK is particularly concerned with the concrete actions and communications between conflict parties. Such a process-oriented approach gives the analysis of political conflicts, especially regarding intensities, a broader and more detailed empirical foundation.

Beginning in 2011, the HIIK in cooperation with the Conflict Information and Analysis System (CONIAS) Research Institute, established in 2005 and likewise located at Heidelberg University, has taken steps to further elaborate its methodological approach. In particular, the institute has revised its definition of political conflicts and restructured its conflict intensity assessment. The latter now not only takes into account the intensity for a given conflict area in a given year, but determines the intensity of the conflict processes for subnational political units and months as well. As such, it allows for a much more detailed measurement of conflict dynamics. Furthermore, the conflict actions and communications, on which the intensity assessment is based, are now evaluated by combining qualitative and quantitative indicators measuring the means and consequences of a conflict. This is intended to further enhance exactitude, reliability, and reproducibility of the conflict information provided.

THE CONCEPT OF POLITICAL CONFLICT

According to the revised definition, a political conflict is a positional difference, regarding values relevant to a society – the conflict items – between at least two decisive and directly involved actors, which is being carried out using observable and interrelated conflict measures that lie outside established regulatory procedures and threaten core state functions, the international order or hold out the prospect to do so.



CONFLICT ACTORS

A conflict actor can be either an individual, a state, an international organization or a non-state actor. Collective conflict actors are distinguished from one another through their internal cohesion and internally shared goals. An actor is regarded as decisive if his existence, actions, and communications considerably alter the practices of at least one other conflict actor pertaining to the conflict item.

CONFLICT MEASURES

Conflict measures are actions and communications carried out by a conflict actor in the context of a political conflict. They are

constitutive for an identifiable conflict if they lie outside established procedures of conflict regulations and – possibly in conjunction with other conflict measures – if they threaten the international order or a core function of the state. Established regulatory procedures are defined as those mechanisms of conflict management that are accepted by the conflict actors. Examples may include elections and court proceedings. The use of physical violence, however, is never considered to be an established regulatory procedure. Core state functions encompass providing security of a population, integrity of a territory and of a specific political, socioeconomic or cultural order. A state function or the international order is threatened if its fulfillment and persistence, respectively, becomes unlikely in a conflict actor's point of view.

CONFLICT ITEMS

Conflict items are material or immaterial goods pursued by conflict actors via conflict measures. Due to the character of conflict measures, conflict items attain relevance for the society as a whole – either for coexistence within a given state or between states. This aspect constitutes the genuinely political dimension of political conflicts. The catalog of conflict items in use up to the present Conflict Barometer covers ten different items.

System/Ideology is encoded if a conflict actor aspires a change of the ideological, religious, socioeconomic or judicial orientation of the political system or changing the regime type itself. National power means the power to govern a state. Whereas Autonomy refers to attaining or extending political self-rule of a population within a state or of a dependent territory without striving for independence, Secession refers to the aspired separation of a part of a territory of a state aiming to establish a new state or to merge with another state. Furthermore, Decolonization aims at the independence of a dependent territory. Subnational Predominance focuses on the attainment of the de-facto control by a government, a non-state organization or a population over a territory or a population. The item Resources is encoded if the possession of natural resources or raw materials, or the profits gained thereof, is pursued. Territory means a change of the course of an international border, while International Power as an item describes the change aspired in the power constellation in the international system or a regional system therein, especially by changing military capabilities or the political or economic influence of a state. The item Other is used as residual category.

THE CONCEPT OF CONFLICT INTENSITY

In addition to the three constituting elements – conflict actors, measures, and items – conflict intensity is an essential feature of political conflicts. Conflict intensity is an attribute of the sum of conflict measures in a specific political conflict in a geographical area and a given space of time. Since 2003, the HIIK has been using a five-level model of conflict intensity. Under its revised methodology, the intensity levels are now known as dispute, non-violent crisis, violent crisis, limited war and war.


METHODOLOGY

intensity level	terminology	level of violence	intensity class
1	dispute	non-violent conflicts	low intensity
2	non-violent crisis		
3	violent crisis	violent conflicts	medium intensity
4	limited war		high intensity
5	war		

The last three levels constitute the category of violent conflicts, in contrast to the non-violent conflicts (dispute and non-violent crisis). Whereas a dispute is a political conflict carried out completely without resorting to violence, in a non-violent crisis one of the actors is threatened with violence.

ASSESSING THE INTENSITIES OF VIOLENT CONFLICTS

When measuring the three levels of violent conflict, five proxies are used indicating the conflict means and consequences. The dimension of means encompasses the use of weapons and personnel, the dimension of consequences the number of casualties, destruction, and refugees/internally displaced persons.




For every region-month observed – for every calendar month in every first-level subnational political unit – each of these indicators is assessed and given a score.

		conflict means		
		0 points	1 point	2 points
conflict consequences	0 points	violent crisis	violent crisis	limited war
	1 point	violent crisis	limited war	war
	2 points	limited war	war	war

In order to determine the respective region-month intensity, the five values are aggregated. Combining qualitative and quantitative research strategies, the following concrete steps are taken when assessing the conflict intensities.

WEAPONS

First, the conflict observer evaluates the type of weapon and the manner in which it was used in a measure. A catalog of keywords helps to distinguish light from heavy weapons and to evaluate the severity of the weapon's employment.



PERSONNEL

Second, the observer identifies the conflict measure of an analyzed region-month in which the highest number of personnel was employed. He or she then distinguishes between low, medium, and high numbers of personnel, based on two thresholds: 50 and 400 persons.

low	medium	high
≤ 50	> 50 ≤ 400	> 400
0 points	1 point	2 points

CASUALTIES

Third, the observer evaluates the overall number of casualties in the conflict in a region-month. The thresholds employed here are 20 and 60 persons killed.

low	medium	high
≤ 20	> 20 ≤ 60	> 60
0 points	1 point	2 points

DESTRUCTION

Fourth, the degree of destruction resulting from the conflict during the whole month and within the subnational unit is determined in four dimensions considered essential for civil populations: infrastructure, accommodation, economy, and culture.

low	medium	high
within 0 dimensions	within 1 - 2 dimensions	within 3 - 4 dimensions
0 points	1 point	2 points

METHODOLOGY

REFUGEES & IDPs

Last, the conflict observer evaluates the overall number of cross-border refugees as well as internally displaced persons (IDPs) in a region-month. The thresholds employed here are 1,000 and 20,000 refugees.

low	medium	high
≤ 1 000	> 1 000 ≤ 20 000	> 20 000
0 points	1 point	2 points

The region-month intensities can be aggregated to inform about the conflict intensity in a given calendar year for a specific conflict area. A conflict area is the sum of all subnational units affected by the violent conflict in question. The area-year intensity is basically equal to the maximum region-month intensity in a given area-year. In addition, the exact area-year intensity is fine-tuned by looking at the annual and area-wide numbers of casualties and refugees as the two core indicators of conflict assessment. A violent crisis can thereby be upgraded to limited war level if there were more than 360 casualties or more than 18,000 refugees in the whole year in the conflict area. A limited war can be upgraded to war level if there were more than 1,080 fatalities or more than 360,000 refugees. In contrast, a limited war can be downgraded to a violent crisis if there were less than 120 casualties and less than 6,000 refugees. Likewise, a war can be downgraded to limited war level if there were less than 360 casualties and less than 120,000 refugees. The area-year intensity is both displayed above each conflict description in this publication as well as in the regional conflict overviews.

SPECIFIC VALUE OF THE HEIDELBERG APPROACH

The revised methodology of the HIIK and CONIAS enables a detailed analysis of conflict dynamics. In contrast to many other conflict methodologies, the Heidelberg approach rests on a broad empirical basis. The number of conflict-related deaths is not excluded from the analysis, but constitutes just one indicator among several others.



This aims at increasing the validity of the data obtained. It is also tried to facilitate researchers a better tool to investigate variances in the global conflict development and to obtain a broader, more differentiated picture. The specified set of indicators guides the institute's conflict observers through the entire research process, improving reliability and reproducibility of the data. The theoretical disaggregation of the concepts of political conflict and conflict intensity, the multitude of indicators included, as well as the differentiated evaluation on subnational and monthly levels, allow for a detailed observation, collection, and analysis of non-violent and violent political conflicts worldwide.

Nicolas Schwank, Christoph Trinn, Thomas Wencker, Lotta Mayer, Natalie Hoffmann, Stephan Giersdorf, Mark Gombert, Jens Hofmann, Gregor Pawlowski



If you are interested in an extended version of our methodology, please contact us via info@hiik.de.

GLOBAL CONFLICT PANORAMA

VIOLENT CONFLICTS IN 2013 (NATIONAL LEVEL)



VIOLENT CONFLICTS IN 2013 (SUBNATIONAL LEVEL)



HIGHLY VIOLENT CONFLICTS IN 2013

LIMITED WARS (25)

WARS (20)

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

DR Congo (FDLR)
 DR Congo (inter-militant violence)
 DR Congo (Ituri militias)
 DR Congo (Mayi-Mayi)
 Kenya (inter-ethnic violence)
 Nigeria (Eggon groups / Nasarawa State)
 Uganda (ADF-NALU)

Central African Republic (rebel groups)
 DR Congo (M23)
 Mali (Islamist groups)
 Nigeria (Boko Haram)
 Nigeria (farmers – pastoralists)
 Somalia (Islamist groups)
 South Sudan (inter-ethnic violence)
 South Sudan (SPLA defectors)
 Sudan (Darfur)
 Sudan (inter-ethnic violence)
 Sudan (SPLM/A-North / Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile)

THE MIDDLE EAST AND MAGHREB

Algeria (AQIM et al.)
 Egypt (Islamist groups / Sinai Peninsula)
 Libya (opposition groups)
 Tunisia (AQIM et al.)
 Turkey (PKK / Kurdish areas)
 Yemen (al-Houthi rebels – Sunni tribal forces)

Afghanistan (Taliban et al.)
 Egypt (opposition groups)
 Iraq (Sunni militant groups)
 Syria (NC, Islamist groups – KSC / Kurdish regions)
 Syria (opposition groups)
 Yemen (AQAP, Ansar al-Sharia)

ASIA AND OCEANIA

India (JeM et al. / Kashmir)
 Myanmar (KIA, KIO / Kachin State)
 Pakistan (inter-ethnic violence / Sindh)
 Pakistan (inter-Islamist violence)
 Pakistan (TTP et al. – religious groups)
 Philippines (BIFM, BIFF – MILF, government)

Pakistan (Islamist militant groups)
 Philippines (MNLF)

THE AMERICAS

Brazil (drug trafficking organizations)
 Colombia (FARC)
 Colombia (inter-cartel violence, neo-paramilitary groups)
 Colombia (neo-paramilitary groups, drug cartels)
 Mexico (inter-cartel violence, neo-paramilitary groups)


Mexico (drug cartels)

EUROPE

Russia (Islamist militant groups / Northern Caucasus)

GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT

The global number of political conflicts increased by nine, totaling 414 cases in 2013. Of these, 221 saw the use of violence and, for the second time since 2011, the number of wars amounted to twenty throughout the five world regions. Together with the recurrence of 25 limited wars, the year therefore witnessed a record total of 45 highly violent conflicts. An additional 176 conflicts constituted violent crises whereas the number of non-violent conflicts increased to 193, subdivided into 75 non-violent crises and 118 disputes. Fourteen of the abovementioned wars had already been classified as such in 2012, whereas two former limited wars and two violent crises escalated to the highest level of intensity throughout the year. In addition, the former non-violent secession crisis between the MNLF and the Philippine government turned violent when an MNLF offensive on the city of Zamboanga resulted in a full-scale war between approx. 300 militants and 4,500 soldiers using heavy weapons. Ultimately, a new conflict erupted in South Sudan and reached the level of war within days: A power struggle within the ruling SPLM party had sparked allegations of a coup d'état in December, allegedly attempted by former vice president Riek Machar Teny Dhurgon. In ensuing clashes, partially fought along ethnic lines, thousands were killed and approx. 200,000 displaced by the end of the year [→South Sudan (SPLA defectors)].



Ten additional conflicts reached the level of war in Sub-Saharan Africa, once again the region with the highest amount of limited and full-scale wars, counting eighteen cases altogether. Five of them were fought in Sudan and South Sudan alone: Inter-ethnic tensions in both countries persisted on war level, as did the conflict between rebel groups and the government in Sudan's Darfur region and the autonomy conflict in the regions Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan. The 2012 war between the two countries over the oil-rich border regions de-escalated to a violent crisis after negotiations on the border lineation between the formerly warring parties.

In the neighboring DR Congo, the war involving the rebel group M23 continued. The UN Force Intervention Brigade, a UN peacekeeping force equipped with an offensive mandate, supported the latter. After taking heavy losses, M23 retreated to Rwanda and Uganda where more than 1,400 of its fighters laid down their weapons. Subsequently, remnants of the group and the government signed two separate declarations announcing the transformation of M23 into a political party, the demobilization of M23 fighters, and a conditional

amnesty for those not suspected of war crimes and crimes against humanity.

In its war against several Islamist groups in Mali, a request for assistance by the Traoré government led to the deployment of 3,000 French troops and the African-led AFISMA mission in January. After heavy bombing campaigns, the joint Malian and external forces retook control over large swathes of land seized by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and other militants in 2012, pushing them back to remote regions in the north. The war over national power in Somalia, including Islamist groups such as al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam, continued on this level for the eighth consecutive year.

Two wars in Nigeria continued as well. The ideology conflict between the Islamist group Boko Haram and the government claimed the lives of more than 1,500 people. In addition, clashes between farmers and pastoralists over arable land in the central regions once again resulted in hundreds of casualties.

Finally, the former limited war between rebel groups and the government in the Central African Republic (CAR) escalated in March to a war over national power when the mainly Muslim Séléka forces toppled the government of François Bozizé. Subsequent fighting between Séléka and Anti-Balaka militias erupted along religious lines.

In the Middle East and Maghreb, a total of six wars were observed. Among these were the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, which had already been classified as such in 2012. In addition, the former violent crises in the Kurdish regions of Syria as well as the opposition conflict in Egypt turned to wars, the latter accompanied by a coup d'état in which the Egyptian military toppled then-President Muhammad Mursi in July. The Syrian civil war, with approx. 125,000 deaths since its start in 2011, was by far the conflict with most casualties and accounted for far more than six million displaced.

Asia and Oceania, apart from the abovementioned war over secession in the Philippines, saw the long-time war between Islamist groups and the government in Pakistan continue. Last year's wars in Myanmar's Kachin State and in India's Assam state de-escalated to a limited war and a violent crisis, respectively.

In the Americas, conflicts persisted between criminal organizations and the governments throughout the region, as did fighting between the groups. The highly violent confrontations over drugs and subnational predominance in Mexico continued with more than 10,000 killed throughout the year. The government's war against various drug cartels was accompanied by the emergence of hundreds of armed vigilante groups in the Pacific states of Michoacán and Guerrero, fighting both the government and local cartels. Conflicts over drugs as well as trafficking routes and points of sale also continued or emerged violently in other countries, with Colombia now counting three limited wars after inter-cartel fighting escalated significantly. The latter thereby accounted for the most intense of the five newly-erupted conflicts in the region. In addition, social protests in Brazil and police riots in Argentina constituted new violent crises, as did a conflict between the Colombian government and protesting farmers in the Catatumbo region.

In Europe, three new violent crises and one dispute erupted, i.e. violent opposition conflicts emerged in both Bulgaria and the Ukraine. In Greece, right-wing militants in connection with the Golden Dawn party engaged in a violent conflict

GLOBAL CONFLICT PANORAMA

with left-wing militants while the party itself disputed with the government over its legal status. The region once again witnessed no full-scale war, yet the continuing limited war in the Caucasus accounted for more than 500 killed. Moreover, attacks took place outside the Caucasus, e.g. two suicide bombings in Volgograd in December.

The overall number of limited wars remained constant with 25 cases. Thirteen of these had already been fought as limited wars in 2012, whereas nine violent crises escalated by one intensity level. In addition, two former wars de-escalated, while a new conflict that reached the second-highest level of intensity erupted in Colombia. The 2012 wars in the Kurdish areas of Turkey as well as in Myanmar's Kachin State de-escalated to limited wars following negotiations between the respective autonomy-seeking movements and the governments. Another three former wars de-escalated to violent crises, i.e. these last year's ethnic tensions in India's Assam state, the autonomy conflict between the Tuareg group MNLA and the Malian government, as well as the interstate war between Sudan and South Sudan, as mentioned above.

Regarding interstate conflicts, a total of eleven were conducted violently. As the former war between Sudan and South Sudan de-escalated to a violent crisis, the world witnessed no highly violent interstate conflict in 2013. However, in numerous conflicts between states, tensions increased concerning certain territories, resources, or regional power struggles. Syria and Israel, permanently engaged in a violent border crisis over the Golan Heights, each dealt with another violent crisis with their respective neighbors [→Syria – Turkey; Israel – Lebanon]. Pakistan too was involved once again in two interstate conflicts. In the conflict over the Kashmir region, Pakistani and Indian border guards exchanged mortar and gunfire on more than 80 occasions near the Line of Control. On Pakistan's western border, sporadic clashes continued with Afghan troops as well. Another interstate conflict, the former non-violent crisis in the South China Sea between Vietnam, China, and other littoral states, turned violent as well.


The Syrian government's alleged use of poisonous gas against civilians near the capital Damascus in August led to the US and other states announcing "military options" against Syria if a use of sarin gas by the government was confirmed. Following UN Security Council's Resolution 2118, Syria agreed to have its stock of chemical weapons destroyed under international supervision. In the conflict concerning the Iranian nuclear program, the conflict parties reached an interim agreement. This was harshly criticized by Israel whose non-violent crisis with Iran also continued.

The border conflict between Guatemala and Belize constituted the sole violent border crisis in the Americas, as the longstanding conflict over US-Mexican border security de-escalated to a non-violent level. Yet, interstate tensions in South and Central America partly increased, e.g. in the conflict over the sea border between Nicaragua and Colombia. Despite the 2012 ICJ ruling on the border lineation, Colombia's parliament sent a request to the defense ministry concerning the possibility of war against Nicaragua and its supposed ally Russia.

In addition, a new conflict between Honduras and El Salvador was classified as a non-violent crisis as El Salvador rejected alleged militaristic threats by its neighbor. Honduran military officials had put the country's superior air force on alert after tensions over disputed Isla Conejo in the Gulf of Fonseca emerged, sparking Salvadoran allegations of a planned attack.

In Asia and Oceania, numerous interstate conflicts were marked by the threat of force, e.g. the conflict between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). The latter also threatened to attack Japan and its ally USA, unilaterally declaring a "state of war" in late March. Tensions in the East China Sea over territory and resources of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, claimed respectively by the Republic of China (ROC), the People's Republic of China (PRC), and Japan continued. Following PRC's inclusion of the disputed islands in its newly proclaimed air defense identification zone (ADIZ) on November 23, the US reaffirmed the coverage of the islands in its Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty with Japan.

In order to better analyze a long-term trend, the HIIK's five intensity levels are categorized into three groups: The two non-violent levels are summarized as low intensity conflicts, while limited wars together with wars are termed conflicts of high intensity. Violent crises are labeled medium intensity conflicts.





As the graph shows, the number of conflicts observed rose more or less continuously from 83 in 1945 to 414 in 2013. However, this increase must partly be considered as a statistical artifact, as the scope and quality of available information on current conflicts augmented considerably in recent decades. Most of the observed conflicts were conflicts of low intensity. With regard to high intensity conflicts, their number increased almost constantly until 1992, when an all-time high was reached with 51 high-intensity conflicts shortly after the decline of the Soviet Union and the breakup of Yugoslavia. Afterwards, its number dropped sharply, but then rose again until it reached 45 in 2003. In the following ten years, the number of highly violent conflicts has ranged between 31 and 44, reaching another high with 45 cases in 2013. (peh)

ANALYSIS INTRASTATE - INTERSTATE

The number of intrastate conflicts increased to 337, while the number of interstate conflicts further decreased to 77. As in previous years, internal conflicts thus constituted about 80 percent of the global conflict count. There were no interstate wars fought this year, after the 2012 war between Sudan and South Sudan had de-escalated to a violent crisis. This remained the only violent interstate conflict in the region of Sub-Saharan Africa. Ten more interstate conflicts were conducted with violent means.

[→ China – Vietnam et al. (South China Sea, Spratly and Paracel Islands)]. Pakistan and India continued their violent conflict over the embattled Kashmir region, with Indian and Pakistani forces clashing along the contested Line of Control. Pakistan was additionally involved in a violent border conflict with Afghanistan [→ Afghanistan – Pakistan]. Spillover effects from the Syrian civil war accounted for several violent incidents with its neighbors Turkey and Israel [→ Syria (opposition groups)].



In Europe, the violent crisis between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh region continued, while the conflict between the Caspian Sea littoral states sharply increased from a dispute to a violent crisis due to violence between Russia and Kazakhstan [→ Armenia – Azerbaijan; Russia – Kazakhstan et al. (Caspian Sea)].

Despite several violent incidents in the territorial conflict between Guatemala and Belize, both states increased efforts to hold a referendum on the matter [→Guatemala – Belize (territory)].


In Asia and Oceania, the conflict over control of the South China Sea turned violent as well. On one occasion in May, the Philippine Coast Guard shot dead a Taiwanese fisherman

The main focus of the crisis between Israel and Syria remained the contested Golan Heights, with several fire exchanges between militants on Syrian territory and Israeli Defense Forces [→ Syria – Israel]. Cross-border tensions between Turkey and Syria, including the downing of a Syrian helicopter by Turkey, were accompanied by the Turkish government's stark criticism regarding Syria's alleged use of chemical weapons. Said allegations set Turkish military forces on high alert along the mutual border. Moreover, heavy domestic fighting between Islamist groups and Kurds in northern Syria, close to the border, caused the death of several Turkish civilians [→ Syria (NC, Islamist groups – KSC / Kurdish regions)]. (ema)

REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Similar to previous years, Asia and Oceania had the highest number of conflicts among the five regions with 129 cases, accounting for almost one third of all conflicts. Sub-Saharan Africa brought forth 97, followed by the Middle East and Maghreb with 71, Europe with 63, and the Americas with 54. In terms of highly violent conflicts, Sub-Saharan Africa ranked highest with eighteen, followed by the Middle East and Maghreb with twelve cases observed. In these two regions the number of wars rose by one each to eleven and six, respectively. Two wars were counted in Asia and Oceania and one in the Americas. In Asia and Oceania, the sum of highly violent conflicts decreased from ten to eight, while it increased from four to six in the Americas and remained stable in Europe with one limited war in the Caucasus. The highest number of violent crises was again observed in Asia and Oceania with 56 cases, followed by Sub-Saharan Africa with 41, and the Middle East and Maghreb with 33. The Americas brought forth 30 and Europe saw fifteen violent crises. With 47 cases, the latter accounted for one quarter of the total number of non-violent conflicts, ranking second

behind Asia and Oceania where 65 low-intensity conflicts were listed. Altogether, a global average of 2.12 conflicts per state could be observed, with the average number of highly



violent conflicts marking 0.23. Relating the regions' number of conflicts to their numbers of states, it becomes clear that the Middle East and Maghreb region was, as in previous years, the most conflict-ridden, as its states had average values of 3.9 conflicts and of 0.7 highly violent clashes in 2013. Asia and Oceania ranked second in the overall average with 2.9 conflicts, and third regarding highly violent conflicts (0.2) since Sub-Saharan Africa counted 0.4 high intensity conflicts

per country, with an overall average of about two conflicts per state. The Americas featured about 1.5 conflicts per state and brought forth an average of 0.17 highly violent conflicts. The data for Europe, once again ranked fifth, showed an average of around 1.3 conflicts per state and with respect to its sole limited war in the Caucasus a distant 0.02 highly violent conflicts per country. (jri)

DYNAMICS WITHIN INDIVIDUAL CONFLICTS

Out of a total of 414 conflicts, a change within 119 of them was registered. 34 conflicts escalated by one level, ten by two, and only one conflict by three levels. The number of wars rose from nineteen to twenty. Although the number of limited wars recorded in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia and Oceania decreased, an increase was registered in the Americas as well as in the Middle East and Maghreb. The total number of 25 limited wars persisted. Europe as well as the Americas saw a slight increase in violent crises. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the total number sunk from 43 to 41, in Asia and Oceania it remained the same (56), whereas in the Middle East and Maghreb the number of violent crises decreased from 38 to 33. In Europe as well as in the Americas it rose by three.

Fifteen new conflicts erupted over the year. For instance, in South Sudan, defected SPLA troops challenged the rest of the ruling party for subnational predominance and the political orientation of the system which resulted in a war in December [→ South Sudan (SPLA defectors)]. A limited war over subnational predominance and resources erupted in Colombia between several neo-paramilitary groups and drug trafficking organizations [→ Colombia (inter-cartel violence, neo-paramilitary groups)]. In the northern Norte de Santander department, an additional conflict between farmers and farmer associations in the Catatumbo region emerged, turning violent after several days [→ Colombia (ASCAMCAT / Catatumbo)]. In Brazil, another violent crisis erupted when social protesters demanded changes to the country's political system [→ Brazil (social protests)]. In both Greece and Bulgaria, violent crises erupted. The one in Greece emerged between left-wing and right-wing militants. In Bulgaria, a broad opposition movement and the government conflicted over national power and the government's economic policy [→ Greece (left-wing – right-wing militants); Bulgaria (opposition movement)]. Another opposition conflict emerged in the Ukraine in November, with mass protests against the government of Viktor Yanukovich turning violent at the end of the year [→ Ukraine (opposition)]. In addition, the opposition conflict in Armenia escalated by two levels to a violent crisis.

Several conflicts escalated from a violent crisis to a war. For example, in the Middle East and Maghreb, the 2012 violent crisis over subnational predominance and resources in Syria between the oppositional National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (NC) and Islamist groups on the one hand, and the Kurdish Supreme Committee (KSC) on the other, became a full-scale war [→ Syria (NC, Islamist groups – KSC / Kurdish regions)]. In addition, the violent crisis between the Egyptian opposition and the government over national power and the orientation of the political system reached the highest level of intensity [→

Egypt (opposition groups)]. The former manifest conflict in the Philippines between the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the government over the orientation of the political system, resources, as well as the secession of the islands of Mindanao, Palawan, and Sulu escalated to a war after years without the use of violence [→ Philippines (MNLF)]. Violence between various Islamist groups in Pakistan escalated to a limited war.

In Sub-Saharan Africa, several former disputes turned violent, e.g. the opposition conflict in Chad, the conflict involving the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in South Sudan, and the tensions between the ethnic groups Guerze and Konianke in Kenya. The same dynamics applied for the former dispute between the umbrella organization Popular Assembly of the Peoples of Oaxaca (APPO) and the National Coordination of Education Workers (CNTE), on the one hand, and the Mexican government, on the other [→ Mexico (APPO, CNTE)]. In the Middle East and Maghreb, the conflict between Israel and Lebanon as well as the one between Israel and the Hezbollah turned violent.

Change of intensity	Number
Escalation by four levels	0
Escalation by three levels	1
Escalation by two levels	10
Escalation by one level	34
No change	281
Deescalation by one level	59
Deescalation by two levels	15
Deescalation by three levels	0
Deescalation by four levels	0


Over the year, a total number of 59 conflicts de-escalated by one level and a further fifteen by two. For instance, the 2012 war over subnational predominance in India's Assam state between indigenous Bodos and Bengalis, Muslims, and other groups de-escalated significantly to the level of a violent crisis [→ India (Bodos, Assamese – Biharis, Bengalis)]. The former war over autonomy between the Tuareg group National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and the Malian government de-escalated to a violent crisis, as did the 2012 war between Sudan and South Sudan following several negotiations [→ Mali (MNLA / Azawad); Sudan – South Sudan].

The conflict in Nepal between the Nepalese People Liberation Army (NPLA) and the government ceased to be a violent one, turning from a violent crisis to a dispute [→ Nepal (former PLA members)]. (jrt)

CONFLICT ITEMS

The Heidelberg Methodology of Conflict Research differentiates between ten conflict items, defined as material or non-material goods which are claimed by the direct conflict actors through constituent conflict measures. Two of these represent exclusively interstate items (Territory, International Power) while five are solely subjects of internal conflicts (National Power, Secession, Autonomy, Subnational Predominance, and Decolonization). The remaining items, System/Ideology, Resources, as well as the residual item Other may be part of both intra- and interstate conflicts. Moreover, a conflict may feature several items or change its item(s) over time. Frequent combinations of conflict items in 2013 were System/Ideology and National Power, Subnational Predominance and Resources, as well as Territory and Resources.

In 2013, System/Ideology was the sole or one of several items in 148 of a total of 414 conflicts, thereby being once again the most prevalent conflict item. Actors in these conflicts aimed at changing or preserving the political or economic system or were concerned with ideological differences, e.g. striving for a theocracy. Of the twenty wars observed in 2013, eleven featured this item, distributed among the Middle East and Maghreb (5), Sub-Saharan Africa (4), and Asia and Oceania (2). Altogether, System/Ideology formed part of 95 of the 221 violent conflicts observed.



National Power ranked second with 94 cases, displaying very heterogeneous regional distributions concerning violence. In total, 61 of the 94 conflicts over this item were conducted violently, including nine wars. While violence was used by conflict actors in about half of the National Power conflicts in Asia and Oceania (10 out of 23), Europe as well as Sub-Saharan Africa marked around two thirds (6/9 and 22/32, respectively) and the Middle East and Maghreb about three quarters (17/23). The latter included the wars in Afghanistan, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. In the Americas, six of the seven conflicts concerning National Power constituted violent crises.

Conflicts concerning Resources, i.e. natural resources, raw materials, or the profit generated thereof, amounted to 90 cases. Of those, 59 displayed violence and nine conflicts reached the intensity level of war. Six of these wars took place in Sub-Saharan Africa and one war each in the Americas, the Middle East and Maghreb, and Asia. In the Americas,

approx. 80 percent of the 26 conflicts pertaining to resources such as coca, illicit drugs, and arable land included violent means, with drugs being part of highly violent conflicts in Mexico, Colombia, and Brazil. In total, almost half of the conflicts observed in this region had resources as at least one of their items. In 30 percent of all conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa, e.g. arable land, cattle, minerals, and oil were contested. In nineteen of the region's 31 conflicts related to resources, the conflict parties resorted to violence (61.3 percent). Almost similar results were found for Asia with 63.6 percent and the Middle East and Maghreb with 57.1 percent. The latter region thereby accounted for four violent conflicts of its seven conflicts regarding this item. In Europe, four conflicts concerned resources (i.e. 6.3 percent), with only one involving violence.

Subnational Predominance, defined as the de facto control of a government, a non-governmental organization, or a population over an area or a population, accounted for 85 cases. It was part of two conflicts in Europe (i.e. 3.2 percent), eleven conflicts in the Middle East and Maghreb (15.5 percent), thirteen conflicts in the Americas (24.1 percent), and 29 in Sub-Saharan Africa as well as Asia and Oceania (29.6 and 22.6 percent, respectively). In total, six of the eight wars over Subnational Predominance were observed in Sub-Saharan Africa while only one was observed in the Americas and the Middle East and Maghreb.

A total of 101 conflicts concerned Autonomy and Secession, with the latter accounting for 48 cases. While only one conflict in the Americas dealt with Secession, it appeared more frequently throughout Asia (19 cases), Europe (13), Sub-Saharan Africa (10), and the Middle East and Maghreb (5). Of the 28 violent conflicts over Secession worldwide, clashes between the MNLF and the Philippine government escalated to the sole war regarding this item in 2013. Conflicts regarding Autonomy, i.e. the achievement or extension of political autonomy of a group in a state or of a dependent region without claiming independence, amounted to a total of 53 cases. Eighteen Autonomy conflicts took place in Asia, thirteen in Europe, nine in Africa, eight in the Middle East and Maghreb, and five in the Americas. Of the 53 Autonomy conflicts, 21 included the use of violence, with three cases in Sub-Saharan Africa, four cases in the Americas, five in the Middle East and Maghreb, and nine in Asia and Oceania. In contrast, none of the thirteen conflicts in Europe concerning this item were conducted violently.

The items least prone to violence were Territory and International Power. Conflicts over Territory, defined as the intended change of an interstate border, accounted for a total of 52. Thirteen of these disputed territories were located in Asia, eleven in Sub-Saharan Africa, ten each in Europe and the Americas, as well as eight in the Middle East and Maghreb. International Power struggles, i.e. conflicts over changes in the power structure of the international system or in one of its regional systems, totaled 30. A threat of force was observed in fifteen of these power struggles this year, whereas in five cases states resorted to violent means against one another. Conflicts over Territory included the threat to use violence in twelve cases and the explicit use of violence in eleven cases. No highly violent conflict, however, was fought over these items, as states did not engage in highly violent interstate conflicts at all. (peh)

COUPS D'ÉTAT

Throughout the year, only one successful coup d'état was observed. Only two years after the last coup in Egypt, the army, led by army chief General Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi, ousted President Muhammad Mursi on July 3. Adly Mahmud Mansour, President of the Supreme Constitutional Court, took over power as interim president of the Arab Republic of Egypt [→ Egypt (opposition groups)].

Furthermore, in several other countries, governments claimed to have witnessed coup attempts. However, the actors' objectives remained unclear. In Eritrea, defected soldiers allegedly staged a coup attempt on January 21. A group of around 100 defected soldiers tried a non-violent coup in the Eritrean Ministry of Information. They forced Asmelash Abreha, the head of the state-run television service, to begin reading a communiqué. After an interruption of 12 hours, the state channel resumed its normal program. Afterwards, the Eritrean government speaker denied that any coup attempt had taken place.

In the Comoros, a group of mercenaries, allegedly including Congolese and Chadian soldiers, allegedly planned the ousting of President Ikililou Dhoinine in late April. The group of

approx. fifteen plotters reportedly included the son of former president Ahmed Abdallah. The latter had been killed in the 1989 coup.

In Chad, according to the government, a coup d'état was prevented by security forces on May 1 [→Chad (opposition)]. During the firefight in an eastern suburb of the capital N'Djamena, between three and eight people died and fifteen were injured. In the aftermath, 21 politicians and military officers, among them members of parliament and two generals, were arrested.

On December 16, South Sudanese President Salva Kiir accused his former second-in-command Riek Machar of having staged a coup d'état by initiating an attack on the army headquarters in Juba [→South Sudan (SPLA defectors)]. Clashes between forces loyal to Kiir and supporters of Machar caused the death of approx. 1,000 people and displaced over 200,000 within the last two weeks of the year.

Several further states reported occurrences of coup attempts, including Libya, Yemen, and the DR Congo. However, the involvement of the military or other elites from the state apparatus was not confirmed in these cases. (sel)

MEASURES OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

NEGOTIATIONS AND TREATIES

Throughout the year, the highest number of negotiations and treaties was observed in Asia and Oceania. Due to increased tensions in the violent crisis over territory, resources, and international power in the South China Sea, Vietnam and the People's Republic of China (PRC) agreed to establish a hotline to resolve fishing incidents. [→China – Vietnam et al. (South China Sea, Spratly and Paracel Islands)]. Vietnam and PRC agreed in October to set up a working group to jointly explore the contested waters in the South China Sea. In the non-violent crisis between Japan, the Republic of China (ROC) and the PRC concerning the maritime border near the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, ROC and Japan concluded a fishery agreement, allowing ROC to fish in the Japanese EEZ. PRC and ROC signed a Service Trade Agreement concerning the secession dispute on June 21 [→China (Taiwan)]. The Taiwanese oppositional Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and civil society organizations protested against the agreement in ROC's capital Taipei.

In the non-violent crisis over territory, international power, and ideology between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the Republic of Korea (ROK), on August 14, both sides reached a five-point agreement to reopen the Kaesong Industrial Complex, which had been closed by DPRK on April 3. On August 23, they agreed on a long-debated family reunion of up to 100 people, cancelled by the DPRK one month later. On September 6, both sides re-established their military hotline. On October 23, tensions in the non-violent crisis between China and India eased when Chinese Premier Li Keqiang and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh signed on a Border Defense Cooperation Agreement [→China – India]. Beside the agreement, aimed at improving communication on border patrols, they signed a Memorandum of Understanding on hydrological information sharing. A new violent conflict over the political system erupted between the Pakistani government and anti-corruption protesters in the run-up to the May 11 general elections [→Pakistan (anti-corruption protesters)]. After the January 15 order of the Supreme Court to detain incumbent Prime Minister Raja Pervez Ashraf for corruption had remained unexecuted, Ashraf signed a declaration brokered between supporters of Tahir-ul-Qadri and the government two days later. The agreement provided for electoral reforms and the installation of an interim caretaker government at least one month before the upcoming general elections in order to scrutinize all candidates. The same day, protests started to dissolve. In February, peace talks between the Thai government and Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), one of various Islamist separatist groups, started in the Malayan capital of Kuala Lumpur [→Thailand (Islamist separatists / southern border provinces)]. The violent autonomy conflict in Nepal's Terai region between various Madheshi political parties, and militant groups and their various factions, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, saw increasing diplomatic efforts of the government over the year [→Nepal (Madheshis / Terai)]. A faction of the militant group Janatantrik Tarai Mukti Morcha, JTMM-S, held peace talks with the government and handed over weapons to the police in March and April. Similarly in May, another faction, JTMM-P, agreed to hand over weapons and to pursue their goals in a non-violent way. In Cambodia and Bangladesh, the respective governments held talks with unions concerning minimum wage increases over violent clashes.

Regarding the Middle East and Maghreb, several successful negotiations led to major changes in the respective conflicts.

After the election of new Iranian President Hassan Rouhani on June 14, intensified diplomatic efforts led to an improvement in the relations between Iran on the one side and the USA and EU on the other [→Iran – USA, EU (nuclear program)]. On September 27, US President Barack Obama and Rouhani spoke on the phone, the first presidential contact between the two countries since the end of official diplomatic relations in 1979. Talks between the P5+1/EU3+3 and Iran were held in Geneva in October and November. An attempted deal failed on November 9 due to France's opposition to a draft presented by the other P5+1/EU3+3 members. On November 24, an interim agreement was reached, limiting Iran's nuclear activities in return for an easing of sanctions. Talks continued on December 19. For the first time in three years, a new round of US-brokered peace talks between the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) and Israel began in Washington on July 29 [→Israel (PNA / Palestinian Territories)]. Negotiations focused on mutual acknowledgement of the states' sovereignty and the disputed status of Jerusalem as well as Israeli settlements in the West Bank. As agreed in the negotiations, Israel released a total of 78 prisoners between August and December. After the country continued to expand its settlements in the West Bank, although halting construction had been a precondition of the PNA to return to the negotiation table, PNA withdrew from the talks on November 13. Yemen witnessed the establishment of a National Dialogue Conference (NDC) on March 18, backed by UN Special Adviser on Yemen Jamal Benomar, aimed at mediating concerning issues such as governance, economic problems, secessionist movements in the south, and other armed internal conflicts [→Yemen (opposition groups); Yemen (SMM / South Yemen); Yemen (al-Houthi rebels)]. On December 23, NDC representatives signed an agreement which paved the way for a new constitution and a federal state. However, the document was rejected by some groups. The former war between the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and the Turkish government over autonomy de-escalated to a limited war following the re-initiation of the peace process. After imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan had declared a ceasefire on March 21, PKK fighters started to withdraw into Iraq on May 8. Still, clashes continued throughout the whole year. On September 9, the group halted its withdrawal. In Tunisia, the National Salvation Front (NSF) and the government agreed on October 5 on the implementation of a technocratic government within three weeks [→Tunisia (opposition groups)]. The consensus was mediated by the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT).

In Sub-Saharan Africa, Sudan's President Omar Hassan al-Bashir and his South Sudanese counterpart Salva Kiir Mayarditt met in late April to discuss the common border, economic relations, and security issues. In late October, despite an agreement to delay, South Sudan unilaterally held a referendum concerning the status of the contested Abyei region, with the large majority of Abyei residents opting for the areas to become part of South Sudan. In Mali, the autonomy conflict between the Tuareg group National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNL) and the government in the northern regions de-escalated after international mediators, including UN, AU, and EU delegates, elaborated a peace deal, signed on June 18 in Burkina Faso [→Mali (MNL / Azawad)]. Both parties agreed on an immediate ceasefire and a return of government forces to MNL's stronghold Kidal in order to secure the elections in July. Despite the ceasefire, MNL clashed with a military patrol on September 12 near Lere,

Timbuktu.

On July 5, the ethnic groups Degodia and Garre signed a peace agreement in Kenya, facilitated by community leaders, temporarily ending a wave of violence which had erupted in May and June in the North-Eastern Province and had killed more than 70 people [→ Kenya (inter-ethnic violence)]. The violence started one month after the Degodia group had lost their long-held parliamentary seat in the March 4 general elections.

In the Americas, peace negotiations between FARC and the Colombian government in Havana, Cuba, yielded two important results, considered by both parties as major breakthroughs to end the 60-year conflict: They agreed on a land reform and on details concerning the political future of the rebel group, including its integration into parliament [→ Colombia (FARC)]. The talks, however, were accompanied by constant clashes between both actors, as well as resentments regarding the newly erupted conflict in Catatumbo in which FARC offered weapons to protesting farmers. The second-largest rebel group in Colombia, the National Liberation Army (ELN), was excluded from the Havana peace talks despite various attempts to join these. FARC and ELN settled their

differences with a peace treaty on July 1. They declared to unite into a single revolutionary guerrilla movement [→ Colombia (FARC – ELN)]. The dispute between Argentina and Iran over the 1994 bombing of the Jewish community center AMIA in Buenos Aires was resolved through the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding on January 27, which included the establishment of a Truth Committee to investigate the bombing [→ Argentina – Iran (AMIA)]. On November 20, after a meeting in Geneva, both parties announced that courts would resolve the case.

In Europe, the EU facilitated talks between the Kosovar and Serbian governments aiming at the normalization of their relations [→ Serbia (Kosovo)]. They reached a reconciliation agreement on April 19: Serbia accepted the Kosovar government's authority over police and juridical as well as political institutions in Kosovo in exchange for significant autonomy for the areas populated by ethnic Serbs. Furthermore, the parties pledged not to obstruct each other's EU membership aspirations. Nevertheless, on December 30, Serbian President Tomislav Nikolic stated that he would never sign an inter-state agreement with Kosovo. (jli)

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Across the five world regions, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) administered fifteen peacekeeping missions and one special political mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). The missions encompassed a total of at least 16,800 civilian and 97,900 uniformed personnel.

UN peacekeeping missions' fatalities decreased slightly from 112 in 2012 to 104. As in previous years, Sub-Saharan Africa was the region with the most DPKO-administered UN missions, with seven missions (see table below). Five peacekeeping missions were stationed in the Middle East and Maghreb, among them the only political mission UNAMA in Afghanistan. Although the highest number of conflicts was observed in Asia and Oceania, only one UN mission was stationed in that region, as many as in the Americas. Two UN missions were maintained in Europe. The Council of the European Union, under its Common Defense and Security Policy (CDSP), managed seventeen missions. Among them were two military operations along with two military training missions and thirteen civilian missions. The military missions encompassed the European Union Force - Operation Althea (EUFOR Althea) in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the European Naval Force Somalia - Operation Atalanta (EUNAVFOR) as well as the European Training Mission Somalia (EUTM Somalia) and the European Training Mission in Mali (EUTM Mali). Civilian missions were located in Afghanistan, the DR Congo, Georgia, Iraq, Kosovo, Libya, Moldova, Niger, in the Palestinian Territories, South Sudan, and Ukraine.

In Europe, throughout the year, three meetings of the Arctic Council, involved in solving the conflicts over the Arctic and Hans Island, took place. One of which, held on May 15, marked the end of Sweden's chairmanship and the beginning of Canada's [→ Denmark – Canada (Hans Island); Russia – Norway et al. (Arctic)]. In the course of the municipal elections in Kosovo, the European Union Election Observation Mission (EU-EOM) was mainly involved by monitoring [→ Serbia (Kosovo)]. A group of twenty long-term observers were deployed throughout Kosovo on October 12 to observe the electoral process. The observers came from all EU member states as well as Norway and Switzerland.

The EU, furthermore, played a central mediation role in the signing of a Reconciliation Treaty between Kosovo and Serbia in April. The deal between Serbia and its breakaway province was signed in Brussels on April 18 under the mediation of EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton.

The UN administered two missions, one in Kosovo and the other in Cyprus. The first, UNMIK, authorized in 1999, intended to promote security, with a total of 14 uniformed and 116 international civilian personnel. The latter, UNFICYP, established in 1964, aimed at monitoring the ceasefire between Greece and Turkey, encompassing 936 uniformed and 38 international civilian personnel.

The OSCE maintained in total ten missions and field operations in South-Eastern Europe, Eastern Europe, South Caucasus, and Central Asia. Among these were six missions in the Balkans, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, Kosovo, Skopje (FYROM) as well as the presence in Albania. In the mission to Moldova, 5+2 negotiations on the Transdniestrian settlement and the resumption of a direct dialog between the Moldovan government and the breakaway region of Transdniestria were the main results of the work carried out by the Ukrainian OSCE Chairmanship in 2013 [→ Moldova (Transdniestria)]. The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) sent an Election Observation Mission (EOM) to monitor the presidential election in Georgia on October 27 [→ Georgia (opposition)].

In Sub-Saharan Africa, a military mission, managed by the Council of the EU, started in 2013. Namely, the EUTM Mali, an EU multinational military training mission aimed at training and advising the military of Mali, was launched on February 18 by the EU Foreign Affairs Council [→ Mali (Islamist groups)]. The mission included instructors and soldiers from France, the Czech Republic, and Spain.

In December 2012, the UN Security Council agreed on the establishment of the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA), aimed at supporting the government in its fight against Islamist groups [→ Mali (Islamist groups)]. This year, in accordance with the UN Security Council Res-

olution 2100, AFISMA transferred control to the MINUSMA. As of December, 6,439 military personnel were deployed and a further 6,000 were to be deployed in 2014. Under the MINUSMA mission, six uniformed personnel were killed. Member states of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) met several times to tackle the crisis in the Central African Republic following the ousting of François Bozizé in March by the Séléka Forces [→ Central African Republic (rebel groups)]. In Somalia, the mandate of the African Union Mission (AMISOM) was extended until October 2014 and its troops increased from 17,731 to 22,126. AMISOM, administered by the African Union (AU) and approved by the UN, was established in 2007 to support the Somali government.

In the DR Congo, the UN authorized an Intervention Brigade as an extension of MONUSCO's mandate, meaning the UN allowed a peacekeeping mission to use military force in the form of offensive operations. Within two months after the deployment of the brigade, the rebel group M23 was pushed out of their stronghold Rutshuru, North Kivu and at least 1,400 of its fighters surrendered to Ugandan and Rwandan authorities [→ DR Congo (M23)]. The mandate was extended for another year with a total of 21,198 uniformed personnel, thereby being the UN's largest peacekeeping mission.

In Darfur, UNAMID with a total of 19,442 uniformed personnel, allowed to use force, began in 2007 intended to support the government. On July 13, seven Tanzanian peacekeepers were killed and seventeen more wounded in an ambush near Khor Abeche, South Darfur [→ Sudan (Darfur)].

In South Sudan, Resolution 2132, passed on December 24, increased UNMISS' force levels, established in 2011 to support the government, from 7,684 uniformed personnel deployed to a maximum of 12,500. YauYau Rebels ambushed a UN convoy in Jonglei state on April 9, killing five UNMISS personnel and seven civilian UN employees [→ South Sudan (various militias)].

In the Americas, the Organization of American States (OAS), the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), and the EU were involved in monitoring Paraguay's general elections in April [→ Paraguay (impeachment)]. The EU sent a total of 74 observers as part of the EU-EOM on behalf of the Paraguayan government and its Superior Court of Electoral Justice. The Electoral Observation and Accompaniment Mission OAS encompassed 68 international observers. The EU and OAS criticized alleged purchases of votes and the treatment of indigenous people, while welcoming the peaceful elections. Presidential elections in Honduras were accompanied by various observer missions, e.g. an EU-EOM. In its final statement, the EU-EOM said that the November elections had been free and fair with only minor irregularities, whereas one of its members reported that countless inconsistencies had taken place [→ Honduras (opposition)]. In neighboring El Salvador, the OAS sent an observatory mission to report on the truce between the country's main criminal gangs, Mara Salvatrucha and Barrio 18, and the government [→ El Salvador (Maras)]. As in previous years, MINUSTAH, established in 2004 after the removal of then-President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and with a total of 8,600 uniformed personnel, was the only UN mission in the Americas. Many Haitians called for the withdrawal of MINUSTAH, especially after the cholera outbreak in 2010 [→ Haiti (opposition groups)].

In Asia and Oceania, UNMOGIP continued monitoring the ceasefire between India and Pakistan in the disputed Kashmir region. The ceasefire was allegedly violated twice in

January [→ Pakistan – India]. UNMOGIP started investigating the first incident where Indian soldiers had reportedly killed Pakistani soldiers near the Line of Control (LoC) dividing Kashmir. India accused Pakistani soldiers of crossing the LoC and killing two Indian soldiers, later beheading one, two days after the first incident. On January 22, India called for an end of UNMOGIP, naming austerity and the fulfillment of its mandate as reasons.

The World Bank was involved in the conflict between Uzbekistan, on the one hand, and Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, on the other, revolving around the Rogun Dam and the Kambarata-1 hydropower plant (HPP) projects [→ Uzbekistan – Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan]. Assessment studies were conducted on behalf of Tajikistan aimed at evaluating the risks and benefits of the Rogun Dam HPP. These assessments were conducted with support by the World Bank.

The UNHCR continued its resettlement program of Bhutanese refugees, one of UNHCR's largest, in Nepalese camps to third countries [→ Nepal – Bhutan]. The EU-EOM described Pakistan's general elections in May as much freer and fairer than previous ones, but also highlighted serious irregularities. 52 long-term and 46 short-term observers monitored the elections [→ Pakistan (opposition)].

In the Middle East and Maghreb, the Council of the EU administered a new civilian mission, the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) in Libya. It aimed at supporting the Libyan authorities in improving and developing security of the country's borders. The annual budget of the mission was estimated to be around EUR 30 million with approx. 100 international staff members. On December 31, the Rule of Law EUJUST LEX Iraq mission that had supported and trained judges, prison officials, and other justice-sector workers, was completed.

Concerning Syria, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2118 stating the immediate and provable destruction of Syria's chemical weapons, following the use of sarin gas near Damascus in August. Syria became a member of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), an intergovernmental organization promoting the compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

The MINURSO, authorized in 1991 and prolonged until April 2014, encompassed a total of 227 uniformed personnel. MINURSO's mission was to monitor the ceasefire between Morocco and POLISARIO [→ Morocco (POLISARIO / Western Sahara)]. Following the UN Special Report on Torture that condemned the treatment of protesters in detention camps, human rights organizations criticized that MINURSO's mandate had not been extended to monitoring human rights violations.

In Afghanistan, the EU, NATO, and the UN maintained their respective missions. The EU police mission (EUPOL) was extended to the end of 2014, aimed at helping Afghanistan to build and train its own police forces. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), authorized by the UN in 2001 and led by NATO since 2003, began its gradual withdrawal. UNAMA, established in 2002 and closely connected to ISAF, consisted of 2,096 civilian personnel. Its mandate was renewed for another year in order to support the Afghan government, especially with regard to the upcoming 2014 provincial council and presidential elections. NATO deployed six Patriot missile batteries, provided by Germany, the Netherlands, and the USA, in southern Turkey as requested by the Turkish government in 2012 [→ Syria– Turkey]. The stationing was defensive and intended to strengthen Turkey's defensive capabilities. (swa, iti)

Overview: Current UN Missions led or supported by DPKO

Mission Acronym	Name of Mission	Start	Country
Europe			
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus	1964	Cyprus
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo	1999	Serbia
Sub-Saharan Africa			
UNOCI	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire	2004	Cote d'Ivoire
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo	1999	DR Congo
UNIOGBIS	United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau	2009	Guinea-Bissau
UNMIL	United Mission in Liberia	2003	Liberia
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali	2013	Mali
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan	2011	South Sudan
UNAMID	African Union / United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur	2007	Sudan
UNISFA	United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei	2011	Sudan
The Americas			
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti	2004	Haiti
Asia and Oceania			
UNMOGIP	United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan	1949	India, Pakistan
The Middle East and Maghreb			
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan	2013	Afghanistan
UNIFIL	United Nation Interim Force in Lebanon	1978	Lebanon
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization	1948	Middle East
MINURSO	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara	1991	Morocco


AUTHORITATIVE DECISIONS BY THE ICJ

At the end of the year, ten cases remained pending at the ICJ. The Court was especially active with regard to cases concerning territory in the Americas. It delivered two judgments in 2013 and removed one case from its list. A new suit was filed by Nicaragua against Colombia over the alleged violation of Nicaraguan maritime territory defined by the ICJ in a ruling from 11/19/12 [→ Nicaragua – Colombia (sea border)]. Colombia declared in September that it would not accept the 2012 ICJ ruling on the border between Nicaragua and Colombia, stating that changing the border would violate Colombia's constitution. Furthermore, Colombia increased the number of military personnel in the disputed area. In the case involving Nicaragua and Costa Rica, the ICJ on April 17 joined two separate proceedings for practical reasons, both involving activity by either Nicaragua or Costa Rica in or around the San Juan River [→ Nicaragua – Costa Rica (Río San Juan)]. On July 16, the ICJ rejected requests by Nicaragua and Costa Rica to adjust provisional measures provided in the 03/08/11 order and reaffirmed the order's validity. However, on November 22, the ICJ ordered that Nicaragua must remove its personnel from the disputed area and refill canals it had

dug in the disputed territory. In the same case on December 13, the ICJ rejected the outlining of provisional measures requested by Nicaragua concerning Costa Rica's construction of a road next to the river, which allegedly damaged Nicaraguan environment. In the case Bolivia v. Chile, the ICJ on June 18 set time limits for both countries to issue pleadings in the dispute over access to the Pacific Ocean [→ Bolivia – Chile (access to sea)]. In the conflict between Peru and Chile, the ICJ said it would render its final judgment on the maritime border on January 27, 2014 [→ Peru – Chile (border)]. In a new conflict that erupted between Honduras and El Salvador over the possession of the islet Isla Conejo in the Gulf of Fonseca, Honduran President Porfirio Lobo said he was not interested in discussing the conflict at the ICJ [→ Honduras – El Salvador (Isla Conejo)]. Regarding Asia, in its final judgment concerning the clarification of the 1962 ruling on the sovereignty over the temple Preah Vihear, the ICJ decided on November 11 that the territory where the temple is located belonged to Cambodia [→ Thailand – Cambodia (border)]. (las)

EUROPE

CONFLICTS IN EUROPE



REGIONAL PANORAMA

With a total of 63, the number of conflicts observed in Europe increased by five compared to 2012. Violent opposition conflicts erupted in Bulgaria and Ukraine, originating from protests against the respective governments. In the latter, a conflict concerning national power and the orientation of the political system between pro-EU-protesters and the government of President Yanukovich led to mass demonstrations and clashes in December. Two further conflicts erupted in Greece: In the first, left-wing and right-wing militants violently clashed over the orientation of the political system. In the second, non-violent tensions between the oppositional right-wing party Golden Dawn and the government resulted in the government classifying the party as a criminal organization.

As a result of a methodological revision by the HIIK, the conflict in Serbia concerning the political status of the Kosovo was subdivided into a dispute over secession between the Serbian and the Kosovar government, on the one hand, and the violent conflict between the Serbian minority and the Kosovar government, on the other [-Serbia (Kosovo); Serbia (Serbian minority - Kosovar government)].



With 75 percent of its conflict being classified as non-violent, Europe was once again the region with the highest share of non-violent conflict. However, the number of violent conflicts increased by three to sixteen in 2013. In total, approx. one third of violent conflicts in Europe were fought in EU member states.

The conflict with the highest intensity in Europe remained the limited war over secession and system/ideology between Islamist militants and the Russian government in the Northern Caucasus Federal District (NCFD), encompassing the republics of Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia, and North Ossetia-Alania, as well as the region Stavropol Krai [-> Russia (Islamist militants / Northern Caucasus)]. This conflict claimed approx. 540 deaths. Violence also affected other parts of Russia when two suicide bombers attacked the train station and a bus in the city of Volgograd in December. Security officials linked the bombings to the upcoming Winter Olympic Games in the Russian city of Sochi in February 2014.

Four conflicts concerning secession were carried out violently. Compared to the previous year, one escalated in Moldova over Transdnistria, whereas the secession conflict in France de-escalated to a non-violent level [-France (FLNC / Corsica)]. In the United Kingdom, Scottish First Minister Alex Salmond announced a referendum over the sovereignty question to be held in September 2014. Thus, the conflict between the British central government and Nationalists in Northern Ireland remained the sole violent secession conflict in Western Europe.

The number of conflicts concerned with system/ideology rose from ten to fifteen, thereby representing the most common item in Europe. This was closely followed by secession and autonomy, accounting for thirteen cases each. Two conflicts concerning subnational predominance remained on the lowest level of intensity-[-Bosnia and Herzegovina (Wahhabi militants); Russia (Ingush minority / North Ossetia-Alania)].

Two violent interstate conflicts were observed in 2013, one between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, and another between Russia, Kazakhstan, and other Caspian Sea littoral states concerning international power as well as territory and resources. (mmu, iti, lw, kwu)



Overview: Conflicts in Europe in 2013

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
Armenia (opposition)	opposition vs. government	national power	2003	↑	3
Armenia – Azerbaijan	Armenia vs. Azerbaijan	territory	1987	•	3
Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh)*	Nagorno-Karabakh vs. government	secession	1988	•	3
Azerbaijan (opposition groups)*	opposition groups vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2003	•	3
Azerbaijan – Iran*	Azerbaijan vs. Iran	international power	2011	•	2
Belarus (opposition groups)	opposition groups vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1994	•	2
Belarus – Poland*	Belarus vs. Poland	international power	1994	•	1
Belgium (N-VA / Flanders)*	N-VA vs. government, Walloon parties	autonomy	2007	•	1
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnian Serbs / Republic of Srpska)	Republic of Srpska vs. Bosniak-Croat Federation, government	secession	1995	•	1
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Croat parties / Herzegovina)*	Croat parties vs. Bosniak parties, Bosniak-Croat Federation, government	autonomy	1992	•	1
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Wahhabi militants)*	Wahhabi militants vs. government	system/ideology, subnational predominance	2007	•	1
Bulgaria (opposition movement)	opposition movement vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2013	NEW	3
Croatia (Croatian Serbs / Krajina, West and East Slavonia)*	Croatian Serbs vs. government	autonomy	1991	•	1
Cyprus (TRNC / Northern Cyprus)*	TRNC vs. government	secession	1963	•	2
Cyprus – Turkey	Cyprus vs. Turkey	territory, international power, resources	2005	•	2
Denmark – Canada (Hans Island)*	Denmark vs. Canada	territory	1973	•	1
Estonia (Russian-speaking minority)*	Russian-speaking minority vs. government	autonomy	1991	•	1
France (FLNC / Corsica)	FLNC vs. government	secession	1975	↘	2
FYROM (Albanian minority)*	Albanian minority vs. ethnic Macedonians	other	1991	•	3
Georgia (Abkhazia)*	Abkhazian separatists vs. government	secession	1989	↘	2
Georgia (Armenian minority)*	Armenian minority vs. government	autonomy	2004	•	1
Georgia (Azeri minority)*	Azeri minority vs. government	autonomy	2004	•	1
Georgia (opposition groups)	UNM vs. GD, various opposition groups	system/ideology, national power	2007	•	3
Georgia (South Ossetia)	South Ossetian separatists vs. government	secession	1989	•	2
Greece (left-wing – right-wing militants)	left-wing militants vs. right-wing militants (Golden Dawn)	system/ideology	2013	NEW	3
Greece (right-wing militants)	Golden Dawn, right-wing militants vs. government	system/ideology	2013	NEW	1
Greece (social protests)	left-wing militants, social groups vs. government	system/ideology	1973	•	3
Greece – FYROM (official name of FYROM)*	Greece vs. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	other	1991	•	1
Hungary – Romania (minority)*	Hungary vs. Romania	international power	1990	•	1
Hungary – Slovakia (minority)*	Hungary vs. Slovakia	international power	1993	•	1
Italy (Lega Nord / northern Italy)*	Lega Nord vs. government	autonomy	1991	•	1
Italy (Red Brigades)*	Red Brigades vs. government	system/ideology	1970	•	2
Latvia (Russian-speaking minority)*	Russian-speaking minority vs. government	autonomy	1991	•	1
Moldova (AEI – PCRM)*	PCRM vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2009	•	1
Moldova (Transdniestria)	Transdniestrian separatists vs. government	secession	1989	↗	3

EUROPE

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
Romania (Hungarian minority / Transylvania)*	Hungarian minority vs. government	autonomy	1989	•	1
Romania (opposition movement)*	opposition movement vs. government	national power, other	2012	•	3
Russia (Ingush minority / North Ossetia-Alania)*	Ingush minority vs. government, Ossetians	subnational predominance	1992	•	1
Russia (Islamist militant groups / Northern Caucasus)	CF vs. government	secession, system/ideology	1989	•	4
Russia (opposition groups)	opposition groups vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2001	↘	2
Russia – Estonia*	Russia vs. Estonia	territory, international power	1994	•	1
Russia – Georgia*	Russia vs. Georgia	international power	1992	•	1
Russia – Kazakhstan et al. (Caspian Sea)	Kazakhstan vs. Russia vs. Azerbaijan vs. Turkmenistan vs. Iran	territory, international power, resources	1993	↑	3
Russia – Latvia*	Russia vs. Latvia	international power	1994	•	1
Russia – Norway et al. (Arctic)*	Russia vs. Norway vs. Denmark vs. Canada vs. United States	territory, resources	2001	•	1
Russia – Ukraine	Russia vs. Ukraine	territory, international power, resources	2003	↗	2
Serbia (Albanian minority / Presevo Valley)*	Albanian minority vs. government	autonomy	2000	•	2
Serbia (Bosniak minority / Sandzak)*	Bosniak minority vs. government	autonomy	1991	•	1
Serbia (Kosovo)	Kosovar government vs. government	secession	1989	•	1
Serbia (Serbian minority – Kosovar government)	Serbian minority vs. Kosovar government	system/ideology, other	2012	•	3
Serbia (Vojvodina)	regional parties vs. government	autonomy	1989	•	1
Serbia (Wahhabi militants / Sandzak)*	Wahhabi militants vs. government	system/ideology	2007	•	1
Slovakia (Hungarian minority / southern Slovakia)*	Hungarian minority vs. government	autonomy	1993	•	1
Slovenia – Croatia (border)*	Slovenia vs. Croatia	territory	1991	•	1
Spain (Catalan nationalists / Catalonia)*	CiU, ERC, Catalan government vs. government	secession	1979	•	1
Spain (ETA, PNV / Basque Provinces)	ETA, PNV vs. government	secession	1959	↘	1
Spain – United Kingdom (Gibraltar)	Spain vs. United Kingdom	territory	1954	↗	2
Turkey – Armenia*	Turkey vs. Armenia	international power, other	1991	•	1
Turkey – Greece (border)	Turkey vs. Greece	territory	1973	•	2
Ukraine (opposition)	Pro-EU-demonstrators, various social groups, oppositional parties (Fatherland party, Svoboda, UDAR et al.) vs. government	system/ideology, national power, other	2013	NEW	3
United Kingdom (Nationalists / Northern Ireland)	RAAD, RIRA, Sinn Féin, The IRA vs. Alliance Party, DUP, government, SDLP, UDA, UUP, UVF	secession	1968	•	3
United Kingdom (SNP / Scotland)	SNP, Scottish regional government vs. government	secession	2007	•	1
USA – Russia (missile system)*	United States vs. Russia	international power	2007	↘	1

¹ Conflicts marked with * are without description

² Mentioned are only those conflict parties relevant for the period under review

³ Change in intensity compared to the previous year: ↑ or ↗ escalation by one or more than one level of intensity; ↓ or ↘ deescalation by one or more than one level of intensity; • no change

⁴ Levels of intensity: 5 = war; 4 = limited war; 3 = violent crisis; 2 = non-violent crisis; 1 = dispute

Please note: The intensity of each conflict as shown in the tables is the highest intensity reached in the course of the year. Therefore, conflicts may, for instance, be classified as limited wars although there may have been no more fighting in the second half of the year.

If a conflict revolves around a territory whose name is disputed by the conflict parties, both variations will be named, separated by an "/" [e.g. Japan – China (Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands); Argentina – UK (Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas)]. If, in contrast, the conflict actors strive for subnational predominance, secession, or autonomy of or in a certain region, the region is separated from the actors by " / " [e.g. France (FLNC / Corsica); Myanmar (KIA, KIO / Kachin State)].

SELECTED CONFLICT DESCRIPTIONS

ARMENIA (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↑** | Start: **2003**

Conflict parties: opposition vs. government

Conflict items: national power

The conflict over national power between the opposition and the government escalated to a violent crisis. Throughout the year, several rallies with thousands of protesters took place. Demonstrations were mostly led by supporters of Raffi Hovannisian, leader of the oppositional Heritage Party and candidate for the February 18 presidential elections. In the elections, incumbent President Serge Sarkisian of the Republican Party (HHK) won approx. 59 percent of the votes, while Hovannisian gained 37 percent. In response, Hovannisian claimed the elections to be manipulated and declared himself winner. The OSCE stated the elections had remained peaceful and respected the fundamental freedoms of assembly and expression, however reprehending a lack of competition. In the days following the election, thousands of pro-Hovannisian protesters gathered in the capital Yerevan. Protests continued throughout the following weeks and spread to several other cities. For instance, on February 22, some 8,000 protesters rallied in Yerevan to protest against the election outcome. On March 10, Hovannisian went on a three-week-long hunger strike, calling on supporters to hold a rally during Sarkisian's inauguration ceremony. Four days later, Armenia's Constitutional Court rejected claims by unsuccessful presidential candidates, stating there had been no violations. On April 9, after Sarkisian's inauguration, police stopped a rally with about 3,000 demonstrators marching to the presidential residence. Reportedly, some protesters were detained at the rally. Following an announcement on July 20 of increases in public transportation fares, young activists held protests throughout Yerevan against the decision. It was described as the first act of mass civil disobedience in independent Armenian history. On 25 July the new fares had to be cancelled.

After Sarkisian announced in the beginning of September that Armenia planned to join to the Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia, demonstrations took place, such as in Yerevan on September 5 with some of the demonstrators being detained. On November 5, several dozen protesters armed with stones, sticks, and fire crackers clashed with police in the capital. Protesters were led by opposition activist Shan't Arutyunian and planned to march on the presidential palace to demand Sarkisian's renunciation. In ensuing clashes, several police officers were injured, while at least twenty protesters were detained.^{mma}

ARMENIA – AZERBAIJAN

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **1987**

Conflict parties: Armenia vs. Azerbaijan

Conflict items: territory

The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh remained violent. Regular mutual

violations of the 1994 ceasefire agreement near the Line of Contact (LoC) as well as casualties due to landmines in the disputed area were reported, causing the death of several civilians and army personnel. For example, two Azeri citizens were killed by landmines in April in separate incidents near Khanliglar in the border district of Qazakh. On March 10, an Armenian sniper killed an Azerbaijan soldier near the border. Ten days later, Azeri soldiers killed an Armenian army officer. On October 22, an Armenian military convoy was attacked from Azerbaijan's territory on the Berd-ljevan motorway in Armenia's Tavush region, resulting in the death of one Armenian soldier and the injury of three others. Another Azeri soldier was killed by gunfire on October 26. Due to ceasefire violations, the OSCE cancelled monitoring of the LoC on October 17.

A meeting scheduled for June 12 between Armenian President Serge Sarkisian and his Azeri counterpart Ilham Aliyev to discuss the conflict was cancelled. On June 18, the presidents of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair Countries released the Joint Statement on the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict drafted by US President Barack Obama, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and French President Francois Hollande, urging both conflict parties to find a peaceful solution.

On November 19, Aliyev and Sarkisian met in Vienna for talks on the issue. Due to mediation efforts of the OSCE Minsk Group, the Azeri and Armenian Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Elmar Mammadyarov and Eduard Nalbandyan met in Kiev on December 5. While the meeting yielded no tangible results on the issue, they agreed to meet again in early 2014 under the supervision of the Minsk Group Co-Chairs^{mt}

BELARUS (OPPOSITION GROUPS)

Intensity: **2** | Change: **•** | Start: **1994**

Conflict parties: opposition groups vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The conflict over system and national power between opposition groups and the government continued on a non-violent level. Throughout the year, opposition activists staged protests against the government while the latter detained several opposition activists and journalists. The human rights activist group Center Viasna deemed these arrests politically motivated and repressive.

On January 11 and 12 as well as on February 2, police raided gay clubs in Minsk and in Vitebsk. In February, the Ministry of Justice denied accreditation to homosexual rights organization Gaybelarus for the third time. On March 24, the National Day of Freedom, opposition groups held a rally in the capital Minsk with approx. 2,000 participating. Police arrested ten participants.

On April 26, another two activists and four journalists were detained at a demonstration in Minsk commemorating the 1986 Chernobyl disaster with some 800 participants. On October 19, BCD opposition politician Pavel Sevyarynets was released from prison. On October 29, police arrested 22 in Minsk during a ceremony for the victims of the Stalin era.

On the occasion of the Remembrance of Ancestors Day on November 3, around 400 people protested in Minsk and one was detained. On November 10, an opposition protester

was jailed for five days for wearing a T-shirt criticizing President Alexander Lukashenko. On December 5, opposition activist Vasil Parfyankow, participant of the 2010 post-election protests, was sentenced to one year in prison.

On September 18, the Belarusian Christian Democracy party (BCD) announced to not accept next year's local council elections' outcome, stating that the elections orchestrated by the government are not free and fair. In mid-October, the Ministry of Information cancelled the license of independent publishing house Lohvinau, which had been publishing in the Belarusian language.

On August 2, the UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in Belarus Miklos Haraszti urged the government to release opposition activist Ales Byalyatski.

The US extended their sanctions against the government on June 13 for one year, as did the EU on October 29. The same day, the EU lifted their sanctions against thirteen Belarusian citizens and five Belarusian companies and added three leaders of penal camps to the black list for having used violence and intimidation against political prisonersjkr

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (BOSNIAN SERBS / REPUBLIC OF SRPSKA)

Intensity: **1** | Change: • | Start: **1995**

Conflict parties: Republic of Srpska vs. Bosniak-Croat Federation, government

Conflict items: secession

The dispute concerning secession between the Republic of Srpska (RS) and the central government of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) continued. Since the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995, BiH consisted of the two entities RS and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBH).

On May 26, RS's President Milorad Dodik hindered the government from joining NATO by not giving his consent, stating that he did not believe in a unitary BiH. On June 6, nearly 3,000 people blockaded the parliament in Sarajevo in reaction to Serb lawmakers' demand of new personal ID numbers that would make discernible the holder's origin by entity. The protesters demanded a new law on personal ID numbers after the old one had lapsed in February. As a result, infants born in February and after were unable to obtain passports or health insurance.

On June 14, thousands protested in front of the parliament building in reaction to the death of an infant who had died after failing to get timely surgery, allegedly because the ID issue had prevented her from getting a passport.

On October 25, the Interior Ministry of RS announced that it would increase police presence along the border between the two entities, which was contradictory to the constitution. On the 18th anniversary of the Dayton Peace Agreement on November 24, the cabinet of Dodik published two proposals for the peaceful future of BiH. The second option involved a separation of the country into three territorial units: one for Serbs, one for Croats, and one for Bosniaks.

On December 14, BiH's participation in the European student exchange program ERASMUS was dropped after the Ministry of Education and Culture of RS refused to give their consent. The program required the creation of a coordination office at the national level, which RS described as an attempt to transfer powers from the entities to BiH. Consequently, students protested in five major cities on December 21iti

BULGARIA (OPPOSITION MOVEMENT)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **NEW** | Start: **2013**

Conflict parties: opposition movement vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

A violent crisis over national power and the government's economic policy erupted between a broad opposition movement and the government. Protesters particularly demanded a decrease in electricity prices after they had risen by nearly 14 percent in 2012. Subsequent demonstrations took place in all major cities throughout the year. Protesters blamed the three foreign-controlled power distributors CEZ and Energo-Pro from the Czech Republic as well as Austria's EVN for the increase. Demands for electricity prices to be lowered were followed by claims for re-nationalization of the private distribution companies and the government's resignation. Citizens of Plovdiv, Varna, Burgas, and the capital Sofia demonstrated against Prime Minister Boiko Borisov and publicly burned their electricity bills on January 28. On February 10, more than 100,000 citizens in all major cities protested against the government's economic policy. Protesters damaged six vehicles and injured two police officers in Sofia. Eleven protesters were arrested. On February 18, between 1,500 and 2,000 protesters hurled stones at public buildings including the parliament in Sofia, demanding the resignation of Borisov's cabinet. During a clash between protesters and the police, eleven people including five policemen were injured. During the course of the demonstration, a man set himself ablaze in front of the parliament. In total, six people set themselves ablaze in February and March, four of whom died.

Following the demonstrations, first Finance Minister Simeon Dyankov resigned on February 18, followed by Borisov and his entire government two days later. In elections on May 12, Borisov's party Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB) won a narrow lead over the oppositional Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP). However, GERB failed to form a governing coalition. Consequently, a coalition led by BSP elected Plamen Oresharski as new prime minister. Following the appointment of media entrepreneur Deylan Peevski as head of the National Security Agency (DANS), thousands protested in Sofia between June 14 and 19. As a reaction to the protests, Parliament voted for his dismissal on June 19.

In ongoing protests, demonstrators blocked the parliament with trashcans, park benches, stones, and street signs on July 23, leaving more than 100 members of parliament and government ministers trapped inside. During clashes with police, at least eight protesters and one police officer were injured. On October 8, after the Constitutional Court had allowed Peevski to remain a member of parliament, thousands again staged demonstrations. In clashes, police arrested six protesters. On October 23, several hundred students occupied a lecture hall in Sofia's St Kliment Ohridsky University during a lecture of a member of the Constitutional Court, sparking a new wave of nationwide protests. On November 5, at least one person was injured as police tried to push back students who had formed a human chain encircling the parliament building, demanding the resignation of the BSP government.cge

CYPRUS – TURKEY

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **2005**

Conflict parties: Cyprus vs. Turkey
 Conflict items: territory, international power, re-sources

The conflict over international power, territory, and resources between Cyprus and Turkey continued on a non-violent level. On February 22, three days ahead of Cyprus' presidential elections, Turkey's European Union Affairs Minister Ege-man Bagis insulted incumbent Cypriot president Demetris Christofias and expressed his hope for a new Cypriot leadership.

On April 25, Turkish Parliament Speaker Cemil Cicek emphasized Turkey's support for the demands of the Turkish community in Northern Cyprus regardless of the consequences for their EU membership admission [→Cyprus (TRNC / Northern Cyprus)].

In mid-July and mid-August, Yiannakis Omirou, President of the House of Representatives of Cyprus, accused Turkey of pursuing an expansionist policy in the region and called on the international community and the EU to exert pressure on Ankara in order to stop what he deemed gunboat diplomacy. Following Turkey's cancellation of the military exercise Taurus, Cyprus also called off its annual military exercise Niki foros on November 6. On November 10, Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan denied the existence of a state called Cyprus, which prompted Cyprus' Government Spokesman Christos Stylianides two days later to express his rejection of the statements.

Throughout the year, the countries engaged each other in conflicts over oil and gas drilling in disputed waters off Cyprus. Turkey continued to refuse recognizing the territorial delineation of Cyprus' Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Cypriot officials repeatedly underlined that Cyprus exercised its sovereign rights in accordance with international law and urged Turkey to stop provocations that destabilized regional security. However, Turkey argued that Cyprus' natural resources belonged to both communities on the divided island. Consequently, on May 18, Turkey's Minister of Energy and Natural Resources, Taner Yildiz, announced to sanction companies operating in the EEZ, two months after Turkey had ceased cooperation with the Italian oil company Eni over its partnership with Cyprus. On July 4, Cyprus' House of Representatives approved legislative amendments allowing Cyprus to designate security zones around facilities in the EEZ.

On July 24, Turkish navy vessels intercepted an Italian-flagged research vessel within the EEZ. Responding to Turkish threats, on October 18, Cyprus' Defense Minister Fotis Fotiou announced the purchase of two military vessels by the end of the year in order to supervise the EEZ. Three Turkish ships conducted seismic surveys in the EEZ between November 22 and December 18, a move that Cyprus denounced to the UN and the EU on December 9.fmb

FRANCE (FLNC / CORSICA)

Intensity: **2** | Change: ↘ | Start: **1975**

Conflict parties: FLNC vs. government
 Conflict items: secession

The secession conflict between the Corsican National Liberation Front (FLNC) and the central government decreased to a non-violent level. After three waves of violence in 2012, including bomb attacks on holiday homes and supermarkets, no violence was observed for the first time since 1998. Nonetheless, in a letter on June 4, a FLNC faction called FLNC 22/10 announced the resumption of the armed struggle for independence. Two FLNC suspects, Nicolas Battini, and Stéphane Tomasini, were arrested on May 31.

Despite threats by nationalist groups on June 30, the Tour de France starting in Porto Vecchio on the southeast coast of Corsica was not targeted. The secessionist group Corsica Libera had announced that it would block the start of the Tour if two activists, arrested earlier for spraying FLNC logos near the designated route, were not to be released.

On November 25, police arrested seventeen suspects in connection with attacks on secondary homes in 2012 and the attempted bombing of a local government building in Corte on 04/01/12.ado

GEORGIA (OPPOSITION GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2007**

Conflict parties: UNM vs. GD, various opposition groups
 Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The system and power conflict between the United National Movement (UNM) on the one hand, and the Georgian Dream (GD) as well as various oppositional groups on the other, remained on the level of a violent crisis. The conflict parties, represented by UNM's Mikheil Saakashvili, holding the office of the president and GD's Bidzina Ivanishvili, being Prime Minister, had built a cohabitation government after the October 2012 parliamentary elections.

Early in February, tensions between UNM and GD rose over GD-initiated constitutional amendments depriving the president of his right to appoint a new government without Parliament's approval. On February 6, the UNM parliamentary faction stated to endorse the amendments only simultaneously with two others obliging the government to pursue a pro-Western foreign policy and raising the number of votes required for constitutional amendments from two-thirds to four-fifths. In turn, GD's parliamentary faction postponed the president's annual state of the nation address in parliament, scheduled for February 8, until a decision on the amendments was made. On February 8, some 300 protesters scuffled with UNM-members outside the national library in the capital Tbilisi where Saakashvili had decided to deliver his address. Saakashvili blamed Ivanishvili for staging the violence. On February 14, UN and NATO officials urged the factions to talk. On March 4, Saakashvili and Ivanishvili met for talks but yielded no tangible results. However, on March 7, Parliament adopted a joint resolution affirming a pro-Western foreign policy. On March 25, Parliament passed the GD-proposed

constitutional amendments.

In the run-up to the presidential elections, the Central Election Commission registered 23 presidential candidates, among them GD's Education Minister Georgi Margvelashvili and Nino Burjanadze (Democratic Movement – United Georgia). Margvelashvili had been appointed presidential candidate by Ivanishvili, while Davit Bakradze had been elected UNM presidential candidate in primary elections. On July 20, during a primary election held near Zugdidi, Samegrelo, protesters threw stones and bottles at UNM members. GD denied responsibility for the violence.

On October 27, Margvelashvili won the presidential elections with 62.12 percent of the votes in the first round, with Bakradze and Burjanadze gaining 21.72 and 10.19 percent, respectively. Turnout was low with 46.6 percent. OSCE called the elections transparent and competitive. On November 2, Ivanishvili stepped down as Prime Minister and named Interior Minister Irakli Garibashvili his successor. Margvelashvili was inaugurated president on November 17 and appointed Garibashvili as new Prime Minister the next day. Upon the inauguration, several constitutional amendments transferring powers from the President to the Prime Minister and Parliament entered into force. The amendments had passed Parliament already in 2010, but had remained unimplemented. On December 11, GD and UNM members of parliament briefly brawled during a debate.

Throughout the year, several former UNM government officials were arrested on charges of corruption. For instance, former Prime Minister Vano Merabishvili was taken into custody on May 21. EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton demanded the case to be pursued without political influence^{jd}

GEORGIA (SOUTH OSSETIA)

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **1989**

Conflict parties: South Ossetian separatists vs. government
Conflict items: secession

The secession conflict between the break-away region South Ossetia and the government continued as a non-violent crisis. No incidents or attacks that caused casualties were observed. However, frequent detentions of Georgian citizens by Russian border guards or South Ossetian militiamen along the Administrative Boundary Line (ABL) continued.

Throughout the year, at least twelve Georgians were arrested. Both conflict parties actively used the regular meetings of the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism held under the auspices of the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) to negotiate the release of detainees, including South Ossetians arrested in Georgian prisons. In mid-September, EUMM's mandate was extended until December 2014.

Tensions rose over Russian servicemen installing physical delimitation infrastructure along the ABL, a move the Georgian side termed as borderization. On May 27, Foreign Minister Maia Panjikidze voiced concerns over barbed wire fencing along the ABL by Russian troops. Reportedly, the fences were installed near the village of Ditsi, Shida Kartli, a few hundred meters beyond the ABL inside Georgian territory. On May 30, Russian troops detained a Georgian national near Ditsi. NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen on June 5 called the erection of fences a violation of international law. On October 10, Panjikidze claimed that Russian soldiers had

erected 35 km of barbed wire fences along the ABL near the towns of Gori, Kareli, and Kaspi, Shida Kartli, as well as the South Ossetian town of Akhagori. On May 28 and September 13, Georgia sent protest notes to Russia via the Swiss Embassy [→ Russia – Georgia]. Four rounds of internationally mediated negotiations between Georgia, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia [→ Georgia (Abkhazia)] took place in the Geneva Talks format, bringing the total number of negotiation rounds to 26. No significant progress was achieved, with the main point of contention being a joint document on the non-use of force. Georgia had unilaterally signed such a document vis-à-vis Russia but refused to do so with South Ossetia and Abkhazia. ^{mak}

GREECE (LEFT-WING – RIGHT-WING MILITANTS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **NEW** | Start: **2013**

Conflict parties: left-wing militants vs. right-wing militants (Golden Dawn)
Conflict items: system/ideology

A violent conflict between left-wing militants and the members of far-right-wing party Golden Dawn (GD) over the orientation of the political system emerged.

On January 19, around 4,000 protested in the capital Athens against racism and GD in response to a fatal stabbing of an immigrant by two GD supporters earlier that week.

On September 14, approx. 50 GD activists attacked a group of communists in Athens, injuring 9. On September 18, leftist musician Pavlos Fyssas was murdered by a GD supporter in Athens. The next day, thousands protested in Athens and about 6,000 in Thessaloniki, Central Macedonia, as well as in Patras, West Greece, Xanthi, East Macedonia and Thrace, Larissa, Thessaly, and Chania, Crete [→Greece (social protests)]. On September 25, around 10,000 protesters participated in anti-fascist protests in Athens and major cities.

On September 26, a group of more than fifteen vandalized the offices of the newspaper Proto Thema in Athens, accusing it of supporting fascism. On November 1, the GD party offices in Athens were attacked by gunmen in a drive-by shooting killing two party members and leaving a third heavily wounded. A previously unknown militant group called Revolutionary Popular Militant Forces on November 16 claimed responsibility for the deaths, reportedly in retaliation for having murdered Fyssas in September. On November 30, far-right-wing GD supporters rallied in Athens condemning charges against GD party leader [→Greece (right-wing militants)]. Leftist groups protested against GD nearby, attacking the GD party offices and clashing with police^{kwu}

GREECE (RIGHT-WING MILITANTS)

Intensity: **1** | Change: **NEW** | Start: **2013**

Conflict parties: Golden Dawn, right-wing militants vs. government
Conflict items: system/ideology

A dispute over the political system between the oppositional far-right-wing Golden Dawn (GD) party and the government emerged. Tensions between GD and the government had risen due to the alleged involvement of GD party members

and members of parliament in a series of criminal acts. After preliminary investigations, parliament suspended state funding for GD, calling it a criminal organization. On September 25, police raided GD party offices in the capital Athens in reaction to the murder of leftist musician Pavlos Fyssas, who had been killed the week before by a GD supporter [→ Greece (left-wing militants – right-wing militants)]. On September 28, GD party leader Nikolaos Michaloliakos, the GD spokesman, and nineteen other GD members were taken into custody, accused of being members of a criminal organization and fomenting violence. The same day, 300 GD members protested against the arrests in front of the parliament. On October 18, parliament lifted immunity of Michaloliakos and five other GD members of parliament in order to prosecute them. On October 23, parliament amended a law to suspend state funding for political parties being prosecuted as criminal organizations. GD claimed the law to be unconstitutional. On November 27, about 2,000 GD supporters protested in front of parliament against the detention of Nikolaos Michaloliakos. On December 18, parliament decided to cut state funding for the GD party^{kwu}

assaults against governing party New Democracy offices, journalists, and politicians had been conducted. New left-wing militant groups called Fighting Minority and Circles of Offenders/Nuclei of Lawlessness Lovers claimed responsibility for some of the attacks. Five months later, the newly emerged Group of Popular Rebels took responsibility for an assault rifle attack on New Democracy offices in Athens in January. On March 12, three offices of members of parliament in Thessaloniki were firebombed. On April 30, five suspects were arrested for participation in the left-wing militant group Conspiracy of the Fire Nuclei. On June 10, the same left-wing militant group assumed responsibility for a bomb attack on the car of Athens' high security prison director the week before. The group announced further attacks and the fusion with the left-wing militant groups Bands of Conscience and Nuclei Fai. On September 3, Conspiracy of Fire Nuclei confessed having sent a letter bomb to an examining magistrate two days earlier in retaliation for the arrest of two anarchists, who were arrested over a letter bomb attack in Thessaloniki in July. ^{kwu}

GREECE (SOCIAL PROTESTS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **1973**

Conflict parties: left-wing militants, social groups vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology

The violent crisis over system and ideology between the government and social groups, among them left-wing militants, continued. Protests primarily against austerity measures and right-wing violence took place every month [→ Greece (left-wing – right-wing militants)]. Throughout the course of numerous demonstrations, police and protesters clashed, the former used teargas and the latter hurled stones and petrol bombs.

Throughout the year, left-wing militants conducted arson and bomb attacks targeting former politicians and their relatives, journalists, party offices, and public figures. Police reported 254 attacks during the first semester, blaming left-wing militants. Anti-austerity strikes and protests with at times more than 10,000 participants took place on January 9, February 13 and 20, March 3, May 1, July 15, September 7, October 31, and November 5 and 17. During most of those protests in Athens and Thessaloniki, Central Macedonia, protesters and police clashed. On January 30, police clashed with protesters and arrested 30 trying to occupy the department of labor in the capital Athens.

Due to austerity measures the public broadcaster ERT was closed on June 11. In reaction, nationwide protests and strikes took place, accounting for thousands in Athens alone. On September 18, 10,000 demonstrated in Athens against the austerity policy and the death of leftist musician Pavlos Fyssas who was killed by a Golden Dawn party supporter the day before during clashes with police [→Greece (left-wing militants – right-wing militants)]. On November 8, police and protesters clashed in Athens during demonstrations against the forced eviction of ERT by the police the day before. On December 6, thousands protested in Athens, Thessaloniki, and further cities to commemorate the death of Alexis Grigoriopoulos, shot by police five years ago. During violent confrontations, police detained more than 60.

In the first weeks of January, firebomb attacks and rifle

MOLDOVA (TRANSDNIESTRIA)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↗** | Start: **1989**

Conflict parties: Transdnestrian sepratists vs. government

Conflict items: secession

The conflict over secession between the breakaway region of Transdnestria and the government escalated to a violent crisis. On February 19, Transdnestrier leader Yevgeny Shevchuk announced that it would not participate in the 5+2 settlement talks attended by Russia, the USA, the EU, the OSCE, and Ukraine as well as both conflict parties in Lviv, Ukraine. In March, tensions erupted in the Security Zone, established on both sides of the river Dniester after violent clashes in the early 1990s. On March 21, Moldova established migration control on six checkpoints in the area. The same day, Transdnestrian militiamen and Moldovan police clashed in Bender, leaving at least one policeman injured. Moldova's delegation at the Joint Control Commission (JCC), a joint mechanism established to monitor the Security Zone, accused law enforcers from the Transdnestrier region of provoking the clash. Tensions increased between April 26 and 27 in the Security Zone. Transdnestrian authorities unilaterally installed two checkpoints between the village of Varnitsa, controlled by the government, and the city of Bender, controlled by Transdnestrian authorities. Reportedly, clashes followed between Moldovan civilians who tried to remove the checkpoints and the Transdnestrian militias that intervened to stop them. On April 27, the JCC removed the checkpoints. However, on May 1, Moldova installed new checkpoints along the border with Transdnestria.

Ahead of the second 5+2 meeting in Odessa on May 24, Shevchuk proposed to move Transdnestria's Supreme Court to Bender under the jurisdiction of the Moldovan authorities. The Supreme Council rejected his proposal on May 23. On June 10, Shevchuk issued a decree that unilaterally redrew the border with Moldova, thereby claiming Varnitsa as well as three villages that were previously designated Moldovan as Transdnestrian territory. On June 17, President Nicolae Timofti criticized the act, rejecting a self-proclaimed Transdnestrian republic.^{fes}

RUSSIA (ISLAMIST MILITANT GROUPS / NORTHERN CAUCASUS)

Intensity: **4** | Change: **•** | Start: **1989**

Conflict parties: **CF vs. government**

Conflict items: **secession, system/ideology**

The ideology and secession conflict between Islamist militants of the Caucasian Front (CF), led by self-proclaimed Caucasian Emir and Chechen Islamist leader Dokka Umarov on the one hand, and the central as well as regional governments on the other hand, continued on a highly violent level. The CF aimed to establish an independent Islamic Emirate ruled by Sharia law in the North Caucasus Federal District (NCFD) which is comprised of the republics of Dagestan (RoD), Chechnya (RoC), Ingushetia (RoI), Kabardino-Balkaria (RoKB), Karachay-Cherkessia (RoKC), and North Ossetia-Alania (RoNOA), as well as the region Stavropol Krai (SK). Several local militant groups operating in the republics supported the CF, such as the Ingush Jamaat, the Yarmuk Jamaat, Kataib al-Khoul also known as the Ossetian Jamaat, and the Shariat Jamaat. Although the number of violent incidents declined slightly compared to 2012, the conflict claimed approx. 540 deaths and 520 injuries. Bombings, assassinations, and attacks on security forces as well as officials and civilians frequently took place in RoC, RoI, RoKB, and RoD, while the number of violent incidents significantly decreased in the districts of RoKC, RoNOA and SK.

Throughout the year, militants conducted more than 300 attacks and assassination attempts on police officers and military servicemen, causing the death of over 100 officials. Government forces killed more than 200 militants. As of November 20, 31 bomb attacks including six suicide blasts were carried out, resulting in 28 deaths.

Aside from the southern republics, violence also affected other parts of Russia. For instance, on October 21, a Dagestani female suicide bomber set off explosives on a bus in Volgograd, killing herself and six others and wounding 28. Two other suicide bombers attacked the Volgograd central railway station on December 29 and a bus in the same city on December 30. The attacks killed at least 34 people and injured more than 70.

With over 260 conflict-related deaths, Dagestan remained the most violent region where, according to the Interior Ministry, about 150 to 200 insurgents were active in the first half of the year. On February 14, a suicide bomber killed four police officers at a police road post near Khasavyurt. Two car bombs detonated outside the headquarters of the court marshal's service in the Dagestani capital, Makhachkala, killing four and leaving 46 injured on May 20. Five days later, a female suicide bomber blew herself up near a building of the Russian Ministry of Interior in Dagestan, leaving one person dead and at least twelve injured. Special forces launched numerous operations against members and leaders of militant groups, killing and detaining fifteen suspected rebel leaders in Dagestan alone. On February 6, security forces killed the last surviving militant directly involved in the attacks on the Moscow metro in March 2010 near Kadyrkent in the Sergokalinsky District. Five days later, security forces killed five militants during a special operation near Darvag in the Tabasaransky District. In a clash between security forces and militants in Muchurino in the Khasavyurt District, six militants as well as one officer died on February 14. A major special

operation with approx. 500 soldiers was launched on March 12. Five militants and two officers were killed during an operation in Smeneder on March 23. In August, another twelve militants including two leaders of local militant groups were killed. Zaur Umarov, known to be a bomb expert allegedly behind a number of attacks, was killed on September 1. On November 16, special forces outside Makhachkala shot dead five militants, among them Dmitry Sokolov who claimed responsibility for the October 21 suicide bombing in Volgograd. Another suspect of the bomb attack was killed on November 19 in Makhachkala.


In Chechnya, the conflict claimed more than 80 deaths. A bomb attack injured a police officer near Aslanbek-Sheripovo on January 18. Five days later, six to eight militants killed two officers during a police search operation in the region of Vedeno. On April 28, a roadside blast in Shatoi District killed two soldiers. On July 14, a police officer was killed by a bomb near Roshni-Chu in the Urus-Martan District. In special operations, several militants and officers were killed and more than 50 injured. In a two-day operation on January 14, security forces killed thirteen militants, among them the Gakayev brothers, both of whom had been on the wanted list for eleven years. Two officers died during the fight and seven were injured. On March 16, in another operation on the border between Chechnya and Ingushetia, security forces encountered a gang of fifteen militants and killed seven of them when they attempted to break through the police cordon. The shootout involved machine guns and grenade launchers. On July 8, security forces killed Dokka Umarov's bodyguard, Rusam Saliyev, in the Achkhoy-Martanovsky District. A few days earlier, Dokka Umarov had called on his followers to attack the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi.

In Ingushetia, shootouts between special forces and militants as well as bomb blasts continued on a frequent basis. Three militants and one officer died in a shootout during a special operation in Dolakovo on April 8. On May 2, special forces killed two militants in the Nazran District, among them Dzhamaleil Mutaliev, suspected right-hand of Dokka Umarov. In particular, the Sunzhensky District, part of both Ingushetia and Chechnya, saw violent measures by the conflict parties. For instance, special forces killed two militants on February 22. Two landmines exploded on April 3, killing a police officer and injuring five other security forces. In a similar incident on June 19, an explosive device wounded two officers in Alkun. On May 17, a suicide bomber blew himself up in Ordzhonikidzevskaya and injured one police officer. On September 16, another suicide bomber killed three police officers and injured four others in a local branch of the Ministry of the Interior in Sernovodsk.

In Kabardino-Balkaria, approx. 70 people were killed throughout the year. On January 20, policemen in Nalchik killed a leader of a militant group operating in the eastern Urvansk District. In the same city on January 29, a police officer shot dead Zeitun Boziyev, who was allegedly responsible for numerous attacks such as the murder of a regional parliament member on 12/25/12. On June 29, security forces killed one militant and detained another in Chereksky. The police also uncovered a cache with an improvised bomb and two machine guns in that particular place.

In Karachay-Cherkessia, the number of violent incidents decreased. On January 2, police officers shot dead a former member of the Uzdenov militant group in the Malokarachayevsky District. [okl](#)

RUSSIA (OPPOSITION GROUPS)

Intensity: **2** | Change:  | Start: **2001**


Conflict parties: opposition groups vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The conflict over national power and the orientation of the political system between various opposition groups and the government de-escalated to a non-violent level. Several oppositional and pro-government demonstrations took place throughout the year. Unlike the events following President Vladimir Putin's election in 2012, police forces and demonstrators did not clash violently. The government continued to detain protesters and pursued judicial and executive action against oppositional persons and parties. These were repeatedly denounced by oppositional figures as being deliberate, illegal, and political in nature. Opposition groups of up to 200 people held smaller protest rallies in Moscow and St. Petersburg on January 31, February 10, March 21, April 13, April 24 and May 31. During these rallies, security forces repeatedly detained up to 30 protesters on January 31, March 21, April 13, and May 31.

On January 13, a crowd of 7,000 to 20,000 people in Moscow protested against the ban on US families' adoptions. On March 2, around 2,000 oppositional protesters faced a pro-Putin demonstration of about 12,000. On April 17, up to 2,000 people in Moscow protested against the charges put against opposition leader Aleksey Navalny. When he was released, Navalny led a protest in Moscow on May 6 at the anniversary of the violent clashes at Bolotnaya Square between protesters and security forces that had followed Putin's inauguration in 2012. 8,000 to 30,000 protesters attended. The same day, the Russian Justice Ministry suspended registration for seven opposition parties. On the official Russia Day of June 12, opposition groups demonstrated, supporting 28 activists who had been detained and pressed with the charge of inciting violence after the Bolotnaya protests in 2012. 6,000 to 30,000 attended the rally. On July 16, about 3,000 people protested in the eponymous oblast against the arrest of the oppositional mayor Yevgeny Urlashov in Yaroslavl. Navalny was convicted of embezzlement on July 18. Subsequently, oppositional groups held demonstrations with around 2,000 participants in St. Petersburg and thousands in Moscow. Between 156 and 254 demonstrators were detained. Navalny was released on July 19. On July 29, the Communist Party organized an authorized demonstration calling for the resignation of the government. According to the party's estimates, about 8,000 people attended. After Navalny's defeat in Moscow's mayoral election on September 8, around 9,000 people gathered at Bolotnaya Square, claiming that the vote had been rigged. On October 29, prosecution filed new charges against Navalny, this time of theft and money laundering.

In late December, parliament passed an amnesty bill signed by Putin which led to the release of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and two members of Pussy Riot, Nadezhda Tolokonnikova and Maria Alyokhina, after nine years and two years of prison camp, respectively.jdr

RUSSIA – KAZAKHSTAN ET AL. (CASPIAN SEA)

Intensity: **3** | Change:  | Start: **1993**

Conflict parties: Kazakhstan vs. Russia vs. Azerbaijan vs. Turkmenistan vs. Iran
 Conflict items: territory, international power, resources

The conflict between the Caspian Sea littoral countries Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan over territory, international power, and resources escalated to a violent level. Tensions between Russia and Kazakhstan accounted for the violent conflict measure while the other conflict parties resorted to non-violent means.


In March, Iran launched two Navy vessels to the Russian port city of Astrakhan, stating its will to improve maritime relations with Russia and the overall security in the Caspian Sea.

A meeting of representatives of the Caspian Sea neighboring states was held in the Turkmen capital of Ashgabat between April 11 and 12. The meeting was dedicated to debating a draft agreement on the conservation and sustainable use of natural resources of the Caspian Sea. Furthermore, the participants discussed the preparation of a regional instrument aimed at preserving the natural world of the Caspian Sea and serving their mutual economic and environmental interests. On September 13, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated the trans-Caspian pipeline project required the determination of the legal status of the Caspian Sea by the five littoral countries. In a move criticized by Lavrov, the EU started negotiations with Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan on the Trans-Caspian pipeline that would link the Azerbaijani and Turkmen shores of the Caspian Sea to deliver natural gas to Europe via Azerbaijan.

On November 26, Kazakh border guards fired at two Russian boats which had entered Kazakhstan's section of the Caspian Sea, killing one Russian citizen and injuring another. In reaction, the Russian Foreign Ministry called the use of firearms an inadequate move and demanded on November 29 that Kazakhstan conducted a detailed investigation.

On December 13, Azerbaijani Deputy Foreign Minister Halaf Halafov announced that new agreements on the status of the Caspian Sea were to be discussed in 2014^{iti}

RUSSIA – UKRAINE

Intensity: **2** | Change:  | Start: **2003**

Conflict parties: Russia vs. Ukraine
 Conflict items: territory, international power, resources

The conflict over territory, international power, and resources between Russia and Ukraine escalated but remained non-violent.

Bilateral tensions temporarily increased after four Ukrainian fishermen died in the Azov Sea when a Russian coast guard ship collided with their boat on July 18. Russian authorities pressed criminal charges on the surviving fisherman, which Ukraine condemned. In addition, Ukraine demanded an investigation of the incident. A Ukrainian prosecution office in Mariupol, Donetsk region, also opened a criminal case over the incident in the Azov Sea. Members of the Ukrainian

government demanded the release of the fisherman several times. Russian prosecution agencies released him on November 5.

On January 28, the Russian gas company Gazprom demanded USD 7 billion from the national joint stock company Naftogaz Ukrainy after Russia claimed that Ukraine had violated a bilateral import agreement on gas. On January 29, Ukrainian authorities stated that they were not willing to deliver the amount. With the import agreement about to expire in December, Ukrainian authorities announced the possibility of choosing alternative gas routes such as the Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline (TANAP) or a new gas terminal in Croatia on July 12. On May 31, Ukraine signed a deal to become an observer of the Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia. On August 14, Russia's Federal Customs Service tightened controls on all Ukrainian imports, putting them on a list of potentially dangerous goods. Tensions eased on August 20 when Russia lifted the restrictions. Both countries signed an agreement on December 17 in which Russia announced that it would buy Ukrainian government bonds worth USD 15 billion and give Ukraine a 33 percent discount on Russian gas [→ Ukraine (opposition)]. The leaders of the two countries also discussed a strategic partnership and signed a number of additional agreements on economic and industrial cooperation. [iti](#), [mmu](#)

SERBIA (KOSOVO)

Intensity: **1** | Change: • | Start: **1989**

Conflict parties: Kosovar government vs. government

Conflict items: secession

The non-violent crisis over secession between the Kosovar government and the central government continued. Since January 27, the premiers of Kosovo and Serbia, Hashim Thaci and Ivica Dacic, continued EU-facilitated talks aiming at the normalization of their relations.

Both sides reached a reconciliation agreement on April 19, mediated by the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton. Serbia accepted Pristina's authority over police and judicial as well as political institutions in Kosovo, in exchange for significant autonomy over the areas populated by ethnic Serbs. Furthermore, the parties pledged to not obstruct each other's EU membership aspirations. Nevertheless, on December 30, Serbian President Tomislav Nikolic stated that Serbia would not accept Kosovo's independence.

Clashes and demonstrations against the reconciliation agreement erupted in May and June [→Serbia (Serbian minority - Kosovar government)]. Furthermore, Prime Minister Ivica Dacic as well as Deputy Premier Aleksandar Vucic received death threats reportedly sent by the Radical Serbian Party (SRS).

The Serbian government in Belgrade urged the Serbian minority in Kosovo to participate in the municipal elections for mayors and assembly deputies scheduled for November 3. For the first time since Kosovo's self-declared independence, the Serbian minority was able to participate in the elections. Nevertheless, low turnout, numerous alleged irregularities, and incidents in northern Kosovo marked the elections [→Serbia (Serbian minority - Kosovar government)]. Consequently, on November 17, the elections were held again under heavy police presence in Kosovska Mitrovica district. Final results left the ruling Democratic Party of Kosovo (DPK) as winner of

most of the municipalities. In Pristina, the Self-Determination Movement (Vetevendosje) member Shpend Ahmeti became mayor. In a meeting of Ashton and the prime ministers of Serbia and Kosovo on December 5, both parties agreed to collaborate on the integration of Serbs into Kosovar police. [mpo](#)

SERBIA (SERBIAN MINORITY – KOSOVAR GOVERNMENT)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2012**

Conflict parties: Serbian minority vs. Kosovar government

Conflict items: system/ideology, other

The violent crisis between the Serbian minority in Kosovo and the Kosovar government continued. Violence occurred in the mainly Serbian populated northern part of Kosovo, although Serbia and Kosovo held EU-mediated talks and reached a reconciliation agreement on April 19 [→Serbia (Kosovo)].

On January 20, 200 Serbian special police forces removed a monument to former fighters of an Albanian guerrilla force in the dominantly Albanian-populated city of Presevo, Serbia. The following day, more than 3,000 Kosovar Albanians protested in Presevo and more than 2,000 in the Kosovar capital of Pristina.

Throughout the year, several bombings hit the city of Mitrovica, located in the north of Kosovo. On February 4, a hand grenade explosion left two people injured in the ethnically heterogeneous neighborhood of Bosnjacka Mahala in the city of Mitrovica, Kosovska Mitrovica district. Subsequently, police arrested a Serbian suspect. On February 16 and 19, bombs exploded in the Serb-dominated part of Mitrovica. One detonated in front of the house of a Kosovar police officer. On February 23, explosive devices destroyed the office of Serbia's Pension and Disability Insurance Fund in Mitrovica. The Serbian government condemned the attack and called it an intimidation of the Serbian population in Kosovo.

On May 10, approx. 3,000 Serbs living in Kosovo went to the Serbian capital Belgrade to protest against the reconciliation agreement. On June 27, the day the Kosovar parliament ratified the agreement, affiliates of the Self-Determination Movement (Vetevendosje) consisting of ethnic Albanians protested against the agreement by blocking the entrance of the parliament in Pristina. During subsequent clashes, 32 protesters and 21 police officers were injured. In addition, police arrested 70 demonstrators.

On August 26, several Serbs threw Molotov cocktails at the Kosovar border station Jarinje in Kosovska Mitrovica district and tried to demolish it with bulldozers. During clashes between local Serbs and police, one Kosovar police officer died. In the run-up to the elections on November 3, several violent acts occurred. On October 31, masked people injured the mayoral candidate Krstimir Pantic in northern Mitrovica. Mitrovica supported the participation of the Serbs in the Kosovo elections. Pantic claimed that the assault on him had been committed by those who had opposed the election. On November 1, dozens of ethnic Serbs called upon people to boycott the elections. In Mitrovica, Serbs entered and destroyed a polling station by smashing ballot boxes and throwing teargas into the station during the election [mpo](#)

SERBIA (VOJVODINA)

Intensity: **1** | Change: • | Start: **1989**

Conflict parties: regional parties vs. government
 Conflict items: autonomy

The dispute over autonomy between the Vojvodinar government and the central government continued. On January 8, the head of the deputy group of the Serbian Progressive Party in Vojvodina Igor Mirovic called for early elections. In addition, he urged the Vojvodinar government to resign, stating it had failed to provide a clear framework for the financing of the province. On April 8, the head of the Vojvodinar government Bojan Pajtic claimed that the provincial government was stable and refused early elections.

On April 12, around 30,000 people including the Serbian Progressive Party, the Democratic Party of Serbia, and the Socialist Party of Serbia protested in Novi Sad against a possible disintegration of Serbia. They also expressed their opposition to a draft declaration concerning the status of the province. On May 20, the Vojvodina assembly in Novi Sad adopted the Declaration on the Protection of Constitutional and Legal Rights of Vojvodina. The declaration stated that the rights and powers of bodies and institutions in the province had been violated and called on Serbia's central government to strengthen cooperation. After the vote, assembly members of the Serb Progressive Party and the Democratic Party of Serbia left the session in protest. On December 6, the Constitutional Court of Serbia ruled that some provisions of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina Statute stipulating the competences of the region were not in accordance with the Serbian constitution. The court gave six months' time to implement the ruling.fph

SPAIN (ETA, PNV / BASQUE PROVINCES)

Intensity: **1** | Change: ↘ | Start: **1959**

Conflict parties: ETA, PNV vs. government
 Conflict items: secession

The conflict between Basque Homeland and Freedom (ETA) and the government concerning the secession of the Basque Country from Spain de-escalated to a dispute. There were no more threats of violence from any side. On January 3, the Basque party Batasuna, suspected of supporting ETA and therefore banned in Spain, announced the disbanding of its French section. On January 12, tens of thousands of ETA supporters demonstrated in favor of a transfer of imprisoned ETA members to prisons in the Basque Country. The Batasuna successor party Sortu was founded on February 23. Several former Batasuna members attended the inaugural congress in Pamplona, among them the first chairman Hasier Arraiz Barbadillo. On March 13, a French court sentenced former ETA military chief Miguel Garikoitz Aspiazu Rubina, alias Txeroki, to twenty years in prison. He had kidnapped a Spanish family in 2007. On April 19 and May 7, French and Spanish police took six suspected members of ETA and eight members of the banned separatist youth organization Segi into custody. On June 26, French police took Aitor Zubillaga Zurutuza into custody. They accused him of threatening a mayor and of violent acts against the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV). On

September 30, police took eighteen members of the suspected ETA support group Herrera into custody. Five days later, tens of thousands protested in Bilbao, capital of the Basque Country, against the arrest. On December 11, a Spanish court sentenced three former ETA members, allegedly responsible for the 2009 bombing of the Guardia Civil headquarters in Burgos, to 3,860 years in prison each.jme

SPAIN – UNITED KINGDOM (GIBRALTAR)

Intensity: **2** | Change: ↗ | Start: **1954**

Conflict parties: Spain vs. United Kingdom
 Conflict items: territory

The conflict over the territory of Gibraltar between the United Kingdom (UK) and Spain escalated to a non-violent crisis.

On March 24, a Spanish police officer allegedly fired a plastic bullet at a British jet-skier in British Gibraltar territorial waters, close to a beach. A spokesperson of the Spanish police denied the action. On July 4, Gibraltar accused the Spanish air force of four military jets entering the airspace of Gibraltar. The Spanish defense ministry denied that the maneuver took place.

Tensions arose on August 29, when Spain intensified its border controls. The same day, Spain accused the Gibraltarian government of having thrown 74 concrete blocks with spikes into waters of Gibraltar to keep out Spanish fishermen, while Gibraltar stated it had been an environmental measure. On October 9, Gibraltar's Chief Minister Fabian Picardo asked the Fourth Committee of the UN if Gibraltar had achieved a full degree of self-government in order to remove Gibraltar from the Non-Self-Governing Territories' list. On October 25, UK accused Spain of sending research boats into disputed waters of Gibraltar. On November 1, the British government complained to Spain after a Spanish police boat had collided with a Royal Navy boat in Gibraltarian waters. On November 15, the European Commission stated it had not found proof that Spain had violated EU rules when intensifying border controls.

On November 18, a Spanish research boat entered disputed waters and refused to leave when a Royal Navy ship requested its withdrawal. Two days later, the British government subpoenaed the Spanish ambassador Frederico Trillo to complain about the incident. On November 25, Picardo demanded the reinforcement of the Royal Navy in Gibraltar to deter Spain.jme

TURKEY – GREECE (BORDER)

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **1973**

Conflict parties: Turkey vs. Greece
 Conflict items: territory

The conflict over territory and resources between Turkey and Greece continued. In particular, both parties disagreed on the demarcation of the continental shelf, territorial waters, and airspace as well as on the rights to resource exploitation in the Aegean Sea.

On January 7, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu announced counter measures if Greece unilaterally demarcated its exclusive economic zone (EEZ). On February 20,

the Greek Foreign Ministry sent a diplomatic note to the UN claiming that Turkey had violated the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, especially Article 121. However, Turkey had never signed the convention. Greece argued that Turkey had licensed their state-run oil exploitation company TPAO in 2007 to hydrocarbon exploitation in areas overlapping with the Greek continental shelf and EEZ. Turkey opposed the Greek declaration on February 22, reiterating rights for resource exploitation in the respective areas. On March 4, Greek Prime Minister Antonis Samaras and his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan as well as several ministers held their second High Level Cooperation Council since 2010 in Ankara. Several agreements were signed to improve relations. However, differences over the EEZ and related issues remained unsolved. The Greek military said that it had spotted a Turkish warship in Greek waters on March 19. A similar statement six days later mentioned that a Turkish frigate had circumnavigated eight islands in the East Aegean Sea which Greece claimed to be within its border lines. Throughout the year, Greece claimed that Turkish fighter jets had entered the Greek Flight Information Region (FIR) and violated its airspace. Reports stated that in most cases, formations of six fighter jets types F-4 and F-16 were spotted. For instance, the Greek military stated that four Turkish fighter jets had flown over Fournes Island and the islet Anthropofagi on April 16.

hundreds of pro-EU protesters from IS in Kiev, using tear gas and truncheons. At least 79 people were injured and police arrested up to 31 protesters. On December 1, hundreds of thousands all over the country protested against the government and the actions of special forces the day before, demanding the resignation of Yanukovych as well as the government led by Prime Minister Mykola Azarow and new elections. In Kiev, some protesters tried to break through lines of policemen to approach the Presidential Administration Building by using a bulldozer. Others attacked police forces with stones and Molotov cocktails. Police responded by using teargas, batons, and stun grenades. Furthermore, protesters occupied City Hall and the Trade Unions House. Altogether the Kiev unrest on December 1 left approx. 100 policemen and 165 protesters injured. Anti-governmental as well as pro-governmental protests continued throughout the first week of December. On December 9, police forces began to remove barricades and tents on several sites of Kiev, which demonstrators had set up the weekend before. They also raided the headquarters of the oppositional Fatherland party and three opposition newspapers and seized several computers and documents. Clashes erupted the next day and around fifteen people, among them at least two policemen, were injured. Clashes continued on December 11, as police forces tried to clear the occupied city hall and the main protest camp on IS but decided to withdraw. 30 people were injured, among them nine policemen. Police detained at least nine people. On December 14 and 15, several tens of thousands of pro-government protesters rallied in Kiev. Police forces separated them from anti-government protesters on IS. After Yanukovych had signed an economic agreement with Russia on December 17 [→Russia - Ukraine], members of pro-EU-opposition and opposition parties accused Yanukovych of compromising Ukraine's independence. On December 22, opposition members announced the formation of a nationwide political movement called MaidanPeople's Union. On December 25, Ukraine restricted entry into its territory for non-Ukrainians. On December 29, some 10,000 protested in Kiev and approx. 1,000 of them marched towards the residence of Yanukovych close to Kievmmu

UKRAINE (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **NEW** | Start: **2013**

Conflict parties: Pro-EU-demonstrators, various social groups, oppositional parties (Fatherland party, Svoboda, UDAR et al.) vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power, other

A new conflict over national power, socio-economic conditions, and the orientation of the political system emerged between opposition groups and the government of President Viktor Yanukovych.

In 2004, a conflict between supporters of the government of the outgoing president Kutchma and his desired successor Yanukovych and a pro-Western opposition bloc had resulted in the so-called Orange Revolution. Yanukovych became president in 2010.

On November 21, one week before the planned signing of an Association Agreement with the European Union, the government suspended preparations for the treaty, which had been negotiated for a couple of years. One day later, pro-EU demonstrations started across the country. Between 1,000 and 2,000 people gathered on the Independence Square (IS) in the capital Kiev with members of opposition parties joining the gatherings. Within three days, the number of protesters on the square rose to 100,000. A protester threw a smoke grenade at policemen in an attempt to enable some protesters to break into the Cabinet of Ministers building. Police responded by using teargas. In ensuing clashes, some 200 people, including policemen, were injured. Later that night, hundreds of protesters build up tents on the square, defying a prohibition to do so.

On November 29, the government did not sign the Association Agreement at the EU Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius, Lithuania. The following day, riot police dispersed

UNITED KINGDOM (NATIONALISTS / NORTHERN IRELAND)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **1968**

Conflict parties: RAAD, RIRA, Sinn Féin, The IRA vs. Alliance Party, DUP, government, SDLP, UDA, UUP, UVF

Conflict items: secession

The conflict between the antagonistic communities over the secession of Northern Ireland from the United Kingdom continued on a violent level. On May 9, Northern Ireland's First Minister Peter Robinson and Deputy First Minister Martin McGuinness presented proposals concerning a shared future in Northern Ireland. The planning included measures to improve relations between the religious communities and integration in Northern Ireland. The planning also included shared education campuses and work placements for unemployed young people. On July 9, the Office of the First and deputy First Ministers of Northern Ireland announced that Richard Haass, former US envoy to Northern Ireland from 2001 to 2003, would chair all-party talks to resolve questions

EUROPE

on parades, flags, and dealing with the past. Talks began on September 17 but ended without any agreement on December 31.

Street demonstrations and clashes, which had begun on 12/03/12 after the Belfast City Council had limited the number of days the union flag was flown at the City Hall, continued in 2013. On January 3, the protests ended up in clashes between Ulster loyalists and police in Belfast. Around 100 protesters attacked police forces with petrol bombs, bricks, stones, and bottles and set a car and debris on fire. Police responded by using water cannon and plastic bullets while rioters injured ten police officers. Protests and riots spread to other cities and continued throughout the following days, injuring several dozens of police officers. On November 18, police stated they had charged 560 people since the beginning of protests in 2012. 260 of them were convicted.

The Parades Commission, set up to mediate disputes concerning parades in Northern Ireland, decided on July 10 that three lodges of the Protestant Orange Order were not allowed parades on their planned route through North Belfast on July 12. On Parade day, clashes ensued in several parts of Belfast when police blocked the route to enforce the decision. Demonstrators attacked police forces with petrol bombs, ceremonial swords, bricks, and fireworks. The latter responded with water cannon and plastic bullets. Riots continued throughout the following days. More than 70 police officers as well as Member of Parliament Nigel Dodds and several protesters were injured during the days of unrest. Police detained more than 60 people. On August 9, rioters injured 56 police officers during a loyalist demonstration against a republican parade in central Belfast. Demonstrators threw bricks, stones, fireworks and scaffolding poles on police forces, damaged several shops, and set a number of cars on fire. Police responded by using plastic bullets and water cannon. Police also arrested at least seven people, six of whom were later charged.

As in previous years, violence by armed republican groups continued. For example, police stated that the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) had been actively involved in the January

unrest. On November 18, police chairman Terry Spence said that the UVF would no longer be on ceasefire and that the group was allegedly engaged in murder, street violence, and criminal activities. In addition, dissident groups were blamed for a number of letter and pipe bomb attacks throughout the year. mmu

UNITED KINGDOM (SNP / SCOTLAND)

Intensity: **1** | Change: • | Start: **2007**


Conflict parties: Scottish regional government, SNP vs. government

Conflict items: secession

The secession conflict between the Scottish regional government formed by the Scottish National Party (SNP) on the one hand, and the central government on the other, continued. On February 10, British Prime Minister David Cameron announced that he would work alongside arguments to keep the United Kingdom (UK) together and stressed out the advantages of a united country. One day later, the UK government published the first in a series of analysis papers about Scotland's role in the Union. SNP members accused the PM of negative campaigning. On March 12, SNP brought an act to parliament to lower the voting age to 16. The act was passed by the Scottish Parliament on June 27. On March 21, Scottish First Minister Alex Salmond announced that the independence referendum would be held on 09/18/14, calling the date a decisive and historic day. Opposition parties supporting the Union said that Scotland was better off as part of the UK. On November 14, the Scottish parliament set out the referendum rules. Most opposition parties also backed the legislation. On November 26, Salmond presented a 670-page White Paper concerning detailed steps towards independence. Members of opposition parties criticized the blueprint as a work of fiction. mmu

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

CONFLICTS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA



- NO VIOLENT CONFLICT
- VIOLENT CRISIS
- LIMITED WAR
- WAR

REGIONAL PANORAMA



With a total of 97 conflicts, the number of conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa remained constant, thereby accounting for nearly a quarter of the world's conflicts. While the opposition conflict in Malawi was still ongoing in 2012 but ended the same year, one new conflict erupted during 2013 [→South Sudan (SPLA defectors)].

While the total number of highly violent conflicts decreased from twenty to eighteen, among them the number of wars increased by one to eleven compared to 2012. This was the highest number of wars observed in Sub-Saharan Africa since 1945. Eight conflicts continued on the level of a war, while two limited wars escalated to wars and one new war erupted [→ South Sudan (SPLA defectors)]. Two former wars de-escalated to violent crises [→Mali (MNL / Azawad); Sudan – South Sudan]. In Somalia, the war over ideology and national power between the Islamist group al-Shabaab and the government continued for the eighth consecutive year [→Somalia (Islamist groups)]. In addition to ongoing clashes in Somalia, the militants repeatedly conducted attacks on Kenyan territory. For instance, on September 21, the attack on a shopping mall in Nairobi left more than 60 people dead. The Kenyan army continued to operate in the border region supporting the Somali government.

In the DR Congo, a UN Intervention Brigade with an offensive mandate was established as part of MONUSCO and led to the surrender of the M23 in late November [→ DR Congo (M23)]. As in 2012, the war between M23 and the government affected the whole Kivu region. The M23 had started their armed fight in April 2012. The concentration of military power in Rutshuru left other parts of North and South Kivu open to other armed groups such as Raia Mutomboki [→DR Congo (Mayi-Mayi)]. Raia Mutomboki continued to expand quickly, recruiting youths under the banner of protecting communities from FDLR [→ DR Congo (FDLR)]. As of 2013, they controlled a large part of Shabunda district in South Kivu, pushing back FDLR into more remote territory [→DR Congo (inter-militant violence)]. According to MONUSCO, armed groups in eastern DRC recruited at least 560 children, most of them by Mayi-Mayi groups and the FDLR. The conflict between the government and the ADF-NALU, operating in the border region between Uganda and DR Congo, escalated to a limited war [Uganda (ADF-NALU)].

In the Central African Republic, after starting their march on Bangui in 2012, the Muslim Séléka alliance took control over the capital Bangui and overthrew the government of President Francois Bozizé in March [→ Central African Republic (rebel groups)]. Shortly after seizing Bangui, the coalition fell apart, with Séléka fighters roaming Bangui. Continued violence against civilians led to the formation of self-defense groups, known as Anti-Balaka. Both the Muslim Séléka and the Christian Anti-Balaka targeted the civilian population of the opposite faith in Bangui and other parts of the country, leading to over 900,000 IDPs. French troops, deployed in early December, disarmed the majority of Séléka fighters in late December.

In Sudan, the war between the SPLM/A-North and the government over the status of the provinces of Blue Nile and South Kordofan continued [→ Sudan (SPLM/A-North / Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile)]. In neighboring South Sudan, President Salva Kiir renewed his 2011 amnesty offer to rebel commanders which led to the surrender of at least 1,500 militants [South Sudan (various militias)]. However, a highly violent conflict erupted in mid-December as tensions within the ruling SPLM party led to large-scale defections and an alleged coup attempt [→ South Sudan (SPLA defectors)]. While defectors aligned themselves with former vice president Riek Machar Teny Dhurgon, who denied coup allegations, other troops remained loyal to President Salva Kiir. The conflict also polarized civilians and the military along ethnic lines, which resulted in widespread clashes. In only seventeen days, several states were captured by anti-government forces, thousands of people were killed and at least 200,000 displaced. In contrast, the former war over territory and resources between South Sudan and Sudan de-escalated to a violent crisis. In the Sudanese Darfur region, the conflict between several rebel groups and the government continued on a highly violent level for the eleventh consecutive year. The coalition of rebel groups Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF), comprised of the most active rebel groups, mainly operated in North and South Darfur. On October 2, the UPFLJ, a coalition of eastern Sudanese rebel factions, joined the SRF [→Sudan (Eastern Front)]. In both Sudan and South Sudan, the conflicts between different ethnic groups continued. Despite not being listed in previous years, the conflict Sudan (inter-ethnic violence) dates back to at least 2011. However, tensions between ethnic groups had existed long before the start of the observation in 1945. The conflicts revolved around subnational predominance and resources, including land, water, and



SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

mineral rights. In Sudan, the heaviest fights took place between Al-Rezeigat Abballa and Beni Hussein tribes over mining rights.

In Nigeria, the war between the Islamist group Boko Haram and the government continued for the third consecutive year. In May, the government announced a state of emergency in north-eastern Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe states and launched a large-scale offensive against the militants. Boko Haram continued targeting military facilities as well as the civilian population. Furthermore, the conflict in Nigeria over arable land between the predominantly Christian farmers of Berom and Tiv tribes on the one hand, and the mainly Muslim Fulani nomads on the other, continued at war level [Nigeria (farmers – pastoralists)]. In central Nigeria's Nasarawa state, clashes between members of the Eggon and the government as well as other ethnic groups constituted a limited war [→Nigeria (Eggon groups / Nasarawa State)]. Confrontations between the militant Eggon group Ombatse and government forces left dozens dead. Moreover, inter-ethnic fighting forced several thousand people to flee their homes.

In Mali, following the advance of Islamist groups, the government called on France for support [Mali (Islamist groups)]. Arriving on January 11, French and Malian troops pushed the Islamists out of the major towns in northern Mali, forcing some of them to retreat to surrounding mountainous areas. The Tuareg group MNLA, which had initially started the capture of the northern regions in 2012, had been considerably weakened after clashes with Islamist groups such as AQIM, MUJAO, and Ansar al-Din [→Mali (Tuareg / Azawad)]. In 2013, MNLA repeatedly offered help to the French troops supporting the Malian government. However, they clashed with Malian troops on several occasions. Also, the advance of Tuareg and the Islamist groups sparked violence between residents of the northern towns and the Tuareg population. Furthermore, the conflict between Islamist groups and Tuareg over subnational predominance continued on a violent level. Throughout the year, numerous fighters who had left the MNLA for Ansar al-Din rejoined the Tuareg group. In addition, Ansar al-Din members left the group and formed new groups such as MIA and Ansar al-Sharia. While the conflicts with the Tuareg and the Islamists in the north persisted, opposition groups in the south took to the streets protesting against the government's handling of the crisis. Conflicts in southern Africa were generally less violent and tended to involve opposition groups instead of heavily armed rebel militants. However, a new violent conflict concerning the re-emerged RENAMO militants erupted [Mozambique (RENAMO)] and several opposition conflicts remained on the level of a violent crisis [Angola (UNITA), South Africa (KwaZulu – Natal), Swaziland (opposition)]. (fb, sel, qgu, thg, mwe)

Overview: Conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa in 2013

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
Angola (FLEC / Cabinda)*	FLEC vs. government	secession, resources	1975	•	1
Angola (UNITA)	CASA-CE, UNITA vs. government	national power	1975	•	3
Angola – DR Congo*	Angola vs. DR Congo	territory, resources	2009	•	1
Botswana (Basarwa)	Basarwa vs. government	resources	1997	•	1
Burundi (FNL)	FNL vs. government	national power	2005	•	3
Burundi (Hutu – Tutsi)*	Hutu vs. Tutsi	other	1962	•	1
Burundi (opposition groups)*	ADC, MSD vs. government, Imbonerakure	national power	2006	•	3
Burundi – Rwanda (border)*	Burundi vs. Rwanda	territory	1960	•	1
Cameroon (militants / Bakassi)*	BSDF vs. government	secession	2006	↘	1
Central African Republic (rebel groups)	Séléka vs. Anti-Balaka militias vs. government	national power, resources	2005	↗	5
Chad (opposition groups)	UNDR, UDR et al. vs. government	national power	1990	↑	3
Chad (rebel groups)*	Popular Front for Recovery (FPR), Union of Resistance Forces (UFR) vs. government	national power, resources	2005	↘	3
Côte d'Ivoire (opposition)*	FPI vs. government	national power	1999	•	3
DR Congo (Enyele)*	Enyele vs. government	subnational predominance	2010	•	1
DR Congo (FDLR)	FDLR vs. government	subnational predominance, resources	2000	•	4
DR Congo (FRF)*	FRF vs. government	subnational predominance, resources	1998	•	1
DR Congo (inter-militant violence)	Mayi-Mayi groups vs. FDLR vs. M23 et al.	subnational predominance, resources	2003	•	4
DR Congo (Ituri militias)	Aru militant groups, FRPI vs. government	subnational predominance, resources	1999	↗	4
DR Congo (M23)	M23 vs. government	subnational predominance, resources	2004	•	5
DR Congo (Mayi-Mayi)	Mayi-Mayi groups vs. government	subnational predominance, resources	2003	•	4
DR Congo (militant groups / Katanga)	Kata Katanga vs. government	secession, resources	2011	•	3
DR Congo (opposition groups)*	UPDS, RCD-ML vs. government	national power	1997	↘	2
DR Congo – Rwanda*	DR Congo vs. Rwanda	resources, other	2002	↘	2

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
Equatorial Guinea – Gabon (Mbanié, Cocotier, Congo islands)*	Equatorial Guinea vs. Gabon	territory, resources	1970	•	1
Eritrea – Djibouti (border)*	Eritrea vs. Djibouti	territory	1994	•	1
Ethiopia (ARDUF)*	ARDUF vs. government	autonomy	1995	↘	2
Ethiopia (OLF / Oromiya)	OLF vs. government	secession	1973	•	3
Ethiopia (ONLF / Ogaden)*	ONLF vs. government	secession, resources	1984	•	3
Ethiopia (opposition)	BPLM, EUFF, Ginbot 7 et al., Semayawi party, UDJ vs. government	national power	2005	•	3
Ethiopia (TPDM)*	TPDM vs. government	subnational predominance	2002	•	2
Ethiopia – Eritrea*	Ethiopia vs. Eritrea	territory, other	1998	↘	1
Gabon (opposition)	UN, various opposition groups vs. government	national power	2009	↘	2
Guinea (Guerze – Konianke)*	Guerze vs. Konianke	subnational predominance	2001	↑	3
Guinea (opposition)*	UFDG, UFR et al. vs. government	national power	2006	•	3
Guinea-Bissau (coup plotters)	military factions vs. government	national power	2009	↓	1
Guinea-Bissau (opposition)*	PAIGC vs. PRS	system/ideology, national power	1998	↓	1
Kenya (inter-ethnic violence)	Borana vs. Rendille and Gabra and Burji, Garre vs. Degodia, Orma vs. Pokomo, Turkana vs. Merille, Turkana vs. Pokot	subnational predominance, resources	1991	•	4
Kenya (MRC / Coast)	MRC vs. government	secession	2008	•	3
Kenya (Mungiki)*	Mungiki vs. government	system/ideology, subnational predominance	1997	•	3
Kenya (SLDF)*	SLDF vs. government	subnational predominance	2002	↘	1
Kenya (TNA – ODM)	TNA vs. ODM	national power	1999	↗	3
Madagascar (TGV – TIM)*	TGV vs. TIM	national power	2009	↘	1
Mali (Islamist groups – Tuareg groups)*	Ansar al-Din, AQIM, MUJAO vs. MNLA vs. HCUA, MAA	system/ideology, subnational predominance	2012	↘	3
Mali (Islamist groups)	al-Mourabitoun, Ansar al-Din, AQIM, MUJAO vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2009	↗	5
Mali (military factions)*	red berets vs. CNRDRE/Sanogo supporters vs. government	national power, other	2012	•	3
Mali (MNLA / Azawad)	MNLA vs. government	autonomy	1989	↓	3
Mali (opposition groups)*	opposition groups vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2012	•	3
Mozambique (RENAMO)	RENAMO vs. government	national power	2012	•	3
Niger (Islamist groups)	AQIM, MUJAO vs. government	system/ideology, subnational predominance	2008	•	3
Niger (opposition)*	opposition groups vs. government	national power	2009	•	1
Niger (Tuareg / Agadez)*	MNJ vs. government	autonomy, resources	1990	↘	1
Nigeria (Boko Haram)	Boko Haram vs. government	system/ideology	2003	•	5
Nigeria (Christians – Muslims)*	Christian groups vs. Muslim groups	system/ideology, subnational predominance	1960	↘	3
Nigeria (Eggon groups / Nasarawa State)*	Eggon groups vs. Alago, Fulani, government, Gwandara, Koro/Migili	subnational predominance	2012	↗	4
Nigeria (farmers – pastoralists)	farmers vs. pastoralists	subnational predominance, resources	1960	•	5
Nigeria (Ijaw groups / Niger Delta)*	Ijaw Youths, MEND vs. government, International Oil Companies in Niger Delta	subnational predominance, resources	1997	•	3
Nigeria (MASSOB / Biafra)	MASSOB vs. government	secession	1967	•	3
Nigeria (MOSOP, Ogoni / Niger Delta)*	MOSOP, Ogoni vs. government	autonomy, resources, other	1990	•	2
Nigeria (Northerners – Southerners)*	Northerners vs. Southerners	system/ideology, national power, resources	1960	↓	1
Nigeria – Cameroon (Bakassi)*	Nigeria vs. Cameroon	territory, resources, other	1961	↑	3
Rwanda (FDLR)*	FDLR vs. government	national power	1990	•	3
Rwanda (opposition)	Democratic Green Party, UDF vs. government	national power	2010	↗	2
Rwanda – France*	Rwanda vs. France	international power, other	2004	•	1

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
Senegal (June 23 Movement)*	June 23 Movement vs. government	national power	2011	↓	1
Senegal (MFDC / Casamance)*	MFDC vs. government	secession	1982	•	3
Sierra Leone (APC – SLPP)*	APC vs. SLPP	national power	2007	↘	2
Somalia (Islamist groups)	al-Shabaab vs. ENA, government, KDF	system/ideology, national power	2006	•	5
Somalia (Puntland – Somaliland)*	autonomous region of Puntland vs. regional government of Somaliland	territory, subnational predominance	1998	↓	1
Somalia (Puntland)*	FGS vs. autonomous region of Puntland	autonomy	1998	•	1
Somalia (Somaliland – Khatumo State)	Somaliland vs. Khatumo State	subnational predominance	2009	↘	3
Somalia (Somaliland)*	regional government of Somaliland vs. FGS	secession	1991	•	1
South Africa (KwaZulu – Natal)*	ANC vs. IFP vs. NFP	subnational predominance	1990	•	3
South Africa (xenophobes – immigrants)*	xenophobes vs. immigrants	subnational predominance	1994	•	3
South Sudan (inter-ethnic violence)	Murle vs. Dinka vs. Lou Nuer vs. various ethnic groups vs. ethnic sub-clans	subnational predominance, resources	2011	•	5
South Sudan (LRA)*	LRA vs. government	subnational predominance	2011	↑	3
South Sudan (SPLA defectors)	defected SPLA troops vs. government	system/ideology, subnational predominance	2013	NEW	5
South Sudan (various militias)	Militias David Yau Yau, SDDF, SSDM/A, SSLA vs. government	system/ideology, resources	2011	•	3
South Sudan – Uganda*	South Sudan vs. Uganda	territory	1994	↘	1
Sudan (Darfur)	LJM, SRF vs. pro-government militias vs. reserve forces vs. government	subnational predominance, resources, other	2003	•	5
Sudan (Eastern Front)*	Eastern Front vs. government	autonomy, resources	2005	•	1
Sudan (inter-ethnic violence)	Al-Rezeigat Abballa, government vs. Beni Hussein vs. Misseriya vs. Salamat vs. Al-Gimir vs. Bani Halba vs. Maaliya	subnational predominance, resources	2011	•	5
Sudan (SPLM/A-North / Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile)	SPLM/A-North, SRF vs. government	autonomy	2011	•	5
Sudan – Eritrea*	Sudan vs. Eritrea	other	1994	•	1
Sudan – South Sudan	Sudan vs. South Sudan	territory, resources, other	2011	↓	3
Swaziland (opposition)*	COSATU, PUDEMO, SFTU, SNU, SWACOPA, TUCOSWA vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1998	•	3
Swaziland – South Africa*	Swaziland vs. South Africa	territory	1902	•	1
Tanzania (Chadema)*	Chadema vs. government	national power	2011	•	3
Tanzania (Christians – Muslims)	Christian groups vs. Muslim groups	subnational predominance	2012	•	3
Tanzania (CUF / Zanzibar)*	Chadema, CUF vs. CCM	autonomy	1993	•	3
Tanzania (Uamsho / Zanzibar)*	Uamsho vs. government	secession, system/ideology	2010	•	3
Togo (opposition)	ANC, CST vs. government	national power	1963	•	3
Uganda (ADF-NALU)	ADF-NALU vs. government	national power, resources	1987	↗	4
Uganda (Baganda / Buganda)*	Kingdom of Buganda vs. government	autonomy, resources	1995	↘	1
Uganda (LRA)	LRA vs. government	subnational predominance	1987	•	3
Uganda (opposition)*	opposition vs. government	national power	2001	•	3
Uganda – DR Congo (Lake Albert)*	Uganda vs. DR Congo	territory, resources	2007	↘	1
Zimbabwe (MDC-T, MDC-M – ZANU-PF)*	MDC-M, MDC-T vs. government	national power	2000	•	3

¹ ² ³ ⁴ cf. overview table for Europe

Please note: The intensity of each conflict as shown in the tables is the highest intensity reached in the course of the year. Therefore, conflicts may, for instance, be classified as limited wars although there may have been no more fighting in the second half of the year.

If a conflict revolves around a territory whose name is disputed by the conflict parties, both variations will be named, separated by an "/" [e.g. Japan – China (Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands); Argentina – UK (Falkland Islands/Islands Malvinas)]. If, in contrast, the conflict actors strive for subnational predominance, secession, or autonomy of or in a certain region, the region is separated from the actors by " / " [e.g. France (FLNC / Corsica); Myanmar (KIA, KIO / Kachin State)].

SELECTED CONFLICT DESCRIPTIONS

ANGOLA (UNITA)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1975**

Conflict parties: CASA-CE, UNITA vs. government

Conflict items: national power

The conflict over national power between the government and two opposition parties, National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and Broad Convergence for the Salvation of Angola-Coalition Electoral (CASA-CE), continued as a violent crisis. The governing party, Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), and the main opposition party, UNITA, had previously fought each other in the civil war from 1975 to 2002.

The government repeatedly cracked down on illegal settlements, especially in the outskirts of the capital Luanda. When UNITA tried to deliver assistance to these settlements on February 23, security forces blocked them, allegedly beating them up. On March 3, police raided UNITA's headquarters in Luanda, confiscating audiovisual materials. Three days later, the car of UNITA's president, Isaiás Samakuva, was rammed by another car and overturned four times. UNITA claimed the attack was a politically motivated assassination attempt. On May 21, alleged MPLA members attacked a group of 23 UNITA members who were preparing a rally in Londuimbali, Huambo province, leaving one dead.

Over the course of the year, police and protesters repeatedly clashed in the context of anti-government demonstrations led by the main opposition parties. On November 23, presidential guards killed a CASA-CE member in Luanda who was putting up posters for oppositional protests against the abduction and murder of two activists in May 2012. The demonstrations in Luanda and several provinces the same day turned violent. While the police cracked down on the protests using guns, water cannon, and teargas, the protesters threw stones. Several people were injured and 292 detained. Police forces prohibited other demonstration attempts in the provinces of Bié, Bengo, Benguela, Cabinda, Cunene, Kuando Kubango, and Namibe.rab

BOTSWANA (BASARWA)

Intensity: **1** | Change: • | Start: **1997**

Conflict parties: Basarwa vs. government

Conflict items: resources

The dispute between the indigenous peoples of the Basarwa and the government over land located in the Central Kalahari Game Reserve (CKGR) continued.

In January, paramilitary police arrested three Basarwa children in the CKGR for the possession of antelope meat. On March 21, the Basarwa took the government to court because it had continued to hinder them from entering the CKGR and had prohibited them from hunting. In May, the government tried to relocate hundreds of Basarwa from Ranyane, Ghanzi Province, claiming that they were a danger to the local wildlife, but the High Court prohibited the planned evictions until mid-June.

After the government had forced the Basarwa to leave the CKGR again in June, the court ruled that it could only enter the Reserve with the permission of the Basarwa.

Furthermore, the government was prohibited from dismantling the Basarwa's water boreholes and from resettling them without notifying their lawyers first. On July 25, the government did not grant the Basarwa's British lawyer the permission to enter the country, thereby prohibiting him from representing the Basarwa's interests in another High Court trial regarding their access to CKGR on July 29. In mid-September, the High Court decided not to grant the Basarwa a general permission of free access to the CKGR due to technical reasons. Throughout the year, the government's policy concerning the Basarwa was criticized by the UN and several individual states.sge

BURUNDI (FNL)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2005**

Conflict parties: FNL vs. government

Conflict items: national power

The national power conflict between the National Liberation Front (FNL) and the government continued on a violent level. On May 18, about fifteen FNL fighters ambushed a bus in Gatumba, situated between the capital Bujumbura and the border to the DR Congo (DRC). The fighters killed three passengers and injured ten.

However, the most affected region was the neighboring DRC's South Kivu province, an FNL stronghold since the rearming of parts of the FNL in 2010. FNL repeatedly clashed with the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) in South Kivu. For instance, six rebels were killed in mid-March during three days of fighting with FARDC soldiers in Magunda. On August 8, FARDC confronted FNL forces allied with Mayi-Mayi Yakatumba in Fizi territory [→DR Congo (Mayi-Mayi)]. On November 19, a soldier of FARDC was shot dead by FNL fighters in the Ruzizi plain in Uvira territory. In mid-December, some 9,000 people fled fighting between FNL and FARDC in Uvira. FNL also fought other armed groups in South Kivu. For instance, in mid-February, FNL and its ally Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) clashed with Raia Mutomboki in Uvira [→DR Congo (FDLR); DR Congo (inter-militant violence)]. Moreover, FNL repeatedly attacked civilians in the area. For instance, 2,300 people fled FNL-attacks on Kinshaje and Mungutu, South Kivu.

On February 24, Burundi was one of the signatories on the Peace Framework Agreement which foresaw the creation of an international intervention force consisting of 3,500 troops to fight various rebel groups in the DRC, including FNL [→DR Congo (M23)].

After three years of exile, FNL's long-time leader Agathon Rwasa returned to Bujumbura on August 6. Police set up road blocks as a way to prevent the celebration of his return by hundreds of supporters from outside Bujumbura and ended up arresting at least seven of them. FNL's leadership remained disputed. While the government considered Emmanuel Miburo to be FNL's president, Rwasa denounced the current FNL leadership as installed by the government. Miburo was replaced by Jacques Bigirimana at a party congress held on October 20, which Rwasa dismissed as a farce. In Septem-

ber, Burundi's public prosecutor opened an investigation against Rwaswa and former FNL spokesman Pasteur Habimana. The investigation concerned the 2004 massacre in a refugee camp near Gatumba, where FNL had killed 166 Congolese Banyamulenge. Both Rwaswa and Habimana denied any involvement, although Habimana had previously claimed FNL's responsibility in 2004 [→Burundi (Hutu – Tutsi)].


On November 7, the government requested that the UN Security Council close down the UN Office in Burundi (BNUB) after the current mandate's end scheduled for 02/15/14, arguing that BNUB's mandate to pacify the country had been fulfilled. UN dispatched a delegation to Burundi.

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (REBEL GROUPS)

Intensity: **5** | Change: **↗** | Start: **2005**

Conflict parties: Séléka vs. Anti-Balaka militias vs. government

Conflict items: national power, resources



The conflict over national power and resources between the rebel alliance Séléka led by Michel Djotodia and the government of Francois Bozizé escalated to a war. Djotodia took over the government in March.

In 2012, former rebel groups Conventions of Patriots for Justice and Peace (CPJP), the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR), the Popular Army for the Restoration of the Republic and Democracy (APRD) and the Democratic Front of the Central African People (FDPC) had joined forces in order to overthrow the government of Bozizé. The coalition was headed by Michel Djotodia, leader of UFDR. However, many smaller factions acted de facto independently. During the march on the capital Bangui, many fighters joined the coalition, raising Séléka numbers to approx. 3,500 in early 2013. Most Séléka fighters originated from the Muslim north-east of the country. After Séléka's approach on Bangui in December 2012, Bozizé agreed to negotiate on the establishment of a government of national unity, to be headed by human rights activist Nicolas Tiangaye as prime minister. However, the Libreville Agreement, signed by Séléka and the government on January 11, failed as Séléka members were dissatisfied with the distribution of power in the new government.

On February 7, Séléka occupied the towns Bambari, Ouaka prefecture, and Mobaye, Basse-Kotto prefecture. They spread further out in March and moved towards the capital, occupying several towns along the way, among them Gamba, Kémo prefecture, and Bangassou, Mbomou prefecture. On March 23, approx. 3,000 Séléka fighters entered the capital and clashed with 200 South African peacekeepers, killing thirteen and wounding 27 of them, while the Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in Central African Republic (MICOPAX) and French troops did not intervene. President Bozizé fled to Cameroon. Djotodia proclaimed himself president, suspended the constitution, and dissolved the parliament. Djotodia also claimed that the Libreville agreement would remain in place. Consequently, AU suspended CAR and imposed sanctions, travel bans and an asset freeze on Séléka's leaders. The following weeks, Séléka rebels pillaged the capi-

tal, clashing with Bozizé-supporters and Bozizé-loyal military, which resulted in at least 130 deaths between March and May.

After seizing Bangui, the coalition slowly fell apart. Several Séléka leaders such as Nouredine Adam, Mohammed Dhaffane, and Nelson Njadder were either dismissed or arrested by Djotodia, leading the fighters to defect from the coalition. At the end of June, Djotodia established a National Security Council headed by Tiangaye, assigned with controlling Séléka fighters who were looting the capital. Djotodia formally dissolved Séléka on September 13. Séléka combatants ignored orders from Djotodia and MICOPAX and launched an alleged disarmament operation on Boy Rabe, an allegedly pro-Bozizé residential district in Bangui, killing at least eleven on August 20.

In late August, violence between Séléka and Bozizé-supporters spread to the country's northwest, while the fighting was carried out along religious lines. The incursions by the Muslim Séléka fighters led to the creation of Christian self-defense militias, collectively described as Anti-Balaka. Both groups targeted civilians in a large-scale manner such as door-to-door searches in Bangui and committed mass atrocities. In mid-August, President Bozizé formed the Front for the Return of the Constitutional Order (FROCCA) in Paris. The group allegedly financed Anti-Balaka fighters and Bozizé-loyal military. On September 9, Anti-Balaka forces attacked a Muslim neighborhood in Bouca, Ouham prefecture, killed at least three people, and burned about 150 houses. Séléka carried out reprisal attacks, burning about 300 houses and killing ten people. Similarly, an attack on Muslim neighborhoods in Bossangoa and reprisal attacks by Séléka led to 100 deaths and the fleeing of all 150,000 inhabitants. Despite the arrival of MICOPAX troops shortly after, violence continued. Throughout October, Séléka and Anti-Balaka attacks on the towns Bangassou, Garga, and Bouar, Nana-Manbéré prefecture, caused at least 96 casualties. For instance, on October 26, Anti-Balaka forces attacked Bouar, causing between twenty and 40 deaths and displacing 10,000 people. Subsequently, MICOPAX troops and the Central African Armed Forces (FACA) regained control of Bouar. Violence peaked on December 5, when Anti-Balaka militias and Bozizé-loyal fighters attacked ex-Séléka members in Bangui, leaving at least 465 dead. FROCCA claimed to have initiated the attack. On the same day, violence also broke out in Bossangoa as Anti-Balaka attempted to re-take the town from ex-Séléka members, leaving at least 38 civilians dead. French troops disarmed 7,000 ex-Séléka rebels until December 25, approx. 95 percent of their fighting force. Anti-Balaka militias continued raiding Muslim neighborhoods in Bangui. An attack on December 25 left at least 44 civilians dead. Clashes between Anti-Balaka, ex-Séléka rebels, and French troops continued in Bangui throughout December, leaving several hundred dead. On July 19, AU established the African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA), its 3,600 troops being recruited largely from already established MICOPAX. The mission was deployed on December 19. Similar to MICOPAX, it was mainly tasked with the protection of government buildings. On November 20, French President Hollande announced that the French troops would be reinforced by almost 1,000 troops over a six month period. On December 5, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution authorizing MISCA, the deployment of French troops to assist MISCA, and sanctions. On December 7, AU announced it would add up to 6,000 more troops. France deployed 1,600 troops in Bangui until December 7 in Operation "Sangaris". As of the end of December, the number of internally displaced

persons (IDP) in Bangui rose to some 500,000, with total IDPs in CAR numbering 935,000.

Violence in CAR led to a spillover to Cameroon, with several thousand refugees crossing the border. At the end of July, Abdoulaye Miskine, leader of FDPC, was arrested in Cameroon. In November and December, ex-Séléka fighters attacked Cameroonian military and refugee camps on Cameroonian territory. fb, fw

DR CONGO (FDLR)

Intensity: **4** | Change: • | Start: **2000**

Conflict parties: FDLR vs. government
 Conflict items: subnational predominance, re-sources

The conflict between the armed group Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and the government, supported by MONUSCO, continued as a limited war while the number of casualties and IDPs slightly decreased. FDLR originated from parts of the former Rwandan army and the Interhamwe militia, who entered eastern Zaire (DR Congo) in 1994 after having been involved in the genocide in Rwanda. While the leadership was still dominated by this generation, the rank-and-file increasingly included younger Rwandan and Congolese combatants including dozens of child soldiers. The group's ultimate goal continued to be the overthrow of the Rwandan government [→Rwanda (FDLR)].

Between 1,500 and 2,500 FDLR combatants operated in the east of the country, geographically divided into a North and South Kivu sector. Over the year, MONUSCO demobilized approx. 600 FDLR combatants. While FDLR's South Kivu sector commander Hamada Habimana deserted in early February, the group's second in command, General Stanislas Nzeyimana disappeared in Tanzania, violating a UN travel ban. According to UN reports, an increase in internal divisions and weakened hierarchy within FDLR led to reduced capability of command and control of its operations.

On January 1, the UN Security Council (UNSC) imposed military and travel sanctions on the FDLR calling for demobilization of the group's rank and file. Following the defeat of the armed group M23 in early November [→ DR Congo (CNDP/M23)], the newly established MONUSCO Force Intervention Brigade announced, it would start operations against the FDLR. The group asked the government and MONUSCO on November 12 to refrain from military action and offered to open negotiations with the Rwandan government. Nevertheless, on December 10, the Brigade and FARDC launched a joint offensive in the region of Kalembe, North Kivu, in order to clear the Kitshanga-Kalembe-Pinga axis. Up to 120 FDLR combatants surrendered in the course of the operation.

Over 1,000 FDLR combatants continued to operate in North Kivu province, primarily deployed in Walikale, Lubero and Rutshuru territories. Following the presence of the armed group Raïa Mutomboki in the south of the province [→DR Congo (inter-militant violence)], FDLR shifted their headquarters eastwards to Nganga area, Walikale. At the end of January, FDLR combatants raped at least 28 women in Lubero and continued to impose illegal taxation. In the last week of February, shortly after the split of M23 into rival factions, FDLR appeared in North Kivu key towns Kiwanja and Rutshuru. They also attacked Kibati, a village very close to Goma. Between May 26 and 29, more than 800 IDPs fled from FDLR's presence in Walikale. On August 10, after the arrival of around 30 FDLR combatants in a neighboring village, more than 300 civilians fled from Ngerere village, Lubero. Within a one-week operation until September 17, FARDC drove off FDLR from the villages of Lusuli, Vuvati, Buhenge and Kataro, Lubero without fighting. On December 2, at least 5,600 fled from the villages of Lusowa, Buheri, Bulindi and Burumbule in Kanyabayonga territory, 150km north of Goma, to neighboring villages after threats of violence by

CHAD (OPPOSITION GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: ↑ | Start: **1990**

Conflict parties: UNDR, UDR et al. vs. government
 Conflict items: national power

The conflict between the opposition and the government over national power escalated to a violent crisis. On January 9, the Patriotic Salvation Movement (MPS), the party of President Idriss Déby Itno, submitted a modification of the constitution which was criticized by the opposition. The modification, which strengthened the position of the president, was adopted without the participation of opposition members.

Tensions between oppositional stakeholders and the government, which had already led to the arrests of journalists in the spring, took a violent turn on May 1, as, according to the government, a coup d'état was prevented by the security forces. During the firefight, which took place in an eastern suburb of the capital N'Djamena, between three and eight people died and fifteen were injured, while 21 politicians and military officers, among them members of parliament, were arrested in the aftermath. The government identified former Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD) rebel Moussa Tao Mahamat as head of the coup.

In the following week, members of the opposition as well as journalists were questioned or arrested by security forces. On May 9, two MPs were charged with plot, violation of the constitutional order and complicity in murder. Despite several protests by the opposition parties, arrested MPs remained in custody. One of them, Saleh Makki, was released on September 25. Further actions against opposition and journalists took place. On July 25, the government prompted Parliament to reverse the immunity of two MPs, one of them being opposition leader Saleh Kebzabo, due to their alleged contempt for the court. This was rejected by Parliament on September 2. On August 21, the journalists Eric Topona and Jean Laokolé were sentenced to three years on parole each.

On November 19, Déby Itno met with the main opposition alliance Coordination of Parties for the Defense of the Constitution (CPDC) and offered them to become a part of his platform National Cadre for political dialogue (CNDP). However, opposition stakeholders refused this offer. Moreover, the commission investigating the case of Ibni Oumar Mahamat Saleh, an opposition leader who disappeared in 2008 after being taken into custody, decided to dismiss this case due to the lack of any identifiable perpetratorjni

FLDR. Since December 3, FDLR captured six villages around Kanyabayonga town, denying peasants access to their fields. Over 500 FDLR combatants operated in the South Kivu territories Mwenga, Uvira, and Fizi, with the headquarters in Kadashomwa area, Mwenga. At the end of February, the increasing presence of FDLR in Uvira territory, South Kivu, led to a continuing flow of IDPs towards Buchajanga and Machuba. In September, FARDC arrested Ferdinand Nsengiyumva, FDLR operations chief of South Kivu. In November, FARDC launched operations against FDLR at several locations in South Kivu, killing and capturing a few militants. At least one unit of the South Kivu stationed FDLR contingent operated in the north of Katanga province. From May to September they looted local populations at Nyunzu, Kabalo, Kalemie, Kyoto and Muyombo and operated at several gold mines. Despite several requests by district officials FARDC made no effort to provide security in the area.

This year, there were several reports of cases of collaboration between FARDC factions and FDLR related to the M23 conflict. According to the UNSC Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, between January and April, FARDC troops based in Tongo, Bambo, Muja and Rusayo, North Kivu, repeatedly met with FDLR commanders and supplied them with ammunition. Between August 12 and 17, several meetings between FDLR and FARDC took place in Kanyarucinya area, North Kivu, with weapons handed over to around 200 FDLR combatants in order to fight M23. The government denied any collaboration between FARDC and FDLR but promised an investigation^{jli}

DR CONGO (INTER-MILITANT VIOLENCE)

Intensity: **4** | Change: **•** | Start: **2003**

Conflict parties: Mayi-Mayi groups vs. FDLR vs. M23 et al.

Conflict items: subnational predominance, resources

The conflict between different militant groups in the eastern DR Congo over subnational predominance and resources continued on a highly violent level.

The concentration of military forces on the M23 group in the border region between DR Congo and Rwanda led to diminished military presence in North and South Kivu, especially in Walikale, Kalehe, Shabunda, and Kabare territories, allowing militant groups to increase their activity [→ DR Congo (M23)]. In North Kivu, Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) clashed with Mayi-Mayi in Rutshuru, Masisi, Lubero and Walikale territories throughout the year. For instance, between January 19 and January 22, fighting between Mayi-Mayi Shetani and the coalition of FDLR and Nyatura militants in Kasave and Kisharo, Rutshuru territory, caused civilians to flee. In April and May, FDLR and the Alliance of Patriots for a Free and Sovereign Congo (APCLS), comprising mainly ethnic Hunde, clashed repeatedly with Mayi-Mayi Cheka militants in Masisi and Walikale. FDLR attacked the newly emerged Mayi-Mayi Aigle Rouge on April 11 in Fungula Macho, Lubero, leaving seven dead. On March 5, fighting between FDLR and M23 near North Kivu's capital Goma resulted in two deaths. 2,000 people fled after Raia Mutomboki (RM) and a coalition of FDLR and Nyatura clashed in Ufamando, Masisi, on October 12.

M23 also clashed with Nyatura in Rutshuru. Several attacks of Nyatura fighters on M23 convoys and camps left eleven

dead in June and July. On July 4, M23 fighters killed three people in Rutshuru, claiming they were Mayi-Mayi or FDLR fighters.

Mayi-Mayi Shetani, Nande militants, clashed repeatedly with the newly emerged Movement of Civil Self-defense (MPA) and their ally Nyatura, in Rutshuru, fighting over control of the area and trading routes after M23 had left in March. Clashes in January, February and March left 30 people dead and more than 8,000 people fled the area.

Nyatura and the Forces for the Defense of Human Rights (FDDH) clashed on May 12 and 14 near Kitshanga, North Kivu, killing one civilian and causing 500 to flee.

APCLS clashed repeatedly with Mayi-Mayi Cheka, composed mainly of ethnic Nyanga, in Walikale and Masisi territories. Fighting on April 28, May 15 and 29, and October 20 killed 200 people and displaced 15,000. Mayi-Mayi Cheka subsequently controlled Pinga town, Walikale, until the Armed Forces of the DR Congo (FARDC) launched a counterattack in October [→ DR Congo (Mayi-Mayi)]. On September 27, Mayi-Mayi Cheka attacked APCLS in Kalembe town, Masisi. FDDH intervened, ensuing clashes with Mayi-Mayi Cheka left twelve dead and caused approx. 10,000 people to flee.

In June, Mayi-Mayi Kifuafua and Raia Mutomboki (RM) fought over the trading route Bunyakiri-Hombo-Walikale, causing more than 10,000 people to flee the area. On October 14, fighting between RM and Nyatura in Masisi left two people dead and caused 15,000 civilians to flee. Further clashes between Kifuafua and Nyatura fighters on October 22 near Masisi caused 1800 locals to flee.

On February 5, five leaders of APCLS, FDDH, Nyatura, Action Movement for Change (MAC) and RM signed a peace treaty in Masisi, aimed at ending the conflict between the combatants of Hunde, Nyanga and Hutu groups in the region. However, this failed to end the fighting.^{hsp}

DR CONGO (ITURI MILITIAS)

Intensity: **4** | Change: **↗** | Start: **1999**

Conflict parties: Aru militant groups, FRPI vs. government

Conflict items: subnational predominance, resources

The conflict over subnational predominance and resources in Ituri district, Orientale province, between militant groups, mainly the Patriotic Resistance Front in Ituri (FRPI), and the government, escalated to a limited war. FRPI was one of several armed groups that had been formed in Ituri during the Second Congo War and continued to operate in the region. FRPI controlled large parts of Irumu territory, including gold mines. Its strength was estimated at 1,000 fighters.

Throughout the year, FRPI looted several thousand cattle. Starting on August 23, the Armed Forces of the DR Congo (FARDC) launched operations against FRPI, trying to regain control over territory controlled by the militants. On August 23, FARDC re-conquered about ten villages south of Bunia, leaving 33 FRPI militants and three soldiers dead. Four days later, FRPI launched counter attacks on FARDC near Aveba, resulting in at least six fatalities. Shortly after, FRPI again occupied territory taken by FARDC. In September and October, FARDC succeeded in taking back large parts of southern Irumu territory. The violence displaced around 150,000.

FRPI leader Cobra Matata stated repeatedly his willingness to reintegrate into FARDC in January and March, if FRPI's condi-

tions were met, such as recognition of their military ranks and amnesty. In February, the military court in Ituri suspended the injunction made against Matata to promote the integration. However, the military court reopened the case on April 17, accusing him of crimes against humanity. On May 21, Matata did not attend a scheduled peace talk with Jean Bamanisa Bogoro, Governor of Orientale.

On March 13, national MPs of Ituri requested MONUSCO to support the government and local authorities in terminating the activities of FRPI. President Joseph Kabila visited Orientale on November 25 and promised to strengthen FARDC's capacity and requested FRPI to disarm.

Militias under various and changing names emerged in Aru territory and repeatedly targeted civilians. A group calling themselves Congolese People's Liberation Army (ALPCU), but also operating under the name of M18 or the United Congolese People's Army attacked Ingi in Aru territory on September 30, clashing with FARDC. Six militants were killed. At the end of October, it attacked settlements in Aru territory, prompting over 6,000 to flee. ALPCU attacked Ingi again on November 9, causing 6,400 people to flee. Between April and December over 10,000 people were displaced in Aru territory due to ALPCU attacks. In March, Ugandan military Colonel Fenekansi Mugenyi allegedly abducted the group's leader, Zachariah Ndamire Ndozi, from his home in Bunga, Makindye division in Uganda's capital Kampala. Ugandan authorities intercepted them at the border and set Ndozi free. Subsequently, Mugenyi was tried by the Ugandan Court Martial for abducting him

In November, the ICC announced it would deliver judgment in the case of former leader of the FRPI Germain Katanga, who was accused of three counts of crimes against humanity and seven counts of war crimes, on 2014/07/02

24. While Makenga supported a more diplomatic approach to solve the conflict, Runiga backed further fighting against the government. The power struggle between the Makenga and the Runiga factions that left 65 people dead in Rutshuru ended when 682 M23 fighters of the latter faction, including Runiga and Ntaganda, fled over the Rwandan border where they were arrested on March 15. On March 18, Ntaganda – wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) – entered the US embassy in Kigali, Rwanda's capital, demanding to be handed over to the ICC, which took him into custody. The UNSC unanimously approved the deployment of a 3,000-strong MONUSCO-integrated Intervention Brigade against militia in eastern DR Congo in Resolution 2098 on March 28, establishing an intervention brigade with the first offensive mandate in the Kivus. The war between the militant group M23 and the government over subnational predominance and resources in the Kivu provinces continued.


Operating as a part of the UN mission MONUSCO, the intervention brigade was supposed to eliminate armed groups in the Kivus, with M23 being explicitly mentioned as one of the main targets. Peace talks stagnated when the first troops from the intervention brigade, consisting of units from Tanzania, South Africa, and Malawi were deployed in the Kivus in late April. Renewed heavy fighting between the Armed Forces of the DR Congo (FARDC) and the UN intervention brigade on the one hand, and M23 on the other, started in May and repeatedly broke out in July, August, and October. Clashes involved the use of heavy weaponry such as rocket propelled grenades, mortars, tanks, and artillery. Furthermore, MONUSCO used helicopters for observation as well as for combat operations. Following M23's non-compliance with a UN ultimatum to clear the area around Goma until August 1, MONUSCO increasingly engaged in combat action. Between October 26 and November 5, FARDC and MONUSCO defeated M23 and seized large parts of Rutshuru, which had been controlled by the armed group for more than a year.

Having been pushed back into Uganda, 1,320 M23 fighters surrendered on November 7, among them their leader Makenga. In addition, less than a hundred fighters fled to Rwanda, where they were disarmed by local troops. Less than 300 surrendered to the Congolese authorities. On November 5, the movement issued a statement that it has ended its rebellion. In the seven months of intense fighting between May and November, at least 201 FARDC soldiers, 721 M23 fighters, and three UN troops were killed. Throughout the year, M23 and parts of FARDC committed crimes such as raping women and children and the forced recruitment of children. Peace talks between the government and M23 started again after the surrender of M23 in mid-November. On December 13, the government and M23's leaders signed two separate declarations announcing the transformation of M23 into a political party, the demobilization of M23 fighters, and a conditional amnesty for those not suspected of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The UN Group of Experts stated that Rwanda supported M23 with financial and military means. M23 continued recruiting in Rwanda after the group declared the end of their rebellion on November 5

DR CONGO (M23)

Intensity: **5** | Change: **•** | Start: **2004**

Conflict parties: M23 vs. government
 Conflict items: subnational predominance, re-sources



The war between the militant group M23, supported by Rwanda, and the government, supported by the UN mission MONUSCO, over subnational predominance and resources in the Kivu provinces continued.

M23 originated from the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP), a former rebel group, whose leadership was mainly composed of Tutsi. After taking the major city Goma in North Kivu without extensive use of violence on 11/20/2012, the rebels retreated completely from the city on 12/01/2012 under the condition that talks were to be held between the government and M23. Though fighting between the government and M23 calmed down after the start of the peace talks in Uganda's capital Kampala in December 2012, M23 kept control of Rutshuru territory, North Kivu.

M23 split when clashes erupted between the faction of General Sultani Makenga and the faction of M23's political leader Jean Marie Runiga and General Bosco Ntaganda on February

DR CONGO (MAYI-MAYI)

Intensity: **4** | Change: • | Start: **2003**

Conflict parties: Mayi-Mayi groups vs. government
 Conflict items: subnational predominance, resources

The conflict between Mayi-Mayi groups and the government over subnational predominance and resources continued on the level of a limited war. Hundreds died and some 100,000 fled due to clashes between Mayi-Mayi groups and the Armed Forces of the DR Congo (FARDC) over the year.

Mayi-Mayi was a general term used to describe various local militias in the eastern DR Congo, ranging from well-organized larger groups to smaller, localized units. They claimed to represent the indigenous population and to defend the DRC against perceived foreign populations. Several Mayi-Mayi groups were active throughout North and South Kivu, Orientale, Maniema and Katanga provinces [→DR Congo (Kata Katanga / Katanga)]. They repeatedly clashed with FARDC, among each other, and with foreign armed groups, while also attacking civilians [→ DR Congo (inter-militant violence)]. Some fought in ad-hoc coalitions on the side of FARDC. Occasionally, parts of Mayi-Mayi groups demobilized or integrated into FARDC. As military power was concentrated against M23 in Rutshuru territory, large parts of North and South Kivu were left open to militant groups [→DR Congo (M23)]. Autonomous armed groups operated under the name of Mayi-Mayi Raia Mutomboki (RM), originally a self-defense group fighting the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) in Shabunda, South Kivu. They maintained their areas of influence in Masisi and Walikale territories, North-Kivu, in Kalehe, Kabare and Walungu territories, South Kivu, and in parts of Maniema province. FARDC repeatedly tried to drive RM out of these areas. In January, RM took control of the cities Kasese and Punia, Maniema, and Shabunda town in the eponymous territory. Subsequent clashes with the army forced about 70,000 people to leave their homes. In Masisi and Walikale territories, North Kivu, the Alliance of Patriots for a Free and Sovereign Congo (APCLS), Nduma Defense of Congo (NDC or Mayi-Mayi Cheka), various Nyatura groups and the Congolese Defense Forces (FDC) were active, while Mayi-Mayi Shetani, Nyatura and their allies People's Autodefense Movement (MPA) operated in Rutshuru, North Kivu. Between February 24 and March 5, APCLS and FARDC clashed repeatedly in Kitchanga, Masisi territory, killing at least 70 and prompting several thousand to flee. In Beni and Lubero territory, North Kivu, Mayi-Mayi PARECO, the groups of Hilaire Kombi, Kasereka and several others continued their activity. On February 12, FARDC launched an attack against PARECO in the village Vuhoyo, Lubero territory. Mayi-Mayi Yakutumba maintained their influence in Fizi territory, South Kivu, clashing at least five times with the army. Following negotiations with the government, their leader William Amuri had announced to lay down arms at the beginning of the year, but did not follow through on his commitment. On August 8 and 9, alleged Yakutumba clashed with FARDC in Baraka, Fizi territory, carrying the fight to Katanga, Malinde, and Sebele, 50 km from Baraka.

In Orientale province, several other Mayi-Mayi groups were active. Mayi-Mayi Simba and Mayi-Mayi Morgan were active in national parks, occupied villages and mining sites, and repeatedly clashed with FARDC. After approx. 300 Mayi-Mayi,

among them Mayi-Mayi Morgan, had occupied Mambasa, Orientale, FARDC and MONUSCO launched a counterattack in early January, leaving fourteen dead. MONUSCO used helicopters to support FARDC with ammunition. About 70 people died in clashes after having participated in at least one of these groups.

Apart from the aforementioned groups, many smaller Mayi-Mayi militias were active throughout North, South Kivu, Orientale and North Katanga often receiving support from larger groups such as M23 or FDLR [→DR Congo (inter-militant violence)]. In November, parts of Raia Mutomboki, Nyatura, and APCLS, laid down arms in North and South Kivu, but the groups continued activity.fgj, fb

DR CONGO (MILITANT GROUPS / KATANGA)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2011**

Conflict parties: Kata Katanga vs. government
 Conflict items: secession, resources

The conflict between Kata Katanga and the government concerning the secession of the DR Congo's resource-rich Katanga province continued on the level of a violent crisis. Kata Katanga, meaning "cut off Katanga" in Swahili, was a loose network of armed groups and political movements that emerged in 2011, demanding Katanga's secession from the DR Congo. However, the internal organization of the movement remained unclear. One of the groups belonging to the movement was the Coordination for the Referendum and Self-determination of Katanga (CORAK), based in Katanga's capital Lubumbashi. The armed wing of CORAK claimed responsibility for small-scale attacks in 2011 and 2012. Furthermore, armed Mayi-Mayi groups demanding secession were allegedly tied to the Kata Katanga movement [→ DR Congo (Mayi-Mayi)]. UN sources presumed Gedeon Kyungu to be the head of the armed movement, however, there were smaller factions operating independently.

Kata Katanga mainly recruited in the poorer northern part of Katanga and primarily targeted civilians in Mitwaba, Mobo and Pweto territories. The movement allegedly received arms as well as logistic and financial support from General John Numbi Banza Tambo, former Inspector General of the National Police, and Jean Claude Masangu Munongo, former governor of the Central Bank of the DR Congo. At the beginning of the year, some 1,000 troops of the Armed Forces of the DR Congo (FARDC) were stationed in Katanga while most troops were concentrated in the Kivu provinces [→DR Congo (M23)].

Between January 22 and February 8, Kata Katanga killed at least 65 in Mwemena settlement, Kasenga territory. Throughout the year, the militants also tried to take control of several mining sites. Mid-January, FARDC launched an offensive against Kata Katanga in the same area, killing at least thirteen people. Civilians fled their homes. On January 27, Kata Katanga attacked police in both Kikondja, Bukama territory, and Kasomeno, Kasenga. Four militants were killed. On February 17, a faction of Kata Katanga under Tanda Imena attacked Kinsevere town, 40 km from Lubumbashi, killing seven people. However, the governor of Katanga attributed the attack to armed bandits, not to Kata Katanga. In mid-February, a group called Tigers, armed with crude weapons and allegedly belonging to Kata Katanga, attacked Nsela village, close to Lubumbashi, killing six. Subsequently, FARDC launched an offensive against them. A group of up to 440 Kata Katanga

members entered Lubumbashi on 23 March 2013, demanding secession. During their march to the MONUSCO headquarters in the town, soldiers and police shot at the lightly armed group, killing at least 35. MONUSCO negotiated with the fighters and reported that 245 had surrendered. According to UN sources, Numbi allowed his farm outside Lubumbashi to be used as a base for Kata Katanga. Following the incident, FARDC launched operations against armed groups in Katanga in April and May. On November 14, Kata Katanga commander Toché surrendered to MONUSCO with 190 of his fighters and dependents.

According to UN sources, FARDC and Kata Katanga committed human rights abuses. As FARDC had no logistics in rural northern Katanga, the military exploited the population for food and housing. Kata Katanga recruited children into their ranks. The ongoing clashes displaced at least 150,000 to 200,000 civilians throughout the year, with total IDP population in Katanga numbering close to 400,000fb

ETHIOPIA (OLF / OROMIYA)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1973**

Conflict parties: OLF vs. government

Conflict items: secession

The secession conflict between the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and its armed wing, the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), on the one hand, and the government, supported by neighboring Kenya, on the other, remained violent. Throughout the year, OLF stated to have conducted several attacks on security forces in Oromiya region, which were neither confirmed nor denied by the government.

From January 2 to January 8, several OLA fighters killed 21 government troops and injured five others in West Harerge Zone, Oromiya. On January 5, an OLA unit thereby destroyed one government vehicle. On January 5, the OLF claimed that Oromo students at Arat Kilo and Amst Kilo campuses of Addis Ababa University were protesting against the government since January 2 and that more than 100 had been arrested by the government. On February 23, OLA killed four and wounded three government troops in East Welega, Oromiya. On April 5, an OLA command unit killed three government soldiers and wounded five others in West Harerge Zone, Oromiya. On April 19, a report by the US Department of State stated that the government restricted access to the internet and blocked the OLF website. Between April 21 and 22, OLA killed a dozen soldiers in North Shewa Zone, Oromiya, and injured many more. An OLA unit killed another three soldiers and injured four in East Welega Zone on July 20. On August 26, Kenyan MP Roba Duba blamed the OLF for killing six persons between August 22 and 24 in Marsabit County, Kenya. In September, OLA killed ten soldiers and wounded fifteen others in West Harerge. In clashes between October and November, three soldiers were killed and at least fourteen injured in East Welega Zone. On November 14, OLA killed two soldiers and wounded another eight in North Shewa Zone. sga

ETHIOPIA (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2005**

Conflict parties: BPLM, EUFF, Ginbot 7 et al., Semayawi party, UDJ vs. government

Conflict items: national power

The national power conflict between various oppositional rebel groups, specifically between the Ethiopian Unity and Freedom Force (EUFF) and the government, remained violent. A peace agreement between the rebel group Benishangul People's Liberation Movement (BPLM) and the government was reached on June 8 in the Benishangul-Gumuz region. Furthermore, several opposition parties, in particular the newly formed Semayawi and the Unity for Democracy and Justice (UDJ) party, organized three demonstrations to demand freedom for political prisoners and journalists. The first took place on June 2 in Addis Ababa and involved more than 1,000 people. It was followed by four more demonstrations on July 14 in Gondar and Dessie, Amhara region, and on September 21 and 28 in Addis Ababa.

Despite peace negotiations and agreements with some rebel groups, violent measures by other actors continued. For instance, on January 8, the EUFF blew up a bus with a landmine, killing about twenty government officials near Lalibela, Amhara. Another rebel group, Ginbot 7, received USD 500,000 from the Eritrean government on June 27 [→ Ethiopia – Eritrea].avm

GABON (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **2** | Change: ↘ | Start: **2009**

Conflict parties: UN, various opposition groups vs. government

Conflict items: national power

The violent crisis over national power between opposition groups and the government de-escalated to a non-violent crisis. On April 11 and 13, Minister of Interior Jean Francois Ndongou of the Gabonese Democratic Party (PDG) prohibited protests against ritual killings. However, on May 11, the government initiated protests led by President Ali-Ben Bongo's wife which criticized these ritual killings.

Hundreds of protesters formed a second demonstration, led by the Association for the Prevention of Ritual Crime, accusing the government of not taking the right actions against the practice of ritually killing people for their body parts. Police forces dispersed the protesters using teargas and batons and arrested six protest leaders. As in 2012, the National Communications Council in Libreville temporarily suspended three newspapers for criticizing President Bongo and his ministries. Elections, which were initially scheduled for November 23, were held on December 14. As demanded by the opposition, a biometrical voters list was implemented for the first time. However, the Network of Free Organizations of the Civil Society for Good Governance in Gabon (ROLBG) argued that technical problems were not fixed and the system was not used in all districts. Voters elected departmental and municipal councilors and, unlike in 2011, the opposition did not boycott the elections. Independent candidates, formerly belonging to the National Union (UN), won in four out

of 122 districts in the regions of Oyem, Mouila and Libreville. The opposition reported several irregularities during the elections such as unusual opening hours of polling stations and the bribing of voters. Additionally, opposition members were only able to take part in the elections as independent candidates due to the UN's 2011 bansec

GUINEA-BISSAU (COUP PLOTTERS)

Intensity: **1** | Change: **↓** | Start: **2009**

Conflict parties: military factions vs. government
 Conflict items: national power

The conflict over national power between military factions, who had staged a coup in 2012, and the government, de-escalated to a non-violent level. Following the coup, an interim government under Interim President Manuel Serifo Nhamadjo was formed. Under Nhamadjo, elections were repeatedly adjourned and finally scheduled for 03/16/14. The coup had ended the dominance of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC), which had provided nearly all of the country's presidents. In 2006, supported by UN and EU, the PAIGC-led government had initiated a security sector reform to restructure the military forces. On January 21, Nhamadjo announced the first postponement of the parliamentary elections originally scheduled for May. The US Drug Enforcement Administration arrested former navy chief Bubo Na Tchuto on April 2 and indicted army chief Antonio Indjai on April 18 in international waters off the coast of Guinea-Bissau, charging them with drug trafficking and delivery of arms to militant groups in Latin America [→ Colombia (FARC), et al.]. On May 30, the interim government presented a new transition roadmap for the formation of an inclusive government. Following negotiations between all political parties from May 7 and after, a new transitional government was formed. It was comprised mainly of members PAIGC and Party for Social Renewal (PRS) members and was installed on June 7. Nevertheless, on July 26, the main parties PAIGC and PRS boycotted a joint meeting held by Nhamadjo. On September 10, parliament denied amnesty to military officials involved in last year's coup. Two days later, members of the army detained and interrogated a journalist who had criticized the military structure. On May 22, the UN extended the United Nations Integrated Peace-Building Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) until 05/31/14, aimed at stabilizing the West African country. In July, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) extended its Mission on Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB) until 05/16/14. On December 10, the UN Security Council demanded that the country to return to the constitutional order suspended in the coup in April 2012, and threatened to impose sanctions. abs

KENYA (INTER-ETHNIC VIOLENCE)

Intensity: **4** | Change: **•** | Start: **1991**

Conflict parties: Borana vs. Rendille and Gabra and Burji, Garre vs. Degodia, Orma vs. Pokomo, Turkana vs. Merille, Turkana vs. Pokot
 Conflict items: subnational predominance, resources

The limited war over resources and subnational predominance between various ethnic groups continued. Clashes erupted over cattle rustling, land use, grazing, and water rights, as well as competition over political representation both between different ethnic groups and among sub-clans within ethnic groups. At least 180 people lost their lives, 220 were injured and thousands fled their homes due to the violence in the first half of the year. By the end of the year, almost 500 people were killed, 1,235 injured and about 50,000 displaced. The most effected districts were Tana River in the Coast Province, Turkana in the Rift Valley Province, and Moyale in the Eastern Province.

Violence between Pokomo and Orma in Tana River, which had started in August 2012, concerned water and pasture. For instance, on January 10, over 100 Pokomo torched houses in the Orma village of Nduru, killing ten people. The next day, Orma members killed ten Pokomo in a revenge attack in Kibisu.

Furthermore, Pokot and Turkana clashed over cattle and grazing grounds in the regions of West Pokot and Turkana. On February 8, seven people were killed when some 400 Pokot fighters raided a Turkana village in Kaptir and stole several thousand heads of cattle. Three people died when 200 Turkana raiders invaded the Pokot village Apuke on the Pokot-Turkana border, stealing 600 cattle in early October. Twenty more people died in further clashes between the two groups in November and December. The government deployed additional security teams to the area on December 6.

Moreover, Merille and Turkana clashed over fishing grounds in Lake Turkana, Rift Valley. For instance, Merille militia from Ethiopia abducted and killed at least four Turkana fishermen on August 2, and seven more on August 12. Subsequently, security was reinforced along the border.

Violence between Degodia and Garre erupted in May and June in North-Eastern Province, after no Degodia representative had been elected in the March 4 general elections. Despite the deployment of additional security forces to the region, at least 70 people were killed in clashes during the first half of the year as violence occurred in remote villages in grazing areas not accessible to the security personnel. On July 5, the two groups signed a peace agreement facilitated by community leaders.

In the border town Moyale in the eponymous district violence erupted between Borana and Gabra, when the Borana candidate lost his seat in the parliamentary elections against the allied tribes Rendille, Gabra and Burji (ReGaBu). In August, violence left more than twelve people dead and ten thousands displaced. Further clashes started on November 28 in Moyale, leading to a series of attacks and retaliation attacks which lasted until the beginning of December. These clashes left more than thirty people dead and more than 32,000 displaced. vm

KENYA (MRC / COAST)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **2008**

Conflict parties: MRC vs. government

Conflict items: secession

The conflict between the political movement Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) and the government over the secession of the coastal region remained violent. MRC carried out their threat from last year to disrupt the March 4 general election [→ Kenya (TNA – ODM)]. Between March 3 and 4, in a series of at least three assaults, around 200 alleged MRC members, armed with machetes and bows and arrows, attacked police in Kilifi and Mombasa Counties leading to twelve fatalities, including six policemen and six attackers. On March 4, deploying 300 secret police officers, the government launched a crackdown on the group in Kwale, Mombasa, and Kilifi Counties and arrested at least four suspected members of MRC. On March 20, police arrested MRC Spokesman Rashid Mraja in Kwale, at the border shared with Tanzania. On March 27, around 300 suspected MRC members, armed with machetes, attacked the casino of Malindi, Kilifi, killing two policemen. Police shot dead six attackers, arrested seven and intensified patrols in the area. On March 29, the government accused MRC and al-Shabaab militants of collaboration and issued an ultimatum giving the two groups seven days to surrender [→ Somalia (Islamist groups)]. MRC denied any links to the Islamists. On May 5, it accused the government of having planted renegades within its ranks to cause violence in order to justify a crackdown. MRC requested newly elected President Kenyatta to intervene and ensure that its members were not harassed. On July 8, government stated that due to several security and socializing programs as well as the arrests of its leaders, MRC would no longer be a threat in Kwale. On July 18 and 28, police arrested ten people total in Kwale, including MRC Spokesman Mraja, for administering oaths to MRC. Between August 30 and September 2, President Kenyatta issued 3,406 title deeds in Mombasa, 19,000 in Kilifi and 14,000 in Kwale to residents in order to end land disputes that had been occurring for decades on the coast. On September 5, Kenyatta declared his willingness to meet MRC elders to discuss peace matters, adding that the government would forget the past if the group ended the violence. On September 19, MRC declared its willingness to drop secession calls and take part in dialog with the central government. On the night of October 25, between ten and 50 alleged MRC supporters attacked a police camp in Ganze, Kalifi, with poisoned arrows and bows, injuring one police officer. MRC denied any involvement and accused the government of having initiated the attack. On November 11, police shot dead an unarmed woman in a house search for suspected MRC members in Ganze. Police stated that the members were armed. On November 29, a court in Mombasa dismissed a case against thirteen suspected MRC members due to a lack of evidence. According to security reports, some incidences connected to MRC were executed by splinter groups not authorized by the organization.¹¹

KENYA (TNA – ODM)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↗** | Start: **1999**

Conflict parties: TNA vs. ODM

Conflict items: national power


The conflict over national power between the political parties Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) and The National Alliance (TNA) escalated. The TNA, led by Uhuru Kenyatta, emerged from then-President Mwai Kibaki's Party of National Unity (PNU) in 2012. After the 2007 presidential election had led to more than 1,100 casualties, Raila Odinga's ODM and the PNU formed a grand coalition government in 2008. In the March 4 general elections, Kenyatta and Odinga ran for president, leading the two major competing political coalitions Jubilee and Coalition for Reforms and Democracy (CORD). Kenyatta and his running mate William Ruto faced charges of crimes against humanity at the International Criminal Court (ICC), both being accused of inciting the post-election violence in 2007/2008. On March 9, after the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) declared Kenyatta winner of the 2013 general elections, supporters of CORD-leader Odinga threw stones at the police in Kisumu County, political stronghold of ODM. Police dispersed the protesters using teargas. On March 30, after the confirmation of the election's outcome by the Supreme Court, stone-throwing ODM-supporters clashed with police again in Kisumu, and in the capital Nairobi. Police shot dead three protesters in Nairobi, killed two and injured eleven in Kisumu. The same day, Odinga publicly accepted his defeat and wished President-elect Kenyatta well. On April 9, Kenyatta was sworn in as Kenya's fourth president. On May 2, the government demanded the UN Security Council (UNSC) to drop the ICC-trials of President Kenyatta and his vice president Ruto. On May 21, the Kenyan Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) handed over a report to President Kenyatta, in which more than 30 sitting and former Members of Parliament and Senators were accused of having perpetrated the 2007/2008 violence. On May 24, the AU drafted a proposal to urge the ICC trials for Kenyatta and Ruto to be referred back to Kenya, which was criticized by Odinga. On June 30, CORD leaders headed by Odinga accused the government of delaying the TJRC report's public release. On August 3 and 4, Kenyatta and Odinga held a private meeting in Kampala, Uganda, convened by Uganda's President Yoweri Museveni, after months of mutual accusations. On September 5, the parliament ratified the government's proposal to withdraw from the Rome Statute, founding document of the ICC. On September 10, the trial against Vice President Ruto and radio journalist Arap Sang started at the ICC with both pleading not guilty. On October 29, police arrested the head of the IEBC and his deputy on grounds of corruption related to the general elections. CORD claimed that this indicated vote rigging. On November 15, the UNSC rejected a resolution that had been proposed by African states in October pleading to defer the trials of Kenyatta and Ruto at the ICC. On December 4, with the majority of the Jubilee faction, Parliament passed a law creating a government-controlled body with power to fine media for their reporting. On December 11, President Kenyatta signed the law which CORD had declared unconstitutional.¹¹

MALI (ISLAMIST GROUPS)

Intensity: **5** | Change: **↗** | Start: **2009**

Conflict parties: al-Mourabitoun, Ansar al-Din, AQIM, MUJAO vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power



The conflict over national power and the orientation of the political system between Islamist groups and the government, supported by France, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the EU, and MINUSMA, escalated to a war. Though Islamist groups had successfully entrenched their presence in northern Mali in 2012, the intervention of international forces in 2013 strongly curtailed their power in the country.

In early January, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Ansar al-Din fighters extended their territory toward the towns of Mopti and Konna, Mopti region. On January 10, President Dioncounda Traoré asked the French government for support in the fight against the Islamist militants. The following day, French troops arrived. France launched "Operation Serval", deploying approx. 3,000 soldiers and flying airstrikes with warplanes and helicopters. On January 17, Nigerian troops arrived as the first contingent of the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) in Bamako. On January 22, French troops bombarded the AQIM headquarters in Timbuktu, Timbuktu region. The same day, Chadian troops arrived in Gao region to support the government. By the end of January, Kidal, Kidal region, Diabaly, Ségou region, Douentza, Mopti region, and Konna were retaken by Malian and French troops. On February 6, French Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian stated that hundreds of militants had been killed in the first 26 days of the French intervention. Between February 2 and 3, French fighter jets targeted twenty suspected training camps and depots of Islamists in Kidal and Tessalit, Kidal region. On February 8, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) claimed responsibility for a suicide attack on a Malian army checkpoint near Gao. The same day, the EU officially launched the EU Training Mission in Mali (EUTM), to train Malian soldiers. Between February 22 and 24, Chadian forces killed 93 militants while losing thirteen soldiers in the Ifoghas Mountains, Kidal region. In late February, AQIM leader Abou Zeid was killed in a French offensive in the Ifoghas Mountains. In the same area, French troops killed fifteen AQIM fighters on March 4. In early March, French troops killed 50 MUJAO fighters in Gao. In mid-March, after several days of heavy fighting, French soldiers killed fifteen Islamist fighters and uncovered large weapons caches, including vehicles mounted with anti-aircraft guns. On March 20, a suicide bomb attack was followed by fights in Timbuktu, resulting in the death of ten Islamists and one Malian soldier. On April 1, Malian and French troops killed three Islamist fighters in Timbuktu. France withdrew its first contingent on April 9. On April 12, a suicide bomber killed three Chadian troops in Kidal. Subsequently, Chad announced that it would withdraw its troops. In late April, French forces passed control on to

AFISMA in Timbuktu. On April 25, UN approved MINUSMA, a peacekeeping mission for Mali, numbering 11,200 soldiers and 1,440 policemen. Between May 2 and 9, French troops launched twelve airstrikes in northern Mali. Two soldiers, the two attackers and one civilian were killed in a suspected MUJAO-orchestrated suicide bombing on the Malian army in Amakoudji near Gao on May 4. AFISMA handed over power to MINUSMA on July 1. On July 28, the first presidential elections were held after the coup in March 2012 [→Mali (military factions)].

On August 22, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, a former leader of an AQIM battalion, declared the formation of the joint movement al-Mourabitoun, consisting of MUJAO and Katibat al-Mulathamin. The latter, also called Masked Brigade, was reportedly led by Belmokhtar who was also known as leader of a group called Blood Signatories. However, it remained unclear whether the names, Masked Brigade and Blood Signatories, both referred to the same group.

On September 28, AQIM attacked a military camp in Timbuktu, killing up to sixteen Malian troops. On October 7, suspected al-Mourabitoun destroyed a bridge connecting Mali with Niger and injured two Malian soldiers [→Niger (Islamist groups)]. On October 23, militants launched a suicide car bomb attack against a MINUSMA camp in Tessalit, Kidal region. Two peacekeepers and one civilian were killed and six people injured. On November 2, AQIM kidnapped and killed two French journalists in Kidal. In mid-November, French troops killed three al-Mourabitoun fighters, among them the deputy commander of Blood Signatories, near Tessalit. In December, French soldiers killed nineteen AQIM fighters north of Timbuktu in a large-scale helicopter-backed operation. On December 14, an Islamist suicide attack in Kidal killed two MINUSMA soldiers and injured several others.

At the end of 2012, approx. 400,000 people had fled their homes. In mid-2013 the number had risen to over 530,000, consisting of approx. 360,000 internally displaced and 180,000 people who sought refuge in neighboring Burkina Faso, Mauritania, and Niger. In the second half of the year, at least 80,000 people returned to their homes.

MALI (MNLA / AZAWAD)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↓** | Start: **1989**

Conflict parties: MNLA vs. government

Conflict items: autonomy

The autonomy conflict between the Tuareg group National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and the government in the northern regions de-escalated to a violent crisis. In the beginning of 2012, MNLA had launched an offensive against the government in order to establish their own state Azawad, consisting of the regions Kidal, Timbuktu, and Gao. They had seized all major northern cities in a short-term alliance with Islamist groups. Following heavy fighting between the Islamists and MNLA over the ideological orientation of the newly established Azawad, most parts of northern Mali were controlled by Islamist groups at the end of 2012 [→ Mali (Islamist groups – MNLA); Mali (Islamist groups)]. In December 2012, MNLA suspended their secessionist goal, declaring their readiness for negotiations on the degree of autonomy for the Tuareg. Following the French Intervention in January, MNLA agreed to hold peace talks. MNLA also offered help to the French in their fight against the Islamists and arrested two Islamists in Tessalit, Kidal region, on February 4.

On January 28, MNLA declared to have regained control of Kidal, the last major city held by the Islamist group Ansar al-Din. The Islamist had already left the city, allegedly drawing back into the surrounding mountainous areas. On June 4, 90 km away from Kidal, a convoy of 300 Malian army vehicles captured Anefis, Gao region, after fights with MNLA, leaving two people dead. International mediators including UN, AU, and EU delegates elaborated a peace deal in mid-June, which was signed on June 18 in Burkina Faso. It included an immediate ceasefire and allowed government soldiers to enter MNLA's stronghold Kidal in order to secure the elections in July. Despite the ceasefire, MNLA clashed with a military patrol on September 12 near Lere, Timbuktu. Both parties accused each other of having started the fighting. On November 19, military clashed with protesters ahead of Prime Minister Oumar Tatam Ly's visit to Kidal. Subsequently, MNLA conclusively withdrew from the ceasefire agreement, stating that their forces were on alert. Following the advance of French troops, several Islamist splinter groups allegedly realigned with the MNLA.^{jsa}

MOZAMBIQUE (RENAMO)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **2012**

Conflict parties: RENAMO vs. government

Conflict items: national power

The violent conflict over national power between the oppositional Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) and the government continued. RENAMO had fought against the government during the civil war, but was disarmed and transformed into the main opposition party after a peace accord in 1992.

Since the beginning of the year, RENAMO, led by Afonso Dhlakama, had threatened to disrupt communal elections that were to be held in November, should its demands for changes in the electoral law be rejected. Clashes erupted in the central province of Sofala in April and June, and intensified in October, November and December. The violence consisted of mutual attacks of RENAMO fighters and security personnel on offices and base camps, as well as of dozens of ambushes by RENAMO on vehicles on the main highways. However, in many of the incidents RENAMO denied being responsible for the attacks.

On April 3, police raided a RENAMO headquarter in the town of Muxengue, Sofala province, using teargas to disperse a campaign, and arrested fifteen RENAMO members. The next day, members of the former rebel group attacked the police station in Muxengue, where their arrested colleagues were held. At least one woman and four police officers as well as a RENAMO commander were killed and ten policemen injured, whereas RENAMO forces claimed to have killed fifteen police officers and wounded 25. Two days later, alleged RENAMO members attacked a truck and a bus in Chibabava District, Sofala, killing three civilians and injuring two. On June 21, two days after RENAMO had threatened to paralyze key roads and the only coal export railway, suspected RENAMO ambushed another bus near the town of Machanga, Sofala, injuring one. On October 17, RENAMO militants attacked a military patrol of the Mozambican Armed Forces (FADM) near Gorongosa, Sofala, killing seven soldiers. The government denied the loss of soldiers and confirmed the death of two militants in the exchange of fire. On October 21, FADM captured Sathunjira base of RENAMO in Sofala province after days of

fighting, during which FADM had bombarded the base camp. Among the casualties was RENAMO's senior commander and MP Armindo Milaco. Subsequently, Dhlakama fled the base and RENAMO announced its annulment of the 1992 peace accord. The next day, gunmen attacked a police station in Maringue District near the fallen base camp. On October 26, alleged RENAMO militants assaulted a bus on the country's main north-south highway near Muxengue, killing the driver and injuring ten people. On October 28, FADM seized a second RENAMO military base in Maringue, allegedly resulting in the death of up to 41 RENAMO fighters and 17 FADM soldiers. In November, Dhlakama expressed his willingness to meet with President Armando Guebuza under the condition of a formal ceasefire and the cancellation of the municipal elections. Then again, he threatened to destroy the country if the government did not make political concessions. Furthermore, RENAMO boycotted the municipal elections held on November 20. On November 15, RENAMO again ambushed a security convoy on the highway near Muxengue. One militant and one policeman were killed, and nine people were injured. Similar attacks occurred on November 22, when RENAMO fighters attacked two vehicles near Maringue, leaving two injured and two dead. On December 4, RENAMO attacked a police station and looted a health center in Tica, Sofala. In mid-December, RENAMO refused to attend any dialog rounds with the government, unless international observers and mediators were present - a demand rejected by the government^{thg}

NIGER (ISLAMIST GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **2008**

Conflict parties: AQIM, MUJAO vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, subnational predominance

The ideology and subnational predominance conflict between Islamist groups and the government remained violent. Following an agreement between the USA and Niger on January 31, the US deployed approx. 100 troops to erect a drone base in Niamey in order to monitor militant Islamist groups. On May 23, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) launched two suicide bomb attacks in Agadez region causing the deaths of up to 25 people in total. In the first attack, members of MUJAO detonated a car bomb at a military camp near Agadez city and took hostages. The rescue attempt supported by French special forces resulted in the deaths of five people, including three MUJAO fighters and two hostages. The second car bomb exploded near a French-operated uranium mine in Arlit. On June 1, 22 prisoners, including members of MUJAO and the Nigeria-based Boko Haram, escaped from Niamey's main prison leaving three prison guards and one civilian dead [→Nigeria (Boko Haram)]. On June 12, alleged MUJAO members attacked a paramilitary police school in Niamey, subsequently being pushed back. On August 20, Niger and Mauritania signed a military cooperation agreement in order to combat militant groups in the Sahel region [→Mauritania (AQIM)]. On August 22, Mokhtar Belmokhtar declared the formation of the joint movement al-Mourabitoun, consisting of MUJAO and Katibat al-Mulathamin. The latter, also called Masked Brigade, was reportedly led by Belmokhtar. He was also known as leader of the Blood Signatories. However, it remained unclear whether or not the names "Masked Brigade" and "Blood Signatories" both referred to the same group [→Mali (Islamist groups)]. On


October 29, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) released four French hostages captured near Arlit in 2010^{jas}

NIGERIA (BOKO HARAM)

Intensity: **5** | Change: **•** | Start: **2003**

Conflict parties: **Boko Haram vs. government**

Conflict items: **system/ideology**



The war over system and ideology between the Islamist group Boko Haram and the government continued. Throughout the year, the conflict left more than 1,500 people dead and thousands displaced. In mid-January, the government deployed approx. 900 soldiers to Mali as part of the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA), where Boko Haram allegedly backed the Islamist groups [→Mali (Islamist groups)]. Security forces of the Joint Task Force skirmished with Boko Haram in their stronghold Maiduguri, Borno State on January 2, killing at least thirteen militants. On January 21, Boko Haram members opened fire on eighteen traders at a market in Damboa, Borno. The traders had sold bush meat, which Boko Haram considered forbidden for strict Muslims. The following day in Kano, Plateau State, Boko Haram members shot five people dead. On January 29, Boko Haram spokesman Sheikh Muhammad Abdulaziz surprisingly declared an impending ceasefire, but Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau denied any peace negotiations. Boko Haram offshoot Ansaru claimed responsibility for an attack on a prison, police station and a worker's camp of a construction company, killing one security guard and abducting seven foreign construction workers in Jama're, Bauchi State, on February 16. One month later, the group declared it had killed all hostages. On February 19, Boko Haram kidnapped a French family, including four children in Cameroon near the Nigerian border, but they were released two months later. On April 16, violence erupted in Baga, Borno, when Boko Haram gunmen attacked a military post, killing one soldier. Subsequently, security forces raided the village and engaged in a gunfight with hiding Boko Haram members. While the military claimed to have killed 30 Boko Haram members, villagers reported that soldiers set more than 2,000 houses ablaze and shot at fleeing inhabitants, causing more than 200 fatalities. Consequently, thousands fled to the nearby Cameroon border. On May 7, in Bama, Borno, approx. 200 Boko Haram members in army uniforms raided a prison, police posts, and army barracks. The heavily armed militants freed 105 prisoners and killed 55 policemen, soldiers, and civilians. Reportedly having lost control over several towns and districts in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states, President Goodluck Jonathan declared a state of emergency in these areas on May 14 in order to re-establish Nigeria's "territorial integrity". Cellular networks in the areas were shut down. In the course of the reinforced military action against Boko Haram bases in northeastern Nigeria, several thousand security forces raided villages, resulting in the arrest of about 200 suspected Boko Haram members and the death of dozens of militants as well as civilians.


The military also launched heavy offensives including air

strikes on suspected Boko Haram hideouts. The airstrikes were the first on Nigerian territory since the Biafran War. For instance, aerial bombardments between May 15 and 17 killed dozens of Boko Haram members and displaced some 2,400 near Gomboru Ngala, Borno. Boko Haram used anti-aircraft-fire. On June 16 and 17, Boko Haram raided two schools in Maiduguri and Damaturu in Yobe state, killing 22 people. Again on July 6, Boko Haram fighters attacked a school at Mamudo, Yobe, leaving 42 students and one teacher dead. Yobe officials claimed that Boko Haram burned down some 200 schools. On July 29, several bomb explosions killed up to 28 people in a Christian-inhabited Sabon Gari in Fagge, Kano. At the beginning of August, 32 Boko Haram members were killed when security forces discovered their heavy armaments both at a military checkpoint and in attempts to attack police and military stations near Bama, Borno. Aiming at members of a recently formed vigilante group which cooperated with the military to protect civilians from the Islamists, Boko Haram raided a mosque in Konduga, Borno, on August 11, killing up to 63 civilians. On August 19, Boko Haram attacked Dumba village, Borno, killing some 44 villagers and displacing 4,000. In retaliation to the forming of vigilante groups, two villages in Borno were raided by Boko Haram on August 31, leaving at least 38 villagers dead. Violence on both sides increased throughout September and October, causing about 700 casualties. Military launched several air and ground operations against Boko Haram strongholds in Borno and Yobe, in which at least 378 Boko Haram members were killed and huge arsenals of heavy weapons were recovered. Moreover, Boko Haram killed at least 341 people in attacks on vigilante groups, villages, schools, and security forces. For instance, after military forces had killed at least 60 militants at the beginning of the month, Boko Haram retaliated by killing approx. 160 people in Benisheik, Borno, on September 17. Reportedly, about 300 heavily armed attackers stormed the town, looting and killing the inhabitants and setting numerous houses, shops, and vehicles ablaze before they ambushed travelers on the nearby highway. The next day, a military attack on a Boko Haram camp in Kafiya Forest, Borno, left some 150 militants and sixteen soldiers dead. In Abuja, security forces killed seven Boko Haram members in a gun battle and detained twelve on September 18. At the end of the month, Boko Haram members killed at least 50 students in an attack on a school dormitory in Gujba, Yobe.

In a two-day attack starting on November 3, Boko Haram raided two villages near Bama, killing 57 civilians, followed by another series of raids on several villages in Borno. Throughout the month, a total of about 100 people were killed. On December 2, about 500 Boko Haram members attacked an air force base near Maiduguri, destroying aircrafts and military barracks. After having been repelled, the militants attacked nearby villages. Twenty soldiers, 24 Boko Haram members and at least 6 civilians were killed in the fighting. Furthermore, Boko Haram claimed responsibility for a car bomb explosion at Maiduguri international airport. Attacks on military bases continued when Boko Haram killed 15 soldiers and torched military barracks in Bama on December 20. Subsequently, the military started air and ground operations on suspected Islamist camps in Alafa forest, killing 56 militants.

According to UN, some 37,000 people fled to neighbouring Niger since the military began its offensive on May 15. In addition, nearly 1,000 Boko Haram members died in custody following the declaration of the state of emergency, according to human rights organizations. ses

NIGERIA (BOKO HARAM)




NO VIOLENT CONFLICT MEASURES VIOLENT CRISIS LIMITED WAR WAR

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NIGERIA (FARMERS – PASTORALISTS)

Intensity: **5** | Change: • | Start: **1960**

Conflict parties: farmers vs. pastoralists
 Conflict items: subnational predominance, re-sources



The conflict between farmers and pastoralists over resources and subnational predominance continued on the intensity level of a war. While the main conflict item was arable land, it was further fueled by differences concerning political, ethnic and religious issues between the predominantly Christian farmers of Berom and Tiv tribes on the one hand, and the mainly Muslim Fulani nomads on the other.

As desertification in the Sahelian Zone narrowed fertile grounds, farmers appealed to their right to use their ancestor’s farmland while Fulani nomads claimed it as grazing areas for their cattle. Due to increasing violence between farmers and pastoralists since 2009, the government established a Special Task Force (STF) to observe the situation in Plateau State and interfere if necessary.

Violence erupted in Zamfara State, where 30 gunmen attacked Makera and Usu villages, killing seven farmers on January 5. In Okpachanyi village, Nasarawa State, herdsmen shot dead 47 farmers at a funeral on March 12.

The same day, hundreds of gunmen attacked a Tiv settlement in Kadarko village, Nasarawa. They looted the village, destroyed farmland, killed sixteen farmers, and forced 6,000 inhabitants to flee. On March 27, following an attack of suspected Fulani herdsmen on the Christian villages Mangor and Matol in Plateau, which left some 23 people dead, police engaged in a gun battle with the assailants. The firefight left six of the attackers and two policemen dead. From April 4 to 9, herdsmen set up roadblocks and shot inhabitants of several villages in Wase Local Government Area, Plateau. At least 48 people were killed and 4,000 internally displaced. In Wukari, Taraba state, clashes between pastoralists and farmers erupted at a funeral on May 3.

During April, March and May, at least 400 people were feared dead and 18,000 displaced through sustained attacks by herdsmen on farmers villages in Agatu, Guma, Gwer west and Makurdi local government areas in Benue State. In the most fatal attack, herdsmen shot 53 attendants of a burial in Agatu on May 12. On June 5, Tiv farmers attacked Rukubi community, Nasarawa, which they suspected to be a hideout for pastoralists with whom they had fought over land. Some 27 people were shot dead and several houses and vehicles were destroyed. After about 1,000 cattle were stolen from herdsmen, they retaliated with attacks on villages inhabited by Taroh-farmers of Karkashi, Bolgang and Magama, Plateau, on June 27 killing approx. 32 farmers using guns and machetes. In a subsequent gun battle with the STF, twenty herdsmen were killed. About 6,000 people fled the area. On August 26, about 30 attackers stormed a nomadic settlement in Borno state, killing seventeen herdsmen.

On September 14, suspected Fulani gunmen looted seven villages in Zamfara State and burnt huts and food stores,

destroyed crops and farmland, and forced inhabitants to flee. On September 28, violence erupted in Benue, when Fulani herdsmen raided the villages of Ojantele, Okpagabi and Ibadan. The assailants killed ten villagers and razed huts, farmland, and fishponds. Another 23 died in a reprisal attack on a Fulani settlement and in clashes that followed. On September 31, Fulani gunmen invaded Attakar, Kaduna State, killing approx. 100 villagers, burning houses and crops. In an overnight attack, pastoralist gunmen killed up to 39 farmers in Barkin Ladi and Mandu villages, Plateau, on November 26. Over the course of the year, approx. 2,000 people were killed and an estimated total of 30,000 were displaced^{seb}

NIGERIA (MASSOB / BIAFRA)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1967**

Conflict parties: MASSOB vs. government
 Conflict items: secession

The conflict over the secession of south-eastern parts of the country between the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) and the government continued on a violent level.

On May 3, MASSOB renewed its secessionist claims but announced their willingness for negotiations. However, on May 29, the government declared that the organization was a national security threat and extremist group. In mid-January, residents of Amansea, Anambra state, found at least nineteen corpses in the Ezu River, among them alleged members of MASSOB. Subsequently, MASSOB blamed the Special Anti-Robbery Squad of the local police for killing their members in Awkuzu, Anambra. On April 19, the Supreme Court commenced a trial for conspiracy and treason against MASSOB leader Ralph Uwazuruike and six other members.

MASSOB repeatedly called on all ethnic Igbo to participate in a sit-at-home strike scheduled for June 8 in commemoration of all killed Igbo. On June 4, hundreds of members of the Association of Igbo Youths Organization protested against the strike. Over the course of the strike in Onitsha on June 8, MASSOB blocked roads and clashed with security forces. Government deployed both soldiers and policemen to the city. Reportedly, several people were killed or injured in the incident. On April 24, soldiers and policemen raided a MASSOB meeting near Ogbunike, Anambra, killing three members of the group, arresting six and injuring dozens. In another raid at a checkpoint near Okwe, Enugu State, on May 8, soldiers arrested fourteen members of MASSOB for hoisting a Biafran flag. A strike in Onitsha, Anambra, initiated by MASSOB, led to further violence on June 8. Police forces killed at least two members and arrested more than five. The same day, MASSOB burned police trucks and used firearms and Molotov cocktails against police forces when they clashed in Oba, Anambra. Reportedly, ten group members were injured though police denied the incident. In Onitsha, security forces allegedly killed one MASSOB member in a crackdown on October 16 and four in a clash on November 11^{db}

RWANDA (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **2** | Change: **↗** | Start: **2010**

Conflict parties: Democratic Green Party, UDF vs. government

Conflict items: national power

The conflict over national power between opposition groups and the government escalated but remained non-violent. Several human rights organizations and foreign governments repeatedly criticized the government's treatment of the political opposition.

On March 25, the leader of the Unified Democratic Forces (UDF), Victoire Ingabire, contested her eight-year sentence at the Supreme Court. She had been convicted for terrorism and genocide denial in October 2012. She was further accused of supporting the militant group Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda [→Rwanda (FDLR)]. On December 13, Ingabire's sentence was raised from eight to fifteen years. On March 28, former Prime Minister Faustin Twagiramungu announced his return from exile. Three months later, he accused the government of refusing him entry to Rwanda, which was subsequently denied by officials. Four years after the first application, the Democratic Green Party was registered as an official party on August 9, five weeks ahead of the elections. Four days later they announced that they were not yet ready to participate in the upcoming elections. On July 23, police arrested eleven members of a Catholic opposition group for protesting in front of the president's residence in the capital Kigali and demanding political reforms. Ahead of the elections, there were several reported cases of missing former government officials and security personnel. For instance, former member of the Security Service Innocent Kalisa went missing in Uganda on August 12.


In the September 16 parliamentary elections, the ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front won 41 out of 53 directly elected seats. The Social Democratic Party won seven and the Liberal Party five seats. nab

SOMALIA (ISLAMIST GROUPS)

Intensity: **5** | Change: **•** | Start: **2006**

Conflict parties: al-Shabaab vs. ENA, government, KDF

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power



The war over ideology and national power between the Islamist group al-Shabaab and the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) continued for the eighth consecutive year.

Al-Shabaab was pushed back over the last year. Ethiopian and Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a (ASWJ) troops now control significant parts of Galguduud, Hiiraan, Bakool and Gedo regions. AMISOM troops, mostly of Kenyan origin, took over parts of Gedo and the majority of Lower Juba region, installing a Jubaland administration under Ras Kambooni leader Ahmed Madobe. The FGS, with support of Amisom troops, extended

their control around Mogadishu and created a corridor into Bay region's capital. Al-Shabaab, however, continued to rule the majority of Southern-Central Somalia's regions, towns and countryside.


On April 4, the first Sierra Leonean troops arrived to augment AMISOM forces. On May 2, the UN Security Council unanimously voted for the establishment of UNSOM, which started its mission on June 3. On June 26, Sheikh Dahir Aweys, key member of the al-Shabaab Shura Council and former leader of the Islamist group Hizbul Islam, surrendered to the Himan and Heeb administration. The UN Security Council decided to expand the AMISOM mandate to 22,126 peacekeeping troops on November 12. On December 2, Prime Minister Abdi Farah Shirdon was ousted by a no-confidence vote of the parliament. Ten days later, President Hassan appointed Abdiweli Sheikh Ahmed as Shirdon's successor.

On January 3, al-Shabaab launched an attack on a Puntland military base in the Galgala mountains, Bari province, in which at least one of the attackers died. Three days later, al-Shabaab attacked a convoy of Somali and Ethiopian troops in Gedo province, which resulted in heavy fighting that left up to 23 people dead. On January 11, a failed hostage rescue attempt by French special forces led to the death of seventeen al-Shabaab militants, several civilians, two French soldiers and the French hostage in Bulo Marer, Shabeellaha Hoose province. At the end of February, government troops and AMISOM forces recaptured the cities of Aw Dheegle in Shabeellaha Hoose and the Jowhar airfield in Shabeellaha Dhexe province. On March 22, clan factions within the government forces clashed in Marka, Shabeellaha Hoose, causing at least five deaths. Al-Shabaab launched a suicide car bomb attack targeting the Supreme Court in the capital Mogadishu, killing at least 35, on April 14. On May 5, an al-Shabaab suicide car bombing on a Qatari delegation in Mogadishu killed at least eight people but none of the targets. Al-Shabaab attacks on FGS and Ethiopian National Army (ENA) forces near Baidoa in Bay on June 3 and June 25 led to at least ten deaths each. On June 17, government forces and AMISOM recaptured several towns in Shabeellaha Hoose. Two days later, al-Shabaab launched a suicide bomb attack on the UNDP compound in Mogadishu, which was followed by a gun battle. Fifteen people died, among them four UN security guards. The same day, al-Shabaab forces loyal to leader Abdi Godane killed al-Shabaab commander Al-Afaghani, an outspoken critic of Godane, and nine other members in Baraawe, Shabeellaha Hoose. After presidential elections in the disputed Jubaland state on May 15, clashes between alleged election winner Ahmed Madobe's Ras Kambooni militia and contenders, notably Barre Hiraale, in Kismayo, Jubbada Hoose province, left up to 70 people dead and 300 injured. In July, al-Shabaab executed at least six bomb and gun attacks in Mogadishu, targeting one hospital, businesses, and the Turkish Embassy, killing more than thirteen. On August 4 and 5, al-Shabaab wounded at least fifteen people in twenty mortar and bomb attacks in Mogadishu. On August 7, AMISOM and FGS forces clashed with al-Shabaab in Afmadhow, Jubbada Hoose, leaving 24 militants and two FGS soldiers dead. Throughout September, al-Shabaab continuously attacked Mogadishu, with the most fatal incident taking place on September 7, killing over eighteen people. On September 12, in an attempt to kill Jubaland President Ahmed Madobe, al-Shabaab killed twenty people after launching a bomb attack in Kismayo. On September 21, al-Shabaab captured Westgate Shopping Mall in Nairobi, Kenya, taking dozens of hostages. In the three-day siege and the ensuing attempt by Kenyan special forces to free the hostages, 72 people died, dozens were injured and

parts of the mall collapsed. On October 3, one day after the assassination of muslim cleric Sheikh Ibrahim Omar, a leading facilitator and recruiter of Kenyan youths for violent militant activity in Somalia, alleged al-Shabaab sympathizers torched a church in the city of Mombasa, Kenya, causing four deaths.

On October 19, an al-Shabaab suicide bomber attacked a cafe in Beledweyne, Hiiraan province, killing over fifteen people and injuring more than 30. Kenyan warplanes bombed an al-Shabaab training camp in the village of Hurguun in Bay, on October 31, killing at least 71 al-Shabaab trainees. On November 11, clashes between two al-Shabaab factions led to ten fatalities in Bulo Marer. On November 19, al-Shabaab attacked a police station in Beledweyne. The attack and the ensuing gun battle led to 28 deaths. During the week following the attack, FGS and ENA conducted security operations in several villages around the town, allegedly ousting al-Shabaab. On December 12, Al-Shabaab attacked FGS and Ethiopian forces in Qansadheer, leading to at least twelve deaths in the ensuing clashes.tg

SOMALIA (SOMALILAND – KHATUMO STATE)


Intensity: **3** | Change:  | Start: **2009**

Conflict parties: Somaliland vs. Khatumo State
 Conflict items: subnational predominance

The conflict over subnational predominance in the provinces of Sool and Sanaag, as well as Togdheer’s Cayn section between Somaliland and Khatumo State, de-escalated to a violent crisis. Somaliland claimed control over the territory, while in 2012, leaders of the three provinces founded Khatumo as an autonomous state of the Federal State of Somalia. The territory was also subject to disputes between Somaliland and Puntland (→Somalia (Somaliland – Puntland)).


After violence had erupted in the context of the local council elections held in Somaliland in the end of 2012, Somaliland troops and Khatumo fighters continued to clash sporadically in the beginning of the year. Most of the fighting took place in Sool. Somaliland troops and Khatumo fighters clashed in Sool’s capital Las’anod on January 19. On January 22 and 24 violence was reported in Huddun town, Sool. On February 3, Khatumo forces abducted three locals working for United Nations Population Fund in Taleh, Sool. On February 13, Somaliland troops attacked a Khatumo military base in Lafweyn settlement, near Huddun. Another incident in the same area occurred on March 8. On July 9, unilaterally declared President of Khatumo Muhammad Yusuf Jama condemned talks between Somaliland and the Federal Government of Somalia about a jointly controlled airspace. On July 22, Khatumo fighters allegedly defected to the Somaliland government. On August 20, Somaliland President Ahmed Mohamud Silaanyo met with elders from Sool, Sanaag and Cayn. After Somaliland authorities had banned the official Somalian currency, residents protested in Erivago town in Sanaag on September 19. Protests turned violent when Somaliland police and supporters of the Somaliland government clashed with protesters.

SOUTH SUDAN (INTER-ETHNIC VIOLENCE)

Intensity: **5** | Change:  | Start: **2011**

Conflict parties: Murle vs. Dinka vs. Lou Nuer vs. various ethnic groups vs. ethnic sub-clans

Conflict items: subnational predominance, resources




The conflict over subnational predominance and resources between various ethnic groups in the east of South Sudan continued on the level of a war. Violence evolved around cattle stealing, abductions, and general controversies over land, grazing, and water rights both amidst different ethnic groups and amongst sub-clans within ethnic groups. On January 1, Murle members attacked members of Dinka Bor in Bor County, Jonglei state, resulting in three fatalities. On January 3, suspected members of the Dinka sub-clan Pakam attacked Gok Dinkas in Cueibet County, Lakes state, leaving one person dead. Between January 16 and 18, approx. 25 people were killed in clashes over grazing grounds and retaliatory attacks between members of the Dinka sub-clans Amothnhom and Panyom in the cattle camps Marial-bek and Ghun in Lakes. On February 4, following the latest confrontations, officials of Bor County in neighboring Jonglei announced a campaign aimed at disarming Dinka members. In late January, Murle members killed three Dinka members during a cattle raid in Twic East County in Jonglei. 5,000 Lou Nuer fighters entered Rumbek Central County in Lakes, on February 2 and attacked Dinka members, resulting in hundreds of deaths. Six days later, Murle, together with members of the Yau Yau militia, attacked Lou Nuer, who drove their cattle to new grazing grounds whilst being accompanied by military personnel in Akobo County, Jonglei [→South Sudan (various militias)]. Between 103 and 114 people, including the fourteen employed soldiers, were killed and 17,000 displaced. Following the attack, Lou Nuer youths protested for more protection of civilians in Akobo County. On February 19, four people died in a fight between sub-clans of Dinka Kok following a Pamany clan member’s burial in a contested area in Rumbek East County, Lakes. To prevent further conflicts in the region, county officials from the states Lakes and Warrap agreed on grazing rights and water shares for pastoralist communities and promised to arrange the return of stolen cattle in March. On May 7, seven people were killed in a clash between two Nuer sub-clans in Akobo County. On May 14, Bul Nuer youths killed two people during a cattle raid on Jageay Nuer in Unity state. The following day, Murle attacked a convoy of the king of the Anuak in Pocholla County, Jonglei, causing five deaths. On May 18, cattle raiders from the Murle community attacked Jikany Nuer members, resulting in the death of 29. Between July 5 and 17, about 11,000 members of the Lou Nuer headed towards Pibor County in Jonglei, an area mainly inhabited by Murle communities. Subsequently, Lou Nuer attacked several Murle villages, abducted dozens of children, and stole cattle. The attacks and ensuing clashes led to the death of up to 370 people and the displacement

of 120,000. The conflict intensity decreased significantly between August and November. However, at least 80 people died in the said period in several clashes. On December 15, an alleged coup attempt by the former vice president Machar, belonging to the Nuer, on Dinka member President Kiir, led to intense fighting amongst different military factions in the capital and several northeastern provinces [→South Sudan (SPLA Defectors)].jpu

SOUTH SUDAN (SPLA DEFECTORS)

Intensity: **5** | Change: **NEW** | Start: **2013**

Conflict parties: defected SPLA troops vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology, subnational pre-dominance



A new highly violent conflict between defected Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) troops and the government erupted in the context of a power struggle within the ruling party, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). At least 1,000 were killed and about 200,000 were displaced in the last seventeen days of December. However, some estimates went as high as 10,000 fatalities. On December 6, several senior SPLM members led by former Vice-President Riek Machar Teny Dhurgon, who had been dismissed from office in July by President Salva Kiir Mayardit, held a press conference criticizing the president's governance as dictatorial. Tensions within the party increased at a meeting on December 14, in which the SPLM voted on fundamental party documents. Senior officials accused Kiir of not acting in the best interest of the party and that the decisions did not reflect the will of SPLM's leadership. The next day, rival groups within the presidential guard clashed in the capital Juba and inter-military skirmishes including heavy gunfire and shelling spread throughout the city. The violence polarized along tribal lines, with Kiir supporters tending to be from the Dinka tribe and Machar supporters from the Nuer tribe, to which the two political leaders belong, respectively [→ South Sudan (inter-ethnic violence)]. On December 16, President Kiir accused Machar of having staged a coup d'état by initiating an attack on the army headquarters in Juba with defected forces. Machar, who fled, denied the allegations. In the following days, eleven high-ranking political and military officials were arrested for being involved in the alleged coup. Within the first three days of the clashes between 15,000 and 20,000 people sought shelter at sites of the UNMISS in Juba and about 450 people were killed. Following the targeted killings of Nuer civilians in Juba, Central Equatoria, tensions and violence spread to several northern regions. On December 18, Nuer General Peter Gadet Yaak, commander of the 8th SPLA division, defected and took control of Bor, capital of Jonglei. The defected forces used heavy artillery and tanks to capture army bases forcing government-loyal troops to retreat. The violence spread further north to Akobo, Jonglei, where a Nuer group attacked Dinka who sought refuge in a UN compound. About 30 Dinka civilians and three UN peacekeepers were killed in the attacks on December 19. On the same day, oil company employees belonging to the

Nuer ethnic group attacked fellow Dinka workers at two oil fields in Unity state, leaving about sixteen dead and resulting in over 200 Dinka seeking refuge in a UN compound in the state capital Bentiu. On December 21, forces including Maj. Gen. James Koang Chuol, commander of the 4th SPLA division, defected and seized Bentiu, claiming to control the entire Unity state. In the following days, Koang declared himself military governor of Unity and established an interim administration. On December 22, former rebel group South Sudanese Liberation Army (SSLA) issued a three-day ultimatum to Koang, threatening to attack Bentiu should the anti-government troops not retreat [→South Sudan (various militias)]. In the following days, SPLA forces loyal to Kiir supported by SSLA attacked Bentiu but the defected troops remained in control. On December 24, government forces regained control over Bor. On the same day, SPLA spokesman Phillip Aguer announced that Machar-loyal rebels had taken control of Malakal, capital of Upper Nile state, but on December 29 stated that government forces had retaken the city. On a summit in Nairobi on December 27, East African regional organization Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) leaders set December 31 as a date for Machar to accept a ceasefire. Uganda's President Yoweri Museveni threatened direct military action against Machar-loyal forces, should he not accept the ceasefire. The same day, Machar claimed that forces loyal to him had been targeted near Bor by a MiG-23 jet fighter and helicopter gunships of the Ugandan army. Ugandan officials denied these accusations but confirmed their general military presence in South Sudan. On December 28, Kiir announced that he would release all but three of the detained politicians. A day later, thousands of members of the Nuer White Army militia reportedly marched on Bor. The next day, while clashes in Jonglei and Unity continued, Machar expressed his willingness to accept a ceasefire although he voiced concerns regarding monitoring mechanisms and the participation of the detained politicians. On December 31, the last day of the IGAD ultimatum, anti-government forces consisting of members of the defected 8th division allegedly supported by White Army militants again seized Borqgu

SOUTH SUDAN (VARIOUS MILITIAS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **2011**

Conflict parties: Militias David Yau Yau, SSDF, SSDM/A, SSLA vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology, resources

The conflict between the government and various militias over the orientation of the political system and resources remained violent. On April 19, President Salva Kiir Mayardit renewed his amnesty offer from 2011 to rebel leaders fighting the government. On April 25, Gordon Buay, a self declared spokesman of the rebel coalition comprising the South Sudan Liberation Army (SSLA), the South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army (SSDM/A), and the South Sudan Defense Forces (SSDF), accepted the amnesty offered by the president. One day later, SSDM/A spokesman Colonel Peter Kobrin Konyi denied the surrender. Reportedly, 3,000 SSLA fighters crossed the border from Sudan and handed over weapons and vehicles to state authorities in Unity state. On June 4, SSDM/A leader Johnson Uliny accepted the amnesty and admitted to having received Sudanese military support [→ Sudan – South Sudan]. On September 27, more than 1,500 SSLA troops, among them Major General

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Ayuok Ogot, surrendered in northern Upper Nile state. They handed over more than sixteen heavy mounted trucks to Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), the South Sudanese military.

On January 1, 50 Yau Yau militants attacked the outskirts of Makuach payam and the nearby village of Kolnyang payam, Jonglei state, killing five, injuring two, stealing cattle, and abducting three children that were later rescued by the army. Five days later, Yau Yau raided Pajut cattle camp in Twic East County, Jonglei, killing two people and thieving 80,000 heads of cattle. On January 8, SPLA killed three Yau Yau rebels trying to enter Pibor town, Jonglei. During the gun fight, rebels killed one young boy and injured two women. On January 21, a firefight between the army and security guards of former Yau Yau commander James Kuberin on Pibor's market forced 2,000 villagers to flee to a nearby UN base. On January 30, alleged Yau Yau rebels killed three and injured another three in an attack at Nyuak payam, Jonglei. On February 7, SPLA repulsed a Yau Yau attack in Obudi area, Upper Nile state, killing seven rebels and displacing thousands. On March 4, the army expelled Yau Yau rebels from Pibor county in several military operations, after Yau Yau had cooperated with the Murle tribe in a heavy attack near Sobat River on February 8 [→ South Sudan (inter-ethnic violence)]. While Yau Yau killed five soldiers, the army killed 28 rebels and seized a large number of ammunition and weapons. On March 28, SPLA forces conquered several airfields allegedly used by Yau Yau all over Jonglei.


On May 6, SSDM/A rebels led by David Yau Yau captured Pibor's capital Boma, leaving 50 dead and taking 250 captive. In a counterattack on May 12, SPLA recaptured Boma, killing twenty and losing four of their own. On October 20, suspected Yau Yau rebels simultaneously attacked three cattle camps in Paleu and Maar, Jonglei, killing 49 people, wounding 53, abducting six children, and stealing 50,000 heads of cattle. mwe

SUDAN (DARFUR)

Intensity: **5** | Change: • | Start: **2003**

Conflict parties: LJM, SRF vs. pro-government militias vs. reserve forces vs. government

Conflict items: subnational predominance, resources, other



The war over subnational predominance and resources in the Darfur region between several rebel groups and the government continued. The coalition of rebel groups Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF), comprised of the most active rebel groups, mainly operated in North and South Darfur. On October 2, the United People's Front for Liberation and Justice (UPFLJ), a coalition of Eastern Sudanese rebel factions, joined the SRF [→ Sudan (Eastern Front)].

According to rebel statements, some 2,000 Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) soldiers were killed throughout the year. However, the government never released death tolls. Furthermore, paramilitary groups such as the reserve police Abu Tira clashed with UN peacekeepers and SAF.

On July 30, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) extended the mandate of UNAMID by thirteen months. Throughout the year, sixteen UNAMID peacekeepers were killed.

For instance, on July 13 in Khor Abeche, South Darfur, seven UNAMID peacekeepers were killed by suspected Abu Tira members. On July 2, Abu Tira clashed with pro-government militias in Nyala, South Darfur, which caused the death of six combatants. Another intergovernmental clash occurred on November 23 in Mershing, South Darfur. The reserve force Popular Defence Force (PDF) attacked Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), killing six. On May 28, pro-government militias killed four policemen in Bielel, South Darfur.

Throughout the year, rebel groups and the government sporadically negotiated. For instance, the splinter group Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)-Bashar held negotiations with the government, signing a peace treaty on April 6 in Doha, Qatar. A few weeks later, the negotiator of the peace deal on the side of the rebel movement, Mohamed Bashar, was killed by unknown gunmen. On April 6, the Sudan Liberation Movement-Minni Minawi (SLM-MM) captured the towns Labado and Muhajeriya in East Darfur, killing approx. 100 soldiers. According to the rebel group, clashes between SLM-MM and SAF left 89 soldiers dead on April 22 in the cities Marla, Hijer Tonga, and Douanehon, South Darfur. The government stated it had killed dozens of SLM-MM members. One day later, SAF conducted an air raid, killing eight civilians in villages in South Darfur. On June 10, Sudan Liberation Movement-Abdel Wahid (SLM-AW) clashed with SAF near Thur, Central Darfur. SLM-AW killed 29 soldiers and seized seven fuel trucks. The ensuing SAF bombardment of the area displaced a large number of civilians. Between July 24 and 28, JEM took control of the Jebel Adaiir mountain area in South Kordofan. In the battle, JEM killed 52 government soldiers and took twelve soldiers hostage.

The splinter group Liberation and Justice Movement-Karbino (LJM-K) increased its activities over the year. For example, on September 10, LJM-K killed 26 soldiers and paramilitary forces in Hashaba, North Darfur.

Cooperation within SRF increased. For example, on May 13, SAF attempted to recapture Abu Karshola, South Kordofan, which had been taken in a joint SRF offensive. SRF attacked a government convoy and killed 411 SAF soldiers. 40,000 people fled their homes.

Skirmishes between SAF and SRF on June 29 in East Jebel Marra, North Darfur, displaced another 17,000 people. On November 3, SRF launched an attack on a Sudanese battalion in Nimra, East Jebel Marra, North Darfur, allegedly killing over 180 soldiers.

Throughout the year, several government ground and air strikes in East Jebel Marra also caused dozens of civilian casualties. For example, on April 28 an Antonov airplane and two MiG fighters from the government dropped over twenty bombs in Allah Kareem, South Darfur, which was completely burned down as a result. The air raid was followed by a ground offensive carried out by pro-government militias. Between November 11 and 26, the air force destroyed 350 houses in East Jebel Marra.


In September, thousands demonstrated all over the country. For example, on September 19, over 5,000 people protested in Nyala, South Darfur, against the presence of militias and demanded that the government enforce public security. Police shot dead five protesters and arrested fifteen. Rioters torched government buildings and several cars. Throughout the year, 460,000 people fled their homes in Darfur

SUDAN (INTER-ETHNIC VIOLENCE)

Intensity: 5 | Change: • | Start: 2011

Conflict parties: Al-Rezeigat Abballa, government vs. Beni Hussein vs. Misseriya vs. Salamat vs. Al-Gimir vs. Bani Halba vs. Maaliya

Conflict items: subnational predominance, resources



The war over subnational predominance and resources, including land, water, and mineral rights, between various ethnic groups continued. Violence mainly revolved around cattle raids, abduction, tribal controversies, and gold, the latter primarily being disputed in Darfur region. The heaviest fights took place between Al-Rezeigat Abballa and Beni Hussein tribes over disagreements on mining rights. Inter-tribal fighting broke out over the control of an artisanal gold mine in Jebel Amer, North Darfur state, on January 5, lasting several days. Beni Hussein tribesmen surrounded the gold mine and ordered workers to leave the site. The next day, heavily armed Abballa tribesmen arrived at the Jebel Amer gold mine. Fighting broke out that killed and injured people of both sides. The local market was looted and around 60,000 gold mine workers were forced to flee. According to UN, at least 839 people were killed, thousands injured, around twenty villages looted, and about 150,000 displaced. Abballa fighters were allegedly supported by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). On January 17, leaders of the Abballa and Beni Hussein tribes signed a ceasefire agreement and started negotiations. However, violence between the two groups and several other ethnicities continued. On February 22, a large number of Abballa fighters assaulted a group of Beni Hussein in El Sereif Beni Hussein city, where displaced people had sought refuge in the aftermath of the first attack. Between twenty and 60 people were killed and around 30 houses burned. On April 28, Abballa militia threatened to invade El Sareif Beni Hussein if members of Beni Hussein did not return livestock which had allegedly been looted by Beni Hussein tribesmen.

On May 21, clashes over land between Al-Gimir and Bani Halba tribes near Katela town, South Darfur, left 53 dead and many injured. The attack was carried out by approx. 1,000 Bani Halba fighters on SUVs, as well as on motorcycles, camels, and horses, temporarily displacing all 20,000 residents. In a similar attack in Katela on June 25, Bani Halba killed at least nine Al-Gimir tribesmen and forced dozens to flee. On June 26, in clashes between Beni Hussein and Abballa militias up to 60 Beni Hussein were killed or injured over ownership of cattle, 4 km north of El Sereif Beni Hussein city besieged by Abballa militia. On June 29, Abballa tribesmen attacked SAF in El Sareif Beni Hussein, who had been sent to calm the situation, killing one soldier and injuring four. Two civilians were killed in the crossfire.

After years of fighting, Misseriya and the rival Salamat tribe signed a peace agreement at Zalingei, South Darfur, on July 3, including compensations and modalities for the return of

refugees. In early July, heavy clashes took place between Misseriya and Al-Rezeigat Abballa tribesmen, in western Darfur, causing the death of 54 people.

On July 25, negotiations between leaders of Beni Hussein and Abballa resulted in a peace agreement in El Fasher, North Darfur. Government authorities assumed administrative responsibility over Jebel Amer and its gold mines. Furthermore, the agreement included a compensation fund financed with gold revenues to pay blood money for each victim of the conflict. It further provided for the return of occupied land, the opening of roads, and the securing of markets and farms. On July 29, weeks after signing the peace agreement between Misseriya and Salamat, renewed fighting broke out in Umm Dukhun, South Darfur, leaving 94 people dead. Three days later, some 134 were killed in additional fighting in the same area. Between August 9 and 17, more than 100 people were killed and 42 abducted in a conflict over land and cattle between Rezeigat Abballa and Maaliya in Kilaikil, East Darfur state. On August 22, both tribes signed a peace agreement. Throughout the year, clashes between the two tribes forced an estimated 144,000 people to flee the Darfur region.

After the signing of a third reconciliation agreement between Salamat and Misseriya, heavy fighting left 45 dead in Muraya village, Central Darfur, between September 26 and 28.


On October 26, Beni Hussein farmers stole camels and destroyed farmland. Subsequently, Abballa gunmen allegedly ambushed members of the Beni Hussein tribe. One person was killed and another injured. bjb, mwe

SUDAN (SPLM/A-NORTH / SOUTHERN KORDOFAN, BLUE NILE)

Intensity: 5 | Change: • | Start: 2011

Conflict parties: SPLM/A-North, SRF vs. government

Conflict items: autonomy



The war between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army-North (SPLM/A-North) and the government over the autonomy of South Kordofan and Blue Nile states [→ Sudan – South Sudan] intensified. The government launched aerial and ground attacks, targeting SPLM/A-North militants in South Kordofan state and Blue Nile state. In comparison to last year, military operations intensified which caused a large number of civilian casualties. Increased military activities of SPLM/A-North from January to June led to a further escalation between Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and rebels. In this time, SAF carried out 208 air strikes using Antonov planes, jet fighters, and military helicopters. Following those operations in the border region to South Sudan, more than 371,000 people were displaced by the middle of the year. Security forces increased abductions and arbitrary arrests as well as house to house searches.

On January 1, President Omar al-Bashir called on SAF and allied militias to recapture rebel-controlled territories. Following this call in early January, a major military operation was carried out in several towns, using heavy artillery, machine guns, gunships, and airplanes. On January 11, gov-

SUDAN – SOUTH SUDAN

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↓** | Start: **2011**

Conflict parties: Sudan vs. South Sudan

Conflict items: territory, resources, other

The conflict over territory and resources between Sudan and South Sudan de-escalated to a violent crisis. While 2012 was marked by several heavy gun battles, both countries increasingly engaged in negotiations on the border delineation and the status of the oil-rich Abyei region in 2013.

On January 2, South Sudan claimed that Sudan had killed 32 people in an attack on their shared border in Raja County, Western Bahr el Ghazal state. Nevertheless, the presidents of both parties met for talks on January 4 and 5, agreeing on the establishment of a demilitarized border zone. On January 25, the AU extended its mediation mission amid problems of implementation. South Sudan claimed that Sudan had carried out a helicopter attack near Babaniss in Upper Nile state on February 2, killing one soldier and injuring three. Despite the agreed upon demilitarized zone, Sudan deployed more troops in the border region. However, in a conciliatory move on February 18, Sudan released five soldiers of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), South Sudan's official army, and announced the plan to release 800 others without providing a specific date. Intending to resume suspended oil exports, both countries met on March 8 and agreed on troop withdrawals from the demilitarized zone. Later in March, the AU and the UN confirmed the implementation of the troop withdrawal. Additionally, both states vowed to cooperate concerning rebel issues [→Sudan (SPLM/A-North / Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile), South Sudan (various militias) et al.].

Sudan's President Omar Hassan al-Bashir pledged to improve relations during a visit to South Sudan on April 12. Two days later, oil transport between the two nations was resumed. During his first visit to South Sudan, al-Bashir met his South Sudanese counterpart President Salva Kiir Mayarditt in late April. They agreed on provisions regarding security, the common border, and economic relations. Both leaders reaffirmed their commitment to reconciliation after the killing of a tribal leader in the contested Abyei region in early May. Still, South Sudan redeployed some troops to the demilitarized zone in response to the incident. Moreover, each conflict party accused the other of supporting rebels in their respective territories and in June Sudan threatened to shut down its pipelines for South Sudanese oil in response. At the same time, South Sudan claimed that Sudan had deployed 3,000 troops on its territory. Nevertheless, in late June, Sudan released 125 South Sudanese abductees, who had been kidnapped by Sudan Armed Forces in January. In an isolated incident on August 5, one Sudanese soldier was killed in a clash with a South Sudanese patrol near Tashween site, Southern Kordofan state, Sudan. However, additional security agreements were reached in the same month.

Oil output substantially increased following a meeting between the two presidents in the Sudanese capital of Khartoum on September 3. On October 22, both countries agreed to delay the envisioned Abyei referendum. Still, in a referendum unilaterally initiated by South Sudan, permanent Abyei residents voted on October 31 to stay with South Sudan. On November 16 the UNISFA mission in Abyei was extended for another six months. On November 20 both presidents vowed to accelerate the implementation of their cooperation agreements. bkm

ernment forces claimed to have killed more than 50 rebels in clashes in the area of the villages El-Homra and El-Ehemer, South Kordofan. Rebels denied this, claiming both to have killed 43 government troops and to have injured hundreds. On January 19, government forces attacked SPLM/A-North militants in Al-Shifir, South Kordofan, killing two and injuring four while losing four soldiers. On February 8 and 20, fighting between government forces and SPLM/A-North militias in South Kordofan resulted in 37 casualties. On February 14, the government launched air and ground attacks in Blue Nile state, forcing out more than 8,000 civilians. On February 18, the government announced that its forces had taken control of Mufu area, Blue Nile state, killing 66 and wounding at least 70 SPLM/A-North fighters. On March 1, the government reinforced its troops with one battalion and announced to deploy two more battalions to Ed Damazin, Blue Nile state. On March 11, clashes in Surkum area, Blue Nile, resulted in more than 40 SPLM/A-North casualties. On April 10, SAF carried out airstrikes in Blue Nile and Kordofan, killing at least seven civilians and injuring ten. On April 16, SPLM/A-North rebels captured the Dandor garrison, near Kadugli, the capital of South Kordofan. Fifteen government troops and four SPLM/A-North militants were killed in this attack. The following day SAF units recaptured Dandor. From 23 to 27 April, SPLM/A-North and the government held the first talks since 2011 about a political solution for the conflict in South Kordofan and Blue Nile. In late April, the SPLM/A-North attacked four towns near Kadugli. More than nine villagers, fifteen rebels and five soldiers were killed in the skirmishes. On May 19, President al-Bashir accused South Sudan of backing SPLM/A-North. On May 27, a coalition of SPLM/A-North and rebels of the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) clashed with government forces in Dandor, killing several soldiers. According to the government, 70 rebels were killed in the fight. In Kadugli, more than 100 were found buried in mass graves in May.

On June 4, Sudan's ruling National Congress Party rejected the negotiation with SPLM/A-North rebels. On June 14, SPLM/A-North rebels killed one UN Interim Security Force for Abyei soldier and wounded two others. On August 2, SPLM/A-North leaders discussed a settlement to the conflict in Blue Nile and South Kordofan states, considering the Addis Ababa Peace Framework Agreement. On August 24, four rebels as well as some government troops were killed during fighting in Blue Nile. On October 28, Sudanese President al-Bashir renewed his call to negotiate with SPLM/A-North fighters. Between November 14 and 19 the SAF launched air strikes on South Kordofan, killing eight and displacing 2,700. On November 19, two people died and four others were injured in an SPLM/A-North attack with mortar shells on Kadugli. On November 20, government forces gained control over Kaling village in South Kordofan which was retaken one day later by SPLM/A-North rebels. On November 23, SPLM/A-North rebels killed fifteen SAF troops in South Kordofan. Three days later, SPLM/A-North killed five government troops and captured military equipment in Blue Nile state. Two rebels were killed in the attack and four were wounded. On December 2, SPLM/A-North rebels destroyed an army camp located in South Kordofan. lmp

TANZANIA (CHRISTIANS – MUSLIMS)

 Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2012**

 Conflict parties: Christian groups vs. Muslim groups
 Conflict items: subnational predominance

The conflict over subnational predominance between Christian and Muslim groups continued on a violent level. Violence started in October 2012, when Islamist protesters burned churches and smashed cars in and around Tanzania's capital Dar es Salaam, after a boy had urinated on a Quran. Since then, the number of violent clashes between radical Christians and Muslims increased.

At the beginning of the year, Muslim leaders demanded the shutdown of butcheries owned by Christians in Buseresere, Kagera province. On February 11, alleged Muslim youths attacked Christians in Buseresere and beheaded a Christian priest. In March, the government suspended the broadcasting of two radio stations for six weeks, accusing them of being responsible for inflammatory messages and thus instigating conflicts between Christians and Muslims. On March 21, 52 followers of the Muslim cleric Sheikh Ponda Issa Ponda, Secretary of the Council of Islamic Organizations in Tanzania, were sentenced to one year in prison. They were charged with three counts of conspiracy, unlawful assembly, and rioting. On April 3, approx. 200 Christian protesters attempted to torch a mosque in Tunduma, Mbeya province, close to the border to Zambia. Police used teargas and live ammunition to disperse the protesters and arrested over 50 people. Subsequently, Zambian authorities decided to close the border to Tanzania in Nakonde, Northern Province of Zambia.

On May 5, attackers threw a bomb into a Catholic church in Arusha in the eponymous province while Archbishop Francisco Montecillo Padilla, the Vatican's ambassador to Tanzania, was present. Three people died and up to 59 were injured. On May 9, Sheikh Ponda Issa Ponda was released from prison under the condition that he would not instigate any violence for at least a year. The same day, the National Assembly passed a resolution aimed at prohibiting politicians and other public figures from spreading inflammatory messages. Three days later, a court in Arusha charged a suspect of the May 5 bomb attack with three counts of murder and eighteen counts of attempted murder. On August 10, police officers tried to arrest Sheikh Ponda Issa Ponda in the province capital Morogoro for instigating violence. However, a clash between his supporters and the police erupted and Ponda managed to escape. Due to the severeness of sustained injuries, he surrendered two days later and was hospitalized in Dar es Salaam. Ponda was charged with repeatedly instigating violence in June and August and transferred to a remand prison in Segerea, Dar es Salaam. On August 19, he faced three further charges at the Morogoro Resident Magistrate's Court. On August 23, unknown assailants threw molotov cocktails into a church in Segerea. On October 21, the 52 supporters of Sheikh Ponda, arrested earlier this year, were acquitted of the charge of conspiracy. In November, Ponda issued an appeal against the most recent charges placed against him. On December 2, the Union of Church Denominations in Tanga province decided to refrain from any further state-initiated multilateral meetings between Tanzanian religious leaders. They stated that these approaches had failed to improve the current situation in Tanzania.

jrt

TOGO (OPPOSITION)

 Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1963**

 Conflict parties: ANC, CST vs. government
 Conflict items: national power

The conflict over national power between the National Alliance for Change (ANC) under Jean-Pierre Fabre as well as several other opposition groups and the government's party Union for the Republic (UNIR) of President Faure Gnassingbé remained violent.

On January 11 and 12, two market places in the city Kara and the capital Lomé were burnt down. Based on governmental investigations, police arrested more than twenty opposition members in the following weeks including former Prime Minister and leader of the Organisation for Building a Solidly United Togo (OBUTS) Agbéyomé Kodjo. In addition, the police searched several houses as well as the ANC's central office.

On February 25, the government released Kodjo next to several other opposition members. Kodjo claimed he had been tortured in prison. Police interrogated ANC leader Fabre as well as the head of Save Togo Collective (CST), Abass Kaboua, on March 11. Fabre accused the government of trying to eliminate political contesters.

In May, the police stated that an imprisoned opposition member of CST died by cardiac infarction. The opposition doubted this. Ten opposition members were released from detention in mid-June.

Over the first half of the year, opposition groups continuously staged demonstrations, mainly organized by ANC and CST, and were often dispersed by police, who used teargas to halt the demonstrations. On April 14, thousands of protesters took to the streets demanding the reopening of schools, which had been closed following teacher's demands for a wage raise. During an attempt to disperse the demonstration, police shot dead a boy. Protesters then demolished several governmental buildings.

Originally scheduled for October 2012, the parliamentary election was finally held on July 25. According to the government, the elections had been repeatedly postponed due to continuous protest. UNIR received 62 out of 91 seats followed by CST with 19 seats. Opposition parties heavily doubted the fairness of the election. Throughout the year, CST members repeatedly clashed with police in Lomé, leaving dozens injured.

nri

UGANDA (ADF-NALU)

 Intensity: **4** | Change: ↗ | Start: **1987**

 Conflict parties: ADF-NALU vs. government
 Conflict items: national power, resources

The conflict over national power and resources between the Allied Democratic Forces-National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (ADF-NALU) and the government, supported by the DR Congo, escalated to a limited war. ADF-NALU's goal was to overthrow the government and establish an Islamist state in Uganda.

Ugandan and Congolese officials had claimed that ADF-NALU

had links to Al-Qaeda or the Somalia-based Al-Shabaab militia. A UN Group of Experts report did not confirm the allegations, but instead stated that foreigners and Arabic-speaking men had conducted military training.

ADF-NALU had an estimated strength of 1,200 to 1,500 armed fighters and controlled up to 420 km in the area between Mbau and Kamango in northeast Beni territory, North Kivu province, close to the Ugandan border.

ADF-NALU maintained older bases and established six new ones. The group had ties to local authorities and businesses, maintaining cross-border economic and logistic networks. They derived funding from the car and motorcycle taxi business in North Kivu and profited from gold and timber exports to Uganda.

Throughout the year, ADF-NALU regularly attacked villages and army units, targeted medical facilities and shipments and conducted forced recruitment in the region. The militants allegedly abducted up to 300 civilians including local officials. On June 29, ADF-NALU took over Semuliki Bridge on the Mbau-Kamango road and killed several Armed Forces of the DR Congo (FARDC). One day later, the militants occupied Mamundioma and Totolito. In clashes with FARDC, twelve militants and four soldiers were killed. On July 11, about 100 ADF-NALU attacked and briefly occupied Kamango, killing twelve people, looting public buildings and the hospital. FARDC re-captured Kamango one day later, killing two militants. ADF-NALU killed four soldiers and wounded twelve. Between 30,000 and 60,000 refugees fled to neighboring Bundibugyo district, Uganda. On July 14, ADF-NALU fired on a MONUSCO patrol north of Mbau and injured three soldiers. One day later, ADF-NALU hit two MONUSCO helicopters. Militants killed five and abducted 36 people in Maleki on September 30. On October 23, ADF-NALU abducted 26 civilians at Upira and took them to the ADF-NALU bases Makembi and Tshutshubo. On December 25, the militants attacked Kamango and allegedly killed 40 civilians. One day later, MONUSCO and FARDC troops retook Kamango, using MONUSCO helicopters.

bjb

UGANDA (LRA)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1987**

Conflict parties: LRA vs. government

Conflict items: subnational predominance

The conflict over subnational predominance between the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the government continued on a violent level.

After being pushed out of northern Uganda by the Uganda People's Defense Force (UDPF) in 2006, LRA operations converged around the border triangle of the DR Congo, the Central African Republic (CAR), and South Sudan [→South Sudan (LRA)]. CAR remained the suspected location of the LRA's command. Attacks commonly consisted of looting and abductions carried out by small formations. Early in the year, LRA's leader Joseph Kony allegedly left his location in Sudan to return to northeastern CAR. Some 443,000 people remained displaced.

In January, security forces killed the commander of LRA operations in DR Congo, Vincent Okumu Binansio, in a clash near CAR's border with South Sudan. Over the year, LRA attacks mostly concentrated in Orientale Province, DR Congo, with 28 attacks on civilians and ten clashes with military forces. For instance, suspected LRA killed eight nomadic Mbororo east of Gwane, Orientale Province. In CAR, LRA violence consisted of at least twenty attacks on civilians and four clashes with military forces. In early June, LRA attacked diamond mining villages Akosso and Pipidemotro, CAR, killing six civilians and abducting ten. The local population pursued and killed four attackers. LRA resounded by decapitating six civilians in a reprisal attack, displaying their heads on tree trunks.

In February, DR Congo officially introduced 500 troops to the AU Regional Task Force (RTF). The RTF, a 5,000 strong US-backed military force and part of the Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the LRA (RCI-LRA), launched Operation "Monsoon" on August 9 in the border triangle. The RTF had suspended operations after Séléka's January overthrow of CAR's president Bozizé [→Central African Republic (rebel groups)]. According to the AU, the force destroyed several LRA camps in CAR and DR Congo. In April, the US State Department announced a USD 5 million award for information on LRA leaders indicted by the ICC. On November 21, CAR's president Djotodia claimed he was negotiating with LRA leader Joseph Kony.cke

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CONFLICTS IN THE AMERICAS



- NO VIOLENT CONFLICT
- VIOLENT CRISIS
- LIMITED WAR
- WAR

REGIONAL PANORAMA



The overall number of conflicts in the Americas increased to 54. While three conflicts had already ended in 2012, five new conflicts erupted in 2013, among these four intrastate and one interstate conflict. The latter, regarding the possession of Isla Conejo in the Gulf of Fonseca, constituted the first new interstate conflict since 2009 [Honduras – El Salvador (Isla Conejo)]. Concerning internal conflicts, two erupted in Colombia alone, as inter-cartel and -paramilitary hostilities in 2013 amounted to a new limited war [Colombia (inter-cartel violence, neo-paramilitary groups)]. In addition, in the region Catatumbo, Norte de Santander department, the local farmers’ organization ASCAMCAT demanded the creation of a semi-autonomous Rural Reserve Zone [Colombia (ASCAMCAT / Catatumbo)]. In Brazil, protests by various social groups against transportation fares in São Paulo escalated to nationwide violent mass demonstrations in June and July [Brazil (social protests)]. In Argentina, a new conflict erupted with dynamics similar to the 2012 police riots in Brazil and Bolivia. The conflict over provincial police’s wages reached the level of a violent crisis and lasted for two weeks [Argentina (police riots)].

Three conflicts ended throughout the observation period. The interstate dispute between Argentina and Iran ended when both countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding which included the establishment of a Truth Committee to investigate the 1994 bombing of the Argentine Israelite Mutual Association (AMIA) building in Buenos Aires [Argentina – Iran (AMIA)]. Another dispute, concerning the 2012 impeachment of former president Fernando Lugo in Paraguay, ended with nationally and internationally recognized presidential elections [Paraguay (impeachment)]. The conflict between the Colombian guerrilla groups FARC and ELN ended with a peace agreement. The groups announced in a joint statement on July 1 that they planned to unite the two groups into a single revolutionary guerrilla movement [Colombia (FARC – ELN)].

The region’s sole war, fought between drug cartels and the Mexican government, witnessed the emergence of civilian vigilante groups in the Pacific states Michoacán and Guerrero, fighting both the government and local cartels [Mexico (drug cartels)]. The limited war pertaining cartel infighting saw a further fragmentation of organized crime groups and intensified turf wars in Sinaloa, Guerrero, Jalisco, and Chihuahua, as well as in the Gulf state Tamaulipas [Mexico (inter-cartel violence, paramilitary groups)]. The Brazilian government extended its efforts to curb criminal activities in the border regions and to regain predominance over gang-controlled favelas. Increasing murder rates in some of the larger cities and violence in surrounding areas again accounted for a limited war [Brazil (drug trafficking organizations)]. In Colombia, the two conflicts involving neo-paramilitary groups and drug cartels constituted limited wars, both accounting for several thousand IDPs [Colombia (neo-paramilitary groups, drug cartels)]. The ongoing limited war between FARC and the government constituted the third highly violent conflict in the country. Despite progress in the peace negotiations in Havana, Cuba, the government’s military campaign as well as attacks by FARC continued [Colombia (FARC)]. In El Salvador, peace negotiations came to a halt when the 2012 truce between criminal gangs and the government was repeatedly violated and gang members resorted to killing security forces and members of adversarial gangs [El Salvador (Maras)].

The predominant conflict items in the region remained resources and system/ideology with 26 and 21 cases, respectively. Subnational predominance, contested in thirteen intrastate conflicts, ranked third. Twelve of these conflicts were conducted violently. Territory remained disputed in ten interstate conflicts, among them the new non-violent crisis between Honduras and El Salvador and the violent border conflict between Guatemala and Belize. Noticeable developments concerned the six struggles for national power in Bolivia, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, as of all these conflicts were conducted with the use of violence.

With 49 percent of their total of conflicts concerning resources, the Americas were the region with the highest percentage of conflicts revolving around this issue. Interstate conflicts mainly revolved around oil and fishing grounds. For instance, in the conflict between Argentina and the UK over the disputed islands of the Malvinas/Falklands, both countries claimed not



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only the pertinent islands but also the surrounding area with assumed oil deposits. In the non-violent crisis with Colombia, Nicaragua allegedly mined for hydrocarbon and prepared oil drillings in disputed maritime areas. Tensions rose due to the ongoing presence of Colombian warships in the area and a request by the Colombian parliament to the defense ministry concerning the possibility of fighting a war against Nicaragua [–Nicaragua – Colombia (sea border)]. The conflict between Chile and Peru concerning fishing grounds and the maritime boundary remained pending at the ICJ at the end of the year.

With regard to intrastate conflicts, a variety of resources such as arable land, minerals, e.g. gold and emeralds, water, and drugs were contested. Various conflicts across the region were fought over the cultivation as well as the trafficking of drugs and/or their precursors. Besides, they accounted for all high-intensity conflicts and three violent crises [Guatemala (drug cartels), Honduras (drug trafficking organizations, organized crime), Peru (Shining Path)]. Indigenous groups demanded control over land for self-subsistence agriculture and the extraction of resources → Brazil (indigenous groups); Chile (Mapuche / Araucanía); Colombia (indigenous groups); Ecuador (opposition groups); Mexico (EZLN / Chiapas)]. In other conflicts, land was contested in the context of agrarian reforms → Brazil (MST), Colombia (ASCAMCAT / Catatumbo), Colombia (ELN), Colombia (FARC), Honduras (MUCA, MARCA, PARCA, farmers of Bajo Aguán valley – landowners), Paraguay (EPP, agrarian movements)]. In total, over 80 percent of those conflicts concerning resources were conducted with the use of violence. (peh, jok, las, swa)

Overview: Conflicts in the Americas in 2013

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
Argentina (police riots)	provincial police vs. government	other	2013	NEW	3
Argentina – Iran (AMIA)	Argentina vs. Iran	other	1994	END	1
Argentina – United Kingdom (Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas)	Argentina vs. United Kingdom	territory, resources	1833	•	2
Bolivia (opposition groups)	opposition groups vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1983	•	3
Bolivia – Chile (access to sea)*	Bolivia vs. Chile	territory, resources	1883	•	1
Brazil (drug trafficking organizations)	drug trafficking organizations, militias vs. government	subnational predominance	2010	•	4
Brazil (indigenous groups)*	indigenous groups vs. government	autonomy, resources	1985	•	3
Brazil (MST)*	MST vs. government	resources	1996	↗	3
Brazil (social protests)	MPL, social protesters vs. government	system/ideology	2013	NEW	3
Chile (Mapuche / Araucanía)	CAM, Mapuche vs. government	autonomy, resources	2008	•	3
Chile (Rapa Nui / Easter Island)*	Rapa Nui vs. government	secession	2010	•	1
Chile (social movements)	ACES, CONFECH vs. government	system/ideology	2006	•	3
Colombia (ASCAMCAT / Catatumbo)	ASCAMCAT, farmers in Catatumbo vs. government	autonomy, system/ideology, resources	2013	NEW	3
Colombia (ELN)*	ELN vs. government	system/ideology, subnational predominance, resources	1964	•	3
Colombia (FARC – ELN)	FARC vs. ELN	system/ideology, subnational predominance, resources	2006	END	1
Colombia (FARC)	FARC vs. government	system/ideology, subnational predominance, resources	1964	•	4
Colombia (indigenous groups)*	various indigenous groups vs. government	resources	2005	•	3
Colombia (inter-cartel violence, neo-paramilitary groups)	Los Urabeños vs. Los Rastrojos vs. Oficina de Envigado vs. Bloque Meta vs. Los Rodos vs. Clan Giraldo (Oficina del Caribe) / Libertadores del Vichada vs. Renacer vs. Los Machos	subnational predominance, resources	2013	NEW	4
Colombia (neo-paramilitary groups, drug cartels)	neo-paramilitary groups, drug cartels vs. government	subnational predominance, resources	1983	↗	4
Dominican Republic – Haiti*	Dominican Republic vs. Haiti	other	2009	•	1
Ecuador (opposition groups)	opposition groups vs. government	system/ideology, resources	1980	•	3
El Salvador (Maras)	Mara Salvatrucha, Barrio 18 vs. government	subnational predominance	2012	•	3
Guatemala (drug cartels)	drug cartels vs. government	subnational predominance, resources	2009	•	3
Guatemala (opposition groups)*	opposition groups vs. government	resources	1985	•	3

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Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
Guatemala – Belize (territory)*	Guatemala vs. Belize	territory	1981	•	3
Haiti (opposition groups)*	opposition groups vs. government	national power	1986	↗	3
Honduras (drug trafficking organizations, organized crime)	drug trafficking organizations, organized crime vs. government	subnational predominance, resources	2012	•	3
Honduras (MUCA, MARCA, PARCA, farmers of Bajo Aguán valley – landowners)*	MARCA, MUCA, PARCA, Peasant Farmers of Bajo Aguán vs. big landowners, government	resources	2009	•	3
Honduras (opposition)	FNRP, LIBRE, PL, PAC, anti-government activists vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2009	•	3
Honduras – El Salvador (Isla Conejo)	Honduras vs. El Salvador	territory	2013	NEW	2
Jamaica (drug gangs)*	drug gangs vs. government	subnational predominance	2010	•	3
Mexico (APPO, CNTE)	APPO, CNTE vs. government	system/ideology	2006	↑	3
Mexico (drug cartels)	drug cartels vs. vigilante groups vs. government	subnational predominance, resources	2006	•	5
Mexico (EPR / Guerrero)*	EPR vs. government	autonomy, system/ideology	1995	•	2
Mexico (EZLN / Chiapas)*	EZLN vs. government	autonomy, system/ideology, resources, other	1994	↗	3
Mexico (inter-cartel violence, paramilitary groups)	Sinaloa et al. vs. Los Zetas et al. vs. CDG et al. vs. LCT et al. vs. CJNG et al. vs. LFM et al.	subnational predominance, resources	2005	•	4
Mexico (opposition)*	opposition vs. government	national power	2006	•	3
Nicaragua (militant groups)	CGN, FDC 3-80, Nicaraguan Democratic Force vs. government	system/ideology	2012	•	3
Nicaragua (opposition groups)*	opposition groups vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2008	•	3
Nicaragua – Colombia (sea border)	Nicaragua vs. Colombia	territory, resources	1825	•	2
Nicaragua – Costa Rica (Río San Juan)	Nicaragua vs. Costa Rica	territory	1858	•	1
Panama (opposition)*	opposition vs. government	system/ideology, resources	2008	•	3
Paraguay (EPP, agrarian movements)	EPP, agrarian movements vs. government	system/ideology, resources	1989	•	3
Paraguay (impeachment)	Lugo supporters vs. Franco supporters	national power	2012	END	1
Peru (opposition movements)	opposition movements vs. government	system/ideology, resources	2008	•	3
Peru (Shining Path)	SL vs. government	system/ideology, subnational predominance, resources	1980	•	3
Peru – Chile (border)	Peru vs. Chile	territory	1883	•	1
United Kingdom – Chile (Antarctica)*	United Kingdom vs. Chile	territory	2007	•	1
USA – Cuba (Guantanamo)*	United States vs. Cuba	territory	1959	•	1
USA – Cuba (system)*	USA vs. Cuba	system/ideology, international power	1960	•	2
USA – Mexico (border security)	USA vs. Mexico	other	2005	↘	2
USA – Venezuela*	USA vs. Venezuela	system/ideology, international power	2001	•	2
Venezuela (opposition)	opposition vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1992	•	3
Venezuela – Colombia (Monjes Islands)*	Venezuela vs. Colombia	territory, resources	1871	•	1

^{1 2 3 4} cf. overview table for Europe

Please note: The intensity of each conflict as shown in the tables is the highest intensity reached in the course of the year. Therefore, conflicts may, for instance, be classified as limited wars although there may have been no more fighting in the second half of the year.

If a conflict revolves around a territory whose name is disputed by the conflict parties, both variations will be named, separated by an “/” [e.g. Japan – China (Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands); Argentina – UK (Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas)]. If, in contrast, the conflict actors strive for subnational predominance, secession, or autonomy of or in a certain region, the region is separated from the actors by “ / ” [e.g. France (FLNC / Corsica); Myanmar (KIA, KIO / Kachin State)].

SELECTED CONFLICT DESCRIPTIONS

ARGENTINA (POLICE RIOTS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **NEW** | Start: **2013**

Conflict parties: provincial police vs. government

Conflict items: other

A violent crisis between provincial police forces and the government over an increase in salaries and better working conditions emerged and lasted for two weeks. The conflict started when the provincial police went on strike in Córdoba province on December 3 amidst festivities for the 30th anniversary of the end of dictatorship. Subsequently, the strike spread to eighteen other provinces including the capital Buenos Aires. The striking provincial police forces demanded wage increases to match the salary of the Federal Police and better working conditions.

With provincial police on strike, looters took advantage of the situation and ransacked stores, in particular targeting those owned by Chinese immigrants. In the course of a week, one person died in Córdoba province and approx. 100 were injured. Two died in Jujuy, four in Chaco, one in Buenos Aires, and two in Tucumán. In Córdoba alone, looters damaged approx. 1,000 stores with sticks, stones, and by torching, causing an estimated damage of USD 12 million.

The government of President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner deployed the Gendarmerie, the Coast Guard, the Airport Security Police, and Federal and Prefecture Police forces to assert public security and order. Moreover, she accused provincial police forces of extorting the government. On December 6, the Gendarmerie clashed with the provincial police in San Fernando del Valle de Catamarca, eponymous province, injuring several of the 200 striking policemen, who were trying to enter the governor's house, with rubber bullets. Governor Lucía Corpacci was trapped inside the house. Military police evicted the area using rubber bullets that left several people injured. Four days later, protesters called for more protection and demonstrated in front of the governor's house against the lootings. Provincial police using rubber bullets and teargas in San Miguel de Tucumán, eponymous province, clashed violently with protesters while the Gendarmerie attempted to mediate. As a consequence of the violent clashes, police chief Jorge Racedo had to resign on December 11. The same day, approx. 15,000 pot-banging protesters demonstrated at the Plaza Independencia against the provincial police strike and the lootings, demanding the resignation of Governor José Alperovich.

The conflict ended with most of the provincial governments granting wage increases on December 16. Additionally, in Buenos Aires, the provincial government granted amnesty to striking police forces. Subsequently, other professions, among them teachers in the province of Mendoza and health-care workers in the province of Buenos Aires, went on strikes which lasted up to four days. The union of the truckers threatened to launch a nationwide strike if they did not receive a bonus payment.^{swa}

ARGENTINA – IRAN (AMIA)

Intensity: **1** | Change: **END** | Start: **1994**

Conflict parties: Argentina vs. Iran

Conflict items: other

The dispute between Argentina and Iran over the bombing of the Argentine Israelite Mutual Association (AMIA) building, a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires, Argentina in 1994, ended.

On January 27, Foreign Minister Hector Timerman and his Iranian counterpart signed a Memorandum of Understanding which included the establishment of a Truth Committee. Accordingly, five independent judges were appointed to investigate the AMIA bombing of 1994. On November 20, after a meeting in Geneva and in accordance with this memorandum, the conflict parties announced that courts will resolve the AMIA case.^{swa}

ARGENTINA – UNITED KINGDOM (FALKLAND ISLANDS/ISLAS MALVINAS)

Intensity: **2** | Change: **•** | Start: **1833**

Conflict parties: Argentina vs. United Kingdom

Conflict items: territory, resources

The non-violent crisis between Argentina and the United Kingdom (UK) over the territory of the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas and resources continued. While the inhabitants of the disputed islands conducted a referendum on the political status on March 12, as set in 2012, Argentina and UK reiterated their territorial claims and voiced mutual accusations in the course of the year.

With respect to the referendum, on February 7, Argentine Foreign Minister Héctor Timerman accused the UK of supporting it due to possible oil findings in the area. On March 12, 99.8 percent of the eligible voters on the disputed islands chose to remain a British Overseas Territory. The Argentine Congress held an extraordinary session on March 13 to reject the referendum's result. The same day, UK Prime Minister David Cameron called on Argentina to respect the outcome. On March 24, Timerman met with UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and the president of the Special Committee on Decolonization to demand talks with the UK over the islands. On August 6, the British ambassador to the UN stated that Falklands' government should be included in talks with Argentina regarding sovereignty issues. He added that the referendum had shown that the disputed islands did not want to become sovereign.

While the political status of the disputed territory remained contested, in the course of the year Argentina repeatedly accused the UK of militarizing the South Atlantic. On February 18, the UK deployed the frigate HMS Argill towards West Africa and the South Atlantic. A week later, Argentina accused the UK of deploying submarines with nuclear weapons capacity near the disputed islands, thus violating UN Resolution 49/84 and the Tlatelolco Treaty at the UN Disarmament Conference in Geneva.^{swa}

BOLIVIA (OPPOSITION GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1983**

Conflict parties: opposition groups vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The conflict between opposition groups and the government over national power and the orientation of the political system continued on the level of a violent crisis. The opposition consisted of political parties, unions such as the main labor federation Bolivian Workers' Center (COB), rural teachers and farmers, indigenous people, and coca planters.

Between May 6 and 17, COB accompanied by miners and rural teachers protested for higher wages and higher pension payments in the departments of La Paz and Cochabamba. In the city of La Paz, thousands of protesters blocked the inner city and Plaza Murillo located next to the government buildings. Security forces intervened using teargas and arresting some 100 people. Clashes left at least 33 people injured. On October 9, farmers demanding more government spending for rural areas clashed with police in Cochabamba department. Farmers blocked roads by setting tires on fire and throwing stones, and police used teargas to disperse the protests. At least two protesters were injured, and police took several into custody.

Military and police forces assigned with the destruction of illegal coca plantations in approx. 26 communities in Apolo, La Paz department, clashed with coca farmers on October 19. In the confrontation, two police officers were killed, sixteen injured, and at least eight taken hostage according to government sources, while ten coca growers were reportedly injured. Approx. thirteen coca planters were arrested during the clashes. Coca farmers released six of the hostages a few days later. Two more people of the government-sent team were found dead in the fields where the clashes had taken place. las

BRAZIL (DRUG TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS)

Intensity: **4** | Change: • | Start: **2010**

Conflict parties: drug trafficking organizations, militias vs. government
 Conflict items: subnational predominance

The conflict over subnational predominance between the main drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) and their regional subsidiaries as well as various militias on the one hand, and the government on the other, continued as a limited war.

During the first quarter of the year, police and armed forces dismantled 65 criminal organizations operating in the border regions. In the course of these operations, 360 tons of drugs were confiscated and 8,000 vehicles seized. As was announced last year, the military implemented "Operation Ágata VII" against drug and arms trafficking in the border regions in May, including hundreds of aircraft and armored vehicles, dozens of naval vessels and around 25,000 troops. In the simultaneously conducted "Operation PC 27," more than 4,600 police forces arrested 2,067 persons linked to DTOs, murder, and theft, among them eighteen military officers, nationwide. They also confiscated 225 firearms, 47 kg of cocaine, eleven kg of crack, and 178 kg of marijuana.

Nevertheless, homicide rates in several large cities remained high, such as in Rio de Janeiro in the eponymous state where more than 406 people were killed in August alone.

Between January 30 and February 5, criminal gangs conducted more than 50 violent attacks in the state of Santa Catarina, south of São Paulo, which included attacks on police stations and the torching of trucks, cars, and public buses. Authorities held members of the First Capital Command (PCC) responsible for these incidents, which were allegedly planned from prison in response to police operations against DTOs. Military police (PM) killed one suspect who refused to stop at a checkpoint. Later, the government sent 120 officers of the National Guard into the city of Florianópolis, Santa Catarina. They arrested 25 persons allegedly involved in the attacks. On March 14, agents of the state police, federal police, PM, and federal highway police units arrested ten drug traffickers and gunrunners in the first big operation planned by the Agency of Integrated Performance (AAI), which had been created in 2012 to combat DTOs in São Paulo. They also confiscated small arms and 1.5 kilograms of explosives.

In the course of the year, Pacifying Police Units (UPP) continued with operations to establish control over several areas across Rio de Janeiro, where DTOs controlled about 36 percent of the favelas, the UPP about 18 percent, and militias often composed of former policemen about 45 percent. Operations started with military occupation, followed by the installation of UPP control stations. On February 3, around 1,600 troops together with armored vehicles, bulldozers, and helicopters mobilized to Complexo do Caju and Barreira do Vasco in the north of Rio de Janeiro. After gunmen had killed a policeman and a civilian in the favela Nova Holanda in Rio de Janeiro on June 24, 400 police forces were sent to the area. During subsequent shoot-outs, five drug dealers and two civilians were killed. Continuous police and military operations resulted in the seizure of drugs and weapons and the arrests of various suspects, but also in disappearances of civilians. For instance, on July 14, Amarildo de Souza, an inhabitant of the favela Rocinha in Rio de Janeiro, disappeared after agents of the UPP had interrogated him. Following investigations, 25 agents were accused of torture and murder in this case. According to a November statement by the Brazilian Forum on Public Security, five people were killed in clashes with police on average every day.

On October 11, the Public Prosecutor's Office revealed that members of the PCC were planning to kill São Paulo Governor Geraldo Alckmin in response to the measures the government had taken to combat DTOs. In addition, authorities intercepted phone calls in which PCC members threatened "terror attacks" in the course of the FIFA World Cup and during the elections, both in 2014, if police operations against DTOs were to be continued.cpn

BRAZIL (SOCIAL PROTESTS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **NEW** | Start: **2013**

Conflict parties: MPL, social protesters vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology

A violent crisis over aspects of the political system erupted between different social protest groups such as the Movimento Passe Livre (MPL) on the one hand, and the government led by President Dilma Rousseff on the other. On June 6, hundreds of protesters rallied on São Paulo's

CHILE (MAPUCHE / ARAUCANÍA)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2008**

Conflict parties: CAM, Mapuche vs. government

Conflict items: autonomy, resources

Avenida Paulista demanding a decrease in public transport fares. Some of them damaged police stations as well as stores. During demonstrations on June 11 and 12, police arrested 32 protesters in Rio de Janeiro. Concurrent protests in São Paulo, accounting for 5,000 demonstrators, lasted about five hours and left 85 buses and several subway stations damaged, thereby paralyzing 137 transport lines. Police arrested several persons and eight policemen were injured. On June 14, people opposed to increasing transport fares staged protests in São Paulo in which 50 persons were injured. The manifestation turned violent as police used teargas and rubber bullets and arrested 250 people.

The following days, protests spread to more than 100 cities throughout the country and attracted further protest groups. Their demands included the improvement of public health care and education systems, reduced expenses for the upcoming FIFA World Cup 2014 as well as government measures against corruption.

On June 21, approx. 300,000 protesters rallied in Rio de Janeiro. Concurrent marches in São Paulo accounted for 110,000, and in Recife, Pernambuco state, for 52,000 participants. The government cracked down on protests with mounted officers and anti-riot police. More than 100 people were injured in the capital Brasília and at least 44 in Rio de Janeiro when police used teargas and batons to disperse the gatherings. During subsequent riots, protesters tried to take over the congress building. At least two people were killed in the course of the mass mobilizations when one participant was hit by a car and another died after inhaling teargas. Rousseff condemned the acts of violence but nevertheless stated that she felt proud of the protests and that it was both her and her government's responsibility to listen to the protesters' demands. Later, Rousseff announced the possibility of a constituent assembly. During August, firemen and policemen as well as teachers organized protests demanding a salary increase, many of whom gathered in front of Congress in Brasília. On September 7, Brazil's Independence Day, thousands of demonstrators protested in more than 150 cities. In clashes with police using teargas, rubber bullets, and pepper spray, 35 were injured. Approx. 300 persons were arrested.

In the course of demonstrations, anarchist groups were reportedly responsible for violent acts such as burning buses and destroying shops. On October 8, during demonstrations in support of teachers demanding higher salaries, about 50,000 protesters marched peacefully in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. Later, anarchists set banks ablaze and threw incendiary objects at public buildings. Police responded with teargas.

In the course of ongoing protests, military police shot dead a minor in São Paulo on October 27. While police called the shooting an accident, local residents claimed he was shot on purpose by the security forces. The incident caused widespread riots in the city.

Two days later, presidential secretary Gilberto Carvalho condemned the anarchists' actions during social protests and announced the government's will to resolve social problems that he deemed the cause of demonstrations^{cpn}

The violent conflict over autonomy and resources in La Araucanía between members and organizations of the indigenous Mapuche such as Coordinadora Arauco-Malleco (CAM), Consejo de Todas Las Tierras, and the government continued. On January 3, Mapuche organized nationwide demonstrations in remembrance of a Mapuche student who had been shot dead in 2008 on the property of landowner Jorge Luchsinger. In the capital Santiago de Chile, protesters set two banks on fire and threw stones and Molotov cocktails at the police. Police responded with teargas and arrested up to a dozen people. On January 4, landowners Werner Luchsinger and Vivianne McKay died during an alleged arson attack on their estate in La Araucanía. While indigenous organizations such as CAM denied their involvement in the attack, police stated that evidence found on the scene suggested a connection to the Mapuche organization.

In the course of the year, the regions of La Araucanía, Los Ríos, and BíoBío remained unsettled. Arson attacks were attempted on estates, while police conducted raids in the region and arrested several Mapuche. On January 16, summit talks were held in La Araucanía with 200 to 350 participants, including Consejo de Todas Las Tierras and governors from the Malleco and Cautín provinces in La Araucanía, while the government and parliament abstained from sending representatives. Among the main demands were the de-militarization of Mapuche reservations, autonomy, and the constitutional recognition of indigenous peoples.

In June, the trial "Norín Catrimán vs. Chile" began at the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in Costa Rica. Mapuche plaintiffs accused the Chilean state of violating human rights conventions, especially in relation to the application of an anti-terrorism law. In July, UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and Counter-Terrorism Ben Emmerson met Mapuche leaders as well as members of the Luchsinger family and submitted to the government a report on the Mapuche situation. Emmerson criticized the use of violence and the arbitrary application of the anti-terrorism law against Mapuche. The government strongly criticized the report.

On August 6, Mapuche activist Rodrigo Melinao Licán was found shot dead in Ercilla, La Araucanía. Mapuche communities accused the police of being responsible for the murder and called for a de-militarization of the region. Throughout the year, several demonstrations took place in La Araucanía and Los Ríos as well as in Santiago to protest against government policies, the application of the anti-terrorism law, and the taking of ancestral land by companies. On October 12, over 700 people protested in Santiago alone. Violence broke out when protesters burned the Chilean flag and threw objects at police cars after the protest march had ended. The police reacted with water cannon and teargas and arrested ten people.^{kgr}

CHILE (SOCIAL MOVEMENTS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2006**Conflict parties: ACES, CONFECH vs. government
Conflict items: system/ideology

The violent conflict over system and ideology between social movement organizations such as the Confederation of Chilean Students (CONFECH) and the government continued. Among the main demands of the social movement groups were reforms of the education system. Throughout the year, several demonstrations took place in the capital Santiago and other cities. Many of them turned violent and led to arrests and injuries.

For example, on March 28, a protest march organized by the student organizations Coordinating Assembly of High School Students (ACES) and Movement of Students of Private Higher Education (MESUP) drew between 4,000 and 20,000 protesters into the streets of Santiago to demand free education. Protesters threw petrol bombs at the police, who used teargas and water cannon as well as paintball pellets to mark protesters. On April 11, between 80,000 and 150,000 persons protested in Santiago during a demonstration organized by CONFECH and other groups. Protesters destroyed lamp posts and traffic lights and threw objects at the police. The police used teargas and water cannon and arrested 109 persons.

CONFECH staged their next major nationwide protests on June 13. In Santiago alone between 45,000 and 100,000 people participated in the demonstration. Up to 324 protesters were detained in total and 24 police officers were injured. According to human rights organizations, at least 50 minors were injured. On June 26, nationwide protests organized by a coalition of student organizations and labor unions took place, joined by at least 100,000 participants. Several thousand protested in Santiago, some of them violently. They attacked stores and a national radio station and damaged traffic lights and bus stops. A police station was attacked with an incendiary bomb. Over 100 people were arrested and between four and ten police officers were injured. The next day, police forces raided 28 schools in Santiago and other cities where protesters had barricaded themselves. The schools were meant to be used as polling stations in the upcoming elections. Between 122 and 151 people were arrested. On July 1, students reoccupied these schools. The final large-scale demonstration of the year took place on October 17. Between 25,000 and 80,000 students marched in Santiago to protest against the education system. Isolated clashes between police and hooded protesters erupted.

In connection to the ongoing conflict Minister of Education Harald Beyer was unseated by Senate and the Chamber of Deputies on April 17 and was succeeded by Caroline Schmidt. After her victory in the presidential elections in December, socialist candidate Michelle Bachelet announced profound reforms regarding the education sector, e.g. making public higher education free.kgr

COLOMBIA (ASCAMCAT / CATATUMBO)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **NEW** | Start: **2013**Conflict parties: ASCAMCAT, farmers in Catatumbo vs. government
Conflict items: autonomy, system/ideology, resources

A violent crisis over the political system as well as autonomy and resources erupted in Catatumbo, Norte de Santander department, between farmers organized in the Peasant Farmer Association of Catatumbo (ASCAMCAT) and the government. Coca eradication by government forces in the first semester led to widespread protests by farmer groups that were partly coerced by neo-paramilitaries and guerrilla groups to grow coca. Protests demanding the creation of a semi-autonomous Rural Reserve Zone (ZCR) and viable economic alternatives to illegal coca cultivation started on June 11 in the communities of Ocaña and Tibú. Peasant farmers blocked twelve main roads from Tibú to the department capital Cúcuta and torched main buildings. On June 19, clashes between 5,000 peasant farmers and 200 policemen in Ocaña left ten persons seriously injured and numerous arrested. The Mobile Anti-Disturbances Squadron (ESMAD) made use of teargas and rubber bullets. The same day, talks between the farmers and the Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development Francisco de Paula Estupiñán Heredia to end protests failed. Nonetheless, Estupiñán announced the creation of another working group for July 3 in Cúcuta, Norte de Santander, and the payment of 3,000 million pesos for the regions affected by coca eradication.

On June 22, soldiers shot dead two peasant farmers during a protest march in which 7,000 demonstrators tried to take over the airport of Ocaña. 600 policemen and soldiers injured at least 30 persons. On June 24, the government announced that it would not talk to the farmers before roadblocks were lifted. The following day, clashes between farmers and riot police claimed the lives of two farmers and at least eleven persons were injured. On June 27, government officials and farmers failed to reach an agreement to end escalated social unrest. After having called off the planned meeting with the government due to the absence of President Juan Manuel Santos, ASCAMCAT and the government agreed on the appointment of Deputy Labor Minister José Noé Ríos Muñoz as mediator on July 3. On July 15, ASCAMCAT rejected the government's demand to lift the roadblocks. ASCAMCAT declared that the roadblocks would end if the government agreed to create a ZCR in Catatumbo as well as provide subsidies for those affected by coca eradication.

In a communiqué the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) offered arms and combatants to support protesting farmers against the government on July 17, while Santos repeatedly accused the guerrilla group of having staged the protests [→ Colombia (FARC)]. In an open letter to Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro Moros on July 23, peasant farmers asked for refuge in the neighboring country. During the following days, around 150 people crossed into Venezuela. On August 2, a commission led by ex-President Ernesto Samper Pizano and peasant farmers reached a pre-agreement to lift the roadblocks and to start dialog on August 8. A subsequent agreement on August 28 promised financial assistance as well as grants for subsistence crops to around 400 families. In October, ASCAMCAT denounced death threats and abuses

by neo-paramilitary groups, namely the Águilas Negras, against peasant leaders [→ Colombia (neo-paramilitary groups, drug cartels)]. The government and farmers resumed talks on November 5 after one month without dialog. On December 2, ASCAMCAT member Jorge Eliecer Calderón Chiquillo was found shot dead near Tibú. While ASCAMCAT accused the military of a targeted killing, officials stated that Calderón had been killed accidentally in the course of an encounter between the military and an armed group. Two weeks later, the house of ASCAMCAT spokeswoman Olga Lucía Quintero was raided by gunmen. While Quintero herself was absent, the intruders stole data about ASCAMCAT and threatened her housemaid.^{asc}

COLOMBIA (FARC – ELN)

Intensity: **1** | Change: **END** | Start: **2006**

Conflict parties: FARC vs. ELN
 Conflict items: system/ideology, subnational pre-dominance, resources

The conflict over subnational predominance, resources, and ideology between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN) ended with a peace agreement.

After several attempts at lasting peace in the past years had failed, the two groups published a joint statement on July 1 reporting on a leadership meeting about uniting the two groups into a single revolutionary guerrilla movement. The communiqué, signed by the groups' leaders Nicolás Rodríguez Bautista (ELN) and Timoleón Jiménez (FARC), expressed the guerrillas' will to unite with the prospect of peace in the country. In a video message, FARC commander Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri alias Timochenko read out the joint statement stressing that the two groups had managed to overcome their differences which had led to heavy-armed confrontation in the past. On August 24, as a result of their settlement of differences, both groups ambushed a military patrol in a joint operation in the Arauca Department, killing fourteen soldiers [→ Colombia (FARC); Colombia (ELN)]. Furthermore, ELN repeatedly expressed its desire to participate in the ongoing peace talks between the government and FARC, which the latter actively encouraged but the government rejected. The conflict between Colombia's two largest guerrilla groups had emerged in 2006 after clashes over strategically important regions in terms of natural resources and drug trafficking routes and alleged ideological differences. When the FARC's Eastern Bloc expanded into ELN-controlled regions, ELN killed a number of FARC members in Arauca. After the Eastern Bloc had declared ELN an enemy, FARC launched an armed offensive against ELN, resulting in the death of approx. 500 guerrillas in 2006 and 2007. Although FARC and ELN staged joint operations in some parts of the country in the following years, the two groups repeatedly clashed in the northeastern region affecting the departments of Arauca, Casanare, Boyacá, Santander, and Norte de Santander. In June 2010, the leader of the 10th Front of the FARC German Briceño alias Grannobles declared "all-out war" against ELN. On 10/01/06, a total of nine guerrilla fighters from both sides died in clashes in Arauca, despite a previously negotiated ceasefire. In September 2010, the ceasefire was successfully renewed.

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COLOMBIA (FARC)

Intensity: **4** | Change: **•** | Start: **1964**

Conflict parties: FARC vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology, subnational pre-dominance, resources

The system conflict between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the government, supported by the US, remained highly violent. While having some 8,000 guerillas in its ranks, the marxist-leninist FARC exerted influence mainly in the departments of Antioquia, Arauca, Caquetá, Chocó, Cauca, Guaviare, La Guajira, Nariño, Norte de Santander, Putumayo, and Valle del Cauca. The group financed its activities mainly through extortion, drug trafficking, and illegal mining. In mid-December, US-funded anti-coca spraying in Colombia was suspended in the aftermath of the downing of two spray planes by FARC members on September 27 and October 5. The incidents had resulted in the death of one US pilot and injuries of one Colombian.

Peace talks between the FARC and the government of President Juan Manuel Santos, initiated in November last year, continued in Havana, Cuba. In late May, the conflict parties agreed on a land reform followed by an early November agreement on the political future of the group. In August, Santos declared to hold a national referendum on a potential peace deal, which the FARC rejected. The peace talks were affected by various political developments in Colombia such as the newly erupted conflict between the government and coca growers in the Catatumbo region, during which the FARC offered weapons to protesting farmers [→Colombia (ASCAMCAT / Catatumbo)]. In late December, Santos offered a positive summary of the talks, stating that they made good progress.

However, violent actions continued throughout the year. On January 20, a month-long unilateral ceasefire declared by the FARC came to an end. It had led to a significant drop in FARC attacks and was followed by a new wave of assaults all over the country. For instance, on January 30, a group of rebels and security forces clashed when the former tried to enter the town of Policarpa, Nariño. This resulted in the death of four soldiers. Moreover, seven soldiers and six FARC members died on February 13 in Milan, Caquetá, in an encounter between some 150 guerillas and an equally strong army unit which later received support from the air force. On April 6, four rebel groups consisting of approx. 50 men each and armed with machine guns and mortars simultaneously attacked the police station and the army base of San Antonio, also in Caquetá.

The soldiers were later supported by warplanes. Hours of combat resulted in the death of three soldiers and an unknown number of FARC members. On July 20, a group of approx. 70 rebels attacked 26 soldiers guarding a pipeline in the border region of the municipalities Fortul and Tame, Arauca. Due to this combat, which had resulted in the killing of fifteen soldiers and six guerrillas, Santos announced that he would send 1,200 additional soldiers to the department. A month later on August 24, FARC members, who received support from the National Liberation Army (ELN), killed fourteen soldiers with improvised explosives and grenades in an ambush in the same region. [→Colombia (FARC - ELN); Colombia (ELN)]. After an attack with explosives on the police station of Inza, Cauca on December 7, which had resulted

in the killing of five soldiers, one police officer, and three civilians, the FARC announced a unilateral ceasefire starting on December 15. In the corresponding statement, the group criticized the government for its alleged unwillingness to agree to a bilateral ceasefire before the peace talks showed more results. On December 22, the air force killed regional leader Pedro Lain Parra Suns alias Jhon 23 near Cubarral, Meta, along with at least nine other FARC members.

Since the beginning of the year, several other FARC leaders had been killed in targeted operations. For example, the head of the guerilla Front 45 Atanasio Girardot alias Antonio Pescador was killed on June 23 in Arauca. On October 9, Santos announced a new offensive in seven southern departments with 50,000 soldiers and 15,000 new policemen.

Throughout the observed period, many civilians and combatants were injured or killed by anti-personnel mines. For instance, on August 30, five soldiers were killed by high-power mines in Rioblanco, Tolima. During the year, the FARC also executed attacks against infrastructure and companies of the mining and oil sector. For example, on February 8 and February 12, the FARC blew up sections of two pipelines of the state oil company Ecopetrol SA, one near the Venezuelan and the other one close to the Ecuadorian border. On June 6, alleged FARC members dynamited an energy tower in the municipality of San Andrés de Cuerquia, Antioquia, leaving 12,000 persons without power.

Due to a confrontation between rebels and police on June 8 in El Mango, Cauca, 400 persons were displaced. In the following days, the United Nations reported the displacement of overall nearly 2,000 people due to intense combats in the municipalities of Argelia, Guapi, and Suárez in the same department.jne

group with approx. 2,300 members (7,000, as claimed by the group itself) and a nationwide network.

In 2013, the turf war between the remaining gangs turned highly violent, resulting in a significant increase in mass displacements and homicide rates in the contested regions. At least 6,000 people were displaced due to violent inter-gang fights which particularly escalated in the cities Buenaventura and Cali, Valle del Cauca, and in the departments Chocó, Antioquia, and Sucre. The fighting was mostly carried out by local mid-level gangs called “oficinas de cobro” or small street gangs or “combos,” which were allied with one of the larger criminal networks.

A violent feud between Los Urabeños and the local gang La Empresa, working for Los Rastrojos, erupted in Buenaventura, Valle del Cauca. In January, twenty were killed in firefights between the two gangs. In November, approx. 2,500 people were displaced within one week due to the fights for control over the strategically important harbor and drug trafficking routes.

The city of Cali was also heavily affected by the clashes between the two groups. Throughout the year, the city witnessed an increase of 12 percent in homicides, and the rates in January doubled in some regions of Valle del Cauca. In response, the government dispatched an additional 1,430 police officers. In May, approx. 1,500 people were forcefully displaced in the Brisas de Comuneros neighborhood in Cali. Over 100 small and mid-level gangs were active in the city, most of them either working for Los Urabeños or Los Rastrojos. On November 24, Minister of Defense Juan Carlos Pinzón announced the deployment of 500 soldiers and 300 additional police officers to four Cali neighborhoods. On May 31, four people were killed in a clash between Los Urabeños and Los Rastrojos in Obando, Valle del Cauca. In several fights across the department in early March, at least eight of their members were killed.

The turf war between Los Urabeños and the Oficina de Envigado – remnants of the cartel led by Pablo Escobar – escalated in the first half of the year in Medellín, Antioquia department. By March, the homicide rate had increased by 18.6 percent. On July 13, leaders of both groups met in San Jeronimo and allegedly agreed on a non-aggression pact and a division of labor concerning drug trafficking. Subsequently, homicide rates dropped significantly in the second semester.

Furthermore, Los Urabeños were involved in a turf war with the Clan Giraldo or Oficina del Caribe in the city of Santa Marta, Magdalena, and in the department La Guajira. Since its breakout in 2012, the feud had claimed at least 150 lives and displaced hundreds of civilians. Violent clashes between Los Libertadores de Vichada and the Meta Bloc erupted in the departments Guaviare, Meta, and Vichada. Both being dissident groups of the defunct Popular Revolutionary Anti-Subversive Army of Colombia (ERPAC), they fought for control over the drug trade and strategic routes in the Eastern Planes. By the end of January, the feud had resulted in at least 40 casualties. The Meta Bloc was significantly weakened by August. Another gang called Los Rodos, which absorbed members of the Meta Bloc, entered into confrontations with the Libertadores de Vichada.meq

COLOMBIA (INTER-CARTEL VIOLENCE, NEO-PARAMILITARY GROUPS)

Intensity: **4** | Change: **NEW** | Start: **2013**

Conflict parties: Los Urabeños vs. Los Rastrojos vs. Oficina de Envigado vs. Bloque Meta vs. Los Rodos vs. Clan Giraldo (Oficina del Caribe) / Libertadores del Vichada vs. Renacer vs. Los Machos

Conflict items: subnational predominance, resources

A violent conflict erupted between various neo-paramilitary groups and drug trafficking organizations over subnational predominance and resources.

Since the demobilization of the paramilitary umbrella organization United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) in 2006, many of its members re-mobilized. Together with remnants of the defunct drug cartels of the 1990s, they formed several criminal hybrid organizations which the government had labeled Criminal Gangs (BACRIM). These neo-paramilitary/drug trafficking organizations were involved in the local and international drug trade, extortion, money laundering, and illegal mining. According to the government, only six of the original 30 gangs remained: Los Urabeños, Los Rastrojos, the Meta Bloc, Los Libertadores de Vichada, Renacer, and Los Machos [→ Colombia (neo-paramilitary groups, drug cartels)]. Many of the smaller groups had been absorbed by Los Urabeños and Los Rastrojos during their expansion into other regions of the country. As a result, Los Urabeños evolved as the dominant

COLOMBIA (NEO-PARAMILITARY GROUPS, DRUG CARTELS)

Intensity: **4** | Change: **↗** | Start: **1983**

Conflict parties: neo-paramilitary groups, drug cartels vs. government

Conflict items: subnational predominance, re-sources

The conflict concerning subnational predominance and resources between various paramilitary groups and drug cartels on the one hand, and the government on the other, escalated to a limited war. As a result of the increased fighting between the different neo-paramilitary groups in several parts of the country, at least 6,000 people were displaced throughout the year [→ Colombia (inter-cartel violence, neo-paramilitary groups)].

According to the government, six neo-paramilitary groups operated in the country: Los Urabeños, Los Rastrojos, the Meta Bloc, Los Libertadores de Vichada, Renacer, and Los Machos. These hybrid paramilitary/drug trafficking networks engaged in the local and international drug trade, extortion, money laundering, and illegal mining. While the government claimed the groups were active in 123 municipalities, other sources estimated their presence reached up to 409. According to the government, Los Urabeños increased their strength to approx. 2,300 members and was the only group operating on a national level. However, the group itself claimed to have 7,000 members. Several organizations and NGOs asserted that Los Urabeños had won the confrontation between the 30 groups originally fighting for predominance since the demobilization of the paramilitary umbrella organization United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) in 2006. On June 28, Los Urabeños published a communiqué stressing that no lasting peace could be accomplished without including them in the peace process [→ Colombia (FARC)]. They rejected accusations of being a drug trafficking organization and accused the government of corruption and neglecting to fight what they deemed to be the structural causes underlying the conflict.

The rapid expansion of Los Urabeños into areas traditionally controlled by Los Rastrojos led to an increase in forced mass displacement especially in the cities of Cali and Buenaventura, Valle del Cauca, as well as in the department Chocó. On March 19, Minister of Defense Juan Carlos Pinzón Bueno announced the reinforcement of the police by 10,000 additional officers in order to improve security in several cities. As a result of the violence in the city of Cali which witnessed an increase of 12 percent in homicides, the government decided to reactivate the so-called 'search-bloc police' which had been used to combat the Cali drug cartel in the 1990s. Pinzón declared on March 14 that it consisted of 700 officers from different elite units of the military and the police. By March, the homicide rate in Medellín had increased by 18.3 percent due to the gang war between Los Urabeños and the local Oficina de Envigado. On July 24, the Air Force announced the use of combat drones in the fight against drug traffickers and guerrilla groups. An hour-long firefight between the anti-narcotics police and Los Urabeños on September 3 left six Urabeños members and one police officer dead in Cúcuta, Norte de Santander. In retribution, Los Urabeños attacked three police officers within the next 24 hours, killing one and injuring two. On May 9 and 25, two members of Los

Urabeños were killed in combat with the military in Barranquilla and Tierralta in the department Córdoba. On September 3, around 150 people allegedly organized by Los Urabeños attacked the police station and city government offices in La Unión, Valle del Cauca. Approx. 100 police officers and 60 additional soldiers were dispatched. Subsequent clashes resulted in the injuring of six and severe material damage.

The government continued its strategy of tracking and arresting the groups' top leaders. On February 6, the alleged head of Los Urabeños, Jacinto Nicolás Fuentes German alias Don Leo, was arrested in a joint operation of Colombian and Peruvian forces in Lima, Peru. On March 19, the national police arrested Freyner Ramírez García alias Carlos Pesebre, leader of the Oficina de Envigado.^{meq}

ECUADOR (OPPOSITION GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **1980**

Conflict parties: opposition groups vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, resources

The violent crisis over system and ideology as well as resources between various opposition groups and the government of President Rafael Correa continued.

On January 15, representatives of the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) and other indigenous environmentalist and human rights activists manifested their discontent in the capital Quito, Pichincha province, with the Mirador copper mining project in the Zamora Chinchipe province. On March 27, the National Electoral Council approved Correa's reelection. On May 1, several thousand supporters joined simultaneous protest marches of the United Laborers Front (FUT) and of the Confederation of Public Servants of Ecuador (CONASEP) in Quito. About 1,800 policemen escorted the demonstrations. On May 27, during a parliamentary commission session concerning the reform of the Mining Act, representatives of various provincial federations of the Andean and Amazonian region moved for an initiation of a pre-legislative consultation. On June 11, indigenous organizations such as the Ecuador Runakunapak Rikcharimuy (ECUARUNARI) gathered in Cuenca, Azuay province, to discuss the planned mining reform and water administration-related topics. The National Assembly approved an altered Mining Act on June 13. On August 6, Correa proposed a constitutional amendment facilitating the unlimited re-election of the Ecuadorian president.

On August 16, the president announced the end of the Yasuní-ITT initiative which had operated against oil drillings in the national park but according to Correa had not provided the expected economic contribution by the international community. On August 27, some of the 1,000 protesters demonstrating against the planned oil production at Yasuní National Park clashed with police in Quito. The latter allegedly used rubber bullets which the government denied. Police arrested Marco Guatemal, vice president of ECUARUNARI, and three other protesters. The same day, other protest marches including hundreds of peasants and indigenous people took place in the provinces of Azuay and Cañar. On September 13, about 1,000 supporters assembled in Quito to back Correa's plans to start oil drilling at Yasuní. About 30 Amazonian mayors attended the gathering. On October 3, the National Assembly approved oil production at Yasuní. In reaction, more than 50 Amazonian women marched from Puyo, Pastaza province, to Quito between October 12 and 16. The following day,

the Amazonian women and more than 100 members of over twenty indigenous organizations protested jointly in Quito. During a clash between indigenous people, allegedly conducting illegal mining, and soldiers operating against those activities, one indigenous protester died and nine soldiers were injured in Gualaquiza, Morona Santiago province, on November 7. The next day, representatives of the Government of the Original Nations of the Ecuadorian Amazon (GONOAE) called the governmental action an infringement of sovereignty and insisted that they had the right to mine in the pertinent territory.^{edit}

2012. In March, the National Civil Police (PNC) had reported a significant rise in the number of missing people. During December, authorities discovered more than 25 bodies in mass graves near Colón, San Salvador which they attributed to gang killings.^{sen}

EL SALVADOR (MARAS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2012**

Conflict parties: Mara Salvatrucha, Barrio 18 vs. government

Conflict items: subnational predominance

The conflict over subnational predominance between the country's main criminal gangs and the government remained violent. Although the murder rate dropped by about half within the first months, it rose again during the second semester when both sides repeatedly violated agreements declared in the 2012 truce negotiations. In addition, criminal gangs killed at least eleven policemen throughout the year. Despite these developments, both gangs declared their willingness to promote the truce. An example of this was a joint statement in September after an observatory visit by the OAS. In January, as part of the gang truce, the government and leaders of the Mara Salvatrucha and Barrio 18 introduced the first "peace zones" in Santa Tecla and Quezaltepeque, both located in the department of La Libertad, and Ilopango, department of San Salvador. Therefore, police stopped large-scale operations and nighttime patrols in these municipalities.

However, gang-related killings took place in the declared "peace zones" throughout the year. In February, a gunfight between members of the Mara Salvatrucha and Barrio 18 left four people dead and three injured in San Miguel in the eponymous department. On September 6, two Mara Salvatrucha members shot and killed four members of Barrio 18 in Ilopango.

On May 17, the Security Minister and main coordinator of the truce, David Munguía Payés, was released from office. The Supreme Court had considered his appointment unconstitutional as Munguía Payés was a former army general. On May 31, prosecutors stated the convictions of 180 people under the controversial anti-gang law despite its previous repeal in favor of the gang truce. Additionally, extortion rates had not yet declined although the gangs agreed to end it in accordance with the peace deal. The next month, the murder rate peaked. Police recorded 182 homicides, an increase by sixteen compared to June 2012. Especially in the municipalities of San Salvador and of Usulután, violence re-intensified with 32 and 21 homicides respectively. In November, mayors of the "peace zones" declared the government had not yet employed necessary state funds for violence prevention initiatives. By the end of the month, Minister for Justice and Security Ricardo Perdomo declared both gangs were again at war with each other as murder rates had more than doubled compared to November 2012.

In December, the Institute of Legal Medicine (IML) claimed the discoveries of at least 97 hidden graves since August

GUATEMALA (DRUG CARTELS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2009**

Conflict parties: drug cartels vs. government

Conflict items: subnational predominance, resources

The conflict between various drug cartels and the government of President Otto Pérez Molina over subnational predominance and resources continued as a violent crisis. The homicide rate rose for the first time since 2009 from 4,411 murders in the first nine months of 2012 to 4,667 in the same period in 2013. Most homicides were committed in the capital Guatemala City and near the south-eastern border to Honduras. For example, in Escuintla, a southern department near the Pacific, a total of 565 homicides were registered by October.

On January 12, the president stated that the Mexican cartel Los Zetas had further expanded its presence in Guatemala [→ Mexico (drug cartels)]. Cooperating with the Guatemalan Lorenzanas Cartel, the Zetas controlled two of the biggest drug routes while fighting the Mexican Sinaloa Cartel and its Guatemalan cartel alliances for another route. Throughout the year, Guatemalan and Mexican authorities arrested several leaders, such as Gerardo "El Yanqui" Jaramillo, allegedly one of the Zetas' leaders in Fraijanes, Guatemala, 30 km south of Guatemala City on October 12.

On June 14, at least fifteen men armed with AK-47 rifles assaulted a police station in Salcaja, Quetzaltenango. They executed eight police officers and abducted another, whose remains were found in a river one week later. In reaction, the government launched Operation "Dignity," including more than 1,000 police, soldiers, and prosecutors. They started to encircle the drug trafficking group "Villatoro Organization," led by Eduardo Francisco "Guayo Cano" Villatoro Cano and supposedly linked to Los Zetas. On July 14 and 16, authorities captured ten suspects in La Democracia, Huehuetenango, and Chimaltenango.

On October 3, Mexican authorities captured Villatoro Cano in Tuxtla Gutiérrez, Mexico. On June 15, Molina announced the deployment of three more military squadrons in Zacapa, Huehuetenango, and Escuintla, to assist local police. On August 23, he announced that approx. 600 military and police forces had destroyed poppy worth USD 226 million in an operation in San Marcos department. In reaction to a shortage of weapons, Molina announced a replenishment of 33,000 weapons for the National Police on June 20.

On October 29, the government announced that the formation of a task force against the wide-spread extortion of bus drivers was under consideration. Protests had arisen due to the death of one driver and serious injuries of two others the week before.^{cme}

HONDURAS (DRUG TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS, ORGANIZED CRIME)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2012**

Conflict parties: drug trafficking organizations, organized crime vs. government

Conflict items: subnational predominance, resources

The conflict over subnational predominance and resources between drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) and organized crime groups on the one hand, and the government, supported by the US, on the other, remained violent. On January 2, the army announced that the destruction of illegal airstrips in the departments of Yoro and Colón would be of top priority for the year to come. On January 10, President Porfirio Lobo Sosa and the commander of the US SOUTHCOM discussed continued military cooperation in combating transnational crime. Later, the US announced an additional USD 10.3 million support for Honduran security forces' training and equipment. On January 16, in the Mosquitia region, Gracias a Dios department, the navy intercepted a boat carrying some 350 kg of cocaine. Navy forces shot dead one Jamaican trafficker and took another into custody. On August 6, a shootout over 700 kg of cocaine involving Honduran, Nicaraguan, and Mexican traffickers took place in Belén Norte, near Brus Laguna, Gracias a Dios. While the Ministry of Defense confirmed the death of four persons, unofficial sources reported up to seventeen deaths. On December 18, head of the army René Osorio Canales announced they would purchase three radars from Israel worth USD 30 million to detect planes carrying illicit goods. In August, US plans to reinforce the anti-drug infrastructure at the Atlantic coast, including new military bases in Caratasca, Gracias a Dios, were made public. Throughout the year, the government restructured parts of the security sector. After dissolving one of the two main anti-crime units of the police in June, a new elite police-military force, TIGRES, was approved by congress. On August 23, congress adopted unanimously the creation of another military police unit, PMOP, with about 900 members. On December 19, outgoing president Lobo removed Chief of Police Juan Carlos Bonilla as well as Osorio from their posts. Government measures against organized crime groups as well as violence between criminal gangs and against civilians continued. On February 5, criminal gangs imposed a curfew in certain areas of the capital Tegucigalpa. Three days later, the government deployed 1,000 soldiers to Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula, Cortés department. On April 2, the government prolonged the state of emergency to January 2014. It had been declared in 2011 and had allowed the deployment of military forces nationwide in order to fight crime. On May 28, the predominant street gangs Mara Salvatrucha and Barrio 18 announced a truce similar to the one between street gangs in El Salvador [→ El Salvador (Maras)]. However, during the 28 days following the declaration of the truce, Honduras saw 475 murders. In October, the homicide rate dropped slightly from 85.5 to 83 per 100,000 inhabitants, but still remained the world's highest.rma

HONDURAS (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2009**

Conflict parties: FNRP, LIBRE, PL, PAC, anti-government activists vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The system and national power conflict between non-party opposition groups and oppositional parties such as the Freedom and Refoundation Party (LIBRE) on the one hand, and the government led by the National Party (PN) on the other, remained violent. LIBRE, headed by former president José Manuel Zelaya's wife Xiomara Castro, consisted mainly of supporters of Zelaya, who was ousted in a coup in 2009. Within eighteen months prior to the November elections, twenty oppositional activists were murdered, two of them on the eve of election day. On March 7, President Porfirio Lobo Sosa reaffirmed his interest in putting a new media law to a referendum concurrent to the presidential elections. The press and opposition criticized the planned media law for allegedly enabling censorship. On May 23, Supreme Electoral Court (TSE) President David Matamoros announced the start of the campaign period in which nine parties competed, four of which founded in the aftermath of the 2009 coup d'état. Reports of death threats, intimidation, and police abuse against oppositional activists accompanied the election process. On November 23, the day before the elections, two LIBRE activists were killed in Carbon, Francisco Morazón department. On election day, opposition activists reported repression by security forces and that military personnel had surrounded several oppositional radio stations. Furthermore, five people were shot dead near a polling station in Belén, Gracias a Dios.

Right after the elections and before the TSE had released final results, Castro declared herself winner. Two days after election day, opposition candidates Castro and Salvador Nasralla, leader of the Anti-Corruption Party (PAC), denounced fraud by the PN. On November 27, the TSE provisionally declared Juan Orlando Hernández of the PN winner with 35.26 percent as 75 percent of the votes had been counted. The next day, the presidential candidate for the Liberal Party (PL), Mauricio Villeda, called for a revision of the results. On November 30, LIBRE supporter José Antonio Ardón was shot dead in the capital Tegucigalpa. The following day, LIBRE staged mass demonstrations in Tegucigalpa, carrying the body of Ardón. US and EU observers described the elections as free and fair with only minor irregularities. However, a member of the EU observer's delegation, Leo Gabriel, told the press about countless inconsistencies. Other international observers, such as the National Lawyers Guild, the International Federation for Human Rights, and the US-based Honduras Solidarity Network/Alliance for Global Justice reported fraud and irregularities. On December 1, the TSE formally declared Hernández president-elect. On December 7, a former LIBRE mayoral candidate was shot dead in La Ceiba, Atlántida. In Danlí, El Paraíso, a radio journalist and LIBRE supporter was assassinated in his home the same day.

rma

HONDURAS – EL SALVADOR (ISLA CONEJO)

 Intensity: **2** | Change: **NEW** | Start: **2013**

 Conflict parties: Honduras vs. El Salvador
 Conflict items: territory

A non-violent crisis erupted between Honduras and El Salvador over the boundary line in the Gulf of Fonseca and in particular the possession of Isla Conejo, an uninhabited islet 600m off the Honduran coast. In an ICJ ruling in 1992 on demarcations in the gulf, the status of the islet had remained undefined. In 1992, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua had agreed to jointly administer the gulf in the Declaration of San Salvador.

On March 13, Honduran President Porfirio Lobo stated that the navies of both Nicaragua and El Salvador had repeatedly harassed Honduran fishermen in the gulf and that his country would defend its national security. The next day, Honduran Defense Minister Marlon Pascua announced that the Honduran fleet of F-5 supersonic fighter aircrafts had been put on alert to "protect the integrity of its national territory." In reaction, Salvadoran President Mauricio Funes called for a peaceful solution and rejected what he described as militaristic threats.

After Honduran soldiers had raised the national flag on Isla Conejo on September 1, Funes sent a protest note to his Honduran counterpart in which he stated that the islet was Salvadoran territory and demanded the removal of the flag. Several days before, Salvadoran fishermen had claimed that Honduran soldiers had threatened and shot at them when approaching the disputed territory. On September 23, Funes made a declaration to forward El Salvador's three-year old plans to buy ten ground-attack airplanes from Chile in order to "regain military balance in the region."

On October 18, Lobo rejected an invitation to talks by his Salvadoran counterpart, asserting there was no doubt the island was Honduran territory. He also rejected a possible move of El Salvador to bring the case to the ICJ and claimed the ICJ had not included Isla Conejo in its decision in 1992 because it was allegedly convinced that it was Honduran territory. The same day, the Honduran military arrested five Salvadoran journalists after they had landed on Isla Conejo. Salvadoran Defense Minister David Munguía Payés stated on October 23 that the presence of the Honduran military posed a threat to his country. He added that El Salvador was in no condition to defend itself and expressed concerns about Honduras being able to destroy vital infrastructure such as dams in El Salvador. After a Salvadoran delegation at the UN had demanded the retreat of Honduran military personnel on November 12, Lobo announced that troops would remain on the island. [peh](#)

MEXICO (APPO, CNTE)

 Intensity: **3** | Change: **↑** | Start: **2006**

 Conflict parties: APPO, CNTE vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology

The conflict over system and ideology between the umbrella organization Popular Assembly of the Peoples of Oaxaca (APPO) and the National Coordination of Education Workers

(CNTE) on the one hand, and the government led by Enrique Peña Nieto on the other, escalated to a violent crisis. While several APPO-affiliated organizations, for instance CNTE and the National Union of Education Workers (SNTE), frequently participated in demonstrations and roadblocks throughout the year, the umbrella organization itself remained passive until its formal re-establishment on June 15. Since the mid-year's reappearance of APPO, their major task force was the Sole Front of the Fight (FUL) complemented by CNTE and SNTE.

On February 26, Peña Nieto launched a major education reform criticized by the SNTE. The same day, after head of SNTE Elba Esther Gordillo had been charged with fraud and embezzlement, the government stressed the arrest's apolitical motivation. In the course of the year, roadblocks and demonstrations took place in more than eighteen states, while violence occurred mainly in the Federal District, Guerrero, and Oaxaca. Roadblocks and protest actions culminated on April 5, when Federal Police cleared a freeway in Chilpancingo, Guerrero. While 2,000 policemen with shields urged thousands of demonstrators to retreat, protesters fought back using tubes, rods, and Molotov cocktails, leaving six teachers and eight policemen injured. On June 10, protesters attacked riot police, throwing objects and Molotov cocktails during demonstrations commemorating the "Halconazo" student massacre of 1971 in the capital Mexico City. The clash resulted in the injuring of five policemen, the arrest of 22 demonstrators, and the seizure of explosive objects.

Concurrent events in Oaxaca City, in the eponymous state, erupted in violence and vandalism when anarchists joined the teachers' union march – a tendency observed during various demonstrations throughout the year. On August 20, approx. 10,000 CNTE members clashed with riot police when the former tried to enter the governmental San Lázaro Palace in Mexico City, leaving more than twenty injured. Meanwhile, around two million students remained without classes due to nationwide strikes. Local businesses affected by demonstrations in Mexico City suffered losses presumably worth USD 44 million.

On September 9, Peña Nieto signed the controversial education reform bill. On September 15, after an ultimatum had expired, riot police removed the protest camp from the central square in Mexico City. The protest camp had been set up in August and was comprised of approx. 10,000 teachers. Clashes left fifteen policemen injured while the camp was transferred to the Monument of the Revolution.

On October 2, annual marches in remembrance of the 1968 Tlatelolco massacre turned into a riot in the capital. Indigenous and social groups, anarchists, and student movements joined the teachers. Protesters, attacking police with stones, bottles, and Molotov cocktails, were fought back by riot police. The encounter left 32 policemen injured.


Human rights organizations condemned the government's measures which included the use of teargas, rubber bullets, and arbitrary arrests allegedly carried out by plainclothes officers. [jok](#)

MEXICO (DRUG CARTELS)

Intensity: 5 | Change: • | Start: 2006

Conflict parties: drug cartels vs. vigilante groups vs. government

Conflict items: subnational predominance, resources



The war between various drug cartels and the government over subnational predominance and resources continued. Most active drug cartels were the Sinaloa Cartel, Los Zetas, the Gulf Cartel (CDG), Los Caballeros Templarios (LCT), and the Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG). Vigilante groups in Guerrero and Michoacán engaged in the conflict as a new conflict party. Most cartel-government clashes took place in the northeast and the mid-west. Clashes between government forces and armed groups took place every week. However, most fatalities were claimed by the inter-cartel conflict [→ Mexico (inter-cartel violence, paramilitary groups)]. At least 17,000 people were murdered in drug-related violence in 2013, according to the government.

Tamaulipas state remained a hotspot. On February 11, Federal Police (PF) killed five gunmen in the center of Reynosa. In the same city, authorities killed eight suspects in three different shootouts on March 16/17, and six in two separate firefights on March 22. On May 4, a firefight on the highway leading to Soto La Marina claimed the lives of two gunmen, one policeman, and one soldier. Authorities used two military helicopters in the clash. Various shootouts took place in Matamoros. On December 17, the military killed six gunmen and seized one grenade launcher, grenades, and a dozen rifles. In the northern Gulf state bordering the US, security forces arrested Los Zetas leader Miguel "Z-40" Treviño on July 15 and CDG leader Mario "X-20" Ramírez on August 18. Clashes were on the rise in Zacatecas state. On January 2, gunmen in armored SUVs ambushed a military convoy in El Fuerte. Reportedly, the military killed eleven while fighting back the aggressors. On April 17, approx. 60 gunmen attacked the mayor's office and the municipal police command of Canitas de Felipe Pescador. Shootouts left three policemen, one private security agent, as well as several armed suspects dead. On May 12, marines intervened in a Los Zetas vs. CDG firefight. After a car chase, the marines confronted up to 30 gunmen near Sain Alto, killing seven. In an encounter with a large group of CDG gunmen in Sombrerete, federal forces killed at least thirteen gunmen on July 11. Official and local sources differed significantly regarding the number of fatalities.

In Chihuahua state, many policemen were assassinated. For example on April 27, about twenty gunmen assaulted the village of Gran Morelos, killing three municipal policemen and one civilian. On May 29, in Marín, Nuevo León state, Ministerial Police raided a Los Zetas shooting range, killing four.

In Gómez Palacio and Lerdo, both Durango state, alleged gang members killed five transit police officers in six separate attacks on February 21. The same month, the government

enlarged the military operation "Operativo Laguna." It was reinforced by 1,900 soldiers in the course of the year.

Violence in Michoacán state sharply increased. On July 23, gunmen staged six coordinated attacks on PF in different parts of the state. Six policemen and twenty gunmen were killed. On July 28, LCT assailants killed Vice Admiral Carlos Salazar, commander of the 8th Naval Zone, and a second marine in Churintzio. Many violent encounters also took place in Guerrero state. On February 6, assailants in more than ten cars ambushed two state police patrols in Apaxtla, killing nine officers. Up to 80 gunmen attacked the municipal police headquarters in Tlacotepec on March 31, killing three policemen. After the attack, the military deployed about 500 troops to the region. An ambush on a military convoy left ten attackers and one soldier dead in Leonardo Bravo on September 6.

Vigilante groups emerged in at least nine states. In parts of Guerrero and in 47 of Michoacán's 113 municipalities, several thousands of vigilantes took up arms. According to José Mireles, leader of Ciudadano de Autodefensa de Tepacaltepec, they took security in their own hands after having suffered widespread extortion by drug cartels for years. He accused authorities of being infiltrated by LCT and La Familia Michoacana (LFM). By mid-2013, a triangle confrontation manifested in the Pacific States. Vigilantes repeatedly clashed with both drug cartels and state authorities. LCT's propaganda portrayed vigilantes as CJNG affiliates. On March 26, over 1,000 members of the regional vigilante umbrella group Union of People and Organizations of the State of Guerrero (UPOEG) set up road-blocks and raided houses in Juan R. Escudero, Guerrero. They arrested thirteen police officers. In Michoacán, on May 15, more than 100 armed vigilantes took control of Coalcomán, taking seven municipal policemen into custody. Military forces rescued them after a shootout. On August 20, State Police killed two vigilantes in a shootout in Aquila, Michoacán.

A firefight between a vigilante group and LCT on April 28 left six cartel members and eight vigilantes dead in Buenavista Tomatlán. The government deployed 6,000 federal forces to Michoacán in late May and 2,000 additional troops in late July. For most of October, LCT impeded the delivery of basic goods to Buenavista Tomatlán, Tepalcatepec, Coalcomán, Chinicuila, and Aguililla by intimidating businessmen. Vigilante groups showed a strong presence in those towns. On October 27, LCT gunmen attacked eighteen electrical substations and six gas stations using Molotov cocktails, assault rifles, and grenades. Electricity supply broke down for 420,291 households. A few hours later, vigilantes killed at least five LCT gunmen in Aguililla. Afterwards, 5,000 additional troops were sent to Michoacán.

Several skirmishes took place in Sinaloa state. On May 9, about 100 gunmen ambushed the convoy of the Ahome police commander between Los Mochis and Guasave, using grenade launchers. Three gunmen and one municipal policeman died. In Pinal del Marquésado, Estado de México, federal forces killed ten alleged LFM gunmen after a shootout involving grenades on March 19.

Drug cartels engaged in criminal activities, including kidnapping, illegal mining, extortion rackets, human trafficking, contraband, and product piracy, as well as the theft of oil and gas. Kidnapping and extortion were especially on the rise. Also, cartels abducted thousands and killed dozens of migrants on their way to the US. Under President Enrique Peña Nieto, the command of PF, was put under the Ministry of the Interior (SEGOB) while plans to build up a gendarmerie were postponed several times. tmi

MEXICO (INTER-CARTEL VIOLENCE, PARAMILITARY GROUPS)

Intensity: **4** | Change: • | Start: **2005**

Conflict parties: Sinaloa et al. vs. Los Zetas et al. vs. CDG et al. vs. LCT et al. vs. CJNG et al. vs. LFM et al.

Conflict items: subnational predominance, resources

The subnational predominance and resources conflict between various drug cartels remained highly violent. Attacks on journalists, self-censorship, and the government’s more reserved information policy limited access to conflict-relevant information.

Most violent combat groups were those of the Sinaloa Cartel, Los Zetas, the Gulf Cartel (CDG), Los Caballeros Templarios (LCT), and the Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG). Cartels were often intertwined by a changing set of alliances and enmities. Sinaloa Cartel and Los Zetas stayed the most powerful albeit having been challenged in some states. Despite the ongoing splintering of drug cartels, proxy groups fought out many turf wars which claimed the lives of thousands. Most victims remained unidentified. More than 50 percent of all homicides related to organized crime were concentrated in the states of Chihuahua, Sinaloa, Guerrero, Jalisco, and Estado de México.

Sinaloa Cartel dominated the northwest, keeping control of the border cities Ciudad Juárez and Tijuana. In its home turf, it fought against an incursion by Los Zetas in southern Sinaloa as well as against remnants of the Beltrán Leyva Organization (BLO). One of those, La Mochomera, claimed the responsibility for six dead bodies found on April 20 and another six corpses on May 4, both in Ahome. Also, Sinaloa Cartel fought regional cartels in southwestern Chihuahua, notably the New Juárez Cartel. In the so-called Golden Triangle region, violence intensified in the second semester. An inter-gang shootout involving assault rifles left six dead in Guadalupe y Calvo on July 21.

Many regions in the northeast were heavily contested. Los Zetas struggled with intensified infighting after marines had killed their former leader Heriberto “Z-3” Lazcano on 10/07/12, and after the arrest of Miguel “Z-40” Treviño on July 15. Many encounters between Los Zetas and its longtime rival CDG took place in Tamaulipas state. The cities of Matamoros, Nuevo Laredo, and Reynosa were especially disputed. On March 31, nine dissected bodies of migrant workers were found in a car in Ciudad Victoria. Banners found on April 4 accused Los Zetas. Both cartels deliberately targeted civilians. A convoy of alleged CDG members launched two attacks on Fe del Golfo, Jiménez municipality, on July 21. The assailants killed up to ten villagers and forced the remaining out. Los Zetas confronted CDG on various occasions in Zacatecas state, contributing to the increasing violence. On April 23, gunmen left six dismembered bodies at a bus stop in General Enrique Estrada, with a message directed at Los Zetas and signed by CDG. Fresnillo was heavily disputed. Between June 20 and June 22, at least ten gunmen died in inter-cartel clashes. On August 1, CDG members confronted about 80 Zetas between Fresnillo and Valparaíso. Approx. 38 gunmen were killed. The same day, in another shootout between the two rivals, eight were killed in Jerez. Los Zetas also struggled to keep their stronghold Coahuila state against CDG and its ally, the

Sinaloa Cartel. In Torreón, fifteen people were killed in attacks at gas stations and bars in the first week of the year. Marines arrived in La Laguna region on January 18. Still, murders continued in early February. On January 25, seventeen musicians were found fatally shot close to Monterrey, Nuevo León state. Authorities blamed Los Zetas. Reportedly, the band had occasionally played in bars run by CDG.

CDG significantly increased its operational capacities, despite the arrest of its leader Jorge “El Coss” Costilla on 09/12/10 and of his successor Mario “X-20” Ramírez on August 18. It regained control over large parts of Monterrey in early 2013. CDG, however, was not spared of infighting, especially in Tamaulipas. Rivaling factions fought over the cartel’s stronghold Reynosa. On March 10, shootouts and grenade attacks left four dozen dead, according to local news agencies. Authorities seized 30 vehicles carrying one rocket launcher, one rocket, two grenade launchers, and thirteen grenades.

LCT fought CJNG for subnational predominance in the states of Michoacán, Guerrero, and Jalisco. On October 3, an inter-gang shootout involving assault rifles left four gunmen dead in Jiquilpan, Michoacán. In Atoyac de Álvarez, Guerrero, five dead bodies bearing signs of torture were found on April 14. A message signed by LCT was placed next to them. On August 17, eight corpses were found shot in San Miguel Totolapan, presumably killed in an inter-gang firefight. Many inhabitants were displaced in the southern Sierra Madre region, where especially Los Rojos, the armed wing of BLO, was active. As of September, more than 1,800 people had left Heliodoro Castillo and San Miguel Totolapan. Several clandestine graves were discovered in Jalisco. Following the detention and interrogation of 22 municipal policemen and three civilians, the location of mass graves at the Río Lerma in La Barca was revealed. 67 corpses were found during excavations starting on November 11. Many were tattooed with LCT symbols. Two soldiers were among the victims. In early December, another seventeen bodies were found in Zapopan. In February, a video message suggested that the CJNG had broken its alliance with the Sinaloa Cartel’s Jalisco proxies Los Coroneles. Furthermore, Sinaloa Cartel and LCT collaborated in the Pacific states.

La Familia Michoacana (LFM) fought its breakaway faction LCT in Estado de México. Allegedly, LFM was responsible for the dumping of eleven corpses on January 14 near Mexico City and of twelve dismembered bodies on January 23/24 in Toluca. Despite the deployment of more than 2,500 troops in late January [→Mexico (drug cartels)], mass murders continued throughout the year.tmi

NICARAGUA (MILITANT GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2012**

Conflict parties: CGN, FDC 3-80, Nicaraguan Democratic Force vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology

The system and ideology conflict between various armed groups and the government of President Daniel Ortega’s Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) continued as a violent crisis. On January 3, the Democratic Front of Commando 3-80 (FDC 3-80) released a communiqué accusing military and police of abusing farmers suspected of supporting militant groups.

On April 15, military special forces attacked ten FDC 3-80 members in the jungle area of El Tortuguero, Autonomous

Region of the Southern Atlantic (RAAS). Special Forces killed the self-proclaimed leader Joaquín Díaz alias Comandante Cascabel together with three other militants. The remaining six escaped. According to a statement by the Coordinated Nicaraguan Guerrillera (CGN), the military was supported by combat helicopters.

Between July 18 and 23, four clashes between security personnel and militants took place in the department of Jinotega. Seven soldiers and one militant were killed and one militant and several soldiers wounded. On July 24, the mayor of Santa María de Pantasma, Jinotega, and the Nicaraguan Center for Human Rights (CENIDH) stated that army and police were intimidating and persecuting peasants in order to get information about armed groups. Two days later, CENIDH stated that 22 different armed groups coordinated by Marvin Figueroa alias Comandante Nicaragua operated in the North. On October 12, the mayor of Santa María de Pantasma and CENIDH declared that there had been three additional combats between security forces and militant groups in Jinotega in which two militants and one soldier were killed. Two days later, CENIDH declared that those killed in the shootout with the army in Jinotega showed signs of torture. On October 16, the army deployed additional troops to the department. The same day, representatives of the church and CENIDH called on the government to seek dialog with the militant groups. Also on October 16, the deputy of Santa María de Pantasma blamed the army for having killed a civilian.

In a meeting with the bishop of Estelí, Juan Abelardo Mata, on October 22, representatives of CGN and another group called Nicaraguan Democratic Force demanded alterations to the constitution as well as free and fair elections. The group also confirmed that Figueroa had been detained by Honduran police in the Honduran Danlí municipality, El Paraíso department.

On October 29, the National Police confirmed that a confrontation with a politically motivated militant group took place in the Autonomous Region of the Northern Atlantic (RAAN). During the clash, the police killed two militants, injured one, and arrested two.

On December 4, a shootout between security forces and a group of Nicaraguan Resistance Union members took place in Bocas de Ayapal, Jinotega. Security forces killed six militants and injured and captured another. The militants killed four policemen. hzi

NICARAGUA – COLOMBIA (SEA BORDER)

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **1825**

Conflict parties: Nicaragua vs. Colombia
 Conflict items: territory, resources

The non-violent crisis between Nicaragua and Colombia over the maritime border surrounding the archipelagos of San Andres, Providencia, and Santa Catalina continued. Regarding the 2012 final ruling by the ICJ that had granted Colombia sovereignty over seven disputed islands within the San Andres archipelago while adjudging Nicaragua political and economic control of a large amount of the surrounding waters, controversies as well as threatening gestures persisted.

On February 21, Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos ordered the National Navy of Colombia to increase its presence at the maritime border. On May 15, Nicaragua’s ambassador to The Hague, Carlos Arguello, announced preparations for

another claim against Colombia at the ICJ for more maritime territory. On May 17, the Colombian government announced that it would investigate the possibility of leaving the Bogotá Pact immediately, a contract obliging American countries to solve international conflicts without the use or threat of violence. In addition, the signatories had agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of the ICJ. On August 1 and 8, the Colombian government accused Nicaragua of mining for hydrocarbon and preparing oil drillings in Colombian maritime areas. The commander of the National Army of Colombia, General Sergio Mantilla, stated his country was ready for any eventuality against Nicaragua.

On September 10, Santos declared that his country would not abide by the ICJ ruling until there was an official treaty on the issue between the two countries. On September 16, he declared that the Colombian constitution forbade the alteration of borders and that Colombia could not accept the ICJ ruling. The next day, Nicaragua filed another lawsuit with the ICJ, demanding to define the exact path of the maritime border.

On November 14, the Colombian parliament asked Minister of Defense Juan Carlos Pinzón whether the Colombian Army would be prepared to fight a war against Nicaragua as well as its alleged supporter Russia. The Russian government, however, declared that it had no geostrategic interests in Central America and would not intervene in an armed conflict between the two countries. hzi

NICARAGUA – COSTA RICA (RÍO SAN JUAN)

Intensity: **1** | Change: • | Start: **1858**

Conflict parties: Nicaragua vs. Costa Rica
 Conflict items: territory

The territorial dispute between Nicaragua and Costa Rica continued. On April 17, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) joined the two existing cases concerning the territorial dispute. Nicaragua then filed four counter-claims. On May 1, the ICJ rejected them all.

On May 13, the Nicaraguan government announced that it no longer planned to build an inter-oceanic canal through the Río San Juan. In May, the governments of Nicaragua and Costa Rica both filled in a request to the ICJ for the modification of the order of 03/08/11, which said that both parties should refrain from sending personal to the disputed area. On July 16, the ICJ rejected both. The same day, the Costa Rican Ministry of Security announced the installation of police and security checkpoints in the border region to Nicaragua. In August, Costa Rica accused Nicaragua of selling oil exploring concessions in Costa Rican waters. On August 15, Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega declared to prepare a claim for an area of 10,141 square kilometers of Costa Rican territory at the ICJ. In September, Costa Rican President Laura Chinchilla accused Nicaragua of disrespecting the ICJ as members of the Nicaraguan military had allegedly dug canals in the disputed area. She added that relations between the two countries had deteriorated significantly. Nicaragua rejected the allegations. On September 21, Costa Rican Foreign Minister Enrique Castillo stated that there was a group within the government that would be ready to face the “expansionism” of Nicaragua, and therefore the national army had to be rebuilt. On November 22, the ICJ confirmed its 03/08/11 order and added that Nicaragua had to stop all dredging and had to remove all kind of personal from the disputed area. hzi

PARAGUAY (EPP, AGRARIAN MOVEMENTS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1989**

Conflict parties: EPP, agrarian movements vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, resources

The conflict over land reform between several farmers' organizations, the left-leaning People's Army of Paraguay (EPP), indigenous groups, and landless people on the one hand, and the government on the other, continued on a violent level. These groups continued to express their demands for integral agrarian, social, and political reform.

The EPP intensified its violent campaign against the government and in particular the security forces. The government responded with the deployment of the military on a permanent basis against the approx. twenty militants.

On April 21, the day before the presidential elections, EPP members attacked a police station in Kurusu de Hierro, Concepción department. They used an explosive device killing one police officer and seriously injuring three. Police forces killed one of the attackers during the subsequent shooting and arrested another. EPP left a pamphlet at the scene, declaring the attack a response to the alleged killing of a farmer by security forces in February. On May 31, EPP killed their former hostage and mayor of Tacuatí, Luis Alberto Lindstrom Picco, in San Pedro department. Two weeks later, police forces arrested EPP member Gustavo Ramón Cardozo Bazán in connection with the assassination. In an armed attack on a Brazilian land owner's industrial farm on August 17, EPP members killed four guards and one policeman near Tacuatí.

As a result of this attack, both Houses of Parliament agreed to make significant changes to the country's defense legislation, allowing the armed forces to be deployed throughout the country. On August 24, newly elected President Horacio Cartes signed a corresponding decree which authorized the deployment of up to 300 security forces to the provinces of Concepción, San Pedro, and Amambay with the mandate to fight EPP. On October 1, EPP members attacked a convoy of the Human Rights Commission and accompanying police in Tacuatí, killing two and injuring seven. During a military operation near Horqueta, Concepción, five EPP members killed one soldier and injured another on December 8.

The deployment of military personnel to the northern provinces led to protests by farmers and workers organizations. For example, on September 3, landless farmers blocked roads in the north and several thousand people marched through the capital Asunción. Furthermore, farmers organizations accused the government of an increasing militarization of the conflict and rejected what they deemed heavy-handed tactics and human rights abuses. They referred to incidents such as the September 18 murder of Inocencio Sanabria, leader of a farmer organization in Concepción, as examples of these abuses.

In addition, a report published on November 14 by a group of human rights investigators which had been deployed to the northern departments accused the military forces of grave human rights abuses.[ank](#)

PARAGUAY (IMPEACHMENT)

Intensity: **1** | Change: **END** | Start: **2012**

Conflict parties: Lugo supporters vs. Franco supporters

Conflict items: national power

The dispute over the impeachment of former president Fernando Lugo ended with nationally and internationally recognized presidential and parliamentary elections on April 21. Both the supporters of Lugo as well as the supporters of interim president Federico Franco accepted the election results which saw Horacio Cartes, candidate of the right-wing Asociación Nacional Republicana - Partido Colorado (ANR-PC), as elected president. Lugo won a seat in the Senate for the left-leaning Frente Guasú (FG). The head of the OAS electoral observer mission in Paraguay, former Costa Rican president Oscar Arias, described the electoral process in Paraguay as exemplary.

Free and fair elections were the pre-condition for the lifting of the suspension of Paraguay's membership in UNASUR and MERCOSUR. Both organizations had suspended Paraguay after Lugo's impeachment. While Paraguay officially rejoined UNASUR on August 15, the country's re-entrance into MERCOSUR was postponed as Paraguay regarded Venezuela's meanwhile admission to MERCOSUR illegal. However, on December 6, Cartes declared his will to formally recognize Venezuela. The following weeks, both the Lower and Upper Chamber accepted Venezuela's incorporation into the South American trade bloc.[ank](#)

PERU (OPPOSITION MOVEMENTS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2008**

Conflict parties: opposition movements vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, resources

The system/ideology and resources conflict related to socio-environmental issues such as water pollution and water shortage mainly in the mining sector between various opposition groups and the government remained violent. The 2011 consultation law aimed at preventing social conflicts was not successfully applied so far. However, the prime minister's office mitigated a part of the social conflicts through the national office for dialog and sustainability.

On January 21, about 200 peasant farmers demonstrated against mining explorations due to concerns about environmental pollution in the Canaris district in the northeastern Lambayeque region. Four days later, the protest turned violent. Police wounded at least four protesters when last-mentioned tried to enter the Canadian-owned Canariaco copper mine.

On March 11, police injured at least eight people blocking a bridge to protest against the upcoming referendum on a mining project in Cajamarca. On March 15, two people were killed in a clash between wildcat miners and police in Parcoy district of La Libertad region. The miners had protested against and tried to invade a gold deposit of the local Consorcio Minero Horizonte.

On April 10, about 400 activists protesting against the Conga

Project, a gold and copper mining project in the Cajamarca region, entered the property of the U.S.-owned mining company Minera Yanacocha and burned containers and pipes. On June 17, thousands of farmers peacefully protested against the project in the same region. On October 24, protesters against the Tia Maria mining project injured at least nine police officers when they tried to enter an informational conference in Arequipa region.mgm

PERU (SHINING PATH)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1980**

Conflict parties: SL vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology, subnational pre-dominance, resources

The subnational predominance and ideology conflict between the left-wing Maoist rebel group Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso; SL) and the central government continued as a violent crisis. After the capture of SL's Huallaga Regional Committee (CRH) leader last year and his life sentence on June 8 of this year, only the Center Regional Committee (CRC) of SL remained active in southern Peru, especially in Apurímac, Ene, and Mantaro river valley (VRAEM). The government accused SL of being involved in drug trafficking and providing gunmen for drug cartels.

While SL restricted its violent actions in comparison to previous years, the government intensified efforts to combat SL and related coca cultivation. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Peru had replaced Colombia as the world's top coca grower in 2012. This year, government forces eradicated a record amount of coca and destroyed nineteen clandestine airstrips used for drug flights, most of them in VRAEM. More than 250 soldiers as well as eight helicopters, six airplanes, and five navy hovercrafts were involved in locating and destroying landing sites.

In February, a major military operation named "Red Sunrise" involving about 300 soldiers and twelve helicopters led to the seizure of several SL camps and a logistical hub in the Vizcatan area of Huanta, Ayacucho region. During the operation, the military killed two SL members. In similar incidents, SL members killed an army corporal in Llochegua, Huanta, on March 4, wounded a marine and police officer in Mazangaro in the Junin region on March 14, and killed an army sergeant in La Convención province, Cusco, on April 5.

On June 8, the government announced that it would build ten additional counterterrorism bases in VRAEM. On June 22 and 23, the army removed six explosives allegedly placed by SL members near a key gas pipeline in VRAEM.

On August 11, police forces killed Alejandro Borda Casafranca alias Comrade Alipio, military chief of CRC, and Marco Antonio Quispe alias Comrade Gabriel, another leading member of CRC, during an ambush in the Ayacucho region. Tarcela Loya Vilchez alias Comrada Olga supposedly took over as military commander. In the second half of September, military and police forces detained 23 alleged SL members during their joint operation named Operation Daedalus in VRAEM. On September 22, the government extended the state of emergency in eleven localities in VRAEM for an additional 60 days. On December 9, police forces arrested Alexander Dimas Fabián Huamán alias Héctor who was held responsible for an alleged reconstruction of CRH.mgm

PERU – CHILE (BORDER)

Intensity: **1** | Change: • | Start: **1883**

Conflict parties: Peru vs. Chile
 Conflict items: territory

The dispute between Peru and Chile over the demarcation in the Pacific continued.

Throughout the year, the ICJ repeatedly postponed its final ruling about the maritime boundary off the Peruvian city of Tacna. On September 9, it re-scheduled the decision to January 2014.

The complaint, filed by Peru in 2008 during the García administration, thus remained pending during the observation period. In various statements, however, both conflict parties expressed their will to abide by the ICJ's ruling regardless of the outcome.peh

USA – MEXICO (BORDER SECURITY)

Intensity: **2** | Change: ↘ | Start: **2005**

Conflict parties: USA vs. Mexico
 Conflict items: other

The conflict between the USA and Mexico over border security de-escalated to a non-violent crisis. Disputed issues were security strategies regarding illegal immigration as well as the "War on Drugs" [→Mexico (drug cartels)].

Region-wise, drug trafficking and illegal entry shifted from Arizona to Texas.

US President Barack Obama and his Mexican counterpart Enrique Peña Nieto consented on focusing more on economic rather than security cooperation, as discussed on May 2 in the Mexican capital of Mexico City. Previously, Mexico had restricted access of US law enforcement agencies to Mexican security forces by re-directing all communication through its Interior Ministry. Nevertheless, both countries established the Cross Border Security Communications Network to coordinate patrols in the border region on July 23. In January, the US announced that it would start training Mexican security forces in Colorado, US, in anti-terrorism techniques.

The US condemned the August 9 release of Rafael Caro Quintero, who had allegedly ordered the murder of US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent Enrique Camarena Salazar in 1985. On September 10, Mexico promised it would re-arrest Caro Quintero.

On April 18, the US and Mexico made permanent a joint initiative enabling the US to continue deporting undocumented Mexican immigrants to the interior of Mexico. On June 27, the US Senate passed the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act, providing for additional fences, surveillance, and at least 3,500 additional Border Patrol agents. The law would allow undocumented immigrants to apply for a legal immigrant status if they met certain requirements, but would also demand apprehension of more than 90 percent of illegal immigrants.

Two days before the Senate passed the act, Mexican Foreign Minister José Antonio Meade criticized that it would include further militarization of the border. The law remained to be introduced in the House of Representativeslas

VENEZUELA (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1992**

Conflict parties: opposition vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The system and national power conflict between the opposition, composed of student organizations, a coalition of a large number of political parties, and representatives of other interest groups, and the government led by President Nicolas Maduro after Hugo Chavez' death continued.

On January 8, the National Assembly (AN) authorized then-president Chávez to postpone his swear-in because of his health condition. A day later, the Supreme Court of Justice reaffirmed this decision. The opposition answered with a petition on January 11 for the OAS to open an extraordinary meeting to discuss the situation in Venezuela. Between January 23 and March 4, tens of thousands of government supporters attended nationwide rallies to commemorate the anniversaries of the end of the Pérez-Jiménez dictatorship and the "Caracazo." They also expressed support for Chávez in response to controversies about his health. Opposition supporters attended smaller rallies, principally in the capital Caracas, demanding clarity over Chávez' health condition. On March 5, then-vice president Maduro announced that Chávez had died. Four days later, the National Electoral Committee (CNE) scheduled presidential elections for April 14. On March


21, pro-opposition students both protesting against CNE and demanding "transparent and fair" elections clashed with police and pro-government students. Official sources stated that pro-opposition and pro-government students threw stones and incendiary material at each other. Police, also having been attacked by pro-opposition students, tried to disperse the crowd with teargas and rubber bullets. Four protesters were injured.

On April 14, Maduro won the presidential election with 50.66 percent of the vote. Opposition candidate Henrique Capriles Radonski, who gained 49.07 percent of the vote, did not accept the result. The opposition also demanded a manual recount of the vote. On April 16, the opposition staged protests in different parts of the country, setting fire to eighteen Central Diagnostic Centers and three subsidized markets. Opposition supporters, mostly young students armed with stones and glass bottles, protested in front of the different CNE headquarters all over the country. Violence left two people dead in Caracas, three in Ojeda, Zulia state, one in Cumaná, Sucre state, and one in San Cristobal, Táchira state. On April 31, opposition lawmakers interrupted the AN's session with air horns, whistles, and shouts to express their rejection of the new government. The situation escalated into violence among the lawmakers.

On November 19, the AN passed an enabling law giving Maduro decree powers to reorganize the economy. In a rally held in Caracas on November 25, opposition supporters criticized the move. On December 8, the government coalition won 49.24 percent and the opposition 42.72 percent in the municipal elections.jca

ASIA AND OCEANIA

CONFLICTS IN ASIA AND OCEANIA





REGIONAL PANORAMA

As in previous years, Asia and Oceania remained the region with the highest number of conflicts, accounting for 129 in total. Most frequently, conflicts revolved around system/ideology (51 cases), subnational predominance (29), and resources (22). Nineteen conflicts included secessionist demands, whereas eighteen included demands for autonomy. Most violent conflicts were fought over system/ideology (27), subnational predominance (21), resources (14), and secession (13).

In 2013, two wars were observed, showing a decrease by one compared to 2012. The conflict between Islamist groups and the Pakistani government continued on the level of a war for the eighth consecutive year. In addition, the conflict between the Moro National Liberation Front and the Philippine government escalated to a war. The 2012 war between Bodos and Bengali Muslims in India de-escalated by two levels. While more than 100 people had been killed and 400,000 had fled their homes in July and August last year, only a few incidents of violence were reported this year. Last year's war in Myanmar's Kachin State de-escalated to a limited war [→ Myanmar (KIA, KIO / Kachin State)]. Furthermore, one limited war was observed in India, one in the Philippines, and three in Pakistan, amounting to six in total.

Less than 20 percent of all conflicts observed were conducted between states. Most common items in the 21 interstate conflicts were territory with thirteen, international power with nine, and resources with four. In Northeast Asia, disputes at Japanese maritime borders continued with Russia, South Korea, and the two Chinas. The People's Republic of China (PRC) reinforced maritime patrols and extended its Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea that overlapped with those of its neighbors, including the Republic of China (ROC) [→ Japan – China (Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands)]. However, cross-strait relations remained stable with regard to the signing of a new Service Trade Agreement [→ China (Taiwan)]. In the South China Sea, tensions over resources and territory turned violent when the Philippine Coast Guard killed a Taiwanese fisherman [→ China – Vietnam et al. (South China Sea, Spratly and Paracel Islands)]. China, Japan, and South Korea increased defense capabilities and tightened internal security. Tensions between the two Koreas increased when the North nullified all non-aggression pacts and shut down the Kaesong Industrial Complex [→ North Korea – South Korea]. In addition, it reported its third nuclear test and threatened to attack the USA and Japan [→ North Korea – USA, South Korea, Japan]. The PRC and the US improved relations but disputed about cybertheft and freedom of navigation [→ China – USA]. The US reaffirmed its nuclear umbrella over South Korea and Japan, and confirmed the inclusion of the disputed Senkaku Islands in its Mutual Defense Treaty. In South East Asia, border disputes eased. An ICJ ruling concerning the temple of Preah Vihear partly resolved the conflict between Thailand and Cambodia. In South Asia, conflicts over the delineation of India's northern borders continued. Pakistan and India clashed at least 47 times along the contested Line of Control in Kashmir. Sino-Indian tensions increased over reported Chinese border incursions, but remained non-violent. In Central Asia, the conflict over water resources between upstream and downstream countries remained tense [→ Uzbekistan – Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan]. In July, Kyrgyz villagers interrupted water flow to the Kazakh Zhambyl Region by blocking a canal for ten days.

Conflicts over secession or autonomy persisted throughout Asia and remained violent in most cases. In Northeast India, secessionist groups launched attacks in the states of Assam, Manipur, Nagaland, Meghalaya, and Tripura. Protests by the Gorkha Janmukti Morcha (GJM) for a separate Gorkha state de-escalated. On July 30, India approved the new state of Telangana, which sparked protests by government employees and renewed calls for autonomy in other parts of the country [→ India (TJAC / Telangana)]. Violence escalated in Kashmir, where the government launched an operation with helicopters and more than a thousand soldiers, deemed the largest military operation in this area since 1999 [→ India (JEM et al. / Kashmir)]. In neighboring Pakistan, at least 150 were killed and about 400 people went missing in the Baloch secessionist conflict [→ Pakistan (BLA et al. / Balochistan)]. In Bangladesh's Chittagong Hill Tracts, the conflict between the government and the autonomy parties PCJSS and UPDF further de-escalated, while both autonomy parties continued to clash over subnational predominance. In Myanmar, fighting decreased in the autonomy conflicts in the states of Kachin, Karen, Kayah, and Shan. The government held several peace talks, culminating in negotiations over a nationwide ceasefire with seventeen ethnic groups in November. In Thailand, Islamist separatists planted hundreds of roadside bombs in the southern border provinces. In the Philippines, violence erupted following government peace talks with the group MILF. Consequently, war broke out in Zamboanga between their rival MNLF and the army. A new armed conflict broke out in Malaysia, when about



ASIA AND OCEANIA

200 gunmen laid claim to the Lahad Datu district in Sabah state [→Malaysia (Sulu Sultanate supporters / Lahad Datu district)]. In Indonesia, the conflict in Aceh de-escalated after Partai Aceh had won the 2012 governor elections [Indonesia (KPA, Partai Aceh – Irwandi camp)]. In the PRC, the government cracked down on protests in Inner Mongolia and Tibet. In Xinjiang, more than 170 were killed in clashes between Uyghurs and security personnel.

In 2013, eighteen opposition conflicts were observed in Asia and Oceania. Violence erupted in the context of elections in Bangladesh, Cambodia, Malaysia, the Maldives, the Philippines, Nepal, Pakistan, and Tajikistan. In Bangladesh, the government deployed the army on December 26 due to large-scale oppositional riots [→Bangladesh (AL, AJL, BCL – BNP, JJD, BJC); Bangladesh (Jel, ICS – AL, BCL)]. In Nepal, Kirati and Madeshi militants attacked candidates in the course of the constitutional assembly election in November. In Pakistan, a new conflict erupted before the general elections in May, when a Sunni cleric mobilized thousands to protest against corruption. Ethno-political violence left more than 400 people dead in Sindh Province. However, despite irregularities, the election results were accepted by all major political parties. In Thailand, so-called Yellow Shirts and Red Shirts repeatedly clashed in Bangkok [→Thailand (UDD, PTP – PAD)]. Opposition conflicts remained non-violent in the PRC, Fiji, Myanmar, and Uzbekistan.

Nineteen intrastate conflicts over resources continued, most of which were violent. In Kyrgyzstan and Myanmar, protests revolved around mining projects [→Kyrgyzstan (Kumtor Gold Mine); Myanmar (farmers et al. / Sagaing Region)].

Socioeconomic protests remained widespread in Bangladesh, China, Kazakhstan, Papua New Guinea, and Samoa. In Bangladesh, mass protests by garment workers followed the collapse of a building that housed garment factories in which 1,129 died. The PRC announced extensive social reforms and security measures as thousands of mass protests continued nationwide. In Papua New Guinea, conflicts between villagers and mining and drilling companies led to deadly clashes at the Porgera mine and resumed secessionist calls at the mining-affected islands of Bougainville and Lihir.

While one conflict with left-wing militant groups de-escalated in Nepal, another continued in India, where the government launched several large-scale police operations against the Naxalites [→India (Naxalites)].

Conflicts with Islamist militant groups persisted in South and Southeast Asia. In the PRC, the Turkestan Islamic Party claimed responsibility for a car attack on Tian'anmen Square [→China (Uyghurs / Xinjiang)]. Islamist militant groups in India launched at least four bomb attacks, one targeting an election rally of BJP Prime Ministerial Candidate Narendra Modi. In Pakistan, the war against Islamist militant groups continued and claimed the lives of more than 3,500. Islamists carried out attacks nationwide and especially attacked secular parties in the run-up to the general elections. Moreover, militant groups continued to attack religious minorities, especially Shiites [→Pakistan (TTP et al. – religious groups)].

Further conflicts involving religious groups continued in the PRC, Laos, and Vietnam, where governments cracked down on dissident Christians. In Myanmar and Sri Lanka, tensions between Muslim groups and the respective governments de-escalated. In Myanmar's Rakhine state, the conflict between Buddhists and Rohingyas de-escalated to a violent crisis, while Sinhalese Buddhist monks started attacks on Muslims. In Indonesia, tensions between Muslims and Christians remained violent on Sulawesi, but de-escalated on the Moluccas. Conflicts with Hindus remained violent in India [→India (Hindus - Christians); India (Hindus - Muslims)]. Conflicts along ethnic lines over subnational predominance remained violent in Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, and the PRC. In Pakistan, Islamist militants declared their intention to kill all Hazara Shiites in Balochistan province. In Papua New Guinea, tensions between highlanders and lowlanders escalated when highlanders reportedly killed a student in the city of Lae, Morobe Province. Violence between highland tribes increased over local elections, but declined in general. (ska, jfr, hru, ast, mwu)

Overview: Conflicts in Asia and Oceania in 2013

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
Bangladesh (AL, AJL, BCL – BNP, JJD, BJC)*	AL, AJL, BCL vs. BNP, BJC, JJD	national power	1991	•	3
Bangladesh (Islamist groups)	Hel, HuJI-B, JMB vs. government	system/ideology	2004	↗	3
Bangladesh (Jel, ICS – AL, BCL)*	ICS, Jel vs. AL, BCL	system/ideology, national power	2000	•	3
Bangladesh (PCJSS, UPDF / Chittagong Hill Tracts)*	PCJSS, UPDF vs. government	autonomy	1971	↘	1
Bangladesh (PCJSS– UPDF)*	Parabotya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samity (PCJSS) vs. United Peoples Democratic Front (UPDF)	subnational predominance	1997	•	3
Bangladesh (RMG workers)	RMG workers vs. government	system/ideology, other	2006	•	3
Cambodia (opposition movement)	CPP vs. civil society groups, CNRP	system/ideology, national power, resources	1997	•	3
Cambodia – Vietnam*	Cambodia vs. Vietnam	territory	1969	•	1
China (Falun Gong et al.)*	Falun Gong vs. government	system/ideology	1999	•	2
China (Han – Hui – Tibetans)*	Tibetan ethnic minority vs. Hui ethnic minority vs. Han Chinese	subnational predominance	1949	•	3
China (Hong Kong pro-democracy groups)	Hong Kong pro-democracy groups vs. government, SAR government	autonomy, system/ideology	1997	•	2
China (house churches)*	house churches vs. government	system/ideology	1949	•	2
China (Inner Mongolia)	Mongolian ethnic minorities vs. government, Han Chinese	autonomy, subnational predominance, resources	1981	•	3
China (opposition groups)	opposition groups vs. government	system/ideology	1978	•	1
China (socioeconomic protests)	environmentalists, peasants, workers vs. government	resources, other	1978	•	3
China (Taiwan)	PRC vs. ROC vs. pro-Taiwan independence groups	secession, system/ideology	1949	•	2
China (Tibet)	CTA, Tibetans, TYC vs. government	secession, autonomy, system/ideology, resources	1950	•	3
China (Uyghurs / Xinjiang)	TIP, Uyghurs, WUC vs. government	secession, system/ideology, subnational predominance	1949	•	3
China – India	China vs. India	territory, international power, resources	1954	•	2
China – USA*	China vs. USA	system/ideology, international power	1949	↗	2
China – Vietnam et al. (South China Sea, Spratly and Paracel Islands)	Brunei vs. PRC vs. ROC vs. Malaysia vs. Vietnam vs. Philippines	territory, international power, resources	1949	↗	3
Fiji (Indo-Fijians – indigenous Fijians)*	Indo-Fijians vs. indigenous Fijians	national power, subnational predominance	1970	•	1
Fiji (opposition groups)	opposition groups vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1987	↘	1
Fiji – Tonga (Minerva Reefs)*	Fiji, Tonga	territory	2005	•	1
India (Bodos, Assamese – Biharis, Bengalis)*	Assamese, Bodos, NDFB, ULFA vs. AAMSU, ABMSU, Bengalis, Biharis	subnational predominance	1981	↓	3
India (GJM et al. / West Bengal, Assam)*	GJM, GNFL, AIGL, GLO, ABGL, ABAVP, Janatachetana vs. Amra Bengali vs. government	autonomy	1947	↘	2
India (GNLA et al. / Meghalaya)	ANLA, ANVC, ANVC-B, ATF, GNLA, HNLC, LAEF, UALA vs. government	autonomy	1988	•	3
India (GNLA, HNLC – ANVC, UANF)*	GNLA, HNLC vs. ANCV, UANF	subnational predominance	1992	↘	2
India (Hindus – Christians)*	Bajrang Dal, Hindus, Shiv Sena, VHP vs. Christians	subnational predominance	1999	↗	3
India (Hindus – Muslims)*	Hindus vs. Muslims	subnational predominance	1947	•	3
India (HPC-D, HNA / Mizoram, Manipur, Assam)*	HPC-D, HNA vs. government	secession	1986	•	2
India (inter-factional violence / Nagaland)	NSCN-K, ZUV vs. NSCN-IM vs. NSCN-KK	subnational predominance	1988	•	3
India (Islamist militant groups)*	HM, HuJI, IM, JeM, LeT, SIMI vs. government	system/ideology	2000	•	3

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Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
India (JeM et al. / Kashmir)	HM, HuM, JeM, LeT vs. government	secession	1947	↗	4
India (MPLF et al. / Manipur)*	MPLF, UPPK, PLA, RPF, KNLF, KRF, KSCD, KCP vs. government	secession	1964	•	3
India (Nagas – Kukis)*	KNF, KNA, KLA vs. NSCN, UNPC	subnational predominance	1947	•	2
India (Naxalites)	CPI-M vs. government	system/ideology	1997	↘	3
India (NDFB – ACF, BCF)*	Bodos, NDFB vs. Santhals, ACF, BCF	subnational predominance	1994	•	2
India (NLFT, ATTF, BNCT / Tripura)*	NLFT, ATTF, BNCT vs. government	secession	1978	•	3
India (NSCN et al. / Nagaland)	ASAM, NNC, NSCN-IM, NSCN-K, NSCN-KK, NSCN-U, UNC, ZUF vs. government	secession	1947	•	3
India (PULF)*	PULF vs. government	autonomy, system/ideology	1993	•	2
India (Sikhs / Punjab)*	Shiromani Akali Dal, KZF, KLF, KTF, BKI, Dal Khalsa vs. government	autonomy	1947	↘	1
India (Sikhs – DSS)	Sikhs vs. DSS	system/ideology	2007	•	3
India (TJAC / Telangana)	TJAC vs. government	autonomy	1969	•	3
India (ULFA et al. / Assam)*	ULFA, NDFB, RNLF, KPLT, DJNA, RNSF vs. government	secession	1979	•	3
Indonesia (Ahmadiyya)	Ahmadiyya vs. government, Sunni militants	system/ideology	1980	•	3
Indonesia (Islamist militant groups)	JAT, JI vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1981	•	3
Indonesia (KPA, Partai Aceh / Aceh)*	KPA, Partai Aceh vs. government	autonomy, resources	1953	•	1
Indonesia (KPA, Partai Aceh – Irwandi camp / Aceh)*	KPA, Partai Aceh vs. Irwandi camp	subnational predominance, resources	2006	↘	1
Indonesia (Muslims – Christians / Moluccas)*	Muslims vs. Christians	subnational predominance	1998	↘	1
Indonesia (Muslims – Christians / Sulawesi)*	Muslims vs. Christians	system/ideology, subnational predominance	1998	•	3
Indonesia (OPM / Papua)	OPM vs. government	secession, resources	1961	•	3
Indonesia – Timor-Leste*	Timor-Leste vs. Indonesia	territory, other	2002	↘	1
Japan – China (Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands)	PRC vs. ROC vs. Japan	territory, international power, resources	1971	•	2
Japan – Russia (Southern Kuril Islands)*	Japan vs. Russia	territory	1945	•	1
Japan – South Korea (Takeshima/Dokdo Islands)*	Japan vs. ROK	territory, other	1951	•	2
Kazakhstan (Islamist militant groups)*	Djund al-Khalifat, Islamist militant groups vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2011	↘	2
Kazakhstan (oil worker protests)*	oil industry workers, opposition parties vs. government	system/ideology, resources	2011	↘	1
Kazakhstan (opposition groups)	opposition vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2004	•	2
Kyrgyzstan (Kumtor Gold Mine)	mine workers vs. government	system/ideology, resources	2009	•	3
Kyrgyzstan (Kyrgyz – Uzbeks)*	ethnic Kyrgyz vs. ethnic Uzbeks	subnational predominance, resources	1990	↗	3
Kyrgyzstan (opposition)*	opposition parties vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2005	•	2
Laos (Christians)*	Christians vs. government	system/ideology	1975	•	2
Laos (Hmong, royalists)*	Hmong, royalists vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1975	↘	2
Malaysia (Malay – Chinese, Indian and indigenous Malaysians)*	Malay Malaysians vs. Chinese Malaysians, Indian Malaysians, Indigenous Malaysians	system/ideology, subnational predominance	1946	•	2
Malaysia (opposition movement)	Bersih, Pakatan Rakyat vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1969	•	3
Malaysia (Sulu Sultanate supporters / Lahad Datu district)	Royal Security Forces of the Sultanate of Sulu and North Borneo vs. government	secession	2013	NEW	3
Malaysia – Indonesia, Philippines (immigrants)*	Malaysia vs. Indonesia, Philippines	other	1998	•	2
Maldives (opposition)*	MDP vs. government	national power	2011	•	3
Myanmar (Arakan Liberation Army, NUFA / Rakhine State)*	Arakan Liberation Army, NUFA vs. government	secession	1948	↘	1

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Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
Myanmar (Buddhists - Rohingyas / Rakhine State)*	Buddhists vs. Rohingyas	subnational predominance, other	2012	↘	3
Myanmar (CNA, CNF / Chin State)*	CNA, CNF vs. government	secession	1988	↘	1
Myanmar (farmers et al. / Sagaing Region)*	farmers et al. vs. government	resources	2012	•	3
Myanmar (KIA, KIO / Kachin State)	KIA, KIO vs. government	autonomy, resources	1961	↘	4
Myanmar (KNPP, KnA, KNLP / Kayah State)*	KNPP, KnA, KNLP vs. government	autonomy	1948	↘	2
Myanmar (KNU, KNLA, DKBA / Karen State, Kayah State)	KNLA, KNU, DKBA vs. government	autonomy	1948	•	3
Myanmar (MNLA, NMSP / Mon State, Karen State)*	MNLA, NMSP vs. government	secession	1948	↘	1
Myanmar (opposition movement)*	opposition vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1962	•	2
Myanmar (Rohingyas, ARNO / Rakhine State)*	Rohingyas, ARNO vs. government	other	1948	↘	1
Myanmar (SSA / Shan State)	SSA-N, SSA-S vs. government	autonomy	1952	•	3
Myanmar (UWSA, NDAA / Shan State)*	UWSA, NDAA vs. government	autonomy	1988	↗	2
Nepal (former PLA members)*	former PLA members vs. government	other	2008	↓	1
Nepal (Kiratis / Kosi, Mechi, Sagarmatha)	FLSC, Khumbuwan National Front, Khumbuwan Mukti Morcha Samyukta, Sanghiya Limbuwan Rajya Parishad, LNLf vs. government	autonomy	1992	↗	3
Nepal (Madheshis / Terai)	AJMM, JTMM, JTMM factions, JTMMF, MJF, MMT, TMPD vs. government	autonomy	2004	•	3
Nepal (opposition)*	opposition vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2008	•	3
Nepal (right-wing Hindu groups)*	NDA, Ranabir Sena, Bishwo Hindu Youth Federation, RPPN vs. government	system/ideology	2006	↘	2
Nepal – Bhutan*	Nepal vs. Bhutan	other	1985	•	1
North Korea – South Korea	DPRK vs. ROK	territory, system/ideology, international power	1948	•	2
North Korea – USA, South Korea, Japan	DPRK vs. USA, ROK, Japan	system/ideology, international power, other	1990	•	2
Pakistan (anti-corruption protesters)	anti-corruption protesters, Minhaj-ul-Quran vs. government	system/ideology	2013	NEW	3
Pakistan (BLA et al. / Balochistan)	BLA, BLF, BNM, BNP, BRA, BRP, UBA vs. government	secession, resources	1948	•	3
Pakistan (inter-ethnic violence / Sindh)	Mohajirs, MQM vs. ANP, Pakhtuns vs. Balochs, PPP, Sindhis	subnational predominance	1947	•	4
Pakistan (inter-Islamist violence)	TTP vs. AI vs. LI	system/ideology, subnational predominance	2010	↗	4
Pakistan (Islamist militant groups)	al-Qaeda, Haqqani Network, LI, TTP vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2001	•	5
Pakistan (opposition)	opposition parties vs. government	national power	1998	•	1
Pakistan (Taliban – tribes)*	LI, TTP vs. Aman Lashka, various tribes	system/ideology, subnational predominance	2001	•	3
Pakistan (TTP et al. – religious groups)	Jundullah, LeJ, TTP vs. Ahmadiyya, Christians, Hindus, Shiites	system/ideology, subnational predominance	1985	•	4
Pakistan – India	Pakistan vs. India	territory, international power	1947	•	3
Papua New Guinea (highlanders - lowlanders)*	highlanders vs. lowlanders	subnational predominance	1975	↗	3
Papua New Guinea (opposition)*	opposition vs. government	national power	2011	↘	1
Papua New Guinea (socioeconomic protests)*	landowners vs. employees vs. government	resources, other	2002	•	3
Papua New Guinea (tribal violence)	Kambia vs. Wambe vs. various highland tribes	subnational predominance, resources	1975	•	3
Philippines (Abu Sayyaf)	Abu Sayyaf vs. government	secession, system/ideology	1991	•	3
Philippines (BIFM, BIFF – MILF, government)	BIFF, BIFM vs. government, MILF	subnational predominance	2011	•	4
Philippines (CPP, NPA)*	CPP, NPA vs. government	system/ideology	1968	•	3

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Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
Philippines (MILF – MNLF)*	MNLF vs. MILF	subnational predominance	2009	•	3
Philippines (MILF)*	MILF vs. government	secession, system/ideology, resources	1977	•	2
Philippines (MNLF)	MNLF vs. government	secession, system/ideology, resources	1969	↑	5
Samoa (landowner protests)*	customary landowners vs. government	other	1946	↘	2
Singapore – Malaysia*	Singapore vs. Malaysia	territory	1963	•	1
Sri Lanka (Muslims)*	Muslims, SLMC vs. government	other	1948	↘	1
Sri Lanka (Sinhalese Buddhists, JHU, JVP – Hindus, Eelam Tamils, Muslims, SLMC, Christians)	Sinhalese Buddhists, Echo of Sinhala, BBS vs. Eelam Tamils, Tamil Hindus vs. SLMC, Muslims vs. Christians	system/ideology, subnational predominance	1948	↗	3
Sri Lanka (Tamils – Muslims)*	Eelam Tamils vs. Muslims	subnational predominance	1948	•	1
Sri Lanka (upcountry Tamils)*	upcountry Tamils, CWC vs. government	other	1948	•	1
Tajikistan (Gorno-Badakhshan)*	Khorugh traffickers vs. government	subnational predominance	2012	↘	3
Tajikistan (Islamist militant groups)	Hizb-ut-Tahrir, IMU, Jamaat Ansarullah, Jundullah, Tablig-i-Jamaat vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1997	↗	3
Tajikistan (opposition)*	opposition vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1997	•	2
Thailand (Islamist separatists / southern border provinces)	various Islamist separatists vs. government	secession, system/ideology	1902	↘	3
Thailand (UDD, PTP – PAD)	PTP, UDD vs. PAD	system/ideology, national power	2006	•	3
Thailand – Cambodia (border)*	Thailand vs. Cambodia	territory, international power	1954	•	2
Thailand – Myanmar*	Myanmar vs. Thailand	territory, other	1948	•	1
Timor-Leste (FRETILIN – CNRT)*	FRETILIN vs. CNRT	national power	2006	↓	1
Timor-Leste (veterans)*	veterans vs. government	other	2006	•	1
Timor-Leste – Australia*	Timor-Leste vs. Australia	resources	2002	•	1
USA – Pakistan*	USA vs. Pakistan	other	2003	↘	1
Uzbekistan (Islamist militant groups)*	IMU, Hizb ut-Tahrir vs. various Islamist militant groups vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1991	•	1
Uzbekistan (opposition)*	opposition vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1991	•	2
Uzbekistan – Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan	Uzbekistan vs. Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan	international power, resources	2010	↘	1
Vietnam (Montagnards)*	Montagnards vs. government	autonomy, system/ideology	1958	↘	2

^{1 2 3 4} cf. overview table for Europe

Please note: The intensity of each conflict as shown in the tables is the highest intensity reached in the course of the year. Therefore, conflicts may, for instance, be classified as limited wars although there may have been no more fighting in the second half of the year.

If a conflict revolves around a territory whose name is disputed by the conflict parties, both variations will be named, separated by an “/” [e.g. Japan – China (Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands); Argentina – UK (Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas)]. If, in contrast, the conflict actors strive for subnational predominance, secession, or autonomy of or in a certain region, the region is separated from the actors by “ / ” [e.g. France (FLNC / Corsica); Myanmar (KIA, KIO / Kachin State)].

SELECTED CONFLICT DESCRIPTIONS

BANGLADESH (ISLAMIST GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↗** | Start: **2004**

Conflict parties: Hel, HuJI-B, JMB vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology

The conflict over ideology and the orientation of the political system between various Islamist groups such as Harkat-ul-Jihad-al Islami Bangladesh (HuJI-B), Jamatul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), and Hefazat-e Islam (Hel) on the one hand, and the government on the other, continued. Contrary to HuJI-B and JMB, Hel rejected militancy.

Over the course of the year, security forces arrested at least twelve alleged militants with connections to the banned militant group HuJI-B, which aimed at the establishment of a strictly Islamic system. On June 20, ten members of the militant outfit JMB were sentenced to death for their involvement in a suicide attack in Gazipur, Dhaka division, in which nine people died in 2005. In previous years, the government had led a massive crackdown on militant Islamist groups and arrested and executed several top leaders of JMB and HuJI-B. In March, Hel, madrasa-based in Chittagong division, started a nationwide campaign demanding capital punishment for defamatory speech against Islam. They also called for the implementation of a thirteen points agenda after bloggers allegedly published pejorative comments and pictures against Islam on the internet. The agenda included the enactment of an anti-blasphemy law and the cancellation of the country's women development policy.

On April 6, thousands of Hel supporters held a demonstration in the capital Dhaka and gave the government an ultimatum to meet their demands within three weeks. The oppositional Bangladesh Nationalist Party and the governing coalition Jatiya Party (JP) provided the protesters with water and food [→ Bangladesh (AL, AJL, BCL - BNP, JJD, BJC)]. The same day, one supporter of the governing Awami League (AL) died when AL supporters attacked Hel activists in Bhanga, Faridpur district. After the rally, the Minister of Home Affairs Muhiuddin Khan Alamgir, AL, thanked Hel for holding a peaceful program and said that the government would consider Hel's demands.

On May 5, tens of thousands of Hel supporters started a protest march in Dhaka as announced on April 18. According to the government, Hel supporters vandalized several shops and clashes between protesters and police left three people dead after rubber bullets and teargas shells were used. The following night, security forces drove Hel out of Dhaka in a combined operation of police, Rapid Action Battalion, and Border Guard Bangladesh. At least ten Hel activists and one policeman died. Opposition groups and NGOs claimed that the number of casualties was much higher. On May 6, Hel activists and law enforcers clashed in different areas in and outside of Dhaka in which at least 27 people were killed and approx. 200 were injured.

Subsequent to the riots, police accused top leaders of Hel of murder, vandalism, and arson, and Minister Alamgir announced that Hel would not be allowed to hold further protests. On December 24, Hel planned to hold another rally in Dhaka, which was cancelled after Hel failed to receive official permission.kbl

BANGLADESH (RMG WORKERS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **2006**

Conflict parties: RMG workers vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, other

The conflict between Ready-Made Garment (RMG) workers and the government continued on a violent level. RMG workers staged protests in demand of higher minimum wages and new accords on workplace safety. Union leaders called for enhanced organization rights and put pressure on international retailers. After the Tazreen Fashion factory fire in Ashulia on 12/24/12, another major industrial disaster took place in Dhaka's industrial belt on April 24, when the collapse of Rana Plaza, a building in Savar housing shops and garment factories, caused at least 1,129 deaths and more than 2,500 people injured. Factory owners had forced them back to work despite warnings of imminent collapse, and were subsequently arrested. In the following days, hundreds of garment workers rioted in Chittagong, Dhaka, Gazipur, and Savar, blocking roads and vandalizing cars, shops, and factories with sticks and bricks. Around 30 were injured in clashes with police, who used teargas and rubber bullets. Union leaders demanded enhanced organization rights for workers. The government announced nationwide inspections of its approx. 5,600 factories in the future.

On September 21, tens of thousands of RMG workers started week-long, violent protests in Dhaka, demanding a minimum wage raise from USD 38 to USD 100 per month. At the same time, the oppositional Bangladesh Nationalist Party organized a general strike [→ Bangladesh (AL, AJL, BCL - BNP, JJD, BJC)]. Worker protests led to approx. 400 factory shut-downs. Police countered with rubber bullets and teargas, injuring dozens. As factory owners and RMG workers did not come to an agreement over the extent of the wage raise, protests frequently erupted over the next months. Workers repeatedly set garment factories on fire. On November 12, at least 50 people were injured and 200 factories closed in clashes between RMG workers and policejfr

CAMBODIA (OPPOSITION MOVEMENT)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **1997**

Conflict parties: CPP vs. civil society groups, CNRP

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power, resources

The conflict between the ruling Cambodian People's Party (CPP), on the one hand, and the opposition Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP), labor unions, land rights activists, and other civil society groups continued on a violent level. Throughout the year, tens, sometimes hundreds of thousands of opposition supporters, union members, garment workers, and land rights activists demonstrated, blocked major national roads, and violently clashed with security forces. Dozens of government critics, unionists and activists faced arbitrary arrests and court suits.

In the run up to the national elections in July, CNRP staged

mass demonstrations and rallies in the streets of the capital Phnom Penh. On request of Prime Minister Hun Sen, opposition leader Sam Rainsy was granted a royal pardon on June 14 and returned to Cambodia a few days later. About 100,000 supporters took to the streets to welcome him. On Election Day, July 28, violence broke out in Stung Meanchey district in Phnom Penh, where rioters set military vehicles on fire and forcibly prevented voters of Vietnamese ethnicity from casting their ballot. Opposition leader Sam Rainsy was heavily criticized for stirring up anti-Vietnamese sentiments to mobilize political support [→Cambodia – Vietnam]. The announcement of final election results on September 7 was accompanied by protests and demonstrations in the capital. The ruling CPP won only 66 of the 123 seats in the National Assembly, compared to previously 90; while CNRP won the remaining 55 seats. On September 23, CNRP has boycotted the National Assembly, demanding an investigation into election irregularities. Negotiations between the leadership of the two parties produced no tangible results. Anti-government demonstrations increased throughout the second half of the year. On September 15, the first day of a three-day mass rally, one man was killed by security forces. Mass demonstrations between October 23 and 25 remained largely without violence. On December 15, opposition supporters started daily protests in the capital's Freedom Park. Over 100,000 marched through the streets of Phnom Penh calling for new elections and Hun Sen's resignation, on December 22.

Land rights activists, especially from Boeung Kak and Borei Keila communities in Phnom Penh, clashed with police several times, dozens were injured. On September 22, a group of police and thugs descended on a peaceful vigil at Wat Phnom temple in the capital and dispersed about twenty protesters with slingshots and batons injuring at least ten.

Thousands of garment workers have protested for higher wages and against arbitrary layoffs and arrests of unionists throughout the year, especially in Phnom Penh, Svay Rieng province, Kampong Speu province and Kandal province. In June, former district governor Chhouk Bandith was convicted in absentia for "unintentional injury" in relation to his shooting of three striking garment workers in Svay Rieng in February 2012. On November 12, security forces opened fire on protesting garment workers, killing one. In December, the government's decision to raise the minimum wage of garment workers to 95 USD, as opposed to 160 USD demanded by unions, sparked nation-wide strikes and mass protests. Factories closed due to the unrest on December 30.

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CHINA (HONG KONG PRO-DEMOCRACY GROUPS)

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **1997**

Conflict parties: Hong Kong pro-democracy groups vs. government, SAR government

Conflict items: autonomy, system/ideology

The system and autonomy conflict between Hong Kong's pro-democracy groups, on the one hand, and the governments of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR), on the other, continued. Pro-democracy activists, organized in bodies such as The Alliance for True Democracy, Hong Kong Federation of Students (HKFS), and the Labour Party of Hong Kong (HK), called

for the removal of pro-Beijing Chief Executive and President of the Executive Council of HK Leung Chun-ying. They referred to the HK Basic Law and proposed procedures to ensure democratic elections in 2017. They organized massive demonstrations for full democracy throughout the year, culminating in 26,000 protesters on January 1 and 10,000 protesters on July 1. The former was countered by a demonstration of 8,000 pro-Beijing activists. Benny Tai and other prominent pro-democracy activists threatened to occupy the city's central financial district in 2014 if the SAR government denied universal suffrage. In early April, HKFS and Labour Party financially supported a dock workers' strike. On June 4, tens of thousands assembled in an annual vigil to commemorate the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident. On June 10, PRC President Xi Jinping ordered Chinese universities to refrain from topics such as free speech and constitutionalism. On August 13, a closed-door lunch took place between the director of Beijing's liaison office to HK, Zhang Xiaoming, and local Democratic Party politicians to foster dialog. In September, Zhang announced that Beijing would not allow HK residents to freely elect their new leader. On October 14, 700 HK students announced protests in the next year if the government would not confer with citizens on voting rights.

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CHINA (INNER MONGOLIA)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1981**

Conflict parties: Mongolian ethnic minorities vs. government, Han Chinese

Conflict items: autonomy, subnational predominance, resources

The conflict in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (IMAR) over resources, subnational predominance, and autonomy between Mongolian ethnic minorities, on the one hand, Han Chinese and the government, on the other, remained violent. Mongolian herders staged protests and sit-ins, complaining about land expropriation, forced relocations, and mining projects. On several occasions, police arrested herders who tried to travel to the capital Beijing and stage protests.

Clashes with Han company employees and farmers erupted throughout the year. In July, three Han reportedly assaulted a Mongolian in Sonid Left/Sunite Zuo Banner. When police allegedly arrested and tortured the assaulted, hundreds of herders surrounded a local Public Security Bureau in the banner's capital Mandalt/Mendelete, smashed its windows and damaged a police car. Special Police Units and the People's Armed Police (PAP) placed a dozen under arrest and injured several others. Also in July, a herder from Ongniud/Wengniute Banner allegedly stabbed to death the head of special police task force Livestock Grazing Prohibition Team and committed suicide thereafter. On August 19, Han railroad workers beat a Mongolian herder to death in Uushin/Wushen Banner.

In September, authorities detained 52 people for inciting public disorder on the internet during a nationwide "anti-rumor" campaign. The same month, police reported to have confiscated large quantities of explosives, detonators, guns and traditional knives from Mongolians in a civilian disarmament campaign. On September 28, 1,700 police, PAP and fire brigades partook in the "2013 Mission Stability" anti-terrorism drills in Tongliao City. On November 13, authorities put six herders on trial for disturbing the production process

of a state-owned forestry company. Using stun batons, police prevented approx. 100 Mongolians from entering the courtroom. Later, a judge granted access to 30 of them.

CHINA (OPPOSITION GROUPS)

Intensity: **1** | Change: • | Start: **1978**

Conflict parties: opposition groups vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology

The dispute over constitutionalism in China between opposition groups and the government continued.

The government repeatedly cracked down on various civil rights and anti-corruption groups, who often received international support. Activists and lawyers organized themselves in networks such as Defending Rights (weiquan) and New Citizens (xin gongmin). They provided legal assistance to dissidents, religious practitioners [→China (Falun Gong); →China (house churches)], migrant workers and expropriated farmers [→ China (socioeconomic protests)], and minority activists [→ China (Tibet); → China (Xinjiang/Uyghurs); → China (Inner Mongolia)]. Authorities placed many of them under surveillance or on house arrest and carried out interrogations. Between March and May, the government arrested several activists and whistleblowers after they bandwagoned an official anti-corruption campaign.

In June, ten Beijing law firms known for taking on human rights cases were denied a renewal of their licenses. On July 18, authorities detained xin gongmin propagator and founder of the Open Constitution Initiative Xu Zhiyong after he had demanded that officials disclose their personal wealth. On August 19, police arrested barefoot lawyer Yang Maodong alias Guo Feixiong for offending public order. On September 13, authorities detained billionaire and rights advocate Wang Gongquan.

On November 6, activist Wang Zheng founded the Zhi Xian Party, which demanded the Chinese Communist Party to rule constitutionally. The party opposed the 2013 trial of former Politburo member Bo Xilai and named him its chairman for life. Bo had been sentenced to life imprisonment for bribe-taking on September 22. In December, the government put a ban on the Zhi Xian Party.^{cbe}

CHINA (SOCIOECONOMIC PROTESTS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1978**

Conflict parties: environmentalists, peasants, workers vs. government
 Conflict items: resources, other

The conflict over social and economic resources between rural landowners, migrant workers, environmentalists, microbloggers, and other civilians, on the one hand, and government authorities, on the other, remained violent.

People protested against pollution, corruption, land grabs, substandard working conditions and restrictive urban management, thereby contesting the government's economic growth and social stability maintenance policies. Protesters forced authorities into negotiations by performing mass gatherings, traffic disruptions, and online campaigns. Some protests escalated with protesters setting cars on fire and

taking officials and factory managers hostage. As in previous years, a number of individuals resorted to suicide attacks with self-made bombs in public places. To quell unrest, city governments tightened security regulations and conducted riot police drills in public. They also changed holidays into work days when expecting protests. Village authorities took measures such as hiring thugs, or switching off energy supply and phone services. The central government increased the internal security budget and stepped up measures against forcible land acquisition and pollution. On November 12, at the third plenum of its 18th congress, the Chinese Communist Party confirmed that it would reform land rights and the household registration system, among others. It also announced the introduction of a new, overarching state security organ. On December 28, the labor camp system was formally abolished.

This year, fewer incidents of large social unrest were reported than in previous years. For instance, on February 24, villagers in Shangpu, Guangdong Province, staged protests over a land lease and demanded democratic elections. They took officials hostage and barricaded the village for almost three weeks. On March 14, about 3,000 security personnel kettled and stormed the village, using teargas and truncheons, injuring approx. 60. Authorities revoked the land lease and arrested the responsible officials. On May 4 and 16, more than 1,000 residents shut down traffic and protested in Kunming, Yunnan Province. They demanded a referendum over the construction of a petroleum refinery that would process oil from the new Sino-Burma pipeline. Kunming mayor Li Wenrong met with the protesters, created an online poll, and agreed to publish an environmental impact assessment. On July 17, criticism over urban management erupted all over the country when urban management officials beat a water melon vendor to death in Linwu County, Hunan Province. Hundreds of local residents clashed with riot police forces, leaving dozens injured. Hackers took over the Linwi government's webpage.^{los}

CHINA (TAIWAN)

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **1949**

Conflict parties: PRC vs. ROC vs. pro-Taiwan independence groups
 Conflict items: secession, system/ideology

The dispute between the two Chinas, the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC), regarding the political status of Taiwan continued. The oppositional Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) reiterated its pro-independence stance under the chair of Su Tseng-chang. Beijing stated that it would not proceed with political exchanges with DPP unless it dropped its current stance. The ruling Kuomintang (KMT) under ROC President Ma Ying-jeou affirmed its dedication to improving cross-strait ties. ROC allowed more Chinese students into Taiwan and announced that it would demilitarize Tatan and Ertan, two of the Kinmen-islets close to the mainland. On April 10, PRC raised concerns over the "One-China policy" when Taiwan and Japan reached an agreement over fishing around disputed islands [→Japan-China (Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands)]. On May 9, both ROC and PRC condemned the killing of a Taiwanese fisherman by a Philippine vessel and independently urged the Philippines to investigate [→China-Vietnam et al. (South China Sea, Spratly and Paracel Islands)]. On June 14, DPP strongly criticized a

high-level meeting in Nanjing between former KMT chairman Wu Poh-hsiung and Xi Jinping. On June 21, the two Chinas signed a new Service Trade Agreement (STA) that would open 80 service sectors in the mainland and 64 service sectors in Taiwan to investment. DPP, business leaders and civil society organizations protested against it. KMT member and President of the Legislative Yuan Wang Jin-pyng stated that the legislature would vote separately on each of the agreement's 24 articles. On June 29, former DPP premier Frank Hsieh welcomed the STA and organized a first ever meeting between PRC director of the Taiwan Affairs Office and Taiwanese businessmen. However, conservative DPP members strongly criticized this.

Over the year, both ROC and PRC conducted large military exercises. ROC carried out live-fire drills in its annual Han Kuang exercises in mid-April. On February 1, ROC officially activated its advanced early-warning radar system, which covers a range of 5,000 km. In April, high Pentagon officials stated that PRC began to deploy DF-21D anti-ship missiles near Taiwan. The USA and Taiwan proceeded with arms deals, including twelve refurbished P-3C anti-submarine aircrafts, 32 UGM-84L submarine-launched anti-ship missiles, three PAC-3 anti-missile batteries, and 30 AH-64E attack helicopters. In early November, US confirmed that it did not consult PRC on arms sales to Taiwan [→China-USA]. On December 20, the US and Taiwan signed a deal on nuclear energy cooperation.

In August, large protests involving 100,000 to 250,000 people erupted in Taipei over the unresolved death of Hung Chung-qi, a young conscript of the unpopular army. Two months later, ROC postponed the abolishment of conscription by two years due to low numbers of volunteers^{kol}

CHINA (TIBET)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1950**

Conflict parties: CTA, Tibetans, TYC vs. government
 Conflict items: secession, autonomy, system/ideology, resources

The conflict over the status of the greater region of Tibet, its system, and resources between Tibetans and the government remained violent. The Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) in Dharamsala, India, also known as the Tibetan government-in-exile, claimed to represent Tibetan interests.

Tibetans protested against religious and cultural restrictions with at least 30 committing self-immolation. An increasing number of exiled Tibetans practiced Lhakar, a form of nonviolent resistance emphasizing traditional lifestyle. Rural Tibetans blocked mining operations in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and Qinghai Province. Reported tensions with Han-Chinese miners remained nonviolent [→China (Han – Hui – Tibetans)]. Police used guns and teargas to crack down on Tibetan protests, injuring and arresting several. At least eighteen Tibetans were reported to have been killed by police during protests or in custody.

Tibetans remained split between secessionist groups such as the Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC), and autonomy advocates such as the CTA, who adhered to the Dalai Lama's Middle-Way Approach. On August 21, CTA officially agreed to Tibetan applications for Indian citizenship.

As in previous years, the Chinese government stated it would defend Tibet's development and stability against "sabotage of the Dalai Lama clique". It continued large-scale urban re-

construction, forced resettlements, resource extraction and hydro dam-building [→ China-India]. The government expanded its grid-based security and surveillance system, introducing smaller administrative units and engaging more volunteer security groups. Exiled Tibetans reported several China-based cyber-attacks.

On January 31, the Chinese government sentenced two Tibetans to death for inciting immolations. The next day, police harassed a group of young Tibetans in Ngaba/Aba County, Sichuan Province. When they encountered the police with knives, police reinforcements dispersed the gathering with guns. On February 13, a Tibetan monk set himself on fire in Kathmandu, Nepal. Throughout the year, Nepal increased documentary restrictions on Tibetan refugees and prohibited open celebration of Tibetan holidays. In mid-April, clashes over house demolitions left six Tibetans and four policemen injured in Kyegudo/Yushu County, Qinghai. In May, about 5,000 Tibetans protested against mining near a pilgrimage site in Driru/Biru County, TAR. In late June, officials partly lifted the ban on Dalai Lama portraits in Lhasa. On July 6, police attacked about 1,000 Tibetans celebrating the Dalai Lama's birthday in Tawu/Daofu County, TAR, injuring at least twelve with gunshots and teargas. In August, authorities started to kill Tibetan-owned livestock in great quantities in areas marked for future mining. On August 19, about 500 security personnel dispersed a thousand Tibetans who were blocking mining work in Gedrong area of Zatoe/Zaduo County, Qinghai, and injured dozens with teargas, rifle butts, and electric batons, arresting eight. When authorities presented their choice of the Shak Rongpo Gaden Dhargyeling Monastery head lama's reincarnation in Driru/Biru, monks boycotted this decision. Subsequently, a reported 2,000-strong police force shut down the monastery in September. In the same county in early October, police fired gunshots and teargas at Tibetans who demonstrated in favor of the release of a Tibetan protester, killing four and injuring at least 60. ffa

CHINA (UYGHURS / XINJIANG)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1949**

Conflict parties: TIP, Uyghurs, WUC vs. government
 Conflict items: secession, system/ideology, subnational predominance

The conflict over ideology, secession and subnational predominance between the Uyghurs, a Turkic Muslim minority living mainly in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), and the government remained violent.

Uyghurs staged protests over discrimination and attacked police stations. Violence erupted over land grabs, housing demolitions, environmental destruction, and the ongoing immigration of Han Chinese. At least 170 were killed. Communist Party Chief of XUAR Zhang Chunxian reiterated that he would strike down on "the three evils" of separatism, extremism, and terrorism, repeatedly blaming Islamist groups for major attacks, such as the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), which is reportedly the successor of the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM). Police forces increased patrols, spot checks, and house-to-house searches. Furthermore, it enhanced cooperation with local community watch groups. Authorities arrested numerous Uyghurs in XUAR, but also cracked down on protesting Uyghur activists, bloggers, and students outside the region. Several were sentenced to death.

On March 7, XUAR authorities imposed a two-day curfew and deployed armed police patrols in the city Korla/Ku'erle after an Uyghur farmer attacked people with a knife over a gambling quarrel, leaving five dead and several injured. In late March, Uyghur villagers were heavily policed in Dighar, Pichan/Shanshan County, to prevent ethnic tensions after a Han had killed an Uyghur boy with a machete. Authorities arrested the man and claimed the murder was due to mental disorder.

In mid-April, twenty Han workers severely injured Uyghurs who were protesting against house demolition. On April 24, Uyghurs stabbed and burned fifteen local officials to death in clashes in Siriqbuya/Selibuya, Maralbeshi/Bachu County. Police backup shot dead six Uyghurs and arrested several others. Two days later, two community officials were killed and three police vehicles were set on fire in Yingawa village, Hotan/Hetian County.

In May, the government organized more than 100 lectures in XUAR during its 31st "ethnic harmony education month". On May 9, an Uyghur suspect was reportedly beaten to death after killing two officials in Yengisar/Yingjisha County. In late May, three Uyghurs and two Han died in clashes at a bazaar in Kargilik/Yecheng Town. In early June in Ghorachol, Awat/Awati County, twelve Uyghurs reportedly died during a police house search while triggering improvised explosive devices. On June 26, Uyghurs armed with knives attacked a local police station and set fire to cars and buildings in Lukqun, Pichan/Shanshan, killing 24, among them policemen and security guards. Police killed at least eleven rioters. The government tightened security in XUAR and carried out riot police parades.

Two days later, police fired on approx. 400 Uyghurs who protested the arrest of an imam, on the main square of Hotan/Hetian. They shot fifteen dead and injured more than 50. On August 7, security forces killed three Uyghurs and arrested hundreds in clashes on the eve of the Eid Feast. On August 20, police killed up to 22 Uyghurs in a raid in Yilkiqi, Kargilik/Yecheng County. Three days later, 80 security personnel stormed an alleged Uyghur militant camp in Poksam/Zepu County, killing up to twelve. Between September and October, police conducted several raids against suspected bomb plotters in Yarkand/Shache County, killing up to eleven. On October 28, three people from XUAR, reportedly, drove an off-road vehicle into a crowd at Tiananmen Square and set it ablaze. The attack left 38 injured and five dead, including the drivers. The TIP claimed responsibility for the attack one month later.

On October 30, more than 1,000 Uyghurs protested against a cemetery relocation in Shixenze/Shihezi city. On November 16, again in Siriqbuya, nine Uyghur youths reportedly stormed a police station with swords and sickles, killing two officers. A rapidly deployed Special Police Unit killed all nine. On December 15, police reportedly shot dead fourteen, after Uyghurs armed with knives and explosives had killed two officers in Konasheher/Shufu County. On December 30, security personnel killed eight Uyghurs attacking a police station. fan, jfr

CHINA – INDIA

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **1954**

Conflict parties: China vs. India

Conflict items: territory, international power, resources

The conflict between China and India regarding territory, resources, and international power continued. In January, China approved the construction of three more hydro dams at Dagu, Jiacha, and Jiexu at the Yaluzangbu/Brahmaputra River in Tibet. Downstream country India urged for a new mechanism to deal with water issues and prevent water flow interruption. On March 19, China proposed a five-point agenda to improve bilateral relations. In mid-April, a platoon of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) marched at least 10 km over the Line of Actual Control (LAC) into Indian territory southeast of Daulat Beg Oldi camp in Ladakh region, Jammu and Kashmir state. They raised tents and banners. When they refused to leave, the Indo-Tibetan Border Police set up tents 300 m away from them, which led to a standoff. China denied any border incursion. On May 5, both sides left the area. On May 19, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh held talks in Delhi, India, and signed eight bilateral agreements. Li was the first Chinese Premier to visit India since 1954. From June 28 to 29, both sides' special representatives held the 16th round of border talks in Beijing, China. In July, PLA troops crossed the LAC twice, in the northeast of Leh District in Ladakh region and in the Barahoti Plains area, Uttarakhand state. On July 17, the Indian Cabinet Committee on Security approved the creation of a 40,000 strong Mountain Strike Corps to be deployed at the LAC by no later than 2014. On October 23, Singh and Li signed a Border Defence Cooperation Agreement in Beijing to improve communication on border patrols and signed a memorandum of understanding on hydrological information sharing. In early December, PLA soldiers allegedly crossed the LAC to take five Indian porters into custody at Chumar area, Ladakh. They released the porters after one week. In late December, about twenty PLA soldiers allegedly crossed the border and camped in Chepzi area, Ladakh.

Aside from border disputes, China protested over Indian oil exploration in the South China Sea [→China – Vietnam et al. (South China Sea, Spratly and Paracel Islands)], while India protested over China's intensified civilian nuclear cooperation with Pakistan [→Pakistan – India].ffa

CHINA – VIETNAM ET AL. (SOUTH CHINA SEA, SPRATLY AND PARACEL ISLANDS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: ↗ | Start: **1949**

Conflict parties: Brunei vs. PRC vs. ROC vs. Malaysia vs. Vietnam vs. Philippines


Conflict items: territory, international power, resources

The conflict over territory, resources, and international power in the South China Sea between Brunei, the governments of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC), Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam escalated.

In January, the Philippines requested arbitration under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), concerning overlapping territorial claims with PRC in the South China Sea. This was rejected by PRC. On March 20, PRC patrol boats allegedly fired on a Vietnamese fishing vessel in the vicinity of the Paracel Islands. Due to increased tensions, the two countries agreed to establish a hotline to resolve fishing incidents. On March 26, a PRC amphibious task force conducted patrols and training missions at James Shoal, claimed by both Malaysia, and ROC, 50 miles from Malaysia's coast. Malaysia subsequently stated that it was not concerned about how often China patrols the disputed waters. In April, a PRC tourist ship visited the Paracel Islands. One month later, Vietnam also opened up some of the disputed islands to tourists. On May 9, the Philippine Coast Guard fatally shot a Taiwanese fisherman, supposedly fishing in disputed waters. ROC responded with a number of diplomatic and economic sanctions. On May 29, three PRC ships converged in the vicinity of Second Thomas Shoal, where about a dozen Filipino marines were stationed on a wrecked ship. In the same month, PRC imposed a fifteen-mile fishing restriction around Scarborough Shoal. On September 5, the Philippines recalled its ambassador to PRC in response to reports that China had been bringing concrete blocks and pillars to Scarborough Shoal. The same month, ROC announced that it would spend over USD 100 million on building a new wharf on Taiping Island. In October, PRC and Vietnam agreed to set up a working group to jointly explore disputed waters in the South China Sea. The same month, the Royal Malaysian Navy announced that it is building a new naval base in Bintulu, 60 miles from James Shoal. In November, PRC's aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, deployed to the South China Sea for the first time to engage in military drills. On December 5, a US guided-missile cruiser and a PRC warship narrowly avoided a collision in the South China Sea [→China – USA].

External supporters became increasingly involved in the dispute. The US announced an increase in military and financial assistance to the Philippines. In June and September, the US and the Filipino navies undertook joint exercises near Scarborough Shoal. Furthermore, the Philippines announced plans for new air and naval bases at Subic Bay, with access for the US and Japan. Moreover, on June 27, during a top-level meeting in the Philippine capital of Manila, Japanese Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera stated that Japan would help to defend the Philippines' "remote islands". In July, India offered Vietnam a loan of USD 100 million in order to purchase military equipment [→China – India]. Vietnam defended its decision to invite India's Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) to search for oil in the disputed waters. In November, it offered India seven oil blocks in the South China Sea. Russian gas company Gazprom has also been exploring for gas in the disputed waters, in partnership with Vietnam. als

FIJI (OPPOSITION GROUPS)

Intensity: **1** | Change:  | Start: **1987**

Conflict parties: opposition groups vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power


The conflict over national power and the political system between opposition groups and the government led by Commodore and Prime Minister Josaia Voreqe "Frank" Bainimarama further de-escalated. Oppositionals organized them-

selves in political parties, unions, church groups, and NGOs. Opposition parties formed the United Front for Democratic Fiji (UFDf). Several high chiefs continued to oppose the government, which had abolished their body, the Great Council of Chiefs (GCC), in March 2012. On September 6, the government adopted a new constitution and scheduled general elections to take place no later than 9/30/14.

On January 8, the government rejected Kenyan law professor Yash Ghai's draft constitution and rewrote it. The government released a draft on March 21 and announced to take improvement suggestions from the public into account until April 26. On August 22, it published the new draft constitution, which was officially adopted on September 6. The constitution recognized land ownership and traditions of the I'Taukei, Rotuman and Banaban people, and prescribed compulsory Hindi and I'Taukei language teaching in primary schools. However, it did not include any reference to the GCC. Several chiefs criticized the new constitution for breaching the rights of indigenous people and announced that they would refer the case to the United Nations [→Fiji (Indo-Fijians – indigenous Fijians)].

On January 18, the government issued a decree demanding political parties to re-register within 28 days. It prohibited non-English party names, leaders with trade union or military membership, as well as exclusively Indo-Fijian or indigenous Fijian parties. Moreover, the member threshold for political parties to be registered was raised from 128 to 5,000. The only three parties meeting these requirements were the Fiji Labor Party (FLP), the Social Democratic Liberal Party (SODELPA), and the National Federation Party (NFP), while fourteen parties had to dissolve. While FLP and SODELPA aligned to form UFDf, NFP stated to contest the 2014 general elections on its own. Bainimarama announced to resign as commodore and to form a political party in order to participate in the elections.cbe

INDIA (GNLA ET AL. / MEGHALAYA)

Intensity: **3** | Change:  | Start: **1988**

Conflict parties: ANLA, ANVC, ANVC-B, ATF, GNLA, HNLC, LAEF, UALA vs. government

Conflict items: autonomy

The autonomy conflict between various militant groups in the northeastern state of Meghalaya and the government remained violent. The militant groups, among them the Garo National Liberation Army (GNLA), the Achik National Volunteer Council (ANVC) and its breakaway faction (ANVC-B) demanded a separate state for the Garo people in Meghalaya.

Several new breakaway factions formed this year. For example, former ANVC-B leader Sengbirth Marak and around 30 militants formed the United Achik Liberation Army (UALA) in February. On December 7, former GNLA leader Reading T. Sangma founded the GNLA-F, which operated mainly at the South Garo Hills district. Other newly formed factions were the Achik National Liberation Army (ANLA) and the Achik Tiger Force (ATF).

Throughout the year, police raided hideouts, confiscated arms, and arrested several militants, while some militants surrendered. Militants repeatedly attacked representatives of the state. For instance, on January 31, suspected GNLA members shot and injured an independent poll candidate during a public meeting in Dawa Songgital, East Garo Hills district.

Two days later, GNLA killed two personnel of Williamnagar district jail, East Garo Hills. On August 23, security forces stormed a major GNLA training camp in East Garo Hills, killing one militant. Four days later, police destroyed another GNLA hideout at Damringgre, North Garo Hills district. On November 5, approx. two dozen GNLA members shot dead five security forces in an ambush in South Garo Hills.

Throughout the year, militants killed several civilians for unpaid extortion money or on allegations for being police informants. For instance, on January 2, in Aklangre village, West Garo Hills district, GNLA killed three persons and injured one, who later died at the hospital. On January 26, coal laborers killed two suspected GNLA members, who had demanded money from a local coal mine in Nongkyllem, West Khasi Hills district. On April 8, militants abducted the son of a grocery trader from Assam state and demanded ransom from his family living in North Garo Hills.

On May 20, militants killed five coal laborers for not paying extortion in Nangalbibra region, South Garo Hills. On July 10, villagers clashed with suspected ANVC-B members in bordering West Bengal state, leaving three militants dead. Civilians killed another two ANVC-B members at Dorengtip, Assam, on August 9. On September 16, clashes with suspected GNLA members left three civilians dead in Garobadha region, West Garo Hills. On December 5, GNLA killed two alleged timber smugglers at Samanda village, East Garo Hills.

INDIA (INTER-FACTIONAL VIOLENCE / NAGALAND)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1988**

Conflict parties: NSCN-K, ZUV vs. NSCN-IM vs. NSCN-KK

Conflict items: subnational predominance

The conflict between the National Socialist Council of Nagaland - Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM), the NSCN faction Khaplang (NSCN-K), the NSCN faction Khole-Kitovi (NSCN-KK) and the Zeliangrong United Front (ZUF) over subnational predominance remained violent. Though all the groups share the common goal of establishing a Greater Nagaland in India's North East, different ideological orientations and ethnic affiliations led to various factional disputes [→ India (NSCN et al. / Nagaland)]. All groups are linked to various illegal activities such as kidnapping, extortion, drug trafficking or illegal taxation. Over the course of the year, factional clashes left nineteen people dead.

Clashes between NSCN-K and NSCN-KK claimed two lives on January 1 and February 17 in Nagaland state. A civilian and an NSCN-K militant were killed in a clash between these outfits in Dimapur Town, Nagaland, on May 6. The body of an NSCN-K member was found in Dimapur District, Nagaland, on June 16. NSCN-K tax receipts and pistols were recovered from the militant. Eleven days later, another NSCN-K militant was abducted and killed by unidentified gunmen. On August 6 and 18, two NSCN-KK members were killed by unknown militants in Senapati District, Manipur state, and Dimapur District, Nagaland.

NSCN-IM was entangled in confrontations with NSCN-K and ZUF. On April 4, NSCN-IM killed one NSCN-K militant in a factional clash in Tamenglong District, Manipur. One NSCN-IM member died in a clash with ZUF militants at Lushai Chiru village, Manipur, on May 18. NSCN-IM killed one NSCN-K

militant in a factional clash in Kiphire Town, Nagaland, on July 25. In a clash that lasted for five hours between NSCN-IM and ZUF, three ZUF militants were killed in Manipur on November 12. Bullets and bomb explosions damaged surrounding houses. Moreover, one NSCN-IM deserter who wanted to join another faction was shot dead by NSCN-IM militants in Chandel district, Manipur, on March 19. Throughout the year, many NSCN-IM militants joined rival factions. NSCN-KK welcomed the militants joining the outfit with a formal reception program on July 12. From March 23 to 25, a reconciliation meeting between warring factions took place in Chiang Mai, Thailand. The three participating units NSCN-IM, NSCN-KK and Naga National Council adopted a three-point resolution concerning the conflict over Greater Nagaland.

INDIA (JEM ET AL. / KASHMIR)

Intensity: **4** | Change: ↗ | Start: **1947**

Conflict parties: HM, HuM, JeM, LeT vs. government

Conflict items: secession

The secession conflict in the Indian-administered state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) between Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), on the one hand, and the government on the other hand, escalated to a highly violent level. Throughout the year, 152 persons were killed in the conflict. Militants killed 24 policemen, 33 army soldiers, four politicians, and five civilians. Indian security and army forces killed 78 militants, four protesters, and four civilians. Members of militant groups made many attempts to cross the Line of Control (LoC) and enter Indian territory. On July 9, four Indian soldiers killed five members of LeT after the latter had tried to cross the LoC in Keran, Kupwara district.

From September 24 until October 8, up to 40 militants tried to enter Indian territory across the LoC in the Keran area. On September 26, three militants crossed the LoC near the Pakistani border and attacked a police station, killing five policemen and injuring two others as well as at least one civilian. The assailants later attacked a nearby army camp using a truck, killing three soldiers and one civilian before they were shot dead by security personnel.

As of October 8, approx. 1,300 soldiers supported by helicopters were deployed in a military search operation in the border area that resulted in the death of at least eight intruders. The operation was described as the largest in the area since 1999.

Throughout the year, militants made attempts on the lives of several sarpanches - elected heads of the panchayat, a local government at village level - and panches, members of the panchayat. In addition, militants carried out several attacks on police and army personnel. On January 11, militants assassinated one sarpanch in Sopore, Baramulla district. In an attack on a Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) camp in J&K's summer capital Srinagar, two militants armed with grenades and assault rifles killed five CRPF officers and injured ten people on March 13. CRPF killed the aggressors. On June 24, HM militants killed eight soldiers and injured fourteen others in an attack on an army convoy on the Airport-Lal Chowk road near Srinagar. In a joint operation, police and army forces killed three HM militants at Tral, Pulwama district on July 1. The militants, armed with AK-47 rifles, killed one policeman and injured three others.

On February 9, Mohammad Afzal Guru, sentenced to death

for being responsible for the attack on the Indian parliament in 2001, was executed at Tihar prison in Tihar, New Delhi. Following the execution, thousands of residents of J&K took to the streets, allegedly instigated by separatist groups. On March 5, hundreds protested in Baramulla town, Baramulla district. As protesters pelted stones at security forces, the latter opened fire which resulted in the killing of one man and the injury of four others.sgs

INDIA (NSCN ET AL. / NAGALAND)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **1947**

Conflict parties: ASAM, NNC, NSCN-IM, NSCN-K, NSCN-KK, NSCN-U, UNC, ZUF vs. government

Conflict items: secession

The secession conflict between Naga nationalist groups, most prominently the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K), NSCN-Khole Kitovi (NSCN-KK), NSCN-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM), and Zeliangrong United Front (ZUF) on the one hand, and the government on the other, remained violent. The Naga groups wanted to establish a Greater Nagaland in the Northeast, while NSCN-K also claimed parts of neighboring Myanmar. Despite ceasefire agreements between the government and separate NSCN factions, confrontations between militant outfits and the police or other executive governmental units claimed fourteen casualties. At the end of July, the government prolonged Nagaland's Disturbed Area status under the Armed Forces Special Power Act, which provided security forces with special rights to fight the militants.

On February 5, while extorting money from civilians, ZUF militants clashed with the paramilitary Assam Rifles in Tamenglong district, Manipur state. Assam Rifles killed one ZUF member, while the rest of them escaped. In a clash between the Indian Reserve Battalion and NSCN-K, one militant was killed in Zunheboto district, Nagaland state, on February 25. Two days later, Assam Rifles clashed with NSCN-IM in Wokha district, Nagaland, killing one. On June 23, Assam Rifles killed six NSCN-K militants in an encounter in Senapati district, Manipur, using light weapons.

Throughout the year, at least 116 militants, among them 45 NSCN-K, 39 NSCN-KK, and 32 NSCN-IM members were detained for acts such as illegal tax collection, gun possession or violation of ceasefire ground rules. Security forces recovered several small arms and explosives during these detentions. On February 23, the Nagaland Legislative Assembly election was held. The government prohibited the three NSCN factions from carrying arms for the period from February 7 to February 23 but all groups refused to comply. Furthermore, the outfits instructed their members to refrain from the elections.

The government in New Delhi agreed on extending the ceasefire agreements with NSCN-K and NSCN-KK for one more year on April 22 and 26, respectively. The temporally unlimited ceasefire agreement between the government and NSCN-IM remained in place and both sides met for reconciliation in New Delhi in November. On May 27, the Action Committee Against Unabated Taxation (ACAUT), a new platform of several societal organizations, condemned the outfit's illegal taxation.

After meetings between ACAUT and NSCN-IM leaders ended without results on June 8, many businesses followed ACAUT's protest call for a twelve-hour shut down in Kohima, Dimapur, and Tuensang districts, Nagaland on June 18. Furthermore, on October 31 ACAUT held a rally with thousands of supporters in Dimapur, Nagaland, following inconclusive negotiations with NSCN-IM. In addition to the tense situation between the NSCN groups and the government, the militant groups continued to fight each other [→India (inter-militant violence / Nagaland)]. fwo

INDIA (NAXALITES)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↘** | Start: **1997**

Conflict parties: CPI-M vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology

The ideological conflict between the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-M), also called Naxalites, and the government, supported by local armed committees, de-escalated to a violent crisis.

The Naxalites operated in the states of Jharkhand, Maharashtra, Chhattisgarh, Odisha, Madhya Pradesh and Bihar. On March 13, Naxalites killed five TPC leaders in Gumla district, Jharkhand. On March 28, clashes between the CPI (Maoists) and Tritiyoa Prastitui Committee (TPC) at Lakarbandha village in Chatra left fifteen Maoists dead. On April 12, an encounter between the Maoists and the security personnel in Sindesur forest of Maharashtra's Gadchiroli district left three people dead, among them a policeman and two civilians. Four days later on April 16, ten CPI-Maoist cadres were killed in an encounter with security forces in the forest area of Puarti village in Sukma district, Chhattisgarh.

In an attack on a convoy of members of Congress Party in Bastar district, Chhattisgarh, Naxalites killed 29 people and injured 32 on May 25. Subsequently, Defense Minister Arackaparambil Kurien Antony sent 2,000 additional paramilitary force personnel to Chhattisgarh. On June 6, police killed six Naxalites in Gadchiroli district, Maharashtra. A week later, in the same district, Naxalites gunned down three people. On July 2, Maoists killed Pakur district Superintendent of Police Amarjit Balihar together with five other policemen in an ambush in the Kathikund forest area of Dumka district, Jharkhand. Four days later on July 6, police killed six Naxalites near Etapalli tehsil in Gadchiroli. Police recovered one 303 carbine, three 12 bore rifles, and some cartridges from the spot.

On September 15, security forces killed thirteen Maoists in Silakuta forests in the Padia area of Odisha, close to the border with Chhattisgarh. On October 18, suspected Maoists killed three policemen and injured two in a landmine blast followed by a firefight in Motha Jhilia village, Gadchiroli. Two commandos were injured in the subsequent firing. On November 11, a Naxalite attack in Amkola village of Gaya district, Bihar, left three persons dead and three others injured. After the incident, security forces launched a massive operation against Naxalites in the area. On December 15, heavily armed Naxalites blew up the Airtel mobile phone tower in Bage Bar village, Gaya.csc

INDIA (SIKHS – DSS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2007**

Conflict parties: Sikhs vs. DSS
 Conflict items: system/ideology

The conflict over ideology between Sikhs and the religious organization Dera Sacha Sauda (DSS) continued on the level of a violent crisis.

In 2007, the DSS leader Gurmeet Ram Rahim Singh had dressed as one of the sacred figures of Sikhism and subsequently clashes between the two groups erupted. Throughout the year, Singh was repeatedly exempted by the regional court in Bathinda town, Punjab state, and the Haryana High Court, from being held accountable for the incident in 2007. On July 9, seven Sikhs were sentenced to seven years in prison on charges of arson and depredation in a clash in 2008 at Dabwali town, Punjab state after police had registered cases against 400 Sikh supporters.

On September 6, police detained a religious congregation of Sikh leader Baljit Singh Daduwal in Teona Pujarian village, Bathinda district, in order to prevent tensions between DSS followers and Sikhs. On the night of November 25, alleged Sikhs armed with fire and sharp-edged weapons attacked DSS followers and injured five in Dhudi Ke village, Moga district. The following day, DSS followers and Sikhs clashed again at Dhudi Ke when DSS followers held a congregation. More than 200 protesters raised banners against them and put vehicles and tents of DSS members on fire. Both sides hurled stones at each other, leaving at least twenty people injured. As tension in the village and surrounding areas prevailed, a heavy police force from neighboring districts was deployed. Three days later, regional authorities organized a meeting in which Sikh representatives and DSS followers agreed to settle their conflict. Tota Singh, Minister for Agriculture in the present Punjab Government, led the meeting which was attended by members of the People's Party of Punjab and the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, an organization responsible for the upkeep of worship places for Sikhs. Subsequent to the clashes, police arrested four Sikhs and three DSS members on December 7.^{lgr}

INDIA (TJAC / TELANGANA)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1969**

Conflict parties: TJAC vs. government
 Conflict items: autonomy

The conflict over autonomy between the Telangana Joint Action Committee (TJAC) and the government of Andhra Pradesh continued as a violent crisis. TJAC, an umbrella organization, demanded the statehood of Telangana region.

TJAC held several small demonstrations and road blocks at the beginning of the year.

On June 14, TJAC organized a demonstration called Chalo Assembly around the congress building in Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh. Clashes between police and protesters ensued. More than 25,000 police blocked the streets around congress and arrested several political leaders, TJAC activists, and public representatives. On the same day, at least three students suffered critical injuries in a clash on the Osmania University

campus in Hyderabad.

On June 17, the Lok Sabha, the lower house of India, excluded 22 members of the Legislative Assembly for two days due to their insistence on discussing the Telangana issue. On June 30, students of the Osmania University founded the Osmania University Joint Action Committee, a political party to support the autonomy of Telangana.

On July 30, the Congress Working Committee passed a resolution suggesting the formation of a separate state of Telangana in accordance with the constitution. Subsequently, over 40,000 government employees and members of the organization Andhra Pradesh Non-Gazetted Officers held strikes and protests against the proposition throughout the region for weeks. The protests peaked on September 7 in the stadium of Hyderabad, with heavy police presence.

On October 3, the Union Cabinet decided in favor of the creation of a new State of Telangana by bifurcating the existing State of Andhra Pradesh. The Group of Ministers finalized the Andhra Pradesh Reorganization Bill 2013 on December 5 and presented it in the Lok Sabha on December 6. Members of the Andhra Pradesh Assembly protested this by burning copies of the bill. The deadline for the Lok Sabha to make a decision on the draft bill was scheduled for 2014/23/01. The discussion over the Telangana Bill in the Lok Sabha was continuously interrupted and disturbed by opponents of the Bill.^{dbu}

INDONESIA (AHMADIYYA)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1980**

Conflict parties: Ahmadiyya vs. government, Sunni militants
 Conflict items: system/ideology

The ideology conflict between the Ahmadiyya religious community and the government, as well as Sunni militants, remained violent.

On April 6, about 50 Ahmadi in Bekasi, West Java province, camped inside their al-Misbah mosque and protested peacefully against the closure of the mosque by local authorities. The protesters refused to remove Islam from their congregation's name and refused to allow officials to decide on its imams.

On April 8, about 300 members of various religious minorities, including Ahmadi, marched towards the House of Representatives in Jakarta, demanding equal protection of their religious freedom under the law. On May 5, an Ahmadiyya mosque in Tasikmalaya, West Java, was vandalized. Dozens of people on motorcycles threw rocks at the mosque and nearby houses, cut electricity, and set the mosque on fire. Nobody was harmed during the attack.

On November 24, the local community in Singkut district, Jambi province, tried to evict two Ahmadiyya families from their homes, accusing them of causing disturbance in the community. The local police intervened and calmed the confrontations.^{lnu}

INDONESIA (ISLAMIST MILITANT GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1981**

Conflict parties: JAT, JI vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The conflict between Islamist militant groups fighting for an Islamic state, such as Jemaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT) and the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) network, and the government, continued on a violent level.

On January 4, policemen fatally shot two suspected JAT members who carried grenades and a handgun on Hasanuddin University campus in Makassar, provincial capital of South Sulawesi. The following day, police raided two JAT training camps in Dompu and Bima, West Nusa Tenggara province, killing five militants.

Between March 14 and 15, police raids in and around Jakarta resulted in the killing of three suspected militants and the arrest of four. Police seized nearly twenty guns and explosives. In May, police arrested 27 JI members and killed seven during a number of raids in Central Java province. On August 7 and 16, militants killed three policemen in the city of South Tangerang, Banten province. In September, the USA froze assets of JAT members in the US and barred them from financial transactions with US citizens.

On October 17 and 18, the police anti-terror unit Densus 88 carried out raids in Solo, Central Java, and Bima. Police forces shot dead one and arrested four suspected members of the Mujahidin Indonesia Barat, part of JI. Two weeks later, police arrested eight suspected members of the group in South Tangerang. Between December 11 and 16, Densus 88 conducted raids in Bima and Solo, arresting four militants and seizing 87 firearms as well as 3,000 rounds of ammunition. lwe

INDONESIA (OPM / PAPUA)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1961**

Conflict parties: OPM vs. government
 Conflict items: secession, resources

The conflict between the Free Papua Movement (OPM) and the government over resources and the secession of Papua and West Papua provinces remained violent. Over the year, around 30 people were killed in shootings between OPM and the army. Clashes particularly erupted in Papua's Puncak Jaya regency, location of the world's biggest goldmine.

On January 10, OPM killed a civilian and wounded one soldier in a clash in Kampung Kuyuwu village, Papua. On February 21, about twenty OPM militants attacked nine soldiers during their patrol near Ilaga Airport in Papua, killing seven soldiers and injuring two civilians. That same day, OPM stormed an army post in Tingginambut, Papua, killing one soldier and wounding another. OPM attacked and injured three more soldiers the day after when an army helicopter arrived to recover the corpse.

On March 13, OPM took two high-ranking police officers hostage in Yobi village, Papua. Two days later, OPM militants clashed with police and injured two in the same area. On May 1, the 50th anniversary of the integration of Papua into Indonesia, OPM attacked a group of soldiers and national

police officers in Sorong, West Papua. Three OPM members were killed and several people were injured on both sides.

On June 25, a shootout between OPM and the army left two soldiers dead in Illu district, Papua. On September 22, an OPM militant assassinated a bus driver in Puncak Jaya, Papua. On November 4, the army shot dead an OPM militant in the same area. On November 30, an OPM militant died in a shooting with police in Jayapura district, Papua.

Over the course of the year the army launched search operations for OPM militants. For instance, in a search operation between February 21 and February 26, the army demolished many buildings in Puncak Jaya. Previously, thousands of people had fled the region in anticipation of a major military offensive against OPM.

In search of OPM members, army and paramilitary forces shot dead one and injured three in Waghete, Papua, on September 23.

Throughout the year, the populations of both provinces held demonstrations for independence and police responded by arresting many protesters. For instance, on November 26, police arrested over 30 people for organizing demonstrations on the "West Papua Independence" day in Timika and Sorong. asc

JAPAN – CHINA (SENKAKU/DIAOYU ISLANDS)

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **1971**

Conflict parties: PRC vs. ROC vs. Japan
 Conflict items: territory, international power, resources

The conflict over international power, territory, and resources of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands between the People's Republic of China (PRC), the Republic of China (ROC), and Japan, continued.

Japan reviewed its National Defense Program Guidelines and introduced a new set of overarching security institutions. It announced the buildup of an amphibious force and the acquisition of Global Hawk drones. Newly elected Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Prime Minister Shinzo Abe stated his intention to change Japan's war-renouncing constitution. On January 25, Natsuo Yamaguchi, chairman of LDP's coalition party New Komeito, met with PRC President Xi Jinping in Beijing to improve relations. On April 27, PRC designated the islands as a core interest. In May, Chinese newspapers published articles questioning Japan's sovereignty over Okinawa and other Ryukyu-Islands. On June 6, ROC President Ma Ying-jeou suggested trilateral talks to promote ROC's East China Sea Peace Initiative. On July 26, President Abe called to resume dialog. In September, Japan stated that it considered stationing civil servants on the islands.

Nationalist activist groups repeatedly sailed to the islands to support the sovereignty claims of their respective countries. For instance, on April 23, eight PRC ships tailed nine vessels with 80 activists of the Ganbare Nippon group who sailed into the disputed waters. The Japanese Coast Guard (JCG) arrested several Chinese fishermen who sailed into Japan's exclusive economic zone (EEZ). On April 10, Japan concluded a fishery agreement with Taiwan, allowing Taiwanese fishermen to fish in the EEZ in the disputed area. PRC opposed this [→ China (Taiwan)].

Throughout the year, PRC and ROC coast guard and navy patrolled the disputed waters. Japan deployed JCG and Maritime Self-Defence Forces (MSDF). Both PRC and Japan

modernized their naval units. Chinese, Japanese and US aircrafts repeatedly entered contested airspace. On February 5, Japan accused a PRC navy frigate of locking its fire-control radar on a MSDF destroyer and helicopter in the East China Sea. On September 8, Japan detected two PRC bombers and a drone near Okinawa. In late October, PRC claimed that a MSDF ship had interfered in its navy drills in the West Pacific Ocean.

In November, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) conducted large-scale live-fire exercises near Okinawa. On November 23, PRC announced a new air defense identification zone (ADIZ), covering the disputed islands, demanding that all entering aircrafts identify themselves. The zone overlapped with the ADIZs of Japan, ROC, and South Korea. Japan refused to recognize the new ADIZ and referred the case to the International Civil Aviation Organization. On November 26, two unarmed US B-52 bombers flew over the zone without prior notification. Japanese and South Korean military aircrafts followed the next day. Both countries held joint air and sea exercises in the zone the following week.

Unlike the US, Japan ordered its civilian airlines to not identify themselves when entering the ADIZ. On December 26, Abe visited the Yasukuni war shrine. PRC and South Korea condemned the move, the former declaring Abe a persona non grata. The US expressed concerns.

Over the year, Japan and the US had enhanced their defense and security cooperation. In April, however, US officials reportedly voiced concerns over Japan's preparations to start its Rokkasho nuclear reprocessing plant. In late June, the SDF participated in the multinational US-led Dawn Blitz exercise, simulating amphibious operations.

On November 25, US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel reaffirmed that the US-Japan Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty covers the disputed territory of the islands. In December, Japan approved the relocation of the Futenma US marine base on Okinawa. PRC repeatedly warned the US not to interfere in the dispute [→China – USA]. kol, jfr

KAZAKHSTAN (OPPOSITION GROUPS)

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **2004**

Conflict parties: opposition vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The conflict concerning national power and the orientation of the political system between various opposition groups and the government remained on a non-violent level.

After the political party Nur Otan, headed by President Nursultan Nazarbayev, had won the 2012 elections with more than 80 percent of the votes, several opposition parties were banned by the government, as e.g. Alga!, which was deemed as extremist on 12/21/12. OSCE had reported that the elections were not in accordance with international standards. On March 14, police arrested oppositional journalist and human rights activist Aleksandr Kharlamov on charges of inciting religious discord. In early April, he was transferred to a psychiatric clinic in Almaty to undergo forced examination, which was extended until June. Colleagues, civil society activists, and family members claimed the sentence was politically motivated.

On June 12, co-founder of opposition party Alga! and former Vice Minister of Economy Muratbek Ketebaev was detained in Lublin, Poland, at the request of Kazakh officials, accused of overthrowing constitutional order. Ketebaev frequently pub-

lished articles critical of the government. On July 12, police detained two opposition members, the chairman of the Azat party Bolat Abilov, and opposition activist Marat Zhanuzaqov, right before a joint meeting of opposition groups. On July 31, Interpol detained the co-founder of opposition movement Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan and former BTA-Bank chairman Mukhtar Ablyazov, who had been hiding for one year in France. Kazakh prosecutors issued an international arrest warrant on suspicion of embezzlement. France's decision about his extradition was still pending at the end of the year. The Court of Almaty upheld the 2012 suspension of two independent newspapers, Pravdivaya Gazeta and the Communist Party paper Pravda Kazakhstan, accusing them of violating regulations on publication. The outlets, linked to Ablyazov, were the only sources that had provided coverage of oil-industry strikes in 2011 [→Kazakhstan (oil worker protest)]. vhu

KYRGYZSTAN (KUMTOR GOLD MINE)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2009**

Conflict parties: mine workers vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology, resources

The conflict over resources and nationalization of the Kumtor Gold Mine between mine workers and inhabitants of Dzety Oguz district, Issyk Kul Province, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, remained violent. The mine workers were supported by the opposition.

Centerra Gold's Kumtor mine, located in the Tien Shan Mountains 350 km south of the capital Bishkek, accounted for approx. twelve percent of Kyrgyzstan's GDP. In accordance with the 2009 agreement, Centerra Gold owned two-thirds of the gold mine's shares, while Kyrgyzstan owned 32,7 percent. The opposition rejected the agreement and called for Kumtor's nationalization.

On May 28, approx. 500 protesters, mainly mine workers and members of their families, blocked the road to the mine in Dzety Oguz district. Two days later, they cut off the electricity supply to the mine for several hours. In addition to nationalization claims, demonstrators demanded wage increases, improvement of medical treatment, and social insurance. The same night, police dispersed some 2,000 demonstrators, using stun grenades and rubber bullets. 55 people, including thirteen police officers, were wounded in the clashes and a police bus was set on fire. At least one protester died and police detained about 80 others. On May 31, President Almazbek Atambayev declared a state of emergency in the area. On September 9, the government and Centerra Gold signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) raising Kyrgyzstan's share to 50 percent. Parliament rejected it on October 23, insisting on Kyrgyzstan's 67 percent share. It returned document with a December 23 deadline.

Earlier, on September 28, a video had appeared on state television showing two men identified as Bakhtiar Kurmanov and Ermek Dzunushbaev. They demanded USD 3 million from Kumtor's Director of Sustainable Development Douglas Grier in exchange for a guarantee that they would not start new protests. Kyrgyzstan's State Committee on National Security (GKNB) announced to open a criminal investigation.

The delay of negotiations concerning the MoU led to new protests in the region. From October 7 to 9, hundreds of protesters clashed with police in Issyk Kul and took the region's governor hostage, threatening to kill him. Police freed

the governor and detained 23 people. Atambayev accused the opposition of having initiated the protests [–Kyrgyzstan (opposition)].ast

MALAYSIA (OPPOSITION MOVEMENT)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **1969**

Conflict parties: Bersih, Pakatan Rakyat vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The system and power conflict between the pro-democracy opposition, led by Pakatan Rakyat and the Coalition for Clean and Fair Elections (Bersih), on the one hand, and the government on the other, continued on a violent level. Bersih is an alliance of several non-governmental organizations and Pakatan Rakyat encompasses the three largest opposition parties Parti Islam Se-Malaysia, Parti Keadilan Rakyat, and Parti Tindakan Demokratik.

On May 5, the 13th general elections were held under a first-past-the-post electoral system in single-member legislative districts. Indelible ink was used on election day to prevent voters from voting more than once and to guarantee a fair electoral process. However, the ink could be easily washed off, raising doubts with regard to the validity of the election results. During the two-week election campaign, several violent incidents took place. On April 23, a bomb exploded in Taman Jawi Jaya, Penang state, near a political gathering of the ruling Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition, injuring a security worker. Two days later, unknown men threw petrol bombs at a BN office outside the capital Kuala Lumpur. The same day, police forces arrested two men related to the bombings in Taman Jawi Jaya. However, no severe incidents were reported on election day. Even though the opposition parties won the popular vote with a result of 50.87 percent, the BN coalition remained in office after having won 133 of the 222 parliament seats. However, the opposition rejected the election results and accused the government of electoral fraud. On May 8, the opposition under the leadership of Anwar Ibrahim rallied more than 50,000 people in a football stadium near Kuala Lumpur to demonstrate against the election results. The rally was the starting point of a series of fifteen demonstrations organized by the opposition in order to voice their displeasure with the electoral process. In June, the Election Commission set up a taskforce to investigate factors that could have caused the indelible ink to fade upon washing. At the same time, the commission rejected the opposition's claims of electoral fraud and asked the opposition to provide evidence. The government's appeal against the acquittal of the homosexuality charges against Anwar Ibrahim from 01/20/12 was still pending.sg

MALAYSIA (SULU SULTANATE SUPPORTERS / LAHAD DATU DISTRICT)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **NEW** | Start: **2013**

Conflict parties: Royal Security Forces of the Sultanate of Sulu and North Borneo vs. government

Conflict items: secession

A violent crisis erupted over the secession of Lahad Datu district in Sabah state between the Royal Security Forces of the Sultanate of Sulu and North Borneo and the government. The disputed region had belonged to the former Sulu Sultanate until it became a British colony in 1878. In 1963, the colony North Borneo, to which Sabah belonged, was integrated into the Federation of Malaya, later Malaysia, while the rest of the former Sulu Sultanate went over to the Philippines. This caused a decades-long conflict over the region between Malaysia and the Philippines which had phased out in the 1990s. More recently, the group wanted Lahad Datu district to be included in the Philippines.

An agreement between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) affecting, among others, the Bangsamoro population of Sulu, was reached in 2012 [–Philippines (MILF)]. The descendant of the Sulu Sultan, Jamalul Kiram III, condemned the fact that he had not been part of the talks about the future of Sulu. On 11/11/12, Jamalul Kiram III called for an armed group to support his claim over Lahad Datu district in Sabah state, Malaysia. On February 11, at least 235 Philippine gunmen of the Royal Security Forces of the Sultanate of Sulu and North Borneo occupied the village of Tanduo, Sabah. After the government's three-week ultimatum to leave Sabah had expired on February 28, the Sulu Sultanate supporters engaged in a firefight with the police the following day. The battle left ten militants and two policemen dead, as well as four militants injured. On March 2, ten militants were spotted near the city of Kunak, after which security forces strengthened their presence in Sabah. On March 3, about ten militants ambushed a local police unit in Kampung Sri Jaya Siminul. Five policemen and two militants were killed in the ensuing gunfight. One militant was reportedly beaten to death by locals after he had tried to take a hostage. On March 5, the Royal Malaysian Air Force attacked the camp of the militants in Tanduo, using F/A-18 and Hawk fighter jets. Furthermore, army and police simultaneously surrounded the camp, but the militants escaped. In the following three days, the army killed 32 militants close to the destroyed camp site. On April 25, about 200 Philippine soldiers killed 35 Sulu Sultanate supporters on the Philippine Sibutu Island, about 40 km away from the Malaysian coast. The latter were involved in the three-week Lahad Datu stand-off. On October 20, Jamalul Kiram III died of natural causes. However, his daughter stated that the group would continue to assert secession claims.ska

MYANMAR (KIA, KIO / KACHIN STATE)

Intensity: **4** | Change: **↘** | Start: **1961**

Conflict parties: KIA, KIO vs. government

Conflict items: autonomy, resources

The conflict concerning autonomy and resources between the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) and its military wing, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), on the one hand, and the government, on the other, de-escalated to a limited war.

KIA and the army clashed in early January in Myaing Gyi Ngu, Karen State. Between 12/24/12 and January 7, the army carried out 119 air strikes on KIA positions in and around Laiza, Kachin State, to reclaim a strategic hilltop position on a transport route to a government base at Lajayang, Kachin State, which had been blocked by KIA. Government troops

attacked KIA with helicopters, gunships, and fighter jets and seized weapons including mortars, hand grenades, mines, and 4,000 rounds of ammunition. Although the number of fatalities remained unclear, reports spoke of heavy losses, especially on the government's side. Tens of thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in a nearby refugee camp were affected by these attacks. Reportedly, more than 100,000 IDPs were registered in the region. On January 14, government troops killed three civilians when they shelled Laiza. The following week, government troops launched several more attacks on KIA positions and eventually seized the KIA outpost of Hka Ya Bum, the last major stronghold protecting their headquarters in Laiza on January 26. Subsequently, tens of thousands of residents of Laiza prepared to flee to China. Shortly before, on January 18, the government had announced a unilateral ceasefire in the Kachin conflict that the army broke the next day. Two civilians died of artillery fire by government troops in Mogaung township, Kachin State, on January 29. As fighting continued, the army seized another KIA outpost near Hpakant township on February 3. Between February and December, sustained fighting forced hundreds of villagers to flee in Kachin State and Northern Shan State. Government forces repeatedly seized heavy weapons. On December 17, KIA killed more than 60 soldiers and captured many of their weapons approx. 10 km from Laiza. Government troops used helicopters, gunships, and artillery. In the course of the conflict, government troops allegedly committed serious human rights violations against civilians. Throughout the year, several peacemaking attempts took place. On February 4, a government delegation led by President's Office Minister Aung Min met with KIO representatives in Ruili, People's Republic of China. Although no major breakthroughs could be achieved, both sides agreed to de-escalate military tensions, establish a liaison channel, and build a ceasefire monitoring system on the ground. In the subsequent meeting on March 11, the two negotiation parties again failed to achieve a ceasefire. During the next round of talks from May 28 to 30 in Myitkyina, Kachin State, the two sides signed a seven-point agreement requiring both sides to work inter alia towards a cessation of hostilities, establish joint-monitoring committees, and to resettle IDPs. On July 23, the government released 73 political prisoners, many among them members of KIA. On August 23, former KIO Vice-Chairman Tu Ja announced his plans to register a new political party, the Kachin State Democracy Party, to participate in the 2015 elections. From October 8 to 10, a government delegation led by Aung Min and KIO representatives met again in Myitkyina. Many representatives from political parties and armed groups as well as the UN Special Adviser on Myanmar Vijay Nambiar attended the meeting as observers. Both sides signed a new seven-point agreement reaffirming many points in the first arrangement. On November 4 and 5, the government held talks over a nationwide ceasefire with seventeen armed ethnic groups in Myitkyina [→ Myanmar (SSA-S, SSA-N / Shan State)]. The two sides exchanged ceasefire draft proposals and agreed to reassemble in December, which was later postponed to February 2014.

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MYANMAR (KNU, KNLA, DKBA / KAREN STATE, KAYAH STATE)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1948**

Conflict parties: KNLA, KNU, DKBA vs. government
 Conflict items: autonomy

The autonomy conflict between the Karen National Union (KNU) and its military wing the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) and the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA), on the one hand, and the government, on the other hand, continued as a violent crisis. Over the year, both sides held several talks. On January 3 and 4, KNU leaders attended a meeting with President Thein Sein in the capital Naypyi-daw to discuss the peacemaking process. On March 5, KNU opened its sixth liaison office in Naung Bo village, Mon state. On June 13, KNU and government officials met again in Myawaddy, Kayin state. Informal talks focused on a code of conduct and the repositioning of troops. On June 15 and 16, two separate KNU delegations discussed, in addition, a nationwide political dialog with government officials.

On November 2, KNU and DKBA attended a meeting of seventeen ethnic groups in Laiza, Kachin state, and signed a conditional agreement supporting a government-proposed nationwide ceasefire [→ Myanmar (KIA, KIO / Kachin State)]. On November 4 and 5, KNU and government held peace talks in Myitkyina, Kachin state.

Despite these negotiations, from April 26 to 29, DKBA and Karen Border Guard Force (BGF), a paramilitary group supporting the government, clashed in Myaing Gyi Ngu town, Mon state, and several nearby villages, forcing most of the residents to flee. Reportedly, Karen BGF was using heavy artillery in the attacks. In the clashes, DKBA killed two Karen BGF soldiers and injured one. On August 16, troops from KNLA and Karen BGF clashed in Weigy, Karen state. One Karen BGF soldier was killed and two were wounded in the fighting.

MYANMAR (SSA / SHAN STATE)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1952**

Conflict parties: SSA-N, SSA-S vs. government
 Conflict items: autonomy

The conflict concerning autonomy between the northern and southern wings of the Shan State Army (SSA-N and SSA-S), on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued on the level of a violent crisis.

Despite the ceasefire agreements that SSA-N and SSA-S had signed with the government in December 2011, skirmishes continued between government and SSA-N troops from February to November. For instance, clashes in Tangyan township, Lashio district, on April 15 and 16, displaced more than 1,000 residents. Government troops took over two bases in Kehsi township, Loilem district, previously controlled by SSA-N, on June 22 and 23. SSA-N reported that its brigade near Namatu township, Kyaukme district, clashed with government troops over a dozen times in September. Government and SSA-S troops clashed multiple times as well. The main skirmishes took place in Kunhing township, Loilem, on March 11 and in Mongpan township, Loilem, on March 13.

According to local sources, at least ten people died in the clashes. Government troops burned down an SSA-S outpost in Namkham township on May 5. Four days later, 500 to 600 government troops fought with 100 to 200 SSA-S troops, causing 2,000 to 3,000 locals to flee.

Leaders of the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), the political wing of the SSA-S, met with President Thein Sein in the capital Naypyitaw on June 10. Both sides agreed to work on the repositioning of troops, the de-escalation of hostilities, and the formation of a conflict monitoring team. However, RCSS expressed their doubts about Thein Sein's ability to stop the fighting in a joint statement issued with SSA-N on June 28. In November, SSA-S and the United Nationalities Federal Council, an umbrella organization of the armed ethnic groups of which SSA-N is a member, took part in multiple talks with the government. SSA-N was among the seventeen armed ethnic groups to agree to a conditional ceasefire with the government in a conference in Laiza, Kachin state, on November 2 [→ Myanmar (KIA, KIO / Kachin state)]. SSA-S participated in the conference but did not sign the Laiza declaration. Talks between ethnic groups and the government continued in conferences in Myitkyina, Kachin state, on November 4 and 5 and in Chiang Mai, Thailand on November 22. A further meeting between the government and armed ethnic groups was postponed to February 2014jre

NEPAL (KIRATIS / KOSI, MECI, SAGARMATHA)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↗** | Start: **1992**

Conflict parties: FLSC, Khambuwān National Front, Khambuwān Mukti Morcha Samyukta, LNLf, Sanghiya Limbuwan Rajya Parishad vs. government

Conflict items: autonomy

The conflict over autonomy in the eastern zones Kosi, Mechi, and Sagarmatha between organizations and political parties of the ethnic Kirati minority such as the Federal Limbuwan State Council (FLSC) and the Sanghiya Limbuwan Rajya Parishad, on the one hand, and the government on the other, escalated to a violent crisis.

From May 4 to 6, Sanghiya Limbuwan Rajya Parishad announced a general strike in the Kosi and Mechi zones to stop the voters list collection process. The strike paralyzed life in the Eastern Districts for three days and came along with arrests and property damage. On June 5, FLSC supporters and more than 90 policemen clashed in the Kosi zone at a mobile camp for voter identification, leaving at least twenty FLSC members and eight police personnel injured. Moreover, on several press conferences during the year, FLSC announced protests to boycott the upcoming Constituent Assembly election in November and threatened to foil the polls by suicide attacks. On October 3, a second general strike initiated by FLSC hit the Kosi and Mechi zones and was followed by the arrest of sixteen people affiliated with the FLSC the day after. On October 25, members of the Sanghiya Limbuwan Rajya Parishad attacked and critically injured a poll candidate of the Unified Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (UCPN-M) in Mechi. An ensuing clash left a dozen people injurednwu

NEPAL (MADHESHIS / TERAI)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **2004**

Conflict parties: AJMM, JTMM, JTMM factions, JTMMp, MJF, MMT, TMPD vs. government

Conflict items: autonomy

The autonomy conflict in the Terai region between various Madhesi political parties, such as the Madhesi Jana Adhika Forum (MJF), and militant groups, including the Akhil Janatantrik Mukti Morcha (AJMM), the Janatantrik Tarai Mukti Morcha (JTMM) and their various factions, as well as the Madhesi Mukti Tigers (MMT), on the one hand, and the government on the other, continued on a violent level.

Government diplomatic efforts increased over the year. The Bhagat Singh-led faction of JTMM (JTMM-S) held peace talks with the government and handed over its weapons to the police in March and April. Similarly in May, the Prithvi Singh-led JTMM-P met with government negotiators and agreed to hand over weapons and to pursue their goals in a non-violent way. Different Madhesi political parties participated in the new Constituent Assembly election in November.

Several militant groups continued to carry out attacks. For instance, on April 1, AJMM detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) in Janakpur city, Janakpur zone. Two weeks later, the Rajan Mukti-led JTMM-R injured one person in Janakpur. On June 16, JTMM-R injured two civilians in Mahottari district, Janakpur. Three days later the group called for a two-day strike in the districts of Dhanusha and Mahottari to oppose the visit of the former King. On July 3, twelve smaller Terai armed groups decided to merge with JTMM to thwart the Constituent Assembly election. On September 23, the police arrested a commander of the Jaya Krishna Goit-led JTMM-G in Narayani zone and, around two weeks later, a district commander of the Jwala Singh-led JTMM-J. On October 4, a Constituent Assembly candidate of the Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxists-Leninists) was shot in Narayani and succumbed to his injuries several days later. MMT and JTMM-R both claimed responsibility for the assassination. On November 16, Indian police arrested Rajan Mukti and handed him over to Nepal. Twelve days later, the police arrested an Indian national who was allegedly working as a contract killer for Madhesi militant groups in Banke district, Bheri zone. The following day, police captured Bhagat Singh, who had given up armed struggle in March.lst

NORTH KOREA – SOUTH KOREA

Intensity: **2** | Change: **•** | Start: **1948**

Conflict parties: DPRK vs. ROK

Conflict items: territory, system/ideology, international power

The conflict over territory, international power and ideology between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the Republic of Korea (ROK) continued. After DPRK's 12/12/12 rocket launch, DPRK leader Kim Jong-un called for better relations with ROK in his New Year's Speech on January 1, but also cautioned against future aggressions.

On February 12, DPRK announced to have carried out its third nuclear test. On February 25, Park Geun-hye succeeded

Lee Myung-bak as president of ROK. In her inaugural speech, she proclaimed resoluteness against DPRK threats, but also openness for trust-building measures. On March 20, a bank and three television stations in ROK reported cyber-attacks, which were later attributed to DPRK. On March 27, DPRK cut the military hotline with ROK. Three days later, it exclaimed a “state of war” [→ North Korea - USA, South Korea, Japan]. From April 3, DPRK denied workers from ROK access to the jointly-run Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC). Six days later, DPRK pulled out its own 53,448 workers. Despite their government’s protest, ROK businessmen continued to work in the KIC. On April 17, DPRK denied food deliveries to the remaining workers. The last remaining workers left the KIC on May 3. On May 7, DPRK threatened to turn ROK’s Seohae Islands into a “sea of flames.”

On June 7, both sides reached a new agreement on the KIC. On June 11, DPRK canceled scheduled high-level talks due to discontent with the nominated ROK chief delegate. On August 14, both sides reached a five-point agreement over reopening the KIC. On August 23, they agreed on a long-debated family reunion of 196 people to be held from September 25 to 30. On September 2, ROK Ministry of Unification announced that it would grant aid to the North via the WHO. Three days later, both sides re-established the military hotline. On September 16, the KIC reopened for a test run. On September 21, DPRK canceled the family reunion that was scheduled for September 25. Subsequently, ROK ruled out talks over the resumption of tourism in DPRK’s Mount Kumguang resort.

On December 3, Kim Jong-un ousted his uncle and supposed second-in-command Jang Song-taek. He was executed nine days later. On December 10, DPRK sent hundreds of leaflets threatening to destroy ROK’s marine brigade on Baengnyeong Island. The same week, both sides exchanged attack threats after Pyongyang voiced criticism over civilians in central Seoul, who protested against DPRK’s leadership

non-aggression pacts with ROK, including the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement, and closed the joint border crossing at Panmunjon inside the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). In late March, the US reaffirmed its nuclear umbrella for ROK and Japan and dispatched B-52 bombers, B-2 stealth bombers and F-22 stealth fighters to take part in the Foal Eagle exercise. DPRK readied its missiles and exclaimed a “state of war”. On April 1, DPRK declared itself a nuclear weapons state. Three days later, DPRK moved intermediate range missiles to its east coast. The US, Japan and ROK announced the dispatching of Aegis-equipped destroyers and initiated missile defense measures. The US announced the stationing of a missile defense system on Guam. Japan deployed three PAC-3 missile units. On April 9, DPRK pulled out its workers from the Kaesong Industrial Complex [→North Korea – South Korea]. Four days later, the US and China agreed on the goal of DPRK’s denuclearization. On April 18, DPRK ruled out denuclearization and set high conditions for negotiations, which were then rejected by the US. On April 21, DPRK moved two mobile missile launchers to its east coast. It continued to voice nuclear threats. On May 2, the US demanded DPRK’s release of US citizen Kenneth Bae. In mid-May, Japanese top cabinet advisor Isao Iijima visited Pyongyang, reportedly to discuss DPRK’s abductions of Japanese nationals. Between May 18 and 20, DPRK fired six short-range missiles into the Sea of Japan. On June 16, DPRK offered high-level talks to the US. On July 18, the US declared its readiness for serious talks on denuclearization. On July 26, Chinese Vice President Li Yuanchao met with DPRK leader Kim Jong-un to mediate. In October, DPRK restarted its Yongbyon nuclear reactor and voiced threats over joint naval drills by the US, ROK, and Japan. On October 12, it refused a US non-aggression pact offer on the condition of de-nuclearization. One month later, DPRK echoed its nuclear threats on US, ROK, and Japan.

NORTH KOREA – USA, SOUTH KOREA, JAPAN

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **1990**

Conflict parties: DPRK vs. USA, ROK, Japan
 Conflict items: system/ideology, international power, other

The system and international power conflict between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) on the one hand, and the USA, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and Japan, on the other, continued. On January 22, the UN Security Council (UNSC) unanimously passed Resolution 2087, which condemned DPRK’s 12/12/12 rocket launch and reaffirmed sanctions contained in previous resolutions. Two days later, DPRK announced plans for a third nuclear test and new long-range missiles that would target the US. On February 12, a DPRK spokesman claimed that a miniaturized nuclear device had been tested underground at the Punggye-ri test site. International research centers detected high seismic activity but no nuclear radiation. The test received international condemnation. A ROK spokesman stated that China and the US had been informed about the test in advance.

On March 1, the US and ROK commenced their two-months Foal Eagle joint exercises. Six days later, the UNSC unanimously adopted Resolution 2094, extending the sanctions and monitoring of DPRK further to individuals and entities acting on its behalf. Subsequently, DPRK canceled all

PAKISTAN (ANTI-CORRUPTION PROTESTERS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **NEW** | Start: **2013**

Conflict parties: anti-corruption protesters, Minhaj-ul-Quran vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology

A new violent conflict over the political system and corruption erupted between the government, led by the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), and anti-corruption protesters in the run-up to the May 11 general elections. Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri, leader of both the religious organization Minhaj-ul-Quran and political party Awami Tehrik, demanded the government’s resignation and the installation of a caretaker government to oversee the upcoming national elections.

Between January 13 and 14, Qadri and more than 20,000 other protesters marched from Lahore, provincial capital of Punjab, to Islamabad. The government deployed 15,000 additional police forces to the capital. For four days, protesters blocked access to the Parliament House and other major streets in Islamabad. On January 15, some protesters threw stones at the police, injuring at least eight officers. The police pushed the protesters back, using teargas and firing warning shots. The same day, the Supreme Court ordered the detainment of incumbent PPP Prime Minister Raja Pervez Ashraf for corruption. However, the order remained unexecuted. On January 17, Ashraf signed a declaration brokered between Qadri and high-ranking politicians. They agreed, among other things, on electoral reforms and the installation of an interim

caretaker government at least one month before the upcoming general elections to scrutinize all candidates. The same day, the protest started to dissolve.

On March 17, Qadri held a public meeting in Rawalpindi, Punjab province, and criticized the allegedly insufficient implementation of electoral reforms. He claimed that his party and followers would boycott the elections and announced nationwide sit-ins in front of polling stations. However on May 11, participation in the announced boycotts remained low and elections took place largely unaffected by his call. The parliament approved hitherto opposition leader Nawaz Sharif as PM on June 5 [→Pakistan (opposition)].mw

PAKISTAN (BLA ET AL. / BALOCHISTAN)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1948**

Conflict parties: BLA, BLF, BNM, BNP, BRA, BRP, UBA vs. government

Conflict items: secession, resources

The conflict over resources and secession between various militant separatist groups and Baloch political parties in Balochistan province on the one hand, and the government on the other, continued as a violent crisis. These aforementioned groups and parties were closely linked to local Baloch and Brahui tribes. Over the course of the year, at least 150 people were killed in clashes between militants and security forces, as well as in attacks on civilians from other ethnicities who were perceived to be advantaged by the government. Moreover, at least eighteen attacks on railroad infrastructure, gas pipelines, power lines, and fuel-tankers disturbed the country's power supply.

In one of many violent incidents, on January 10, United Baloch Army (UBA) detonated a remote-triggered bomb near a paramilitary checkpoint in Balochistan's provincial capital Quetta, which killed twelve people and injured over 47. On April 23, UBA launched four separate bomb-attacks in Quetta and injured twenty people, including two policemen.

On March 10, the Baloch Republican Army (BRA) blew up a gas pipeline in the Dera Bugti district. On May 10, BRA attacked a convoy with a remote-triggered bomb in Jaffarabad district. The explosion left four people dead, including a member of the paramilitary Frontier Corps and an employee of the Oil and Gas Development Company Limited (OGDCL). The government-run OGDCL exploited gas and oil resources in mineral-rich Balochistan. On July 18, a similar attack on an OGDCL convoy in the same district killed four people, including two security officials. On October 21, BRA triggered a bomb directed at the Jaffar Express train, killing seven people. On November 18, BRA kidnapped and killed three Punjabi construction workers in Turbat town.

On June 15, Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) attacked the memorial residency of the first Governor-General of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, in Ziarat district. The target was a highly symbolic building for the state of Pakistan. Rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) destroyed the building and killed one policeman. On August 6, BLA set up a fake checkpoint in Bolan district and shot dead fourteen people from two Punjab-bound buses, including three security officials. BLA claimed that all victims supported the security forces. On August 16, BLA fired rockets at the Jaffar Express train, killing four people. Two days later, two security forces and one BLA militant died in an ambush on a Frontier Corps checkpoint in Quetta. On July 28, Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF)

attacked a coast guard checkpoint in Gwadar, killing seven officers.

Approx. 400 people disappeared throughout the year, allegedly abducted by state agencies for their involvement in secessionist activities. At least 70 bodies of those missing were found in different parts of the provinceiro

PAKISTAN (INTER-ETHNIC VIOLENCE / SINDH)

Intensity: **4** | Change: • | Start: **1947**

Conflict parties: Mohajirs, MQM vs. ANP, Pakhtuns vs. Balochs, PPP, Sindhis

Conflict items: subnational predominance

The limited war over subnational predominance in the province of Sindh between different ethnic groups and their affiliated political parties continued. These included the Mohajir people and their political organization, the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM), Pakhtuns, backed by the Awami National Party (ANP), and the Balochs and Sindhis, both of which are supported by the Pakistan People's Party (PPP). Most of the violence occurred in Karachi, Sindh's capital and Pakistan's economic hub, where Mohajirs constituted the majority. According to official sources, more than 400 people died in targeted killings throughout the course of the year. Among them were at least 154 MQM, 35 ANP, and 30 PPP supporters.

In January, at least 21 political activists of MQM, ANP, and PPP died in separate assaults. On February 18, a self-made bomb was thrown at the house of an ANP politician in Karachi. On the same day, the killings of three ANP supporters sparked violence as protesters took to the streets in Jamshed Town, Karachi, firing in the air. After they torched a motorbike and damaged a police van, police dispersed them with warning shots. In April, at least 24 political activists were killed in separate incidents. For example, on April 23, an improvised explosive device targeting an MQM camp in Karachi killed four people and injured at least 30 others.

In the context of the elections for national and provincial assemblies on May 11, the government deployed 92,000 policemen to the 14,980 polling stations across Sindh and put 27,000 soldiers on standby. However, violence escalated steeply, with at least 46 political activists assassinated throughout the month of May. In the night before the election day, an MQM poll candidate was gunned down and a PPP poll candidate was kidnapped. On the morning of May 11, a bomb attack killed eleven ANP activists and injured 45 others in Karachi. In the city of Nawabshah, MQM activists clashed with PPP supporters soon after the polling started and continued until the evening of the following day. Two MQM and one PPP member died in the clashes. After authorities suspended elections in 43 polling stations in Karachi due to large-scale rigging and intimidation of voters, the Election Commission ordered re-polling in these stations. PPP remained the ruling party in Sindh's provincial assembly.

In June, at least 21 political activists died in targeted killings. After the assassination of an MQM lawmaker and his son on June 21, many towns in the province shut down to observe a day of mourning. At least 22 political party members were killed in August in separate incidents across the province. On September 6, violence broke out in Tandojam town, Hyderabad district, after the killing of an MQM activist in a targeted attack. A large number of armed MQM followers took to the streets, torched a trailer, and forced shopkeepers

to shut down. On September 8, scores of MQM supporters demonstrated against the disappearance of 33 MQM activists. On December 6, over 100 activists of the PPP took to the streets over reports that their leader had been arrested. They protested in front of the police station and forced shopkeepers to close by firing in the air.nwu

PAKISTAN (INTER-ISLAMIST VIOLENCE)

Intensity: **4** | Change: **↗** | Start: **2010**

Conflict parties: TTP vs. Al vs. LI
 Conflict items: system/ideology, subnational pre-dominance


The conflict between Sunni militant groups such as Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Lashkar-e-Islam (LI) and Ansar-ul-Islam (Al) over ideology and subnational predominance in Pakistan's northwest escalated to a limited war. TTP, an umbrella organization of various Sunni militant groups, LI, a militant Deobandi Sunni group and Al, whose ideology was based on the Barelwi belief, had been banned by the government. In January, Al launched an offensive against TTP in Tirah Valley, situated in the Khyber, Kurram and Orakzai agencies of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Al announced to expel TTP from the strategically important valley which stretched from the Afghan border to the outskirts of Peshawar, provincial capital of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KP). Thereby, Al ended its informal settlement with TTP which had lasted since Al's formation in 2005. On January 24, fighting started when Al captured three TTP bases close to Maidan village, Khyber agency. The following day, up to 300 TTP members armed with mortars and rocket launchers started a retaliatory attack. At least 23 Al militants and approx. 40 TTP members died within the two days. On January 26 and 27, at least twelve more militants and five civilians were killed. While Al claimed to control at least 25 former TTP-controlled villages in Orakzai agency, TTP encircled a major Al base in Khyber agency on January 28. From this day onwards, the air force started to bomb parts of Orakzai and Khyber agencies [→ Pakistan (Islamist militant groups)]. After LI gained control of the hitherto neutral Takhtaki area in Khyber agency, Al attacked them on January 31. In early February, locals from Takhtaki clashed with LI, sometimes in collaboration with Al [→ Pakistan (Taliban – tribes)]. On February 9, at least eight militants died when Al recaptured a strategically important outpost from TTP in Khyber agency. In the following weeks, up to thirteen TTP and six Al militants died in various clashes. On March 7 and 8, at least five militants died when TTP and Al clashed in Khyber agency using heavy weapons. Four days later, heavily armed TTP militants launched a major offensive against Al in Tirah valley that claimed dozens of lives. On March 16, TTP entered the central areas of the valley and captured Al's headquarters in Bagh-Maidan on March 18. On this last day of fighting, a double suicide blast by Al killed 25 TTP members at Bagh-Maidan. After the TTP offensive, the army intensified their land and air operations in the area. By the beginning of April, around 50,000 people had fled to neighboring areas due to the militant clashes and the ongoing army operation. On June 26, hundreds of heavily armed Al militants, supported by local militias, attacked one TTP base in Mohmand agency, FATA, and two smaller camps in the bordering Kunar province of Afghanistan. Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), a militant group mainly fighting in Indian-administered Kashmir, allegedly supported Al [→ India (JeM et al. / Kashmir)].

However, LeT denied any involvement. Between September and November, most of the displaced people from Tirah valley returned to their homes. Throughout the year, minor clashes continued among rival militant groups. For example, on October 3, TTP destroyed the house of defected TTP-Hanafi group leader Mullah Nabi Hanafi in Hangu, KP. Following a car bomb explosion in front of the building, militants stormed the house. At least fifteen people died and several more were injured, Hanafi among the latter. On November 19, an unknown suicide bomber killed a TTP commander and six other militants near Mirali in North Waziristan agency, FATA. hru

PAKISTAN (ISLAMIST MILITANT GROUPS)

Intensity: **5** | Change: **•** | Start: **2001**

Conflict parties: al-Qaeda, Haqqani Network, LI, TTP vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology, national power



The war over national power and the orientation of the political system between various Islamist militant groups, such as the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Lashkar-e-Islam (LI), al-Qaeda, and Haqqani Network, on the one hand, and the government, supported by the USA, on the other, continued. Despite the ongoing ceasefire talks, the conflict claimed the lives of over 3,500 people over the course of the year. The heaviest clashes between security forces and militants took place in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). In the first half of the year, the army launched an offensive in the Tirah valley, located in the Orakzai, Khyber and Kurram agencies of FATA, and the valley's bordering areas, following heavy fighting between different Islamist militant groups [→ Pakistan (inter-Islamist violence)]. Local militias repeatedly supported the army or fought Islamist militants independently [→ Pakistan (Taliban – tribes)]. On January 28 and 29, army jet fighters targeted LI and TTP militants in the Orakzai and Khyber agencies, killing at least 33 militants. Similar operations continued throughout the following months, such as the instances on February 7 and March 8, with an official death toll of fifteen and 36 militants, respectively. Military engagement culminated in the beginning of April. During a comprehensive offensive from April 5 to 9, the army regained control of important parts of Tirah Valley. The fighting resulted in the death of approx. 30 soldiers and 100 militants. Following the clashes, militants moved to the bordering Kurram agency, where they were again attacked by the military. On May 31, an intense firefight between the government troops and the militants left 34 militants and three soldiers dead. On June 8 and 9, the army regained control of the main areas of Tirah Valley surrounding the village Maidan. During the operation, 35 militants and one soldier died. Skirmishes continued, but no other major offensive was launched. Throughout the year, US drone strikes targeted leading Islamist officers in FATA. On January 2, a US drone attack killed key Taliban commander, Mullah Nazir, and eight of his associates in South Waziristan agency. In another attack on May 30, five Taliban militants died, including TTP's second in

command, Waliur Rehman. On November 1, the US military killed five militants in a drone strike in North Waziristan agency, among them two high-rank commanders and the leader of the Pakistani Taliban, Hakimullah Mehsud. Apart from these high profile attacks, US drone operations killed more than 140 people.

Despite resumed peace negotiations between the TTP and the government, Islamists carried out various suicide attacks and ambushes throughout the whole country, targeting both security personnel and civilians. Attacks intensified during the two months prior to the general elections in May, specifically targeting party rallies in FATA, KP and the city Karachi, Sindh Province. On April 16, an unidentified suicide bomber blew himself up during an election campaign of the Awami National Party (ANP) in Peshawar, provincial capital of KP, killing seventeen people and wounding 60. Similarly, TTP targeted an ANP gathering next to an election office in Karachi on April 26, leaving eleven dead and 45 injured. Furthermore, TTP attacked an election rally of the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam-Fazl in Kurram Agency of FATA on May 6, leading to the death of 23 people and injuring of 47. Further, 57 people died in a TTP suicide attack on a market in Kurram agency, FATA, on July 26.

Islamist groups mainly targeted Security forces in FATA and to a lesser extent in the provinces of Balochistan and KP. In North Waziristan, TTP targeted a security convoy on January 13, killing fourteen and wounding 27 soldiers. In the same agency, a suicide bomber rammed his vehicle into an army check point on May 23, resulting in the death of seventeen soldiers. Moreover, on July 29, in an overnight attack on a prison located in the town of Dera Ismail Khan in KP, TTP militants freed nearly 250 prisoners who belonged to the militant organization. A TTP suicide bomber killed at least 31 people, including two high-ranking officials, and injured more than 44 others at Police Lines in Quetta, provincial capital of Balochistan, on August 8.

His party, the All Pakistan Muslim League, announced a boycott soon after. Two days later, Musharraf was placed under house arrest and the senate passed a resolution to charge him for high treason.

In the run-up to the election, Islamist militants especially targeted secular political parties [→Pakistan (Islamist militant groups)]. Various incidents of election-related violence occurred in Karachi, Sindh province. The government deployed troops to 43 polling stations in the city [→Pakistan (inter-ethnic violence / Sindh)]. On May 11, PML-N won the parliamentary elections with 32.77 percent of the valid votes. After the election, people in major cities protested against electoral fraud. The EU's election observation mission confirmed serious irregularities. The National Assembly approved hitherto opposition leader Nawaz Sharif as Prime Minister on June 5. On July 30, PML-N candidate Mamnoon Hussain won the indirect presidential election after the opposition candidate Raza Rabbani withdrew his candidatureship. On August 20, Musharraf was charged with murder of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in 2007. However, until the end of the year, no verdict was passed against Musharraf. mw

PAKISTAN (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **1** | Change: • | Start: **1998**


Conflict parties: opposition parties vs. government

Conflict items: national power

The conflict over national power between opposition parties and the government continued on a non-violent level. Until the parliamentary elections on May 11, the government was lead by the Pakistan People's Party (PPP). The opposition consisted of the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, and others.

After winning the elections, the government was comprised of PML-N. The results were accepted by most political parties. On January 15, at least 10,000 protesters gathered in the capital Islamabad, demanding resignation of the government because of corruption, and demanded elections under a neutral caretaker administration [→Pakistan (anti-corruption protesters)]. The same day, the Supreme Court ordered the arrest of Prime Minister Raja Pervez Ashraf, PPP, for corruption, but the investigation was suspended four days later. The government term ended on March 16 and an interim-government under the former judge Mir Hazar Khan Khoso took over in compliance with constitutional rules. Former president and four-star general Pervez Musharraf returned from exile on March 24 to run as candidate for the National Assembly. On April 16, a court excluded him from the elec-

PAKISTAN (ISLAMIST MILITANT GROUPS)



NO VIOLENT CONFLICT MEASURES VIOLENT CRISIS LIMITED WAR WAR

data: mfu maps: flr, tw

PAKISTAN (TTP ET AL. – RELIGIOUS GROUPS)

Intensity: **4** | Change: • | Start: **1985**

Conflict parties: Jundullah, LeJ, TTP vs. Ahmadiyya, Christians, Hindus, Shiites
 Conflict items: system/ideology, subnational pre-dominance

The limited war over ideology and subnational predominance between militant Sunni groups, among them most prominently Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), its splinter Jundullah, and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) on the one hand, and various religious minorities, such as Christians, Hindus, and Shiites, on the other, continued.

On January 10, an LeJ suicide bomber and successive car bomb blast killed at least 95 civilians, mostly Shiite Hazara, on Alamdar Road in Quetta, capital of Balochistan province. One day later, LeJ declared its intention to kill all Shiite Hazara in Balochistan. During the following days, thousands of civilians protested across the country and demanded government action against the perpetrators of the Quetta bombing. On February 1, a suicide bomber killed 27 civilians, mostly Shiites, in front of a mosque in Hangu, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province. On February 16, LeJ militants detonated a tanker truck packed with explosives near a marketplace in Quetta, killing at least 84 civilians, mostly Shiite Hazara. After the attack, civilians blocked access to the location and threw stones at security forces. During the following days, thousands of civilians protested countrywide. Relatives of the victims refused to bury their dead and demanded armed forces to be deployed in the region.

On March 3, a suicide bomber killed 45 Shiites when they were leaving a mosque in Karachi, capital of Sindh province. On June 21, a suicide bomber killed fifteen civilians in a Shiite mosque in Peshawar, capital of KP. Nine days later, a LeJ suicide bomber and a remotely triggered explosive device killed at least 28 civilians in Hazara Town, a quarter of Quetta. On July 26, a similar double attack killed at least 50 civilians in Parachinar, Kurram Agency, Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). One week later, six gunmen shot the Shia Council's Divisional President Sheikh Manzoor Hussain and his son in Rahimyar Khan, Punjab province. On September 22, a double suicide bombing carried out by Jundullah militants aimed at a Christian church killed at least 80 civilians in Peshawar. Jundullah had announced that it would kill non-Muslims across the country as long as US drone strikes were occurring [→ Pakistan (Islamist militant groups)]. On November 15, at least eight civilians died in a confrontation between members of a Shiite Ashura procession and attendants of a Sunni seminary in Rawalpindi, Punjab. At least 30 people were injured and several shops in the surrounding area were destroyed. On November 21, a suicide bomber killed 23 participants of a Shiite procession in Rawalpindi and injured at least 62. The same day, a double bomb blast in front of a Shiite mosque killed two people and injured seven in Karachi. TTP claimed responsibility for both attacks.mhu

PAKISTAN – INDIA

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1947**

Conflict parties: Pakistan vs. India
 Conflict items: territory, international power

The violent crisis between Pakistan and India over international power and the status of the Kashmir region continued. Over the course of the year, the contested Line of Control (LoC) served as battlefield for at least 47 skirmishes between the Indian and Pakistani soldiers. Additionally, more than 40 fire exchanges occurred without inflicting damage on life or property, partially involving heavy weapons such as mortars. Between January 5 and 15, three Pakistani and two Indian soldiers died and another two Pakistani soldiers as well as one Indian soldier were wounded in at least nine encounters with automatic weapons, rocket launchers, and mortars. When one of the killed Indian soldiers was beheaded, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced the re-evaluation of the bilateral relations. Subsequently, India delayed the introduction of a new Indian visa scheme vis-à-vis Pakistan, scheduled for January 15 until April 1.

Pakistani Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar invited her Indian counterpart to direct talks on January 17 and opted for an investigation of the incident by the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). India refused both proposals and called on the UN Security Council to end the UNMOGIP mission on January 22. An Indian unilateral investigation concluded on February 21 that the Pakistani military and the Islamist group Lashkar-e-Toiba were responsible for the beheading [→ India (JeM et al. / Kashmir)]. In a gunfight on May 25, three Indian soldiers were wounded.

In two similar skirmishes on June 7, two Indian soldiers died. At least five artillery shellings between June 18 and 20 left one Indian civilian injured. On the Pakistani side, two civilians were killed and seven injured, while four soldiers were injured. On August 14, both armies fired mortars across the LoC, wounding three Indian soldiers. Between October 15 and 28, one Pakistani and four Indian soldiers died, while eighteen Indian soldiers suffered injuries in eight clashes.

After being sworn in as Prime Minister of Pakistan on June 5, Nawaz Sharif repeatedly expressed his will to improve relations with India and to end the clashes at the LoC. In a meeting with Prime Minister Singh on September 29, he assured his commitment to peace and ending the skirmishes after continuous clashes in August had led to a suspension of lower-level diplomacy.

On October 10, Pakistani officials announced not to grant India most-favored nation status in trade issues due to the ongoing fights. On October 31, Sharif proposed trilateral talks with the US or the UK to help solve the Kashmir issue, which was rejected by India.

On November 24, Indian officials announced their intention to build a wall along the LoC.jmi

PAPUA NEW GUINEA (TRIBAL VIOLENCE)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1975**

Conflict parties: Kambia vs. Wambe vs. various highland tribes

Conflict items: subnational predominance, resources

The conflict over subnational predominance and resources between various tribes in the highlands continued on a violent level, counting at least fourteen deaths. During the Local Level Government (LLG) elections from July 6 to August 9, rival candidates' supporters clashed in nineteen local government areas in the six highland provinces of Eastern Highlands, Enga, Hela, Jiwaka, Southern Highlands, and Western Highlands. Local candidate supporters and drunk youths intimidated voters and hijacked or destroyed ballot boxes. On August 16, Electoral Commissioner Andrew Trawen declared the LLG elections invalid in all six provinces. Later in August, armed members of the Andakelkang tribe supported by Moge, Jiga, and people settled around the Kagamuga Airport, entered the airport's area in the city of Mount Hagen, Western Highlands. Protesting against Trawen's decision, they also blocked the main highland highway and several other roads with trucks, containers, and car wrecks.

Aside from incidents in the context of elections, clashes between the Kambia and Wambe tribes broke out in Sugu Valley, Southern Highlands on the night of November 11. Wambe tribe members locked up doors of a Kambia village and torched about 600 houses made of bush material as well as twelve brick houses, shooting villagers trying to leave their houses. In addition, they allegedly threw a hand grenade into a community center for men where many Kambia tribe members slept. The attackers killed fourteen Kambia tribe members and seriously injured at least four. They called it a revenge for a tribe member allegedly killed by Kambia tribe members in 2011. The government sent 50 members of the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary, and, a few days later, mediators trained by the district's Peace and Good Order Committee.

On December 20, crops and at least fourteen houses were burnt in a reported retaliation attack on Sing village, Autonomous Region of Bougainville (ARB), leaving approx. 90 people homeless. Local MPs and ARB disaster managers supported village leaders in solving the conflict.

PHILIPPINES (ABU SAYYAF)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1991**

Conflict parties: Abu Sayyaf vs. government

Conflict items: secession, system/ideology

The secession and ideology conflict between the Islamist Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the government continued on a violent level. Throughout the year, Abu Sayyaf was responsible for several kidnappings and bombings.

On January 22, ASG ambushed Army Scout Rangers in Basilan province in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), injuring seven. On February 3, approx. 300 Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) militants sieged two camps with some 250 ASG militants near Patikul in Sulu province,

ARMM. The military rescued hundreds of fleeing civilians but did not interfere. At least thirteen ASG militants and seven MNLF militants were killed in the battle. On April 6, some 30 suspected ASG members engaged in a gunfight with two marine soldiers in Talipao Town, Sulu, injuring both. On April 15, a military offensive in Tipo-Tipo, Basilan, left approx. six to eight ASG members dead and wounded three others. During May, clashes between ASG and soldiers in Sulu and Basilan caused the death of fifteen to sixteen people, including at least seven Marine soldiers, and left 23 to 28 injured. The military sent a Navy-Marine team to investigate the killing of the soldiers. On August 14, suspected ASG militants conducted a grenade attack in Jolo, Sulu, leaving two people injured.

On September 12, about 200 MNLF gunmen supported by ASG and Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) attacked Lamitan City, wounding nine soldiers. Three rebels were killed and seven injured [→Philippines (MNLF)]. The next day, clashes continued between government troops and suspected ASG and MNLF members in Lamitan City and the number of injured persons increased by six, totaling at 22. On October 8, ASG and BIFF shot dead one soldier in a shootout in Ungkaya Pukan, Basilan. On October 29, suspected ASG militants kidnapped a businessman in Cotabato City in the region of Soccsksargen, killing one security guard and injuring another. On December 24, police killed an ASG leader, Fraser Hajan, in Parang, Sulu, when he resisted arrest.

PHILIPPINES (BIFM, BIFF – MILF, GOVERNMENT)

Intensity: **4** | Change: • | Start: **2011**

Conflict parties: BIFF, BIFM vs. government, MILF

Conflict items: subnational predominance


The conflict over subnational predominance in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and Soccsksargen region between the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement (BIFM) and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), on the one hand, and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the government, on the other hand, continued as a limited war.

From June 22 to 24, government forces conducted a ground offensive against a BIFF camp after 200 of their fighters had attacked the village Bagumbayan, Soccsksargen region, and killed two people. More than 300 families fled the area. On July 6, BIFF and government forces clashed in different locations in Maguindanao province, ARMM, and North Cotabato province, Soccsksargen. Five soldiers and at least 25 BIFF fighters were killed in the fights which displaced 5,000 inhabitants. Later in July, a number of clashes in Maguindanao and North Cotabato left seventeen people dead. Between August 9 and 10, approx. 2,000 people were displaced due to fighting in North Cotabato and two BIFF attackers were killed. In September, BIFF and security forces clashed multiple times, killing nineteen people and forcing around 2,000 to flee their homes. From September 12 to 13, BIFF fighters, together with Abu Sayyaf and Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), were engaged in an attack in Lamitan City, Basilan province, ARMM [→Philippines (MNLF)]. The army countered the attack with airstrikes. On October 21, three soldiers were wounded in a mortar attack by BIFF in Maitumaig village, Maguindanao province, ARMM.

PHILIPPINES (MNLF)

Intensity: **5** | Change: **↑** | Start: **1969**

Conflict parties: MNLF vs. government
 Conflict items: secession, system/ideology, resources



The conflict between the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the government over the orientation of the political system, resources, and the secession of the islands of Mindanao, Palawan, and Sulu escalated to a war. MNLF strived for an independent United Federated States of Bangsamoro Republic. During the escalation of the conflict in September, approx. 120,800 people fled their homes and 255 people were killed.

On May 13, police arrested fifteen members of MNLF in the capital Manila for illegally carrying firearms. On July 12, MNLF kidnapped twelve people in Basilan province, Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). Following the signing of a budgetary agreement between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) on July 13, tensions between the MNLF and the government increased [→ Philippines (MILF – MNLF)]. On July 24, MNLF members displayed Bangsamoro flags and posters in Sta. Maria and Pasconanca, Zamboanga Peninsula. On August 12, Nus Misuari, chairman of the MNLF, declared the independence of Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan as the United Federated States of Bangsamoro Republic. On August 19, hundreds of MNLF members expressed their support for the declaration of independence in demonstrations in Jolo, Sulu province, ARMM. Amidst gradually rising tensions, the MNLF and the government met on August 31 where they discussed PAMANA, a development assistance program for conflict-affected areas, and decided to establish a steering committee on the matter. Another meeting was planned for September 15 but was cancelled later on.

On September 9, MNLF fighters arrived with six boats close to Zamboanga City, Zamboanga Peninsula, and killed one soldier in a firefight. A few hours later, MNLF entered the city, where they clashed with security forces. The MNLF offensive lasted for three weeks and involved 300 militants. The government deployed 4,500 soldiers to the area to halt the attack. The weapons used included high-powered firearms, mortar, and M-203 grenade launchers, and the army launched airstrikes using MG-520 combat helicopters. More than 244 people were killed and approx. 10,000 houses were destroyed. At least 118,800 people were forced to flee the area. On September 11, MNLF fighters took 180 hostages of which 151 were rescued by the army four days later.

On September 12 and 13, some 200 members of the MNLF, Abu Sayyaf, and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) launched a joint attack in Lamitan City, Basilan, killing three people [→ Philippines (Abu Sayyaf); → Philippines (BIFM, BIFF - MILF, government)]. 2,000 people fled their homes as the army subsequently launched airstrikes with MG-520 combat helicopters. On September 30, a soldier and an MNLF fighter died in another clash in Zamboanga City.

Additionally, on October 10, security forces shot two MNLF fighters dead in the same city. By November 4, the Department of Justice had charged at least 217 MNLF members suspected of connections to the stand-off in Zamboangapur

SRI LANKA (SINHALESE BUDDHISTS, JHU, JVP – HINDUS, EELAM TAMILS, MUSLIMS, SLMC, CHRISTIANS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↗** | Start: **1948**

Conflict parties: Sinhalese Buddhists, Echo of Sinhala, BBS vs. Eelam Tamils, Tamil Hindus vs. SLMC, Muslims vs. Christians
 Conflict items: system/ideology, subnational predominance

The subnational predominance and ideology conflict between nationalist Sinhalese Buddhist groups, such as the monk-led associations Echo of Sinhala and Bodu Bala Sena (BBS) on the one hand, and various religious groups such as Muslims, Christians, and Hindus, among them the Eelam Tamils, on the other, escalated to a violent level. The Muslims were mainly represented by the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) party.

On February 17, BBS organized a rally with thousands of followers in Maharagama, Western Province, demanding the abolishment of Halal certification and a stop to the building of mosques. Furthermore, they called on the people not to rent their properties to Muslims. On March 18, a crowd led by Echo of Sinhala sieged the house of a Christian pastor in Katuwana, Southern Province. They damaged property outside the building and assaulted civilians. On March 28, around 500 Buddhists, including monks, attacked a Muslim-owned storehouse near the capital Colombo, Western Province. They injured several workers and at least two journalists, using stones and iron rods. On May 26, a monk belonging to Echo of Sinhala self-immolated in front of the Temple of the Tooth in Kandy, Central Province, protesting against Halal slaughter and the conversion of Buddhists by other religious groups. On June 18, a group of Buddhist monks allegedly belonging to Echo of Sinhala set a Muslim-owned slaughterhouse on fire in Tangalle, Southern Province.

On August 10, a group of Buddhists, including monks, attacked a mosque in a suburb of Colombo during the evening prayers. When they damaged several houses and injured at least four, including two policemen, hundreds of Muslims took to the streets. Subsequently, authorities imposed a curfew for one night and deployed riot police and Special Task Force troops.cwl

TAJIKISTAN (ISLAMIST MILITANT GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↗** | Start: **1997**

Conflict parties: Hizb-ut-Tahrir, IMU, Jamaat Ansarul-lah, Jundullah, Tablig-i-Jamaat vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The system and national power conflict between various Islamist militant groups, among them the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the Jamaat Ansarullah, the Tablig-i-Jamaat,

Jundullah, and the Hizb-ut-Tahrir, on the one side, and the government on the other, escalated to a violent level. Last year, the conflict was notably marked by government actions of arrests, charges, and the sentencing of suspects for alleged membership in outlawed groups or participation in militant activities.

On January 14, a routine traffic control ended in a gunfight near the city of Konibodom, Sughd region, leaving a police officer and a suspected militant dead. Police forces detained nine members of IMU. On July 18, a court sentenced two members of Jundullah to 15 and 20 years in prison. On September 21, security forces stated that they had averted a bombing plot by arresting at least ten individuals. According to the government, the Islamist cell affiliated with IMU had planned several bomb attacks in the government district in Dushanbe prior to the presidential elections in November. Throughout the year, authorities detained at least 85 suspected militants. Reports of alleged terrorism convictions declined sharply.^{sci}

THAILAND (ISLAMIST SEPARATISTS / SOUTHERN BORDER PROVINCES)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↘** | Start: **1902**

Conflict parties: various Islamist separatists vs. government

Conflict items: secession, system/ideology

The conflict over secession and ideology between various Islamist separatists, among them Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) and the Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO), and the government de-escalated to a violent crisis. Islamist separatists engaged in attacks in the southern border provinces of Narathiwat, Pattani, Yala, and Songkhla. Reportedly, Islamist militant groups planted on average 24 roadside bombs per month in the first half of the year. At least 300 people died in the conflict, among them 129 security forces, according to police. Islamist militants especially targeted representatives of the state.

For instance, on January 23 militants shot dead a teacher in a school canteen in Narathiwat province. On February 10, suspected militants killed five soldiers and injured one during a roadside attack in Yala province. According to the police, they first detonated a car bomb as a truck with six soldiers passed by and then opened fire, killing five soldiers and taking away their rifles. In another roadside bombing on the same day, militants wounded four soldiers in Ra Ngae district, Narathiwat province. Three days later, an attack on a military base ended with sixteen militants killed in Narathiwat province. On February 16 and 17, a series of around 50 attacks by militants hit the province of Pattani. Militants launched widespread arson attacks, targeting shops, mobile phone towers, security cameras, and defense bases. The only reported attack involving casualties was a bomb explosion outside a restaurant in Pattani city which killed three local defense volunteers and injured nine other people.

On March 6, another roadside bomb explosion killed four soldiers and injured one in Rueso district, Narathiwat province. On April 12, suspected militants set off a roadside bomb, killing two soldiers and injuring six in Panaræe district, Pattani province. The detonation of a bomb on April 22 killed four soldiers and injured another four while they were trying to defuse the device hidden under a bridge close to the military

base in Narathiwat province. According to the police, four militants opened fire with M16 rifles and killed six civilians in Pattani city on May 1. On June 29, a roadside bomb explosion killed eight soldiers and injured two in Yala province, also injuring two civilians. On July 24, a roadside bomb explosion killed two teachers and injured one in Chanae district, Narathiwat province. A group of militants started to fire at a shop in Pattani city on September 21. In the aftermath, a car bomb hit the gathered crowd, killing six people and injuring at least 50. Thirteen people, including five journalists, were injured by a double bomb blast in Narathiwat, on October 19, including five journalists. Suspected militants shot dead four people on December 4 in an ambush in Nongchik district, Pattani province. On December 22, three bombs exploded in Songkhla province, injuring 27 people.

In February, peace talks between the government and BRN started in the Malayan capital of Kuala Lumpur. PULO stated that it would continue to carry out attacks as long as the group was not included in the talks. The government rejected the independence of the provinces, but agreed on a discussion about their autonomy. BRN halted the peace process in early August and demanded further concessions from the government. However, the government rejected the request.^{ska}

THAILAND (UDD, PTP – PAD)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **2006**

Conflict parties: PTP, UDD vs. PAD

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power


The conflict over national power and system between the government led by Pheu Thai Party (PTP) and the United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD), known as Red Shirts on the one hand, and the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD), known as Yellow Shirts, on the other, continued on a violent level.

Anti-government protests in Bangkok, mostly organized through social media, took place every Sunday in June. The largest demonstration took place at the Ratchaprasong intersection on June 21, with 3,000 protesters and 600 policemen. On November 1, the Lower House passed a bill granting amnesty to those involved in the 2006 coup and its aftermath. The bill also allowed Prime Minister Thaksin Sinawatra, who was ousted in the coup, to return to the country without facing charges. Three days later, around 32,000 people protested against the bill in Bangkok, a further 17,000 in other provinces. Moreover, around 1,000 public servants protested in front of the government complex on Chaeng Wattana Road on November 6. Four days later, around 5,000 UDD members rallied in support of PTP in Nonthaburi province, part of the greater Bangkok Metropolitan Area. Although the Senate rejected the amnesty bill on November 11, the protests continued until the end of the year. On November 24, around 10,000 PAD supporters protested in the capital.

On December 1, protests escalated when around 30,000 people gathered at several places in Bangkok's city center, such as the Government House, television stations, and police headquarters. They demanded the resignation of PM Yingluck Sinawatra, PTP. At least four people died during the protests, two of them killed in a clash between PAD and UDD supporters. Approx. 100 were injured. Protesters threw stones whereas police fired rubber bullets and teargas. PAD leader and former deputy prime minister Suthep Thaugsuban

called for a general strike on the following day. On December 3, the government opened the barriers to the premises of the Government House for the protesters. On the King's birthday two days later, protests stopped temporarily. On December 8, the oppositional Democrat Party pulled out of the parliament to protest against the PTP government. On December 9, PM Yingluck Sinawatra announced the dissolution of the parliament and new elections. However, PAD rejected elections under the present constitution and demanded the appointment of an unelected caretaker government to oversee major constitutional reforms. The government refused to step down. The same day, around 150,000 PAD supporters took to the streets. On December 26, one policeman reportedly died in a clash with anti-government protesters. the

UZBEKISTAN – TAJIKISTAN, KYRGYZSTAN

Intensity: **1** | Change:  | Start: **2010**

Conflict parties: Uzbekistan vs. Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan
 Conflict items: international power, resources

The conflict over water resources and international power between Uzbekistan on the one side, and Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan on the other, de-escalated. The conflict revolved around the controversial Rogun Dam hydropower plant (HPP) project on the Vakhsh River in southern Tajikistan, and Kambarata-1 project with Narynski HPP cascade on the Naryn River in Jalal-Abad province, southwestern Kyrgyzstan. The Tajik and Kyrgyz governments claimed that hydropower projects were essential for the countries to overcome energy shortages, while the Uzbek government was concerned that dam projects could reduce flows from the two major transnational rivers in the region, threatening its water supply and cotton

industry. In addition, Uzbekistan criticized the projects, stating that the area showed high seismic activity that posed a threat to the stability of the dams and thereby to the country. In 2012, Uzbek President Islam Karimov had warned of possible wars over water resources in the region. In the annual negotiation over energy supplies in December 2012, the parties failed to agree on future gas prizes. Subsequently, on January 1, Uzbekistan cut off gas shipments to Tajikistan. Upon Uzbekistan's request, the World Bank financed the Techno-Economic Assessment Study (TEAS) as well as the Water Economics and Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) for the planned Rogun Dam. First reports were published on February 10, and discussed on the Third and Fourth Riparian Consultation and Information Sharing Sessions in the following two days in Almaty, Kazakhstan, and on October 17 to 20 in Tajikistan's capital Dushanbe. During the period of investigations Tajikistan stopped the project, waiting for the final international validation. On August 20 and 21, the UN High-Level International Conference on Water Cooperation took place in Dushanbe, aiming at identifying certain aspects of effective water-sharing agreements on a transboundary level, especially in Central Asia. As of September 2012, the Kyrgyz Kambarata-1 project was mainly funded by Russia. On August 22, the Kyrgyz Ministry of Energy and Industry announced that drilling for the proposed 1,900 MW Kambarata-1 had begun. On the fourth EU-Central Asia conference on environmental protection and water resources on February 14, EU Special Representative for Central Asia Patricia Flor expressed her support for an independent report by an international organization on the effects of the Kyrgyz dam. Picking up the idea on September 27, Uzbekistan's Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdulaziz Kamilov addressed the issue of water cooperation at the General Debates of the 68th Session of the UN General Assembly. He pointed out that Uzbekistan was very concerned over Kambarata-1 and wished for a fair international expert examination under auspices of the UNste

THE MIDDLE EAST AND MAGHREB

REGIONAL PANORAMA

With a total of 71, the overall number of conflicts in the Middle East and Maghreb increased slightly. As in previous years, about two thirds of the conflicts in the region concerned ideology or the orientation of the political system. System/ideology was a conflict item in ten out of twelve highly violent conflicts. One third of the region's conflicts concerned national power. Further conflicts regarding territory or international power were characterized by lower intensities. The overall number of highly violent conflicts increased from nine in 2012 to twelve this year. While last year five wars were counted, the number rose to six this year, thus nearly one third of the wars worldwide were fought in the region.

The war between opposition groups and the Syrian government continued. Moreover, a new violent conflict erupted within the opposition, leading to increased clashes between Islamists and the Free Syrian Army (FSA) [-Syria (inter-opposition violence)]. Clashes between Islamists, FSA, and the Kurdish Popular Protection Unit (YPG) escalated to a war [-Syria (NC, Islamist groups – KSC / Kurdish regions)]. The UN and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons investigated the use of sarin gas. The Syrian government later agreed on the eradication of its chemical weapons arsenal, starting in the last quarter of 2013. Since the beginning of the civil war, at least 125,000 people have been killed.



Violence frequently spilled over into neighboring countries. In order to protect Turkey's airspace, NATO stationed patriot missiles. Still, the year was marked by several cross-border incidents, for instance Turkish forces downed a Syrian helicopter in September [-> Syria – Turkey]. In North Lebanon, clashes between opponents and supporters of the Syrian government continued. Moreover, Sunni Islamists increasingly targeted Hezbollah strongholds in Beirut [-Lebanon (March 14 Alliance – March 8 Alliance)]. Israel attacked convoys within Syria and responded to the firing of grenades and bullets from Syrian territory towards the Golan Heights [-> Syria – Israel].

The civil war in Syria also spilled over to Iraq, where the war between Sunni militant groups and the government continued. On March 4, Syrian soldiers crossed into Iraq seeking refuge and were escorted back to Syria by Iraqi forces. Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) ambushed the convoy, killing at least 48 Syrian and nine Iraqi soldiers. The number of Sunni militant attacks increased significantly, resulting in rising casualties among civilians and security forces. The government conducted large-scale military operations and executed more than 130 people on terrorism charges[- Iraq (Sunni militant groups)]. The conflict between the Sunni opposition and the government, which had begun in December 2012, remained violent [-Iraq (Sunni opposition)]. Sunnis took to the streets due to their perceived political marginalization by the Shiite-dominated government. The conflict culminated in April, when government forces cleared a protest camp in Hawija, Kirkuk. About 50 people were killed and around 100 injured. The conflict between the Kurdistan Regional Government and the government decreased to a dispute [-> Iraq (Kurdistan Regional Government)].

In Turkey, the former war between the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and the government over autonomy de-escalated to a limited war. A roadmap for a peace process was brokered between PKK leader Öcalan and the government and implemented in May. However, in September, stating that their demands had not been met, PKK fighters stopped their agreed withdrawal and clashes continued [-> Turkey (PKK)]. Moreover, a new opposition conflict erupted with nationwide protests in May after police forces had violently dispersed groups of demonstrators in Istanbul. Throughout the year, protesters demanded the government to resign [-> Turkey (opposition movement)].

The opposition conflict in Egypt escalated from a violent crisis in 2012 to a war. On July 3, President Muhammad Mursi was ousted by the military, following weeks of protests. Subsequent clashes between pro- and anti-Mursi protesters and security forces reached their peak in August. By the end of November, the constitutional committee issued a draft of the constitution and a referendum was scheduled for January 2014. Tensions increased in the Sinai Peninsula after the ousting, with growing Islamist militant activities and large-scale military operations [-Egypt (Islamist groups / Sinai Peninsula)]. Furthermore, several Islamist groups sporadically launched rockets from within the peninsula at southern Israel [-Israel (Hamas et al. / Palestinian Territories)]. The violent crisis between the Palestinian National Authority and the Israeli government continued. In July, a new round of peace talks was held in Washington.

In Libya, the limited war between opposition groups ranging from groups represented in the General National Congress,



THE MIDDLE EAST AND MAGHREB

militias formally integrated into the security apparatus, militant groups, as well as protesters on the one side, and the government on the other, continued. The government attempted to gain authority and was itself supported by armed groups. The autonomy conflict over the region of Cyrenaica between federalist groups and the government de-escalated to a non-violent crisis. The conflict between several tribes, militias, and armed groups, as well as within the respective factions, also de-escalated by one level of intensity, but remained violent [→Libya (inter-factional violence)].

In Tunisia, the assassination of the two opposition leaders Chokri Belaid and Muhammad Brahmi caused mass protests [→ Tunisia (opposition groups)]. Further opposition conflicts in Algeria, Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, and Oman continued on the same levels as last year, while the intensity of opposition conflicts in Iran, Morocco, as well as in Saudi Arabia decreased.

Additionally, the opposition conflict in Yemen continued. However, by holding the National Dialogue Conference, the government made efforts to resolve its differences with the opposition, with southern secessionists, and with the Shiite al-Houthi movement. Despite those efforts, seven violent conflicts within the country persisted. The conflict between al-Houthi rebels and Sunni tribal forces escalated to a limited war. In another conflict in central Yemen, tribal attacks on oil and electricity infrastructure increased [→Yemen (tribes / Marib)]. The conflict between al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQAP) and Ansar al-Sharia, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, remained on the level of a war. By bombing the Ministry of Defense in December, AQAP demonstrated its ability to conduct large-scale attacks even in the capital Sanaa. In North Africa, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) operated alongside further militant groups and offshoots. In Algeria, the conflict between AQIM and affiliated groups and the government continued. In January, the attack on the oil field in In Amenas, conducted by an AQIM offshoot called Blood Signatories, showed direct links to the war in Mali. Militant groups were increasingly able to operate across borders.

In Tunisia, fighting between AQIM as well as affiliated militants and the government escalated to a limited war. Especially in Kasserine governorate near the border with Algeria, government troops conducted large-scale operations against militant Islamists. The intrastate conflicts between the governments of Morocco and Mauritania and AQIM remained on or declined to a non-violent level this year.

In Afghanistan, the war between the Taliban, the Haqqani network, and other militant groups, on the one hand, and the government supported by foreign troops, on the other, continued. The number of civilian casualties rose. Most civilians were killed in militant activities, especially in suicide and IED attacks. The fatalities among foreign troops further decreased. Combat lead was transferred from NATO to the responsibility of Afghan security forces. As agreed in 2012, the Taliban opened a negotiation office in Doha, Qatar.

Another conflict gained worldwide attention due to efforts of conflict resolution. The non-violent crisis concerning Iran's nuclear program between Iran, on the one hand, and the USA and EU, on the other, continued. However, on November 24, an interim agreement was reached in talks between Iran and the P5+1/EU3+3 group, including the US, UK, France, Russia, China, and Germany. The implementation of the agreement remained pending by the end of the period of observation, but the consensus already marked progress after years of failed negotiations. Nevertheless, the agreement which allows Iran the enrichment of uranium up to a 5 percent level for civil purposes, was criticized by Israel [→Iran – Israel]. (yal, et, ema, flr, sul)

Overview: Conflicts in the Middle East and Maghreb in 2013

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
Afghanistan (Kuchi nomads – Hazara)	Kuchi nomads vs. Hazara	subnational predominance, resources	2007	↘	2
Afghanistan (Taliban et al.)	Taliban, Haqqani Network, al-Qaeda, Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, militant groups vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1994	•	5
Afghanistan – Pakistan*	Afghanistan vs. Pakistan	territory, other	1947	•	3
Algeria (AQIM et al.)	AQIM, MUJAO, al-Mourabitoun, Blood Signatories vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1989	•	4
Algeria (Berbers / Kabylia)*	Berbers vs. government	autonomy, system/ideology	1963	↗	2
Algeria (opposition groups)*	opposition groups vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2011	•	3
Bahrain (opposition groups)	opposition groups vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1975	•	3
Egypt (Bedouin activists)*	Bedouin activists vs. government	other	2004	↘	2
Egypt (Islamist groups / Sinai Peninsula)	Islamist groups vs. government	secession, system/ideology	1992	↗	4
Egypt (Muslims – Christians)	Muslims vs. Christians	subnational predominance	1952	•	3
Egypt (opposition groups)	opposition vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1954	↑	5
Egypt – Sudan*	Egypt vs. Sudan	territory	1958	•	1
Iran (Jundallah et al. / Sistan-Balochistan)*	Jundallah, Jaish al-Adl, Haraqat Ansar Islam, Sunni militant groups vs. government	autonomy, system/ideology	1979	•	3
Iran (opposition)	opposition vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1993	↘	2

THE MIDDLE EAST AND MAGHREB

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
Iran (People's Mujahideen)*	People's Mujahideen vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1965	•	1
Iran (PJAK / Kurdish areas)	PJAK vs. government	autonomy	1979	•	3
Iran – Israel*	Iran vs. Israel	system/ideology, international power	1979	•	2
Iran – UAE*	Iran vs. UAE	territory	1970	•	1
Iran – USA, EU (nuclear program)	Iran vs. EU, USA	international power	1979	•	2
Iraq (al-Sadr group, Shiite militant groups)*	al-Sadr group, Kata'ib Hezbollah, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, Promised Day Brigades, al-Mukhtar Army vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2004	↗	3
Iraq (KRG – opposition movement)*	KRG vs. opposition movement	system/ideology, subnational predominance	2011	•	1
Iraq (Kurdistan Regional Government)	KRG vs. government	autonomy, resources	2005	↓	1
Iraq (opposition movement)*	opposition movement vs. government	system/ideology	2011	•	3
Iraq (Sunni militant groups)	Ansar al-Islam, AQI, ISIS, Sunni militant groups vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2003	•	5
Iraq (Sunni opposition)	Sunni opposition vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2012	•	3
Iraq – Iran*	Iraq vs. Iran	territory	1969	•	1
Iraq – Kuwait*	Iraq vs. Kuwait	territory, resources	1961	•	1
Israel (al-Fatah – Hamas)*	al-Fatah vs. Hamas	system/ideology, subnational predominance	1994	•	1
Israel (Hamas et al. / Palestinian Territories)	Hamas, PIJ, PRC vs. government	secession, system/ideology	1988	↘	3
Israel (Hamas – Salafist groups)*	Hamas vs. Salafist groups	system/ideology	2007	•	2
Israel (Hezbollah)*	Hezbollah vs. Israel	system/ideology	1982	↗	3
Israel (PNA / Palestinian Territories)	Palestinian National Authority vs. government	secession, system/ideology, resources	1948	•	3
Israel – Lebanon*	Israel vs. Lebanon	territory	1948	↗	3
Jordan (Hamas)*	Hamas vs. government	system/ideology	1994	•	1
Jordan (opposition groups)	opposition groups vs. government	system/ideology	2011	•	3
Kuwait (Bedouns)*	Bedouns vs. government	other	1960	•	3
Kuwait (opposition movement)	opposition movement vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2012	•	3
Lebanon (Fatah al-Islam et al. – Fatah)*	Fatah al-Islam, Palestinian Islamist groups vs. Fatah	subnational predominance	2007	•	3
Lebanon (Fatah al-Islam et al.)*	Fatah al-Islam, Islamist groups vs. government	system/ideology	2006	↑	3
Lebanon (March 14 Alliance – March 8 Alliance)	March 14 Alliance vs. March 8 Alliance	system/ideology, national power	1975	•	3
Libya (Federalists / Cyrenaica)*	Cyrenaica Transitional Council (renamed in Council of Cyrenaica in Libya in October), other federalists, Political Bureau of Cyrenaica vs. government	autonomy, system/ideology	2012	↘	2
Libya (inter-factional violence)	Awlad Suleiman tribe vs. Zwai tribe vs. Tibu tribe vs. al-Shourafa Arab tribe vs. Gontrar tribe vs. Wershifana tribe vs. Mashasha tribe vs. Garamna tribe vs. Ethnic Arab settlements et al.	subnational predominance, resources	2012	↘	3
Libya (opposition groups)	opposition groups vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2011	•	4
Mauritania (AQIM)*	AQIM vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2007	↘	2
Morocco (AQIM)*	AQIM vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2003	•	2
Morocco (opposition movement)*	February 20 Movement vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2011	↘	2
Morocco (POLISARIO / Western Sahara)	POLISARIO vs. government	secession	1975	↗	3
Oman (opposition movement)*	opposition movement vs. government	system/ideology	2011	•	1

THE MIDDLE EAST AND MAGHREB

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
Saudi Arabia (al-Houthi rebels)*	al-Houthi rebels vs. government	subnational predominance	2009	↘	1
Saudi Arabia (AQAP)*	AQAP vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1990	↘	2
Saudi Arabia (opposition movement)*	opposition movement vs. government	system/ideology	1990	↓	1
Saudi Arabia (Shiites)	Shiites vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1979	•	3
Syria (inter-opposition violence)	ISIS vs. al-Nusra Front vs. Islamic Front vs. Islamist groups vs. NC	system/ideology	2013	NEW	3
Syria (Kurdish groups)*	KDPS, PYD vs. government	autonomy, subnational predominance	1962	•	3
Syria (NC, Islamist groups – KSC / Kurdish regions)	NC, Islamist groups vs. KSC	subnational predominance, resources	2012	↑	5
Syria (opposition groups)	NC, FSA, ISIS, Islamic Front, al-Nusra Front et al. vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2011	•	5
Syria – Israel*	Syria vs. Israel	territory, international power, resources	1948	•	3
Syria – Turkey	Syria vs. Turkey	territory, international power	1946	•	3
Syria – USA	Syria vs. USA	system/ideology, international power	2003	•	2
Tunisia (AQIM et al.)	AQIM, various militant groups vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2011	↗	4
Tunisia (opposition groups)	opposition groups vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2010	•	3
Turkey (opposition movement)	opposition movement vs. government	system/ideology	2013	NEW	3
Turkey (PKK / Kurdish areas)	PKK vs. government	autonomy	1974	↘	4
Turkey – Iraq*	Turkey vs. Iraq	international power	1979	•	2
Yemen (al-Houthi rebels – Sunni tribal forces)	al-Houthi rebels vs. Sunni tribal forces	system/ideology, subnational predominance	2011	↗	4
Yemen (al-Houthi rebels)*	al-Houthi rebels vs. government	system/ideology, subnational predominance	2004	•	3
Yemen (AQAP – al-Houthi rebels)*	AQAP vs. al-Houthi rebels	system/ideology	2010	•	3
Yemen (AQAP, Ansar al-Sharia)	AQAP, Ansar al-Sharia vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1992	•	5
Yemen (opposition groups)	opposition groups vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2011	•	3
Yemen (SMM / South Yemen)*	SMM vs. government	secession	2009	•	3
Yemen (tribes / Marib)	militant tribesmen vs. government	autonomy, system/ideology	2012	•	3


^{1 2 3 4} cf. overview table for Europe

Please note: The intensity of each conflict as shown in the tables is the highest intensity reached in the course of the year. Therefore, conflicts may, for instance, be classified as limited wars although there may have been no more fighting in the second half of the year.

If a conflict revolves around a territory whose name is disputed by the conflict parties, both variations will be named, separated by an "/" [e.g. Japan – China (Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands); Argentina – UK (Falkland Islands/Islands Malvinas)]. If, in contrast, the conflict actors strive for subnational predominance, secession, or autonomy of or in a certain region, the region is separated from the actors by " / " [e.g. France (FLNC / Corsica); Myanmar (KIA, KIO / Kachin State)].

SELECTED CONFLICT DESCRIPTIONS


AFGHANISTAN (KUCHI NOMADS – HAZARA)

Intensity: **2** | Change:  | Start: **2007**


Conflict parties: Kuchi nomads vs. Hazara
 Conflict items: subnational predominance, re-sources

The conflict between Kuchi nomads and Shiite Hazara concerning subnational predominance and resources continued. The Pashtun and Sunni Kuchi nomads claimed pastures in the Hazarajat area where Shiite Hazara had settled. On April 4, a government delegation arrived in Wardak province in order to negotiate a settlement of the conflict over grazing land. President Hamid Karzai’s Advisor on Tribal Affairs, Asadullah Wafa, met with members of both conflict parties as well as provincial officials to find a solution to the conflict. mku

AFGHANISTAN (TALIBAN ET AL.)

Intensity: **5** | Change:  | Start: **1994**

Conflict parties: Taliban, Haqqani Network, al-Qaeda, Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, militant groups vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology, national power



The war over national power and the orientation of the political system between the Taliban, the Haqqani network, the Hezb-e-Islami, and various other militant groups on the one hand, and the government supported by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and other US troops, on the other, continued.

As agreed in 2012, the Taliban opened an office in Doha, Qatar, in June this year in order to negotiate with Afghan representatives and international actors. Negotiations between the government and its allies focused on plans regarding the post-2014 phase, when NATO combat troops would have withdrawn. Foreign governments stated they would provide units for training and advising matters after the withdrawal of combat units. The ISAF troop contingency further decreased and consisted of around 60,000 troops by the end of 2013. By the end of 2013, a compromise between the government and the USA regarding a bilateral security agreement could not be reached.

The number of civilian casualties rose compared to the previous year. According to UN figures, from January to October 2,568 civilians were killed, which marks an increase of thirteen percent compared to the same time span last year. President Hamid Karzai repeatedly condemned militants and foreign troops for killing civilians. Furthermore, UN registered an increased number of civilians killed in clashes between

security forces and militants. However, as in previous years, most civilians were killed in suicide attacks or in assaults with improvised explosive devices (IEDs). For instance, the most fatal attack of the year was carried out by Taliban suicide bombers and gunmen on a courthouse in Farah, Farah province, on April 4. Up to 54 people, including assailants, security personnel, and civilians were killed, and around 100 were injured. On October 27, eighteen civilians died in a roadside bomb attack in Andar district, Ghazni province.

At the beginning of the year, the Taliban announced a spring offensive. In May and June, the capital Kabul was the target of high-profile militant attacks. On May 24, six Taliban fighters assaulted a building used by the International Organisation for Migration, which collaborates with the UN in Afghanistan. Hundreds of policemen were sent to subdue the attackers armed with bombs, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and machine guns. Four people were killed and another thirteen injured in the attack. On June 10, two suicide bombers and five gunmen armed with RPGs attacked the Kabul International Airport. A police rapid reaction force was deployed, killing all involved militants in a four-hour gun battle. Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack. The next day, a suicide bomber killed at least seventeen and injured another 40 when he attacked a bus with Supreme Court employees. Two weeks later, suicide bombers and gunmen infiltrated Kabul’s government zone, using fake documents and launched an attack near the presidential palace. Four attackers and three security forces were allegedly killed. Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack, whereas Afghan officials blamed it on the Haqqani network.

Security institutions were in the center of militant activities. Militants frequently attacked security checkpoints and police posts throughout the country. In addition, militants assassinated high-ranking officials and targeted public buildings. For example, on April 6, two gunmen fatally shot Mirza Ali, a member of the High Peace Council and head of the Paktia tribal council, in Kunduz, Kunduz province. At the beginning of August, officials reported that a large number of Taliban besieged the home of a tribal elder and ambushed security personnel in Sherzad district, Nangarhar province. An hours-long gun battle ensued between army, security forces, and militants. According to officials, around 100 were killed, including civilians, militants, and security forces. In the same province, suicide bombers and gunmen assaulted the Indian consulate in Jalalabad, killing approx. eight and injuring another 21 on August 3. The next day, Taliban suicide bombers and gunmen attacked the compound of Parwan’s province governor, leaving 22 dead and injuring 34. On October 15, the governor of Logar province, Arsala Jamal, was assassinated when a bomb detonated in a mosque during his speech in celebration of the Muslim holiday of Eid al-Adha. The gradual security transition was completed on June 18. Thus, combat lead was transferred from NATO into the responsibility of Afghan forces. Hence, government forces planned and conducted an increasing number of operations. Oftentimes, government and foreign forces cooperated in offensives. Among others, government troops received assistance in operational planning, as well as air support. While the number of fatalities among foreign troops decreased throughout the year to about 160, casualty rates among Afghan security personnel mounted. Especially affected by the conflict were southern and eastern provinces bordering with Pakistan [→Pakistan (Islamist militant groups)]. Officials

stated that army, police, and intelligence forces launched a ground and air offensive in Badakhshan province in March, killing approx. 43 militants. In June, security forces conducted a similar operation in the same province, allegedly leaving 33 militants dead. On April 15, US and Afghan forces reportedly killed approx. 21 militants in Batkot district, Nangarhar. Ghazni province saw fierce fighting between security personnel, ISAF forces, and militants in May. Officials claimed that security and ISAF troops shot dead approx. 25 militants on May 10. Two weeks later, security forces and ISAF troops clashed with militants in Gelan district, leaving at least 22 militants dead. In June, around 70 militants were killed in security operations and airstrikes by Afghan National Army (ANA) forces and ISAF troops in Logar province. Security forces reportedly shelled a Taliban meeting in Shinwari district, Parwan, on June 22, leaving 46 militants dead and another 7 injured. In July, security forces, with NATO air support, carried out an operation in Pashtun Kot district, Faryab province. 35 militants were killed. Authorities claimed that by the end of July, ANA airstrikes and ISAF operations on Taliban posts in Paktia province caused the death of approx. 100 militants. On August 9, a spokesman for the Afghan Ministry of Defense stated that police and ANA had recently concluded an operation in Azra district, Logar, in which 200 militants were killed. In the beginning of October, security forces killed 26 Taliban and injured another 34 when they reconquered a military base in Daikundi province.

ALGERIA (AQIM ET AL.)

Intensity: **4** | Change: • | Start: **1989**

Conflict parties: AQIM, MUJAO, al-Mourabitoun, Blood Signatories vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The conflict over national power and the orientation of the political system between al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), and the Blood Signatories on the one side and the government on the other continued on a highly violent level. On August 22, Mokhtar Belmokhtar declared the formation of the joint movement al-Mourabitoun, consisting of MUJAO and Katibat al-Mulathamini. The latter, also called Masked Brigade, was reportedly led by Belmokhtar. He was also known as leader of the Blood Signatories. However, it remained unclear as to whether or not the names Masked Brigade and Blood Signatories both referred to the same group [→ Mali (Islamist groups)]. Over the course of the year, the conflict claimed approx. 240 lives, including militants and security forces as well as civilians.

In the Sahara-Sahel area militant groups operated across borders. This year's most fatal assault lasted from January 16 to January 18, when 32 members of Blood Signatories attacked a gas field near In Amenas, Illizi province, following the French intervention in Mali. Algeria had allowed French warplanes to cross Algerian airspace. The militants took control of the entire oil field and took at least 850 hostages, most of whom escaped. Blood Signatories draped remaining hostages with explosives and the area was mined. On January 17, the government launched counterstrikes by air and land, regaining the oil field on January 18. A total of 29 militants and at least 48 civilians were either assassinated or killed during the operation. On April 13 and on August 31, government troops operating by helicopter from Adrar province chased

and killed twelve Islamist militants, who attempted to enter Mali and Mauritania [→ Mauritania (AQIM)]. On October 26, security forces discovered a weapons cache in Illizi, including surface-to-air missiles and explosives, smuggled from Libya. In November and December, fifteen AQIM militants were killed in three separate operations near the Malian border. However, the conflict in Algeria was not limited to the south of the country. From the beginning, several northeastern provinces were affected as well. On February 6, approx. 50 militants attacked army barracks in Khenchela province. The three-hour-long gunfight left two militants dead. In the first seven months of the year, smaller operations and clashes between security personnel and AQIM members in the provinces Batna, Bouira, Bourmedes, Chlef, El Oued, Khenchela, Medea, Sidi Bel Abbes, Tipaza, Tissemsilt and Tizi Ouzou left approx. 70 militants and thirteen security personnel dead. A large military operation was conducted on July 7 and 8, when the air force bombarded targets in the provinces Bouira and Bordj Bou Arreridj, leaving seven AQIM members dead. Moreover, in coordination with military operations in Tunisia, the government deployed 6,000 to 10,000 soldiers to protect the shared border [→ Tunisia (AQIM et al.)]. In mid-August, government forces attacked militants in Tebessa province near the border with Tunisia, killing an unspecified number of individuals. Ambushes and smaller clashes in August left six dead on each side in the provinces of Batna, Bouria, Boumerdes, and Tizi Ouzou. From September to December, a total of fifteen AQIM-affiliated militants were killed in the provinces of Bejaia, Bordj Bou Arreridj, Bouria, Boumerdes, Constantine, Tebessa and Tizi Ouzou.

Throughout the year, at least 22 roadside bombs planted near military facilities exploded or were discovered across multiple districts, killing ten people and injuring 23.

BAHRAIN (OPPOSITION GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1975**

Conflict parties: opposition groups vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The conflict over the orientation of the political system and national power between opposition groups and the Sunni government continued. The majority of the population as well as the protesters were comprised of Shiite Muslims. Every month, protesters took to the streets all over the country, demanding the release of prisoners, democratic reforms, and the end of the monarchy. In clashes throughout the year, security forces killed three protesters and injured around 80, while some 200 were arrested. Oftentimes, they used teargas and stun grenades. Approx. 60 police officers were injured and two killed due to protesters throwing stones, Molotov cocktails, and self-made bombs. Furthermore, courts convicted about 200 demonstrators to prison terms.

Talks resumed between Shiite opposition groups and the government on February 10. However, protests continued leading up to the two-year anniversary of the uprising on February 14. Thousands of protesters staged demonstrations in the capital Manama and several Shiite villages, which were dissolved as a result of riot police firing teargas and stun grenades. One protester and one police officer died in the process. In April, tensions increased prior to the upcoming Formula One Grand Prix. The government conducted night-time raids arresting twenty anti-government activists around Sakhir circuit on April 10. On July 29, King Hamad bin

Isa al-Khalifa called for tougher measures against Shiite-led protests. Three days later, King Hamad expanded the possibility for the government to withdraw citizenship. On September 4, the government introduced a statute requiring its approval for political groups when meeting with appointees from abroad. Two weeks later, the opposition groups quit their participation in further talks with the government.

EGYPT (ISLAMIST GROUPS / SINAI PENINSULA)

Intensity: **4** | Change: **↗** | Start: **1992**

Conflict parties: Islamist groups vs. government
 Conflict items: secession, system/ideology

The secession and ideology conflict between militant Islamist groups in the Sinai Peninsula on the one hand, and the government, supported by Israel, on the other, escalated to a limited war. Violence occurred mostly in North Sinai governorate, with only sporadic attacks during the first half of the year. For instance, on January 11, Islamist militants attacked four police vehicles protecting a pipeline that had been previously attacked several times near the border to Israel. Following the kidnapping of seven policemen and increasing pressure from security forces to take action, President Muhammad Mursi deployed tanks and helicopters as reinforcement into the Sinai on May 20. With the ousting of Mursi on July 3, Islamist militants staged deadly attacks on a daily basis followed by intensive military counter-operations [→ Egypt (opposition groups)]. In July, clashes between security forces and Islamist militants left twenty soldiers, 25 Islamists, and eleven civilians dead. For example, militants using a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG), allegedly targeting a police vehicle, hit a bus instead, killing three and injuring sixteen civilians on July 15. Following Islamist attacks in Arish and Sheikh Zuweid, North Sinai, the military launched operation “Desert Storm”, deploying up to 22,000 soldiers, including special parachute forces and troops of the Second Field Army, backed by the navy and the air force. Airstrikes left four members of the Islamist group Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis dead on August 9. On August 10, the army stormed a militant hideout, killing one and injuring 25. The next day a helicopter attack in Sheikh Zuweid killed another twelve militants. On August 16, militants and security forces clashed for about eight hours in Arish, killing six and injuring nineteen. Militants attacked two police vehicles on a road to Rafah, killing 25 and injuring two, on August 19. The army attacked three houses in Muqata’a and Touma with helicopters, killing eight and wounding fifteen militants on September 3. Two days later, a suicide car bomb exploded, targeting the convoy of Interior Minister Muhammad Ibrahim, killing two bystanders and wounding twenty in the capital Cairo. The minister was not harmed in the attack claimed by Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis. On September 11, suicide bombers of the militant group Jund al-Islam killed six soldiers in two separate attacks in Rafah, North Sinai. The only incident that took place in South Sinai this year was a militant car bomb attack in al-Tour that killed three policemen and injured 47 people on October 7. On November 1, the army arrested the leader of the Islamist group al-Takfir wa-l-Hijra in al-Kharouba, North Sinai, along with 34 other militants all over Sinai. Five days later, the army killed three Islamists, seized a number of weapons, and destroyed 61 houses in an operation in Arish. On November 17, members of Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis shot dead Interior Ministry lieutenant colonel Muhammad Mabruk in Cairo. On

November 20, two suicide bombers drove a car loaded with explosives into a convoy of four buses on the Rafah-Arish road, killing eleven soldiers and injuring 37. In December, the army killed Abu Eita, a leader of Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, and two other key members of the group. On December 24, a car bomb detonated in the city of Mansoura, Dakhalia, killing sixteen and injuring about 140. Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis claimed responsibility. However, the government blamed the Muslim Brotherhood for the bombings [→Egypt (opposition groups)].
asm

EGYPT (MUSLIMS – CHRISTIANS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **1952**

Conflict parties: Muslims vs. Christians
 Conflict items: subnational predominance

The violent crisis over subnational predominance between Muslims and Coptic Christians continued. Coptic Christians, the largest non-Muslim minority, repeatedly claimed they faced discriminatory government policies as well as political and economic marginalization. Police forces intervened several times in the recurring religious violence, arresting scores of involved persons, while at other times reportedly remaining idle. Copts blamed the government for not providing them with enough security.

On January 19, following claims that a Coptic man had sexually assaulted a Muslim child, several thousand Muslims looted and torched Coptic houses, shops, and demolished a church in the predominantly Christian city of Marashda, Qena governorate. Subsequently, police fired teargas at a crowd of approx. 2,000 Muslims who tried to prevent the police from arresting the suspected assailants. On February 15, a crowd of Salafists set fire to the church of St. Georgas in Sarsena, Faiyum governorate, without intervention by nearby police forces. On March 19, hundreds of Muslims in the southern city of al-Wasta, Asyut governorate, damaged several Christian-owned shops following kidnapping accusations. On April 6, a Muslim and four Christians died during violent clashes following claims that Christians had painted provocations on the wall of a Muslim al-Azhar institute in Khosous, Qalyubiyya governorate. Violence continued three days later when a Muslim crowd threw stones and Molotov cocktails at Christians after a mass funeral of the four Christians who died in the previous clash. Two persons were killed and over 80 injured. In July, at least five Christians, including one priest, were killed in Northern Sinai and Luxor governorate together with one Muslim when several shops and churches came under attack.


Starting on August 14 and lasting several days, Muslim rioters attacked and torched about 40 churches as well as other Christian property across the governorates of Asyut, Bani Suef, Fayum, Giza, Minya, North Sinai, Sohag, and Suez. At least four people died in the attacks which came immediately after police and military had dispersed sit-ins in support of former president Muhammad Mursi in the capital Cairo and Giza [→Egypt (opposition groups)]. On September 29, security forces arrested seventeen people after Muslims had assaulted and torched Christian-owned houses in Ezbet Zarakryia, Minya governorate, the day before. Gunmen fired at a wedding outside a Coptic church in Cairo on October 21, killing four and injuring at least seventeen. Assaults continued in Minya governorate on November 28. In one such case, three people died in clashes following claims that a Coptic

man intended to build a church in al-Hawarteh villageskb

EGYPT (OPPOSITION GROUPS)

Intensity: 5 | Change: ↑ | Start: 1954

Conflict parties: opposition vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology, national power



The violent crisis over national power and the orientation of the political system between several opposition groups and the government escalated to a war. After the ousting of President Muhammad Mursi on July 3, led by army chief General Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi, the head of the Supreme Constitutional Court Adly Mahmud Mansour took over power as interim president. Thus, former ruling Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), along with the affiliated Muslim Brotherhood (MB), returned to opposition.

Accusing Mursi of betraying the 2011 revolution, specifically regarding the drafting process of the constitution, protesters gathered on its second anniversary on January 25 in various cities, including Cairo, Alexandria, Suez, and Port Said, all capitals of eponymous governorates. Protests continued the following days, leaving more than 60 people dead and more than a thousand injured in clashes between police forces, Mursi-supporters, and the opposition. On March 3 and 4, clashes between security forces and thousands of protesters left five people dead and more than 400 injured in the city of Port Said. Protesters threw stones and firebombs and torched the security headquarters, while police forces fired birdshot and teargas to disperse the crowd. Ordering the review of the electoral law on March 6, the Cairo Administrative Court suspended the parliamentary elections scheduled for April 27. On March 22, members of the MB and protesters clashed in cities across the country. Protesters threw stones and ransacked offices of the MB in Cairo and Alexandria and torched the MB office in al-Mahalla, Gharbia governorate. Riot police fired teargas to disperse the fighting groups. Supporters and opponents of President Mursi repeatedly clashed during mass demonstrations across the country, initiated by opposition movement Tamarud at the end of June, in the days leading up to the anniversary of Mursi’s inauguration. The movement claimed to have collected up to fifteen million signatures for a petition demanding Mursi’s resignation. Clashes erupted in Cairo’s Tahrir Square as well as in several other cities, resulting in the death of at least ten people. Hundreds of thousands took part in the protests, with some of them throwing petrol bombs and stones, ransacking, and torching several MB offices.

On July 3, the military ousted President Mursi after having imposed an ultimatum on him to resign within 48 hours. Subsequently, pro-Mursi protesters took to the streets demanding Mursi’s reinstatement. On July 8, clashes between security forces and pro-Mursi protesters during a sit-in in Cairo left at least 80 people dead including one army officer and hundreds of others wounded. According to the army, protesters threw Molotov cocktails and bricks and used live ammunition and petrol bombs. Security forces fired teargas and guns. In one of many arrests of MB members since Mursi’s

ousting, police arrested MB leader Muhammad Badie and nine other senior members on July 10. A new interim government was sworn in on July 16, with Hazem el-Beblawi as prime minister and al-Sisi as deputy prime minister. The following days, tens of thousands of Mursi supporters protested in Cairo, Alexandria, Port Said, Mansoura in Dakahlia governorate, and Kafr el-Zayat in Gharbia governorate. Security forces and protesters engaged in gunfights, causing the death of over 100 Mursi supporters and one soldier.

The conflict escalated in August with an army crackdown on protest camps in Cairo’s Nahda and Rabaa al-Adawiya squares on August 14, and further clashes in governorates across the country in the following days. The clashes resulted in approx. 1,000 fatalities, including 43 police officers. However, estimates on the death tolls varied significantly. Furthermore, thousands were injured and hundreds arrested. Subsequently, the government declared a month-long state of emergency and a curfew. Protests and clashes continued on a daily basis. On September 23, the Cairo Court for Urgent Matters banned the MB and affiliated groups. In the beginning of October, pro- and anti-Mursi protesters as well as security forces repeatedly clashed in the governorate capitals Cairo, Suez, Alexandria, Bani Suef, and Ismailia, as well as in Delga, Minya Governorate, leaving a total of 57 demonstrators dead and hundreds wounded. On November 4, the trial against Mursi began in Cairo, with Mursi supporters staging demonstrations outside the court. Judges adjourned the trial until January 2014. On November 12, government authorities lifted the state of emergency and the night-time curfew. On the second anniversary of the Muhammad Mahmoud battle, protesters gathered in Tahrir square on November 18 and 19. Anti-military and anti-MB protesters clashed with government supporters and security forces, leaving two people dead. Having revised several parts of the constitution, the constituent assembly, which included only two members of Islamist parties, agreed on a draft on November 30. The document contained, among others, an amendment of the voting system as well as an article allowing civilians to be tried in military courts. A referendum was scheduled for January 2014. On December 24, a suicide bomb attack targeted the police headquarters in Mansoura. A Sinai-based Islamist group claimed responsibility for the attack [↔ Egypt (Islamist groups / Sinai Peninsula)]. On December 25, the government declared the MB a “terrorist group” in a cabinet statement, claiming that they were responsible for the attack. Moreover, cabinet announced the same day that the Central Bank of Egypt had frozen the assets of 1055 NGO’s accused of being affiliated with the MB.sep

IRAN (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: 2 | Change: ↓ | Start: 1993

Conflict parties: opposition vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The conflict between opposition groups and the government de-escalated to a non-violent level. The election of Hassan Rouhani as president on June 14 marked a turning point in the conflict.

Previous to the presidential elections in June the government had restricted freedom of the press and assembly, as well as access to the internet. In early February, security forces arrested seventeen journalists. On February 3, the national chief of police announced the formation of a special

police force to secure the elections in June. Police arrested family members of opposition figures Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karrubi on February 11. UN Human Rights bodies repeatedly expressed their concerns about the wave of arrests. On May 21, the Guardian Council disqualified 90 percent of the candidates from the electoral campaign, including Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, an ally of President Mahmud Ahmadinejad, and former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. Only one opposition-backed candidate was left in the race. Rouhani won the elections with 51 percent in the first round on June 14, sparking celebrations in the streets all over the country. The UN described the elections as neither free nor fair. After his inauguration on August 4, President Rouhani announced the reexamination of Mousavi's and Karrubi's cases and a possible abolition of the social networks' blockade. On September 18, the government released eighteen political prisoners, among them the prominent lawyer Nasrin Sotoudeh. Another 80 political prisoners were released five days later. The coordination council of the Green Movement appreciated the release on September 18, expressing its hopes for political change. However, human rights organizations reported an increase in executions after Rouhani's election and called upon the government to halt them immediately. However, in the beginning of November, more than 80 prisoners entered a hunger strike led by the famous opposition lawyer Abdelfattah Soltani to protest the conditions of their imprisonment.cbr

IRAN (PJAK / KURDISH AREAS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1979**

Conflict parties: PJAK vs. government
 Conflict items: autonomy

The conflict over autonomy in the Kurdish areas of north-western Iran between the Party of Free Life of Kurdistan (PJAK) and the government remained violent. The PJAK was considered to be linked to the Kurdistan Workers' Party [→ Turkey (PKK)]. Throughout the period of observation, the government's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and the PJAK repeatedly clashed. For instance, according to official sources, fights on February 24 between IRGC and PJAK left three IRGC officers dead in northwest Iran, among them a general. In the beginning of April, clashes between PJAK and IRGC left seven IRGC soldiers dead in Maku, West Azerbaijan province. Additionally, on April 15, PJAK attacked IRGC in Kabat, West Azerbaijan, killing two. On May 19, PJAK forces shot dead two members of the IRGC in the city of Jandaran, West Azerbaijan. Hence, according to Kurdish sources, on August 22, seven IRGC officers were killed as well as two PJAK members when the two conflict parties clashed in Sardasht, West Azerbaijan. An IRGC general claimed that IRGC forces shot dead three members of the PJAK in Baneh, Kurdistan, on October 26mpf

IRAN – USA, EU (NUCLEAR PROGRAM)

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **1979**

Conflict parties: Iran vs. EU, USA
 Conflict items: international power

The non-violent crisis over Iran's nuclear program between Iran on the one hand, and the USA and EU on the other, continued. However, the second half of the year was marked by intensified diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict. As in previous years, Iran underlined that its program served civil purposes, while especially Israel suspected Iran of developing nuclear weapons [→Iran – Israel]. The EU and the US announced that they would not accept a nuclear-armed Iran. IAEA reports uncovered increasing uranium enrichment capacities in Iranian facilities.

In January, several naval drills by Iranian maritime forces and Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) were held in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran warned off surveillance planes trying to cover the area. In February, US military announced holding multinational anti-mine exercises in the area in May. 41 nations participated in the two-week "International Mine Counter Measure Exercise" (IMCMEX13).

As in previous years, the first half of the year was not marked by any diplomatic breakthrough, although US and EU announced to ease some economic sanctions if Iran stopped certain nuclear work. Talks between the P5+1/EU3+3 group (US, UK, France, Russia, China and Germany), led by EU's chief diplomat Catherine Ashton, and Iran took place between late February and May. Talks between the IAEA and Iran did not result in consensus either.

On February 21, IAEA reported that Iran had started to install new advanced centrifuges and was driving forward construction on the heavy water reactor in Arak, which would bring up the possibility of producing plutonium. Additionally, Iran announced two days later that it had found uranium deposits. On March 4, the IAEA stated that Iran was uncooperative and that it could not conclude that Iran's nuclear activities were entirely peaceful. On May 3, the US stated that North Korea and Iran had collaborated in order to obtain material for their nuclear programs and accused Iran of sending weapons to Syria [→ North Korea – USA, South Korea, Japan] [→ Syria (opposition groups)]. While the US eased sanctions on the export of mobile phones to Iran on May 29, it imposed further sanctions on June 3, targeting Iran's currency. On June 4, Russia and China also voiced concerns over Iran's nuclear activities. On July 1, further US sanctions targeted the metals trade. US lawmakers from both parties urged the imposition of tighter sanctions on Iran. For instance, "The Nuclear Iran Prevention Act 2013", which aimed at cutting Iran's oil exports, passed the House of Representatives on July 31.

EU and US welcomed the election of President Hassan Rouhani, a former chief nuclear negotiator, on June 14. Rouhani, inaugurated on August 3, announced his commitment to resolve the current crisis and stated that Iran did not seek nuclear arms. Nevertheless, EU and US kept up pressure, demanding concrete steps. On August 28, IAEA stated that Iran had continued to expand its nuclear program. In September, Rouhani and US President Barack Obama exchanged letters. On September 24, first European leader French President Francois Hollande met with Rouhani on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly. Two days later, US Secretary of State John Kerry met with Iran's foreign minister Muhammad


Javad Zarif. On September 27, Obama and Rouhani spoke on the phone, the first direct presidential contact between the two countries since the end of official diplomatic relations in 1979. On October 15 and 16, P5+1/EU3+3 met with Iran in Geneva. On November 3, Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Kahmenei backed Rouhani's course in negotiations. Talks continued from November 7 to 9. However, a deal failed on November 9 as France opposed a draft presented by the other P5+1/EU3+3 members, when French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius allegedly raised concerns over uranium enrichment and the heavy water reactor in Arak. On November 13, Hollande and Obama demanded guarantees that Iran was abandoning its military nuclear program. On November 24, an interim agreement was reached, limiting Iran's nuclear activities in return for an easing of sanctions. Nevertheless, the interim agreement which allows Iran the enrichment of uranium up to a 5 percent level for civil purposes, was criticized by Israel [→ Iran – Israel]. Throughout the second half of the year, the EU and the US government eased several smaller sanctions on Iran and announced further sanctions relief. However, US Congress members continued to discuss further sanctions on Iran, despite the government's opposition. On December 9, Iran stated that the current agreement would be considered void if US Congress continued imposing sanctions. Iran halted talks on the agreement implementation on December 13. Talks continued on December 19^{flr}

IRAQ (SUNNI MILITANT GROUPS)

Intensity: **5** | Change: • | Start: **2003**

Conflict parties: Ansar al-Islam, AQI, ISIS, Sunni militant groups vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power



The war over national power and the orientation of the political system between the al-Qaeda affiliated Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) and other Sunni militant groups on the one hand, and the government supported by the Sahwa militia on the other, continued. Throughout the year, thousands of civilians and up to 1,000 security forces were killed. Sunni militant groups conducted attacks on a nearly daily basis, many of which took place in the provinces of Baghdad, Salah ad Din, Anbar, Ninawa, Diyala, Kirkuk, and Babil. In April, AQI announced their merger with the Syrian al-Nusra Front to a single organization named the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) [→ Syria (opposition groups)].

Throughout the year, militants frequently attacked crowded public places and buildings in predominantly Shiite areas as well as Shiite pilgrims. For instance, on January 23 a suicide bomber killed up to 42 people and injured 75 in a Shiite mosque in Tuz Khurmatu, Salah ad Din. On March 19, more than a dozen car bombs, suicide blasts, roadside bombs, and mortar shells targeted mainly Shiite districts, government buildings, and security personnel across the country. ISI claimed responsibility for the attacks. At least 56 people were killed and about 200 wounded on that day in Baghdad alone. On August 10, when Muslims celebrated the end of Ramadan, ISIS launched a series of bomb attacks, targeting markets, cafes, and restaurants, killing at least 74 people and wounding 300 across the country. On September 4, militants shot dead at least sixteen Shiite family members before blowing up their homes in Babil province. Two suicide bombers killed at least 60 Shiite pilgrims in Baghdad on October 5. On December 25, three car bomb explosions in Christian areas in the capital left at least 34 dead.

In addition, militants targeted political institutions, public figures, and journalists. For instance, on January 15 an ISI suicide bomber killed Efan al-Essawi, a Sunni lawmaker and local head of the Sahwa militia in Falluja, Anbar province. The following day, a suicide bomber in an explosive-packed truck as well as an additional car bomb left some 25 people dead and at least 180 injured near the Kurdistan Democratic Party's local headquarters in Kirkuk. On December 23, several ISIS fighters with explosive vests raided a local government channel in Tikrit, Salah ad Din after having detonated a car bomb, killing at least five employees. Security forces stormed the building and killed seven attackers.

Furthermore, militants attacked government institutions and security forces. For instance, on February 3 a suicide bomber in Kirkuk set off an explosive-packed truck outside a police building. Subsequently, gunmen dressed as police officers stormed the building and engaged in a firefight with the security forces. The assault left 33 dead and more than 90 wounded. The following day, militants also targeted Sahwa

IRAQ (KURDISTAN REGIONAL GOVERNMENT)

Intensity: **1** | Change: ↓ | Start: **2005**

Conflict parties: KRG vs. government

Conflict items: autonomy, resources

The conflict between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the central government over resources and autonomy decreased to a dispute. KRG and the central government disagreed over the distribution of oil revenues, the demarcation of the Kurdish region as well as the extent of its autonomy. For the first time in two years, Iraq's Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki visited the region on June 6 and held talks with KRG President Massoud Barzani.

In mid-February, the central government stated the KRG should receive 12 percent of the national budget, while the KRG demanded 17 percent. On March 7, Iraq's parliament passed the budget notwithstanding protests by Kurdish members of parliament, who withdrew in disagreement. They returned to the assembly on May 6, following an announcement to revise the oil and gas law.

The period of observation was also marked by controversies about security competences between the central government and the KRG in dealing with Sunni militancy [→ Iraq (Sunni militant groups)]. For example, on June 5 Iraq's Interior Ministry issued a statement in which it called upon KRG to withdraw its forces, the Peshmergas, from disputed areas. These areas included the districts of Sulaiman Pek and Tuz Khurmatu. In August, the central government and the KRG agreed to cooperate on security issues.^{vs}

militiamen. A suicide bomber killed at least 22 during a meeting in Taji, Baghdad. On July 21, ISIS fighters attacked two prisons using mortars, rocket-propelled grenades, and car bombs. They freed 500 inmates from Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad, including senior al-Qaeda leaders. Ten policemen and four militants were killed. In the second prison in Taji, guards prevented convicts from escaping. Sixteen soldiers and six militants were killed.

The government executed at least 130 suspected Sunni militants, including local AQI leaders. Additionally, the military carried out operations against Sunni militants. In July, the major security campaign "Avenge the Martyrs" began after the mass jail break-outs. Over 800 militants were arrested. Within the operation, the government deployed thousands of troops and helicopters in Sulaiman Pek, Salah ad Din on August 5. The troops killed eleven militants and arrested dozens. To prevent militants from crossing the Syrian-Iraqi border, military operations were particularly executed alongside the border area [→ Syria (opposition groups)]. For example, at the end of May the military started the air force-backed operation "Ghost", including at least 8,000 troops. On December 21, at least sixteen Iraqi military officers, including Commander Muhammad Ahmed al-Kurwi, were killed in an ambush by Islamist militants in Anbar. The attack was reportedly launched in revenge for a raid by security forces on a Sunni protest camp in April in Hawija [→ Iraq (Sunni opposition)]. Operation "Iron Hammer" started the same day in Anbar. Two days later, the military attacked camps of al-Qaeda-linked groups, using surveillance aircrafts, combat helicopters, and high-precision rockets. According to officials, they destroyed two camps and killed at least twenty militants.

In addition to attacks on Shiites, assaults on Sunnis increased. However, it remained unclear who was responsible for the attacks. ami, sul

anti-government demonstrators were killed and around 50 wounded. On April 23, government forces stormed an anti-government-protesters' camp in the city of Hawija, Kirkuk province. In the ensuing clash, approx. 50 people were killed and 100 injured. Officials stated that Sunni militants took refuge in the protest camp and federated with protesters [→ Iraq (Sunni militant groups)].

However, following the Hawija incident, battles arose in mainly Sunni-inhabited cities, including Ramadi, Fallujah, Mosul and Sulaiman Pek. Sunni militants intermixed with protesters and called upon Sunnis to participate in the fights. All in all, more than 170 people were killed in clashes between government forces, protesters, armed Sunni tribesmen and militants between April 23 and April 27. In late April, a protester announced the creation of a militia consisting of tribesmen called Army of Pride and Dignity in order to protect Sunnis in Anbar.

On December 28, government forces arrested Sunni Member of Parliament (MP) Ahmed al-Alwani in Ramadi, Anbar. A clash between his guards, tribesmen from the Alwani tribe, and the security forces erupted, in which al-Alwani's brother as well as five of his guards were killed. Two days later, security forces dismantled a Sunni protest camp in Ramadi. At least thirteen people were killed including three policemen. The same day, 40 Sunni MPs offered to lay down their posts.

Earlier in the year, other Sunni politicians had already resigned. At the beginning of March, al-Issawi quit. The minister for science and technology and the minister for education, both Sunnis, left the cabinet in late April, protesting against the government's actions against Sunni protests throughout the country. jba, et

IRAQ (SUNNI OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2012**

Conflict parties: Sunni opposition vs. government













Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The conflict over national power and the orientation of the political system between the Sunni opposition movement and the government remained violent. Throughout the year, demonstrations against Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and his Shiite-dominated government took place. The opposition movement consisted mainly of Sunnis who perceived themselves as socially and politically disadvantaged by the Shiite-led government.

The conflict emerged on 12/20/12, when government forces searched the house and office of Sunni Finance Minister Rafa al-Issawi in the capital Baghdad and detained ten of his guards. Subsequently, protests broke out in al-Issawi's home province Anbar and soon spread to other provinces, including Salah ad Din, Baghdad, Ninawa, Diyala, Babil, Kirkuk, and Dhi Qar. Following Sunni protests, thousands of pro-government supporters protested in the provinces of Basra, Diwaniyah, Karbala, al-Muthanna and Babil at the beginning of January, calling for national unity and an end to sectarianism.

Government forces and anti-government protesters repeatedly clashed, especially in Sunni-dominated areas, leaving several people killed and injured. For example, on January 25, government troops and demonstrators clashed in the city of Fallujah, Anbar province. During the incident, seven


IRAQ (SUNNI MILITANT GROUPS)



NO VIOLENT CONFLICT MEASURES VIOLENT CRISIS LIMITED WAR WAR

data: ami, sul maps: flr, tw

ISRAEL (HAMAS ET AL. / PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES)


Intensity: **3** | Change:  | Start: **1988**

Conflict parties: Hamas, PIJ, PRC vs. government
 Conflict items: secession, system/ideology

The conflict over the creation of a sovereign Palestinian state between the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) and other Islamist militant groups operating in Gaza, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, de-escalated to a violent crisis. After the November 2012 “Operation Pillar of Defense,” which had resulted in a limited war, the truce between Israel, Hamas, and the militant groups, brokered by Egypt, was largely upheld. However, several rocket attacks were conducted on Israeli territory.

On February 26, Palestinian militants fired a single rocket into Israel’s Southern District, causing no damage. Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) responded by closing the Kerem Shalom border crossing to Gaza. During the visit of US President Barack Obama to Israel, militants belonging to a Salafist group fired several rockets into southern Israel on March 21, causing no damage. On April 17, Salafist militants fired another two rockets from the Sinai Peninsula on the Israeli city of Eilat, again causing no damage. On April 30, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) conducted an air strike on Gaza, killing a militant suspected of being associated with the rocket attack. On July 24, militants fired three rockets at southern Israel. In reaction, IAF attacked underground rocket launchers in the Gaza Strip. On September 18, Israel announced the redeployment of units stationed close to Gaza to other areas, using automated surveillance systems instead of monitoring the border. On September 22, Israeli soldiers opened fire on a group of Palestinians who had breached the security zone when approaching Gaza’s border with Israel, wounding two of them. On September 30, IDF shot two Palestinians at the security fence who were attempting to sabotage the fence. On October 28, militants fired rockets into southern Israel, as Israel prepared to release several long-term Palestinian prisoners. Israeli warplanes later attacked two concealed rocket launchers in the northern Gaza Strip. Three days later, an Israeli air strike killed three militants in a Gaza tunnel after an overnight gun fight had left one Palestinian dead and five Israeli soldiers wounded. On December 20, Israeli soldiers killed one Palestinian as he and others were attempting to damage the border fence between Gaza and Israel. Four days later, militants killed an Israeli worker who was repairing damaged sections of the fence. On December 26, the IAF attacked targets in Gaza after several missile attacks on southern Israel. Two Palestinians were reportedly injured by the air strikes.^{ht}

ISRAEL (PNA / PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES)

Intensity: **3** | Change:  | Start: **1948**

Conflict parties: Palestinian National Authority vs. government
 Conflict items: secession, system/ideology, re-sources

The violent crisis between the Palestinian National Authority

(PNA) and the government centering on the creation of a sovereign Palestinian state continued.

Throughout the year, continuing demonstrations by Palestinians took place, leading to scores of injured civilians and wounded Israeli soldiers in ensuing clashes. Furthermore, Israeli military raids and arrests continued. According to UN sources, a total of 28 Palestinians were killed and 3,718 injured. On July 29, a new round of US-brokered peace talks began in Washington and was attended by Israel and PNA, the first time in nearly three years. Main topics of the negotiations were the mutual acknowledgement of the states’ sovereignty and the disputed status of Jerusalem as well as Israeli settlements in the West Bank. Throughout the negotiations, the government continued to announce and implement the expansion of settlements with at least 28,186 new housing units. Halting construction was a precondition of the PNA to return to the negotiation table. Israel agreed to gradually release a total of 104 Palestinian prisoners. Thereafter, in August, October, and December, Israel released a total of 78 prisoners as part of the negotiations.

On January 3, PNA President Mahmoud Abbas called for the necessity of a UN Security Council resolution against the construction of Israeli settlements in the disputed region. On January 11, 250 Palestinian activists erected a protest camp in area E1 where the Israeli government planned settlement expansion. Two days later, the camp was dismantled by about 500 police and Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) soldiers, arresting several protesters. In total, six Palestinians were killed in January in the West Bank during encounters with IDF. For instance, on January 23, an IDF soldier killed a woman in Hebron. On February 23, a Palestinian died in an Israeli prison under unclear circumstances. Following allegations of torture, clashes erupted between protesters and IDF after his funeral during rallies near Hebron and in the Gaza Strip. At least 440 protesters were injured when IDF used teargas, rubber bullets, and sound grenades. Also, over 4,000 Palestinian prisoners went on hunger strike. Throughout the following months, Palestinians protested in solidarity with Palestinians held in Israeli prisons, leading to confrontations and clashes with IDF.

On March 12, one protester was killed and seven injured during clashes with IDF in Hebron. On March 20, activists set up a new protest camp close to area E1 as US President Barack Obama visited Israel and the West Bank. On March 25, Israel announced that it would resume regular tax transfers to the PNA. Between April 9 and 15, nine IDF soldiers were wounded and at least 130 protesters injured in several clashes throughout the West Bank. On May 15, during Palestinian commemorations of the 1948 Nakba Day, clashes erupted between IDF and protesters. The protesters threw stones, while IDF responded using teargas and rubber-coated metal bullets, injuring seventeen. On August 26, an Israeli border guard patrol entered Qalandiya refugee camp, reportedly conducting a search operation. Violent clashes broke out during the raid. Three Palestinians were killed and at least fifteen injured in the consecutive clashes. In a weekly demonstration on November 15, nineteen people were injured during clashes with the IDF in Bi’lin. On December 18, IDF raided the Jenin refugee camp in order to arrest a Hamas member [→ Israel (Hamas et al. / Palestinian Territories)]. Soldiers opened fire on Palestinians who reportedly assaulted them, killing one and injuring six. On November 13, Abbas stated that the negotiations had made no progress and that his delegation would resign due to ongoing settlement construction. However, he noted that negotiations would continue. US Secretary of State John

Kerry, in charge of brokering the peace talks, reportedly intended to promote a framework agreement to be reached between the parties by April 2014.^{eol}

JORDAN (OPPOSITION GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2011**

Conflict parties: opposition groups vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology

The violent crisis between opposition groups and the government over the orientation of the political system continued. On January 23, parliamentary elections were held but boycotted by the main opposition groups, the Islamic Action Front (IAF), representing the Muslim Brotherhood's political wing, as well as the Popular Democratic Unity Party, the communist party, and al-Hayat Jordanian Party. The opposition proclaimed electoral fraud and criticized the electoral law favoring rural pro-governmental territories as well as the limited power of the parliament.

Between January 23 and 26, demonstrations took place all over the country. The government deployed high numbers of gendarmerie and police using teargas and armored vehicles. Reportedly, protests turned into riots in the capital Amman, the governorates of Irbid, Karak, and Ma'an, as well as in Salt, Balqa governorate. For instance, on January 23, one person was killed and two more injured in riots in the city of Ma'an. On January 25, four people were injured when protesters attacked several houses and public property in Irbid. During concurrent riots in Karak, security forces used teargas against protesters. On January 26, protesters tried to storm Prime Minister Abdullah Ensour's residence and the headquarters of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) in Salt. However, the buildings were protected by high numbers of security forces and armored vehicles.

Despite protests, King Abdullah II reappointed Ensour as Prime Minister on March 9. Protests again turned violent when pro-government protesters threw stones at pro-reform protesters on February 22 and April 12 in Irbid and on March 24 in Amman. Security forces used teargas to disperse the crowd. In June and July, the government blocked access to a total of 254 websites because they were not licensed, as stipulated in a law introduced in 2012. Throughout the rest of the year, non-violent demonstrations took place on a weekly basis, mainly in the cities of Amman, Karak, Tafileh, Irbid, and Ma'an, especially after Friday prayers. Protesters demanded political reforms, measures against economic shortcomings and demonstrated against the detentions of opposition activists. ^{bsc}

KUWAIT (OPPOSITION MOVEMENT)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2012**

Conflict parties: opposition movement vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The violent crisis over national power and the orientation of the political system between the opposition movement and the government continued. Throughout the year, the opposition staged demonstrations demanding democratic reforms,

the legalization of political parties, and the release of prisoners.

On January 6, in a demonstration against the recently passed electoral law amendment, riot police in Qurtoba, al-Asimah governorate used teargas, stun grenades, and batons to disperse several hundred protesters, injuring at least two and arresting around a dozen. Another demonstration in al-Sabahiya, al-Ahmadi governorate, was violently dispersed on January 22. On February 5, thousands of demonstrators demanded the release of three opposition leaders who were convicted for allegedly insulting the Emir Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jaber al-Sabah. On April 15, opposition leader and former member of parliament Mussallam al-Barrak was sentenced to five years in prison for anti-government comments during a speech in October 2012. Two days later, police forces failed to arrest al-Barrak as they raided his house whilst he was absent. About 10,000 of his supporters had assembled in front of his house when al-Barrak came back in the evening. When they started a protest march towards Central Prison where al-Barrak was about to be incarcerated, they subsequently clashed with security forces in Andalus, al-Asimah governorate. While the latter fired teargas and stun grenades to end the protest, demonstrators used fireworks and threw stones at police forces. Several people were injured. A few days later, al-Barrak was granted bail by an appeal court. The case was still pending in decision by the end of 2013.

In the course of the year, several activists were sentenced for insulting the emir via Twitter. On June 16, the Constitutional Court rejected a case challenging the controversial voting system. However, judging that the pre-electoral process had been incorrect, the court called for new elections and the dissolution of parliament. While the main liberal opposition group National Democratic Alliance took part in the elections, some other opposition groups and tribal leaders boycotted the polls on July 27. On July 31, Emir al-Sabah announced a pardon to convicted activists and called on all parties to cooperate in order to ensure the country's stability.^{wi}


LEBANON (MARCH 14 ALLIANCE – MARCH 8 ALLIANCE)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1975**

Conflict parties: March 14 Alliance vs. March 8 Alliance
 Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The violent crisis over national power and the orientation of the political system between the anti-Syrian March 14 Alliance, led by the parties Future Movement and the Christian Lebanese Forces, on the one hand, and the governing pro-Syrian March 8 Alliance, mainly consisting of Hezbollah, the Free Patriotic Movement, the Amal Movement, as well as pro-Syrian Alawite groups, on the other, continued. The conflict exacerbated due to spillover effects from the Syrian civil war [→ Syria (opposition groups)]. Since the assassination of Internal Security Forces' Brigadier General Wissam al-Hassan on 10/19/12, March 14 Alliance boycotted almost all parliamentary activities of the government. Amidst rising tensions between Sunnis and Shiites, the cabinet deadlock remained unsolved throughout the year, with both March 8 and March 14 rejecting the formation of a new, inclusive government. President Michel Suleiman, Prime Minister Najib

LIBYA (INTER-FACTIONAL VIOLENCE)

Intensity: **3** | Change:  | Start: **2012**

Conflict parties: Awlad Suleiman tribe vs. Zwai tribe vs. Tibu tribe vs. al-Shourafa Arab tribe vs. Gontrar tribe vs. Wershifana tribe vs. Mashasha tribe vs. Garamna tribe vs. Ethnic Arab settlements et al.

Conflict items: subnational predominance, resources

Mikati, and Progressive Socialist Party leader Walid Jumblatt met on January 8, attempting to create a centrist political force. On April 5, Tammam Salam was designated prime minister to form a new cabinet, after Mikati had resigned. Due to discrepancies regarding the new electoral law and the internal security situation, parliament extended its mandate on May 31 until November 2014. On June 20, clashes erupted in Beirut between security forces and protesters demonstrating against the extension.

Throughout the year, clashes between pro-Assad Alawites and anti-Assad Sunnis intensified especially in Tripoli, North Governorate, where the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) repeatedly increased its deployment and intervened in the fighting. For instance, between March 21 and 24, anti-Syrian Sunnis of the Bab al-Tabbaneh and pro-Syrian Alawites of the Jabal Mohsen neighborhoods of Tripoli clashed using machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), killing at least ten people and wounding 35. Starting on May 18 and lasting for one week, repeated clashes between the groups left 25 persons dead and 200 injured. On August 23, bombs exploded in two Sunni mosques in Tripoli, leaving at least 42 dead and 400 wounded. Sunnis, among them Sheikh Dai al-Islam Shahhal, accused Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and Hezbollah of having orchestrated the attacks and announced that they would take security in Tripoli in their own hands. A week-long battle broke out on October 21 in Tripoli between the two groups, who used mortar and sniper fire and RPGs. The clashes left more than twelve dead and some 88 wounded. Clashes between Alawites and Sunnis continued on November 30, lasting two days. At least ten people were killed and 49 injured, among them eleven soldiers. Consequently, LAF arrested 21 people on December 3. In ensuing clashes with Sunni militants in Bab al-Tabbaneh, one soldier was killed, and seven soldiers, five militants and 25 civilians were injured on December 5. Previously, President Suleiman, Mikati, and LAF officials had agreed to give LAF a six-month mandate, granting them full responsibility of establishing security in Tripoli.

On December 27, a car bomb blast killed former finance minister Mohammad Shatah, along with seven others, in central Beirut, wounding about 70. Shatah was an affiliate of former prime minister Rafik al-Hariri, who had been assassinated in 2005. Members of the March 14 Alliance blamed Hezbollah. The UN-backed Special Tribunal for Lebanon scheduled the start of the trial of four Hezbollah suspects over the assassination of al-Hariri for 01/16/14.

Over the course of the year, Sunni Islamists repeatedly accused Hezbollah of supporting Assad and increasingly targeted the group. For instance, on August 15, a car bomb exploded in a Hezbollah stronghold in Beirut, killing at least 25 and leaving 200 wounded. The Sunni group Brigades of Aisha claimed responsibility. On November 19, a double suicide bombing in front of the Iranian embassy in Beirut left at least 25 dead and 140 wounded. The Sunni group Abdullah Azzam Brigade claimed responsibility.[map](#)

The conflict over subnational predominance and resources between several tribes, militias and armed groups, as well as within the respective factions de-escalated to a violent crisis. Throughout the year, clashes in various districts across the country left at least 46 people dead and 126 wounded. For instance, on January 8, a dispute between Tibu and Zwai tribesmen escalated into an armed confrontation at the University of Kufra, Kufra district. When forces of the militia Libya Shield intervened, four Tibu tribesmen were killed. At the beginning of March, clashes erupted between the Mashasha and Gontrar tribes. In the town of Mizdah, Jabal al-Gharbi district, a brigade of the latter tribe was attacked on March 1, leaving at least one of their members dead. Subsequently, Mashasha neighborhoods came under fire from tanks and rocket launchers, killing at least one person, injuring several, and destroying five houses. Due to the clashes, around 3,000 people fled their homes in the first week of March. On June 3, members of al-Shourafa Arab tribe and Tibu tribe clashed in Zweila town, Murzuq district. The fighting, in which light weapons and rocket-propelled grenades were employed, left five people dead and three injured. A number of houses and cars were set ablaze. On June 25 and 26, fighting between rival armed groups erupted in the capital Tripoli when a militia from Zintan, who was in charge of guarding a major oil field, attacked the headquarters of the national body set up to guard oil facilities. In subsequent clashes involving heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, at least five people were killed and 97 wounded. Starting on August 22, members of the Wershifana tribe clashed with residents of the town of Zawiya in the eponymous district, making use of heavy weapons. Wershifana tribesmen reportedly attacked a health center in Zawiya, killing two people and abducting another. One person was killed and more than a dozen injured in fighting around Zahra in the same district, when an armed group of Zawiya tried to free the hostage. On August 26, Libya Shield forces intervened to end the fight. On September 12, eleven people were killed during a fight between Garamna and Zintan tribesmen in the town of Derj, Nalut district. Three days later, a local Libya Shield unit clashed with members of the Baha-Uddin battalion, leaving two people dead in Sabha in the eponymous district. The two groups reportedly belonged to the Awlad Sulaiman and Hasawna tribes. Between December 20 and 22, units from Zwai and Tibu tribes fought over control of a water reservoir in al-Sarir and oil wells in Ajdabiya, al-Wahat district, causing the death of eight people.[cro](#)

LIBYA (OPPOSITION GROUPS)

Intensity: **4** | Change: • | Start: **2011**

Conflict parties: opposition groups vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The limited war over the orientation of the political system and national power between opposition groups and the government continued. The opposition groups ranged from groups represented in the General National Congress (GNC), such as the Muslim Brotherhood, militias formally integrated into the security apparatus, to militant groups, and protesters. The government was supported by pro-government protesters as well as armed groups.

In the course of the year, protesters demanded the disbanding of militias and governmental control over the security sector. The government tried to integrate militias on an individual basis. For instance, demonstrations against the Libya Shield militia in Benghazi turned into clashes on June 8. At least 25 people were killed and more than 70 wounded. Reportedly, protesters were later backed by government forces. On November 11, clashes between the police, supported by armed residents, and fighters from the Misrata militia, part of Libya Shield, erupted in the capital Tripoli, leaving 47 people dead and up to 500 injured. The demonstration turned violent after protesters had entered the Gharghur district where members of the Misrata militia attacked them with anti-aircraft cannons. Ten days later, several militias of the Security Supreme Committee (SSC) and the al-Qaqa brigades of Zintan handed over their bases to the army. On November 26 and 27, Ansar al-Sharia attacked several army positions and three checkpoints in Benghazi. Fightings between the army and Ansar al-Sharia, which used grenades and rifles, resulted in the injuries of several people.

Militias repeatedly besieged or entered government ministries and offices, pressing the government to meet their demands. From April 28 to May 11, armed groups blocked off several ministries with pick-up trucks and anti-aircraft guns, demanding the adoption of the Political Isolation Law, which bans Qaddafi-era officials from holding office. Demonstrations for and against the law were staged in several cities before and after it was passed by the GNC on May 5.

On October 10, the Anti-Corruption Bureau of the Operations Room of the Libyan Revolutionaries and the Counter Crime Agency seized Prime Minister Ali Zeidan and other GNC members from a hotel in Tripoli. The groups stated they had arrested Zeidan for complicity in the October 5 kidnapping of Nazih Ruqaii alias Abu Anas al-Libi by the USA. According to officials, government forces stormed the Counter Crime Agency's headquarters and freed Zeidan several hours later. Reportedly, members of the GNC and members of the Justice and Construction Party, which is linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, was involved in the incident that Zeidan called an attempted coup d'état.

Throughout the year, militants frequently attacked police stations, government buildings, police and military officers, especially in Benghazi but also in Tripoli. In Benghazi, at least fifteen bomb attacks hit police stations. Nationwide, at least 68 security officials were killed in bomb and gun attacks. On July 28, two bomb attacks targeted the Benghazi courthouse and the Benghazi branch of the Ministry of Justice, injuring 43 people and damaging the buildings.

On December 12, the alleged first suicide bomber in Libya

killed thirteen soldiers and injured twelve when he exploded his truck at an army checkpoint in the city Bersis, Benghazi. The investigation concluded that the bomb could also have been set off remotely, as parts of a mobile phone attached to the bomb were found. The military stated that the attacker was a member of Ansar al-Sharia.

In addition, attacks often targeted foreign personnel and buildings. For instance, on October 11, militants attacked the honorary joint Swedish and Finnish consulate in Benghazi with a car bomb. No group claimed responsibility for the attack. However, after the kidnapping of Nazih Ruqaii, Ansar al-Sharia announced that it was behind such attacks.

MOROCCO (POLISARIO / WESTERN SAHARA)

Intensity: **3** | Change: ↗ | Start: **1975**

Conflict parties: POLISARIO vs. government

Conflict items: secession

The conflict over the secession of Western Sahara between the Popular Front of the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro (POLISARIO) and the government escalated to a violent crisis.

From February 1 to 17, a military court in the capital Rabat sentenced 25 people involved in the 2010 killing and mutilating of security forces. During the incident, police had attempted to dismantle the Gdim Izik protest camp. On April 25, the UN Security Council extended the MINURSO mandate for another year until 04/30/2014. At the beginning of April, the USA suggested that the MINURSO mandate be extended to include the monitoring of human rights violations, which caused diplomatic tensions with Morocco. The next day, a pro-independence demonstration was staged in Laayoune, the largest city in Western Sahara. Demonstrators and security forces clashed, injuring at least 40 people, including eight policemen. On May 4, approx. 500 pro-independence protesters held a demonstration in Laayoune, later dispersed by police forces. Violence erupted between protesters and the police, resulting in the injuries of 21 policemen and an unknown number of protesters. During the course of a visit of Christopher Ross, UN Envoy for Western Sahara, on October 21, demonstrators again staged a pro-independence demonstration in Laayoune. They set up barricades, burned tires, and threw stones in clashes with security forces. At least ten people were injured.

Following a new four-year fishing accord between Morocco and the EU which allowed at least 120 EU boats access to Moroccan coastal water, another demonstration took place in Laayoune on December 11. Protesters condemning the agreement threw stones and clashed with police forces. During the clashes, 90 protesters and 35 policemen were injured.

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SAUDI ARABIA (SHIITES)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1979**

Conflict parties: Shiites vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The violent crisis over national power and the orientation of the political system between Shiites and the Sunni government continued in the Shiite-dominated Eastern Province.

Shiites called for political reforms, denounced what they perceived to be sectarian discrimination, and demanded the release of political detainees.

On February 17, suspected Shiite gunmen opened fire on a prison and a police checkpoint in Awamiya, as well as on a police patrol in another town in Eastern Province. Two bystanders were injured. On March 19, security forces arrested eighteen people, among them sixteen Saudi Shiites, accusing them of spying. Two days later, leading Saudi Shiites condemned the arrests. On April 30, police arrested two Shiites after a reported gun battle in the town of Qatif, one of whom was wanted for protesting. According to officials, both of them suffered leg injuries. On June 21, police exchanged fire with a gunman in Qatif region, killing one bystander. The following day in the same region, police forces shot dead a Shiite wanted for inciting unrest, saying he had resisted the arrest. At his funeral five days later thousands protested against the ruling family. Security forces arrested another nine on July 29, one of whom was wanted by the government in relation to protests. Government sources stated that the arrest followed gunfire, but Shiite sources claimed police forces had also raided the house of the wanted protester in Awamiya and thereby burned the house as well as several cars. The government convicted two protesters, sentenced a third, and gave another a 30-year prison term on July 12, December 20 and 23, respectively.

SYRIA (INTER-OPPOSITION VIOLENCE)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **NEW** | Start: **2013**

Conflict parties: ISIS vs. al-Nusra Front vs. Islamic Front vs. Islamist groups vs. NC

Conflict items: system/ideology

A new violent crisis between the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (NC) and their military wing Free Syrian Army (FSA) on the one hand, and Islamist groups such as the al-Nusra Front, the Islamic Front, and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) over ideology and the orientation of the political system, erupted.

On September 25 and 27, a total of 43 Islamist and various other groups dissociated themselves from the NC, stating that they no longer felt that their interests were represented in the anti-Assad coalition [→ Syria (opposition groups)]. On November 22, seven other Islamist groups formed the Islamic Front, consisting of at least 45,000 fighters, the largest merger so far. It is mainly composed of members from the former Syrian Islamic Liberation Front and the Syrian Islamic Front, two groups formed in 2012 to topple Assad's government. ISIS and the al-Nusra Front were not part of the newly established front.

On July 12, ISIS killed a senior FSA commander during a joint battle strategy meeting in Latakia, Latakia governorate.

On July 15, fights between Islamists and FSA erupted in the city of Aleppo, Aleppo governorate with no casualties reported. Starting in September, Islamist groups repeatedly clashed with FSA. For instance, on September 18, ISIS fighters captured the town of Azaz, Aleppo after days of fighting with FSA members, leaving five persons dead. Two days later, the groups agreed on a ceasefire. The Northern Storm brigade, a subgroup of FSA, accused ISIS of having violated the ceasefire agreement on September 22, when ISIS had not released FSA hostages. The same day, ISIS fighters clashed with FSA in Hazano, Idlib governorate, leaving six fighters dead. Clashes

between the groups continued on a smaller scale around Azaz throughout September and October.

On October 13, ISIS fighters allegedly bombed a Sufi shrine in an act against rival opposition groups in Deir al-Zor governorate. On November 13, political activists were forced to flee Raqqah, al-Raqqah governorate which ISIS had captured from the government in May, after attempts to undermine the group's position had failed. In mid-November, a member of the Islamic Front and former part of the FSA, Suqur al-Islam, clashed with FSA in the village of Atma, Idlib. However, on November 21 ISIS violently captured the village from Suqur al-Islam. On November 28, ISIS members killed seven fighters from the Ghuraba al-Sham brigade, a group in favor of a secular state, in Atarib, Idlib. On December 6, fighters of the Islamic Front captured FSA bases near the Bab al-Hawa border crossing to Turkey, leaving five dead.


Towards the end of the year, Islamist groups as well as FSA fought against the growing influence of ISIS. For instance, on September 22, ISIS fighters attacked an al-Nusra base in al-Hasakah governorate. Two fighters were killed. The same day, clashes broke out between al-Nusra and ISIS fighters in Raqqah after al-Nusra had previously killed an ISIS fighter. In the beginning of December, a group affiliated to al-Nusra group killed one ISIS member at the Bab al-Hawa border crossing.

SYRIA (NC, ISLAMIST GROUPS – KSC / KURDISH REGIONS)

Intensity: **5** | Change: **↑** | Start: **2012**

Conflict parties: NC, Islamist groups vs. KSC

Conflict items: subnational predominance, resources



The conflict over subnational predominance and resources in the Kurdish regions between the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (NC), their armed wing Free Syrian Army (FSA), and the Kurdish Supreme Committee (KSC), the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), their militia Popular Protection Unit (YPG), as well as between various Islamist militant groups, mainly al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIS) and PYD and YPG, escalated to a war.

Islamist groups fighting against the central government of Bashar al-Assad emerged as a new actor in the conflict over predominance in the Kurdish region [→ Syria (opposition groups)]. FSA and Islamist groups occasionally cooperated in fighting against the PYD, but increasingly clashed over ideology in 2013 [→ Syria (inter-opposition violence)]. Towards the end of 2012, Islamists increased attacks on Kurdish areas after government forces had retreated. However, FSA attacks on Kurdish areas were less frequent than in the previous year. Heavy fighting between Islamists, FSA, and YPG mostly affected the governorates of Aleppo, al-Hasakah, and al-Raqqah in northern Syria. The conflict parties clashed over the control of villages, border checkpoints, and oil fields, leaving hundreds dead. According to the UN, at least 47,000

mostly Syrian Kurds fled to Iraqi Kurdistan since mid-August. During the first half of the year, clashes revolved around the mainly Kurdish city of Ras al-Ain, al-Hasakah, ending with YPG gaining control in July. The first fights erupted in November 2012 when YPG and FSA, government forces as well as Islamist militants such as al-Nusra Front and Ghuraba al-Sham attempted to seize the city. An agreement including a ceasefire from 12/17/12 lasted until mid-January 2013. On January 17, the Islamist group al-Nusra Front and Ghuraba al-Sham allegedly crossed the Syrian border coming from Turkey, with around 300 fighters and three tanks. Subsequently, both groups engaged in fights with YPG over Ras al-Ain until January 30, using artillery and tanks. The clashes left 59 people dead. On February 14, shootings between YPG and FSA in Tall Tamr near Ras al-Ain left several dead after FSA had allegedly attempted to capture a cattle farm. On February 19, YPG fighters regained control over Ras al-Ain. Subsequently, both groups reached an agreement on the division of the city. The Islamist groups refrained from taking part in the negotiations. Reportedly, FSA rejected the agreement three days later due to YPG's affiliation with the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK). On July 16, al-Nusra and ISIS fighters attacked a YPG Women's Defence Unit in Ras al-Ain. After a YPG retaliation attack, al-Nusra reinforced its troops with more than 200 fighters. The next day, YPG temporarily expelled al-Nusra and ISIS fighters from the city, leaving eleven persons dead. On July 18, al-Nusra attacked parts of Ras al-Ain with artillery fire and engaged in fights with YPG members, causing the death of 29 people.

In July, clashes between YPG, al-Nusra, and ISIS also spread to other areas in al-Hasakah. For instance, on July 16, al-Nusra and ISIS fought against YPG for the control of the al-Sweidiya oil area. Combat actions lasted for ten days, leaving at least 29 dead. Thus, YPG forces reclaimed control of al-Sweidiya city and its surrounding oil areas. Moreover, YPG attacked an al-Nusra checkpoint near the village of Karhouk, expelling al-Nusra from the area and seizing their weapons on July 20. The five-day-long fights left 54 dead. After a Kurdish politician had been assassinated in a car bomb explosion in Qamishli, al-Hasakah, on July 30, YPG mobilized all fighters. Subsequently, clashes between ISIS and YPG intensified in the area, leaving twelve Islamist and 22 YPG fighters dead.

Clashes occurred on an almost daily basis in August. For instance on August 2, al-Nusra and ISIS attacked a YPG checkpoint between Jel Agha and Karki Laki, al-Hasakah, leaving twelve fighters dead. Between September 10 and 12, clashes between al-Nusra, ISIS, and YPG using artillery and tanks, near the village of Tal Alo, al-Hasakah, left 35 fighters dead. According to YPG, the clashes erupted after the two Islamist groups had attacked several Kurdish villages, leaving thirteen YPG fighters dead. On October 15, renewed clashes between YPG and ISIS left at least 40 fighters dead in al-Hasakah. On October 25, YPG fighters expelled al-Nusra and ISIS fighters from the border crossing Yarubia, al Hasakah, to Iraq after three days of clashes, leaving eleven fighters dead. Consequently, YPG took control of the checkpoint as well as the village. The border post, formerly controlled by the Syrian government, had been captured by Islamists in March.

Less frequently, fights also erupted in al-Raqqah and Aleppo. For instance, on May 25, clashes between al-Nusra, ISIS and YPG left eleven fighters dead in Afrin, Aleppo. In a similar fight on June 20, at least seven were killed. In clashes between ISIS and YPG in Tal Abyad, al-Raqqah, on October 9, the son of PYD co-leader Saleh Muslim was killed. On October 16, ISIS fighters attacked a YPG checkpoint near a village in Aleppo, leaving three fighters dead.

On September 25 and 26, ISIS and FSA jointly fought against YPG near Atma, Idlib governorate, using heavy weapons. The clashes left at least fifteen dead.


During October and November, YPG regained control of many villages within al-Hasakah and al-Raqqah. Subsequently, on November 12, the PYD announced it would create an autonomous transitional government within the next six months [→ Syria (Kurdish groups)]. Previously, YPG had established an Arab brigade on November 1. Reportedly, up to 200 Syrian Kurds were kidnapped by Islamists in the towns of Ihras, Jarabulus and Minbej, Aleppo, in December.

SYRIA (OPPOSITION GROUPS)

Intensity: **5** | Change: • | Start: **2011**

Conflict parties: NC, FSA, ISIS, Islamic Front, al-Nusra Front et al. vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power



The war between opposition groups and the government of President Bashar al-Assad over national power and the orientation of the political system continued. The opposition mainly consisted of the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (NC), its military wing Free Syrian Army (FSA), and Islamist groups such as the al-Nusra Front, the Islamic Front (IF), and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS). The opposition increasingly included Islamist fighters from neighboring countries. However, growing disagreement between the different groups led to a splitting of the opposition in September which led to intense fighting especially between Islamist groups and the FSA [→ Syria (inter-opposition violence)].

While the most affected governorates were Damascus, Homs, and Aleppo, governorates such as Tartus and as-Suwayda were only sporadically affected. Between the beginning of the uprising in March 2011 and December 2013, at least 125,000 people were killed. As of September, a total of 4.25 million were internally displaced and approx. two million sought refuge in neighboring countries. On May 28, EU leaders failed to agree on a renewed arms embargo after having previously eased an oil embargo.

Throughout the year, government and opposition forces repeatedly accused each other of using chemical weapons. For instance, attacks on suburbs of Damascus and Aleppo in March and April, allegedly including sarin gas, left at least 35 dead. It remained unclear who initiated the attacks. A chemical attack in Damascus governorate on August 21 left hundreds dead and thousands injured. A UN investigation confirmed the use of poisonous gas, which led to the Security Council Resolution 2118 demanding the eradication of chemical weapons [→ Syria – USA].

Suicide bombings and car bomb attacks increased. For instance, on January 16, three car bombs targeted government buildings in Idlib governorate, killing 25. On February 21, car bombs exploded in Damascus, one of them near the headquarters of Assad's Baath Party. The explosion and the ensuing fights between government forces and the FSA left more than 100 people dead. On July 15, a car bomb explosion

caused the death of thirteen, including ten policemen, in the capital. Another suicide bombing and following clashes on October 19 left another 30 persons dead.

Both parties blamed each other for a massacre on January 15 in the village of Haswiya, Homs governorate, with more than 100 deaths. Beginning on January 21, the government launched an army offensive, backed by at least 10,000 Shabiha fighters, on opposition strongholds in Homs, killing more than 120 civilians and 40 opposition fighters. In the beginning of February, an opposition advance in Damascus with RPGs and mortar was fought back by Assad's forces, involving tanks and snipers. The fighting left 64 people dead. Subsequently, the government launched air strikes to halt the opposition's advance. Clashes continued throughout February. Fighters from the Islamist al-Nusra Front captured a town in al-Hasakah governorate on February 14, killing 100 soldiers and leaving dozens of civilians dead. On February 21, government warplanes bombarded the city of Deera in the eponymous governorate for the first time in nearly two years, killing eighteen. On March 3, battles near a police academy in Aleppo governorate for eight consecutive days left up to 300 dead, prompting the shutdown of the Aleppo airport. The same day, an opposition offensive on the city of Raqqa, al-Raqqa governorate, was fought back by government troops supported by warplanes. However, the opposition captured Raqqa on March 6. The clashes left 60 dead and forced thousands to flee. Government troops seized the town of Jdaidet al-Fadl, Damascus, on April 21 and Baida, Tartus governorate on May 3 after days of fighting with opposition troops, which forced hundreds of families to flee. The opposition accused the government of having killed up to 300 residents of Jdaidet al-Fadl and Baida in the following days. On May 19, government forces backed by Lebanese Hezbollah militants began an offensive on the town of Qusair, Homs, near the Syrian-Lebanese border, taking full control on June 5. Hundreds of fighters and civilians were killed. From June 7 to 14, the government recaptured parts of Aleppo governorate in an offensive which was subsequently stopped by the opposition. Fighting ensued, with the rebels capturing the strategic town of Khan al-Assal, Aleppo, on July 22. According to the government, the opposition killed 150 soldiers in following fighting. From August 4 to 18, the opposition launched a large-scale offensive on towns in Latakia governorate, home to the Assad family, leaving more than 200 dead. In ensuing clashes, government troops recaptured the grounds. Battles for towns mostly in Damascus and Aleppo continued throughout September and October, whereby none of the conflict parties achieved further territorial gains. In the beginning of October, the army forcefully recovered two Damascus suburbs, leaving more than 70 dead. Hundreds died in following clashes. On October 15 and 16, air strikes on opposition-held districts in Deera, Hama, and Idlib killed more than 200. The conflict concentrated on Damascus and Aleppo governorates in the end of 2013. A government offensive on Qara, Damascus, between November 15 and 19 led to a high number of refugees and many casualties. While at least 400 died during an opposition advance in the end of November on government-held areas near the town of Goutha, Damascus, a government offensive using barrel bombs on Aleppo governorate between December 15 and 29 killed at least 517. Damascus and bordering towns were continuously hit by heavy rocket and artillery fire. Aleppo remained divided after government forces recaptured three towns in mid-November, forcing the rebels to withdraw up north.

Violence repeatedly affected neighboring countries, caus-

ing dozens of foreign casualties. Government forces were supported by Hezbollah fighters from Lebanon, which intensified the violent conflict in Lebanon between pro-Assad and anti-Assad supporters and also led to increased attacks on Hezbollah [→ Lebanon (March 14 Alliance – March 8 Alliance)]. Several cross-border incidents killed dozens of civilians. For instance, on August 3, at least six people were killed when Syrian warplanes attacked the Lebanese town of Yabroud. Throughout the year, five civilians were killed in Turkey due to cross-border shell-fire. On September 16, Turkish Armed Forces downed a Syrian helicopter as it entered Turkish airspace [→ Syria – Turkey]. Moreover, Israeli forces increasingly responded to stray bullets striking the Golan Heights by launching air strikes and attacks on convoys within Syria [→ Syria – Israel].ghe

SYRIA – TURKEY

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1946**

Conflict parties: Syria vs. Turkey

Conflict items: territory, international power

The violent crisis between Syria and Turkey over international power due to spillover effects from the Syrian civil war continued [→ Syria (opposition groups)]. By the end of January, six Patriot missile batteries from Germany, the Netherlands, and the US were stationed in the Turkish provinces Adana, Gaziantep, and Kahramanmaras as a response to Turkey's request to NATO from 11/21/2012. Turkey requested NATO to extend the stationing of Patriot missiles for another year on November 13. Throughout the year, the Turkish government increased pressure on Syria after violations of its air space and cross-border attacks.

On February 11, the Turkish government blamed Syria for a car bombing at the Cilvegözü border gate which had left fourteen people dead. On May 11, two car bombs with at least 100kg TNT exploded in the city of Reyhanli, Hatay province, killing over 50 civilians. Subsequently, nine Turkish suspects allegedly tied to Syrian intelligence were arrested. On February 15, Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) fired shells across the border in response to a mortar shell which had been fired from Syrian territory and exploded in the border town Yayladagi, Hatay. On May 6, TAF started a ten-day long maneuver with twelve vehicles and 60 soldiers in Adana. Between July and October, cross-border mortar fire in the context of clashes between Kurdish and Islamist groups in northern Syria killed five Turkish civilians in Hatay and Sanliurfa [→ Syria (NC – KSC, Islamist groups)].

On August 21, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan accused the Syrian government of using chemical weapons against the Syrian opposition and called for a response by the international community. Due to allegations by the international community that the Syrian government had used chemical weapons, Turkey turned its missile systems towards Syria on August 28 and set its troops on high alert. In the first week of September, Turkey deployed additional troops to the south-eastern border region. On September 16, TAF downed a Syrian helicopter which had entered Turkish airspace by 2km. Turkey had previously announced that any Syrian element that crossed the Turkish border would be treated as a military target. On October 3, Turkey renewed a one-year mandate that would allow Turkish troops to intervene in Syria. During November, Syrian air force radar locked on Turkish F-16 planes flying through Turkish airspace several timesaj

SYRIA – USA

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **2003**

Conflict parties: Syria vs. USA
 Conflict items: system/ideology, international power

The conflict between Syria, on the one hand, and the USA, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN, and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), on the other hand, over Syria’s nuclear power and chemical weapons (CW) continued.

After allegations that Syria had used CW in the beginning of 2013 [→ Syria (opposition groups)], OPCW emerged as a new actor in the conflict when UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon asked OPCW on March 21 to support investigations into the accusations. Because of a shift towards focusing on CW allegations, IAEA did not take part in conflict actions. Several governments, notably the US, announced military consequences against Syria if the allegations proved to be true. Issuing a statement by Deputy National Security Adviser for Strategic Communications Ben Rhodes, the US government affirmed the possession of a US intelligence assessment on June 13, revealing the repeated use of CW on a small scale by Syria killing 100 to 150 people. On August 19, US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel stated that the US was preparing military options in case the use of CW was verified.

On August 21, a sarin gas attack killed approx. 1,500 civilians outside the Syrian capital Damascus; the attack had allegedly been launched by the Syrian government. Consequently, on September 4, the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations approved Senate Joint Resolution 21 authorizing military action. On September 14, the US and Russia agreed on the Framework for the Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons. On September 27, the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 2118 over the destruction of Syrian CW stockpiles. Based on the Framework Agreement, the OPCW Executive Council agreed on a program for achieving the complete elimination of Syria’s CW.

The destruction of Syria’s CW stockpiles and facilities began on October 6 by a joint team of OPCW and UN officials. On October 27, the Syrian government submitted details of the scheduled destruction of their CW to the OPCW. Four days later, the OPCW confirmed the destruction of all declared Syrian facilities for the mixing and producing of CW. On December 18, the OPCW submitted a plan to the UNSC to destroy Syria’s priority chemicals by March 31, 2014 and other chemicals by June 30, 2014^{sep}

TUNISIA (AQIM ET AL.)

Intensity: **4** | Change: ↗ | Start: **2011**

Conflict parties: AQIM, various militant groups vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The conflict over national power and the orientation of the political system between al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), militant Islamists linked to Ansar al-Sharia, and the Uqbah ibn Nafi Brigade on the one side, and the government on the other, escalated.

AQIM declared solidarity with Ansar al-Sharia in May, warning the government against the placing of restrictions on the group. On August 27, the government proclaimed Ansar al-Sharia a “terrorist group” with ties to AQIM. The group denied involvement in violent actions and described itself as a non-violent movement [→Tunisia (opposition groups)].

This year’s largest military offensive was conducted in the mountainous area of the Djebel Chaambi National Park in Kasserine close to the border with Algeria. Beginning in mid-April, security forces backed by Algerian intelligence conducted operations in search of militants linked to AQIM and Ansar al-Sharia hiding in the area. Algeria deployed 6,000 to 10,000 soldiers in order to prevent militants from entering Algeria [→ Algeria (AQIM et al.)]. Six militants carrying explosives were arrested on May 13 in Kasserine. The large-scale search in the area continued through May and June. In June and July, gunfights with militants and roadside bombings left at least eleven soldiers dead. In reaction, the army set parts of the mountainous forest area aflame through artillery fire. According to officials, soldiers backed by airstrikes killed ten AQIM members on August 2. On August 12, further airstrikes killed at least six suspected militants close to the border with Algeria. On August 26, the military resumed the search in the area. On September 29, after receiving intelligence on militant movement, the military once again bombed targets in Djebel Chaambi. Over the course of the year, mines casted out by militants in the area have killed at least four people and wounded eleven.

The conflict was not limited to Kasserine. On February 21, security forces and armed militants clashed in Sidi Bouzid governorate, leaving one militant dead. On July 31, a bomb detonated on a road south of Tunis, responsibility remaining unknown. From August to December, security forces arrested at least 47 suspects linked to AQIM, Ansar al-Sharia, and Uqbah ibn Nafi Brigade all over the country. On October 16, militants attacked two border posts in Jendouba governorate. Subsequently, the military deployed helicopters and additional troops to the area. In mid-October, an operation by air and ground forces in Beja governorate left nine militants allegedly tied to Ansar al-Sharia and AQIM and two security personnel dead. On October 23, one militant and six security forces were killed and four wounded in a shootout with unidentified militants in the town of Sidi Ali Ben Aoun, Sidi Bouzid. The army deployed tanks and helicopters. On October 30, two suicide bombers reportedly belonging to Ansar al-Sharia attacked the governorate capitals Monastir and Sousse, causing no damage. Security forces killed one militant in a gunfight in Kebili governorate on November 11. On November 12, security forces arrested Ansar al-Sharia deputy head Wael Amami and spokesman Seideddine Raes, accusing them of being involved in the killing of six security personnel in Sidi Ali Ben Aoun in October.

Additionally, it must be noted that the government accused Ansar al-Sharia of being responsible for the killing of the opposition leaders Chokri Belaid and Muhammad Brahmi [→ Tunisia (opposition groups)].^{kni}

TUNISIA (OPPOSITION GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2010**

Conflict parties: opposition groups vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The conflict between opposition groups and the government

over national power and the orientation of the political system continued. The opposition consisted, among others, of the National Salvation Front (NSF), labor unions, and Salafist groups such as Ansar al-Sharia. This year was marked by the drafting of the first constitution since the ousting of former president Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in 2011, amidst continuous demonstrations and clashes over lasting disparities and the slow transition.

On January 6, violent demonstrations over socio-economic disparity broke out in Ben Gardane, Medenine governorate, involving more than 300 protesters. The protests erupted in the context of the closure of the Tunisian-Libyan border crossing Ras Jedir, Medenine, two weeks earlier. On January 10, the situation escalated when protesters burned down a police station. On January 14, the second anniversary of the ousting of Ben Ali, approx. 8,000 people demonstrated in the capital Tunis for and against the ruling Ennahda party. On February 6, following the assassination of opposition leader Chokri Belaid, Popular Front (PF), days-long protests were staged nationwide. In some cases, rioters threw stones, torched Ennahda offices in Tunis and a police Station in Sidi Bouzid, Sidi Bouzid governorate, killing one policeman. Police responded with teargas and batons. On February 19, Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali resigned due to a lack of support from his party, after trying to introduce a technocratic cabinet in response to the mass protests. The ban of the annual meeting of Ansar al-Sharia on May 17 resulted in protests in Tunis and governorate capital Kairouan. Protesters clashed with policemen, leaving one protester dead. On July 1, the Constitutional Assembly discussed the constitutional draft from June 1, while hundreds protested in Tunis, criticizing the insufficient inclusion of civil liberties. Following the assassination of opposition leader Muhammad Brahmi, PF, on July 25 in Tunis, the Constituent Assembly was suspended due to the withdrawal of six opposition parties calling for the implementation of a technocratic cabinet. Thousands of protesters gathered in front of the Interior Ministry in Tunis, demanding the dissolution of the government. While rioters attacked a government office in Sfax, Sfax governorate, and torched Ennahda offices in Sidi Bouzid, police responded with teargas. Blaming Ansar al-Sharia for both assassinations, the government declared it a "terrorist group" on August 27. Further pro- and anti-government mass protests ensued in August and September. On October 5, the secular opposition, united in the National Salvation Front (NSF), and the government agreed on the implementation of a technocratic government. The consensus, aimed at ending the political crisis and setting up new elections, was mediated by the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT). However, further negotiations failed. On December 4, UGTT set an ultimatum to the two parties, pressuring both sides to agree on a new Prime Minister by December 14. The parties finally approved current Industry Minister, Mehdi Jomaa, as head of a caretaker government.^{ml0}

government. In the course of nationwide protests against governmental construction projects, culminating in calls on the government to resign, eleven people died, at least 8,000 were injured, and approx. 4,900 people had been detained by the end of June.

On May 26, environmentalists held sit-ins in the Gezi Park, Istanbul, to prevent bulldozers from cutting down trees as part of the disputed Taksim pedestrianization project. In order to disperse the sit-ins and subsequent protests in the Taksim area, riot police used teargas and water cannon for five consecutive days, leaving dozens injured. The following days, the number of protesters increased from hundreds to ten thousands and their objectives increasingly shifted from the preservation of the park to criticizing government policies. On June 1, police withdrew from Taksim Square after heavy encounters with protesters. In the following week, dozens were injured when police used teargas and water cannon to disperse protests near the office of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Besiktas, Istanbul. Protesters threw stones and committed damage to property.

Throughout June, solidarity protests erupted nationwide and continued on a regular basis mostly in the provinces of Adana, Ankara, Eskisehir, Hatay, Istanbul, and Izmir. During protests in Ankara on June 1, a police officer shot one demonstrator. On June 2, a protester who later succumbed to the injuries was beaten by unidentified perpetrators in Eskisehir. The same day, another demonstrator was fatally injured in Istanbul when a car drove into a crowd of protesters. On June 3, a protester died after being hit by a teargas cartridge in Antakya, Hatay. Two days later, a police officer died after falling off a bridge during protests in Adana. On June 7, thousands of government supporters rallied in Istanbul, where Erdogan publicly denounced the protests. Three days later, police forces cleared a protest camp in Ankara, detaining several protesters. After President Abdullah Gul had called for dialog with protesters, Erdogan met with delegates from the Taksim Solidarity Platform on June 14 and announced to dismiss the reconstruction plans of the park until a court decision. The next day, police forces entered Gezi Park for the first time in two weeks in order to clear the protest camp, thereby preempting an ultimatum by the government that protesters cleared the park by June 16. On June 19, about 5,000 protesters called on the government to resign and clashed with police forces in Eskisehir.

In late June and early July, police raided homes in several cities, arresting dozens for the alleged use of Molotov cocktails and damage of private property during protests. On July 11, about 3,000 people protested the death of a protester in Hatay, leading to police intervention. Ensuing clashes between security forces and protesters lasted for three consecutive days.

Since July, the frequency of protests decreased to a weekly basis. Between September and December, clashes erupted when students of the Middle East Technical University (METU) in Ankara attempted to prevent the uprooting of 3,000 trees on the university campus for another construction project and were dispersed by police forces. Solidarity protests erupted in Istanbul, Hatay, and several other cities, protesting both the METU construction plans and the Gezi incidents. Encounters between protesters and police in Hatay on September 10 left one protester dead.^{yal}

TURKEY (OPPOSITION MOVEMENT)


Intensity: **3** | Change: **NEW** | Start: **2013**

Conflict parties: opposition movement vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology

A violent conflict over the orientation of the political system erupted between the opposition movement and the

TURKEY (PKK / KURDISH AREAS)

 Intensity: **4** | Change:  | Start: **1974**

Conflict parties: **PKK vs. government**Conflict items: **autonomy**


The conflict between the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and the government over autonomy de-escalated following a reinitiated peace process. Nevertheless, the conflict remained highly violent in February and May due to cross border operations of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) in northern Iraq and clashes in the southeast, leaving more than twenty PKK members, two security personnel, and five civilians dead. After the government had announced plans to convince PKK to lay down its arms in late 2012, various deputies from the Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) repeatedly discussed a road map for the peace process with imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan between January and June. After Öcalan had declared a ceasefire on March 21, PKK fighters started to withdraw into Iraq on May 8. In the following months, Kurdish officials repeatedly pressured the government to implement political reforms, urging for official negotiations including an arbitration board. On June 19, for instance, PKK accused the government of sabotaging the peace process by increasing military surveillance and constructing new army posts in Kurdish areas. On several occasions Cemal Bayik, leader of PKK's military wing, threatened that PKK would resort to violence again if their demands were not met. PKK ended its withdrawal on September 9. Three weeks later, the government announced a reform package, removing, for instance, restrictions on the use of the Kurdish language. BDP and PKK officials criticized it as not addressing Kurdish expectations. Despite the political rapprochement, violence continued.

Throughout January, 28 militants were killed by TAF and one soldier was found to be dead amidst clashes in Hakkari and Mardin province and a three-day air campaign involving F-16 jets on the Qandil Mountains in Iraq's Erbil province. Fighter jets repeatedly bombarded PKK positions in Qandil throughout the course of February. On March 4, militants detonated roadside explosives under a military convoy near Lice, Diyarbakir province, injuring four soldiers. On May 17 and 18, TAF again attacked PKK's Qandil bases. About one week later, TAF fired mortar shells at PKK positions in Duhok province, Iraq. On June 3, a gun battle involving a Cobra Attack helicopter, which had ensued from a PKK attack on a military base in Sirnak, left one sergeant injured. On July 3, militants attacked two gendarmerie outposts in Diyarbakir. On November 15, PKK militants assaulted a military convoy with automatic rifles and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) in Nusaybin, Mardin. Since June, militants have repeatedly raided construction sites and abducted workers in Bitlis, Tunceli, Hakkari, Elazig, Sirnak, and Siirt provinces.

Throughout the year, police repeatedly dispersed mass protests in Kurdish areas and Istanbul, using water cannon, teargas, and at times live ammunition. On February 10, for instance, one protester died after being run over by an armored police vehicle in the city of Diyarbakir. On June 27, a group of PKK affiliates hurled Molotov cocktails and stones at police forces in a clash in Cizre, Sirnak. The following day, police dispersed a crowd of 200 protesters in Lice and shot one demonstrator dead. On December 6, demonstrators clashed with police during a rally of 150 people in Yüksekova,

Hakkari, hurling Molotov cocktails and hand grenades. Two protesters sustained fatal injuries after being shot by police forces. During their funeral two days later, which was attended by thousands, police clashed with protesters setting up barricades. One demonstrator died after being hit by a tear gas canister. On December 8, clashes ensued when police dispersed a gathering of some 5,000 people in Diyarbakir, leaving four police officers and at least eight protesters injured. Simultaneously, PKK fighters abducted four soldiers at a roadblock in Lice, releasing them the following day.

YEMEN (AL-HOUSHI REBELS – SUNNI TRIBAL FORCES)

 Intensity: **4** | Change:  | Start: **2011**

Conflict parties: **al-Houthi rebels vs. Sunni tribal forces**Conflict items: **system/ideology, subnational predominance**

The conflict over subnational predominance and ideology between Shiite al-Houthi rebels and Sunni tribal forces, among them Salafist militants, escalated. Those most affected by the conflict were the northern governorates of Amran, Dhamar, Hajjah, al-Hudaydah, Ibb, al-Jawf, and Saada.

Al-Houthi members clashed with armed Sunni tribesmen and militant Salafists on a regular basis. For instance, on May 19, al-Houthi rebels clashed with armed tribesmen in al-Hudaydah, leaving five dead. Another clash between militant Salafists and al-Houthis in Mabrar, Dhamar claimed the life of one al-Houthi member on July 25. Three Salafists were injured. On July 29, a similar clash in al-Radma, Ibb, left two people dead. On August 13, clashes between al-Houthi rebels and Sunni tribesmen erupted after tribesmen reportedly attempted to detain al-Houthi adolescents in al-Ashah, Amran. The fighting left fourteen al-Houthis and five tribesmen dead. Because of ongoing clashes between al-Houthi rebels and Salafist tribesmen, two army battalions were deployed to al-Radma to prevent further clashes [→ Yemen (al-Houthi rebels)]. On September 7, a ceasefire agreement came into force, but lasted only for some hours. Moreover, violent incidents between al-Houthis and Sunni tribesmen continued in other regions. For instance, fights between the Sunni al-Ahmar tribe and al-Houthi fighters in Amran governorate killed approx. 127 when al-Houthis took over areas in al-Osaimat in mid-September. Al-Houthi sources accused the army of fighting on the tribesmen's side. Throughout October, al-Houthi fighters shelled the area of Damaj, Saada, several times.

The conflict escalated from October 30 on when attacks on Damaj intensified. Al-Houthi rebels reportedly used tanks and Katyusha rockets on November 1. The ICRC evacuated residents and demanded a ceasefire. According to local Salafist sources, more than 100 people died in the fights in Damaj from October 30 to November 4. Al-Houthis accused Salafists of trying to get a foothold in the area, of spreading their ideology, and of having recruited foreign Islamist fighters. UN Special Envoy to Yemen Jamal Benomar announced on November 4 a previously negotiated ceasefire. However, the ceasefire lasted for only one day.

On November 7, al-Houthi fighters reportedly deployed BM-21 multiple rocket launcher systems to attack the tribesmen in Damaj. The army intervened in the fights in the Damaj area,

allegedly fighting against al-Houthis. However, the government stated on November 7 that the military tried to end the conflict without supporting any side. Several government attempts to establish a long-lasting ceasefire between the two sides failed, and in most cases ceasefires collapsed the day after they went into effect. Further clashes took place in the area of Kataf, Saada, in November. For instance, on November 20, Salafist fighters clashed with al-Houthi rebels in the area of Kataf, using machine guns and mortars. Throughout the rest of the year, fighting between al-Houthi rebels and Sunni tribes continued in Saada, focusing on Damaj.


Violence spread to Hajjah on December 13 when Salafists clashed with al-Houthi rebels in the town of Fatgga, using artillery, mortars, and machine guns. Some 40 people were killed. Further clashes between local tribesmen and al-Houthi members in Amran claimed the lives of approx. twenty on both sides in mid-December. On December 20, al-Houthi rebels reportedly kidnapped the general secretary of the Sunni al-Islah party, a major opposition party [→Yemen (opposition groups)].

As in 2012, security forces seized several shipments of weapons and ammunition, accusing Iran of supporting the Shiite al-Houthi movement. The remains of the founder of the al-Houthi rebel movement Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi were buried on June 5. Tens of thousands of Shiites attended the funeral. The movement founder had been killed nine years ago in fighting with government troops^{jri}, flr

YEMEN (AQAP, ANSAR AL-SHARIA)

Intensity: **5** | Change: • | Start: **1992**

Conflict parties: AQAP, Ansar al-Sharia vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology, national power



The conflict over national power and the orientation of the political system between al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the linked Islamist militants of Ansar al-Sharia on the one hand, and the government on the other, supported by the USA and so-called Popular Resistance Committee forces (PRCs), remained at war level. Throughout the year, the conflict claimed at least 670 lives, including civilian casualties. AQAP frequently attacked military facilities and checkpoints. Most of the attacks took place in the governorates of al-Bayda, Abyan, Shabwah, and Hadramout and were followed by shootouts between the Islamists and security forces. Government forces conducted a number of large-scale operations against the groups using airplanes and tanks, however they did so to a lesser extent than in the previous year.

AQAP and Ansar al-Sharia intensified their practice of targeted assassinations against state officials. At least 36 military officers and officials, as well as three PRC leaders, were killed throughout the year with peaks in April and October, pre-eminently in Hadramout governorate but also in Abyan, Aden, Bayda, Lahij, Marib, Taiz governorates, and the capital Sanaa.

Several drone strikes, reportedly conducted by the US, killed at least 125 suspected AQAP members throughout the year

in Hadramout, Marib, al-Bayda, Shabwah, Abyan, Lahij, Sanaa, Dhamar and al Jawf governorates.

A major military campaign took place in al-Bayda governorate between January 27 and 29, following failed negotiations to free three European hostages held by AQAP. During the offensive which involved approx. 8,000 soldiers, backed by airstrikes, tanks, and armored vehicles, at least 49 people died on both sides. Some 2,500 people fled their homes before local tribes negotiated a ceasefire. On February 2, after two days of fighting which left 21 militants and six soldiers dead, security forces and PRC members drove Ansar al-Sharia fighters out of the Mojan Mountain area in Abyan. At the beginning of March, President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi stated that he would only consider negotiating with AQAP if they stopped their armed struggle. However, on March 10, the government agreed to a temporary truce with AQAP's affiliate Ansar al-Sharia in return for their assurance to stop assassinating public officials.

On June 5, security forces launched an operation against AQAP in Ghayl Ba Wazir, Hadramout deploying helicopters and tanks. At least three soldiers and seven militants were killed. Three days later, AQAP killed seven soldiers and wounded eleven by using machine guns and rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) in Mukalla, Hadramout.

On July 31, AQAP announced that it would kill members of the State Building Group of the National Dialogue Conference (NDC), who had voted against making Islam the only source of law and legislation in Yemen [→Yemen (opposition); Yemen (SMM)]. Already on July 14, security forces prevented an assassination attempt in Sanaa on Muhammad Ali Ahmed, head of the NDC delegation of the Southern Mobility Movement (SMM). Police found an explosive device attached to his car. According to investigations, AQAP was responsible for the assassination attempt. On August 11, AQAP militants killed five soldiers in an attack on a gas export terminal in Balhaf, Shabwah. In a series of coordinated suicide attacks against three military camps in Shabwah on September 20, AQAP killed 56 soldiers and policemen. On September 30, dozens of AQAP militants stormed an army base and took an unknown number of hostages in Mukalla, Hadramout. Special forces retook the base, after having employed tanks and artillery. Ten soldiers and 25 militants were killed in the course of the operation.

Suspected AQAP members shot a German security official employed by the German embassy in the capital Sanaa on October 6. During August, several embassies from western countries were closed due to security situation warnings. The air force repeatedly bombarded AQAP hideouts in Abyan and al-Bayda during October and November, killing at least 23 militants.

On December 5, AQAP carried out a large scale suicide attack on the Ministry of Defense complex in Sanaa, killing 56 people including soldiers, civilians, a number of foreigners, and injuring approx. 200^{jri}

YEMEN (OPPOSITION GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2011**

Conflict parties: opposition groups vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The violent conflict over national power and the orientation of the political system between opposition groups and the government continued. The opposition consisted among oth-

ers of the Joint Meeting Parties, the Organizing Committee of the Youth Revolution, and tribal forces. As of last year, clashes erupted between the dissolved Republican Guard (RG) and government forces.

In early February, protesters demanded better medical treatment for those injured in clashes with security forces since the start of protests in 2011. One protester set himself on fire, while others went on a hunger strike. On February 11, tens of thousands of protesters took to the streets nationwide, marking the anniversary of the uprising against former president Saleh in 2011. This year, a National Dialogue Conference (NDC), backed by UN Special Adviser on Yemen Jamal Benomar, was held with the aim to mediate in controversial issues such as governance, economic problems, secessionist movements in the south and other armed internal conflicts. Approx. 500 delegates of various parties and tribes as well as religious groups participated in the dialog that started on March 18 [→ Yemen (SMM); Yemen (al-Houthi rebels)]. The conference was interrupted by several violent incidents that left dozens of people dead or wounded. On April 20, the Organizing Committee of the Youth Revolution suspended its protests in capital Sanaa's Change Square, considering several of its goals had been achieved, such as the restructuring of the military. Earlier that month, President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi removed Ahmed Ali Saleh, son of former president Saleh and RG commander, as well as other military officers. On May 2, the National Security Bureau reported that it had discovered a plot to overthrow President Hadi and announced the arrest of several suspects. On May 16, after NDC delegate Fuad al-Himiari had published a document accusing former president Saleh of illegal activities, armed men allegedly affiliated with Saleh stormed his house. On June 2, armed tribesmen stormed a government building in Hajjah governorate in protest against the appointment of a new regional deputy security director by the government. On August 2, former RG soldiers attempted to storm the presidential palace in Sanaa and clashed with the Presidential Guard. Two people died and five were wounded. Throughout the year, thousands of people demonstrated in Sanaa against the immunity granted to former president Saleh in January 2012. For instance, on September 18 and 26, protesters demanded that Saleh should be put on trial. On December 21, the NDC Reconciliation Committee agreed on a two-year extension of the current parliament. On December 23, NDC representatives signed an agreement which paved the way for a new constitution and a federal state. However, the document was rejected by some groups, including a faction of the General People's Congress, the Yemeni Socialist Party, and the Nasserist party.jwi

YEMEN (TRIBES / MARIB)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2012**

Conflict parties: militant tribesmen vs. government

Conflict items: autonomy, system/ideology

The conflict between militant tribesmen and the government over autonomy and the orientation of the political system continued on a violent level. The focal point of the conflict was the oil-rich region in the governorate of Marib. The situation in the area became increasingly unstable following the uprising in 2011. Local tribes, some of them reportedly loyal to former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, opposed reforms by the new government under President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, who came into office in February 2012 [→Yemen (opposition groups)]. Already in 2012, tribesmen had blocked roads, blown up oil pipelines, attacked electricity infrastructure, and clashed with security forces, albeit less frequently. This year, tribesmen reportedly demanded reintegration into the army, better public services, and more autonomy through governorate rights. Tribesmen allegedly belonging to the Jehm, Bani Dhabyan, Murad, Ta'iman, and al-Ayshan as well as other local tribes criticized government reforms, blocked roads, or were involved in attacks on critical infrastructure and clashes with security forces.

At least 32 attacks on oil pipelines occurred this year in Marib. For instance, on September 5, tribesmen blew up an oil pipeline near Sirwah. It was the third attack against oil infrastructure in Marib within two days. Additionally, approx. 30 attacks on electric grids, especially on the power lines between Sanaa and Marib, caused widespread blackouts in the capital and neighboring governorates this year. Because of attacks on the electricity system, the Marib gas-based power station went out of service at least seven times this year. For example, tribesmen cut off both electric circuits of the power station on June 10 and 11. Two days later, military troops were deployed to stop further attacks on the electric grid and to protect engineering teams repairing damages. The day before, security forces had used artillery against tribal militants suspected to be involved in attacks on infrastructure, and destroyed two houses in the Wadi Abida area.

Throughout the year, several clashes between security forces and armed tribesmen left at least thirteen people dead and several wounded. The most violent incident took place on April 8, when a group of tribesmen attacked a military patrol, using rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and killing five soldiers.

Additionally, several shootouts and attacks by militants were reported in the area. However, responsibility often remained unknown. Since al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Ansar al-Sharia, and affiliated tribes were also active in Marib and neighboring governorates, the identification of gunmen remained difficult [→Yemen (AQAP, Ansar al-Sharia)].fr

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FUNDRAISING CAMPAIGN 2013 - REPORT

The first fundraising campaign in HIIK's history started on October 1 and ended on January 31. The goal was to raise EUR 32,000 / USD 43,300 to implement important innovations. With the HIIK reliably publishing the Conflict Barometer annually, we want to consider additional options to provide information about the global development of conflicts for free. One of these planned innovations is an interactive illustration of our research results on our homepage.

The user of the interactive map will be able to pick the region and year of his or her interest. He or she can choose from different visualization options of conflicts dynamics. The tool will allow users to create a customized map and a list of those options of interest. For example, the user might be interested in those intrastate conflicts in the region of Sub-Saharan Africa that escalated by one level and dealt with resources as a conflict item. The user will then be able to download the information for free.

So far, we achieved only a portion of our financial goal. By February 1, the raised amount was EUR 5,423. We are grateful for the support of Ellerbrock Konferenztechnik, Julian-G. Albert, Birgitt Lehnard-Schelenz and Alfred Schelenz, Ursula and Peter Leo Byrne, and all other donors. These funds will help us improve our editing database and constitute a basis for the abovementioned project of the interactive Conflict Barometer.

We hope that we will be able to implement the innovations this year with further contributions.

Simon Ullrich and Laura Schelenz

fundraising@hiik.de

DATABASE CONIAS

The data on which the Conflict Barometer is based has been collected and processed in cooperation between the HIIK and the CONIAS Group, using news archives and other open sources.

The CONIAS database comprises information on all forms of inter- and intrastate political conflicts from 1945 until today. With more than 15,000 conflict-year data, it aims at understanding the dynamics of violent and non-violent conflicts worldwide. CONIAS (Conflict Information System) was developed on the basis of the Conflict Simulation Model (COSIMO) database in the course of two research projects at Heidelberg University, co-financed by the European Union and in cooperation with the HIIK. More information on CONIAS, containing data on affected countries, conflict parties, conflict items, and annual intensities, can be accessed at www.conias.org.

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