



CONFLICT BAROMETER | 2024

Heidelberg Institute for
International Conflict Research



disputes
non-violent crises
violent crises
limited wars
wars

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The HIIK evolved from the 1991 research project COSIMO (Conflict Simulation Model), led by Prof. Dr. Frank R. Pfetsch, University of Heidelberg, and financed by the German Research Foundation (DFG).

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HIK

Heidelberg Institute for
International Conflict Research

CONFLICT BAROMETER 2024

Analyzed Period: 01/01/24 – 12/31/24

PREFACE

With the 33rd edition of the Conflict Barometer, the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK) continues its annual study on global conflict.

Since 1992, the Conflict Barometer has qualitatively and quantitatively recorded the dynamics of political conflicts, both violent and non-violent, worldwide. In accordance with the HIIK methodology, violent conflicts are classified according to their intensity into violent crises (intensity 3), limited wars (intensity 4), and wars (intensity 5). Non-violent conflicts are divided into disputes (intensity 1) and non-violent crises (intensity 2). The annual report is supplemented by conflict maps, graphics, and datasets as well as Spotlight texts that shed light on the wider context of current conflict dynamics.

In 2024, the HIIK and its 191 researchers documented a total of 365 conflicts worldwide, an overall increase of four conflicts. Of these, 209 were violent (accounting to 57 percent) and 156 non-violent. While 48 conflicts escalated and 53 de-escalated, 264 conflicts remained with the same intensity as in 2023. The HIIK opened three new conflicts in 2024 and five more retroactively. Compared to the previous year, the number of wars rose from 21 to 27. The Ethiopia (Fano militias / Amhara) conflict, the inter-communal rivalry conflict in Sudan, various conflicts in Myanmar (four in total), as well as the Israel – Lebanon conflict, the opposition conflict in Syria, and the Syria (SDF – Türkiye / Northern Syria) conflict escalated into wars. One war de-escalated, while 18 wars continued. The number of limited wars increased by one from 22 to 23 in 2024. The number of non-violent conflicts rose from 139 to 156. Twelve conflicts were settled by the conflict parties themselves or closed due to inactivity. As in previous years, the most common types of conflict were intrastate (242 conflicts), followed by interstate conflicts (60 conflicts), substate (47 conflicts), and transstate conflicts (16 conflicts). While the number of intrastate conflicts increased by three, interstate and transstate conflicts remained constant compared to the previous year. Substate conflicts, in contrast, decreased by one. The most common of the ten methodically followed conflict items, material or immaterial goods which are sought by the direct conflict actors through conflict measures, were system/ideology (in 162 conflicts), resources (in 104 conflicts), and subnational predominance (in 92 conflicts).

We recognize that this Conflict Barometer comes at a very late point of the year - a shortcoming that we mostly have to attribute to various technical issues with our software systems, major conflicts we had to research completely new again, and personal issues on various fronts. We understand that many international stakeholders rely on the data the HIIK provides and that the interested public or researchers from around the world have been waiting for the whole year, often left in the dark about the final date of publication. Our hands have been tied in many cases, but we deeply apologize to our readers and to our own researchers for this tremendous delay, analysed our own shortcomings, and are back on track to publish the Conflict Barometer of 2025 on time again.

The Board of Directors would like to thank all editors, heads of regional working groups, and everyone else who contributed to this report for their outstanding efforts, especially during the final stages of editing. Without your commitment, a publication like this would be impossible. When time resources seem to be more limited than ever, voluntary efforts spent on a project like this become even more extraordinary.

The Board of Directors of the HIIK overseeing the 2024 Conflict Barometer

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Heidelberg, December 2025

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Methodology

METHODOLOGY


Since 1991, conflict research at HIIK has analyzed political conflicts by focusing on conflict processes rather than purely quantitative thresholds of casualties. Thus, HIIK's methodology is based on a set of specified actions and acts of communication between conflict parties. This process-oriented approach enriches the analysis of political conflicts with a broader and more detailed empirical foundation.

Located at Heidelberg University, HIIK has continuously taken steps to further elaborate its methodological approach. Notably, in 2011 the institute revised its definition of political conflicts and restructured its conflict intensity assessment. The latter now accounts for not only the intensity of a given conflict area in a given year, but also determines the intensity of a conflict for first-level subnational political units and per month. As such, it allows for a much more detailed measurement of conflict dynamics.

Furthermore, conflict actions and acts of communication can be operationalized with the help of qualitative and quantitative indicators of the means and consequences of violence. This allows for a more comprehensive overview of political dynamics and intensities.

Most recently, in 2017, HIIK introduced the concept of inactive conflicts to widen the span of observed cases and create space for dormant dynamics that may become active again within three years. These changes have further enhanced the accuracy, reliability, and reproducibility of the conflict information provided.

HIIK's Basic Concept of Political Conflict



According to HIIK's approach, a political conflict is an incompatibility of intentions between at least individual or collective actors. Such an incompatibility emerges in the form of observable and interrelated actions and acts of communication (measures) with regard to certain positional differences of values (issues) relevant to society and threatening (the continuity of) state functions or the international order. Actors, measures, and issues are the constitutive attributes of political conflict.

METHODOLOGY

CONFLICT ACTORS

Conflict actors are collective actors or individuals as part of a collective in direct pursuit of a conflict item, which are acknowledged by other conflict actors in their decision-making processes and are thus perceived to be relevant. Their actions must in turn provoke reaction; there must be reciprocity between actors to fulfill the definition. Collective actors such as states, international organizations, and non-state actors share a certain level of unitary conception, internal cohesion and a common structure of preferences. Actors may be considered as a coalition if their preferences are on the same side of a conflict dynamic and contrary to those of another actor or coalition. There may also be indirect actors involved: so-called supporters help a direct actor to claim or aspire to the conflict item, while so-called interveners wish to end the conflict without supporting either coalition in their actions regarding the item.

CONFLICT MEASURES

Conflict measures are actions and acts of communication carried out by a conflict actor in the context of a political conflict. They are constitutive for a conflict and its intensity if they occur outside established regulatory procedures and – possibly in conjunction with other measures – if they threaten the international order or a core function of the state or have the prospect to do so. Established regulatory procedures are defined as those mechanisms of conflict management that are accepted by all conflict actors in their respective context and performed without the use or threat of physical violence. Examples of conflict regulations include elections, court proceedings, public fora, round tables, or other forms of negotiations. Core state functions encompass the provision of security for a given population, as well as the guarantee of integrity of a given territory and of a specific political, socioeconomic, or cultural order. If, from a conflict actor's point of view, the fulfilment of state functions or the maintenance of the local or global order cannot be upheld, established procedures are threatened.

CONFLICT ISSUES

Conflict issues are material or immaterial goods pursued by conflict actors via conflict measures. They can become relevant for the entire society if they impact the coexistence of individuals or groups within a given polity or the relations between polities. Conflict issues are classified on the basis of ten items representing common objectives of conflict actors: (i) System/Ideology is encoded if a conflict actor aspires to change the ideological, religious, socioeconomic or judicial orientation of the political system or of the regime type itself. (ii) National Power refers to the power to govern a state, whereas (iii) Autonomy refers to attaining or extending the political self-rule of a population within a state or of a dependent territory without striving for independence. (iv) Secession refers to the aspired separation of a territory of a state aiming to establish a new state or to merge with another state. Furthermore, the goal of (v) Decolonization is the independence of a dependent territory. (vi) Subnational Predominance focuses on the attainment of the de-facto control by a government or a non-state actor over a territory or a population. The item (vii) Resources is encoded if the possession of raw materials, pasture, or the profits gained thereof, are pursued. (viii) Territory refers to a contested change of the delimitation of an international border. (ix)

International Power as an item describes an aspired shift in the power constellation in the international system or a regional system therein, through the change of military or institutional capabilities, related violent measures, or of an actor's political or economic influence. The item (x) Other is used as a residual category. Conflict actors can have multiple demands, and thus claim more than one item at the same time.

CONFLICT TYPES

IIK's methodology distinguishes between interstate, intrastate, substate, and transstate conflicts. While interstate conflicts only involve internationally recognized state actors, intrastate conflicts involve both state actors and non-state actors. Statehood is viewed as non-contested if the state is an official UN member state; states with limited recognition that are recognized by at least one other official UN member state are marked with a °. Substate conflicts are carried out solely among non-state actors. Transstate conflicts involve at least two sovereign states, both of which meet the criteria of a political conflict, and (at least) one non-state actor. This means that the actors are in conflict with each other and pursue their goals through conflict measures on the territory of at least two states.

CONFLICT START, INACTIVITY AND CLOSURE

When assessing levels of violence, IIK differentiates between violent and non-violent conflicts. A conflict is observed in the Conflict Barometer if it fulfills the minimum criteria defining a conflict. It may start at any level of intensity, therefore also at a non-violent level. As the start date, we define the day of the first recorded constitutive measure. Conflicts may be opened in retrospect.

Should the basic conflict criteria be fulfilled but no active measures can be observed at any specific time, a conflict's status can be set to inactive. An inactive conflict only comprises so-called persistent measures in which claims and goals are not renewed but implied without actions or statements, such as the tacit stipulation of a goal in a charter or effective declaration of the actor, dormant territorial demands or ongoing demobilization processes. The absence of reporting within this period is an indicator for continued inactivity. After 24 months of inactivity, a conflict is usually seen as passively closed at the end of the year, unless a re-occurrence of any violent or non-violent measures continues to be likely.


A conflict is actively closed if the basic conflict criteria are no longer fulfilled, with a set date of closure that justifies the decision. This may be the day a peace agreement is enforced between all conflict actors, for instance. Other forms of closure include the annihilation of a conflict actor, its dissolution, or unification with another.

ASSESSING THE INTENSITIES OF VIOLENT CONFLICTS

THE CONCEPT OF CONFLICT INTENSITY

intensity Level	terminology	level of violence	intensity class
1	dispute	non-violent conflicts	low intensity
2	non-violent crisis		
3	violent crisis	violent conflicts	medium intensity
4	limited war		high intensity
5	war		

In order to measure the three levels of violent conflict, five proxies are used to indicate their means and consequences. The dimension of means encompasses the use of weapons and deployment of personnel, the dimension of consequences, the number of casualties, refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), and the level of destruction.



Each indicator is scored on a ternary scale. Aggregating the five individual scores results in the total regional monthly intensity (RMI). The regions are the first-level administrative units of a country.

		conflict means		
		0 points	1 point	2 points
conflict consequences	0 points	violent crisis	violent crisis	limited war
	1 point	violent crisis	limited war	war
	2 points	limited war	war	war

WEAPONS

		weapons employment	
		light	heavy
weapon type	light	0 points	
	heavy	1 point	2 points

The weapons indicator determines whether light or heavy arms are used (e.g. handguns or hand grenades vs. artillery or heavy bombs, respectively). Regarding the extent to which the fighting capacity of heavy arms is exploited, we differentiate between limited and extensive use. The former is characterized by a light exertion of violence compared to its actual capacity, the latter by a powerful exertion of violence.

PERSONNEL

low	medium	high
≤ 50	> 50 ≤ 400	> 400
0 points	1 point	2 points

The personnel indicator measures the highest number of participants in an individual measure. All persons are counted who, by their engagement in a concerted action, represent a conflict actor in the context of a violent measure. Low, medium, and high numbers of personnel are distinguished, based on two thresholds: 50 and 400 persons.

CASUALTIES

low	medium	high
≤ 20	> 20 ≤ 60	> 60
0 points	1 point	2 points

Third, the overall number of casualties in the conflict in a region per month is counted, comprising the number of deaths from violent measures or their direct consequences. They include combatants as well as civilians who were injured or killed. Persons dying due to indirect effects, e.g. starvation or disease, are not included. The thresholds employed for the indicator are 20 and 60 persons killed.

REFUGEES & IDPs

low	medium	high
≤ 1 000	> 1 000 ≤ 20 000	> 20 000
0 points	1 point	2 points

Fourth, the overall number of cross-border refugees and IDPs in a region per month is tallied. Displacement is defined as the migration of human beings provoked by conflict measures, e.g. by the creation of inhumane living conditions. Taken into account is flow, not stock data. The thresholds employed for the indicator are 1,000 and 20,000 refugees, respectively.

DESTRUCTION

low	medium	high
within 0 dimensions	within 1 - 2 dimensions	within 3 - 4 dimensions
0 points	1 point	2 points

Lastly, destruction resulting from the conflict in a region per month is determined by four dimensions that are considered essential for civilian populations: (civilian and military) infrastructure, habitation, economy/self-sufficiency, and identity-establishing goods. The level of destruction is classified as low, medium, or high, depending on the number of dimensions affected. Any form of destruction counted within this indicator has to be on a massive scale, i.e. the damaged object must be crucial for the functioning of the category in question.

UP- AND DOWNGRADING

Regional monthly intensities (RMIs, see above) are the first pillar for determining the yearly conflict intensity of a specific conflict region (region/year intensity) as well as the overall yearly conflict area intensity (area/year intensity). A conflict area usually equals an internationally recognized country and is the sum of all subnational units affected by the respective conflict. Typically, the area/year intensity is equal to the highest RMI in a given area per year. As such, intensities of a certain spatiotemporal unit would directly translate to a corresponding yearly conflict intensity level. However, methodological issues such as a considerable variance in the size of administrative regions might threaten the comparability between different conflicts on the same intensity level. Thus, up- and downgrading becomes the determining factor when reassessing the given RMIs, if violence occurred. For instance, two conflicts might have an area/year intensity of a violent crisis according to the assessment based on the first pillar. The first conflict accounted for 30 casualties in three RMIs with ten fatalities each, while the second conflict accounted for more than 370 casualties in 37 RMIs. In this case, it might be disproportional to assign the same conflict intensity to both conflicts. Therefore, we apply up- and downgrading rules – the second pillar of our conflict intensity assessment –, which allows us to fine-tune conflict intensities to ensure comparability.

This decision is based on the conflicts' annual and area-wide numbers of refugees and IDPs, and casualties. A violent crisis must thereby be upgraded to the level of a limited war if more than 360 casualties or more than 18,000 refugees and IDPs were counted in the whole year in the conflict area. A limited war must be upgraded to the level of a war if more than 1,080 casualties or more than 360,000 refugees and IDPs were counted. In contrast, a limited war must be downgraded to the level of a violent crisis if less than 120 casualties and less than 6,000 refugees and IDPs were counted. Likewise, a war must be downgraded to the level of a limited war if less than 360 casualties and less than 120,000 refugees and IDPs were counted. In the Conflict Barometer, the area/year intensity is displayed above each conflict description and in the regional conflict overview.

Updated in 2020 by:


Katharina Valjak, Mostafa Bostani, Hannah Brandt, Nathalie Brügger

Methodology Revision in 2011 by:


Nicholas Schwank, Thomas Wencker, Christoph Trinn, Stefan Giersdorf, Lotta Mayer, Natalie Hoffmann, Mark Gombert, Jens Hoffmann, Gregor Pawlowski

Global Conflict Panorama

CONFLICTS IN 2024 (NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEVEL)



VIOLENT CONFLICTS IN 2024 (SUBNATIONAL LEVEL)



INTENSITY

- 5 WAR
- 4 LIMITED WAR
- 3 VIOLENT CRISIS

MARITIME CONFLICTS IN 2024



HIGHLY VIOLENT CONFLICTS IN 2024

LIMITED WARS (23)

WARS (27)

WEST ASIA, NORTH AFRICA, AND AFGHANISTAN

Israel, Lebanon (Hezbollah)	Israel (Hamas et al.)
Syria (inter-opposition rivalry)	Israel – Lebanon
Syria (IS)	Israel – State of Palestine° (PNA)
Türkiye (PKK, KCK)	Syria (opposition)
Yemen, Saudi Arabia (al-Houthi forces)	Syria (SDF – Türkiye / Northern Syria)

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Burkina Faso (inter-communal rivalry)	Cameroon (English-speaking minority)
Central African Republic (militant groups)	DR Congo (Ituri militias)
DR Congo (Mobondo – Teke)	DR Congo (M23 factions)
Ethiopia (inter-communal rivalry)	DR Congo, Uganda (ADF)
Ethiopia (OLA / Oromia)	Ethiopia (Fano militias / Amhara)
Mali (CSP-PSD, CMA et al. / Azawad)	Mali, Burkina Faso et al. (JNIM, ISGS et al.)
Mozambique (ASWJ)	Niger, Mali et al. (IS Sahel)
Nigeria (ISWAP – JAS)	Nigeria (bandits)
Somalia (Puntland – Somaliland)	Nigeria, Chad et al. (ISWAP)
Somalia (subclan rivalry)	Nigeria, Chad et al. (JAS – Boko Haram)
	Somalia, Kenya (al-Shabaab)
	South Sudan (inter-communal rivalry)
	Sudan (Darfur)
	Sudan (inter-communal rivalry)
	Sudan (opposition)

THE AMERICAS

Colombia (FARC dissidents)	Haiti (inter-gang rivalry)
Colombia (inter-cartel rivalry, neo-paramilitary groups, left-wing militants)	
Mexico (inter-cartel rivalry, paramilitary groups)	

ASIA AND OCEANIA

Bangladesh (opposition)	Myanmar (AA / Rakhine State)
India (Naxalites)	Myanmar (KIA, KIO / Kachin State)
Myanmar (MNDAA / Shan State)	Myanmar (KNU, KNLA, KNDO et. al. / Karen State, Kayah State)
Myanmar (Rohingya)	Myanmar (opposition)
Pakistan (Islamist militant groups)	Myanmar (TNLA / Shan State)

EUROPE


Russia – Ukraine

GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT


This text will be made available within April 2026.

GLOBAL CONFLICT INTENSITIES IN 2024 COMPARED TO 2023


■ 2023
■ 2024




FREQUENCY OF REGIONAL CONFLICT INTENSITIES IN 2024 AND 2023




FREQUENCY OF CONFLICT INTENSITIES BY CONFLICT TYPE IN 2024 AND 2023



GLOBAL CONFLICT INTENSITY CHANGES IN 2024



FREQUENCY OF CONFLICT INTENSITIES BY CONFLICT ITEM IN 2024



AUTHORITATIVE DECISIONS BY THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

This text will be made available within April 2026.

Spotlights

CLIMATE CHANGE AS A CONFLICT CATALYST BEYOND THE “THREAT MULTIPLIER”

From ethnic clashes in Nigeria to violence against state representatives in flood-stricken Spain, 2024 offered a stark reminder that climate change is not just an environmental issue but a catalyst for conflict. The “threat multiplier” concept builds on foundational insights such as Homer-Dixon’s (1999) Environmental Conflict Theory, which identifies environmental degradation, population pressure, and unequal access to resources as key drivers of conflict. Homer-Dixon’s concept of the “ingenuity gap” refers to the disparity between a society’s increasing need for innovative solutions to complex problems and its actual capacity. The ingenuity gap as a structural mechanism reveals how institutional limitations can undermine a society’s ability to adapt to environmental stress and thus leave them unaddressed. This results in weakened governance structures, which in turn exacerbates resource competition, and increases the likelihood and intensity of social unrest.

Other scholars and activists include Scheffran et al. (2012, 869-871), who have similarly conceptualized climate change as a nonlinear risk amplifier. Scheffran’s cascading risk model (2020, 19-48) shows how climate events like drought or flooding can interact with grievances and exclusion to destabilize governance and incite violence.

Building on a human security framework, Caballero-Anthony (2018) illustrates how climate-driven disasters in Southeast Asia – such as typhoons, rising sea levels, and food insecurity – translate into concrete security challenges such as migration, resource conflicts, and interstate tensions. This perspective is further enriched by Shiva’s (2016) analysis, which situates environmental breakdown within the broader context of structural violence. She highlights how ecological dispossession – particularly the loss of access to water, soil, and seed sovereignty – creates latent conflict dynamics that may be activated or intensified by climate shocks. When such shocks occur in contexts marked by extractivist, unjust, or dysfunctional governance, the potential for escalation is significantly heightened. UN Secretary-General Guterres has echoed this shift by referring to climate change as both a “threat” and “crisis multiplier,” implicitly acknowledging its potential to act as a proximate cause of conflict (Guterres, 2021, 3-5).

In summary, the concept of climate change as a “threat multiplier” has gained prominence across scholarly, policy, and security domains, over the past two decades (Goodman et al. in CNA, 2007, 6, 44; Guterres, 2021, 3-5). While analytically useful, this framework tends to name climate change a secondary influence. While we do not contend this framework, we stress that, in recent years, climate change has increasingly acted as a central catalyst of conflict – a dynamic evident across diverse regions and conflict types. The following empirical cases show how environmental stress, when combined with factors including but not limited to institutional fragility, socio-political exclusion, inadequate infrastructures, and/or dysfunctional governance, can overwhelm a society’s capacity to cope and/or adapt. We have found that this can directly drive conflict intensity to violent levels—and worryingly, the likelihood of such escalations appears poised to grow as climate change continues to accelerate.

CLIMATE CHANGE AS CATALYST: THE JANUARY 2024 MANGU VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA

Nigeria (Plateau State) – January 2024 (Sahelian drought) – Resource scarcity → Communal violence:

In January 2024, deadly violence erupted in Mangu District, Plateau State, Nigeria, where Fulani Muslim herders – as attributed by the Mwaghavul Development Association (MDA) –killed at least 30 people dead and left many more wounded (Reuters, 2024; Al Jazeera, 2024). While this occurred within Nigeria’s long-standing farmer-herder tensions [→ Nigeria (farmers – pastoralists)], the Mangu case starkly illustrates how climate change acted as a direct trigger rather than a background factor.

Mangu lies in Nigeria’s Middle Belt, a zone where Fulani Muslim pastoralists and predominantly Christian farming communities have long competed over land and water (Bonews, 2024). Due to increasing desertification in the Sahelian north, Fulani herders have migrated further south in search of viable grazing land (Global Centre for R2P, 2024). Simultaneously, expanding agriculture in Plateau State has reduced the availability of such land. By 2023, erratic rainfall and prolonged dry seasons had exacerbated environmental stress and resource scarcity (CJID/ICIR, 2024).

This ecological pressure sharply intensified competition. As herders entered farmlands, disputes over grazing paths or damaged crops escalated into cycles of violence. Local leaders directly linked the violence to pressure from desertification and the influx of northern pastoralists (Tribune, 2024). Fertile land, once shared, became a zero-sum asset under climate stress.

Crucially, this conflict was not driven by environmental stress alone. Weak governance and institutional failure enabled escalation (Amnesty International, 2024; Al Jazeera, 2024; Bonews, 2024). Land tenure insecurity further compounded the crisis. Nigeria’s ambiguous legal framework allows overlapping claims, and there are few mechanisms to mediate disputes or compensate damages (Bonews, 2024). Fulani herders, often perceived as “settlers,” face systemic exclusion, while indigenous farmers feel their land is being seized. Misinformation, circulated especially via social media, fueled distrust and communal polarization (CJID/ICIR, 2024).

As pasture and water sources dwindled, both sides felt existentially threatened. In this context, the Mangu case exemplifies how climate stress amplifies pre-existing tensions into open violence. Environmental degradation, population pressure, and socio-political exclusion intersected to turn resource competition into ethnic conflict – a clear embodiment of Homer-Dixon’s Environmental Conflict Theory and the “threat multiplier” logic (Homer-Dixon, 1999; CNA, 2007). Importantly, climate change did not operate as a mere secondary influence. It functioned as a proximate trigger – without the Sahelian drought and shrinking grazing land, Fulani migration into Mangu would likely not have occurred at this scale. As noted by the Global Centre for R2P (2024), climate change has driven herders into the Middle Belt, igniting fierce competition and deadly outcomes.

VALENCIA 2024: A CLIMATE DISASTER AS CATALYST FOR CIVIL UNREST

Spain (Valencia region) – November 2024 (Mediterranean flooding; DANA) – Deadly floods → Mass protests with clashes:

In November 2024, a DANA (Isolated Depression at High Levels) triggered record-breaking torrential rains in the Valencia region, resulting in over 200 deaths, thousands

evacuated, and widespread destruction. Rainfall exceeded 700mm in a matter of hours – equivalent to the average annual precipitation in Valencia (approx. 470–500mm), falling in less than a day – causing rivers to overflow and paralyzing infrastructure (AEMET, 2024). While the event was clearly linked to climate change, the public expressed most outrage towards the institutional response, widely perceived as delayed and inadequate (El País, 2024a).

The emergency alert system (ES-Alert) was not activated until many areas were already flooded. Regional president Carlos Mazón joined the emergency coordination meeting hours after the crisis had begun (eldiario.es, 2024). The request for military rescue teams (UME) also came late and no official suspension of work activities was issued, leaving many people trapped during commutes or at work (RTVE, 2024a). These failures created a widespread perception that many of the deaths could have been prevented.

This public outrage aligns with what Homer-Dixon calls the “ingenuity gap” – the growing divide between the complexity of emerging challenges (like climate-induced disasters) and a society’s institutional capacity to respond to them (Homer-Dixon, 1999). In Valencia, the delay in response, lack of coordination, and underestimation of risk exemplified this structural shortfall. As a result, the crisis evolved from a natural disaster into a crisis of public trust.

Anger quickly turned into mass mobilization. On November 9, more than 130,000 people marched through Valencia’s city center, demanding resignations and justice (El País, 2024b). Organized by over 40 civil society groups, the demonstration featured slogans like “We’re covered in mud, you’re covered in blood”, symbolizing the perceived betrayal by authorities. The protest was largely peaceful, but small radicalized groups clashed with riot police, throwing mud, flares, and debris at government buildings. Police responded with batons and charges, resulting in 31 injured officers and 4 arrests (RTVE, 2024b; La Vanguardia, 2024).

The unrest spread to other cities. In Alicante, thousands joined solidarity marches with banners calling the regional government “murderers” (Público, 2024). In Madrid, 300 protesters gathered in Puerta del Sol chanting “Mazón is eating and people are dying” (20minutos, 2024).

Tensions escalated further during official visits to the disaster zones, where the King, Queen, regional president, and Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez were met with hostile crowds. Protesters hurled mud and objects at the delegations, injuring and accusing them of negligence and abandonment (Político, 2024). These incidents illustrate how climate-induced disasters, when perceived as mismanaged, can provoke direct and increasingly violent expressions of dissent against national leadership.

Importantly, the public’s hostility occurred against a backdrop of mounting political tensions in Spain. Over the past decades, and particularly in recent years, the country has grappled with numerous corruption scandals and instances of governmental mismanagement, eroding public trust in political institutions. Notable cases include the Correa (alias Gürtel) case, one of the largest corruption scandals in recent European history, as well as the 2023 vote-buying scandal and other systemic issues within Spain’s electoral processes. Spain’s exposure to such cascading risks is compounded by its underlying geographic vulnerability and political landscape, echoing Scheffran’s concept. It contains the most arid regions in Europe, with areas such as Almería receiving only 150-200mm of rain annually, levels characteristic of desert climates (AEMET, 2023; Geiger, 1954; Olcina Cantos & Ayala Carcedo, 2017). Mediterranean climate projections

indicate a rise in high-intensity rainfall events following prolonged droughts, a dynamic particularly hazardous in semi-arid zones where soil impermeability amplifies runoff and flash flood risk (EEA, 2023). The 2024 Valencia floods exemplify how such climatic stressors, when met with institutional shortcomings, can escalate into social unrest. From the perspective of Homer-Dixon’s ingenuity gap, the Spanish case reveals a significant mismatch between the complexity of environmental threats and the capacity of institutions to respond effectively. In comparison to Northern and Central European states – where civil protection systems have often been more adaptive and proactive – Spain’s reactive posture, fragmented emergency coordination, and delays in communication highlight critical structural weaknesses. These deficits not only intensified the immediate human and infrastructural impact of the floods but also acted as catalysts for political contest, exposing the fragility of governance in the face of compounding climate and legitimacy crises.

CONCLUSION

The cases of Mangu and Valencia demonstrate how climate change is no longer merely a background amplifier of risk but can function as a proximate catalyst of violence and civil unrest. In both contexts, environmental shocks interacted with governance gaps, social exclusion, institutional fragility, and infrastructure failure – aligning closely with environmental conflict theory and the ingenuity gap framework. Similar dynamics emerged in 2024 in Mozambique, where Cyclone Chido displaced over 450,000 people and triggered unrest in Cabo Delgado (UNHCR, 2024), in Pakistan’s Sindh province (Al Jazeera, 2025), and in Algeria’s city of Tiarat (France24, 2024). These examples indicate a broader global trend – as climate extremes intensify, so too do the political and social consequences of inadequate adaptation.

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INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS: MANEUVERING WITHIN THE SYSTEM OF MULTIPLE CRISES

International conflicts, as a subject matter of international relations, policymaking, and policy research, have interdependencies with global issues in the economy, finance, energy, environment, migration, resources, and society. This spotlight text aims to analyze the position of international conflicts in the system of multiple crises. The first section studies the connection between global inflation and the massive sanctions introduced against Russia after the beginning of the Ukraine crisis. The second section explores how the great power conflict impacts ideological, economic, and financial issues at regional or international scale.

GLOBAL INFLATION CRISIS

Undoubtedly, the most catastrophic consequence of violent conflicts, such as the Russia – Ukraine war, is that of human casualties, especially of military personnel (Uribe-Neira, et al. 2024). From the very beginning of the conflict, however, there were also significant repercussions on economics. Immediately after the military intervention started on February 24, 2022, a coalition of Western states imposed numerous economic sanctions on Russian entities and individuals [→ Russia – Ukraine; 2022], creating a drastic shift in international trade dynamics. The total number of sanctions adopted against Russia amounted to 24,387 as of January 2025. This is put into perspective in comparison to other conflict-related sanctions against Iran 5,475 [→ Iran – USA] and North Korea 2,233 [→ Japan, South Korea, USA – North Korea] (Castellum.AI 2025). The most significant consequence of sanctions against Russia was the global acceleration of inflation, which has not yet returned to its pre-crisis level. A key component of this acceleration was wheat price, which increased dramatically due to a series of measures: 1) sanctions on financial transactions with Russian banks, on its access to the global payment messaging network SWIFT, on marine insurance, and on complicated wheat export from Russia, a top world wheat exporter, which created negative expectations on financial markets; 2) the Black Sea military blockade which stopped Ukrainian grain wheat supply, but which was re-established in July 2022; 3) the indirect costs of freight, fuel and fertilizer, which further hiked the wheat price. The wheat price became even higher when some countries started introducing export embargos on this product. For example, on May 16, 2022, after India announced export restrictions, wheat price hit a new record on the European markets (Le Monde 2022) at almost double the previous year's figure; on May 23, 2022, a quotation was 541 USD/tonne, and a year before was 280 USD/tonne (Agricultural Market Information System 2022). High wheat prices and the food crisis more generally created public disturbance. This is particularly felt in the Global South, where share of food in household expenditures, as in other LMICs, is approx. 40-50% (Valdes 2023). One of the examples is large-scale violent protests over inflation, food, and fuel storages started in 2022 in Sri Lanka [→ Sri Lanka (opposition); 2022] and reactivated in January 2024 [→ Sri Lanka (opposition)]. The highest food price inflation was recorded in September 2022 at 94.9 percent (Trading Economics 2025). The food crisis was caused by minimal foreign currency reserves and the country's inability to import fuel, which raised prices for food transportation and consequently for food prices. The situation worsened due to the global inflation crisis. While food prices decreased considerably throughout 2023, in

January 2024, the protests occurred again due to increased taxes and high costs for electricity and fuel.

Another serious consequence of massive sanctions was increased energy costs (oil, gas, electricity). The prices, already up in comparison to the second half of 2021 due to opening economies after COVID-19 lockdowns, spiked after the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis with further increases throughout 2022 and 2023. For example, the steepest increase in energy costs among the EU zone was demonstrated in the following countries: between August 2021 and January 2023 in Estonia, the gas price increase was 150%, for electricity 131%; in the Netherlands the gas price increase was 116%, for electricity 131%; in Denmark the gas price increase was 138%, for electricity 64% (Fulvimari, et al. 2023). Even if, in 2024, the prices had stabilized, these prices remain far higher than the pre-crisis level. Indeed, if the Consumer Price Index was at 109 points in June 2021, in December 2024, it was at 131 points, where the reference value set to 100 points was given to the year 2015 (Trading Economics 2024). The population's purchasing power was eroded severely, and the protests started in 2022 and 2023 over a cost-of-living crisis and continued into 2024. For example, in November 2024, thousands of Greek public and private-sector workers, along with trade unions, organized a strike over the high cost of living and low wages [→ Greece (social protests, left-wing militants)]. Moreover, a cost-of-living crisis led to increased social polarization and extremism, as generally, there are growing anti-immigration sentiments in countries affected by the economic recession. In fact, in 2024, right and far-right political parties made significant gains in several national elections across Europe, for example, in France, Portugal, Belgium, and Austria (Euronews 2024). Moreover, in August 2024, anti-immigration, far-right violent riots occurred in 27 towns and cities in the UK after a British citizen of Rwandan origin killed three school-aged girls and injured ten others. The authorities arrested approx. 1,200 protesters and charged more than 400 (BBC 2025), after over 100 police officers were injured (Reuters 2024). Research evidenced that not only immigration issues but also inflation, the cost-of-living crisis, and latent distrust in institutions caused violent public disturbance across the UK (The Guardian 2024).

This section has illustrated the following logical consequences: the Ukraine crisis → massive sanctions → increased food and energy prices worldwide → global inflation → a cost-of-living crisis → social polarization and extremism → violent protests. Multiple connected political, social, and economic crises make each issue more complex to resolve. Highlighting the root cause permits policymakers to formulate the most appropriate policy to respond adequately to crises.

INTERNATIONAL POWER CRISIS

In the previous section, we explored the economic consequences of the Ukraine crisis, which is part of a broader conflict over international power between Western countries and BRICS members [→ EU, USA, et al. – Russia; China – USA]. The BRICS members, especially China and Russia, propose their own geopolitical agenda and compete for a better strategic position in the international system. The confrontation has three dimensions: ideological, economic, and financial. The ideological level comprises narratives on sovereignty and foreign influence. Thus, the Western bloc's program includes the displacement of authoritarian and corrupted powers and gives voice to oppressed people by

implementing democracy and human rights, even if this interferes in the domestic policy of one's state by creating and financing the opposition forces, such as non-governmental organizations and alternative media outlets. The antagonistic idea is that this "support" does not truly represent a public voice, the proposed ideas are far from the real needs of the population and serve only to expand the Western influence worldwide. The confrontation between the USA, EU, and others, on the one hand, and China and Russia, on the other, over international power, stretched further to other countries that should choose which coalition to join. For example, in April 2024, the Georgian parliament introduced a law on transparency of foreign influence, leading to violent protests between the government and the opposition. The level of violence increased after the parliamentary elections, in which the ruling party, in favor of the law on foreign influence, had won [→ Georgia (opposition)]. Similarly, in April 2024, after numerous parliament discussions, the Kyrgyz president signed a law on "foreign representatives" that regulates NGOs receiving funding from abroad. However, the regulation did not cause any disorders, and the conflict remained at the non-violent level [→ Kyrgyzstan (opposition)].

Another dimension of the confrontation between the Western bloc and the BRICS members is economic. To challenge the rising ambitions of Russia and China, Western countries use economic warfare instruments such as sanctions and tariffs. Another economic tool used to achieve geopolitical goals is foreign direct investments in strategic sectors and infrastructure. These instruments can also be defined as geoeconomic, a phenomenon already known throughout history but which gained crucial importance in recent years due to the confrontation between the US and China. Geoeconomics is the ability of governments to use economic relationships to enforce their demands on foreign entities over which they have no direct legal control (Clayton, Maggiori and Schreger 2023). When the cost of a direct armed conflict is too high, major powers resort to such methods to influence another international actor. For example, within its Belt and Road Initiative, China provides developing countries with massive funding for power plants, the mining sector, airports, and other crucial infrastructure projects in exchange for, among other things, political support, persuading developing countries to withdraw diplomatic recognition of Taiwan [→ China (Taiwan°)]. For example, in 2017, Panama cut diplomatic ties with Taiwan in favor of China; in 2018, the Dominican Republic; in 2021, Nicaragua, and in 2024, Nauru (Bock 2024).

Moreover, along with the above-mentioned geoeconomic instruments, rising powers such as Russia, China, and, more generally, BRICS countries create alternative financial infrastructure for cross-border transactions. For example, due to the sanctions introduced by the US and the EU on the Russian financial sector, dollars and euros amounted to the smallest share (18,6 percent) for the export of goods from Russia in 2024, while currencies of "friendly" to Russia countries amounted to 40,2 percent. In settlements for import, dollars and euros also took the smallest share for the first time (RBC 2025). In October 2024, at the BRICS Summit, the members supported Russian initiatives to use domestic currencies to facilitate trade and finance and create a more multipolar financial system. Another attempt to "de-dollarize" the international financial system is the Chinese Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS), which includes 169 direct and 1467 indirect participants located in 119 countries. The annual transaction volume on CIPS increased by 80 percent since 2022 (The GeoEconomics Center 2025). However, the

share of foreign exchange transactions in renminbi amounts to only 7 percent, while in dollars 88 percent, and in euros 31 percent, taking into consideration that each transaction includes two currencies and the sum of shares in individual currencies will total 200 percent. In other words, the dollar remains the primary vehicle currency in global finance in the near and medium term, however, there is a moderate declining trend in the long term due to the numerous attempts launched in recent years by other international actors (The GeoEconomics Center 2025). Indeed, all these initiatives received the attention of US President Donald Trump, who threatened to impose 100 percent tariffs on BRICS nations if they create a rival currency to the US dollar (BBC 2024). This measure could end with a more intense trade war, bringing devastating consequences to the population of involved parties and further escalating a conflict between geopolitical actors over international power.

CONCLUSION

The analysis of the above-mentioned global issues, such as war and violent conflicts, global inflation, a cost-of-living crisis, social radicalization, political and economic foreign interference, and a multipolar financial system, is highly relevant to how policymakers search for practical solutions. Some researchers describe the system of entangled global issues as a polycrisis; according to them, policymakers should address the whole architecture to resolve them efficiently. Other researchers believe that governments should tackle global crises separately without inventing new concepts but taking into consideration the high interdependencies among domestic and foreign policy issues.

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FROM MUTUALLY HURTING STALEMATE TO COMFORTABLE DEADLOCK - HOW THE EU INTEGRATION FROZE THE CYPRUS CONFLICT RATHER THAN RESOLVING IT

Since its unilateral declarations in 1983, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus^o (TRNC^o) has relied heavily on Türkiye for political and military support, with Türkiye controlling its security. In fact, the very environment in which the informal state came into existence was created and upheld by the Turkish military occupation. Even before the TRNC^o was officially declared, Türkiye set up the “Turkish Federal State of Cyprus^o” in 1975, slowly shaping the region without trying to gain international recognition. While Türkiye today styles itself as the protector of the Turkish Cypriots, continuously calling for a sovereign and internationally recognized Turkish Cypriot state, Türkiye’s relationship with the latter is characterised by neo-Ottoman imperialist rule. In fact, Türkiye’s influence over the contested state and Turkish Cypriot dependency on its patron have now reached a level that poses several challenges for HIIK’s methodological approach and begets a new assessment of the conflict’s methodological frame. This spotlight aims to disclose these challenges and allow for a better reflection of HIIK’s findings by shedding light on the dependency of the informal Turkish Cypriot state on its patron and, in doing so, to give context to HIIK’s data and methodological reevaluations.

The TRNC^o’s international isolation has persisted since its foundation in 1983, since which time it has remained internationally unrecognized. This has only been reinforced by UNSC Resolution 541, which was passed the same year and declared the informal state “invalid”. The absence of international recognition has not only resulted in political dependency of the TRNC^o on Türkiye but has also aggravated its already significant economic dependency on the latter. This has proved an obstacle to the establishment of foreign relations and international trade. A notable instance is the ECJ case C-432/92, concerning preferential trade agreements between the Republic of Cyprus and the EU. The ruling confirmed that only movement and phytosanitary certificates issued by the Cypriot Government are valid under EU law. The court established that, since Turkish Cypriot authorities are not recognized, their certificates cannot be accepted for import into EU member states. With its ruling, the ECJ effectively excluded the TRNC^o from preferential trade with the EU in 1994. This led to a drastic fall of Turkish Cypriot exports to the EU, which previously constituted the north’s most important consumer. Subsequently, Türkiye became the TRNC^o’s primary trading partner. This relationship, however, proved unevenly advantageous and is marked by a rapidly growing trade deficit for the contested state. While Turkish Cypriot exports to Türkiye in 2019 were estimated at roughly 62 million USD, imports from Türkiye were estimated at around 1.3B USD, resulting in a trade deficit of 2.6 billion USD. Five years later, this deficit had nearly doubled. Foreign direct investment flows from Türkiye also increased drastically since 2009, which has had a major impact on ownership structures. The overwhelming majority of five-star hotels and casinos, for instance, are now owned by Turkish citizens. Similarly, 75-80 percent of all tourists visiting the TRNC^o are from Türkiye, given it is the only country with direct air links with the informal state. Overall, the TRNC^o’s economy has relied heavily on a large public sector and informal economic activities that do not generate tax revenues, resulting in persistent budget deficits that are largely financed by

Türkiye. Also, in regard to economic growth and development assistance, the TRNC^o remains heavily dependent on Turkish aid due to the aforementioned international isolation and disruption of international development assistance, which has come to shape its economic development, infrastructure, and political stability.

The accession of a divided Cyprus to the European Union in 2004 further proved as another catalyst for Turkish Cypriot isolation and dependency on Türkiye economically and beyond. Symptomatically, the Cypriot government, using its access to EU resources, political mechanisms and institutions, continuously resisted the participation of the Turkish Cypriot Eastern Mediterranean University in the Bologna Process out of fear that it would imply a creeping recognition of the informal state and its “illegal institutions”. While it can be assumed that participation in the Bologna process would have contributed to inter-communal contact and fostered the social learning of young Turkish Cypriots, multiple universities have also been established by Turkish investors, and approx. 60 percent of foreign university students in the TRNC^o are Turkish citizens. In combination with Turkish settlement and migration policies and the prevalence and active promotion of Turkish nationalism in the Northern Cypriot education and media systems, Ankara’s demographic and cultural influence can hardly be overstated.

These dependencies have served as a vehicle for Turkish dominance over Turkish Cypriots and their internal affairs. For instance, studies have attested a punitive use of Turkish aid in cases that Northern Cypriot elections produced political realities that are not preferential to Türkiye. Likewise, the 2020 presidential elections in the TRNC^o were reportedly marred by unprecedented interference from Turkish politicians, diplomats, military, and intelligence services, aimed at securing the electoral victory Ankara’s chosen candidate, Ersin Tatar. Turkish officials and their local proxies reportedly engaged in vote-buying tactics, offering cash payments and other financial benefits to individuals and communities in exchange for their support, and exerted pressure on other candidates and their staff, including incumbent president Mustafa Akıncı, who was known for his pro-solution stance in the conflict with the Greek Cypriots and his commitment to maintaining sovereignty vis à vis Türkiye. Furthermore, politicians in Ersin Tatar’s UBP party who advocated for greater independence from Türkiye were allegedly sidelined and prevented from taking high-level positions. Türkiye was thus able to heave two AKP-allies into the TRNC^o’s office of prime minister in 2020 and 2022, respectively, taking control of both president and government.

The resulting dependency of the Turkish Cypriot state on its patron Türkiye and the latter’s growing control over Turkish Cypriot affairs not only necessitate constant monitoring of the methodological framing of the conflict but pose several challenges to HIIK’s methodological approach and conflict research in general, as shall be laid out in the following. According to HIIK’s methodology, a political conflict requires “incompatibility of intentions between at least individual or collective actors [...] with regard to certain positional differences of values (issues) relevant to society and threatening (the continuity of) state functions or the international order”. Actors necessarily pursue a conflict item (values relevant to a society), are perceived relevant by the adversary, and are accordingly reflected in the decision making of the latter. Supporters, on the other hand, are only involved in the conflict with the aim of supporting the direct actor’s pursuit of its conflict item. For most of the time HIIK has been moni-

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toring the Cyprus Conflict, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus^o was regarded as the direct actor in the conflict with the government of the internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus. The guarantor powers Greece and Türkiye, on the other hand, were methodologically framed supporters in the conflict.

While this alone might represent a methodological stretch since the TRNC^o's foundation, its very existence is predicated on Turkish military occupation of the northern part of Cyprus, with Ankara controlling the TRNC^o's security and shaping its political landscape. Nonetheless, the contested state has exhibited its own agency for most of its existence. During the EU accession negotiations, for instance, the Turkish Cypriot state predominantly pursued its own interests, several of which were incongruent with the interests of Türkiye. The accession process further bypassed Türkiye as the Turkish Cypriot representative in large parts, strengthening Turkish Cypriot agency vis à vis its patron. Another personified example of Turkish Cypriot strife for greater autonomy from Türkiye is the aforementioned Mustafa Akıncı.

With the rejection of the Annan-Plan by Greek Cypriots in 2003 and the subsequent accession of a divided Cyprus to the European Union, the latter has shown a great reluctance to engage with the Turkish Cypriot leadership directly. Türkiye, on the other hand, has made use of the Turkish Cypriot isolation and has re-established itself as the self-proclaimed mouthpiece of the community's interests. With the dispute over gas reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean and the announcement to re-open the once untouchable Varosía, Ankara has not only served as a main conflict driver, but in doing so has further taken over direct control of the conflict's intensity, course, and end. Türkiye is no longer a factor in the still unfruitful reunification efforts. It has become virtually impossible to bypass Turkish interests in any solution of the Cyprus Conflict.

Considering Ankara's afore-mentioned erosion of the TRNC^o internal sovereignty in favor of a de-facto imperialist rule over the island and the ensuing near-complete control over Turkish Cypriot politics as well as HIIK's methodological approach, various conclusions must be drawn. For one, Turkish Cypriot actorhood must be seriously called into question, and the contested state can no longer be assumed the main conflict actor beyond reasonable doubt. This is reflective of the change of Ankara's aims, which no longer appear to be achieving Turkish Cypriot independence and international

recognition but have grown to the extension of Turkish sovereignty over the northern part of the island. Secession and subsequent international recognition of the TRNC^o should rather be understood as an intermediate step in the creeping annexation of Turkish Cypriot territories under the strategic appearance of compliance with international law. This calls for the adaptation of the conflict's type and items, which now resemble that of a traditional inter-state conflict over territory rather than an intra-state conflict over secession.

MELIS DIKME AND JANNIS KOHLT

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FROM NARCO-STATE TO SOVEREIGN RESISTANCE: THE POLITICS OF EXTRADITION, CORRUPTION, AND U.S. INTERVENTION IN HONDURAS

Over the past year, both national authorities in Honduras and regional organizations such as the Central American Integration System (SICA), have issued warnings regarding evolving patterns in drug trafficking within the country. Official reports and empirical data suggest a significant shift in Honduras's role in the transnational drug trade, transitioning from a predominantly transit nation to an increasingly relevant site of cocaine production. This transformation is evidenced by the exponential growth in coca plantations, clandestine laboratories, and illegal airstrips identified across several key regions, notably Olancho, La Mosquitia, Atlántida, and Colón. This dynamic has also been documented in the texts [Honduras (drug trafficking organizations, organized crime)] of the CoBa 2022 and 2023.

Furthermore, a key indicator of the escalating dynamics of the drug trade, cocaine seizures, has demonstrated a consistent upward trend since 2019, reaching unprecedented levels annually. The dramatic increase in seizures is exemplified by the rise from just over three tons of cocaine confiscated in Honduras in 2020 to over 68.5 tons based on data available for 2024. Moreover, a single interdiction of a speedboat in the Honduran Caribbean on August 3, 2024, accounted for over four tons, highlighting the scale of current trafficking operations.

On another dimension, financial flows linked to transnational drug cartels most notably the Cartel del Pacífico, commonly known as the Sinaloa Cartel, have demonstrably penetrated Honduras's law enforcement bodies and democratic institutions. The country's prevailing criminal landscape is characterized by a deeply entrenched and multifaceted network that includes influential economic elites, high-level political actors, and local drug trafficking organizations such as the Montes Bobadilla Clan, the Valles and the Cachiros.

A striking example of this infiltration is the case of former President Juan Orlando Hernández (2014-2022), also known by the alias JOH. In June 2024, a federal court in New York sentenced Hernández to 45 years in prison for conspiring with Mexican drug cartels to facilitate the transshipment of several tons of cocaine to the United States. This case underscores the systemic nature of narco-corruption in Honduras and highlights the profound institutional challenges the country faces in addressing criminal capture at the highest levels of power.

Hernández and his brother Tony Hernández enriched themselves by exploiting state institutions to support Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzmán's drug trafficking operations, even as the Honduran government maintained close cooperation with the Trump administration (2017–2021) in its anti-narcotics agenda. This dual role, facilitating transnational drug flows while outwardly aligning with U.S. narcotics policy, sharpened both domestic and international perceptions of Honduras as a narco-state. For a significant period, the U.S. government appeared either willfully ignorant or strategically indifferent to Hernández's criminal entanglements. Indeed, it was the United States that played a pivotal role in enabling his initial rise to power and in supporting his consolidation of political authority over two presidential terms.

Tensions over Washington's influence in Honduras's sovereignty reached a new height on August 28, 2024, when President Xiomara Castro ordered the suspension of

the extradition agreement with the United States. This executive measure was formalized the next day by Foreign Minister Enrique Reina through an official decree and an announcement on X. According to Castro, the decision was in response to alleged US interference in Honduran domestic politics and alleged coup plots against her government, and followed US Ambassador Laura Farnsworth's public condemnation of a meeting between Honduran defense leaders and a Venezuelan official wanted on international drug trafficking charges. Castro's suspension of extradition mirrors a similar move by former Mexican President Andrés López Obrador, who temporarily froze diplomatic ties with the U.S. and Canada over claims of meddling in Mexico's proposed judicial reforms. Taken together, these developments underscore a broader regional backlash against perceived US overreach, even among states long heralded as partners in the war on drugs, and highlight the fraught interplay between sovereignty, counter-narcotics cooperation, and domestic legitimacy.

Beyond the long and imperialistic history of U.S. interventionist policy in Latin America, the unilateral termination of the extradition agreement significantly elevates the risk of further eroding Honduran judicial capacity and undermining collective regional efforts to counter transnational drug trafficking networks. Indeed, the fragility of institutional integrity was again exposed on 31 August 2024, when a video published by an American think tank surfaced showing Carlos Zelaya, President Castro's brother-in-law and former secretary of the National Congress, accepting campaign contributions in 2012 from key figures of the Los Cachiros cartel. The ensuing scandal led to the resignation of both Zelaya and his son, Defense Minister José Manuel Zelaya. Los Cachiros have acted as a crucial intermediary actor between the Sinaloa Cartel and Colombian cocaine producers, effectively leveraging the systematic bribery of politicians, business elites, and military officials to facilitate the cartel's operational success.

Altogether, these episodes illustrate how narco-corruption in Honduras is not merely a matter of isolated criminal actors but a phenomenon that compromises the rule of law and the institutions designed to combat organized crime and impunity. The suspension of extradition and the Zelaya scandal alike underscore the precarious balance between external counter-narcotics support and the imperative of domestic accountability. A balance that, if upset, threatens both democratic resilience and the efficacy of regional security cooperation.

During her 2022 presidential campaign, Xiomara Castro pledged to combat corruption through the establishment of an International Commission against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras (CICIH), with the support of the Organization of American States. However, more than two years into her presidency, this commitment remains unrealized. In stark contrast, the country's extradition treaty with the United States has proven to be a highly effective multilateral instrument in dismantling the impunity enjoyed by powerful traffickers. Over the past decade, Honduras has extradited fifty-one internationally wanted suspects to the United States and Costa Rica, significantly disrupting trafficking networks associated with the Valle, Bobadilla, and Ardón clans.

The abrupt suspension of the extradition agreement in late August 2024, just days before the narco-video scandal broke, has prompted widespread conjecture that the move was partly intended to insulate members of the presidential family from U.S. prosecution. Such maneuvering recalls Pablo Escobar's infamous maxim that it is "better to have a grave in

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Colombia than a prison cell in the United States," underscoring how drug traffickers continue to exploit legal loopholes and institutional inertia to evade accountability.

The allegations against Carlos Zelaya have further undermined the confidence of the Honduran population in the ruling political class. While claims that the United States administration may be trying to destabilize a democratically elected government deserve serious scrutiny rather than dismissal, the deeper symbiotic relationship between democratic erosion and the expansion of transnational organized crime has entrenched a destructive cycle of violence and corruption in Honduras. Addressing these correlated challenges demands concerted cooperation and coordinated international intervention. Critically, the absence of a robust extradition mechanism would likely strengthen drug trafficking networks, significantly increasing their ability to penetrate state institutions and thus aggravating the already serious crisis plaguing the country.


DANIEL LLANOS RAMIREZ

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
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
VIOLENT CONFLICTS IN EUROPE IN 2024 (SUBNATIONAL LEVEL)




CONFLICT INTENSITIES IN EUROPE IN 2024 COMPARED TO 2023



FREQUENCY OF CONFLICT INTENSITIES BY CONFLICT ITEM IN EUROPE IN 2024



FREQUENCY OF CONFLICT INTENSITIES BY CONFLICT TYPE IN EUROPE IN 2024



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Overview: Conflicts in Europe in 2024

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
Albania (opposition)*	opposition groups, opposition parties vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2017	•	2
Armenia (opposition)*	opposition groups vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2003	•	3
Armenia – Azerbaijan *	Armenia vs. Azerbaijan	territory	1987	•	3
Armenia – Türkiye*	Armenia vs. Turkey	international power, other	1991	•	1
Azerbaijan (opposition)*	opposition groups vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2003	•	3
Belarus (opposition)*	civil society activists, opposition movement, opposition parties vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1994	↘	2
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Republika Srpska)*	government of Republic of Srpska vs. government, government of Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina	secession	1995	•	1
Croatia (ethnic Croats – Serb minority)*	ethnic Croats vs. Serb minority	subnational predominance	1991	•	1
Cyprus – Türkiye (Northern Cyprus ^o)*	Türkiye, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus ^o vs. Cyprus	secession, resources	1963	•	2
Cyprus, Greece et al. – Türkiye, Libya (Eastern Mediterranean)*	Cyprus, EU, Greece, Israel vs. Libya, Türkiye	territory, resources	2002	•	2
Estonia – Russia *	Estonia vs. Russia	territory, international power	1991	•	2
EU, USA, et al. – Russia *	EU, USA, et al. vs. Russia	system/ideology, international power	2007	•	2
France (Corsican nationalists / Corsica)*	Corsican regional government, FC, FLNC, nationalist activist groups vs. government	secession, autonomy	1975	•	2
France – United Kingdom (fishery)*	France vs. United Kingdom	resources	2021	•	1
Georgia (Abkhazia ^o)*	Republic of Abkhazia ^o vs. government	secession	1989	↘	1
Georgia (opposition)*	ENM, various opposition groups vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2007	•	3
Georgia (South Ossetia ^o)*	Republic of South Ossetia / the State of Alania ^o vs. government	secession, subnational predominance	1989	↘	2
Georgia – Russia *	Georgia vs. Russia	international power	1992	•	2
Germany (migration)*	various right-wing groups, xenophobes et al. vs. government	system/ideology	2014	•	3
Greece (left-wing militants – right-wing militants)*	left-wing militants vs. right-wing militants	system/ideology	1976	↘	2
Greece (right-wing militants)*	right-wing militants vs. government	system/ideology	1985	•	2
Greece (social protests, left-wing militants)*	left-wing militants, social groups, worker's union vs. government	system/ideology	2010	↓	1
Greece – Türkiye (Aegean Sea)*	Greece vs. Türkiye	territory	1973	•	2
Hungary (minorities – right-wings)*	Arrow Cross Party - Hungarist Movement, Carpathian Brigade, Fidesz, Jobbik, Légió Hungária, Magyar Önvédelmi Mozgalom, Mi Hazánk Mozgalom vs. activists (allies), Jewish community, LGBTQI+ groups, Muslim community, refugees	system/ideology, subnational predominance	2008	•	1
Hungary – Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine (Hungarian minorities)*	Hungarian minorities (Transylvania / southern Slovakia / Transcarpathia), Hungary vs. Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine	system/ideology, international power	1989	•	1
Kosovo ^o (opposition)*	opposition groups, opposition parties vs. government	system/ideology, national power, subnational predominance	2015	↘	1
Kosovo ^o – Serbia *	Kosovar government vs. Serbian government, Serbian minority (in Kosovo ^o)	secession	1989	↘	2
Latvia – Russia*	Latvia vs. Russia	international power	1994	•	1
Moldova (opposition)*	opposition parties vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2009	•	1
Moldova (Transnistria)*	Transnistria regional government vs. government	secession	1989	↘	2

EUROPE

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
Montenegro (opposition)*	opposition groups, opposition parties vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2015	•	2
North Macedonia (Albanian minority – ethnic Macedonians)*	Albanian (minority) vs. ethnic Macedonians	subnational predominance	1991	•	2
North Macedonia (opposition)*	opposition groups vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2014	•	2
Norway et al. – Russia (Arctic)*	Canada, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, USA vs. Russia	territory, international power, other	2001	•	2
Russia (Islamist militants / Northern Caucasus)*	IS Caucasus Province, other Islamist militant groups vs. government	secession, system/ideology	1991	•	3
Russia (opposition)*	opposition groups, opposition parties vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2001	•	3
Russia – Ukraine*	Russian Federation vs. Ukraine	territory, system/ideology, international power, resources	2003	•	5
Serbia (opposition)*	opposition parties vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2018	•	3
Spain (Basque provinces)*	EH-Bildu vs. government	secession, autonomy	1959	•	1
Spain (Catalan nationalists / Catalonia)*	Catalan civil society groups, Catalan regional government vs. government, Spanish civil society groups	secession, autonomy	1979	•	1
Spain – United Kingdom (Gibraltar)*	EU, Spain vs. United Kingdom	territory	1954	↗	2
Sweden (migration)*	various right-wing groups, xenophobes vs. government	system/ideology	2015	•	2
Sweden (organized crime)*	14K vs. Österberganätverket vs. Bandidos vs. Black Cobra vs. Dödspatrullen vs. Foxtrotnätverket vs. Hells Angels vs. Satudarah MC vs. Södertäljenätverket vs. Serbian-Motenegrin Mafia vs. various criminal organisations vs. Zerolätverket vs. government	subnational predominance, resources	2002	•	3
Ukraine (right-wing / opposition)*	right-wing groups vs. civil right groups, minorities, oppositional parties vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2013	↗	3
United Kingdom (nationalists / Northern Ireland)*	DUP, Red Hand Commando, UDA, UVF vs. Army of the Republic, Óglaigh na hÉireann, IRA, nationalist youth, NIRA, Sinn Féin vs. government	secession, subnational predominance	1968	•	3
United Kingdom (Scottish nationalists / Scotland)*	AUOB et al., SNP vs. government	secession	2007	•	2

¹ Conflicts marked with * are without description

² Mentioned are only those conflict parties relevant for the period under review

³ Change in intensity compared to the previous year: ↑ or ↗ escalation by one or more than one level of intensity; ↓ or ↘ deescalation by one or more than one level of intensity; • no change

⁴ Levels of intensity: 5 = war; 4 = limited war; 3 = violent crisis; 2 = non-violent crisis; 1 = dispute

⁵ HIIK considers statehood to be non-contested if the state is an official UN members state.

Disputed statehood is marked with a * if a territory is recognized by at least one other official UN member state ("limited recognition")

EUROPE

REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT

This text will be made available within April 2026.

ARMENIA (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2003**

Conflict parties: opposition groups vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The violent crisis over political power and the design of foreign policy between the Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and his ruling party Civil Contract, on the one hand, and the opposition, on the other, continued. The main points of contention were the agreement regarding territorial concessions towards Azerbaijan and the alleged abuse of power by Armenian authorities, particularly the police.

The Armenian opposition, consisting of the Armenia Alliance and the I Have Honor Alliance, repeatedly criticized the ruling party and called for the PM's resignation. For instance, on May 11, Bagrat Galstanian, an Armenian archbishop and political activist, called for protests against Pashinyan in the capital of Yerevan, leading to the forceful arrest of 48 demonstrators. On May 13, two opposition journalists were injured by police whilst documenting another ongoing protest in Yerevan. On May 27, residents of areas due to be handed over to Azerbaijani control protested the transfer by burning their farmland in the village of Kirants, Tavush province. On the same day, Galstanian called for civil disobedience and the Prime Minister's resignation. During protests in Yerevan on the same day, more than 270 demonstrators were forcefully detained by police, with the opposition alleging police brutality.

On June 10, several hundred protesters set up tents on a main avenue in front of the Parliament in Yerevan, demanding a vote of non-confidence against Pashinyan. As the number of protesters grew to the thousands on June 12, police dispersed the crowd using at least 25 stun grenades, injuring more than 100 people and detaining at least 70, and leaving 18 police officers injured.

On October 9, Galstanian organized another protest, accusing the PM of collaborating with Azerbaijan during the 2023 Nagorno-Karabakh War, again calling for his resignation. Two days later, several hundred protesters demanded further efforts by the government to free eight former leaders of the Republic of Artsakh^o and other Armenian captives held by Azerbaijan.

On June 20, Pashinyan ordered the draft of a new constitution in order to meet Azerbaijan's demands to remove the reference to the 1990 declaration of Armenia's independence, which is mentioned in the preamble [→ Armenia – Azerbaijan]. The declaration includes reference to Nagorno-Karabakh, which Azerbaijan interprets as a territorial claim. Its removal is demanded as a precondition for further peace talks. On October 17, Galstanian held a speech in Parliament, defending the 1990 declaration. sgr

ARMENIA – AZERBAIJAN

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1987**

Conflict parties: Armenia vs. Azerbaijan
 Conflict items: territory

The violent crisis over territory between Armenia and Azerbaijan continued. The crisis revolved around the issue of the border demarcation between the two countries and was

closely related to the 2023 war between the self-proclaimed Republic of Artsakh and Azerbaijan [→ Azerbaijan (Nagorno Karabakh)].

Throughout the year, various skirmishes along the border left several Armenian and Azerbaijani soldiers injured or dead. Both sides regularly accused the other of having started gun-fights along the border. On January 9, for instance, two Armenian soldiers were found dead, bearing gunshot wounds, at a guard station. On February 12, Azerbaijan claimed that Armenian forces opened fire and injured one Azerbaijani soldier in the Kapan-Zangelan section of the border. The day after, both sides engaged in clashes during which four Armenian soldiers were killed and one injured in Nerkin Hand, Syunik Province, Armenia. Both sides accused each other of initiating the violence. Exchanges of fire continued along the border throughout April, with multiple accusations of ceasefire violations expressed by both countries. Armenia discovered another dead soldier with gunshot wounds at a guard station on May 7. Skirmishes continued frequently from June to September, culminating in the death of an Armenian soldier on June 14.

Throughout the year, several land mines previously planted by Armenia on formerly occupied Azerbaijani territory exploded, causing deaths and injuries to Azerbaijani soldiers and civilians. On April 28, for instance, two Azerbaijani soldiers were killed in Garaagaj village, Sadarak district, as a result of a military ammunition explosion allegedly caused by Armenian forces. On July 19 and October 14, land mines previously laid by Armenian armed forces exploded in the Azerbaijani villages of Aghdaban, Kalbajar region, and Gushchu Ayrim, Gazakh region. Each of these explosions caused the injury of an Azeri civilian. On December 20, an Azerbaijani soldier was injured by an old land mine in Gulustan village, Goranboy district, Azerbaijan.

Initial negotiations for a peace agreement between both countries were concluded in Almaty, eponymous region, Kazakhstan, on May 10, which resulted in the transfer of four Armenian border villages to Azerbaijani control. Azerbaijan further demanded the removal of a preamble in the Armenian constitution, which it interprets as a territorial claim to the region of Nagorno-Karabakh. The demand and the transfer of territory, which took place on May 24, was heavily opposed by large parts of the Armenian population [→ Armenia (Opposition)]. On April 24, Azerbaijani armed forces destroyed Karin Tak/Dashalty village, Shusha district, which had been under the control of the Republic of Artsakh until 2023. On May 24, Azerbaijan destroyed another Mokhrenes/Susanlyg village and the Surb Hambardzum Church in the city of Laçın, eponymous district, which have also been under Artsakh control until the ceasefire deal that concluded the 2020 war [→ Azerbaijan (Nagorno Karabakh)]. On 09/07/2021, the ICJ had previously established and prohibited the eradication of Armenian cultural heritage by Azerbaijan.

Following the 2023 war with Azerbaijan, the Armenian government sought to diversify its allies, shifting away from Russia. On June 12, for instance, Armenia withdrew from the Collective Security Treaty Organization and, on June 18, France agreed to sell Armenia self-propelled howitzers. ame

AZERBAIJAN (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2003**

Conflict parties: opposition groups vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The violent crisis over the orientation of the political system and national power between opposition groups and the government continued.

Throughout the year, the opposition advocated for political pluralism and increased democratic representation, while facing arrests and charges. The government detained numerous opposition leaders, activists, and journalists, accusing them of various crimes, with the opposition alleging that the charges were fabricated to suppress dissent. For instance, on March 6, police raided the offices of the online television station Toplum TV in Baku and arrested seven individuals under the pretext of smuggling charges. On April 2, a prominent pro-democracy activist was arrested in Baku, also charges of smuggling. On April 19, police arrested the head of a website informing the Azerbaijani public about draft laws in Parliament, on charges of smuggling and illegally receiving foreign grants. The detained stated that he had been beaten and tortured with electric shocks to force him to sign documents and confess to the charges. In another instance, on September 30, a former MP was sentenced to eight years in prison for extortion after spending over a year in pre-trial detention. His arrest followed an interview in which he criticized the government's response to protests. On December 6, police arrested 13 people, including six Meydan TV staff in Baku on foreign currency smuggling charges. Some detainees later claimed to have been beaten and denied legal representation.

In Azerbaijan's snap parliamentary elections on September 1, the ruling party and independent candidates, believed to be aligned with the government, secured a majority. Media reports and international observers from the OSCE expressed concerns over electoral violations and a lack of fairness of the election process.

Azerbaijani dissidents in exile further faced the prospect of extradition and personal harm. For instance, on September 29, three unknown persons attacked and stabbed an exiled Azerbaijani human rights activist at his home in Mulhouse, Grand-Est region, France. He died from his wounds two days later. Known for his outspoken criticism of the Azerbaijani government, he had previously been attacked in 2022, further suggesting that his death may have been politically motivated. On November 28, the Tbilisi City Court, Georgia, ruled to approve the extradition of an Azerbaijani journalist who had been in custody in Gldani prison in Tbilisi since August 4. mdi

BELARUS (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **2** | Change: ▼ | Start: **1994**

Conflict parties: civil society activists, opposition movement, opposition parties vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The violent crisis over national power and the orientation of

the political system between opposition parties and movements, on the one hand, and the government under President Aljaksandr Lukashenka, supported by Russia, on the other, de-escalated to a non-violent crisis.

On February 25, Belarusian parliamentary elections were held, while the opposition refrained from campaigning and called for a boycott of the elections. OSCE observers were prevented from monitoring the process. The pro-government party Belaya Rus won the majority of seats.

After Belarusian Freedom Day on March 25, which took place abroad and was livestreamed, the Investigative Committee of the Republic of Belarus initiated investigations into 104 participants. Authorities claimed to have information about the participants' property in Belarus.

Moreover, on April 25, during the 7th All-Belarusian People's Assembly, Lukashenka accused the exiled opposition of planning to seize parts of Belarus with alleged support from NATO and Ukraine.

On July 27, a German Red Cross employee was sentenced to death on charges of espionage and terrorism. The individual was returned to Germany in a prisoner exchange agreement on August 1.

On August 5, the EU imposed sanctions against 28 Belarusians, among them two deputy heads and several judges, for ongoing internal repression and human rights violations in Belarus.

Overall, approx. 110 political prisoners were released in three waves between July and September, most of them serving short sentences for online activities. Over 1,300 remain imprisoned. The conditions for political prisoners remained critical.

The relationship between the exiled opposition and the Belarusian government remained tense. lit

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (REPUBLIKA SRPSKA)

Intensity: **1** | Change: • | Start: **1995**

Conflict parties: government of Republic of Srpska vs. government, government of Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
 Conflict items: secession

The secession dispute between Republika Srpska (RS) and the Bosnian central government and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) continued.

The ongoing disagreements concentrate on the legitimacy of political institutions established by the 1995 Dayton Accords. On January 8, two United States Air Force fighter jets conducted training exercises over BiH, coinciding with a statement from the US Embassy reaffirming the US's support for BiH's territorial integrity. The following day, on January 9, the RS celebrated its Statehood Day, which the Court of BiH declared unconstitutional. On March 27, High Representative to BiH, Christian Schmidt, utilized his so-called "Bonn Powers" to enact a new election law which strives to limit instances of electoral fraud. Subsequently, on April 19, the National Assembly of RS passed its own election law, aiming to enhance the entity's control of electoral administration.

jhb

CYPRUS – TÜRKIYE (NORTHERN CYPRUS^o)

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **1963**

Conflict parties: Türkiye, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus^o vs. Cyprus

Conflict items: secession, resources

The non-violent crisis over resources and secession of Northern Cyprus between the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC^o) and Türkiye, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued.

On June 10, a Turkish-Israeli citizen was arrested by Cypriot police while on his way to Israel from the TRNC^o. Cypriot law enforcement accused the real estate developer of being involved in the purchase and development of property in Northern Cyprus, which Cyprus regards as the property of previously displaced Greek Cypriots.

As in recent years, a Turkish army officer, accompanied by armed soldiers, threatened a Greek Cypriot farmer. The incident occurred on October 28 when the latter tried to tend his field in the UN buffer zone in Deneia, Kyrenia District. The farmer refused to leave and local authorities called the UN to intervene. UNFICYP members were able to resolve the situation.

On November 8, the Greek and Turkish foreign ministers met in the Greek capital of Athens and discussed, among other topics, the Cyprus conflict and the prospect of Cypriot reunification. Following the meeting, the Turkish foreign minister called for a new approach as the federation model was "not viable".

On November 28, Cyprus' President Nikos Christodoulides, announced efforts to upgrade the defensive capabilities of the Cypriot National Guard with US assistance. He further claimed his country may seek NATO membership in the future, signaling a shift from the island's long-standing policy of neutrality. On the same day, the Turkish Defense Ministry dismissed Cyprus' interest in NATO as "unacceptable". mdi

CYPRUS, GREECE ET AL. – TÜRKIYE, LIBYA (EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN)

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **2002**

Conflict parties: Cyprus, EU, Greece, Israel vs. Libya, Türkiye

Conflict items: territory, resources

The non-violent crisis over maritime territory and resources between Greece, Cyprus and the European Union (EU), on the one hand, and Türkiye and Libya, on the other, continued.

After Libya's Government of National Unity (GNU) declared a 24-nautical-mile contiguous zone, in light of the 2019 'Memorandum of Understanding Between Turkey and Libya on Delimitation of the Maritime Jurisdiction Areas in the Mediterranean' (MoU), Greece protested the move in a letter to the UN on January 17. Greece stated Libya's decision was violating international law in several ways. On March 28, Greece, Cyprus, and Israel finalized an energy deal that includes the connection of the countries' power grids and a possible natural gas pipeline through the eastern Mediterranean Sea. In mid-May, the Libyan government claimed in a letter to the Greek ambassador that Greece was conducting

illegal prospecting in areas south of the Greek island Crete that allegedly lay under Libya's jurisdiction. On May 30, the Turkish Energy Minister said his country would persist in its search for natural resources in the eastern Mediterranean in what Türkiye considers its 'Blue Homeland', despite parts of the region being claimed as Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) by Greece and Cyprus. On June 1, Greece and Israel held a joint air exercise south of Crete. The exercise was conducted in an area within the boundaries of the Türkiye-Libya MoU demarcating maritime boundaries in the region. On November 17, the Turkish foreign ministry criticized the publication of an EU map depicting Greek maritime waters. The map grants Greece twelve nautical miles of territorial water which the country had long claimed, despite Turkish opposition. Following the fall of the Assad-regime in Syria [→ Syria (Opposition)], the Turkish Transport Minister claimed on December 24 that his country was aiming to strike a maritime demarcation agreement with Syria, once a new permanent government is formed. njk

ESTONIA – RUSSIA

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **1991**

Conflict parties: Estonia vs. Russia

Conflict items: territory, international power

The non-violent crisis between Russia and Estonia over territory and international power continued. Tensions are driven by Russian aggression against Ukraine [→ EU, USA et al. – Russia; Russia – Ukraine].

The Estonian authorities responded to alleged Russian hybrid operations with increased security measures. On January 3, the Estonian Internal Security Service arrested a Russian citizen working as a professor in Tartu, eponymous county, on espionage charges. Between December 2023 and February 22, the Estonian authorities detained ten individuals on suspicion of involvement in hybrid operations coordinated by the Russian special services.

Between April 25 and 29, Estonia experienced widespread GPS jamming, which disrupted air traffic to Finland. The Estonian government attributed this interference to a Russian "hybrid attack". On May 23, the Russian Coast Guard unilaterally removed buoys marking the Russian-Estonian border on the Narva River. On September 5, Estonia officially attributed responsibility for the 2020 cyberattacks to the Russian military intelligence agency GRU. On December 25, unknown actors damaged the Estlink 2 undersea power cable connecting Estonia and Finland. In response to the suspected involvement of a Russia-linked tanker, Estonia launched naval patrols to protect its undersea infrastructure on December 27. On the same day, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte announced the alliance would increase its military presence in the Baltic Sea.

Following a report by the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service published on February 13, which warned of a military confrontation with Russia in the next decade, Russia placed several high-ranking Baltic politicians, including then-Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas, on the Interior Ministry's wanted list. On January 19, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania announced plans to construct a "Baltic Defense Line" along their borders with Russia and Belarus, with construction set to begin in 2025. From December 2 to December 15, Estonia hosted the NATO joint military exercise "Pikne" to strengthen defense capabilities in the Baltic Sea Region. fka

EU, USA, ET AL. – RUSSIA

Intensity: 2 | Change: • | Start: 2007

Conflict parties: EU, USA, et al. vs. Russia
Conflict items: system/ideology, international power

The non-violent crisis over ideology and international power between the EU, USA, and several others, on the one hand, and Russia, supported by states such as Belarus, China and Iran, on the other hand, continued.

In 2024, tensions intensified, with accusing and threatening rhetoric, nuclear threats, hybrid warfare, extensive parallel military build-ups and exercises, as well as mutually imposed sanctions regimes. The conflict's reach spanned the Balkans, Caucasus, the Baltics, Nordic countries, Eastern Europe, Africa, the WANA region, and East Asia, as well as global and regional media, also contributing to regional conflicts' escalation risks. This complex web of strategies, sanctions, and hybrid warfare blurred conventional boundaries, threatening global stability. On November 21, Russia heightened tensions in the region by launching its new hypersonic, nuclear-capable intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), named Oreshnik, from a mobile platform allegedly near the Ukrainian-Russian border. This missile, derived from the RS-26 Rubezh intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and equipped with six multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), targeted the Ukrainian city of Dnipro, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. Prior to the launch, Russia issued a brief notification to the US through "nuclear risk reduction channels", the US Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary stated the same day. This launch underscored a significant shift in Russia's nuclear doctrine the Russian President Vladimir Putin had introduced on November 19. The revised nuclear doctrine permits nuclear strikes in response to perceived critical threats to national sovereignty, including conventional attacks. This posture has drawn considerable concern, particularly given Russia's ongoing nuclear drills and heightened deterrence rhetoric. The Oreshnik launch, coupled with the continued deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus, reinforced Russia's increasingly assertive nuclear strategy and intensified fears of potential miscalculation in the volatile region, which the Chancellor of Germany Olaf Scholz pointed out on November 22 [→ Russia – Ukraine].

Concerning military mega-exercises and conventional strategic posturing, both the EU, USA and others linked through NATO and Russia undertook large-scale military maneuvers to reaffirm their strategic commitments. NATO's Steadfast Defender 2024 – held from January 22 to May 31 – saw the deployment of 90,000 troops, approx. 1,100 combat vehicles, over 80 aircraft, and a variety of naval assets across the Trans-Atlantic region. The exercise tested Article 5 commitments, all 31 NATO-members and Sweden participated. Sub-exercises like Dragon-24 in Poland, which simulated 300-kilometer armored advances with contributions from the US, French, Spanish, and German forces, and Nordic Response 24 – leveraging the capabilities of Finland, Sweden, and Norway – demonstrated NATO's readiness to counter threats and protect critical points along the NATO-eastern/Russian-western border [→ Norway et al. – Russia (Arctic)]. Meanwhile, Russia's Okean-2024 exercise, its largest naval drill in 30 years, spanned the Pacific, Arctic, Baltic, Mediterranean, and Caspian Seas. The exercise was held from September 10 to 16, with Putin claiming that 120 aircraft, 400 warships, 7,000

weapons systems and 90,000 personnel participated. Notably, the participation of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) signaled deepening military ties with China [→ China – USA] with the PLNA also showing of force toward Taiwan [→ China – Taiwan°].

Throughout the year, Russia employed hybrid warfare tactics, including cyber operations, disinformation campaigns, sabotage, and provocative incursions. Russian troll networks like Storm-1516 flooded social media with pro-Kremlin content, amplifying conspiracy theories and undermining support for Ukraine. In July, the US reported Storm-1516 to the OSCE, and in December, Austrian intelligence uncovered a Russian-linked disinformation campaign. Over 500 sabotage incidents occurred, including for instance arson attacks in March in London, the capital of the UK and in July in Birmingham city, West-Midlands region, and disruptions to critical infrastructure like undersea cables, such as the alleged sabotage of Estlink 1 – an undersea power cable connecting Finland's and the Baltic's energy markets – by sudden anchor letting of a vessel linked to Russia so-called shadow fleet, on December 31. Russian GPS-jamming and area denial (A2/AD) in the Baltic Sea disrupted maritime navigation. The responsible systems are presumably stationed in or near the Russian exclave city Kaliningrad, eponymous Oblast. Russian incursions into NATO's air and maritime spaces increased too. As a part of NATO's Baltic air policing, French Rafale jets stationed in Šiauliai Air Base, near Šiauliai city, eponymous county, Lithuania, intercepted Russian planes several times throughout the year. For instance on December 13, they intercepted an AN-72 transport plane over Lithuania, that was violating the air space over the Baltic sea en route to Kaliningrad Chkalovsk air base, eponymous Oblast [→ Estonia – Russia; Latvia – Russia]. In the Balkans, Serbia – a country with longstanding and close connections with Russia – buildup its military and during April held the so-called Vihor drill near Kosovo involving 2,000 troops and advanced anti-aircraft systems, has prompted neighboring countries to bolster their defenses, contributing to the deterioration of the Serbia-Kosovo relations [→ Kosovo° – Serbia]. Contributing to a rising tension with the EU and US due to their presence in Kosovo. Meanwhile, in the South Caucasus, Russia allegedly attempted to exploit Georgia's stalled EU accession process, backing the ruling party Georgian Dream [→ Georgia – Russia]. Furthermore protesters stromed the parliament of Georgia's Black Sea separatist-region Abkhazia, over a deal between Russia and the russian-backed Abkhazian government over construction and land ownership [→ Georgia – Abkhazia°] on November 15.

Beyond traditional state military forces, Russian private military companies (PMCs) have significantly expanded their operational reach. In 06/23 Russia dissolved its prominent PMC Wagner Group and formed the successor Africa Corps, led by General Andrey Averyanov, on 23/11/23. The Africa Corps quickly secured mining contracts for instance in Sudan and the Central African Republic (CAR). Subsequently Russia was accused of selling "regime survival packages," exchanging military support for access to resources such as gold and diamonds, uranium and rare earths. These operations were speculated to aid financing Russia's war effort in Ukraine while undermining US and EU influence in Africa. For instance, in response, on December 12, the EU sanctioned Dimitri Sytii, the unofficial head of the Africa Corps in CAR over human rights violations [→ Sudan (Opposition); Central African Republic (militant groups)].

Meanwhile, on a diplomatic, in Syria, after the Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)-led insurgency ousted the Syrian President

Bashar al-Assad on December 8, Russia adapted its strategy engaging with HTS, later the same month, to maintain control over Tartus naval base, near Tartus city, eponymous governorate, and Hmeimim airbase, near Latakia city, eponymous governorate, both critical for its Mediterranean operations. The EU, notably Germany, France, as well as the UK and the US also considered engaging diplomatic relations with HTS toward the end of the year [→ Syria (opposition)]. Furthermore Russia enlarged its military posture signing a treaty with North Korea on mutual defense on November 9.

At the same time, tensions between Russia and Japan over the disputed Kuril Islands rose. The Kuril islands are a volcanic archipelago consisting of 56 islands stretching approx. 1,300 kilometers, they are administered in the Russian Sakhalin Oblast, and claimed by Japan. Russia intensified military drills, bolstering its positions, and severing long standing fishing agreements, while Japan reaffirmed its sovereignty claims over the islands, during August [→ Japan – Russia].

In terms of sanctions and economic warfare, throughout the EU's 14th and 16th sanctions packages 14th and 16th sanctions packages intensified pressure on Russia, targeting energy, technology, and maritime sectors. Efforts to curb shadow fleets evading oil price caps included sanctions on 79 vessels. The EU also restricted dual-use goods and sanctioned nine Iranian individuals on October 14 for aiding Russia's missile and UAV production. Earlier, on September 10, the US sanctioned Iran's drone procurement network, imposing harbor bans and asset freezes [→ Iran – USA]. The UK and US also expanded sanctions on procurement networks and payment channels like SWIFT, targeting Russian, Belarusian, and Iranian entities. tcr

FRANCE (CORSICAN NATIONALISTS / CORSICA)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↗** | Start: **1975**

Conflict parties: Corsican regional government, FC, FLNC, nationalist activist groups vs. government

Conflict items: secession, autonomy

The non-violent crisis over Corsican autonomy and secession between the Corsican regional government, led by Free Corsica, a nationalist pro-independence alliance, the National Liberation Front of Corsica (FLNC), a paramilitary organization, and nationalist activist groups, on the one side, and the government on the other, escalated to a violent crisis.

On September 28, President Emmanuel Macron set a six-month deadline for a new Corsican autonomy plan. On March 12, a draft Corsican constitution was released, meanwhile on February 29, the Interior Minister stressed Corsica's "autonomous status" remained "within the Republic." However, until September there was no further progress. FLNC had rejected talks since 2023. Consequently, on January 30, FLNC posted a video showing firearms, vowing to continue armed fighting, demanding independence. This followed bombings on February 1 and 2 in Calvi city, Haute-Corse department, one on a cruise boat in the port and another damaging a club, both apparently having the same owner and also possibly linked to organized crime. Bombings are typically directed against tourist infrastructure or public and residential buildings perceived to be French or non-Corsican. Organized crime, such as Corsican Mafia, has been active there since the 1950s, and has evolved significantly since the early 2000s. Throughout the year several protests occurred. For instance,

allegedly on March 2 protests demanding more rights for Corsican activists turned into violent clashes in Bastia city, Haute-Corse department. Dozens of protesters threw rocks and petrol bombs, the riot police responded with baton charges and water cannons, leaving approx. 23 police officers and three protesters injured. The incident coincided with the second anniversary of the death of a Corsican nationalist militant leader in a French prison in 2022. On October 4, spontaneous strikes blocked Corsican ports and airports for nearly 24 hours over fears of French control of regional infrastructure and demands for 54 million USD in French aid. Regional President Gilles Simoni assured regional control, ending the strike. On November 26, the Marseille administrative court of appeals ruled French mandatory in official institutions, including the Corsican regional parliament, upholding a 2023-Corsican language ban. Subsequently, on December 3, approx. 200 students protested in Ajaccio, throwing rocks and petrol bombs at police and government buildings. Police responded with water cannons and tear gas. On December 15, Pope Francis visited Corsica, the first papal visit to the island. In Ajaccio, he emphasized that prayer "can nurture constructive citizenship." tcr

FRANCE – UNITED KINGDOM (FISHERY)

Intensity: **1** | Change: **•** | Start: **2021**

Conflict parties: France vs. United Kingdom

Conflict items: resources

The dispute over resources, in particular fishing rights in the English Channel, between France, supported by French fisherfolk, on the one hand, and the UK, supported by British fisherfolk, on the other, continued.

On March 22, the UK banned bottom trawling – a fishing technique that ensures a maximum catch yet is damaging to the seabed – in 13 Marine Protected Areas, affecting approx. 4,000 square kilometers of sea. The UK justified this move as vital for marine conservation, while French fishermen protested, claiming their livelihoods would depend on the fishing technique. France denounced the ban, claiming as discriminatory and challenged it under the post-Brexit EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), increasing diplomatic as well as international legal tensions.

Another major conflict arose when the UK and Scottish governments banned sand eel fishing to protect marine ecosystems. Since EU vessels previously held 97% of the sandeel quota in UK waters, this prompted the EU to file a formal complaint. With negotiations failing, an arbitration tribunal was established, on November 18, under the TCA, expected to deliver a ruling within 160 days. tcr

GEORGIA (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **2007**

Conflict parties: ENM, various opposition groups vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The violent crisis over the orientation of the political system and national power between civil society and political opposition groups, on the one hand, and the government, led by

the Georgian Dream (GD) party, on the other, continued. The conflict mainly centered around electoral reforms, political transparency, and judicial independence, as well as questions of international affiliation. The latter issue particularly revolved around the accession to the EU vis-à-vis alignment with Russia.

On April 3, the government introduced a law mandating all entities receiving more than 20 percent of their funding from abroad to be registered as “agents of foreign influence”. This led to mass protests and violent clashes between protesters and police, particularly in the capital of Tbilisi, which continued throughout the year. For example, during protests on April 30, police detained and physically assaulted the chairman of the largest Georgian opposition party. On the same day, riot police attempted to disperse protesters with tear gas, water cannons and rubber bullets, arresting 63 protesters and injuring at least eleven. On May 1, protesters attempted to enter the parliament building. The subsequent confrontation with the police left at least eleven people injured, including 6 police officers.

The implementation of the law and the subsequent crackdown on the popular protests strained relations between Georgia and its Western partners. On May 15, for instance, the EU urged the Georgian government to “rethink its course”, stating that the law would hamper the prospect of EU accession.

During parliamentary elections on October 26, the ruling government party emerged victorious. The opposition, however, alleged election fraud, with the OSCE voicing concern over the fairness of the election. The European Commission urged Georgian authorities to investigate the reported irregularities. The reports sparked widespread protests, for instance on October 28, when several thousand protesters gathered in front of parliament in Tbilisi.

On November 29, the government announced it would suspend negotiations regarding Georgia’s EU accession until 2028. This led to daily widespread protests and confrontations between protesters and police in the weeks following the announcement. For instance, on December 2, riot police used water cannons against protesters and cleared the area around the parliament building. Protesters shot fireworks and threw bottles at police and built barricades. The police were accused by Human Rights Watch of repeatedly using excessive and disproportionate force against protesters. During the protests, more than 460 protesters were injured, with 300 of those accusing the police of ill-treatment and torture. 80 arrestees reportedly required hospitalization. 16 Western countries issued a statement criticising the government’s repressive tactics against peaceful protesters, including arbitrary detention and excessive physical violence. mrm

GEORGIA – RUSSIA

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **1992**

Conflict parties: Georgia vs. Russia
 Conflict items: international power

The non-violent crisis between Georgia and Russia over international power and Russian regional influence in the two breakaway regions of South Ossetia [→ Georgia (South Ossetia°)] and Abkhazia [→ Georgia (Abkhazia°)] continued. Tensions were highlighted by the adoption of the “foreign agent law” and the parliamentary elections. Both events were linked to Russian influence and were followed by mass

protests [→ Georgia (opposition)].

On January 3, then President of Abkhazia, Aslan Bzhania, signed a bilateral agreement to host a Russian naval base near the Abkhazian city of Ochamchira.

In two separate judgments by the ECHR on April 9 and December 17, Russia was found liable for human rights and homeowners’ rights violations during the 2008 Russian invasion into Abkhazia and South Ossetia. On July 3, the OSCE court and on August 14 the UNSC urged Russia to withdraw from occupied Georgian territories.

On May 14, the Georgian parliament adopted the “foreign agent law”, which requires organizations receiving more than 20% of their funding from abroad to register as agents of foreign influence. Former president Salome Zourabichvili spoke out against the law, drawing parallels with similar Russian legislation and vetoed the law on May 18. On May 28, Georgian parliament overrode the veto.

On September 29, Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov stated at the UNGA that Russia was ready to help in the reconciliation process with Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

On October 26, the OSCE reported alleged violations in the parliamentary election, including ballot-stuffing, bribery, voter intimidation, violence near polling stations, and alleged interference in the process from Russia. On October 27, Russia recognized the election results whilst former president Zourabichvili linked the outcome of national polls to a Russian special operation and called for protests. On October 28, the Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson called for the arrest of Zourabichvili for calling for a coup. jdo

GERMANY (MIGRATION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2014**

Conflict parties: various right-wing groups, xenophobes et al. vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology

The violent crisis over the orientation of the political system, in particular asylum and immigration policies, between right-wing groups, as well as xenophobic individuals, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued.

Throughout the year, federal criminal statistics recorded several thousand politically motivated criminal offenses with right-wing background across Germany, among them thousands of threats – also against politicians and other officials –, calls to violence, hate and propaganda offences, at least 597 act of violence against individuals with presumed migratory backgrounds, leaving at least 157 people injured, allegedly one person died in this context, furthermore, at least 189 attacks on asylum related infrastructure, including 25 acts of destruction were conducted – marking an increase compared to the last year.

Concerning threats, on June 8, a Social Democratic Party (SPD) MP – with migration background – received an eMail with racial slurs and death threats.

In terms of physical violence against refugees, on February 20, a perpetrator, racially insulted and violently pushed a person of Burkina-Faso origin to the ground, injuring the person, in Dessau-Roßlau town, Saxony-Anhalt state. Similarly, a known perpetrator racially insulted two persons of colour outside a youth club in Halberstadt town, same state, attacking both with a bottle hitting one in the throat and the other over the head injuring them, on June 19. Later that year, on September 2, a group of four xenophobes, racially insulted

and violently attacked a person of Afghan origin at a train station in Haldensleben town, same state, injuring the person severely.

Regarding the destruction of infrastructure, on February 25, a perpetrator conducted an arson attack on an apartment building in which people with diverse nationalities lived, rendering the building inhabitable, in Pirmasens town, Rhineland-Palatinate state. On another occasion, on March 22, perpetrators conducted an arson attack on a refugee accommodation in Regis-Breitingen municipality association, Saxony state.

On January 11, the president of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) – Germany’s spy agency for interior affairs –, expressed distress that people “don’t realize the threats to our democracy today” alluding to a meeting of the extreme right-wing party Alternative for Germany (AfD), conservative politicians and members of the Identitarian Movement as well as European right-wingers in which participants allegedly discussed mass deportations of people perceived to be not ethnic Germans on 25/11/2023. In this context, approx.1,4 million people demonstrated against the AfD’s alleged xenophobic policy plans throughout January and early February across Germany. For instance, on January 20, 50,000 protested in Hamburg city, eponymous state, continuing to January 29, when 60,000 people demonstrated there.

Later that year, on June 29, several thousand protesters and approx.1,000 left-wing extremists took part in a demonstration against AfD’s party conference, in Essen city, North Rhine-Westphalia state. When protesters tried to break into the perimeter of the conference venue, the police attempted to disperse the crowd using tear gas and batons. Protesters wrangled down and injured one police officer with kicks to the head seriously.

In October, media reported that a right-wing extremist and social media expert associated to AfD, allegedly praised race science as well as eugenics revealing intentions to re-establish and normalise the public discourse and to influence public perception using grassroots-style communication strategies as well as mass and social media aimed at the youth, during a fund-raising dinner with international race science and right-wing activists and potential investors in Athens, the capital of Greece. These media reports sparked concern about the influence of those concepts on public debate and political parties.

After a terror attack on a christmas market state that had allegedly been conducted by a person of Saudi-Arabian origin in Magdeburg city, the state capital of Saxony-Anhalt, AfD called for massive street protests, on December 23.

On July 7, BfV reported, that 364 members of the security apparatus are suspected to be part of right-wing extremist groups being engaged in anti-constitutional efforts. This reporting is part of a larger strategy to mitigate the risk of right-wing extremism within the security forces that was established in 2020. tcr

GREECE (LEFT-WING MILITANTS – RIGHT-WING MILITANTS)

Intensity: **2** | Change:  | Start: **1976**

Conflict parties: left-wing militants vs. right-wing militants

Conflict items: system/ideology

The violent crisis over the orientation of the political sys-

tem between right-wing militants and left-wing militants de-escalated to a non-violent crisis. Throughout the year, the conflict exclusively played out through protests.

On January 28, left-wing groups prevented a far-right gathering in Rigillis Square in the capital Athens, which led to far-right groups retreating and subsequently firing a flare at police at Mavili Square. On February 3, following a police ban on all gatherings in Athens, Golden Dawn (GD), a far-right organization, announced a gathering, which prompted a counter-march by a left-wing coalition in Kolonaki neighborhood, Athens.

Similar events occurred on March 12 in Thessaloniki, Central Macedonia region, where despite said ban, left-wing groups gathered outside a cinema screening that was targeted by nationalists, leading to brief confrontations.

On September 18, left-wing groups marched in honor of the rapper Pavlov Fyssas (Killah P.) in Piraeus, Attica, who was killed in 2013 by a GD-member and started the trial against GD. Additionally, on October 20, left-wing organizations, including KEERFA, an anti-fascist organization, and Unity, demonstrated against what they described as extremist right-wing activities at an immigrant accommodation facility.

lar

GREECE (RIGHT-WING MILITANTS)

Intensity: **2** | Change:  | Start: **1985**

Conflict parties: right-wing militants vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology

The non-violent crisis over the orientation of the political system between right-wing militants and the government continued.

On January 28, during a gathering near Mavili Square in the capital Athens, members of the far-right group Propatria fired flare rockets at police officers. The incident resulted in no injuries or casualties, and police detained 17 individuals. In March, two members of parliament from the New Democracy party received threatening letters from the youth wing of Golden Dawn (GD), a far-right organization. The letters criticized their votes in favor of the same-sex civil marriage bill.

On February 3, the police imposed a protest ban on both left-wing and right-wing groups in Athens. On March 12, despite the ban, a small group from the Holy Society right-wing organization briefly gathered in Thessaloniki, Central Macedonia region. The gathering was linked to a film screening but was quickly dispersed by the police.

Judicial developments included a preliminary investigation by the public prosecutor against the GD youth organization for membership in a criminal organization, racist violence and violation of flare regulations. On April 24, the Supreme Court ruled that the Spartans, a far-right party, would be excluded from the European Parliament elections, after it was ruled that the true leader of the Spartans was Ilias Kasidiaris, a convicted member of GD. Meanwhile, a trial regarding allegations of voter deception involving the Spartans was repeatedly postponed. On December 18, the parliament interrupted state party funding for the Spartans.

Furthermore, Nikolaos Michaloliakos, the long-standing leader of GD, was briefly released from prison on May 2, but his release was revoked by the Lamia Appeal Court on June 3, which cited ongoing endorsements of Nazi activities.

lar

GREECE – TÜRKIYE (AEGEAN SEA)

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **1973**

Conflict parties: Greece vs. Türkiye

Conflict items: territory

The non-violent crisis over territory between Greece and Türkiye continued.

On January 24, the Turkish foreign minister called Greece's sovereignty over several islands near the Turkish coastline into question, if Greece continued to violate the non-military status that was established in the 1923 and 1947 peace treaties. On January 27, Turkish President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan held a speech in the capital of Ankara to fellow party members. Referencing the 1922 burning of Smyrna/Izmir by the Turkish army, during which tens of thousands of Anatolian Greeks and Armenians were killed, Erdoğan pledged the Turkish struggle did not end with expelling the Greeks from Anatolia "and throwing them into the sea from Izmir". On February 14, Türkiye conducted a large-scale exercise of the Turkish Air Force in an area spanning the Greek islands of Chios, Samos, Tinos, and Andros.

On July 27, both countries engaged in a naval standoff, when an Italian research vessel, with the official permission of Greece, entered the Aegean near the Greek islands of Kasos and Karpathos to carry out surveys for the planned installment of submarine cables. Türkiye sent five military vessels to monitor the movement of the Italian research ship, to which Greece responded with the deployment of its own navy. The resulting standoff lasted almost 40 hours.

Despite continued tensions, efforts were made to normalize relations, with several meetings between high-ranking officials of both countries taking place. For instance, the Greek Prime Minister, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, and Erdoğan, met on May 23 in Ankara, as well as on September 30, on the sidelines of the UNGA. On November 8, the countries' foreign ministers met in the Greek capital of Athens. On December 2, the Greek government announced that progress in resolving differences with Türkiye over maritime demarcation in the Aegean Sea is "all but impossible" and that it would shift priorities back to maintaining contacts and engaging in lower-level talks. sgr

KOSOVO° – SERBIA

Intensity: **2** | Change: ↘ | Start: **1989**

Conflict parties: Kosovar government vs. Serbian government, Serbian minority (in Kosovo°)

Conflict items: secession

The violent crisis over secession of Kosovo between the Kosovar government, on the one hand, and the Serbian government and the Serbian minority in Kosovo, on the other, de-escalated to a non-violent crisis. Serbia has not acknowledged Kosovo as a sovereign state since its unilateral declaration of independence in 2008.

On January 17, Kosovo imposed a ban on cash transactions in Serbian Dinar. On February 12, thousands of Kosovo Serbs demonstrated against this regulation, in North Mitrovica, Mitrovica District. In addition, the election on April

21 to remove the Albanian mayors in northern Kosovo was boycotted by Srpska Lista, with turnout below validity.

Throughout 2024, Kosovo authorities shut down various Serbia-operated institutions, including post offices, banks licensed by Serbia, and Serbian administrative structures in northern Kosovo. In mid-July, Kosovo announced the reopening to vehicular traffic of the bridge over the Ibar River, which divides Mitrovica into the Serb-dominated north and Albanian south of the city. This decision sparked demonstrations by Kosovo Serbs and drew criticism from the international community.

The EU-facilitated dialogue stalled, marked by mutual accusations and both parties' refusals to attend trilateral meetings and exemplified by a failed attempt to meet in September. Serbia insists on its establishment to ensure representation of Kosovo's Serb minority.

By October 8, Kosovo lifted a ban on imports of Serbian goods at the Merdare border in North Kosovo, a restriction that had been in place since June 2023. On November 29, an explosion damaged the Ibar-Lepenac canal in northern Kosovo which is critical for the country's electricity supply. Kosovo's Prime Minister Albin Kurti accuses Serbia for the attack.

At the end of the year, on December 23, the Central Election Commission in Kosovo refused to certify Srpska Lista which means they cannot run for the planned February 2025 elections. has

MOLDOVA (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **1** | Change: • | Start: **2009**

Conflict parties: opposition parties vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The dispute over national power and the orientation of the political system between the government of the pro-EU Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) led by President Maia Sandu, on the one hand, and opposition parties, the pro-Russian Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova (PSRM) and the Sor Party, on the other, continued.

Tensions between pro-Russian and pro-European sentiment persisted. In response to alleged Russian interference in Moldovan politics, the EU imposed sanctions against six individuals and one entity accused of undermining Moldova's democracy on February 22.

Both the EU membership referendum and the presidential election faced allegations of interference and manipulation. According to Moldovan officials, voters were allegedly paid by Russian actors to vote against EU membership. Moreover, polling stations in Germany for Moldovans living abroad were the targets of bomb threats.

On October 20, a narrow majority of 50.46% Moldovans voted in favor of joining the EU. On November 3, Sandu (PAS) won the second election round with approximately 54% of the vote to serve her second and last term as president of Moldova. lit

MOLDOVA (TRANSNISTRIA)

Intensity: **2** | Change:  | Start: **1989**

Conflict parties: Transnistria regional government vs. government

Conflict items: secession

The violent crisis over the secession of Transnistria between the self-proclaimed Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (PMR), supported by Russia, on the one hand, and the Moldovan government, on the other, de-escalated to a non-violent crisis.

Tensions between the parties persisted. From the beginning of 2024 Moldova revoked custom privileges for Transnistrian businesses, requiring them to pay duties to both Transnistria and Moldova. In response, the Transnistrian government imposed tax hikes on Moldovan enterprises in Transnistria. Furthermore, on January 23, Transnistria announced plans to modernize its armed forces and called on Russia for assistance, citing alleged pressure from Moldova. Russian officials declared their readiness to support Transnistria. On May 17, human rights activist Viktor Plescanov, who had been imprisoned in Transnistria in 2022 for waving a Ukrainian flag, was pardoned and released.

On September 5, Transnistrian officials banned the use of the term "Transnistria", which originates from Romanian. Instead, only the Russian term "Pridnestrovia", or the full name "the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic" is permitted. Misuse can be punished with a fine.

Following the war in Ukraine [→ Russia – Ukraine] a gas transit deal between Russia's Gazprom and Ukraine's Naftogaz that supplied Transnistria will be discontinued after its expiration on December 31. Hence, on December 13, the Moldovan parliament voted to approve a 60-day state of emergency. Transnistria also declared a state of emergency following the expected shortage of gas on December 10. lit

NORWAY ET AL. – RUSSIA (ARCTIC)

Intensity: **2** | Change:  | Start: **2001**

Conflict parties: Canada, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, USA vs. Russia

Conflict items: territory, international power, other

The non-violent crisis over economic and military activities in the Arctic region between Russia, on the one hand, and Norway and its NATO allies, on the other, continued. Tensions remained high throughout the year.

On January 8, the Norwegian parliament approved deep sea mining in the Arctic Ocean. On February 14, Russia suspended the annual payment to the Arctic Council until further notice. Over the course of the year, both sides held drills to showcase military presence and power. For instance, between March 3 and 14, NATO conducted its "Nordic Response" exercise with 20,000 soldiers at the Cap of the North. From November 4 to 24, a NATO military exercise "Dynamic Front" took place from the Arctic circle to the Black Sea, close to the NATO-Russian border, with more than 3,600 soldiers and around 1,000 military vehicles participating.

Russia also conducted several military exercises, the most notable of which took place in June. For instance, Russia sim-

ulated the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons on June 12 in the Arctic region, and, on June 18, a nuclear-powered submarine launched missiles in the Barents Sea. Russia also used deterring strategies in the region. For example, on September 12, a Russian warship fired warning shots at a Norwegian fishing boat.

Additionally, on June 20, Norway, Sweden and Finland signed an agreement to create an Arctic military transport corridor to channel personnel and equipment to Finland [→ EU, USA et al. – Russia; Russia – Ukraine]. dkl

RUSSIA (ISLAMIST MILITANTS / NORTHERN CAUCASUS)

Intensity: **3** | Change:  | Start: **1991**

Conflict parties: IS Caucasus Province, other Islamist militant groups vs. government

Conflict items: secession, system/ideology

The violent crisis over ideology and secession between militant groups, most of them fighting under the umbrella of the self-proclaimed Islamic State Caucasus Province (IS Caucasus Province), on the one hand, and the central and regional governments of Russia, on the other, continued. The IS Caucasus Province aims to establish an independent Islamic Emirate in the North Caucasus Federal District, comprising the republics of Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia, and North Ossetia-Alania, as well as the Stavropol Krai region.

The intensity of the conflict increased over the course of the year. This is a continuation of a trend seen in the previous year. After a decline in casualties between 2020 to 2022, they have gradually increased in the last two years. 48 people were killed and 53 were injured in 2024.

A terrorist attack on June 23, in which six Islamists attacked several churches and synagogues in the cities of Derbent and Makhackala, Dagestan, stands out in particular. The militants, who also died during their attack, killed a total of 17 police officers and five civilians. Among the attackers was the son of the then-governor of the Sergokala district (Dagestan).

This was the second major Islamist attack in Russia in 2024 after the attack on a concert in the Crocus City Hall in Krasnogorsk, Moscow region, on March 22, in which IS supporters killed a total of 144 people and injured 360. Both attacks illustrate the growing level of Islamist violence in the North Caucasus and Russia as a whole in the last two years.

The level of violence decreased significantly in the second half of the year. bba

RUSSIA (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change:  | Start: **2001**

Conflict parties: opposition groups, opposition parties vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The violent crisis over national power and the orientation of the political system between various opposition groups and parties, on the one hand, and the government under President Vladimir Putin, on the other, continued.

The ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine provoked oppo-

sition actions on various levels [→ Russia – Ukraine] and peaceful protests took place. The government intensified the execution of its restrictive regulations. Due to a prisoner exchange, several Russian opposition figures were able to leave Russia.

Throughout the year, at least one person died and two were injured. For instance, on February 16, the Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny died at the IK-3 penal colony in the Yamal-Nenets region. On February 19, his widow Yulia Navalnaya announced she would continue her late husband’s oppositional political work. On March 12, a confidant of Alexei Navalny, was attacked by an unknown person outside his home in Lithuania. The attacker hit him 15 times with a hammer and broke his arm.

Over the course of the year, opposition groups and members of civil society protested against the government. On March 15, people protested against the presidential election in Moscow, Voronezh region, by pouring dye into ballot boxes, setting them on fire, or setting off fireworks inside polling stations. At least nine people were detained. On November 16, several thousand people protested against the war in Ukraine on the 1000th day of war. They were led by Russian opposition figures.

The government also arrested journalists and issued arrest warrants against opposition figures. On March 17, a Russian journalist was arrested for 10 days after reporting about the trial of Alexei Navalny. She was arrested again on March 29, accused of working for Navalny’s anti-corruption foundation which is classified as an extremist organization. On April 27, two further journalists were detained on the same charges. On July 9, a Moscow court issued an arrest warrant for Yulia Navalnaya for working for an extremist organization. On August 1, a prisoner exchange involving Russia, Germany, the US, Slovenia, and Norway took place, resulting in the release of 24 prisoners. A Russian linked to the Russian security apparatus who served a life sentence in Germany for the assassination of a Russian citizen of Georgian descent on 08/23/19 in Berlin, Germany, was among those exchanged [Russia (Islamist militants / Northern Caucasus; EU, USA et al. – Russia)].

On July 23, the Russian Duma passed an amendment to the “undesired organizations law” of 2015. The original law allowed a ban on NGOs only while the amendment expands its effect to government-funded organizations. fza

casualties, and the destruction of infrastructure. The total yearly confirmed military deaths amount to 19,349 Ukrainian and 20,812 Russian military personnel. In terms of civilian casualties, 2,064 were killed and 9,089 injured. The number of refugees globally from Ukraine increased from 6,444,800 to 6,813,900, while the number of internally displaced persons decreased from 3,689,000 to 3,555,000 in 2024.

Throughout the year, Russian forces gained 4,168 square kilometers, seven times more than last year, including the following significant towns: Avdiivka, Selydove, Vuhledar, and Kurakhove, Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian-backed forces continued cross-border raids into Belgorod and Kursk oblasts, Russia, starting in 2023. For example, from March 12 to March 21, they conducted sabotage and reconnaissance group raids in Belgorod Oblast, Russia, leaving more than 110 dead, 98 injured, and 10,000 people displaced respectively. On May 10, Russian forces started an offensive in Kharkiv Oblast to stop the Ukrainian shelling of Belgorod and Kursk oblasts and to create a buffer zone. This offensive had stalled by the end of May. One of the reasons was that US President Joe Biden permitted Ukraine to strike inside Russia, solely close to Kharkiv Oblast, with US-provided weapons. On August 6, Ukrainian forces initiated an offensive into Kursk Oblast, gaining around 1,000 square kilometers in the first week. At least 56 civilians had been killed and 266 wounded in the first seven weeks of the offensive. This operation led to the displacement of over 133,000 residents. As of December, less than 500 square kilometres of Kursk Oblast remained under Ukrainian control.

Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted numerous drone and missile strikes. For example, on January 24, a Russian military transport plane crashed after a missile attack, killing all 74 passengers. On July 8, a Russian missile attack on civilian infrastructure and a military plant in Kyiv killed at least 27 people and injured 119. On November 17, a Russian missile destroyed a residential building and power plants in Sumy, Sumy Oblast, killing eleven and injuring 90 civilians.

During the year, Russian forces regularly attacked the Ukrainian military-industrial complex. For example, on November 21, Russia launched a new type of hypersonic intermediate-range ballistic missile called Oreshnik. The missile was not equipped with nuclear warheads, although theoretically capable of transporting them. It damaged an aerospace manufacturer in Dnipro, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. Additionally, Russia launched missile attacks targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure, while Ukraine carried out numerous drone attacks on oil refineries and fuel storage facilities across Russia. Moreover, Ukrainian forces continued to attack the Black Sea Fleet. They hit a military corvette, a patrol ship, and three landing ships. Furthermore, they reportedly sunk a diesel-electric attack submarine.


Regarding NATO-Ukraine relations, in 2024, Ukraine did not receive an official invitation to NATO. However, its member states confirmed their military, financial, and humanitarian support to Ukraine. Moreover, on February 26, the President of France Emmanuel Macron announced the possibility of sending NATO troops to Ukrainian territory, while other members, including the USA, the UK, Germany, and Italy, rejected this idea. Moreover, between February and July, Ukraine signed ten-year bilateral security agreements with 22 countries, including the US, UK, Germany, France, Italy, Finland, and Japan, on military and non-military security, recovery and reconstruction, Ukraine’s reform process, and a mechanism in case a future armed attack [→ EU, USA et al. – Russia].

Regarding military equipment, Ukraine received 79 F-16

RUSSIA – UKRAINE

Intensity: **5** | Change: **•** | Start: **2003**

Conflict parties: Russian Federation vs. Ukraine
 Conflict items: territory, system/ideology, international power, resources



The war over territory, international power, system/ideology, and resources between Russia, supported by Belarus, Iran, and North Korea on the one hand, and Ukraine, supported by the USA, UK, the EU, and Japan, on the other, continued. Compared to 2023, the war of attrition continued, characterized by intense fighting, a high number of military

combat aircraft in the second half of the year. However, the model sent was not up to date. Moreover, the UK, the USA, and France permitted Ukraine to launch long-range missile strikes on Russian territory. Consequently, on November 19, Russia approved an updated nuclear doctrine, expanding conditions for the use of nuclear weapons. Under the changes, an attack by a non-nuclear state supported by a nuclear power would be considered a joint attack on Russia. Moreover, a large-scale attack with conventional missiles, drones, or aircraft could meet the criteria for a nuclear response.

Concerning Russian supporters, on June 18, Russia and North Korea signed a defense treaty that would provide mutual assistance in repelling external aggression. Since October, nearly 10,000 North Korean troops have been deployed in Kursk Oblast to conduct combat operations with Ukrainian forces.

Negotiations on Ukraine's accession to the EU continued. On March 12, the European Commission submitted proposals for draft negotiating frameworks for Ukraine and Moldova [→ Moldova (opposition)] to the Council of the European Union. The frameworks comprise the experience of past enlargements and the ongoing accession negotiations. On June 25, the EU held the first Intergovernmental Conference at the ministerial level to open accession negotiations with Ukraine.

In terms of economic confrontation, on February 22 the UK announced over 50 sanctions against munitions manufacturers, electronics companies, and diamond and oil traders. On February 23, the EU adopted the 13th package of sanctions against Russia, further limiting its access to military technologies and adding 88 entities and 106 individuals to the sanction list. On February 23, the US imposed new sanctions on almost 300 individuals and entities, also due to the death of a Russian opposition activist, Aleksey Navalny, which happened on February 16 [→ Russia (opposition)]. On May 8, the EU diplomats agreed to use the income from frozen Russian state assets to aid Ukraine. On June 24, the EU adopted its 14th package of sanctions against Russia, which targeted Russian liquified natural gas and investments in related projects. On August 23, the US imposed sanctions on nearly 400 individuals and organizations linked to Russian evasion networks. Additionally, on October 30, the US sanctioned 275 individuals and entities involved in supplying Russia with advanced technology and equipment. The EU's 15th package of sanctions against Russia, adopted on December 16, banned 52 vessels of the Russian shadow fleet from entering EU ports and receiving services from European companies. elb, agl, lma, hal, jop, tzo, tcr

SERBIA (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2018**

Conflict parties: opposition parties vs. government
Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The violent crisis over national power and the political system between the opposition parties and the government continued.

On January 16, supporters of the opposition parties protested in the capital Belgrade against the results of the elections of 12/17/23. They also supported the European Parliament's decision to discuss these results, encompassing both parliamentary and local elections in Serbia. On January 26, opponents of President Aleksandar Vučić rallied outside the

Constitutional Court building in Belgrade, demanding the annulment of the elections results due to reported irregularities. Moreover, thousands marched on the same day to the headquarters of Serbia's public broadcaster RTS, in Belgrade, to protest perceived government bias in the media.

On February 6, members of the opposition protested in the Serbian parliament against the reported irregularities of the elections, as the new parliament held its first session. On June 2 after allegations of cheating by the ruling party SNS in a local election rerun, protests ensued in Belgrade, forcing authorities to schedule another rerun.

Furthermore, there were several protests led by civilians and environmental activists against the government-backed lithium-excitation project in Serbia. These occurred on July 29, August 10, September 1, and October 16, primarily in Belgrade, Šabac, Kraljevo, Aranelovac, Ljig, Barajevo, and Loznica.

Following a railway station collapse in Novi Sad on November 5, which resulted in 14 deaths, thousands protested in Novi Sad and Belgrade on November 11. They targeted government officials, hurling flares and red paint at the City Hall building in Novi Sad. Serbian police responded with tear gas, leading to the detention of nine individuals during the November 5 protests. These protests continued throughout November and December with weekly demonstrations in Novi Sad and Belgrade, organized by opposition leaders and university students. While the protests against the government remained mostly peaceful, on November 26 members of the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) attacked protesting citizens in Belgrade. This resulted in numerous fights and an injured journalist. Finally, on December 31, tens of thousands of protesters gathered overnight in Belgrade to demand political reforms under the slogan "There is no New Year - you still owe us for the Old One". cap

SPAIN (BASQUE PROVINCES)

Intensity: **1** | Change: • | Start: **1959**

Conflict parties: EH-Bildu vs. government
Conflict items: secession, autonomy

The dispute over autonomy or secession of the Basque Country between the left-wing pro-independence coalition Basque Country Gather (EH Bildu) with ties to individuals linked to the 2018 self-dissolved terrorist group, Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA), on the one side, and the central government, on the other, continued.

On January 13, approx. 65,000 people gathered in the Basque capital Bilbao, Biscay province, Basque autonomous community, demanding for compliance with prison law and an end to exceptional legislation for ETA-prisoners.

These claims were raised, even though, as of 2023, all remaining ETA-prisoners had been transferred to prisons closer to their homes. This complied with prison law and ended the Spanish government's years-long strategy of dispersal as a form of punishment.

According to Etxerat, an NGO claiming to support families of those exiled or imprisoned in pro-independence contexts. However, on December 12, the Spanish main criminal court, Audiencia Nacional, sentenced four ETA-members to 74 years in prison each, for a failed bomb attack on 10/11/20.

Over the course of the year, political quarrels in the regional parliament over various topics continued. For instance, on April 16, tensions flared when, EH Bildu's candidate for head

of the Basque regional government, refused to describe ETA as “terrorist,” instead calling it an “armed group” and stating that whether it could be considered terrorist “depends on different points of view”. This prompted outrage from the Spanish government, with a spokesperson calling the statement “cowardly” – in the context of the Basque provinces – and showing “utter contempt” for ETA’s victims. [tcr](#)

SPAIN (CATALAN NATIONALISTS / CATALONIA)

Intensity: **1** | Change: **•** | Start: **1979**

Conflict parties: Catalan civil society groups, Catalan regional government vs. government, Spanish civil society groups

Conflict items: secession, autonomy

The dispute over secession or further autonomy of the autonomous community of Catalonia between the Catalan regional government and various civil society groups, on the one hand, and the central government as well as political parties, on the other, continued.

On May 12, the Socialists’ Party of Catalonia (PSC) won the elections for Catalan parliament, whereas the Catalan parties favoring independence lost their majority for the first time in over a decade. This marked a shift in conflict dynamics, since the electoral outcome reflected a decline in popular support for independence-oriented parties.

On May 30, despite ongoing protests, the Spanish government subsequently enacted the extensively disputed amnesty bill granting allegedly anti-constitutional immunity to anyone involved in the independence referendum on 10/01/17 and its aftermath. Protests broke out across the country, most notably on May 27, when between 20,000 and 80,000 people demonstrated against the government’s decision in the capital, Madrid.

Although the amnesty law was approved, Spain’s Supreme Court judges have blocked its implementation several times by deciding to uphold arrest warrants for individuals under investigation. This was the case for the former president of the Generalitat and current member of the Catalan Parliament, Carles Puigdemont. Puigdemont was unable to attend the investiture of the new president of the Generalitat on August 8 because the Catalan regional police had cordoned off the building by court order to arrest him.

On “La Diada”, Catalan National Day, on September 11, several protests took place to demand independence in various Catalan cities. For instance, around 60,000 people attended a demonstration in Barcelona, the region’s capital.

Later that year, on the anniversary of the amnesty bill, on November 9, hundreds demonstrated in Madrid.

However, significantly fewer people attended these demonstrations compared to former years, since the increase of the mass protests in 2012. [som](#)

SPAIN – UNITED KINGDOM (GIBRALTAR)

Intensity: **2** | Change: **↗** | Start: **1954**

Conflict parties: EU, Spain vs. United Kingdom

Conflict items: territory

The dispute over territory of the British overseas territory

Gibraltar between the UK and Spain escalated to a non-violent crisis.

Tensions between the UK and Spain in 2024 centered on border controls, territorial disputes, and sovereignty. Efforts to resolve these issues included renewed talks involving the EU, UK, Spain, and Gibraltar, which aimed to establish a “Schengen-adjacent” status for Gibraltar. This arrangement sought to maintain border fluidity without Gibraltar formally joining the Schengen area, during April and May. Negotiations continued throughout the year, despite the May 16 joint statement of the EU and UK, expressing their “shared commitment” reaching an agreement, yet with the EU Entry/Exit System (EES) set to take effect on November 10, concerns mounted over stricter border controls and potential delays for the 11,000 daily commuters. Subsequently, on October 11, Spain imposed unexpected passport controls at the Gibraltar border, causing severe delays. In response, Gibraltar’s Chief Minister Fabian Picardo introduced reciprocal measures requiring passports for those entering Gibraltar. The situation calmed later that day, though some Spanish officers continued checks, citing unclear instructions.

Amidst ongoing tensions, the Mayor of La Línea de la Concepción, the city bordering Gibraltar, Andalusia autonomous community, led a protest in which thousands participated, on October 25, demanding improved economic conditions and border solutions.

In September and October, tensions also rose in the context of mega-construction projects. For instance over Gibraltar’s approx. 368 million USD, Eastside Project, which involves land extension into the seas around Gibraltar not only enlarging Gibraltar but also the contested so-called British Gibraltar Territorial Waters (BGTW). Spain objected citing environmental risks and alleged violations of their sovereign waters. Gibraltar dismissed these claims, asserting its rights under international law. Meanwhile, the Spain-Morocco underwater tunnel project, set to connect Punta Paloma, Tarifa municipality, Andalusia autonomous community, Spain, with Cape Malabata near Tangier city, Tanger-Tetouan-Al Hoceima region, Morocco, faced delays in October 2024, with its completion presumably pushed to 2040, and cost estimates varying between approx. 7,4 and 16,3 billion USD.

Maritime incidents intensified over the course of the year. On April 11, a Spanish Guardia Civil vessel collided with a Gibraltar airport runway light fixture and allegedly began to sink in BGTW on the north-western side of the peninsula. On June 27, another Guardia Civil vessel entered BGTW near the eastern side, attempting to board a local boat. On August 14, the Spanish Navy vessel El Rayo entered BGTW near the Eastside Project development site, prompting HMS Dagger to intercept and escort it away. On October 18, the Royal Navy’s Gibraltar Squadron carried out joint maritime exercises in the disputed waters off Gibraltar. The exercises involved the Royal Gibraltar Police, the Ministry of Defense Police in Gibraltar, and the Rock’s Customs Service. [tcr](#)

SWEDEN (MIGRATION)

Intensity: **2** | Change: **•** | Start: **2015**

Conflict parties: various right-wing groups, xenophobes vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology

The non-violent crisis over the orientation of the political system, in particular asylum and immigration policies, between

various xenophobic actors as well as several far-right political organizations, on the one hand, and liberal multicultural activists and the government on the other, continued.

Throughout the year, right-wing extremist, anti-immigration and/or anti-muslim groups threatened or provoked muslim communities. For instance on May 28 a person threw the corpse of a boar against the wall of a mosque located between Gothenburg municipality, Västra Götaland county and the capital Stockholm. On another occasion, on April 10, islam-critical priests demonstrated against the "islamisation of Sweden" outside the largest mosque in Stockholm, wielding a crucifix and burning Qu'rans.

The government took counter measures, on August 7, individuals involved in last year's Qu'ran burnings of 07-09/23, in mostly muslim areas or in front of mosques, were charged and put on trial for "offenses of agitation against an ethnic or national group". On September 10, Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson linked organized crime to migration and failed integration efforts [→ Sweden (organized crime)]. Furthermore, on December 13, the government announced to map the extent of racism in the general public.

On June 14, the US designated Sweden's largest right-wing extremist group, the Nordic Resistance Movement (NRM), as a terrorist organization and imposed sanctions, reflecting growing concern. tcr

SWEDEN (ORGANIZED CRIME)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2002**

Conflict parties: 14K vs. Österberganätverket vs. Bandidos vs. Black Cobra vs. Dödspatrullen vs. Foxtrotnätverket vs. Hells Angels vs. Satudah MC vs. Södertäljenätverket vs. Serbian-Motenegrin Mafia vs. various criminal organisations vs. Zerolätverket vs. government

Conflict items: subnational predominance, resources

The violent crisis over resources and subnational predominance between and within criminal organizations such as several rival gangs, clans and motor-cycle clubs, as well as the government against those, continued.

The government announced changes in security policies and raised concerns about the internationality of operations of criminal organizations, as well as migration and underage perpetrators. For instance, on January 1, the Swedish Parliament passed a law making testimonies of anonymous witnesses possible in organised crime related cases. One month later, on February 1, Sweden introduced its first national strategy against organized crime outlining more stringent counter-measures. Continuing the effort, on April 10, the Swedish Parliament amended the Police Act, allowing the temporary creation of "safety zones" in which searches without suspicion are legal. On September 6, The Social Democratic Party proposed to use coercive measures such as wire-tapping also in cases in which suspects are younger than 15 years old – the age below which a person is considered a child under Swedish law. On September 10, Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson stated that addressing organized crime, specifically shootings and bombings, will require "extraordinary measures for a long time.", pledging to target organized crime's

financing structures and its "infiltration of authorities," while implying ties to migration and failed integration [→ Sweden (migration)], also emphasizing the need to tackle the issue of "dangerous child soldiers" that Sweden has become known for, linking these efforts to strengthening Sweden's international prestige. In December Swedish politicians and Police began talks about imposing an Australian-style age limit for social media use to combat digital recruitment platforms of criminal organizations.

The Police estimated that until February, approx. 62,000 people were part of organized crime networks, with 14,000 being active, 48,000 associated, and of both groups 1,700 being underage. Furthermore, the Police counted in its criminal statistics, from January 1 to December 31, 296 shootings, 44 people were shot dead and 66 were injured related to violent crimes such as organised crime and gang violence. For instance, on January 6, a person was found shot in an industrial area in Linköping municipality, Östergötland county. On another occasion, on May 6, a person was shot dead midday in the Södermalm area in the center of the capital Stockholm. The police subsequently arrested multiple suspects, stating that the perpetrators allegedly had connections to Hells Angels and Foxtrotnätverket, a mostly Kurdish-Turkish criminal network. Similarly, on June 4, a famous rapper was shot dead while leaving a parking garage on Hisingen island in a suburban area of Gothenburg municipality, Västra Götaland county. On October 10, an underage perpetrator shot rounds outside the office of an Israeli defence technology company in central Gothenburg. The Swedish Security Service (SÄPO) immediately linked the incident to Iran, alledgling Iran of using organized crime networks such as Foxtrotnätverket to conduct such attacks [→ Iran – Israel; Israel (Hamas et al.)]. SÄPO have been speculating about this kind of link for some time. On October 22, a family member of a known gang criminal was shot in the head multiple times in Akalla district, west Stockholm.

Furthermore the Police reported a total of 317 bombing related incidents throughout the year: 129 bomb explosions, 60 attempts and 128 preparations. For instance, in the evening of March 4, an underage perpetrator conducted a bomb attack on a residential building complex, damaging the building; the residents had to be evacuated due to the risk of collapse. The police arrested the perpetrator.

Criminal organizations also regularly committed acts of extortion as well as drugs, arms and human trafficking and other various crimes. In January, Swedish authorities seized approx. 2,3 million illegal tablets in Göteborg Municipality. The head of the Swedish Customs Criminal Department highlighted that this was an example of how this kind of drugs came from sites in Serbia via Hungary into Sweden. In this context, the Police arrested three Serbian nationals, presumably linked to Scandinavian Yugo Mafia. On another occasion, on September 25, Iceland's Minister of Justice, accused Sweden based allegedly palestinian controlled Kronogårdsnätverket of setting a police officer's car ablaze in Iceland in August. tcr

UKRAINE (RIGHT-WING / OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: ↗ | Start: **2013**

Conflict parties: right-wing groups vs. civil right groups, minorities, oppositional parties vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The non-violent crisis over national power and the orientation of the political system between right-wing groups, opposition parties, alongside minorities and civil-rights groups, the Orthodox church, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, escalated to a violent crisis.

Throughout the year, freedom of the press and the work of activists were endangered by attacks and surveillance. For instance, on January 14, unknown assailants attempted to break into the apartment of the co-founder and editor of the anti-corruption media investigative project, "Our Money in the Capital Kyiv". On January 16, the NGO Bihus.info, known for investigating law enforcement officials, claimed that its staff had been monitored through video surveillance and telephone wiretapping. On June 20, unknown assailants shot a Kazakh journalist and former member of Kazakhstan's opposition in the capital. On July 2, he died due to his injuries. Activists reported that he had been surveilled and had received death threats for weeks. On July 19, a member of the Russian National Socialism/White Power Crew killed nationalist politician Iryna Farion in Lviv.

Over the course of the year, at least two dozen clerics with ties to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) (UOC-MP) were investigated, arrested, or imprisoned by the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU). For instance, on January 30, SSU detained a priest of a church in Vinnytsia Diocese, eponymous Oblast, for praising terrorists, and sent him to prison for two years. On February 13, a court sentenced a rector of a church in Dnipro diocese, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, to five years in prison for spreading Russian propaganda. On March 12, SSU identified more than 15 UOC-MP media bloc members, arresting four in Kyiv. On August 20, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy signed a bill banning religious groups with ties to Russia. Religious communities have nine months to sever their respective ties. The bill primarily targets UOC-MP.

Furthermore, democratic processes remained contentious. For instance, on March 31, the presidential elections due to be held were postponed due to martial law. Martial law has been in force since Russia's full-scale invasion [→ Russia – Ukraine] and has been extended until 02/07/2025. On May 7, the SSU arrested two army colonels who were engaged in a plot to assassinate or kidnap Zelenskyy and deliver him to Russian President Vladimir Putin. On another occasion, on June 17, a few hundred right-wing militants participated in a march after Kyiv Pride, shouting death threats against queer people and slogans against Russia. On June 19, the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine banned the party Our Land by the final decision of the Eighth Administrative Court of Appeal. jdo

UNITED KINGDOM (NATIONALISTS / NORTHERN IRELAND)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1968**

Conflict parties: DUP, Red Hand Commando, UDA, UVF vs. Army of the Republic, Óglaigh na hÉireann, IRA, nationalist youth, NIRA, Sinn Féin vs. government

Conflict items: secession, subnational predominance

The violent crisis over secession between nationalist and

dissident republican groups on the one hand and unionists, loyalists and the government on the other, as well as over subnational predominance both between and within these antagonistic communities and the government, continued.

On January 18, Northern Ireland's legal deadline to restore the power-sharing government expired as the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) continued its boycott. Power-sharing requires unionists and nationalists to serve jointly. On January 25, the UK Parliament extended the deadline to February 8. On January 29, the DUP leader ended the 22-month stalemate. On January 31, UK Northern Ireland Secretary presented a DUP-government deal addressing post-Brexit issues, ending hard border checks for goods from the UK, removing EU law "alignment" – to which UK and EU had agreed in the 2023-Windsor Framework –, reinforcing Northern Ireland's position in UK's internal market, and including approx. 4 billion USD for public services. Sinn Féin welcomed that, and on February 3, Sinn Féin's Michelle O'Neill became Northern Ireland's first nationalist First Minister. On July 4, in the UK general election in Northern Ireland, out of 18 seats in the House of Commons of the UK, Sinn Féin, won seven, with no changes, DUP won five, losing three, the Social Democratic and Labour Party won two, the remaining seats split evenly to smaller parties. According to the government's PSNI Security Statistics of 2024, overall violence both between and within the antagonistic communities and against the government decreased significantly. Before the report was released, on March 6, the UK government lowered the terrorism threat level from "severe" to "substantial," according to MI5, indicating a level three out of five, meaning a terrorist attack was "likely."

However, according to the PSNI, one person was shot dead in the context of security-related criminality, on January 9, in the Greenan area of the Northern Irish capital Belfast. Similarly, in 17 paramilitary shootings five were injured across the country. Furthermore, paramilitary groups assaulted and injured 23 people. For instance, on May 5, PSNI found a person nailed through the hands to a wooden fence in a car park near Dundarave Park in Bushmills village, Causeway Coast and Glens Borough Council. The Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) leader, Doug Beattie, linked the incident to loyalist paramilitary attacks. Furthermore, the PSNI counted six bombings or attempted bombings. Over the course of the year, 67 people were arrested under section 41 of the Terrorism Act 2000 and nine were subsequently charged. For instance, on February 26, four men were arrested for manufacturing pipe bombs in Dungiven town, same Borough Council.

PSNI and dissident republican groups clashed throughout the year, pronouncedly in the context of parades. On February 26, dissident republican paramilitary group Arm na Poblachta claimed responsibility for targeting PSNI vehicles in Dungiven. On May 24, PSNI arrested a suspected New Irish Republican Army (NIRA)-member and seized AK-47 automatic rifles in Derry/Londonderry city, Derry City and Strabane District Council. On April 1, Easter Monday, a dissident republican parade marking the 1916 Easter Rising ended with several nationalist youths and dissident republicans throwing petrol bombs at journalists and setting ablaze a van in the Creggan area in the west of the city. On August 10, approx. ten nationalist youths attacked PSNI officers at the end of the Apprentice Boys of Derry parade with petrol bombs, fireworks and heavy bricks, injuring ten officers and damaging at least four PSNI vehicles in the same city. One person was arrested subsequently. While the unionist Ulster Volunteer Force allegedly attempted to show strength, on June 17, with approx. 1,500 people, many of whom uniformly dressed, lining streets in east Belfast to commemorate the 1988 IRA-

killing of a member.

On December 3, the UK imposed a new counter-terrorism financial sanctions regime, freezing assets of a person and associated companies suspected of financing NIRA-terrorism. tcr

UNITED KINGDOM (SCOTTISH NATIONALISTS / SCOTLAND)

Intensity: **2** | Change: **•** | Start: **2007**

Conflict parties: AUOB et al., SNP vs. government

Conflict items: secession

The non-violent crisis over secession between the Scottish regional government of the Scottish National Party (SNP) supported by nationalist civic organizations such as All Under One Banner (AUOB) and pro-independence supporters, on the one hand, and the British government supported by pro-unionists, on the other, continued.

Scotland faced a government crisis from April 18 to 29, after SNP leader and First Minister Humza Yousaf ended the 2021-Bute House Agreement on power-sharing between the SNP-led Scottish regional government and the Scottish Green Party, removing their party leaders from government positions and key climate change goals. Yousaf subsequently faced a vote of no confidence, formally resigning on May 7, after John Swinney was elected SNP leader on May 6,


becoming First Minister on May 8. On May 9, Swinney linked SNP's independence strategy to winning the majority in the UK general election in Scotland, on July 4. In this election of 57 seats in the House of Commons of the UK, SNP won nine losing 38, while Labour won 37 gaining 36, five seats each went to Liberal Democrats and Conservatives.

Public opinion on Scottish independence fluctuated throughout the year. On September 3, a poll showed 44% support for independence and 56% for remaining in the UK, reflecting little change over the past decade. However, by December, another poll reported 54% in favor of independence, a four-year high

Throughout the year several protest marches and rallies for independence from the UK and subsequent EU-membership were conducted. For instance, on May 4, AUOB organised a March through Glasgow city, eponymous Council Area, in which several hundreds participated, showing pro-independence and nationalist symbols, while many also expressed support for Palestine [→ Israel (Hamas)] waving banners. SNP politicians, such as the former-First Minister Alex Salmond, took part as well. AUOB canceled a march scheduled for September 7 in the capital Edinburgh, because the civil society movement Stand Up to Racism had planned a March on the same day in Glasgow.

Furthermore, Sara Salyers, the founder of pro-independence group Salvo that describes itself as a "liberation movement" stated on March 3, that they planned to proceed to the International Court of Justice, saying they were "up against the British state" adding "Scots have defeated much bigger opponents". tcr


SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA




VIOLENT CONFLICTS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA IN 2024
(SUBNATIONAL LEVEL)

- INTENSITY
- 5 WAR
 - 4 LIMITED WAR
 - 3 VIOLENT CRISIS


CONFLICT INTENSITIES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA IN 2024 COMPARED TO 2023



CONFLICT INTENSITIES BY CONFLICT ITEM IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA IN 2024



CONFLICT INTENSITIES BY CONFLICT TYPE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA IN 2024



SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Overview: Conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa in 2024

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
Angola (FLEC et al. / Cabinda)*	FLEC, MIC vs. government	secession	1975	•	3
Angola (opposition)*	UNITA vs. MPLA	national power	1975	•	2
Burkina Faso (inter-communal rivalry)*	Gourmantché, Koglweogo et al., Mossi vs. Fulani vs. Islamist Groups	subnational predominance, resources	2016	•	4
Burkina Faso (opposition)*	opposition groups vs. government vs. military	national power	2014	↗	3
Burundi (opposition)*	ADC-Ikibiri, CNL, RED-Tabara, UPRONA vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2006	•	3
Burundi – Rwanda*	Burund vs. Rwanda	international power	2015	•	2
Burundi, DR Congo (FNL, RED-Tabara, Forebu)*	Burundi, DR Congo vs. FNL, Forebu, RED-Tabara	national power	2005	•	3
Cameroon (English-speaking-minority)*	English-speaking minority vs. government	secession, autonomy	2016	•	5
Central African Republic (militant groups)*	militant groups vs. government	national power, resources	2012	•	4
Central African Republic, DR Congo, South Sudan (LRA)*	LRA vs. Central African Republic, DR Congo, South Sudan	resources	1987	•	1
Chad (inter-communal rivalry)*	pastoralists vs. farmers	subnational predominance	1947	•	3
Chad (militant groups)*	CCSMR, CSD, FACT, UFR vs. government	national power	2005	•	2
Chad (opposition)*	opposition groups vs. government	national power	1990	↗	3
Côte d'Ivoire (militant groups)*	militant groups vs. government	national power	2012	•	2
Côte d'Ivoire (opposition)*	opposition groups vs. government	national power	1999	•	3
Djibouti (opposition)*	BSN vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2011	↑	3
DR Congo (Bantu – Batwa)*	Bantu militias vs. Batwa militias	subnational predominance	2013	•	3
DR Congo (Ituri militias)*	CODECO, FPIC, FRPI, Zaire militia vs. government	subnational predominance, resources	1999	•	5
DR Congo (Kata Katanga)*	Kata Katanga vs. government	secession, subnational predominance, resources	2011	•	3
DR Congo (KN)*	KN vs. government	subnational predominance	2016	•	2
DR Congo (M23 factions)*	M23 factions vs. government vs. other militias	national power, subnational predominance, resources	2004	•	5
DR Congo (Mayi-Mayi et al.)*	NDC-R vs. APCLS vs. Mayi-Mayi groups vs. Nyatura groups vs. FPP/AP vs. Banyamulenge militias vs. Bafuliuro militias vs. Babembe militias vs. government	subnational predominance, resources	2003	•	3
DR Congo (Mobondo – Teke)*	Mobondo vs. Teke	subnational predominance	2022	↗	4
DR Congo (MONUSCO protests)*	MONUSCO personnel vs. civil society	other	2022	•	3
DR Congo (opposition)*	church groups, civil society groups, opposition parties vs. government	national power	1997	•	3
DR Congo – Rwanda*	DR Congo vs. Rwanda	international power, other	1998	•	3
DR Congo, Uganda (ADF)*	ADF vs. DR Congo, Uganda	system/ideology, subnational predominance, resources	1995	•	5
Egypt – Ethiopia, Sudan (GERD)*	Egypt vs. Ethiopia vs. Sudan	resources	2011	↗	2
Eritrea (RSADO)*	RSADO vs. government	autonomy	1999	•	1
eSwatini (opposition)*	COSATU, PUDEMO, SUDF vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1998	•	2
Ethiopia (Fano militias / Amhara)*	Fano militias vs. government	autonomy, subnational predominance	2023	↗	5
Ethiopia (inter-communal rivalry)*	Oromo vs. Amhara vs. Konso vs. Ale vs. Issa vs. Afar vs. other ethnic groups	subnational predominance, resources	2017	↗	4
Ethiopia (OLA / Oromia)*	OLF vs. government	subnational predominance	1992	↗	4
Ethiopia (opposition)*	opposition groups vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2005	•	2
Ethiopia, Eritrea (TPLF / Tigray)*	Eritrea, Ethiopia vs. TPLF	system/ideology	2020	↘	2
Gabon (opposition)*	opposition groups vs. government	national power	2009	•	2

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
Gambia (opposition)*	opposition groups vs. government	national power	2016	•	2
Ghana (HSGF et al. / Western Togoland)*	HSFG et al. vs. government	secession	2017	•	2
Guinea (opposition)*	opposition groups vs. government	national power	2006	•	3
Guinea-Bissau (opposition)*	opposition groups vs. government	national power	1998	•	3
Kenya (inter-communal rivalry)*	Pokot vs. Turkana vs. Toposa vs. Borana vs. Rendille vs. Akamba vs. Orma vs. various other tribes	subnational predominance, resources	1963	•	3
Kenya (opposition)*	Azimio la Umajo One-Kenya Coalition vs. government	national power	1999	•	3
Kenya – Somalia*	Kenya vs. Somalia	territory, resources	2015	•	1
Mali (CSP-DPA, CMA et al. / Azawad)*	CMA, CSP-DPA vs. Platform et al. vs. government	autonomy	1989	•	4
Mali (inter-communal rivalry / central Mali)*	Bambara, Dogon, Dozo vs. Fulani vs. Islamist groups	subnational predominance, resources	2012	•	3
Mali (inter-militant rivalry / northern Mali)*	CMA, CSP-DPA vs. Platform et al. vs. Islamist groups	system/ideology, subnational predominance	2012	•	3
Mali (opposition)*	opposition groups vs. government	national power	2012	↗	3
Mali, Burkina Faso et al. (JNIM et al.)*	Al-Mourabitoun, Ansar Dine, Ansaroul Islam, AQIM, JNIM, Macina Liberation Front vs. Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Chad, France, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Togo, USA	system/ideology, international power	1998	•	5
Mozambique (ASWJ)*	ASWJ vs. government	system/ideology	2017	•	4
Mozambique (opposition)*	PODEMOS, RENAMO, RENAMO Military Junta vs. government	national power	2012	•	3
Niger (opposition)*	opposition groups vs. government	national power	2009	•	3
Niger, Mali et al. (IS Sahel)*	IS Sahel vs. Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger	system/ideology, international power	2016	•	5
Nigeria (Ansaru)*	Ansaru vs. government	system/ideology	2012	↗	3
Nigeria (APC supporters – PDP supporters)*	APC supporters vs. PDP supporters	system/ideology, national power	1960	•	3
Nigeria (bandits)*	bandits vs. government	subnational predominance, other	2016	•	5
Nigeria (farmers – pastoralists)*	farmers vs. pastoralists	subnational predominance, resources	1960	↘	3
Nigeria (Ijaw groups / Niger Delta)*	CEND, DSF, Force of Egbesu, Ijaw groups, NDA, RNDA vs. government, international oil companies	autonomy, resources	1997	•	2
Nigeria (Islamic Movement)*	IMN vs. government	system/ideology	1991	•	3
Nigeria (ISWAP – JAS)*	ISWAP vs. JAS	system/ideology, subnational predominance	2016	•	4
Nigeria (pro-Biafra groups / Biafra)*	pro-Biafra groups vs. Cameroon, Nigeria	secession	1967	•	3
Nigeria, Chad et al. (ISWAP)*	ISWAP vs. Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria	system/ideology, international power	2015	•	5
Nigeria, Chad et al. (JAS-Boko Haram)*	JAS vs. Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria	system/ideology	2003	•	5
Republic of Congo (opposition)*	opposition groups vs. government	national power	2015	•	1
Rwanda (opposition)*	FDU-Inkingi vs. government	national power	2003	•	1
Rwanda – Uganda*	Rwanda vs. Uganda	international power	2018	•	1
Senegal (MFDC / Casamance)*	MFDC vs. government	secession	1982	↘	2
Senegal (opposition)*	opposition groups vs. government	national power	2023	•	3
Sierra Leone (opposition)*	APC vs. government	national power	2007	↘	2
Somalia (ISS)*	ISS vs. al-Shabaab vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2015	•	3
Somalia (Jubaland)*	Jubaland Regional Government (JRG) vs. Federal Government of Somalia (FGS)	system/ideology, subnational predominance	2024	NEW	3
Somalia (Puntland – Somaliland)*	regional government of Puntland vs. regional government of Somaliland	subnational predominance	1998	•	4
Somalia (Somaliland)*	regional government of Somaliland vs. government	secession	1991	↗	2
Somalia (subclan rivalry)*	Hawiye vs. Rahanweyn subclan vs. Darod vs. Dir vs. Isaaq vs. various other clans	subnational predominance, resources	2012	•	4

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
Somalia, Kenya (al-Shabaab)*	al-Shabaab vs. Kenya vs. Somalia	system/ideology, national power	2006	•	5
South Africa (opposition)*	civil rights groups, DA, EFF, IFP, MK vs. government	national power	2015	•	3
South Africa (socioeconomic protests)*	residents of informal settlements vs. government	system/ideology	2018	↘	2
South Africa (xenophobes)*	immigrants vs. xenophobes	system/ideology	1994	•	3
South Sudan (inter-communal rivalry)*	Murle vs. Dinka vs. Nuer	subnational predominance, resources	2011	•	5
South Sudan (opposition)*	NAS, SPLM/A-IO-Kitwang vs. government, SPLM/A-IO-RM	system/ideology, national power	2011	•	3
Sudan (Darfur)*	'non-Arab' communities vs. RSF, 'Arab' militias	subnational predominance, resources	2003	•	5
Sudan (inter-communal rivalry)*	Fulani et al, Fur, Masala vs. Hawazma et al, Misseriya, Taisha	subnational predominance, resources	2007	↗	5
Sudan (opposition)*	RSF vs. SAF	national power	2011	•	5
Sudan (SPLM/A-North / South Kordofan, Blue Nile)*	SPLM/A-North vs. government	autonomy, resources	2011	↓	1
Sudan, South Sudan (inter-communal rivalry / Abyei)*	Balanda vs. Murle vs. Dinka vs. Nuer vs. Azande	subnational predominance, resources	2011	•	3
Tanzania (opposition)*	ACT-Wazalendo, CHADEMA, CUF vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1993	↑	3
Togo (opposition)*	opposition groups vs. government	national power	1963	↗	3
Uganda (opposition)*	DP, FDC, Jeema, NEED, NUP, PFT, UPC vs. government	national power	2001	•	2
Zimbabwe (opposition)*	CCC vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2000	•	3

¹ Conflicts marked with * are without description

² Mentioned are only those conflict parties relevant for the period under review

³ Change in intensity compared to the previous year: ↑ or ↗ escalation by one or more than one level of intensity; ↓ or ↘ deescalation by one or more than one level of intensity; • no change

⁴ Levels of intensity: 5 = war; 4 = limited war; 3 = violent crisis; 2 = non-violent crisis; 1 = dispute

⁵ HIIK considers statehood to be non-contested if the state is an official UN members state.

Disputed statehood is marked with a ° if a territory is recognized by at least one other official UN member state ("limited recognition")

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REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT

This text will be made available within April 2026.

ANGOLA (FLEC ET AL. / CABINDA)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1975**

Conflict parties: FLEC, MIC vs. government
 Conflict items: secession

The violent crisis over the secession of Cabinda between the Front for the Liberation of Cabinda (FLEC) and its armed wing, the Armed Forces of Cabinda (FAC), as well as the Movement for Independence of Cabinda (MIC) on the one hand, and the Angolan government with its armed forces (FAA), on the other, continued. During the year, conflict incidents took place as armed clashes between FAC and FAA forces, civilian casualties allegedly caused by FAA operations targeting FLEC members, and cross-border incidents in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

FLEC maintained its claims that ongoing violent events are part of its struggle for Cabindan independence. As in previous years, reports of injured persons and fatalities are primarily based on statements by FLEC, while the Angolan government refrains from acknowledging the existence of an armed struggle in Cabinda province


FLEC reported several violent clashes in Cabinda province. On February 14, a clash near Belize reportedly left seven FAA soldiers injured and three Brazilian citizens dead, although the Brazilian embassy denied the latter claim. On April 4, FAC operations in Ndunga-Buba and Kakata allegedly resulted in the deaths of 19 and twelve FAA soldiers, respectively. On April 20, an FAC attack in Tchiobo reportedly left six FAA soldiers dead, followed by an FAA retaliatory operation in the same village that left four alleged FAC members dead. In Tundu Maselese, on May 14, an attack by FAC forces left twelve FAA soldiers dead. Another clash in Bonde-Grande on May 24 reportedly left 25 dead, including civilians. On July 15, during an attack on FAA positions, FAC killed eleven Angolan soldiers. In addition to military clashes, FLEC reported numerous incidents involving civilian casualties, allegedly caused by FAA forces targeting individuals accused of FLEC membership. During eight further events, FAA soldiers reportedly killed 32 civilians.

The border region with the DRC remained a focal point of conflict. Reports of incursions included large-scale movements of FAA personnel and attacks on villages housing Cabindan refugees. Notably, thousands of raids by FAA forces occurred during the month of May. On July 4, Congolese government officials confirmed the presence of FAA forces in the DRC but denied any involvement by Congolese military personnel.

BURKINA FASO (INTER-COMMUNAL RIVALRY)

Intensity: **4** | Change: • | Start: **2016**

Conflict parties: Gourmantché, Koglweogo et al., Mossi vs. Fulani vs. Islamist Groups
 Conflict items: subnational predominance, resources



This conflict text will be made available within April 2026. For an earlier access, please contact us. mha

BURKINA FASO (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: ↗ | Start: **2014**

Conflict parties: opposition groups vs. government vs. military
 Conflict items: national power

This conflict text will be made available within April 2026. For an earlier access, please contact us. mha

BURUNDI (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2006**

Conflict parties: ADC-Ikibiri, CNL, RED-Tabara, UP-RONA vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The violent crisis over national power and the orientation of the political system between various members of the opposition coalition ADC-Ikibiri, as well as the National Freedom Council (CNL), on the one hand, and the government, led by the National Council for Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD), supported by its armed youth wing Imbonerakure, on the other, continued.

Throughout the year, the government frequently arrested, abducted, and tortured members of the opposition and curbed the freedom of the press, with support from its youth wing, police forces, and the National Intelligence Service (SNR). Imbonerakure attacked and killed various opposition members. For example, on May 11, they clubbed a CNL activist to death in Butaganzwa commune, Kayanza province. On July 2, Imbonerakure killed another CNL member in Isare commune, Bujumbura Rural province.

On May 13, police forces arrested three members of the opposition party, Council of Patriots (CDP), in Makamba Province. On August 8, a group of police agents beat and severely injured the president of the Alliance for Peace, Democracy, and Reconciliation party, in Bujumbura Mairie Province. On August 20, police arrested a party representative of the Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU) party, which is part of the ADC-Ikibiri alliance, in Kigwena commune, Rumonge province.

Several CNL members were subjected to violence. For example, on April 6, the police beat and abducted a CNL-activist in Ntakangwa commune, Bujumbura Mairie Province. On May 21, the head of SNR, Giharo district, Nyabitsinda commune, Ruyigi Province, tortured a CNL-youth party leader during his detention. The justification for targeting CNL members is their denial of joining the ruling CNDD-FDD party.

Besides violent incidents, the government continued to restrain the political activities of opposition parties. On February 28, the Minister of the Interior announced a suspension for all countrywide CNL activities. Due to threats to their security in Burundi, over 100 CNL members crossed the border into Tanzania at the end of March.

Efforts to reduce press freedom in Burundi included the po-

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lice and the SNR arresting and beating journalists, leading to excessive prison sentences. On May 22 a police officer beat a journalist and confiscated his material in Gitega province. In addition, the police arrested one civilian accused of being an informant of the exile African Public Radio on May 30 and the Isanganiro radio director for rebellion on September 2. In light of the 2025 elections, reports published by SOS Médias Burundi accuses Imbonerakure and CNDD-FDD representatives of using hate speech and calling for the killing of opposition activists. On December 13, the opposition parties FRODEBU, CODEBU, FEDES-SANGIRA and CNDD formed the "Coalition Burundi Bwa Bose". sap

BURUNDI, DR CONGO (FNL, RED-TABARA, FOREBU)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2005**

Conflict parties: Burundi, DR Congo vs. FNL, Forebu, RED-Tabara
 Conflict items: national power


The violent crisis over national power in Burundi between the Resistance for Rule of Law in Burundi (RED-Tabara), the Popular Forces of Burundi (Forebu/FPB) and a militant faction of the National Forces of Liberation (FNL), on the one hand, and the governments of Burundi and the DR Congo (DRC), on the other, continued. Violent clashes primarily affected Mwenga territory in South Kivu Province, DRC, as well as Buringa zone, Burundi, bordering the DRC.

On February 25, RED-Tabara fighters armed with rifles attacked Buringa in Gihanga commune in Bubanza province, Burundi, killing ten civilians and five Burundian soldiers. Around October 27, RED-Tabara clashed with the Burundian military (FDNB) and the military of the DRC (FARDC) in Itombwe Sector, Mwenga Territory, South Kivu province, DRC. RED-Tabara claims to have killed 45 and injured 32 FDNB and FARDC soldiers. The Burundian government denies this claim. On November 9, RED-Tabara clashed with FDNB and Maï Maï Yakutumba near Kitombo and Kipupu in South Kivu province, DRC. RED-Tabara claims to have killed 20 soldiers of the FDNB and their allies. On November 25, RED-Tabara attacked FDNB in the Itombwe area, Mwenga territory, South Kivu province, DRC. RED-Tabara claims to have assaulted a military base and killed at least nine soldiers. The FDNB denies this claim, alleging instead that several rebels were captured. On December 25 and 26, FARDC clashed with RED-Tabara and their allied Mekanika militia in Fizi territory, South Kivu province, DRC. A total of at least 33 soldiers and rebels were killed. bgo

CAMEROON (ENGLISH-SPEAKING-MINORITY)

Intensity: **5** | Change: • | Start: **2016**

Conflict parties: English-speaking minority vs. gov-ernment
 Conflict items: secession, autonomy



I J J I F I M I A I M I J J J I A I S I O I N I D I
 upgraded (> 360,000 IDPs / refugees)4

The war over autonomy or secession of the Southern Cameroons region between various groups of the English-speaking minority, such as the Ambazonia Defense Forces (ADF), the Ambazonia Self-Defense Council (ASC), and the Southern Cameroons Defense Forces (SOCADEF), on the one hand, and the French-speaking Cameroonian government, on the other, continued.

The ASC and ADF were attached to the main political wings of the self-declared Federal Republic of Ambazonia, the Interim Government (IG) of the Federal Republic of Ambazonia, and the Ambazonia Governing Council (AGovC), respectively. The Cameroonian government was led by President Paul Biya and his Cameroon People's Democratic Movement.

Throughout the year, most of the fighting occurred in the anglophone northwestern region (NW) and the southwestern region (SW). Violent clashes between government forces and separatists left at least 197 dead and 106 injured. 104,659 Cameroonian refugees were registered in Nigeria in December 2024, an increase of 64,388 from December 2023. At least 583,114 people were internally displaced, which is a reduction by more than 55,307 people compared to the previous year.

As in previous years, the separatists repeatedly ambushed government forces in NW and SW. For instance, on January 10, separatists claimed to have shot down a government aircraft which crashed in the village of Kikaikelaki, NW. At least two people were killed the gunfight that followed between separatist fighters and government forces. The military claimed instead that the aircraft had suffered mechanical failure. On November 10, separatist fighters killed two soldiers in an attack on the residence of the Tubah divisional officer near the city of Bamenda, NW.

The Cameroon Armed Forces (FAC) further increased their pressure on separatist groups by conducting several military operations. For example, on March 27, government forces killed at least 25 separatist fighters during military raids in Mezam division, NW. The military claimed the raids were in response to the increasing insecurity through threats, violence, and kidnappings by separatist fighters in the region. On April 24, government forces of the Rapid Intervention Battalion killed five Ribbons of Ambazonia separatist fighters during a military intervention. Their bodies were later publicly displayed.

Both sides continued to target civilians. For example, on January 29, separatist fighters of the Fako Black Tar group torched at least three vehicles during a raid in Buea, capital of SW, killing at least two people. They claimed residents had violated lockdown orders imposed by separatists. On September 2, separatist fighters killed three civilians in a drive-by shooting in the village of Mbatu, NW, also on account of alleged lockdown violations. Government forces also targeted civilians for alleged separatist activities. For instance, on April 10, government forces raided houses of alleged separatists in three villages in Bui, NW, allegedly killing three civilians and one separatist fighter. On July 7, FAC forces raided Bamali village, NW, killing two civilians and injuring several others.

The violence from both separatist and government forces was met with protests by the population. For instance, on October 10, dozens of women from Maumu village, SW, protested against the arrests of their sons by soldiers in front of the gendarmerie in Buea city, SW. Additionally, forms of silent protest emerged, especially in August and September after separatists demanded all taxi drivers change the color

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of their yellow taxis to blue and white, the color of the Ambazonian flag. The vehicles of taxi drivers who refused to comply were targeted and torched by separatists. For instance on August 14, separatists set fire to five taxis in Bamenda, NW.

The conflict also occasionally spread to neighboring franco-phone regions and the Nigerian border region. For instance, on February 26, government forces detected and destroyed an IED in Galim commune, bordering the western region (W) and N. The IED was allegedly placed there by separatist fighters. On October 18, the Nigerian Army arrested six armed, alleged Ambazonian separatists in Akampka, Cross River State, Nigeria, after they had entered the local government area. Some reports claim separatists attempted to establish governments-in-exile in Nigeria.

Throughout the year, several separatists including senior leaders surrendered to Cameroonian authorities, and proceeded to Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) centers. Some of these persons were subsequently targeted by separatist groups. On June 16, for instance, a former separatist that had taken part in a DDR program was killed by separatist fighters in Bamenda, NW. ^{ast}

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (MILITANT GROUPS)

Intensity: **4** | Change: **•** | Start: **2012**

Conflict parties: militant groups vs. government

Conflict items: national power, resources



The limited war over national power and resources between militant groups, such as the Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC) and anti-Balaka militias, on the one hand, and the government, supported by the Central African Armed Forces (FACA) and MINUSCA, as well as Russian private military contractors (PMCs), on the other, continued. In 2020, the Union for Peace in the Central African Republic (UPC), Patriotic Front for the Renaissance in the Central African Republic (FPRC), Return, Reclamation and Rehabilitation (3R), as well as Patriotic Movement for the Central African Republic (MPC) and Mokom and Ndomaté anti-Balaka wings, had formed the CPC with the aim of disrupting national security and capturing the capital Bangui.

The security situation remained volatile, particularly along the country's borders. Over the course of the year, at least 260 people were killed and at least 43 injured.

Throughout the year, FACA and PMCs clashed with militant groups on multiple occasions, mainly in the northwestern and southwestern areas of the country. For instance, on January 31, CPC killed a senior security officer in the town Sikikédé in Vakaga prefecture but was repelled by FACA. On March 7, dozens of armed CPC militants attacked Sikikédé again but were repelled by FACA and PMCs reinforcements within hours. The FACA announced at least 40 CPC rebels and five FACA officers were killed and one officer was injured. Two improvised fighting vehicles (technicals) and several motorbikes were also destroyed in the incident. Following

these incidents, residents called on state authorities to step up security in the region. In September, due to internal friction, Coalition of Patriots for Fundamental Change (CPC-F) emerged as a new dissident faction. CPC-F clashed with FACA, for example on October 8, leaving one FACA officer dead and five people, including three civilians, injured. FACA also clashed with 3R rebels on several occasions. For instance, on August 2, 3R rebels killed two FACA soldiers in an ambush near the commune of Amada-Gaza, Mambéré-Kadéï prefecture.

After receiving training from PMCs in the first half of the year, members of the militia Azande Ani Kpo Gbe (AAK Zande) joined FACA and the group changed their name into Wagner Ti Azandé. Throughout the year, Wagner Ti Azandé intensified its fighting against UPC rebels and their allies in Mboki, Zémio and other towns in the southeastern Haut-Mbomou prefecture, bordering the Democratic Republic of Congo and South Sudan. For instance, on May 25, clashes between PMCs supported by Wagner Ti Azandé and UPC rebels in Mboki left four dead and three injured. Despite their alliance with the government, Wagner Ti Azandé continued their militant activity. For example, on October 6, the group killed 20 civilians in an attack in the village of Dembia, Haut-Mbomou prefecture, specifically targeting members of the Muslim community.

Armed groups continued attempts to gain control of gold mining sites, particularly in the Ouham and Ouham-Pendé prefectures. For instance, on July 4, PMCs, supported by Wagner Ti Azandé, tried to take control of the Saya and Wouhou gold mining sites in the Ouham-Pendé prefecture, but were forced to withdraw after repeated attacks from 3R militants. On June 22, CPC attacked a mining site near Bossangoa, the capital of the Ouham prefecture, killing at least five civilians. On July 22, 3R militants killed four civilians they had abducted near a gold mining site in Korom-Poko, Ouham prefecture. On December 25, 3R attacked a mining site in Garo village, near Bozoum city, Ouham-Pendé prefecture, killing at least 14 civilians.

On July 30, the UN Security Council lifted its arms embargo on the Central African Republic. The government welcomed the decision, describing it as a major step forward in strengthening the FACA. On November 14, the Security Council extended the mandate of MINUSCA to 11/15/25.

The number of IDPs fluctuated over the course of the year. At the end of December, there were a total of 469,892 IDPs, a reduction of 73,927 compared to 2023. New displacements were recorded mainly the prefectures of Ouham, Bamingui-Bangoran, and Mbomou, due to clashes between armed groups, military operations, and natural disasters. ^{jug}

CHAD (INTER-COMMUNAL RIVALRY)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **1947**

Conflict parties: pastoralists vs. farmers

Conflict items: subnational predominance

The violent crisis over subnational predominance between farmers and pastoralists (herders) continued.

Natural disasters, the drying up of Lake Chad, increased desertification, and soil degradation exacerbated inter-communal tensions over the control of dwindling resources such as grazing land and water. Conflict often stemmed from pastoralists' animals encroaching onto farmer agricultural land.

Throughout the year, farmers and pastoralists clashed on

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multiple occasions. For instance, on March 21, farmers and herders clashed in Tileguey village, Ouaddai Region, leaving at least 42 people dead and many houses in the area torched. Following the fighting, security forces arrested at least 175 people. Between March 21 and 27, herders and farmers clashed for seven days in the villages Balawai, Kolo and Balkoutou, Moyen-Chari Region. A total of at least 23 people were killed in the fighting, 100 houses were burned down, 100 livestock killed, and 21 people were arrested by security forces.

Incidents like this are common but details and casualties are often hard to verify due to limited media coverage and the lack of reliable sources. twe

CHAD (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↗** | Start: **1990**

Conflict parties: opposition groups vs. government

Conflict items: national power

The non-violent crisis over national power between opposition groups and the government escalated to a violent crisis. The government is represented by the National Transitional Council (CNT), and led by Mahamat Idriss Déby.

On February 27, the electoral commission announced presidential elections on May 6, several months earlier than planned. On March 24, authorities announced they had cleared ten of 20 initial candidates for the election and barred two opposition candidates. Three days after the official start of the election campaign, on April 17, CNT deployed its military to the capital N'Djamena, eponymous province. After elections on May 6, the National Election Management Agency announced provisional results on May 9 with the CNT candidate Déby allegedly securing the majority of the vote. On May 12, the PM Succès Masra and his Transformateur Party appealed the result on grounds of alleged election fraud. On May 22, the PM resigned in protest. On May 23, Déby was sworn in as President.

The period after February 27, when elections were announced, as well as the immediate post-election period were marked by violent clashes between security forces and civil society and opposition supporters in N'Djamena. For example, on the night of the election announcement, at least nine people were killed and at least 60 were injured in shootings and chaotic celebrations. A day later, on February 28, security forces killed the opposition leader of the Socialist Party Without Borders (PSF) and a leading critic of CNT along with twelve other people in a shootout at the party's headquarters. Similarly, on May 10, after the announcement of provisional election results, three people were killed and at least 30 others injured. Opposition and civil society claim dozens of opposition supporters were arrested and detained, especially in N'Djamena and in Moundou city, Logone Occidental region. On August 21, the National Election Management Agency announced that legislative, provincial, and municipal elections would be held on December 29. In response, on October 13, 15 opposition parties called for the public to boycott the upcoming elections, claiming they would be neither free nor fair. On September 20, PSF claimed its leader had been abducted by intelligence forces after a meeting with other opposition members at the PSF headquarters in N'Djamena. However, elections took place on December 29 as planned. On November 28, Chad's government ended its defense co-operation agreement with France, which sparked protests by

hundreds of people in N'Djamena on December 6 to demand the withdrawal of French troops. Some protesters went to a military airbase where French soldiers were stationed, and others gathered in front of the French embassy where they faced heavy security from the Chadian army protecting the embassy. On December 11, France started to withdraw its forces. sag

CÔTE D'IVOIRE (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **1999**

Conflict parties: opposition groups vs. government

Conflict items: national power

The violent crisis over national power between the ruling party Rally of Houphouëtists for Democracy and Peace (RHDP), led by President Alassane Ouattara, on the one hand, and various opposition parties, especially the Democratic Party of Ivory Coast African Democratic Rally, and the African People's Party Cote d'Ivoire (PPA-CI), led by former president Laurent Gbagbo, on the other, continued.

On July 2, demonstrators allegedly affiliated with the RHDP burst into the chambers of the local council in Hiré (Loh-Djiboua), damaging the room and causing injuries among the attendees of the council session. The protesters demanded the resignation of the mayor of Hiré Gilbert Francis Kacou who had been elected last year as a candidate for the RHDP but recently announced his return to the PDCL, which he had been a member of before the election.

In response to the successful hosting of the men's football African Cup of Nations, President Alassane Ouattara (RHDP) issued a presidential pardon for 51 prisoners close to opposition leaders Gbagbo and Guillaume Soro (Generations and People's Solidarity, GPS) as a signal of national reconciliation. The year was marked by the run up to the presidential election scheduled to take place in October 2025. Alongside Laurent Gbagbo, Pascal Affi N'Guessan (Ivorian Popular Front, FPI), Charles Blé Goudé (Young Patriots of Ivory Coast, CO-JEP) and Simone Gbagbo (Movement of Capable Generations, MGC) announced their ambition to run for president. Both Gbagbo and Blé Goudé are still considered ineligible and not on the electoral list due to prison sentences against them. The current president had not made a definite decision to run again in 2025, despite the RHDP board naming him their "natural candidate" in May. Soro remains in exile. He spoke to President Ouattara about a possible return in April. The electoral list was opened for voter registration from 19 October to 10 November. The opposition had called for an extension of this period as well as electoral reforms.

Various prominent opposition figures were arrested for offences related to their political activities.

For the PPA-CI this concerned the deputy Secretary General Charles Rodel Dosso and the responsible for communications Gala Kolebi. In August, two members of of the GPS close to party leader Soro were arrested and both sentenced to two years in prison. mti

DJIBOUTI (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↑** | Start: **2011**

Conflict parties: BSN vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The dispute over national power, as well as system and ideology, between Le Bloc pour le Salut National (BSN) and the government escalated to a violent crisis. On January 9, the Gendarmerie Nationale arrested the leader of the opposition group MJO-Europe, in the capital Djibouti City, Djibouti region, and subjected him to torture. On February 12, the government detained the director of the opposition newspaper “La Nation” in Djibouti City. On May 24, the opposition groups Movement for Democratic Renewal and Development (MRD), Alliance Républicaine pour le Développement, and Mouvement pour le Développement et la Liberté formed the BSN coalition. On June 3, members of the Gendarmerie Nationale harassed a politician from MRD in Ali Sabieh City, eponymous region. In the same month, a journalist of the opposition newspaper “La Voix de Djibouti” was arrested and subjected to torture by police forces in Hodan, Djibouti region. The journalist states he has been unlawfully and violently imprisoned ten times since 2020. On July 3, youth protests against unemployment in Djibouti City led to several arrests. On November 13, a French citizen of Djiboutian origin was arrested and detained by the secret service in Ali Sabieh city. In response, protests took place on the same day in front of the Djibouti embassy in the Belgian capital Brussels. Protests against his arrest continued in the French capital Paris, on December 21. [vne](#)

DR CONGO (BANTU – BATWA)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **2013**

Conflict parties: Bantu militias vs. Batwa militias
 Conflict items: subnational predominance


The violent crisis over subnational predominance between Bantu and Batwa people in Tanganyika province continued. Throughout the year, the conflict accounted for at least five deaths and left six people injured. On July 30, Twa militiamen attacked the village of Tumbwe, setting fire to several houses and leaving more than 2,500 civilians without shelter. The attack also led to three deaths and left several injured. On October 8, the governor of Tanganyika welcomed the contributions of humanitarian aid workers to the management of the conflict between the Twa and Bantu peoples. However, on the same day, Twa militiamen of Chief Kabemba attacked the village of Koki, subsequently clashing with the Armed Forces of the DR Congo in the village of Zongwe. The fighting left one dead and three injured. On December 8, Twa and Bantu militias clashed in the village of Lubamba, setting fire to houses, killing one person, and injuring another. As a result, the villagers fled in the direction of the village of Lengwe. Despite the ongoing violence, the conflict saw notable advancements in peacebuilding throughout the year. For instance, between August 12 and 14, the Tanganyika section of the Disarmament, Demobilization, Community Recovery and

Stabilization Program and its partners freed 60 minors from the control of three Twa militias between the cities of Kalemie and Bendera. After their rescue, the children were handed over to a volunteer association to provide care. Furthermore, on August 23, UNHCR announced the closure of the Kikumbe IDP site, located about ten kilometers from Kalemie. The camp, which had originally been established in 2017 following the escalation of the conflict, contained at least 1,200 households from various territories in Tanganyika. According to a local media outlet, the stable security situation, on the one hand, and the desire of many IDPs to return home, on the other, led to the closure. [agr](#)

DR CONGO (ITURI MILITIAS)

Intensity: **5** | Change: **•** | Start: **1999**

Conflict parties: CODECO, FPIC, FRPI, Zaire militia vs. government
 Conflict items: subnational predominance, resources



The war over subnational predominance and resources, especially gold, between the militant groups Cooperative for the Development of Congo (CODECO), Patriotic and Integrationist Force of Congo (FPIC), Zaire militia, and Front for Patriotic Resistance in Ituri (FRPI), on the one hand, and the government, supported by MONUSCO, on the other, continued in the Ituri province, eastern DR Congo. Throughout the year, the security situation in Djugu and Mahagi territories, as well as in the north of Irumu territory, Mambasa territory and Aru territory, remained critical. Djugu territory remained the territory with the highest militia activity. In January, Zaire militia joined the Demobilization, Disarmament, Community Recovery and Stabilization Program (P-DDRCS) peace process, making it the last of all militias to join. Despite the ongoing declaration of a state of siege by the government, the security situation remained critical. Peace talks between Zaire militia and CODECO on February 9 and 10, as well as official peace talks between all militias and the government on April 7 that took place in the capital Kinshasa, failed to stabilize the region. Various Ituri militias, armed with rifles and machetes, attacked and abducted civilians, looted livestock, burned down houses, fought for control of goldmines, and clashed with the Armed Forces of the DR Congo (FARDC) and MONUSCO throughout the year. At least 400 people were killed. The militant group CODECO was considered an umbrella association subsuming different factions of militants primarily from the Lendu community. Its Union of Revolutionaries for the Defense of the Congolese People faction was the largest. Although CODECO took part in the P-DDRCS process and promised to end violence against civilians on April 19, they continued to attack civilians and IDPs. For instance, on April 15, 16 and 17, attacks on the village of Matongo in Djugu territory took place, leaving at least 20 dead and displacing approx. 16,000. On March 1, CODECO clashed with the FARDC and MONUSCO in the village of Dzuda in

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Djugu territory, leaving three dead. Between June 30 and July 2, the FARDC launched an offensive, carried out with helicopters, against CODECO in and around the village of Lisey in Djugu territory, leading to twelve deaths. On August 31, a group of approx. ten CODECO militiamen attacked a MONUSCO convoy in the village of Bali, Djugu territory, leaving one dead. On December 20, CODECO attacked the IDP Camp Lala in Djugu territory. The attack was repelled by the FARDC, leaving six CODECO militiamen dead.

CODECO also clashed with other militias on multiple occasions. For instance, on June 19, fighting over the control of the Bendere mining site in Djugu territory between CODECO and Zaire militia took place, leading to at least ten deaths. In retaliation for the attack on the mining site, fighting between Zaire militia, CODECO, and the FARDC broke out on June 20 and 21 in the villages of Bianda and Lodjo, Djugu territory. The clashes led to at least 35 deaths, many of them civilians. On October 22, Zaire militia clashed with the FARDC following the arrest of one of their members in Pluto village, Djugu territory, which left four militiamen and one FARDC soldier dead, and three civilians injured.

Fighting also occurred internally between militia factions. For instance, on February 3, an internal dispute between two factions of the FPIC in the village of Kunda in Irumu territory led to approx. 25 deaths. 57 houses were also burned down. lha

DR CONGO (KATA KATANGA)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2011**

Conflict parties: Kata Katanga vs. government
Conflict items: secession, subnational predominance, resources

The violent crisis over subnational predominance and secession between the Kata Katanga militia and the government continued. This year, Kata Katanga were active in the provinces of Haut-Katanga and Tanganyika.

On January 24, soldiers of the Armed Forces of the DR Congo (FARDC) stationed in a village near Mitwaba, Haut-Katanga province were reassigned following accusations of multiple cases of abuse against civilians. Shots were fired during the reassignment, for which the FARDC blamed Kata Katanga. Residents of the village fled due to this incident. Later on, it transpired that the FARDC were responsible for the shots.

On May 12, members of the Kata Katanga militia attacked a military position of the FARDC in the village of Lutandula, Haut-Katanga province, killing two FARDC soldiers. In the aftermath of the event, two of the four Kata Katanga suspects were captured. Eleven AK-47 rifles and a pickup truck with ammunition were confiscated.

On August 15, the FARDC shot nine people and injured three others in the village of Kilwa, Haut-Katanga province. The FARDC claimed they were members of the Kata Katanga militia who had attacked the village. Civil society organizations doubted the FARDC's claims and stated that the FARDC had conducted a civilian massacre. The government promised to investigate the incident.


On December 19, the Kata Katanga militia raided and looted four villages in the province of Tanganyika. The militiamen burned down 500 houses, forcibly displacing 4,000 villagers. The displaced people found shelter in surrounding villages that were considered safer. On December 27, the commander of the 22nd military region of the DR Congo called on the

militiamen to lay down their arms and denounced their atrocities. He called on the population to distance themselves from the militia. ssc

DR CONGO (M23 FACTIONS)

Intensity: **5** | Change: • | Start: **2004**

Conflict parties: M23 factions vs. government vs. other militias
Conflict items: national power, subnational predominance, resources



The war over national power, subnational predominance and resources between the March 23 Movement (M23), supported by Rwanda and Uganda, and the Congolese government, supported by MONUSCO and the Southern African Development Community Mission in the DR Congo (SAMIDRC), as well as various other militias including the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and Wazalendo, continued. The war led to tensions between the governments of DR Congo and Rwanda and complications in the peace negotiations, as Rwanda accused DR Congo of supporting the FDLR and DR Congo accused Rwanda of supporting M23 [→ DR Congo – Rwanda]. Whilst FARDC had announced to end its operations with armed groups, this disentanglement was not complete by the end of the year.

Despite completing its withdrawal from South Kivu province on June 30, MONUSCO continued to maintain a presence in Ituri and North Kivu provinces. On December 20, the UN Security Council extended MONUSCO's mandate until at least 12/2025, ensuring that nearly 11,000 peacekeepers will remain deployed in the country during this period [→ DR Congo (MONUSCO protests)].

According to a UN investigation, the M23 were supported by the governments of Uganda and Rwanda, including the Rwandan Defence Force (RDF). Throughout the year, the militia launched a series of offensives, leaving at least 195 dead, 267 injured and 700,000 displaced people. Due to chronic underreporting, these numbers may well be higher. According to reports of the UN Joint Human Rights Office, the M23 repeatedly committed war crimes, such as abductions, recruitment, and use of children, sexual violence, attacks on schools and hospitals, and unlawful killings in their operations. Their actions remained limited to North Kivu province, where they were able to make substantial territorial gains.

From January to February, M23 initiated attacks in Rutshuru and Masisi territories, capturing key towns and villages, including the city of Mweso. This escalation resulted in a significant increase in displacement, with at least 167,500 IDPs in February alone. M23's strategic advances brought FARDC positions closer to displacement sites near Goma. March saw renewed hostilities in Rutshuru territory, involving the villages of Mutanda and Kihondo. For example, on March 5, fighting with guns and shells between the M23 and FARDC left 15 civilians dead and ten injured. M23 occupied several villages, including Nyanzale, Kirima, Kikuku, and Kibirizi. Concurrently, clashes erupted in Masisi territory, further isolating Goma and reinforcing M23's control of the surrounding areas.

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

In their offensive, M23 repeatedly clashed with FDLR. For example, on March 4 and 5, M23 captured the previously FDLR controlled town of Nyanzale. The gunfights left ten dead and thousands displaced.

From April to June, the conflict saw the involvement of various regional actors. SAMIDRC and MONUSCO supported FARDC operations to defend Goma and Sake town from M23 advances. On May 30, for example, SAMIDRC engaged in heavy fighting with M23 rebels near Sake, leaving one dead and 13 injured. Despite these efforts, M23 captured several strategic locations, including FARDC bases, leading to further population displacements. The rapid territorial expansion of M23 and the subsequent displacement of civilians overwhelmed the capacity of humanitarian agencies to provide adequate aid. The security situation hindered the delivery of essential services, exacerbating the suffering of displaced populations.

On July 31, a ceasefire agreement mediated by Angola was signed in the Angolan capital Luanda between DR Congo and Rwanda, regarding their support of FDLR and M23 respectively. However, the truce collapsed before it formally began on August 4, when M23 captured the city of Ishasha in Rutshuru territory. Throughout August and September, fighting continued in Rutshuru territory. For example, on August 7, M23 captured the village of Nyakakoma, a previous stronghold of FARDC and Mai-Mai groups [→ DR Congo (Mayi-Mayi et al.)]. The Wazalendo, a coalition of local self-defense Mai-Mai groups, fought back an M23 offensive with support of FDLR. For example, on September 11, the Wazalendo recaptured the city of Kitshanga. At the same time, FARDC continued their fight against FDLR. For example, on September 26, fights between FARDC, Wazalendo and FDLR left 20 people injured and three dead in refugee camps of Rusayu, Baraka Kashaka, and Sam-Sam Shabindu.

By October, M23 had expanded its control northward, capturing the town of Kanyabayonga and threatening to push further into Lubero territory. The rebel group also made significant gains in southern Masisi territory, taking control of the villages of Kibabi, Ngungu, and Kinigi. By the end of October, the conflict saw a significant increase in violence and territorial control by M23. For example, the fight over the city of Kalembe between M23 and RDF against Wazalendo and FARDC from October 20 to 25 led to ten deaths and 16 injured people.

In early November, the governments of DR Congo and Rwanda launched a committee to monitor ceasefire violations, with Angolan support. They agreed on a document setting out the terms by which Rwandan troops would disengage from Congolese territory a few weeks later. Nevertheless, renewed peace talks between DR Congo and Rwanda were called off on December 15. nre, gda

DR CONGO (MAYI-MAYI ET AL.)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2003**

Conflict parties: NDC-R vs. APCLS vs. Mayi-Mayi groups vs. Nyatura groups vs. FPP/AP vs. Banyamulenge militias vs. Bafuliro militias vs. Babembe militias vs. government

Conflict items: subnational predominance, resources

The violent crisis over subnational power and resources in

the eastern provinces of South Kivu, North Kivu, and Ituri, between various local Mayi-Mayi militias and the Armed Forces of the DR Congo (FARDC), supported by MONUSCO, continued.

As fighting between M23 and FARDC continued in eastern Congo [→ DR Congo (M23 factions)], Mayi-Mayi frequently clashed with FARDC, causing substantial internal displacement.

Following a confrontation in North Kivu province, on February 7, FARDC apprehended three Mayi-Mayi Banabateseke members, including one of their leaders, and confiscated weapons in the Beni area. From September 16 to 28, clashes between the Front of Patriots for Peace/People's Army and Mayi-Mayi Yira in the Kasugho area, Lubero territory, North Kivu province, prompted massive internal displacement. Civil society groups reported at least three deaths and multiple injured persons.

Several clashes also occurred in South Kivu and Ituri provinces. For instance, on January 3, during a clash in Lwemba locality, Ituri, FARDC killed four Mayi-Mayi Kyan-denga militiamen and apprehended three others. On March 6, the Mayi-Mayi Twirwaneho ambushed and launched a rocket on a joint FARDC-Burundian army patrol in Nyawaranga locality, Uvira territory, South Kivu, killing three FARDC soldiers and injuring one, as well as killing one and injuring three militiamen. On November 28, Twirwaneho-Ngumino and Rukunda Makanika armed groups ambushed FARDC in the Fizi and Mwenga highlands in Kalindi district, South Kivu, affecting numerous villages. Two civilians, two FARDC soldiers, and seven militiamen were killed.

The year marked a shift in international peacekeeping engagement, with MONUSCO withdrawing from the region [→ DR Congo (MONUSCO protests)]. For example, on February 28, the initial phase of withdrawal from South Kivu began with the handover of the first base in Kamanyola town, near the border with Burundi, to DR Congo's government. On April 30, MONUSCO announced the cessation of its operation in South Kivu. On December 20, the UN Security Council voted to extend the mission until 12/20/25.

Throughout the year, several youth demobilization operations occurred. On April 19, MONUSCO and its partners freed 288 children from the Armed Forces Biloze Bishambuke (FABB) group in Fizi territory, South Kivu. Between August 5 and 11, the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Community Reintegration Programme freed 96 children from the custody of Mayi-Mayi Toronto and FABB in Katanga Lwemba, Kalundja, Ituri, and South Kivu, with plans to reintegrate a further 104. nme

DR CONGO (MONUSCO PROTESTS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2022**

Conflict parties: MONUSCO personnel vs. civil society

Conflict items: other

The violent crisis over foreign presence in DR Congo, including MONUSCO, between civil society and MONUSCO personnel, continued.

On 11/23/23, the DR Congo and MONUSCO co-signed a memorandum to confirm gradual withdrawal of all MONUSCO forces by December 31. In the first phase of this withdrawal, MONUSCO gradually handed over their military bases to the Armed Forces of the DR Congo, such as the base in Kamanyola, South Kivu province, on February 28, and the base in

Bunyakiri, South Kivu province, on April 19. On April 30, MONUSCO ceased all remaining operations in South Kivu. The complete withdrawal of its staff and the closing of its office in Bukavu city, South Kivu, followed on June 30. Despite the ongoing withdrawal, several protests against the presence of MONUSCO took place. For example, on February 10, protesters set fire to several UN vehicles in the capital of Kinshasa, with the UN alleging a new wave of disinformation campaigns targeting MONUSCO as grounds for this attack. On February 12, protestors in Kinshasa demanded foreign powers including the UN leave the DR Congo, accusing them of looting the country and allowing Rwanda to support the M23 rebellion in eastern parts of the country [→ DR Congo (M23 factions)]. Some protestors burned Belgian and American flags, and police forces used teargas to disperse the crowds. As a result of the protests, international schools and foreign-owned businesses stayed closed due to security concerns. Following substantial territorial gains made by M23 in North Kivu on July 9, the DR Congo announced that it would pause the second phase of the withdrawal of MONUSCO until further notice to avoid a possible security vacuum in North Kivu. On October 19, the DR Congo stated that it would announce a new timeframe for the departure of the remaining MONUSCO forces, but it had not done so by the end of the year. lgf

DR CONGO (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1997**

Conflict parties: church groups, civil society groups, opposition parties vs. government

Conflict items: national power

The violent crisis over national power between opposition parties, civil society groups, and church groups, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued. Despite persistent criticism from the opposition, the 2023 election results were not legally contested. On January 20, President Félix Tshisekedi was sworn in for a second term. The results of the parliamentary elections, published on March 13, confirmed Tshisekedi's Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS) as the leading force in the National Assembly. On April 1, Judith Tuluka Suminwa was announced as the country's first female prime minister. However, due to prolonged negotiations within the ruling coalition, the Sacred Union, a new government was not formed until May 29. On May 19, there was a coup attempt led by the self-exiled opposition figure Christian Malanga. Armed men attacked the residence of Economic Minister Vital Kamerhe in the capital Kinshasa, before entrenching themselves in the presidential palace, and hoisting the flag of Zaire. Government forces thwarted the coup, arresting around 40 people and killing four. On September 13, a military court sentenced 37 people to death for their involvement in the coup attempt. Tshisekedi's government had reinstated the death penalty in March, sparking strong criticism from human rights groups and creating a new point of contention between the conflict parties. There were several further incidents surrounding Tshisekedi's predecessor, former president Joseph Kabila. On July 31, alleged members of the Union of the Forces of Progress, a militia with alleged affiliation to the UDPS, attacked Kabila's residence in Kinshasa. Three people were injured and several attackers were arrested. While Kabila's family claimed


the attack was politically motivated, authorities suggested it was related to a land dispute. Additionally, on August 6, Tshisekedi accused Kabila of supporting the Congo River Alliance, a politico-military movement allied to M23 [→ DR Congo (M23 factions)], and of preparing an insurrection. He did not provide evidence to support this claim, however. Opposition and civil society groups repeatedly denounced the shrinking of democratic space, exemplified by arrests and convictions of their members, among other things. Through multiple protests, they called for the release of these "political prisoners". For example, on August 9, members of the Alliance for Change party demonstrated in Kinshasa, demanding the release of their leader Jean-Marc Kabund, who had been detained for two years. Police used tear gas to disperse the protest, injuring several people. Finally, on October 23, Tshisekedi announced plans to review the country's constitution, which he described as "outdated" and "not adapted to the country's realities", among other reasons. Opposition parties, along with civil society and church groups, immediately voiced strong concerns, fearing the move could be aimed at removing term limits to allow Tshisekedi to extend his time in office. The debate sparked protests, such as on November 14, when police used tear gas to disperse a demonstration in Kinshasa and arrested two opposition members. cwi

DR CONGO, UGANDA (ADF)

Intensity: **5** | Change: • | Start: **1995**

Conflict parties: ADF vs. DR Congo, Uganda

Conflict items: system/ideology, subnational pre-dominance, resources



The war over the orientation of the political system, subnational predominance, and resources between the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), on the one hand, and the governments of DR Congo and Uganda, supported by MONUSCO, on the other, continued. ADF is also known as the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (ADF-NALU), Madina at Tauheed Wau Mujahedeen (MTM), or the Congolese branch of Islamic State's Central Africa Province (ISCAP-DRC). The Islamist group operated in DR Congo's eastern provinces North Kivu and Ituri, especially in the Beni and Lubero territories of North Kivu and the Irumu and Mambasa territories in Ituri. This year was marked by the progressive withdrawal of MONUSCO troops from DR Congo [→ DR Congo (MONUSCO protests)], as well as the M23 conflict [→ DR Congo (M23 factions)], which demanded significant resource and attention from the government and military. This enabled ADF to operate more effectively. By far the most common ADF strategies were to raid villages, ambush people on the road, or assault farmers working in the fields. In these attacks, they frequently kidnapped or killed civilians, looted and set fire to their homes. In total, at least 678 people were killed as a result of the conflict, most of them civilians. The real number is most likely significantly higher, however, because ADF kidnapped a large number of civilians and in most cases their fate remains unclear. It is also difficult to estimate the number of

internally displaced persons due to this year's conflict, given that many of the affected areas were also affected by other conflicts [→ DR Congo (M23 factions); DR Congo (Mayi-Mayi et al.); DR Congo (Ituri militias)].

In Ituri province, at least 256 people were killed. For example, on February 5, 18 civilians were killed in an ADF attack on Bangole and Bakwanza villages, Mambasa territory, with ADF also looting and burning down parts of the villages. Five civilians were kidnapped from the village of Uesa, Irumu territory, by ADF on July 21, and were executed in the following days. In North Kivu province, at least 422 people were killed. For example, between July 24 and 25, ADF attacked multiple villages in Beni territory, killing at least 50 civilians and kidnapping several more. In the night from December 21 to 22, ADF attacked the village of Robinet, Lubero territory, killing 18 civilians and burning several houses. Three days later, three further bodies were found near the village.


The joint military operation by the Armed Forces of the DR Congo (FARDC) and Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF), which began in 2021 to combat ADF in both countries, continued this year despite FARDC being occupied with fighting the M23 [→ DR Congo (M23 factions)] and filling some of the roles previously fulfilled by MONUSCO. Fighting in the first half of the year forced ADF to largely retreat from Irumu territory, Ituri, and focus efforts on the neighboring Mambasa territory instead. Subsequently, on May 27, FARDC and UPDF jointly announced an operation in Mambasa aiming to destroy ADF strongholds there. For example, in the week from July 25 to 31, FARDC-UPDF troops and ADF repeatedly clashed in Lolwa Forest, Mambasa, leaving 20 ADF fighters and five soldiers dead and displacing at least 2,200 local residents. On September 23, FARDC-UPDF forces clashed with ADF in Biakato town, Mambasa, killing 27 ADF fighters and freeing 40 civilians that were being held hostage.

Fighting between the two sides, as well as violence against civilians, reduced between October and November but resurged in December. For instance, on December 2, ADF killed five civilians and burned two houses on Mbau-Kamango Road, Beni, North Kivu. Due to the ongoing violence, civil society organizations regularly asked security forces to intensify their operations against ADF and to strengthen their presence in highly affected regions. lgf

ETHIOPIA (FANO MILITIAS / AMHARA)

Intensity: **5** | Change: **↗** | Start: **2023**

Conflict parties: Fano militias vs. government
 Conflict items: autonomy, subnational predominance




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ETHIOPIA (INTER-COMMUNAL RIVALRY)

Intensity: **4** | Change: **↗** | Start: **2017**

Conflict parties: Oromo vs. Amhara vs. Konso vs. Ale vs. Issa vs. Afar vs. other ethnic groups
 Conflict items: subnational predominance, resources



The violent crisis of inter-communal rivalry between various ethnic groups over resources and subnational predominance in Ethiopia, escalated to a limited war. Notable ethnic rivalries include the Afar and Issa (Somali), Amhara and Oromo, Tigrayans and Amhara, Oromo and Kore, as well as the Nuer and the Anuak (Anyuaa) ethnic groups among others.

From January until March the rivalries between the Anuak and Nuer ethnic groups were the most prominent, with four reported attacks. For instance, on March 26, in the Abobo district of the Gambella region, gunmen from an Anuak ethnic militia killed five civilian farmers with Nuer ethnic background as they were tending to their cattle. The attackers stole livestock as they made their escape. Between April 13 and 15, Tigray forces and Amhara militants clashed in the towns of Alamata and Raya Alamata, Tigray Autonomous Region, displacing almost 50,000 and killing several dozens. Tigray interim President Getachew Reda blamed "anti-Pretoria deal elements", while Amhara authorities accused Tigrayans of launching a "full-scale war" against Amhara.

On May 20, gunmen from the Afar region killed seven farmers in Raya Azebo district, Tigray region. On June 17, in Silk Amba town, Oromia region, where extremist Amhara gunmen killed more than 20 Oromo civilians at a wedding with grenades and small arms. Furthermore, on August 18, a militant group originating in Dirashe district, South Ethiopian Regional State raided local government structure in Segen district, South Ethiopian Regional State. Initially, they killed five civilians and then a further eight responding police officers. Afterwards, the militants looted and burned down several local government buildings, resulting in damages of more than USD 4.79 million.

On another note, the conflict transformation between the Afar and Somali ethnic groups made initial progress, on September 13. The respective Presidents of the Afar and Somali regions concluded negotiations alongside the Minister of Peace within the National Committee, which was formed to resolve the conflict. The negotiations concluded with a call to cease all hostilities.


In a string of attacks on September 12, October 14 and December 22 respectively, Oromo militants targeted local farmers of the Goroka district, Southern Ethiopia Regional State. The small militia of 16 individuals, armed with small arms, subsequently killed a total of nine civilians. bmo

ETHIOPIA (OLA / OROMIA)

Intensity: **4** | Change: **↗** | Start: **1992**

Conflict parties: OLA vs. government
 Conflict items: subnational predominance

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GABON (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **2** | Change: **•** | Start: **2009**

Conflict parties: opposition groups vs. government
 Conflict items: national power

The non-violent crisis over national power between the de-facto government represented by the Committee for the Transition and the Restoration of Institutions (CTRI), on the one hand, and opposition parties, on the other, continued. On 08/30/2023, following presidential elections, the government was ousted from power by the military junta which later formed the CTRI, led by General Brice Oligui Nguema. Between April 2 to 30, the CTRI held a National Dialogue to review the constitution and develop a roadmap for the transitional government. The recommendation to suspend 200 political parties and bar members of the ousted governing party from taking part in elections for three years was controversial amongst opposition parties. On November 16, significant changes to the constitution were approved in a referendum. The changes included limiting the term of presidency to a maximum of two seven-year terms, revoking the position of prime minister and prohibiting dynastic transfers of power. Presidential candidates would also require at least one Gabon-born parent and a Gabonese spouse, eliminating former president Ali Bongo and his children from future presidential elections.

Bongo's family largely remained in detention. On May 15, Ali Bongo and his two youngest sons started a hunger strike to protest alleged torture and their detention. Their lawyers announced on May 14 that a lawsuit had been filed to the Paris Judicial Court accordingly. The transitional government denied the allegations. On September 19, Ali Bongo announced his withdrawal from politics and called for the release of his family.

On February 21, a US delegation met with General Nguema, reiterating the continuation of economic and diplomatic relations and urging for a return to constitutional order in Gabon. At the same time, many Gabonese supported the coup. For instance, in the week of January 8, demonstrations took place in the capital of Libreville, Estuaire Province, as well as in the cities of Oyem, Woleu-Ntem Province, and Franceville, Haut-Ogooué Province, as civil society groups called for an end to sanctions. sag

GUINEA (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **2006**

Conflict parties: opposition groups vs. government
 Conflict items: national power

The violent crisis over national power between various opposition groups, particularly the National Front for the Defence of the Constitution (FNDC), and the ruling military junta, continued.

After the coup d'état in 2021, the military junta proposed a 36-month timeline to general elections, which was approved by the interim legislative body, the National Transitional Council (CNT). ECOWAS demanded a shorter timeline for the transition in 2022 and pressured the transition government with sanctions. They agreed on a 24-month transition timeline, starting in January 2023, resulting in elections before the end of 2024. In March 2024, the prime minister stated that the return to civilian rule will delay until at least 2025. This caused a huge outcry among the opposition parties, who want the junta to hold on to the elections in 2024.

In February, the former opposition leader Mamadou Oury Bah, who was a founder of the Union of Democratic Forces of Guinea, was appointed prime minister by the military junta. One week before, the junta dissolved the government, as a reaction to ongoing worker strikes.

In July, the opposition parties rejected a proposal of a constitution drafted by the junta because it would allow military leaders to run in elections. In the eyes of the opposition, that would hinder a return to civilian rule.

On July 9, two opposition leaders in Guinea, Mamadou Billo Bah and Oumar Sylla, also known as "Foniké Mengué," were arrested in Conakry by soldiers without any legal basis. Before their arrest, they were denied access to lawyers, and no court process took place. The opposition is calling for the immediate release of the detainees.

In October, the junta dissolved 53 political parties in Guinea and put 67 others under observation for a period of three months. Among them are major opposition parties like the Union of Democratic Forces of Guinea.

In December, opposition leader Aliou Bah was arrested for allegedly insulting the head of the junta General Mamady Doumbouya. Many parties and members of the civil society demanded his release. ssc

GUINEA-BISSAU (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **1998**

Conflict parties: opposition groups vs. government
 Conflict items: national power

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KENYA (INTER-COMMUNAL RIVALRY)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1963**

Conflict parties: Pokot vs. Turkana vs. Toposa vs. Borana vs. Rendille vs. Akamba vs. Orma vs. various other tribes

Conflict items: subnational predominance, resources

The violent crisis over resources and subnational predominance between various communities continued.

Similar to last year, the Turkana community has been involved in a cross-border conflict with the Toposa community from South Sudan predominantly related to cattle raiding.

During May, at least three people were killed and several injured in cattle raiding clashes between the two communities. For instance, a suspected raider got shot dead and two herders were injured while cattle raiding on May 5, in Atapar village, Turkana County. On May 7, suspected Toposa gunmen attacked herders who grazed their animals in Kibish Sub-County, Turkana County. On May 14, Turkana cattle raiders crossed the border into South Sudan, killed two Toposa youths and injured two more while raiding 1,000 cattle in the villages of Nadapal and New Site, Kapoeta East County, South Sudan.

On September 7, farmers from the Kamba community and herders from the Somali community clashed over land and pasture in Mandongoi village, Kitui County, resulting in six deaths, several injuries and the theft of livestock.

On September 27, Waradei and Malakote communities clashed over land in Madogo town, Tana River County, two people were killed. The government had previously relocated the Malakote due to severe flooding, onto areas claimed by the Waradei as grazing lands. The Waradei community opposed the move, necessitating security forces to intervene and prevent further escalation.

On November 3, suspected Turkana bandits shot a man from the Samburu community in the Noltipo area, Samburu County. The incident occurred while Samburu residents were grazing their livestock. During the attack, the bandits raided 100 goats. Police intercepted the bandits, retrieved the goats on the same day and intensified their presence in the area to prevent and deter further attacks. Furthermore, intercommunal rivalries also manifested in contexts related to refugee camps, sexualised violence and retaliation.

As in previous years, refugees from the Nuer community of South Sudan and the Anuak community from the Gambella region, Ethiopia, resided in Kakuma Refugee Camp, Turkana County. On June 20, the Nuer and Anuak communities clashed which led to ten refugees being killed.

Around August 29, violence erupted between the Orma and Degodia clan communities at Tula village, Tana River County. Police arrested two men on charges of rape, thereafter, members of the rival clan attacked members of the victim's clan at a local water point, killing four with poisoned arrows. lav

KENYA (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1999**

Conflict parties: Azimio la Umajo One-Kenya Coalition vs. government

Conflict items: national power

The violent crisis over national power between the political coalition Azimio la Umajo One-Kenya Coalition (Azimio), and non-systemic opposition on the one hand, and the government of the Kenya Kwanza Alliance (KKA), on the other, continued. As in previous years, protests were held in Nairobi capital and spread countrywide.

On June 25, people gathered to protest against tax hikes in Nairobi and tried to storm the Kenyan Parliament. In response, police opened fire on the protesters and killed at least eight people. During the incident, protesters set a part of Kenya's parliament on fire. The protests were predominantly led by young people without political affiliations. On June 26, President William Ruto withdrew the planned taxes. The protests continued throughout July and August, and various sources reported that in total, at least 60 people were killed in protest activity between June and July of the year. At least four people were killed by the police on July 16, following a day of anti-government protests. Two deaths were reported in Kibwezi township, Makueni county. In both Nairobi, and Kitengela municipality, Kajiado county, one person was killed. The protesters wanted President Ruto to deal with bad governance, corruption, mismanagement of public funds, and to resign. Azimio expressed support for the protesters and likewise called for President Ruto's resignation. On August 8, Kenyan police injured at least three journalists during protests in Nairobi by firing volleys of tear gas. More than 170 protesters were arrested.

Hundreds of people gathered on December 10 in Nairobi, as they protested against a wave of femicides in Kenya. Although the protest was reportedly peaceful, Kenyan police fired tear gas and arrested at least three people during the event.

Since the start of the large-scale protests in June, dozens of government critics had gone missing, with human rights organizations accusing the state authorities of being behind the abductions. On December 24, for instance, four masked men abducted a cartoonist and anti-government critic after he had posted cartoons critical of President Ruto and his government to social media. On December 25, the Police Reforms Working Group, an alliance of human rights organizations, called on the government to "reveal the location of these individuals, ensure their safety, and present them before a court of law or release them unconditionally". On December 30, people gathered to protest the alleged abduction of government critics in Nairobi. The police fired tear gas to disperse the crowd and arrested dozens of protesters. According to the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, at least 82 government critics had gone missing by the end of the year.


lav

MALI (CSP-DPA, CMA ET AL. / AZAWAD)

Intensity: **4** | Change: • | Start: **1989**

Conflict parties: CMA, CSP-DPA vs. Platform et al. vs. government

Conflict items: autonomy



This conflict text will be made available within April 2026. For an earlier access, please contact us. pad

MALI (INTER-COMMUNAL RIVALRY / CENTRAL MALI)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2012**

Conflict parties: Bambara, Dogon, Dozo vs. Fulani vs. Islamist groups

Conflict items: subnational predominance, resources

This conflict text will be made available within April 2026. For an earlier access, please contact us. pad

MALI (INTER-MILITANT RIVALRY / NORTHERN MALI)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2012**

Conflict parties: CMA, CSP-DPA vs. Platform et al. vs. Islamist groups

Conflict items: system/ideology, subnational predominance

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MALI (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: ↗ | Start: **2012**

Conflict parties: opposition groups vs. government

Conflict items: national power


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MALI, BURKINA FASO ET AL. (JNIM ET AL.)

Intensity: **5** | Change: • | Start: **1998**

Conflict parties: Al-Mourabitoun, Ansar Dine, Ansaroul Islam, AQIM, JNIM, Macina Liberation Front vs. Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Chad, France, Mali, Mauretania, Niger, Togo, USA

Conflict items: system/ideology, international power




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MOZAMBIQUE (ASWJ)

Intensity: **4** | Change: • | Start: **2017**

Conflict parties: ASWJ vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology



The limited war over the orientation of the political system between the Islamist militia Ahlu Sunna Wal Jammaa (ASWJ), locally also referred to as "al-Shabaab", and the government, continued.

Most recorded incidents occurred in Cabo Delgado province, with additional attacks in neighbouring Nampula province. At least 349 people were killed. The government was supported by international actors, including the Rwandan Defence Forces (RDF), the Southern African Development Community Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM), the European Union (EU), and locally formed self-defence militias. SAMIM's deployment officially ended on July 15. Rwanda subsequently increased its military presence to approx. 3,000 troops.

On January 21, insurgents occupied the Mucojo administrative post, Macomia district, after forces of the Mozambican Defence and Security Forces (FADM) withdrew. On February 9, ASWJ fighters stormed a FADM base in Mucojo, killing 25 soldiers. On April 27 and again on May 10–11, fighters attacked Macomia town, Macomia district. At least 15 people were killed in the April raid, and at least 10 in May. More than 700 residents fled the area.

In Mocímboa da Praia district, on October 29, insurgents planted a roadside explosive on the Chinda–Mbau road, killing one civilian. On the same day, fighters killed at least two civilians in Marere village, same district.

In Muidumbe district, two civilians were killed in Mandela village on November 4. On November 7, fighters killed at least one civilian in Mapate village, same district.

In Meluco district, around October 30, fighters attacked

Minhanha village, burned four homes and abducted several loggers. In Palma district, on September 28, a cassava farmer was beheaded in Naliendele village.

In Chiúre district, Nampula province, insurgents killed one civilian and burned houses in Nacoja village on May 3. On May 5, they burned two churches, a school and around 190 homes in Siripa village, same district. In Metuge district, on March 6, fighters killed an elderly man and burned homes in Pulo village and neighbouring settlements.

On March 6, nine schoolchildren were abducted in Pulo village, Metuge district. In Meluco district, loggers abducted in Minhanha village were later released.

Civilians were also killed during raids on Litamanda village, Macomia district, in early January, and on Nachiji village, near Mocímboa da Praia.

On January 21, ASWJ seized Mucojo, Macomia district. FADM forces withdrew from much of the coastal area. While government forces later re-entered, insurgents retained a presence in parts of the district. Macomia, Mocímboa da Praia and Muidumbe districts remained contested.

SAMIM's exit in July marked a turning point. No further international deployments were confirmed. In September, allegations of human rights abuses by FADM troops protecting French energy interests in Afungi, Palma district, led to questions in the European Parliament concerning the EU's Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive. Regarding displacement, by the end of 2024, over 577,000 people were internally displaced within Mozambique due to the ongoing conflict and related violence in Cabo Delgado province. Neighboring provinces such as Nampula and Niassa also host smaller displaced populations. For example, more than 700 people fled Macomia district following attacks in April and May 2024, and Chiúre district in Nampula saw around 96,000 displaced after insurgent attacks in early 2024. tcr

MOZAMBIQUE (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2012**

Conflict parties: PODEMOS, RENAMO, RENAMO Military Junta vs. government

Conflict items: national power

The violent crisis over national power between Mozambique's ruling party Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) and the opposition continued.

The only violent confrontation against RENAMO happened on August 11, when the police attacked a march of the party in Gurué, Zambezia province, injuring three people.

In light of the elections on October 9 and their aftermath, the Mozambican Optimists for Development Party (PODEMOS), supporting independent, former RENAMO candidate Venancio Mondlane, replaced Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) as the main opposition.

FRELIMO's candidate Daniel Chapo was declared winner of the presidential election on October 24, continuing the party's decades-long rule amid widespread claims of fraud. Even before the election results, violence broke out on October 16 as the police opened fire on a political rally in support of Mondlane, in his stronghold Nampula, eponymous province, wounding one person. Shortly after, on October 19, unidentified gunmen killed two PODEMOS members in their car in Maputo capital. As the opposition protested on October 21, the police violently dispersed the crowd, injuring three people.

From then onwards, Mondlane encouraged several phases of nationwide protests to oppose allegedly rigged election results. Mondlane himself was in exile since October 20. Those protests were frequently met with violence and the police fatally shooting people, killing many. For example, from October 24 to 25, Mondlane first called for a national general strike, drawing thousands. During these protests, security forces killed at least eleven and injured over 50 protestors, using live bullets and tear gas. Another general strike started on October 31 and culminated in a march upon Maputo capital, on November 7. During that week, the police shot dead several people. On November 7, three people were killed and at least 66 injured during clashes with the police. Mondlane encouraged another phase of protests between November 13 and 15, during which time Mondlane specifically encouraged protesters to target economically significant locations. After a negotiation impulse failed due to Mondlane's exile and his unmet conditions, protests resumed November 27 to 29.

Violence further escalated in December, with protests from December 4 to 14 and between December 23 to 29. For instance, police shot dead 36 people during the last December week.

On December 29, the local monitoring organization Plataforma Eleitoral DECIDE summarized the protests, reporting a death toll of 278 since the presidential poll on October 9. anh

NIGER (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2009**

Conflict parties: opposition groups vs. government

Conflict items: national power

The violent crisis over national power between the military regime of the Conseil National pour la Sauvegarde de la Patrie (CNSP) and armed groups supporting the former democratic elected President Mohamed Bazoum continued. The four armed groups Front Patriotique de Libération (FPL, founded in August 2023), its split Mouvement Patriotique pour la Liberté et la Justice (MPLJ, founded in August 2024), the Front Patriotique pour la Justice (FPJ, founded in August 2023) and the Forces Armées Libres (FAL, founded in September 2024) claim to fight for the restoration of the constitutional order and the release of Bazoum who has been under house arrest since the coup d'état in July 2023.

FPL ambushed Nigerien soldiers on the road between Arlit and Tabarak, Agadez region, on February 7. According to FPL, 27 soldiers and 5 FPL fighters were killed and 9 soldiers and 7 FPL fighters were wounded. According to the government, 10 FPL fighters were killed and 8 soldiers and one civilian were wounded. On May 4, FPL attacked defense and security forces in Séguédine, Agadez, leaving several soldiers killed. In the night of June 16, FPL carried out a sabotage act in the north of Tesker, Zinder region, against the new oil pipeline to Benin. During the kidnapping of the prefect of Bilma and four security forces north of Bilma, Agadez, on June 21 by FPJ, at least one guard and one FPJ fighter were killed and another guard wounded. Between August 25 and 29, an FPL delegation met a delegation of the Cadre Stratégique et Permanent (CSP), which is fighting the Malian military regime, to strengthen the cooperation in Tinzaouatène, Mali. MPLJ attacked a military and Gendarmerie post in Chirfa, Agadez, on September 17. According to MPLJ 14 soldiers, 2 gendarmes and 2 MPLJ


SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

fighters were killed and several wounded, according to the government 2 soldiers were killed and 6 wounded. To create a broader platform, FPL, FAL and two other groups announced the formation of the Coordination des Forces Libres du Niger (CFLN) on October 5, which announced a cooperation with Mali based CSP five days later. FAL and JNIM separately claimed responsibility for an attack on a security checkpoint in Assamaka, Agadez, on October 19 with six soldiers and one civilian killed. On October 10 and November 5, CNSP revoked the Nigerien citizenship of 16 persons, including the leaders of FAL, FPL, FPJ and MPLJ. In November 2024, around 100 FPL fighters laid down their weapons in different disarmament ceremonies in Agadez after negotiations. Meanwhile, the CNSP intensified its cooperation with also military led Mali and Burkina Faso and continued building closer relations with Russia. On January 28, Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso announced to leave ECOWAS. On April 10, Russia sent 100 military trainers and an air-defense system to Niger. [lie](#)

NIGER, MALI ET AL. (IS SAHEL)

Intensity: **5** | Change: • | Start: **2016**

Conflict parties: IS Sahel vs. Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger
Conflict items: system/ideology, international power



This conflict text will be made available within April 2026. For an earlier access, please contact us. pad,jak

NIGERIA (APC SUPPORTERS – PDP SUPPORTERS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1960**

Conflict parties: APC supporters vs. PDP supporters
Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The violent crisis over the orientation of the political system and national power between supporters of the northern-based ruling party All Progressives Congress (APC) and supporters of the southern-based main opposition People's Democratic Party (PDP) continued.

Violence usually peaks during election campaigns and voting day. Compared to previous election cycles, violence decreased this year, with fewer clashes reported. Two gubernatorial elections for Edo and Ondo state took place. On September 21, the APC candidate, Monday Okpebholo, was elected governor of Edo State. Prior to the governorship elections, the PDP decided not to sign a peace accord to curb electoral violence. During the campaign, APC and PDP accused each other of violent clashes and unlawful arrests. On July 18, a policeman was shot dead in an attack on APC candidate Okpebholo in Benin city, Edo State. The motivation for the shooting remains unclear.


On November 16, the APC candidate, Lucky Aiyedatiwa, won the Ondo State elections. Prior to election day, on November

8, APC and PDP signed peace accords in the state capital Akure. However, the PDP accused the ruling APC of inciting violence before the election, citing an incident on November 13 in which a group of alleged ADP supporters attacked PDP supporters with guns and machetes, leaving seven people injured in Idanre, Ondo State. [vro](#)

NIGERIA (BANDITS)

Intensity: **5** | Change: • | Start: **2016**

Conflict parties: bandits vs. government
Conflict items: subnational predominance, other



The war over subnational predominance specifically in the northwestern Nigerian states between bandits and the government continued.

Criminal gangs, predominantly ethnic Fulani pastoralists referred to as bandits, arose from the conflict between the mainly Christian farmers and the predominantly Muslim Fulani pastoralists. While initially driven by ethnic and religious clashes, today the bandits focus on economic opportunism and extraction. The spread of banditry was reinforced by the proliferation of illegal firearms, particularly from the Sahel, and the limited presence of Nigerian security forces in northwestern areas due to the active conflict with Boko Haram [→ Nigeria, Chad et al. (JAS-Boko Haram)]. The Nigerian Army collaborated more frequently with local police and volunteer security operatives, so-named vigilantes. Throughout the year, their activities included raids on villages, looting, cattle rustling, and kidnapping for ransom, particularly targeting civilians with political power, such as village leaders.

At least 1,400 people were killed this year, with violent activities being concentrated in Kaduna, Katsina, Benue, Taraba, Zamfara, Sokoto, and Niger states. For instance, on April 4, approx. 50 armed bandits raided the Agojeju-Odo, Ajokpachi-Odo and Bagaji communities in Kogi State, killing 25 people and burning farm produce, property, and crops. At least 50 residents fled to neighboring communities. On May 1, approx. 200 bandits raided the palace of the emir of Zurmi town, Zamfara State, killing three palace officials and abducting three residents. On June 20, bandits conducted separate attacks on the Lanta, Tunga, Dnakau, and Juweedna communities, Niger State, burning houses and rustling cattle. On December 1, a commercial bus passed over concealed explosives buried under a major road in the village area by bandits. The attack killed at least twelve passengers in Zamfara State.

From January 5 to January 8, over 150 bandits abducted approx. 84 people in Bwari Area Council of the Federal Capital Territory and Kaduna State and demanded a ransom of approx. USD 120,000. On March 7, bandits abducted 137 students and staff of the LEA Primary School and Government Secondary School, located in the Chikun Local Government Area (LGA) of Kaduna State, killing 40 and injuring 30 people. On March 12, the bandits threatened to kill the students and staff unless an approx. USD 625,000 ransom was not paid in 20 days. However, on March 24, the state governor secured the release of hostages without payment

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A total of 600 people were displaced. Similar insecurity-based violence acts continued to September 17, when Nigerian Army troops reportedly shot four bandits and rescued 20 hostages in two separate missions in Kaduna State. Clashes between the military and the bandits reached a peak when bandits took over a military camp in Niger State on October 23. This, the takeover of one of the biggest military training grounds in Nigeria, displaced approx. 23 surrounding communities. On November 10, bandits attacked the Kwaga and Unguwar Zako communities in Kaduna State during the night and set fire to several hectares of maize farms, which came 48 hours after a peace parley between the two parties. In response, security forces increased counter-operations. For instance, raids by bandits in Logo LGA, Benue State on January 17 and on January 24 were followed by counter-operations by the Nigerian Army and the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps on the same days respectively, killing five bandits. One day after the kidnapping of 30 people from the Kasai village, Katsina State on April 1, security operatives negotiated the release of all 30 people. A Nigerian Air Force operation took place on June 9, when the airstrike following recent attacks by bandits on the Kankara LGA, Katsina State killed 29 bandits. On July 24, security operatives coordinated an ambush on approx. 100 bandits on their way on Akere axis in Kundu, Wushishi and Mashegu local councils, Niger State. On August 19, security operatives raided a bandit hideout in Plateau State, recovering at least 100 cows from the bandits, whilst a gunfight broke out, leaving at least 18 people dead. On September 17, the Nigerian Army conducted two simultaneous clearance operations in Kaduna State, recovering AK47 rifles and motorcycles; rescuing 20 hostages, and leaving four bandits dead. On November 15, the Nigerian Air Force conducted multiple airstrikes in Zamfara State, targeting banditry settlements and key loyalists of renowned bandit leaders. eoy

NIGERIA (FARMERS – PASTORALISTS)

Intensity: **3** | Change:  | Start: **1960**

Conflict parties: farmers vs. pastoralists
Conflict items: subnational predominance, re-sources

The limited war over subnational predominance and resources between farmers and pastoralists de-escalated to a violent crisis.

The conflict was deeply intertwined with the ongoing crises between so-called bandits and state authorities, as part of intercommunal rivalry [→ Nigeria (bandits)]. While the core of the dispute initially concerned arable land and cattle, the conflict progressively evolved to encompass political, environmental, ethnic, and religious issues. Tensions between the predominantly Christian farmers, on the one hand, and the mainly Muslim Fulani pastoralists, on the other, continued to overlay the conflict dynamics.

Over the course of the year, the conflict left at least 337 dead and hundreds of others injured. For instance, on January 23, gunmen — allegedly herdsmen — killed at least 30 civilians, injured multiple others, and set houses on fire in a series of attacks around the Magu district in Plateau State. On February 18, suspected herdsmen invaded multiple communities in Benue State and killed ten people, injuring several others. On March 7, over 40 alleged herdsmen killed 16 persons and destroyed houses and farmland in eleven settlements in the

Mbalom Council Ward of Gwer East Local Government Area (LGA) of Benue State. In a series of attacks from April 11 to 15 in the Bokkos LGA of Plateau State, Fulani herdsmen killed at least 30 people. Many others fled. Moreover, on May 12, suspected herders attacked a village in Agatu LGA of Benue State, killing eleven people and abducting several others. On June 13, an armed herdsman killed a farmer on his farm in Shiroro LGA of Niger State. After that, several farmers mobilised and killed the herdsman and one other person. On August 27, Fulani herdsmen killed ten people and injured three others in the Oke-Ogun zone of Oyo State. On October 1, suspected pastoralists killed seven villagers and two soldiers in the Agatu Local Government Area of Benue State. Between November 24 and December 1, Fulani herdsmen killed at least 48 people in multiple attacks. For instance, on November 24, over 300 pastoralists attacked counties in Logo and Katsina-Ala, killing at least 30 persons and injuring 37 others. On December 25, gunmen, who are suspected to be herdsmen and men from the Jukum militia, attacked multiple communities in the Kwande LGA of Benue State, killing eleven. hku

NIGERIA (ISLAMIC MOVEMENT)

Intensity: **3** | Change:  | Start: **1991**

Conflict parties: IMN vs. government
Conflict items: system/ideology

The violent crisis over the orientation of the political system between the Islamic Movement Nigeria (IMN) and the government continued. Members of the IMN follow Shia Islam, and desire a shift to a different political system via the implementation of Islamic law.

Throughout the year, the IMN clashed with the government and government forces over its rights and intentions. The government had banned IMN and its activities in 2019, declaring them to be illegal and terrorist in nature.

On April 5, in Kaduna City, Kaduna State, police and IMN members clashed at a pro-Palestinian protest on Quds Day in which police killed four protesters and at least 23 people on both sides were injured. On April 9, Borno State police sent out a nationwide warning about a planned revenge attack by the IMN's armed wing called "Haris". Subsequently, on April 17, the IMN released a statement on its website denying any violent intentions. Following this, the IMN officially petitioned the Speaker and Senate President of the House of Representatives concerning the clashes on April 5, claiming that the Governor of Kaduna State had ordered a violent intervention during their peaceful protest. The police denied these allegations.

In July, the police issued two official warnings to the IMN, advising them not to hold their planned religious processions for the Islamic day of commemoration Ashura on July 14 in Kaduna city, Kaduna state, and on July 16 in the capital Abuja.


On August 25, IMN protestors and local police clashed in Wuse District, Abuja. Three people, including two police officers, were killed and at least seven injured. On the same day, police stormed the house of an IMN member in Suleja, Niger state, arrested several people and injured approx. 30 others with teargas and bullets. On September 5, the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) police command arrested a man affiliated with the IMN in the FCT due to a bribery attempt. The IMN member had attempted to pay for the release of a prominent IMN

member who had been arrested on August 25. On October 21, the Kaduna State Urban Planning and Development Authority demolished the residence of an IMN member in Malali, Kaduna State, over land ownership issues. The resident and his family insisted that they held all relevant permits. On December 14, the IMN planned to commemorate the 2015 Zaria massacre in an event center in Abuja. Police officers barricaded the building in the morning and arrested several people. On December 20, the IMN publicly demanded freedom to exercise their religion, criticizing continuous disruptions of IMN activities by the police. jne

NIGERIA (ISWAP – JAS)

Intensity: **4** | Change: • | Start: **2016**

Conflict parties: ISWAP vs. JAS
 Conflict items: system/ideology, subnational pre-dominance



The limited war over subnational predominance and ideology between the Islamist armed groups Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'Awati wal-Jihad (JAS), also known as Boko Haram, continued. Both groups remained highly active in Borno State. ISWAP retained a dominant presence in the northern and central areas of Borno State, particularly around the Lake Chad basin. In January, a series of violent confrontations took place between ISWAP and JAS fighters in Borno State. On January 15, the two factions clashed in Kukawa LGA, near the islands of Kandahar and Kaduna Ruwa. Reports indicated many fatalities, though no exact number could be confirmed. On January 21, JAS launched an assault on ISWAP positions in Abadam LGA. Fighting continued the next day, as ISWAP units attacked a JAS encampment in Kukawa LGA. The clashes continued in March and April. For example, on March 11, ISWAP expanded operations westward by attacking a JAS base in Katsina State. ISWAP fighters killed nine JAS members and captured weapons and supplies. In July, JAS fighters carried out an armed raid on ISWAP positions in Kwatar Shalla Shuwari, Borno State, reportedly killing sixteen ISWAP fighters. Two days later, on July 8, JAS again attacked ISWAP fighters in Borno State. While casualty figures remained unclear, the incident underscored the frequency of retaliatory violence between the groups. On August 24, ISWAP reportedly executed 69 individuals, including several JAS fighters, in Marte LGA, Borno State. In mid-September, clashes intensified again. On September 15, ISWAP launched a midnight assault on JAS positions in Gurnuwa and Laraba Mairari, killing several militants. Fighting reportedly continued the next day along the Monguno–Kukawa axis, with both factions sustaining casualties. On December 17, a coordinated ISWAP attack on a JAS position in Kukawa LGA, reportedly killing fifteen JAS fighters. hku

NIGERIA (PRO-BIAFRA GROUPS / BIAFRA)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1967**

Conflict parties: pro-Biafra groups vs. Cameroon, Nigeria
 Conflict items: secession


The violent crisis over the secession of southeastern parts of the country between pro-Biafra groups such as the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) including its military arm Eastern Security Network (ESN), as well as the Biafra Nations League (BNL) and its affiliated militias Black Marine and Dragon Fighter Marine on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued. Members of pro-Biafra groups reiterated their demand for an independent Biafra state during protests and violent activities. At least 341 people were killed in clashes between pro-Biafra groups and Nigerian security forces or during attacks on civilians. On February 12, a suspected IPOB/ESN member attacked Okigwe Correctional Centre in Umualomoke Community, Imo State, killing one policeman and freeing seven inmates. On May 30, during a sit-at-home order on Biafra Day, IPOB/ESN members clashed with security forces in Aba, Abia State, leaving eleven dead. At Orogwe Community, Imo State, IPOB/ESN members clashed with security forces on December 19, leaving five dead. In December 2023, the Nigerian Joint Task Force (JTF) had launched Operation Udo-Ka to take military action against separatist fighters in southeastern areas of Nigeria. Within this context, the JTF raided separatist camps, apprehended kidnappers and killed suspected Biafra separatists throughout the year. For instance, on June 8, Nigerian forces killed six suspected IPOB/ESN members during a raid of their militant camp in Igboro Forest, Abia State. Similarly, troops killed two suspected IPOB/ESN members at Lilu Community, Anambra State, on October 21. The conflict continued to spill over into Cameroon. On October 1, BNL affiliated Dragon Fighter Marines kidnapped the Divisional Officer for Idabato in Bakassi Peninsula, Sud-Ouest Region, Cameroon. The group later executed the hostage after the Cameroonian government did not meet their demands by November 19. Polarization within IPOB intensified. While Nnamdi Kanu and his faction of IPOB claimed to be a peaceful organization, Simon Ekpa's Autopilot faction claimed responsibility for several attacks on Nigerian Security Forces during the year. In one such instance, while enforcing a sit-at-home order, gunmen shot four police officers and one civilian on July 29, at Irete Community, Imo State. On September 9, members of Ekpa's Autopilot faction attacked local government headquarters and Obowo police station in Imo State, killing three officials. On November 21, Finnish authorities arrested Simon Ekpa, accused of terrorism-related activities such as financing terrorism and inciting violence. Nnamdi Kanu remained imprisoned at end of 2024, following the reinstatement of terrorism charges brought against him by the Nigerian Supreme Court in December 2023. The IPOB leader has remained in custody since he was arrested abroad in 2021. yme

NIGERIA, CHAD ET AL. (ISWAP)

Intensity: **5** | Change: • | Start: **2015**

Conflict parties: ISWAP vs. Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria

Conflict items: system/ideology, international power



The war over international power and the orientation of the political system between the so-called Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), on the one hand, and the governments of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger, on the other, continued. The group’s main area of operation was the Lake Chad Basin, comprising parts of northeastern Nigeria, namely Borno State and Yobe State, as well as Cameroon’s far-northern Region, Niger’s Diffa Department, and Chad’s Lac Region.

Throughout the year, ISWAP carried out numerous attacks across these regions. On January 5, ISWAP terrorists attacked Kware town, Geidam Local Government Area (LGA) in Yobe State, and murdered a pastor and 13 other Christians. On February 3, ISWAP members attacked a police station in Gajiram town, Nganzai LGA in Borno State, killing four police officials and seizing significant arms and ammunition. Furthermore, kidnappings of civilians also increased significantly in the first half of the year. For instance, on March 1, ISWAP terrorists kidnapped 47 women in Ngala LGA, Borno State.

On April 27, a vehicle of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) was hit by an IED planted by ISWAP, killing eight soldiers. On May 26, ISWAP killed 35 fishermen and injured at least 25 in Kukawa LGA, Borno State, while 30 individuals remained missing five days later. Afterwards, ISWAP issued an ultimatum to the people of Kukawa LGA “to leave the region until June 1 or die”.

ISWAP fighters carried out another attack on September 1 after the town of Mafa, eponymous LGA in Yobe State, refused to continue paying levies to ISWAP. The terrorists torched the town, allegedly killing 170 inhabitants.

ISWAP also returned to use of suicide bombings. On June 30, ISWAP fighters killed 32 and injured 42 in a series of suicide bombings on a wedding, a parking lot, and a burial ceremony, in Gwoza town, eponymous LGA, Borno State.

At the same time, states comprising the MNJTF aiming to combat ISWAP made significant efforts. On January 2, the Nigerian Air Force killed the leader of ISWAP, Ba’a Shuwa, in an airstrike in Kwatan Dilla, Abadam LGA in Borno State. According to reports, 32 other members of ISWAP were killed. On February 19, the Nigerian Air Force carried out an airstrike in which 25 terrorists, including three top commanders, were killed in Marte LGA, Borno State. On the same day, MNJTF troops in Diffa city, eponymous department, intercepted an arms transport intended to supply ISWAP.

On April 9, another top commander of ISWAP was captured in Mubi, Adamawa State, Nigeria. On April 21, the Nigerian Army destroyed an ISWAP bread factory and a factory for IEDs in the Sambisa forest in Borno state. On May 19, the


Nigerian Army freed 386 hostages from Sambisa forest and several villages in Borno, some of whom had been abducted by ISWAP ten years ago. On June 4, the Nigerian Air Force carried out a further airstrike that killed 140 terrorists in Marte LGA. As a result, 57 ISWAP fighters surrendered. On July 2, through a series of land, air, and naval operations on the territories of Nigeria and Cameroon, near Lake Chad, the MNJTF killed over 70 ISWAP militants. As a result of these operations, five ISWAP hideouts were dismantled across the Lake Chad region. Between August 28 and September 3, the Nigerian Army killed 31 ISWAP fighters in the states of Borno and Yobe. jet

NIGERIA, CHAD ET AL. (JAS-BOKO HARAM)

Intensity: **5** | Change: • | Start: **2003**

Conflict parties: JAS vs. Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria

Conflict items: system/ideology



The war over the orientation of the political system between Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’Awati Wal-Jihad (JAS), a splinter group of Boko Haram, and the governments of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, continued. JAS is opposed to secular and liberal values, in particular Western education and democratic systems, seeking to establish an Islamic caliphate in the region. At least 515 people were killed and 115 injured.

As in previous years, JAS operated mainly in the southeastern area of Borno State, the Sambisa Forest, which continued to be disputed between JAS and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), another Boko Haram splinter group, as well as in the Mandara Mountains in the border areas of Nigeria’s Yobe and Borno State. Clashes between JAS and ISWAP continued [→ Nigeria (ISWAP – JAS)].

Throughout the year, government military operations by, among others, both the Nigerian Army and the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), resulted in the death of at least 70 JAS-members. For instance, on August 17, the Nigerian Army killed three JAS-members, including one of their commanders, in Bula Daloye, Borno State, Nigeria. On September 11, the Nigerian Air Force claimed to have killed 28 JAS-members in an airstrike at Bassa village, Niger State, Nigeria. Allegedly, over 100 members of JAS had been involved in fighting with government forces.

On October 27, JAS raided a Chadian military camp near Ngouboua, Lac Region, Chad, burning vehicles and seizing weapons, leaving at least 40 people dead, including the garrison’s unit commander, and 20 injured. On November 9, a clash between JAS and the Chadian Army resulted in the deaths of 96 JAS-members and 15 soldiers of the Chadian Army, also leaving 32 soldiers injured.

As in previous years, JAS-members and their families continued to surrender to the Nigerian Army. This year, at least 434 people surrendered to the MNJTF, including four commanders. For instance, between July 10 and 17, the MNJTF reported the surrender of 263 individuals at the border of Nigeria and Cameroon.

JAS frequently attacked and abducted civilians. For instance, on March 6, JAS abducted around 200 IDPs in Gamboru Ngala, Borno State, Nigeria. On the border between Cameroon and Nigeria, 27 fishermen were killed and a further three abducted on April 12. On May 24, the group reportedly abducted 160 local villagers during a raid in Kuchi village, Niger State, Nigeria. On June 29, JAS conducted suicide bombings in Gwoza, Borno State, Nigeria, leaving at least 18 dead. On August 1, the group planted an IED in Kawuri village, Borno State, Nigeria, killing at least 19. hpa

SENEGAL (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2023**

Conflict parties: opposition groups vs. government
 Conflict items: national power

This conflict text will be made available within April 2026. For an earlier access, please contact us. mib

SOMALIA (JUBALAND)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **NEW** | Start: **2024**

Conflict parties: Jubaland Regional Government (JRG) vs. Federal Government of Somalia (FGS)
 Conflict items: system/ideology, subnational predominance

A violent crisis over subnational predominance and the orientation of the political system between the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and the Regional Government of Jubaland (RGJ) erupted. The crisis broke out over the procedure of the regional election in Jubaland and the transition in Somalia towards a one person, one vote system.

On October 7, the RGJ left the National Consultative Council (NCC) which was tasked with the reforming of the Somali clan-based electoral system towards one based on a one-person, one vote-principle. RGJ president Ahmed Mohamed Islam Madobe withdrew from the talks arguing the NCC's refusal to include Puntland and Khatumo in the discussion about the new electoral system. On November 9, the RGJ declared that they would conduct their own regional elections without the FGS. After Kenya failed to mediate between the two parties, the RGJ proceeded with the election on November 25 which the FGS declared illegal. On November 28, both actors issued warrants for the arrest of their respective leaders and broke off relations. On December 11, the Jubaland Regional Forces and the Somali National Forces (SNF) clashed in Raskamboni, Lower Juba, leading to at least one casualty. RGJ accused SNF of the use of drones in the fighting. On December 22, Jubaland Regional Forces with the support of troops from neighboring Ethiopia seized control of Dolow, Gedo Region. The clash with SNF left four people dead and led to approx. thousand internally displaced persons. On the same day, Jubaland Regional Forces and SNF fought in Kulbiyow, Lower Juba, resulting in at least four deaths. jfg

SOMALIA (PUNTLAND – SOMALILAND)

Intensity: **4** | Change: • | Start: **1998**

Conflict parties: regional government of Puntland vs. regional government of Somaliland

Conflict items: subnational predominance



The limited war over subnational predominance between the self-declared state of Somaliland and its security force, the Somaliland Armed Forces (SAF), the semi-autonomous region of Puntland, and the self-declared state of SSC-Khatumo (Khatumo) continued. The regions Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn formed the semi-autonomous region of Khatumo State in Somalia in 2023, which was recognized by the central government of Somalia. Both Somaliland and Puntland claimed the three regions which make up Khatumo State. This has been subject to recurring and opposing territorial claims by Somaliland, Puntland and Khatumo, as well as by various ethnic groups inhabiting the region.

After SAF announced their intentions to attack the city of Las Anod, Sool region, on May 14, they deployed troops and artillery to the region on May 20. As a response, on August 19, the government of Khatumo declared their willingness to defend the Sool region against Somaliland. On September 29, the Khatumo government, denounced the government of Puntland for implementing projects in the Sool and Cayn regions.

On May 28, Somaliland security forces arrested 50 young people for waving the Somali flag in the city of Erigabo, Sanaag region. On August 28, Khatumo security forces attacked SAF and civilians in Goof district, Sanaag region, killing five people and seizing military equipment. In retaliation, SAF attacked Khatumo security forces on the same day, killing three people.


On October 23, members of the parliament of Khatumo refused an invitation by the government of Puntland to a regional conference aimed at discussing tensions between Puntland and Somalia, since Khatumo did not see itself as part of Puntland. The diplomatic tensions continued in December, as Khatumo reproached the government of Puntland for blocking humanitarian aid to the region on December 10. Between December 14 and 16, SAF and the Khatumo military clashed in Erigabo, killing at least seven people and injuring several more. On December 16, the fight ended with the withdrawal of the Khatumo military. As a result of the fighting, approx. 43,000 people fled the area to Sanag and Sool regions, Khatumo, and Bari region, Puntland, as well as the Togdheer region, Somaliland. According to UNOCHA, schools, businesses and humanitarian organizations ceased activities amid the escalation. On December 28, the governments of both Somaliland and Khatumo signaled their readiness for peace talks. jfg

SOMALIA (SUBCLAN RIVALRY)

Intensity: **4** | Change: • | Start: **2012**

Conflict parties: Hawiye vs. Rahanweyn subclan vs. Darod vs. Dir vs. Isaaq vs. various other clans

Conflict items: subnational predominance, resources



The limited war over subnational predominance and resources between various Somali clans continued. Somali society is structured into various clans, with various associated militias fighting each other over local influence.

On April 19, two unidentified clans fought in Daifo village, Middle Shabelle region, over agriculturally used water canals, leaving 25 people dead. After two months of fighting in Quoryole town, Lower Shabelle region, between the Jiiddu-Dir subclan and Garre-Rahanweyn subclan over unknown issues, the two clans stopped the clash at the end of April, which killed ten people overall.

On June 10, the Dir Clan and Marihan Clan fought over water and grazing land in Abudwaq and Herale town, Galmudug state, the clash resulted in 55 casualties and a further 155 injured people. Heavy weapons like anti-tank weapons were used by the 400 militants.

Later, on June 22, the Saad Clans and Leelakase Clans clashed in Galdodob town, Galmudug state, over an unknown cause, which resulted in ten deaths and 20 injuries, several civilians had to flee the area.

Fighting between the Gabawayn Subclan and Ma'allin Wayne Subclan, both Clans of the Rahanweyne Clan in the Luuq district, Gedo region, Jubaland state, killed four people and injured many others. In the fight, the market of Luuq was torched. As a result of the conflict, 42000 people left the area. The following day the combat killed two humanitarian workers. On August 15, Abdalla Carone Subclans and Mohamed Muse Subclans agreed on a peace agreement and stopped the fighting.

On September 6, Saleban Subclan (part of the Habar-Gidir-Clan) and the Wagar Dhac Subclan (part of the Marehan Clan) clashed in Adado, Galgaduud region, Galmudug state. The fight killed ten people. Six days later on September 12, two unidentified clans fought in Buq village, Mudug region, Galmudug state. During the clash, 15 people died with a further 20 injured. On October 14, a fight erupted over grazing land between the Adado Subclan and Galkayo Subclan in Do'oley area, Mudug Region, Galmudug state, which resulted in four deaths and eleven injured people overall. Two clashes took place on October 20 and 30, in Luuq, Gedo Region, Jubaland state, overall thirteen people died and multiple injured. The two clans were unidentified but are most likely Gabawayn Subclan and Ma'allin Wayne Subclan which clashed in the region for months. After a fight on November 30 between Hawadle and Abgaal Subclans in Middle Shabelle, Hirshabelle state, 6 people died. On December 3, both clans agreed on a ceasefire but fighting broke out again between the two clans on December 4, killing 20 people. Further 30 people


died during the clash of two clans in the respective area on December 6. jfg

SOMALIA, KENYA (AL-SHABAAB)

Intensity: **5** | Change: • | Start: **2006**

Conflict parties: al-Shabaab vs. Kenya vs. Somalia

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power



The war over national power and the orientation of the political system between the Islamist militant group al-Shabaab, and the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) continued. The FGS was supported by local security forces, the Kenya Defense Forces, the African Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) and the United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM). At least 593 people died throughout the year. Over the course of the year, al-Shabaab militants conducted several attacks on international military personnel and compounds in Somalia's capital city of Mogadishu. In two separate mortar attacks on the Aden Adde International Airport on January 11 and November 3, al-Shabaab killed three and injured one soldier from the UN and the ATMIS each. On February 11, a former al-Shabaab fighter, recruited by the Somali National Army (SNA), opened fire in the General Gordon military base during a training session with Bahraini and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) officers, killing three UAE officers, one Bahraini and one Somali officer and injuring 14. On March 23, al-Shabaab militants attacked the Busley military base near Mogadishu, Lower Shabelle region, breaching fortifications with suicide car bombs and engaging in heavy fighting with SNA, killing seven SNA soldiers and ten al-Shabaab militants. On March 15, al-Shabaab stormed and occupied the Syl Hotel in Mogadishu, engaging in heavy firefight with SNA troops. Al-Shabaab killed three SNA soldiers and injured 27 people. All five al-Shabaab insurgents were killed in the incident. On March 24, Somali security forces arrested 16 people affiliated to the Syl Hotel raid.

Throughout the year, al-Shabaab conducted road, car and suicide bombings in the Lower Shabelle region and especially Mogadishu. In ten separate bomb attacks, al-Shabaab killed 67 and injured at least 130 civilians and policemen. For instance, the single most fatal bombing occurred on August 2, when an al-Shabaab suicide bomber killed 32 and injured 63 in an attack on a restaurant on Lido Beach in Mogadishu.

Throughout the year, USAFRICOM and SNA conducted several airstrikes against al-Shabaab militants and strongholds on behalf of the FGS. The series began with an SNA airstrike on January 25, killing 25 al-Shabaab militants in the Galgaduud region. Between March 10 and July 15, USAFRICOM killed 26 militants and injured one in seven different strikes in Jubaland, South West and Galmudug states. The latest airstrike on December 24 in Quyan Burrow, Jubaland state, killed senior al-Shabaab leader Mohamed Mire, also known as Abu Abdurahman.

SNA's counterinsurgency against al-Shabaab had its pinnacle in March, conducting several military offensives. On March 18, SNA struck al-Shabaab with a preemptive airstrike and ground offensive, disrupting mobilization efforts of al-

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Shabaab in Baghdad village, Lower Shabelle region, killing at least 40 militants and injuring several others. Al-Shabaab claimed that the airstrike killed 18 civilians. On March 28, SNA conducted large offensives in the states of Galmudug, Hirshabelle and South West, as a reaction to al-Shabaab's attack on the Busley military base on March 23, killing 91 al-Shabaab fighters and injuring at least 100. On July 22, al-Shabaab militants attacked Bulo Haji, Harbole, and Mido villages, Gedo region, earlier seized by the SNA, leading to the most fatal event of the year, with at least 135 al-Shabaab militants and SNA soldiers being killed. SNA continued its offensive against al-Shabaab positions on October 19 and November 3 and 6 in Galmudug, Hirshabelle, and Jubaland states, killing 77 al-Shabaab fighters and eleven SNA soldiers and injuring at least 60.

During the first half of the year, al-Shabaab conducted several violent attacks on the Kenyan-Somali border. For instance, on March 24, al-Shabaab killed two Kenyan police reservists in Lamu County, Coast region in Kenya. On March 25, al-Shabaab killed four people with an explosion near a police station in Mandera village, North Eastern region of Kenya. Similarly, on April 29, al-Shabaab killed five civilians with an explosion in El-Wak village, North Eastern region. Al-Shabaab militants furthermore killed four Kenyan construction workers in Dabaab village, North Eastern region, near the Kenyan-Somali border on June 8, as they claimed the land on which the construction took place as their territory. On August 1, the AU Peace and Security Council endorsed a proposal to form the AU Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia, which would take over from ATMIS on 01/01/25. The AU argued that this change would strengthen the FGS in their fight against al-Shabaab. On December 27, the decision was approved by the UNSC. fzi

SOUTH AFRICA (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2015**

Conflict parties: civil rights groups, DA, EFF, IFP, MK vs. government

Conflict items: national power

The violent crisis over national power in South Africa between factions within the African National Congress (ANC), on the one hand, and political opposition parties such as the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) and Democratic Alliance (DA), uMkhonto weSizwe (MK), and civil rights groups, on the other, continued. Leading up to the May 29 general elections, protests and disputes increased between the ruling faction (ANC) and opposition political parties EFF, DA, and MK.

On January 29, the ANC suspended former president Jacob Zuma, after he formed and headed the MK political opposition party in December 2023. On February 29, a council meeting in Gauteng province escalated when ANC and EFF members started a fistfight and throwing papers and water bottles. On March 5, MK party representatives threatened mass violence, riots, and to prevent South Africans from voting in the elections if they were excluded from the election ballot. Political violence increased in the weeks leading up to the general elections. For example, on May 19, ANC and EFF members in Juju Valley, Seshego, Limpopo, opened fire and threw stones at each other when door-to-door campaigning turned violent. 25 people were wounded. Two were shot and dozens were wounded, in a firefight, although no deaths were reported. Following the general elections, the ANC rul-

ing party lost majority votes for the first time since the end of apartheid rule, leading to President Ramaphosa's creation of the Government of National Unity (GNU) coalition.

Political assassinations continued throughout the year. Between January and April 2024, ten South African politicians were killed as part of intra-party violence ahead of the general elections. On January 31, the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) interim secretary in the KwaZulu Natal province was killed in Escourt, KwaZulu Natal province. On February 7, an IFP councillor was shot and killed in Nongoma, KwaZulu Natal province, leading IFP officials to express concern over politically motivated assassinations. On August 3, the Gauteng EFF regional leader was shot and killed at a protest in Johannesburg, Gauteng province. Council meeting disruptions and violence continued through the end of the year. For example, on October 31, two DA councillors were forcibly removed from a meeting in Pretoria, Gauteng. zza

SOUTH AFRICA (SOCIOECONOMIC PROTESTS)

Intensity: **2** | Change: ↘ | Start: **2018**

Conflict parties: residents of informal settlements vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology

The violent crisis over the orientation of the political and economic system between residents of informal settlements and the government de-escalated to a non-violent crisis.

As in previous years, the conflict was marked by decentralised and spontaneous protests over the provision of basic public services, such as housing, electricity, water, sanitation, and infrastructure. Protests were held across most regions of the country.

Throughout the year, protesters blocked major roads to disrupt traffic and increase visibility of their demands. On January 10, workers of the eThekweni Municipality in Durban, KwaZulu-Natal province, went on a strike over unpaid wages and contract terminations. The police opened fire on the march and used rubber bullets. On February 28, members of the South African Municipal Workers Union went on a strike and destroyed valves on a number of reservoirs and sabotaged pipelines to disrupt services in Durban. Over 500 protesters dumped rubbish to block the access to city facilities and damaged the infrastructure through vandalism to express their frustration about unpaid wages. On August 22, municipal workers barricaded parts of the M1 and M2 in Johannesburg, Gauteng, with stones and tires because of the wage dispute. 10,000 workers participated.

From September on, protests over service delivery took place nationwide. On October 16, residents of Coronationville, Gauteng province, stopped the traffic by blocking roads with burning tires and rubbish because of the ongoing water outages. On November 11, the community action group WaterCan protested and demanded Joburg Water to guarantee water. On December 5, residents of Alexandra, Gauteng province, burned tires and barricaded roads to protest illegal electricity connections and illegal structures in the area. On December 18, residents from Elands Valley, Gauteng province, protested against water supply issues and the poor state of roads in the area. They burned tires and blocked the roads with rocks. ssw

SOUTH AFRICA (XENOPHOBES)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1994**

Conflict parties: immigrants vs. xenophobes
 Conflict items: system/ideology

The violent crisis over labour market shares, cultural hegemony, and access to the social security system between xenophobic South African nationals and groups of immigrants continued.

Throughout the year, xenophobes continued to accuse immigrants of taking jobs from locals and being involved in criminal activities.


In February, a series of shootings occurred in Ratanda township in Heidelberg, Gauteng. Four shop owners were shot dead and at least one individual was injured during these violent incidents. On March 3, a Bangladeshi couple was shot by a group of strangers in Johannesburg, Gauteng, while reaching the front of their residence. On March 10, a Bangladeshi immigrant was shot in front of his shop after a group of strangers attacked him in Durban, Gauteng. On March 13, a stranger shot a Zambian missionary in the head outside the Tzaneen Cathedral in Johannesburg. On April 16, a Zimbabwean immigrant was stabbed in the neck and died as a result of the attack in Diepsloot, Gauteng.

On August 6, riots broke out in Pretoria, Gauteng, leading to the deaths of five individuals. Shops were also extensively looted during the unrest. On September 8, a Bangladeshi shop owner was shot during a robbery in Cape Town, Western Cape. On October 16, a foreign national was shot and killed in Sharpeville, Gauteng, while another individual was injured in the incident. On November 8, a shop owner was shot outside his store in Bophelong Township, Gauteng while entering his parked vehicle. On November 23, two Zimbabwean men were killed by a mob in Laudium Pretoria Gauteng, who claimed they were part of gangs terrorizing the community. On December 2, a Somali shopkeeper was shot dead after assailants stormed his shop in Gugulethu, Western Cape, and looted cash and goods. On December 12, an armed gang shot two Somali citizens at work in Rustenburg, Western Cape. ssw

SOUTH SUDAN (INTER-COMMUNAL RIVALRY)

Intensity: **5** | Change: • | Start: **2011**

Conflict parties: Murle vs. Dinka vs. Nuer
 Conflict items: subnational predominance, resources



The war between various local communities over subnational predominance and resources, especially cattle and land, continued. Overall, violent confrontations between and within local communities such as the Dinka, Nuer, and Murle communities, as well as their various sections, increased in number. The Head of the UN Mission in the Republic of South

Sudan (UNMISS) urged authorities to address inter-communal conflicts and underlying grievances to build peace.

Cyclical violence related to cross-border cattle raiding persisted among the tri-state borders of Warrap, Unity, and Lakes States. Among these, Warrap had the highest casualty rate, with inter-communal clashes between the Thiik and Luanyjang communities leaving 144 people dead and more than 181 persons injured. As stated by the report of the UN Secretary-General, retaliatory attacks by the Thiik and Luanyjang communities in July, August, and October, left 114 people dead and 82 injured.

In Tonj East County, Warrap State, attacks and counterattacks among Dinka sub-groups continued, with cross-border tensions involving armed Nuer from Unity State and other communities from Lakes, Abyei, and Western Bahr el Ghazal. For instance, on March 15, Nuer youth from Unity's Mayom County raided cattle in Warrap's Gogrial East, leaving 17 dead and twelve injured. Between August and October, clashes between the Luachjang and Akook sections intensified in Tonj East. On August 9, Luachjang youth attacked Akook communities in Ngapagok Payam, prompting retaliation on August 10 and leaving six Luachjang members dead in Majak Amal Village. In total, 16 were killed and twelve injured. On September 28, a Pan Kuei member killed a Pan Arek member in revenge for a past murder, sparking a retaliatory attack on September 29 that left 20 dead and 37 injured. Violence within the Lou Ariik community of Alabek Payam on October 12 led to 20 deaths and 38 injured persons.

Communal clashes over land led to heavy fighting in the Lakes region. On January 31, cattle keepers from Luanyjang, Warrap and Pakam, Lakes clashed in Alor Payam in Rumbek North County, Lakes which left 38 dead and 34 injured.

In Jonglei State, attacks, incursions, and abductions, allegedly by the armed Murle elements of the Greater Pibor Administrative Area against the Nuer and Dinka communities in Greater Jonglei, remained a concern for local civilian communities. On March 19, 15 people were killed during an ambush by the youth from the Anyuak community in the Pibor area. Among the dead were Boma's deputy army commander, government officials, and the county commissioner's bodyguards. Moreover, Boma County has experienced periodic violence between the Murle and Anyuak communities, as well as with other ethnic groups from neighboring Jonglei State. On March 31, armed Murle youth attacked Ajwara Payam on the northern outskirts of Pochalla town, killing ten people and injuring another ten. Between June 5 and 19, several attacks were carried out again by armed Murle youth in different payams in Duc and Nyirol County, Jonglei. 18 people were killed and 14 others were wounded in these clashes.

In Eastern Equatoria State, cyclic retaliatory violence between communities and civil defense groups, such as the Toposa, Lango, and Lopit communities, persisted. On February 12, clashes erupted between the Toposa communities of Buno and Nyianginyang over ownership of the Lokisele Lopua water point in Kapoeta East County, a resource claimed by both groups. As a result, nine people were injured and 11,000 displaced. On April 26, armed Murle youth attacked eight cattle camps in the Kauto area, Kapoeta East County, Eastern Equatoria. 32 people were killed, 22 wounded, and 90 women and children abducted in this attack. The attacks also displaced approx. 6,500 people to mountain areas. Consequently, the UNMISS deployed additional peacekeepers and launched urgent patrols at the conflict hotspot in Kapoeta East County.

Border areas between Western Bahr el Ghazal and Warrap States have experienced recurring violence. Between Febru-

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ary 2 and February 3, inter-communal fighting between the Marial-Wau community of Jur River County and Apuk Giir Thiik of Gogrial East County, Warrap State, killed more than 20 people in Tharkueng, Jur River County, Western Bahr el Ghazal. Shops and houses were also burned down during the attack. Nearly the entire population of approx. 20,000 people was displaced to neighboring villages. In Upper Nile State, tensions remained high. On May 30, an outbreak of violence between the Shilluk and Dinka communities left at least eight persons dead and several injured. Nearly 600 people fled to the Malakal Protection of Civilians site. emr

SOUTH SUDAN (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2011**

Conflict parties: NAS, SPLM/A-IO-Kitwang vs. government, SPLM/A-IO-RM

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The violent crisis over national power and the orientation of the political system between the government of Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), led by President Salva Kiir, and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM/A-IO-RM), led by Vice President Riek Machar, on the one hand, and several opposition groups primarily associated with the splinter group Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition Kitwang (SPLM/A-IO Kitwang), on the other, continued.

With elections originally scheduled for 12/22/24, the year began with growing calls to extend the transitional government's mandate, citing insufficient time to organize credible elections. During a meeting with a UN envoy on January 11, Vice President Machar stated that his party SPLA-IO-RM would participate in the polls under the condition that key prerequisites, including census, a new constitution, and unification of forces, were in place. On February 27, in a virtual statement, the chairperson of the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission voiced concerns about the incomplete requirements stipulated in the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS), which are critical for ensuring free, fair, and credible elections.

On September 13, the government extended the R-ARCSS transitional period by two years and postponed the elections. The extended transitional period should allow for more time to implement key remaining protocols in the peace agreement.

On April 29, the UN Security Council renewed the UN Mission in South Sudan mandate for one year. On May 30, it extended sanctions on South Sudan for an additional year to curb the flow of weapons that could fuel conflict and contribute to further instability.

The year was also marked by high-level peace mediations. The government and a few opposition groups, such as the South Sudan United Front, the Real-Sudan People's Liberation Movement, and the South Sudan People's Movement/Army, which did not sign R-ARCSS, came together in the Kenyan capital of Nairobi on May 9 to discuss an end to the conflict. The absence of the National Salvation Front and the SPLM/A-IO-Kitwang cast doubt on the possibility of a comprehensive agreement. These Kenyan-led talks, known as the Tumann Initiative, reached no consensus, after SPLA-IO-RM withdrew in July. On October 28, President Kiir sent a delegation to


Nairobi to consult with Kenyan President William Ruto on ways to restart the stalled initiative. tzi

SUDAN (DARFUR)

Intensity: **5** | Change: • | Start: **2003**

Conflict parties: 'non-Arab' communities vs. RSF, 'Arab' militias

Conflict items: subnational predominance, re-sources



The war over national power and resources between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), Joint Force Darfur (JFD), and Sudanese Liberation Movement (SLM) on the one hand, and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on the other, continued within Darfur.

At the start of the year, the SAF retained control of only one of the five state capitals in Darfur, which was El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur. North Darfur experienced the most intense ground assaults, heavy bombings, and the highest levels of displacement across the region. Sporadic measures, primarily SAF air strikes, were also reported in South, Central, West, and East Darfur. Across Darfur, at least 1,104 people were killed, 1,561 injured, and 570,000 displaced.

In North Darfur, the SAF and its allies, most notably the JFD, regularly clashed with the RSF throughout the year. Highly violent measures were recorded from the onset of the year. For example, at least 13 people were killed in January, at least four and as many as 100 were killed in February, and at least 23 were killed in March. In April, RSF forces encircled El Fasher and besieged the city, with preliminary artillery bombardments and gunfights killing at least 69 civilians and as many as 1,500 people including combatants. Across May and June, a minimum of 232 people were killed, 641 injured, and approximately 300,000 displaced as the RSF repeatedly assaulted SAF positions.

In July, the RSF took part in artillery duels across El Fasher, killing at least 28, injuring 75, and displacing 33,000. Ground offensives continued in August, killing at least 70 people, injuring 130, and displacing 14,000. Fighting intensified in September, with the RSF conducting mass drone and mortar strikes, as well as large-scale ground assaults. For example, on September 2, the SAF conducted airstrikes on the cities of Mellit, North Darfur, killing at least ten civilians.

In October, intense ground fighting, artillery duels, and SAF airstrikes continued in El Fasher, with the SAF-aligned JFD becoming heavily engaged. In Malha, hundreds of combatants were killed in a battle between the Joint Force of Armed Struggles and RSF forces. Separately, the JFD captured the Bir Maza base on October 2, North Darfur, which borders Libya and Chad. In retaliation, between October 2 and 12, the RSF destroyed 17 ethnic-Zaghawa villages, killing at least 40 civilians, displacing 4,443 households, and detaining dozens in neighboring Kutum. The RSF was also defeated in two other battles by the SLM in Madu, and the JFD near El Fasher. The siege of El Fasher continued throughout November. On November 17, the RSF destroyed the villages of Amrai and Boya near Kutum and later intensified bombardments of IDP

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camps in El Fasher. The shelling continued for the following month, killing at least 58 civilians. Throughout December, SAF airstrikes continuously targeted sites across El Fasher and al-Kuma, North Darfur. In retaliation, the RSF attacked Zureiga villages, killing over 50 civilians and displacing over 6,000 families. SAF warplanes later supported the JFD's capture of al-Zurg, another key RSF base in the tri-area border. Violence in South Darfur was recorded in January, April, May, August, and from September to December, primarily in the form of SAF airstrikes targeting Nyala, capital of South Darfur. The bombings largely destroyed infrastructure and residential areas, such as severely damaging Nyala airport. While these strikes caused at least 31 deaths, South Darfur has continued to serve as a key destination for IDPs from wider Darfur.

Central Darfur experienced several low-level measures throughout the year. On April 30, Chadian forces raided a marketplace at RSF-held Um Dukun, alledged leaving three dead in the ensuing shootout. On August 31, SAF airstrikes targeted Zalingei, killing at least five and wounding three civilians.

West Darfur has also seen sporadic episodes of violence. In January, SAF airstrikes targeted El Geneina Airport, with no casualties reported. On July 9, 11 and 24, further SAF airstrikes hit RSF positions across the state. The West Darfur front further opened in September when the JFD repelled an RSF attack on Kablus, on September 30, leaving at least 20 dead. Fighting intensified again on October 17, when RSF troops attacked a JFD outpost at Jebel Oum, with dozens of deaths reported.


In East Darfur, SAF airstrikes on Ed Daein were reported on February 20, with warplanes hitting five civilian targets and killing at least ten civilians. On August 20, SAF airstrikes hit Al Daein Hospital, killing more than 15, necessitating the evacuation of 650 patients, and forcing the facility to close. dbu

SUDAN (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **5** | Change: • | Start: **2011**

Conflict parties: RSF vs. SAF

Conflict items: national power



The war over national power between the de-facto military government of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary group Rapid Support Forces (RSF) continued. The conflict escalated to a war on 4/15/2023, when the RSF launched an attack on SAF positions in the capital city of Khartoum, triggering nationwide confrontations.

The first months of the year saw fighting in urban and rural areas, leading to significant fatalities and widespread displacement. In January, fighting concentrated in Khartoum and southwestern states, including Central and North Darfur [→ Sudan (Darfur)]. On January 7, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) al-Hilu seized control of Dilling, South Kordofan, amid claims of an agreement with the SAF. In February and March, clashes, drone attacks, and airstrikes between SAF and RSF escalated in Khartoum, Gezira, North

Darfur, West Kordofan, and South Kordofan. On February 24, the RSF attacked the city of Habila, Central Sudan, displacing over 40,000 people. On March 26, SAF forces killed over 30 RSF fighters while recapturing most of old Omdurman, Khartoum, after two months of combat.

In the second quarter of the year, the conflict spread to further regions, resulting in significant military confrontations and civilian deaths. International organizations increasingly called for peace negotiations. Clashes erupted in Central Darfur, Al Qadarif, North Kordofan and River Nile in April. From April 5 to 6, armed groups supporting the RSF attacked villages controlled by SPLM-N (al-Hilu) in Qurdud Nyama, South Kordofan, killing at least 100 people. On June 5, the RSF attacked the village of Wad Al-Noora in Gezira, killing at least 100 civilians.

In the third quarter of the year, fighting persisted as the humanitarian situation worsened, with famine in South Kordofan and Blue Nile exacerbating the crisis. In July, RSF and SAF confrontations continued, with clashes concentrated in urban areas and changes in control of territories within Sennar and North Darfur [→ Sudan (Darfur)]. For instance, the RSF captured Dinder, Sennar, on July 2. Over 100,000 fled from Al Dinder and Singa, Sennar, to Gedarif, Al Qadarif, after RSF's takeover. In August, violence spread nationwide, at its greatest intensity in Gezira, Khartoum, and Sennar. Famine affected millions in South Kordofan, Blue Nile, and North Darfur, with SPLM-N reporting 109 famine-related deaths. Neither the SAF nor the RSF attended US-led peace talks on August 14. Throughout September, combat continued in Gezira, Khartoum, North Darfur and Sennar. For instance, on September 2, the SAF repelled an attack by the RSF on a strategic base in Khartoum, killing dozens of soldiers and civilians.

The last quarter of the year saw particularly intense clashes in Gezira, Khartoum, and North Darfur, with clashes in most states across Sudan. An RSF attack on October 25 on Al-Sreiha, Gezira, resulted in 141 deaths, including reports of over 50 executions. The RSF continued its attacks in North Darfur on November 2, burning villages and attacking the Zaghawa ethnic group [→ Sudan (Darfur)]. On November 6, the RSF encamped in the town of Al-Hilaliya, Gezira and killed 67 people, 54 presumably by poisoning. By November 12, the two-week death toll in Al-Hilaliya had risen to 382. In December, clashes erupted in the Northern state, North Kordofan, River Nile, and South Darfur. For example, on December 10, 65 civilians were killed in RSF shelling in Khartoum. Famine declarations extended to North Darfur and the Nuba Mountains by the end of the year. vko

SUDAN, SOUTH SUDAN (INTER-COMMUNAL RIVALRY / ABYEI)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2011**

Conflict parties: Balanda vs. Murle vs. Dinka vs. Nuer vs. Azande

Conflict items: subnational predominance, resources

The violent crisis over subnational predominance and resources in the disputed Abyei border region between the Ngok Dinka community and the Misseriya community, as well as between the Ngok Dinka and Twic Dinka community, continued. Due to its substantial oil reserves, the region is also

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of strategic interest to the governments of Sudan and South Sudan, both of whom claim Abyei as an integral part of their own territory.

Inter-communal clashes in the Abyei region remained tense. A decision on the final status of the disputed border region was stalled by the ongoing conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces that escalated to a war on 4/15/23 [→ Sudan (opposition)]. Inter-communal clashes between the Twic Dinka and Ngok Dinka resulted in 52 civilian deaths, including two UN peacekeepers, and left 64 injured in late January and early February. The fighting also led to the displacement of more than 2,200 people, most of them women and children seeking refuge in a UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) camp in Rumajak, approx. seven kilometres north of Abyei town. The second half of the year saw no direct confrontations between the Ngok and Twic Dinka communities since the deployment of UNISFA.

Furthermore, the presence of South Sudanese security forces in Abyei contributed to the tensions. An estimated 1,400 members of the South Sudan People's Defence Forces and 300 members of the South Sudan National Police Service were stationed in Agok and Aneet in southern Abyei. These deployments, which occurred in late March and early April, violated the 2011 Darfur Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement regarding temporary administrative and security arrangements for Abyei, as well as the region's demilitarized and weapons-free status.

Efforts to foster peaceful coexistence between the Misseriya and Ngok Dinka communities were made when, on May 17, both parties signed a peace agreement at the end of the Post-Migration Conference held in Noong. The conference, facilitated by UNISFA, promoted peaceful farming and grazing, as well as improved inter-communal relations. However, on October 11, a medical doctor was killed and two women went missing following an attack in Rumamer County by armed criminals from the Twic Dinka community. tzi

TANZANIA (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↑** | Start: **1993**

Conflict parties: ACT-Wazalendo, CHADEMA, CUF vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The dispute over political freedom, democracy, state power, and ideology between opposition party CHADEMA (Party for Democracy and Progress: Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo), on the one hand, and governing body CCM (Party of the Revolution: Chama cha Mapinduzi) on the other, escalated to a violent crisis.

Following the death of former president Magufuli in 2021 during the coronavirus pandemic, the political opposition conflict was resolved in 2022. This is thanks to more open communication and the unbanning of political opposition parties by new President Samia Suhulu Hassan. In 2024 however the violent crisis reopened. Severe repression and violence against political opposition increased as is an election year.

On August 11, the Tanzanian police arrested over 500 CHADEMA youth members on their way to a banned protest for the creation of a new constitution in Mbeya Region. On September 6, a senior member of CHADEMA was kidnapped, beaten, doused in acid, and killed in Dar es Salaam. The arrests

of many senior CHADEMA members and leaders continued throughout the year in the lead up to the November elections. For example, on September 23, police arrested eight of CHADEMA's leaders in Dar es Salaam, along with dozens of members, ahead of a rally in Dar es Salaam. On October 20, a senior CHADEMA official was abducted and beaten in Kibiti, Pwani Region. She was questioned on the planning behind a protest earlier in the year that involved burning clothing given to Chadema by President Hassan, citing political motivation for as grounds for the violence. On November 22, the police arrested CHADEMA's opposition leader, Mbowe, at a roadblock in Mbeya Region. Police used tear gas to disperse the crowd of protestors from the scene. On the eve of local elections on November 23, two CHADEMA members were killed. One was killed by gunfire from the prison police during an escalation of CCM vs. CHADEMA opposition supporters in Mkese, Kagera. Another CHADEMA supporter was killed by machete by a group of CCM supporters in Tunduma, Mbeya. CHADEMA officials expressed concern when pre-filled ballots voting for ruling faction CCM were discovered in multiple constituencies ahead of the local elections, with opposition supporters being arrested when this was further investigated. zza

TOGO (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↗** | Start: **1963**

Conflict parties: opposition groups vs. government

Conflict items: national power

This conflict text will be made available within April 2026. For an earlier access, please contact us. pad

UGANDA (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **2** | Change: **•** | Start: **2001**

Conflict parties: DP, FDC, Jeema, NEED, NUP, PFT, UPC vs. government

Conflict items: national power

The non-violent crisis over national power between various opposition parties and the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) party continued.

Different opposition parties, such as the National Unity Platform (NUP), the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC), the Democratic Party (DP), the Uganda People's Congress (UPC), the People's Front for Transition (PFT), the National Economic Empowerment Dialogue (NEED), and the Justice Forum Party (Jeema) collaborated to disempower the NRM government and President Yoweri Museveni.

Throughout the year, security forces continued to target opposition parties. For instance, on January 18, security forces surrounded the residences of NUP leader Robert Kyagulanyi "Bobi Wine", in Magere, Central Region, and FDC leader Kizza Besigye, ahead of a protest. On July 22, security forces surrounded the NUP headquarters in the capital of Kampala, Central region, ahead of a planned anti-government protest. On September 3, Wine was injured in the leg as he was allegedly hit by a policeman with a tear gas canister in Bulindo, Central Region. On October 21, a military tribunal convicted 16 NUP members of "illegal possession of explosive devices

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and treachery” between November 2020 and May 2021. Security forces also targeted members of the opposition along the borders with Kenya. On July 23, Kenyan authorities detained and deported 36 FDC members who claimed they planned to take part in a leadership and governance training course in Kisumu, eponymous county, Kenya. On July 29, the detainees were charged with terrorism-related offenses. They denied the charges. On August 5, security forces arrested 14 FDC members who protested in Kampala against the deportation of their colleagues. On November 16, Besigye was abducted by security forces in the Kenyan capital Nairobi, and brought to Uganda without extradition process. On November 20, he appeared before a Court Martial in Kampala, facing charges of illegal possession of firearms and negotiating to buy arms abroad. Besigye denied all charges and questioned the military court’s jurisdiction to try him. Human rights groups, including Amnesty International and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, expressed their concerns. Besigye remained in custody as of December 31. The government also faced opposition from the country’s youth. For instance, on July 23, security forces detained and charged at least 42 young people for protesting against official corruption and alleged human rights abuses by the government in Kampala. The president further consolidated power amongst the country’s institutions. For instance, on March 22, Museveni promoted his son, General Muhoozi Kainerugaba, to head the military. On September 21, Kainerugaba stated he had abandoned plans to run for presidency at the next election in 2026, urging his supporters to endorse his father instead. sag

ZIMBABWE (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2000**

Conflict parties: CCC vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The violent crisis over the orientation of the political system and national power between the main opposition party Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC) and the ruling party


Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) continued. In numerous instances, the police arrested CCC members, supporters, and other activists.

On June 27, President Emmerson Mnangagwa warned against protest activity during the run-up to the 44th Southern African Development Community (SADC) summit, which took place in the capital Harare, eponymous province, Zimbabwe, on August 17. Violence was restricted to the months leading up to the summit. The rest of the year was marked by political dispute between the conflict parties, for example due to the planned introduction of a ZANU-PF ideology training, first mentioned in mid-August. The year also witnessed party-political upheaval, given Nelson Chamisa’s resignation as leader of CCC on January 25, and the party subsequently splitting into two camps.

On June 16, in Harare, the police stormed the home of the new interim CCC leader Jameson Timba and arrested him and nearly 80 young CCC members for holding an unauthorized meeting. Several were injured. Appearing in court two days later on June 18, they claimed assaults and abuse during their arrest. On June 27, as CCC supporters protested against the denied bail of the group around Timba, the police beat dozens of the protesters and arrested some. During a demonstration in Kariba, Mashonaland West province, on July 31, participants demanded the release of Timba and the other CCC members. The police detained 13 people. For participating in said demonstration, state agents forcibly removed four activists including CCC politicians from a flight at Harare airport on the same day, July 31, whereupon at least one of them was tortured in police custody.


Further arrests took place over the course of the year. For example on June 30, the police hindered access to a memorial service for CCC activist Mboneni Ncube, who was stabbed to death in 2022, in Gweru, Midlands province. Hundreds of its attendees were arrested, according to a spokesperson of the Chamisa-backed CCC faction. Moreover, two former CCC MPs were arrested in separate incidents. For example, on August 15, an armed force raided the Harare home of Costa Machingautu in Harare. On August 17, the police arrested Prince Dubeko Sibanda at Beitbridge Border Post, Matabeleland South province. Both faced accusations of violent intentions and disorderly conduct against Zanu-PF. anh

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





CONFLICT INTENSITIES IN THE AMERICAS IN 2024 COMPARED TO 2023



CONFLICT INTENSITIES BY CONFLICT ITEM IN THE AMERICAS IN 2024



CONFLICT INTENSITIES BY CONFLICT TYPE IN THE AMERICAS IN 2024



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Overview: Conflicts in the Americas in 2024

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
Argentina – United Kingdom (Falkland Islands / Islas Malvinas)*	Argentina vs. United Kingdom	territory, resources	1833	•	1
Belize – Guatemala*	Belize vs. Guatemala	territory	1981	•	1
Bolivia (opposition)*	opposition groups and parties vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2017	•	3
Bolivia (socioeconomic protests)*	various social groups vs. government	system/ideology, resources	1983	↓	1
Bolivia – Chile (access to sea)*	Bolivia vs. Chile	territory	1883	•	1
Brazil (drug trafficking organizations)*	drug trafficking organizations, militias vs. government	subnational predominance	2008	•	3
Brazil (indigenous groups)*	indigenous groups vs. agribusiness, government, landowners, loggers, miners, Zero Invasión	autonomy, resources	1985	•	3
Brazil (MST, MTST)*	indigenous groups vs. agribusiness, government, landowners, Zero Invasión	resources	1996	•	3
Brazil (social protests)*	Bolsonaro supporters vs. Lula supporters	system/ideology	2014	•	3
Chile (anarchist groups)*	anarchist groups vs. government	system/ideology	2014	•	3
Chile (Mapuche / Araucanía)*	CAM, Mapuche, RML, WAM vs. government	autonomy, resources	2008	•	3
Chile (social protests)*	ACES, CONES, CONFECU, CUT vs. government	system/ideology	2006	•	3
Chile – United Kingdom (Antarctica)*	Chile vs. United Kingdom	territory	2007	•	1
Colombia (artisanal miners / Antioquia)*	artisanal miners vs. AGC vs. government	resources	2017	•	3
Colombia (ASCAMCAT / Catatumbo)*	ASCAMCAT vs. government	autonomy, system/ideology, resources	2013	•	1
Colombia (ELN)*	ELN vs. government	system/ideology, subnational predominance, resources	1964	•	3
Colombia (FARC dissidents)*	FARC dissidents vs. government	system/ideology, subnational predominance, resources	2017	↗	4
Colombia (indigenous groups)*	indigenous groups vs. government	resources	2005	•	3
Colombia (inter-cartel rivalry, neo-paramilitary groups, left-wing militants)*	AGC vs. CDF vs. Los Caparros vs. ELN vs. FARC dissidents vs. EPL vs. Los Rastrojos vs. ASCM	subnational predominance, resources	2013	•	4
Colombia (neo-paramilitary groups, drug cartels)*	drug cartels, neo-paramilitary groups vs. government	subnational predominance, resources	1983	•	3
Colombia (social protests)*	Comité Nacional de Paro, Primera Línea vs. right-wing opposition vs. government	system/ideology	2019	↘	2
Colombia – Nicaragua (sea border)*	Colombia vs. Nicaragua	territory, resources	1825	•	1
Colombia – Venezuela (border security)*	Colombia vs. Venezuela	other	2015	•	1
Cuba (social protests)*	civil society groups, pro-democracy groups, social protesters vs. government	system/ideology	2021	•	2
Cuba – USA (Guantanamo)*	Cuba vs. USA	territory	1959	•	1
Cuba – USA (system)*	Cuba vs. USA	system/ideology, international power	1960	•	2
Dominican Republic – Haiti*	Dominican Republic vs. Haiti	resources, other	2009	•	2
Ecuador (inter-gang rivalry)*	Choneros et al. vs. Lobos et al. vs. R7	subnational predominance, resources	2021	•	3
Ecuador (opposition)*	opposition groups vs. government	system/ideology, resources	1980	↘	2
El Salvador (drug trafficking organizations)*	Barrio 18, MS-13 vs. government	subnational predominance	2003	•	3
El Salvador (inter-gang rivalry)*	Barrio 18 vs. MS-13	subnational predominance	2003	•	2
El Salvador (opposition)*	civil society groups, opposition parties vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2020	•	2
Guatemala (drug cartels)*	drug cartels vs. government	subnational predominance, resources	2009	•	3
Guatemala (opposition)*	opposition groups vs. government	system/ideology	1985	↘	2
Guyana – Venezuela*	Guyana vs. Venezuela	territory, resources	2015	•	2

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Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
Haiti (inter-gang rivalry)*	Viv Ansanm vs. Haitian police, MSS, TPC vs. vigilante groups	subnational predominance, resources	2020	•	5
Haiti (opposition)*	Inite / Montana Accord vs. Fanmi Lavalas vs. Struggling People's Organization vs. EDE / RED-Historic Compromise vs. 21 December Agreement vs. Platfòm Pitit Desalin vs. civil society representatives vs. FREN vs. anti-government protesters	system/ideology, national power	1986	↗	3
Honduras (Bajo Aguán)*	peasants, peasants unions vs. government, land-owning companies	resources	2009	•	3
Honduras (drug trafficking organizations, organized crime)*	criminal organizations, drug trafficking organizations vs. government	subnational predominance, resources	2012	•	3
Honduras (opposition)*	opposition government vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2009	↘	2
Honduras – El Salvador (Isla Conejo)*	Honduras vs. El Salvador	territory	2013	•	1
Jamaica (drug gangs)*	drug gangs vs. government	subnational predominance	2010	•	3
Mexico (CNTE)*	CNTE vs. government	system/ideology	2006	•	2
Mexico (drug cartels)*	drug cartels vs. vigilante groups vs. government	subnational predominance, resources	2006	↘	3
Mexico (EZLN / Chiapas)*	EZLN vs. government vs. ORCAO	autonomy, system/ideology, resources, other	1994	↘	2
Mexico (inter-cartel rivalry, paramilitary groups)*	CJNG et al. vs. CU et al. vs. CSRL et al. vs. CDS et al. vs. CDN et al. vs. CDG et al.	subnational predominance, resources	2005	•	4
Mexico (opposition)*	opposition groups vs. government	system/ideology	2006	↗	3
Mexico (public security)*	normalistas, social movements vs. government	system/ideology	2014	•	3
Mexico (women's protests)*	feminist groups, human rights activists, women's rights groups vs. government	system/ideology	2020	↘	2
Mexico, USA (border security)*	Mexico, USA vs. illegal immigrants, refugees, smugglers	other	2005	•	3
Nicaragua (indigenous groups)*	Mayangna, Miskito groups, Rama, YATAMA vs. government, non-indigenous settlers	autonomy, resources	2015	•	3
Nicaragua (opposition)*	anti-government protesters, opposition groups vs. government, paramilitary groups	system/ideology, national power	2008	•	2
Paraguay (EPP, agrarian movements)*	agrarian movements, EPP vs. government	system/ideology, resources	1989	↑	3
Peru (opposition)*	opposition movements vs. government	system/ideology, resources	2008	↘	2
Peru (Shining Path)*	SL vs. government	system/ideology, subnational predominance, resources	1980	•	3
USA (racial tensions)*	anti-discrimination protesters vs. right-wing extremist groups vs. government	system/ideology	2014	•	3
USA (right-wing extremists)*	right wing extremist groups vs. government	system/ideology	1990	•	3
USA – Venezuela*	USA vs. Venezuela	system/ideology, international power	2001	•	2
Venezuela (FARC dissidents)*	FARC EMC vs. ELN, FARC Segunda Marquetalia, government	subnational predominance, resources	2020	•	2
Venezuela (indigenous groups)*	indigenous groups vs. government, miners	subnational predominance, resources	1988	↘	2
Venezuela (mega-gangs)*	Carlos Capa vs. Tren de Aragua vs. El Wilexis vs. Yeico Masacre vs. various gangs vs. government	subnational predominance, resources	2014	•	3
Venezuela (mining)*	El Perú vs. 3R vs. Tren de Guyana vs. El Talao vs. Sindicato de Barrancas vs. ELN, FARC dissidents, government, Juancho / Las Claritas Syndicate, various gangs	subnational predominance, resources	2006	•	3
Venezuela (opposition)*	opposition parties vs. government, pro-government militias	system/ideology, national power	1992	↗	3

¹ Conflicts marked with * are without description

² Mentioned are only those conflict parties relevant for the period under review

³ Change in intensity compared to the previous year: ↑ or ↗ escalation by one or more than one level of intensity; ↓ or ↘ deescalation by one or more than one level of intensity; • no change

⁴ Levels of intensity: 5 = war; 4 = limited war; 3 = violent crisis; 2 = non-violent crisis; 1 = dispute

⁵ HIIK considers statehood to be non-contested if the state is an official UN members state.

Disputed statehood is marked with a * if a territory is recognized by at least one other official UN member state ("limited recognition")

THE AMERICAS

REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT

This text will be made available within April 2026.

BOLIVIA (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2017**

Conflict parties: opposition groups and parties vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The violent crisis over the orientation of the political system and national power between various opposition parties and groups, on the one hand, and the government of President Luis Arce, on the other, continued.

On January 15, protests were held in the capital Sucre by supporters of former president and Movement for Socialism (MAS) party leader Evo Morales, in light of the pending reelection of judges that had resigned from the Plurinational Constitutional Tribunal (TCP). Protesters trying to reach the TCP building used sticks and stones, while police used tear gas. At least one person was injured. Moreover, on January 22, Morales supporters set up roadblocks in La Paz, Oruro, and Potosí regions. Protesters used dynamite, burning objects, and stones, leaving two dead and over 100 people injured, and damaging infrastructure.

On March 30 in Yapaquí city, Santa Cruz region, Morales publicly announced his candidacy for the 2025 presidential elections, followed by warnings by his supporters should he be disallowed.

On June 26, a failed coup d'état took place in La Paz city, eponymous region, led by former General of the Army José Zúñiga and the former commanders of armed forces, demanding the release of alleged MAS political prisoners. Massive counter protests broke out, leaving at least 14 persons injured. By June 28, the government had arrested at least 17 accused co-organizers of the coup.

On September 16, opposition groups blocked several main roads into La Paz city, criticizing both MAS wings for economic issues. From September 17 to 23, Morales supporters organized a so-called "March for the Salvation of Bolivia" against various economic policies, the cabinet, and the recognition of last year's MAS general assembly. Protesters reportedly used artisanal firearms, leaving at least 26 injured.

On October 3, the public prosecution accused Morales of having sexual relations with and having a child with a minor while in office in 2016. Morales refuted the allegations. He and his supporters pointed out that the government was deliberately using these accusations to prevent his political comeback. From October 14 to November 7, supporters of Morales organized roadblocks in Cochabamba, Santa Cruz, and Oruro regions in response to his possible arrest. They further stated in December that they would continue to block any attempts to arrest him, and that he would not appear in court hearings.

On October 27, unknown gunmen chased and shot at Morales' car in Cochabamba region, leaving one person dead and two injured. Morales claimed this to be an attempted assassination targeting him, whilst the Arce government described it as an attempted murder of a police officer, leading to an investigation against Morales. Consequently, on the same day, Morales supporters blocked Chimoré airport, Cochabamba region. jas

BOLIVIA (SOCIOECONOMIC PROTESTS)

Intensity: **1** | Change: ↓ | Start: **1983**

Conflict parties: various social groups vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, resources

The violent crisis over the orientation of the socio-economic system and resources between various social groups and the government, de-escalated to a dispute.

On March 6, several demonstrations nationwide took place calling for educational reform, retirement regulations, and healthcare system improvements. Health workers, represented by the Public Health Medical Branches Union and the National Health Council, organized strikes and peaceful demonstrations calling for the repeal of a law mandating the retirement age of 65 and better working conditions. On April 3, The Confederation of Urban Education Workers of Bolivia demanded more funding and resources to address shortages and opposed forced retirement.

From May 20 to 24, trade unions, transport workers, and citizens organized blockades and protests across the country that lasted until November. Protesters disrupted supply chains and demanded stable fuel supplies and government action against inflation. laf

BRAZIL (DRUG TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2008**

Conflict parties: drug trafficking organizations, militias vs. government

Conflict items: subnational predominance

The violent crisis over subnational predominance between the main drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) – Comando Vermelho (CV), Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC), Família do Norte (FDN) – and various militias on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued.

In the first months of 2024, the military police carried out two major operations in the state of São Paulo, namely Operation Summer and Operation Shield. Operation Summer began on 12/15/2023 and ended on April 1 in the Baixada Santista metropolitan region. During this period, clashes between the police and drug trafficking organizations left 56 people dead. On January 26, the killing of a police officer prompted the launch of Operation Shield, as a second phase of operations that had already faced criticism in 2023 for possible human rights violations. The killings of two further police officers on February 2 and 7 led to an intensified military response, resulting in further clashes between police units and DTOs. On February 27, security forces killed nine people and injured six during raids in areas controlled by the CV in the state of Rio de Janeiro. This operation focused on communities in the city's northern districts, including Cidade de Deus, and the Alemão and Penha favela complexes. On March 22 and 29, confrontations with the police left three dead, among them one teenager, in Amapá state.

The Ministry of Human Rights and Citizenship expressed the federal government's concern over reports received by the National Human Rights Ombudsman's Office on February 10. These reports indicated the occurrence of serious human rights violations during the so-called "Operation Shield" in

Baixada Santista, on the coast of São Paulo State. On March 3, these allegations, along with those regarding Operation Summer, were published by the São Paulo State Police Ombudsman's Office in a "Monitoring Report on Human Rights Violations in Baixada Santista During the Second Phase of Operation Shield", in collaboration with civil society organizations, human rights movements, and ombudsman offices. On December 6, the Brazilian Forum on Public Security claimed that 130 of 772 municipalities in the northern and northeastern parts of Brazil are dominated by the CV. According to the organization, violence by organized crime in the Brazilian Amazon has increased by 46 percent [→ Brazil (indigenous groups)]. sw

BRAZIL (INDIGENOUS GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1985**

Conflict parties: indigenous groups vs. agribusiness, government, landowners, loggers, miners, Zero Invasion

Conflict items: autonomy, resources

The violent crisis over the demarcation of indigenous territories, autonomy, and resources between various indigenous groups, on the one hand, and the government, as well as miners, loggers, and agribusiness, on the other, continued. Several indigenous communities urged the government to delimitate indigenous lands, to ensure their rights, and to stop illegal mining, logging, and farming. The most prominent groups were the Guarani-Kaiowá, Guajajara, Pataxó, Yanomami, Avá-Guarani, Tembé, Xokleng, and Kaingang. Throughout the year, there were several protests across the country against a discriminatory land-property verification law, which would restrict the land rights of indigenous peoples. The core of the law, the so-called "time marker thesis," stated that indigenous peoples could only claim land they had physically occupied since the enactment of the Constitution in October 1988. Although the Supreme Court declared the thesis unconstitutional on 09/21/2024, a congressional committee was established to discuss the issue under a new bill.

The discussion surrounding the law and the demarcation of indigenous lands intensified land conflicts. In July, in the states of Paraná and Mato Grosso do Sul, indigenous people began to retake their lands. This led to various raids by farmers and military police in the regions. For example, on August 28, farmers assaulted and injured six Avá-Guarani indigenous people in the Tekoha Guasu Guavirá indigenous Territory in Paraná state, where they had retaken land.

In Mato Grosso do Sul state, indigenous people also faced attacks. On August 3, farmers in pick-up trucks fired live and rubber ammunition at Guarani-Kaiowá indigenous people in the retaken areas of Douradina municipality. Ten people were injured. In Antônio João municipality, attacks began on August 12, when indigenous people reclaimed the Barra farm, which lies within the boundaries of the Nhanderu Marangatu indigenous land. The Military Police, who were protecting the farm, clashed with them, shooting and wounding three people. Six days later, the Military Police shot a young Guarani-Kaiowá indigenous man in the head, killing him. On September 23, another Guarani-Kaiowá adolescent was found dead on the side of the road leading to the Nhanderu Marangatu indigenous land in Antônio João.

On January 21, a group of farmers and merchants who were

members of Zero Invasion attacked a group of Pataxó Hã Hã Hãe indigenes who had taken over sacred ground the day before, in Potiragua, Bahia state. They shot and killed a traditional leader and injured at least three others. Zero Invasion is a right-wing legal organization of farmers opposed to land reform [→ Brazil (MST, MTST)]. Created in 2023, the group claims to have the support of authorities, especially the Military Police, while being accused by indigenous groups of acting as a private militia. mvo

BRAZIL (MST, MTST)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1996**

Conflict parties: indigenous groups vs. agribusiness, government, landowners, Zero Invasion

Conflict items: resources

The violent crisis over land and housing, involving leftist organizations such as the Landless Workers' Movement (MST) and the Homeless Workers' Movement (MTST), on the one hand, and the Zero Invasion group and the government under President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, on the other, continued.

In April, social mobilizations peaked nationwide as part of the National Day of Struggle in Defence of Agrarian Reform, also known as the Red April Campaign. For instance, on April 15, civil and military police — alongside the Battalion of Special Police Operations, BOPE — arrested five MST leaders in Goiás federal state after a land occupation attempt. In São Paulo, the Municipal Guard shot rubber bullets and tear gas at approximately 200 families that had occupied a farm. In Rio de Janeiro, police used drones and signal jammers to disperse around 300 families. In response, Zero Invasion launched the Yellow April campaign to counter any potential MST land invasions. Zero Invasion is a right-wing legal organization of farmers opposed to land reform. Created in 2023, the group claims to have the support of authorities, especially the Military Police, while being accused by indigenous groups of acting as a private militia [→ Brazil (indigenous groups)]. Alleged individuals linked to right-wing groups attacked MST members several times throughout the year. On April 17, Zero Invasion besieged Coqueirinho Farm in Espírito Santo federal state. They threw two IEDs at the camp in which 200 landless families settled. On September 30, a gunman killed an MST-leader in the rural area of Gameleiras municipality, Minas Gerais. MST claimed that local farmers, intent on disputing the possession of MST-occupied lands, hired the shooter to attack the running candidate for the local council. On July 30, tensions heightened at the Saleté Moreno Camp when law enforcement arrested three MST activists and injured one of them. On October 9, without prior warning, the police evicted around 530 MST families from their homes in Santa Maria da Boa Vista municipality, Pernambuco state. On October 10, MST denounced an alleged attempt to burn down the Egídio Brunetto Settlement, Lagoinha municipality, Sao Paulo state, in which two houses, approx. 128 hectares and certain areas of protected natural areas were affected. On October 11, MST denounced a raid against an independent but associated collective at the Terra Prometida Rural Association Farm in Pará state. Police killed at least two people, injured several, and arrested four others on behalf of an alleged raid to address criminal activities, including theft, illegal logging, and weapon possession. MST denied this version of events, claiming that only hunting shotguns were confiscated. fho

BRAZIL (SOCIAL PROTESTS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2014**

Conflict parties: Bolsonaro supporters vs. Lula supporters

Conflict items: system/ideology

The violent crisis over the orientation of the political system between supporters of former president Jair Messias Bolsonaro and those of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva continued. The Brazilian government acted as an intervener. Throughout the year, violence against members and followers of Lula’s political party, the Workers’ Party (PT), continued. On September 17, assailants opened fire on supporters of a PT mayoral candidate in the Tabapuá neighborhood, Caucaia municipality, Ceará state, as they finished placing campaign flags, targeting their vehicle.

On September 19, Federal Police arrested five individuals who allegedly plotted to assassinate Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva before his inauguration. Furthermore, threats against PT candidates continued. For example, on October 24, newspapers reported a federal investigation of a threat to kill a candidate running for the office of Natal municipality’s city hall, Rio Grande de Norte state. Later in the month, a counsellor from Fortaleza, Ceará state, recorded himself physically abusing a pig while threatening the re-elected PT mayor.

On November 13, a former far-right candidate for the city council of Rio do Sul, Santa Catalina state, killed himself with explosives near the Supreme Court building in Brasília, Federal District. Authorities defused a further six IEDs. According to the police, the attacker intended to kill the judge investigating the attempted coup by Bolsonarista followers on 01/08/23. On November 17, a Bolsonaro supporter physically injured a Lula supporter at a gas station in Jaciara municipality, Mato Grosso state.

On November 21, the National Supreme Court indicted Jair Bolsonaro and 36 other people for an alleged attempted coup d’état in 2022. On December 14, former Defense Minister and Bolsonaro’s ex-chief of staff was arrested in Rio de Janeiro for allegedly interfering in the investigation of a planned military coup. Investigators claimed his involvement in the plot, citing that he hosted a meeting to plan the assassination of President Lula and the Vice President-elect. Prosecution also asserted that he funded the operation and had attempted to obstruct the inquiry. fho

CHILE (MAPUCHE / ARAUCANIA)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2008**

Conflict parties: CAM, Mapuche, RML, WAM vs. government

Conflict items: autonomy, resources

The violent crisis over autonomy and resources of the Araucanía region between the Mapuche indigenous people, mainly represented by the organizations Weichan Auka Mapu (WAM), Resistencia Mapuche Lavkenche (RML) and the Coordinadora Arauco-Malleco (CAM), on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued.

Throughout the year, the Mapuche engaged in land reclamation efforts targeting forestry companies, while denouncing

systemic historical injustices and social inequalities. For instance, on January 5, armed individuals intimidated forestry workers in Nueva Imperial, Cautín Province. On January 16, protests during Pope Francis’s visit to Concepción, Biobío region, led to the arrests of 30 protesters. On March 18, eviction proceedings commenced against the Coronado Inalef community’s land occupation in Temuco, Araucanía Region. There were several significant developments to the crisis in April and May. On April 22, for example, CAM leader Héctor Llaitul was convicted on multiple charges under Chile’s Law of State Security, with a potential sentence of up to 25 years. On April 28, three police officers were killed in an ambush in the Biobío Region (P-72 highway), prompting the government to declare a national mourning period. On May 29, the Resistencia Kunko Williche claimed responsibility for an arson attack in Río Negro, Los Lagos Region, which destroyed forestry equipment and infrastructure following the intimidation of workers.

On June 26, Mapuche activist Facundo Jones Huala began a hunger strike. By July 31, his health had severely deteriorated. On August 16, the Chilean Supreme Court ruled his detention unlawful, leading to his immediate release. On September 12, a police operation targeting WAM members in Malleco Province, Araucanía Region, resulted in eight arrests and the death of one Mapuche person.

In November, tensions between the Mapuche and opposing forces intensified with two significant incidents. On November 8, a Mapuche environmental defender disappeared in the Los Ríos Region after receiving threats from landowners opposed to her advocacy for indigenous territorial protection. On November 11, the Lafkenche Leftraru Territorial Resistance, connected to the CAM, carried out an arson attack on trucks and forestry machinery in Nueva Imperial, Araucanía Region. mgs

CHILE (SOCIAL PROTESTS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2006**

Conflict parties: ACES, CONES, CONFECH, CUT vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology

The violent crisis over the orientation of the political system and ideology between various social movements, such as the Workers’ United Center of Chile (CUT), and the government, continued.

Political unrest, rooted in the significant social and economic inequalities, and those around resources that sparked protests in April 2006 and intensified in October 2019, manifested in commemoration protests throughout September and October, while the rest of the year was marked by mostly non-violent protests for workers’ rights and a new focus on international issues such as the Israel-Hamas war [→ Israel (Hamas et al.)]. In the first quarter of 2024, social protests focused on labor and environmental issues. Demonstrations often included worker groups advocating for better conditions, as seen during protests by taxi drivers against regulatory policies such as “Ley Uber” on January 20. Environmental protests were also prominent, particularly in the Atacama region, where indigenous groups opposed mining activities. For instance, on February 8, an indigenous group in Atacama protested living conditions and a new lithium extraction law.

The months of April, May, and June saw an increase in

protests focus on social and workers' rights. For instance, public healthcare workers organized peaceful strikes in various cities to demand better working conditions on June 26 in River Pilmaiquen. Housing rights advocates staged protests in several urban centers on April 3, calling for government action on affordable housing policies in Centinela, Valparaíso. Protests ranged in intensity from peaceful gatherings to clashes with security forces. For instance, on April 24, at the intersection of Santa Rosa and Fernández Albano streets in La Granja, protesters erected a barricade and blocked traffic to demand housing rights.

During the third quarter of 2024 Chile experienced heightened social unrest, particularly in the capital of Santiago, as commemorative protests intensified. July saw numerous demonstrations focused on workers' rights and women's rights. The first half of August was marked by protests against power shortages and rising tariffs, following a major power outage at the beginning of August.

In September, commemorative demonstrations peaked, albeit with less intensity than in previous years. On September 11, a protest in Santiago was dispersed with water cannons, leaving 10 demonstrators and Carabineros injured. ivg

COLOMBIA (ARTISANAL MINERS / ANTIOQUIA)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2017**

Conflict parties: artisanal miners vs. AGC vs. government

Conflict items: resources

The violent crisis over resources between artisanal miners and the government, mining companies and neo-paramilitary groups, including the Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AGC), also known as Clan de Golfo, FARC dissident forces, and the National Liberation Army (ELN), continued.

On July 20, unidentified individuals killed a mining leader in the Cuanzal Alto Vereda, Antioquia. The victim was a member of Social and Farmers Organization of Northern Antioquia and founder of Small-Scale Miners of Northern Antioquia.

On August 14, the government issued Decree 1035, allowing military and national security forces to destroy heavy machinery and equipment utilized for illicit mining operations. This decree incited protests from artisanal miners in the Gremio region, Antioquia department. On October 10, security forces destroyed three units of heavy machinery utilized for illicit mining in Caracoli municipality, Antioquia department. Subsequently, from October 21 to 25, farmers, ranchers, and miners protested and obstructed roads in the departments of Santander, Norte de Santander, Boyacá, Antioquia, Caldas, and Chocó. They opposed the decree, arguing that it would negatively impact their productive activities and called for a stronger government commitment to assist thousands of small and medium miners in formalizing their operations.

On November 20, AGC, ELN, and FARC dissidents clashed over control of mining land parcels in Anorí municipality, Antioquia department, leading to the displacement of approx. 370 civilians. On the same day, 200 security forces were called to quell violence in the region. ivm

COLOMBIA (ELN)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1964**

Conflict parties: ELN vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, subnational pre-dominance, resources

The violent crisis over the orientation of the political system, subnational predominance and resources between the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the government continued. The ceasefire expired on August 3 and, despite efforts to reach an agreement on an extension, no resolution was achieved [→ Venezuela (FARC dissidents)]. This resulted in a crisis and the suspension of peace talks, which have remained at an impasse since April 11. The reasons for the crisis and the failure to extend the ceasefire were primarily due to the ELN's continued involvement in kidnapping activities and the formal separation of the Comuneros del Sur front on May 7, which remains active in Nariño department.

On August 19, the government initiated separate peace negotiations with ELN dissidents of the Comuneros del Sur front. On September 17, President Gustavo Petro suspended the peace talks following an ELN bomb attack on a military base in Puerto Jordán, Arauca department, which left three dead and 27 injured among the military personnel stationed there. This was followed by an increase in clashes between the Colombian military and the ELN, resulting in further casualties and fatalities on both sides. For instance, on September 24, a group of soldiers was injured in a minefield during clashes in the rural area of Teorama, Norte de Santander, which left one dead and six injured.


Throughout the year, the ELN struck critical infrastructure on multiple occasions, including an attack on the Caño Limón-Coveñas, the country's primary oil pipeline, on March 27. On October 10, the government agreed to the ELN's proposal to resume peace negotiations. Hostilities persisted throughout October, with the ELN launching a multitude of attacks utilizing rifles and explosive devices against military and police personnel. For instance, on October 27, ELN killed a soldier in a sniper attack in Morales, Bolívar department.

On November 3, an extraordinary meeting between the ELN and the government commenced in Caracas, Venezuela, with the objective of unfreezing the suspended peace talks. The armed conflict between the ELN and the Colombian armed forces persisted, with the most significant losses experienced by the ELN on November 14 and 15. During these clashes, which occurred in Araucita, Arauca department, against the army and in San Pablo, Bolívar, against the national police, a total of 14 ELN members and one policeman were killed. The armed forces suffered a significant loss on November 21, when five soldiers were killed and three further soldiers and a civilian sustained injuries in a bomb attack in Anorí, Antioquia department. Despite the unilateral ceasefire declared by the ELN for eleven days, effective December 23 and intended as a gesture of peace towards the Colombian people, armed conflict and bomb attacks persisted throughout the entire month. For instance on December 15, a ELN member was killed in combat during a clash in El Zulia, Norte de Santander department. fer

COLOMBIA (FARC DISSIDENTS)

Intensity: **4** | Change: **↗** | Start: **2017**

Conflict parties: FARC dissidents vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology, subnational pre-
 dominance, resources



The violent crisis over the orientation of the political system, subnational predominance, and resources between several dissident groups of the former Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), on the one hand, and the government, on the other, escalated to a limited war. The different groups of militant dissidents of the FARC remained active throughout the year, most notably in the departments of Nariño, Cauca, Tolima, Huila, and Valle del Cauca.

At the beginning of the year, on January 14, the government and the Estado Mayor Central (EMC), the largest group of dissidents, extended their bilateral ceasefire for six months until July 15. On January 28, a clash between security forces and dissidents left two soldiers and injured two more, while injuring two EMC members in Magüí Payán, Nariño department. On February 27, a soldier working for the EMC killed three other soldiers and injured another at a military base in Putumayo department. He died of his wounds in the hospital after a brief clash during his capture.

On March 16, EMC members attacked members of the indigenous guard, in Toribío, Cauca, killing one and injuring two more. The following day the government suspended the ceasefire with the EMC in Cauca, Nariño and Valle del Cauca. Throughout April the government conducted a large operation to recover control of El Plateado municipality, Cauca. It deployed more than 2000 soldiers, helicopters, armored cars and heavy artillery to fight the EMC. As a result, 1100 people were displaced and 44 were injured while 36 members of EMC were killed in combat. On May 25, the government announced it would not agree to a new ceasefire, after EMC attacked a police station in Morales, Cauca, which left four people killed and seven more injured.

On October 12, the government conducted another large-scale operation to regain control of El Plateado, Cauca, sending more than 1600 soldiers as well as armored vehicles, airplanes and heavy artillery. On October 25, the government also attempted to capture the main leader of EMC, Néstor Gregorio Vera Fernández alias Iván Mordisco in a military operation in Pradera, Huila which left five dissidents killed.

On January 5, the government announced that negotiations with Segunda Marquetalia, another large group of FARC dissidents, would start on June 24 in Caracas, Venezuela [→ Venezuela (FARC dissidents)]. On July 14, more than a hundred members of Segunda Marquetalia attacked the town of Restrepo, Nariño killing two soldiers. On November 20, the government confirmed the splitting of Segunda Marquetalia. Luciano Marín Arango alias Iván Marquez, deauthorized the meetings of Comandos de la Frontera (CDF-EB) and the Coordinadora Guerrillera del Pacifico (CGP), which operate in the Putumayo department, with the government.

Throughout the year dissidents were responsible for several attacks using drones. For instance, on June 12, the EMC used drones loaded with explosives to attack the army three times at different points in Argelia, Cauca, injuring three soldiers. Dissidents attacked the civil population. On February 12, FARC dissidents attacked a school bus in Piamonte, Cauca department, killing two passengers and injuring another two, among which there was one child. On December 24, a 15-year-old child was killed while trying to escape recruitment from the EMC in Argelia, Cauca. On August 20, signatories of the 2016 peace agreement and their families, totaling 86 people, were forcibly displaced from their homes in Caquetá department by FARC dissidents. smo

COLOMBIA (INDIGENOUS GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **2005**

Conflict parties: indigenous groups vs. government
 Conflict items: resources

The violent crisis over resources, particularly the use of land, between various indigenous groups, on one hand, and the government, on the other, continued. Throughout the year, indigenous groups have repeatedly demonstrated for an improvement in their living conditions and protection from violence by armed groups.

On January 19, around 500 indigenous people from the Embera community, who had previously been transferred to their regions, returned to the Integral Protection Units in the capital of Bogotá, as they said they had not received any guarantees from the government that they would be able to remain in their regions.

On February 24, more than 300 indigenous people from the Wiwa community were displaced from Sierra Nevada towards the city of Riohacha, La Guajira department, due to violence between armed groups involving the use of firearms and explosives.

On March 12, in a violent clash between farmers and members of the Arhuaco indigenous people over land ownership in the upper part of the Santa Clara district, on the banks of the Ariguani River, in the vicinity between Cesar and La Guajira departments, three indigenous people were injured with bladed weapons and a shotgun. Human rights activists called on the national and departmental governments to settle the dispute. On March 13, around 15,000 indigenous people from various communities began to march from their regions towards Cali, Valle del Cauca Department. On March 15, they met with the national government to discuss humanitarian problems caused by paramilitary groups.

On May 15, indigenous people blocked the Panamerican highway between Popayán and Pasto, near the municipality of El Bordo, Cauca department, and between Cali and Popayán, at the Cajibío tunnel, Cauca, demanding better school conditions.


Between December 19 and 22, approx. 2,000 Arhuaco people held peaceful demonstrations in Valledupar, Cesar department, demanding recognition of their traditional governing structures by the Colombian State. Following the protest, it was agreed to convene a working group with Arhuaco authorities at the beginning of 2025 to facilitate the election of their Cabildo Governor. ls

COLOMBIA (INTER-CARTEL RIVALRY, NEO-PARAMILITARY GROUPS, LEFT-WING MILITANTS)

Intensity: **4** | Change: • | Start: **2013**

Conflict parties: AGC vs. CDF vs. Los Caparros vs. ELN vs. FARC dissidents vs. EPL vs. Los Rastrojos vs. ASCM

Conflict items: subnational predominance, resources



The limited war over subnational predominance and resources between several neo-paramilitary groups, drug cartels, and left-wing guerrilla groups, including the Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AGC) also known as Clan del Golfo, Los Caparros, Border Command (CDF), the Self-Defense Conquerors of Sierra Nevada (ASCN), the National Liberation Army (ELN), multiple dissident factions of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and the Popular Liberation Army (EPL) continued.

Throughout the year, these armed groups clashed numerous times, attempting to control profitable regions for illicit activities, such as drug trafficking, resource exploitation, illegal gold mining, and extortion. They also clashed to reinforce their power over territories they had previously controlled whilst pushing to take areas which were previously dominated by the FARC. Fragmentation into substructures and small groups on the level of departments or municipalities continued. On January 9, one FARC-EMC dissident group clashed with the ELN in Toribío, Cauca department. Later in March, La Segunda Marquetalia and FARC-EMC clashed twice, once in Puerto Caicedo, Putumayo department, on March 6, and once in Resguardo, Putumayo, on March 20. On May 23, a clash between the ELN and AGC in Remedios municipality, Antioquia department, resulted in at least ten deaths. Only one day later, a clash between two FARC-EMC groups left three people dead and three vehicles destroyed. On December 2, a clash between two FARC groups in Puerto Guzmán, at the border between Caquetá and Putumayo departments, resulted in 11 deaths. These clashes often resulted in the displacement of local communities. For instance, on January 10 and the following days, La Segunda Marquetalia and FARC-EP clashed in Olaya Herrera, Nariño department, displacing approx. 1,500 people. Similarly, on July 17, La Segunda Marquetalia and EMC clashed in Argelia, Cauca department, displacing approx. 1,300 people.

Throughout the year, groups repeatedly announced armed strikes lasting several days, and introduced movement and trade restrictions, curfews, and in-home confinements. For instance, a clash between CDF and FARC-EMC dissidents on March 6 resulted in a ten-day strike from March 7 to March 17 in several municipalities in Putumayo. In September, at least 2,000 people were confined in their homes in Cartagena del Chairá, Caquetá, after clashes between two FARC-EMC splinter groups.

To maintain control over the civilian population, armed groups erected illegal checkpoints, issued IDs, and increased

killings of declared political enemies.

From January until December, Indepaz documented 76 massacres of three or more deaths. Identifying the perpetrators was difficult, however they were often suspected to belong to one of the aforementioned conflict parties. On April 7, for instance, in a massacre in a club in Toro municipality, Valle del Cauca department, alleged FARC dissident members killed five and injured four. On August 25, another massacre by alleged FARC dissident groups killed five in Puerto Rico, Caquetá.

The conflict is closely entangled with other conflicts between singular conflict parties and the Colombian government [→ Colombia (ELN); Colombia (neo-paramilitary groups, drug cartels); Colombia (FARC dissidents)]. Disagreements within conflict parties led to clashes and created splinter groups, further complicating the relations of conflict actors. In August, the Ivan Mordisco and Calarcá EMC-affiliated groups declared war with each other due to disagreements over peace negotiations with the Colombian government. On September 8, an internal fight within the FARC dissident group surrounding Jaime Martínez in López de Micay, Cauca department, left twelve dead. In November, the FARC dissident group La Segunda Marquetalia split due to internal tensions. mz

COLOMBIA (NEO-PARAMILITARY GROUPS, DRUG CARTELS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1983**

Conflict parties: drug cartels, neo-paramilitary groups vs. government

Conflict items: subnational predominance, resources

The violent crisis over subnational predominance and resources between neo-paramilitary groups and drug cartels, including the Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AGC) which is also known as the Gulf Clan, Los Caparros, Los Costeños which is also known as Caribbean Resistance Bloc, The Conquering Self-Defense Forces of the Sierra (ACSN) which is also known as Los Pachenca, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued.

On January 3, the AGC launched an explosive attack on the 17th Brigade of the National Army in the municipality of Turbo, Antioquia department, leaving a soldier dead and twelve injured. On February 16, an armed clash between the AGC and the armed forces in the municipality of Segovia, Antioquia department, left five soldiers dead and seven injured. One day later, in response to these events, President Gustavo Petro issued an ultimatum to the AGC to cease their illicit activities, threatening a potential state offensive otherwise. On February 25 and March 19, the AGC reiterated their willingness to engage in political peace negotiations with the government under the 'Total Peace' government policy and to maintain the unilateral ceasefire. On May 2, it requested the suspension of arrest warrants against its leaders, including its head Jobanis de Jesús Ávila Villadiego "Chiquito Malo", to continue with the peace negotiations. Through a resolution signed on August 1, the government declared the initiation of talks with the ACSN, and on August 5, it announced its intention also to negotiate with the AGC. As of December 2024, the peace talks have not progressed. Throughout the year, the AGC carried out targeted killings of civilians in the departments of Antioquia, Magdalena, and Cauca. For instance, on

May 14, AGC members killed three civilians at their home in the municipality of San Zenón, Magdalena department. Despite the ongoing peace talks, on October 1, the AGC killed five civilians who were traveling from Yondó, Antioquia department, to Cantagallo, Bolívar department. Among the victims were two community leaders from local villages. Over the year, the AGC utilized gender-based violence as a weapon of warfare. For instance, on September 23, the AGC threatened at least 27 women in Quibdó, Chocó department, for their alleged connections to local rival gangs such as RPS, Los Mexicanos, and Locos Yam, and compelled them to flee their territories. Between February and May, armed clashes between the AGC and the ACSN led to forced confinements and the displacement of at least 90 families in La Guajira and Magdalena departments, many of which belong to the Wiwa people, native to the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta. dfn

COLOMBIA (SOCIAL PROTESTS)

Intensity: **2** | Change:  | Start: **2019**

Conflict parties: Comité Nacional de Paro, Primera Línea vs. right-wing opposition vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology

The violent crisis over the orientation of the political system among the Primera Línea and the Comité Nacional de Paro (CNP), supported by student groups, workers associations, and indigenous communities [→ Colombia (indigenous groups)], right-wing oppositional groups, and the government de-escalated to a non-violent crisis.

Since the beginning of Gustavo Petro's presidency, demonstrations have undergone a notable shift in actors and demands compared to prior administrations. Over the course of the year, protests and blockades agglomerated indigenous communities, civil society organizations, feminist activist groups, and diverse labor unions, in contrast with last year, where most events were predominantly aligned either in support of or in opposition to the current government's political direction.

On March 20, members of the Embera indigenous community protested at the Secretariat of Education in the capital Bogotá to advocate for their children and youth's right to education. On April 8, farmers demonstrated along the roads of Baranquilla, Atlántico department, demanding consideration in all national agrarian policies. From June 5 to 9, social organizations and residents of the southern Cesar department blocked the "Ruta del Sol" highway, urging the government to address violence in their territories due to the expansion of illegal armed groups like the Gulf Clan [→ Colombia (neo-paramilitary groups, drug cartels)].

Between August 30 and September 6, transportation unions and truckers set up blockades nationwide in response to a significant increase in fuel prices.

Despite the shift in protest dynamics, right-wing oppositional groups maintained pressure on the left-wing administration. For instance, on April 21, protesters gathered in capital cities rejecting Petro's health policy and his declared attempt to call for a national assembly to reform the 1991 constitution. On November 23, protesters took to the streets to reject flagship presidential initiatives, such as the labor reform, the ongoing national security, and economic policy. dfn

COLOMBIA – VENEZUELA (BORDER SECURITY)

Intensity: **1** | Change:  | Start: **2015**

Conflict parties: Colombia vs. Venezuela

Conflict items: other

The dispute over border security between Colombia and Venezuela continued.

On May 9, both governments agreed to reopen the International Bridge La Unión linking Norte de Santander, Colombia, and Táchira, Venezuela, for commerce. This event followed previous diplomatic meetings to tackle criminality and foster economic developments along the 2,200 kilometer-long Colombian-Venezuelan border. For instance, on February 10, the governors of the neighboring regions of Norte de Santander, Colombia, and Táchira, Venezuela, discussed their concerns over the activities of the paramilitary groups in the border region. Both agreed to join up efforts and strengthen measures to combat crime, illegal activities, and to ensure safety and economic development in the border region. On April 9, Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and Colombian President Gustavo Petro met in Caracas to discuss their joint fight against the criminal activities of subnational groups and the presence of illicit economies along the shared border. lz

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC – HAITI

Intensity: **2** | Change:  | Start: **2009**

Conflict parties: Dominican Republic vs. Haiti

Conflict items: resources, other

The non-violent crisis between the Dominican Republic (DR) and Haiti over immigration, racist sentiment, territory, and resources continued.

On January 9 and 10, the foreign ministers of both nations met at the Organization of American States (OAS) headquarters to settle the dispute over the canal construction on the Haitian side, which diverts water from the River Massacre/Dajabón. Both parties agreed on the necessity of conducting a comprehensive technical study.

The war over sub-national predominance and resources between rivaling gangs in Haiti intensified [→ Haiti (inter-gang rivalry)]. At the beginning of the year, the DR continued regular deportations of Haitian citizens. On March 5, the government of the DR implemented partial restrictions on individuals and vehicles entering from Haiti. President Abinader reasoned this with the fear of a spillover of the gang violence in Haiti. Borders were partially reopened for commercial activities.

On September 20, the DR minister of the presidency announced that the construction of the border wall between the DR and Haiti, which began in 2022, would continue during the second four-year term of re-elected President Luis Rodolfo Abinader Corona. On October 2, the DR announced its plan to expel up to 10,000 Haitian citizens per week. On October 10, the DR alleged to have deported or repatriated nearly 11,000 Haitians in a single week. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) observed that October was the month with the highest volume of deportees, numbering 27,825. According to IOM, more than 199,000 Haitian citizens were repatriated, 97.15 percent of them by the DR, during

2024. eth

ECUADOR (INTER-GANG RIVALRY)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2021**

Conflict parties: Choneros et al. vs. Lobos et al. vs. R7
 Conflict items: subnational predominance, resources

The violent crisis over subnational predominance and resources between the Choneros, their main rival group the Lobos, the R7, and the government, continued.

The criminal groups are fragmented into gangs such as the Gángsters, the Fatales, and the Águilas on one hand, and the Lobos, the Chone Killers, and the Tiguerones on the other. The latter allegedly affiliated with the Jalisco New Generation Cartel, a transnational Mexican drug trafficking group [→ Mexico (drug cartels); Mexico (inter-cartel rivalry, paramilitary groups)].

On January 7, President Daniel Noboa declared a state of emergency after the main leader of the criminal gang Los Choneros escaped from a prison in Guayaquil, Guayas province. The national police and armed forces were mobilized, triggering a wave of violence. On January 9, at least ten armed individuals entered TC television channel studios, threatening journalists and cameramen by pointing guns at them. On the same day, violent riots erupted in seven prisons across the country, including in the provinces Azuay, Cañar, Cotopaxi, Tungurahua, Loja, El Oro, and Esmeraldas. The prison inmates took around 170 prison officials hostage, resulting in the death of one guard. Within the same week, further outbreaks of violence in prisons followed, leaving three people dead and six injured.

Criminal gangs further used violence against state authorities and civilians. Numerous armed attacks on military, police and civilians resulted in at least 71 deaths and 40 injuries. On April 15, members of a criminal gang attacked police officers in Samborondón, Guayas province, killing two and injuring two others. Gangs also targeted public figures, assassinating 20 individuals throughout the year. For instance, a prosecutor investigating the January 9 attack on TC was fatally shot on January 17 in Guayaquil. Bomb threats became frequent, with dozens of incidents reported.

Violent clashes also occurred between criminal gangs, leading to 140 dead and 69 injured persons throughout the year. Territorial disputes intensified the violence between the Chone Killers and their main rivals, the Latin Kings. Between September 18 and 29, at least 22 dead and nine injured persons were reported in the province of Guayas. On October 12, members of the Latin Kings killed seven members of the Chone Killers in Durán city, Guayas. laf

ECUADOR (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **2** | Change: ▼ | Start: **1980**

Conflict parties: opposition groups vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology, resources

The violent crisis over resources, such as oil extraction, and the orientation of the political system between various opposition groups, on the one hand, and the government, on

the other, de-escalated to a non-violent crisis.

Throughout the year, the new administration of President Daniel Noboa secured a legislative alliance with the Christian Social Party (PSC) and the Citizen Revolution (RC) and faced meager resistance from opposition groups. After an upsurge of criminal violence, Noboa declared an internal state of war, implementing a firm state of emergency. In March, opposition groups in Cotopaxi and Santo Domingo de los Tsáchilas provinces staged protests against environmental concerns stemming from oil field gas flares and the La Plata mining project. In the clashes between the police and protestors resulted in 46 injuries.

On April 9, the police raid on the Mexican embassy in Ecuador to arrest former vice president Jorge Glas over corruption charges, led to a severe internal political crisis. In the first half of 2024, the legislature has sent over 4,500 requests for information to ministries and other state agencies. Opposition parties convened an occasional multi-party commission to probe irregularities in the management of the executive.

On 14 September, the National Assembly summoned the interior and defense ministers to appear before parliament and present a report on concrete measures to improve public safety.

On August 8, the vice president pressed charges against the president for political violence. On 11 November, Noboa pressured the vice-president to resign. The administration crisis culminated in the forced removal of the vice president, with opposition parties exploiting the power struggle by siding with the vice president against the president. bku

EL SALVADOR (DRUG TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2003**

Conflict parties: Barrio 18, MS-13 vs. government
 Conflict items: subnational predominance

The violent crisis over subnational predominance between El Salvador's main gangs, namely Barrio 18 and Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued.

This year was marked by the re-election of President Nayib Bukele in February, as well as the 27th extension of the state of exception in April. The government continued to enforce strong measures to combat gang violence. By May, the number of people arrested for alleged gang affiliations amounted to approx. 83,000, according to Amnesty International and media reports.

Gang members operated in El Salvador and neighboring countries, as well as different continents, evading arrest. Throughout the year, several clashes between gang members and security forces were reported. For instance, on March 25, an alleged gang member died during a shootout with the military in Dolores city, Cabañas department.

Human Rights Organizations such as Amnesty International continued to report Human Rights violations, stating that throughout the state of exception, gang violence had been replaced by state violence, worsened by the re-election of President Bukele [→ El Salvador (opposition)].

There was an increase of demonstrations in the second half of the year. For example, on September 15, the Independence Day of El Salvador, hundreds of people protested in the capital San Salvador against the ongoing state of exception,

during which many alleged gang members were imprisoned and removed from family members and friends. According to the human rights organization Socorro Jurídico Humanitario, the number of prisoners that died during the state of exception has risen to approx. 349. [ido](#)

EL SALVADOR (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **2020**

Conflict parties: civil society groups, opposition parties vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The non-violent crisis over the orientation of the political system and national power between oppositional parties and civil society groups, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued.

President Nayib Bukele won national elections on February 4 with 85 percent of the vote, despite the constitutional one term limit for the presidency. Voter turnout was 60 percent.

On March 3, local elections took place. The presidential party Nuevas Ideas won in 28 of the 44 localities. The organization Committee in Solidarity with People in El Salvador stated that the government had interfered with the election by restricting press access to polling stations. On April 10, the national government extended the state of exception that became effective on 03/22, for the 25th time.

On April 29, congress amended the constitution, which originally established that an amendment to the constitution must be approved by two separate legislative assemblies. It is now possible for a single assembly to make amendments, if three quarters of the legislative assemblies are in favor.

Throughout the year the conflict intensified. In the second half of the year, after Bukele took office on June 1, many demonstrations took place against the state of exception. For example, on September 15, the Independence Day of El Salvador, thousands of protestors in the capital San Salvador protested the arrests and forced disappearances that took place during the state of exception.

On October 19, many employees of the health and public sector demonstrated against budget cuts planned in the San Salvador region. State authorities reacted with the dismissal of at least 60 people that took part in said demonstration. [ido](#)

GUYANA – VENEZUELA

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **2015**

Conflict parties: Guyana vs. Venezuela

Conflict items: territory, resources

The non-violent crisis over resources and territory between the Venezuelan and the Guyanese governments continued. Venezuela and Guyana maintained their claims over the disputed territory of Essequibo, also known as Guayana Esequiba, and the rights to the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the Atlantic via diplomacy and military muscle-flexing.

On January 25, the Venezuelan and Guyanese foreign ministers met in the Brazilian capital Brasilia to initiate a joint commission with a view to solving the dispute diplomatically, as agreed in the Argyle Declaration on 12/14/23. On March 21, the Chavista-controlled National Assembly issued an or-

ganic law creating the so-called federal state of Guayana Esequiba. In response, on April 8, CARICOM urged both parties to resort to diplomacy. On June 11, Venezuelan officials refused to recognize the jurisdiction of the ICJ and urged Guyana to comply with the Geneva Agreement signed between Venezuela, the UK, and British Guiana on 02/17/66.


Military activity at the border was a source of continued tension. Between February 2 and 28, the Brazilian armed forces deployed at least two dozen armored vehicles and increased their military contingent in Boa Vista, Roraima state, claiming to prevent a potential Venezuelan invasion of Essequibo through the only land route in the Brazilian Amazonas. On February 9, an open-source intelligence report confirmed the massing of military assets at the border with El Essequibo. Venezuelan security forces built facilities for several hundred personnel, gathered light attack aircrafts and air defense systems, and built a bridge across the Cuyuni River to connect the river bank with Ankoko Island, a disputed island de facto administered by Venezuela. On May 10, the Guyana government granted permission for the US Navy to fly two fighter jets over the capital as a signal of military support. On December 1, reports indicated that Guyanese authorities expanded four military facilities with the support of the US Southern Command. [run](#)

HAITI (INTER-GANG RIVALRY)

Intensity: **5** | Change: • | Start: **2020**

Conflict parties: Viv Ansanm vs. Haitian police, MSS, TPC vs. vigilante groups

Conflict items: subnational predominance, resources



The war over sub-national predominance and resources among the newly formed Viv Ansanm gang coalition, the Haitian security forces including the UN Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission, and vigilante groups continued.

On February 6 onwards, Viv Ansanm, the gang alliance composed by the two largest gang coalitions in the country, GPèp and G9, coordinated its first large attack against Port-au-Prince. Former police officer and G9-leader Jimmy Chérizier alias Barbecue, acting as self-appointed speaker of Viv Ansanm, stated that the goal of the attack was to “tie up” the police chief and government ministers in the country and demanded the participation of those groups in a future government.

Gangs looted and burned down police stations, business, banks, schools, and State administrative offices. Toussaint Louverture International Airport ceased air operations between March 3 and May 20, after an attack to impede the landing of PM Minister Ariel Henry who visited Kenya to coordinate the deployment of the UN-mandated Multinational Security Support (MSS) Mission in Haiti. Gangs destroyed the Varreux Power Plant and briefly took control over the largest container terminal in the country on March 7. In the late hours of March 2, gangsters released more than 4,000 prisoners in Croix-des-Bouquets. The confrontation with authorities left seven cops and five prisoners dead. On May 17, 400

Mawozo demolished the Croix-des-Bouquets police station and the women’s prison of Titanyen, already deserted due to a previous attack in September/22, with an excavator.

On June 25, the same day that the first batch of 200 Kenyan police officers landed in Port-au-Prince, Chérizier/Barbecue called for talks with the PM in order to restore “peace in the country”, which PM Conille rejected on June 28. In June drone imagery circulated in social media revealing MSS-cops patrols in the city in what it was described as an attempt to intimidate the mission. On July 30, the first clash between MSS and suspected gang members left the first MSS-cop injured along the National hospital - APN Sea Port road, Port-au-Prince. On October 9, the MSS deployed against Kokorat San Ras and Gran Grif in Gonaïves, Artibonite. On October 17, a clash between police and the the Bel-Air gang in the Solino area, Port-au-Prince, left three gangsters dead and another two injured. On December 1, a joint Haitian police and MSS-operation regained the control of Petite-Rivière de l’Artibonite’s city centre, Artibonite department, following the massacre of Pont-Sondé which left 109 killed and 40 injured on October 3.

On September 30, the UN Security Council extended the MSS-mandate, after denying TPC’s request to transform MSS into a peacekeeping mission. On October 21, TPC formally requested the UN Secretary-General for the expansion of the MSS. However, on November 29, the Security Council requested its Secretary-General to provide options for possible UN-roles in the country. On October 3, El Salvador signed an agreement to provide a police contingent, aerial surveillance and medical equipment. By the end of the year, 400 Kenyan, four Belizean cops, six Bahamian and 20 Jamaican military personnel joined MSS ranks.

Despite the proclaimed alliance, Viv Ansanm inner factions clashed with each other and disputed territory in the capital Port-au-Prince. For instance, in La Plaine a territory covering Croix-de-Bouquets and Tabarre communes G-PèP-affiliated Canaan gang allied with Chen Mechan, a G-9 dissident faction, clashed to take over the territory of G-9-affiliated Pierre VI and Terre gangs between February 8 and 12. The skirmishes left 127 residents dead in their homes or while fleeing violence in the streets. Another confrontation between G-9 affiliated gangs (Belekou, Boston, Simon Pelé, Terre Noire gangs) and G-PèP-associated Brooklyn in alliance with some G-9 splinter groups left 246 killed and injured and another 66 killed, including children by sniper fire.

Gang violence targeted communities throughout the year. Between December 6 and 11, Wharf Jérémie (G-9) assassinated with firearms or machetes at least 207 people accused of allegedly killing the gang leader’s child with voodoo. Gangsters chased voodoo practitioners and their families and attempted to erase any evidence of the crime by burning, dismembering or dumping the bodies into the sea. Between December 9 and 10, the Chandelle so-called self-defense group killed 44 people suspected of being affiliated with the Gran Grif gang in Petite Rivière de l’Artibonite, Artibonite department. In response, Gran Grif killed in the same place at least 70, abducted another 20 and set approx. 20 residences ablaze. Further, non-gang-affiliated civilians allegedly took part in violent collective action. On November 18, a mob lynched with sticks, machetes and firearms at least 77 suspected gang members in Bourdon and Pétion-Ville areas, including two children and other non-gang affiliated people.

According to UN-Data, there were at least 5,150 killed and 2,139 injured as a result of violent incidents throughout the year. This represents a 17%-increase of fatalities compared

to 2023. Violence displaced 1,041,000 people, a number rising from 315,000 the previous year [→ Dominican Republic Haiti]. Moreover, forced displacement, gang violence and a fragile governance disrupted supply chains [→ Haiti (opposition)]. Almost half of the 11,5 million inhabitants lived in food insecurity. Famine was declared on September 30. run

HAITI (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↗** | Start: **1986**

Conflict parties: Inite / Montana Accord vs. Fanmi Lavalas vs. Struggling People’s Organization vs. EDE / RED-Historic Compromise vs. 21 December Agreement vs. Platfòm Pitit Desalin vs. civil society representatives vs. FREN vs. anti-government protesters

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The non-violent crisis over national power and the orientation of the political system among opposition parties and civil society representatives, grouped in the Transitional Presidential Council (TPC) on the one hand, and between the TPC and political figures with explicit gang affiliations, on the other, escalated to a violent crisis.

In early 2024 anti-government protests demanded the resignation of the acting Prime Minister Ariel Henry in anticipation of the end of its mandate on February 7. Guy Philippe, a former police commander, senator and convicted money launderer deported from the US on 11/30/23, called for protests on January 15. Philippe, joined by the BSAP, a rogue governmental environmental unit, urged the population to join a “revolution” in an attempt to challenge Henry’s rule. On January 18, Philippe together with the leader of the Pitit Desalin and former PM Claude Joseph (Les Engagés pour le Développement), led protests in Port-au-Prince, Ouanaminthe and Les Cayes cities.

Within this context, national-wide protests in 20 cities led to at least seven killed and 23 injured. For instance, In Petit-Goâve, Ouest department, protestors looted and set the offices of the national water supply agency ablaze on February 5. On February 6, protesters ransacked the local police station which left one person dead in Ouanaminthe, North East. In the capital Port-au-Prince, cops shot and killed ten protestors and injured two local journalists in Cap-Haïtien, North East, and three others in Jérémie, Grand’Anse department. A clash between BSAP and the police left five rangers dead in Laboule neighbourhood, Port-au-Prince on February 7. On February 6, gangs also joined the national protests and exploited the illegitimacy of Henry’s mandate to ransack the capital [→ Haiti (inter-gang rivalry)].

At the face of public discontent, PM Ariel Henry urged calm to the protesters on February 8 but did not relinquish his office. On March 4, gangs attacked the international airport in Port-au-Prince, barring the Prime Minister from landing in the capital and forcing him to divert his flight to Puerto Rico. On March 5, political parties built up alliances to fill the vacancy, among them a transitional government led by a triumvirate including Guy Philippe and the leader of the Piti Dessalines. On April 24, Henry resigned from office, after the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) with the support of the US summoned early March an emergency meeting in Jamaica for the creation of a nine-seated Transitional Presidential Council (TPC).

A lack of transparency in its inner workings and allegations of corruption dampened TPC legitimacy. On April 30, four council members elected a former sports minister as PM, overriding the internal TPC electoral protocol. After setting a minimum of five votes for all major decisions, the council elected Garry Conille as PM on May 28. On July 24, the chairman of the national bank claimed in a letter to the Prime Minister that three TPC-members requested ca. \$758,000 US Dollar in order to remain in office. On December 2, a judge summoned the suspected members for questioning. However, they alleged the judge did not have the authority to initiate legal proceedings. As a consequence of the alleged bribery attempt, Conille demanded the removal of the three accused councilors, while they pushed for the shuffling of a new cabinet. These tensions led to the voting of a new PM, Alix Didier Fils-Aimé, on November 12, whose election was, in turn, criticized by a lack of legal basis and legitimacy within the TPC itself. run

HONDURAS (BAJO AGUÁN)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2009**

Conflict parties: peasants, peasants unions vs. government, land-owning companies

Conflict items: resources

The violent crisis over resources between peasants and peasant unions, on the one hand, and government and land-owning companies, on the other, continued.

In 2024, paramilitary groups killed three people, kidnapped one, and injured at least one person in an armed attack. The victims were environmental activists and leaders of farmers' organizations.

On January 27, two men shot and injured the president of the Camarones peasant cooperative in Colonia Suyapa, Tocoa city, Colón province. On the same day, four men attacked the president, treasurer and vice-president of the Brisas del Aguán peasant cooperative.

Three days later, on January 30, armed men kidnapped a farmer and member of El Remolino Agricultural Farmers' Cooperative in Trujillo, Colón. Paramilitary groups have extorted families of this cooperative since 12/2022 due to land disputes in the region between cooperatives and agro-industrial companies. Furthermore, on March 17, members of a paramilitary group killed a member of the Tranvío Farmers agricultural cooperative, in Tocoa.

On September 14, members of a paramilitary group shot and killed an environmental activist who criticized the mining expansion of the Inversiones Los Pinares company, Tocoa. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) granted the victim precautionary measures on 10/5/2023 due to the recurrent death threats against him. Consequently, hundreds of members of peasant and indigenous communities protested in the capital Tegucigalpa and demanded justice for the activist. On October 17, members of a paramilitary group shot a member of the Brisas del Aguán Cooperative in Bonito Oriental town, Colón. cap

HONDURAS (DRUG TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS, ORGANIZED CRIME)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2012**

Conflict parties: criminal organizations, drug trafficking organizations vs. government

Conflict items: subnational predominance, resources

The violent crisis over subnational predominance and the production, trade, and trafficking of illegal drugs between transnational gangs, such as Barrio18 and MS-13, as well as international drug trafficking organizations, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued.

Honduras remained a major transit point for drug trafficking from South America to Mexico and the USA. According to official reports, the country evolved from a transit nation to a medium-scale cocaine producer. Throughout the year, armed forces secured 81 coca plantations, destroyed 31 processing facilities, and arrested over 1,000 people involved in drug trafficking. Coca leaf plantations are heavily concentrated in the departments of Colón, Atlántida, Olancho, and El Paraíso. On March 24, Honduran authorities intercepted a boat near the Bay Islands in the Honduran Caribbean and seized 45 bales of cocaine weighing a total of 1,350 kilograms. The operation was a joint effort by the Special Prosecutor's Office against Organised Crime (FESCCO), the Technical Agency for Criminal Investigation (ATIC), and the Navy. On July 28, Honduran naval forces seized a go-fast boat carrying an estimated four tons of cocaine off the coast of Cabo Gracias a Dios. The naval officers captured three Colombians and two Hondurans during the operation. This record confiscation is the largest seizure of drugs on the high seas in Honduran history. Drug trafficking routes by sea appear to be growing in importance as the number of illegal landing points in the country decreases. Between January and October 2024, the Honduran authorities seized at least 20 tons of cocaine, significantly exceeding the total amount of seizures made during the same period in the previous year.

Money flows from transnational drug cartels, particularly the Cartel del Pacífico, continues to infiltrate the country's law enforcement and democratic institutions. In the first seven months of this year, national authorities extradited ten persons to the US and one to Costa Rica. For instance, on July 27, the Honduran government extradited Edgardo René Velásquez and Mario Rodolfo Mejía to the US to face drug trafficking charges. On August 28, Honduran President Xiomara Castro ordered the unilateral cancellation of the existing extradition treaty with the US, claiming foreign interference in Honduran domestic politics and alleged coup plots against her government.

Gang related violence is a major factor in Honduras's persistently high homicide rate, estimated at 26.5 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2024 by the National Observatory of Violence, making it the second most violent country in Latin America. For instance, on March 14, members of the MS-13 gang killed a police officer in an armed confrontation in Lamaní, Comayagua State. On July 12, the military police killed a gang member during a pursuit in the Honduran capital Tegucigalpa. On September 19, policewomen killed three gang members involved in organized crime and cocaine trafficking during an attempted robbery in Catacamas, Cortés state. dll

HONDURAS (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **2** | Change:  | Start: **2009**

Conflict parties: opposition government vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The violent crisis over the orientation of the political system and national power between the government of President Xiomara Castro, on the one hand, and various opposition groups and parties, on the other, de-escalated to a non-violent crisis.

On January 16, the national assembly met in an extraordinary session after over 120 days of break and agreed on a new board of directors.

On August 29, in the context of a diplomatic crisis with the USA, President Xiomara Castro alleged that the US had been involved in planning to destabilize parts of the military in preparation for a coup and removal of General Hernández.

On September 4, as opposition criticism mounted because of alleged involvement of Castro's relatives in drug trade, Castro denounced again plans for an alleged coup against the government. On September 6, opposition groups mobilized in the capital Tegucigalpa to protest the alleged involvement in drug trade of Castro family members. On September 14, supporters of the Castro Government held demonstrations in Tegucigalpa to show support in the context of alleged attempts to destabilize the government. jas

JAMAICA (DRUG GANGS)

Intensity: **3** | Change:  | Start: **2010**

Conflict parties: drug gangs vs. government

Conflict items: subnational predominance

The violent crisis over subnational predominance between various drug gangs and the government continued.

As in previous years, several violent clashes between police forces and gang members occurred. On April 19, the police killed the leader of the One Don faction of the Clansman Gang in a shootout in Spanish Town. On May 9, the police killed four alleged Taliban Gang members in a clash in Charles and King Street in the capital Kingston. One policeman was shot and injured. On May 29, the police killed the leader of the Bottom August Town Gang in August Town, Saint Andrew Parish. On June 5, the police shot the leader of the Dump faction of the 13th Street Gang, during a targeted operation in Saint James Parish.

During a joint police-military operation on July 20, the authorities shot and killed two men in the Linstead and Bog Walk areas, Saint Catherine Parish. The two men were former gang members and connected to the killing of the leader of the One Order Gang. Two police constables were also injured. On August 4, the police shot three men, including a member of the One Order Gang, in Saint Catherine Parish. One policeman was shot and injured. On September 6, the police shot one alleged member of the King Valley Gang, during a targeted operation in Westmoreland Parish. One policeman was shot and injured. On October 10, the police killed a member of the Clansman Gang during a shootout in Villa Palm, Spanish Town, Saint Catherine. On October 22, the

police killed a member of the Ski Mask Gang in Bunkers Hill, Trelawny Parish. Violence between gangs flared on August 11, when two shootings in Clarendon Parish left eight dead and nine injured.

In a press release on September 5, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) expressed concern over Jamaica's continued use of states of emergency. For example, in response to the shooting on August 11, the government imposed curfews across Central and Southern Clarendon, as well as Southern and Northern Saint Catherine, on August 12. On August 14, Prime Minister Andrew Holness also issued a 14-day state of emergency in Southern Clarendon Parish. The IACHR called on the state to ensure that such measures were implemented in accordance with international human rights standards. eth

MEXICO (PUBLIC SECURITY)

Intensity: **3** | Change:  | Start: **2014**

Conflict parties: normalistas, social movements vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology

The violent crisis over the orientation of the political system and the handling of public security between trainee teachers, so-called Normalistas, and associated social movements, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued. Normalistas and the government clashed violently throughout the year. For instance, on February 7, a group of Normalistas tried to detain vehicles by blocking the highway which connects Patzcuaro with Morelia cities, Michoacán state. When the civil guard arrived, Normalistas attacked them by throwing sticks and stones at them. The civil guard responded by throwing tear gas.

Twice, conflicts between Normalistas and members of state authorities resulted in shootings. For instance, on March 7, two police officers shot two Normalistas at a traffic checkpoint in the Indeco neighborhood in Chilpancingo de los Bravo city, Guerrero state, killing one and injuring the other. This incident led to several protests as well as the kidnapping of members of the National Guard. For instance, on March 9, a group of 80 to 100 Normalistas held eleven members of the National Guard for two hours at Tixtla, Guerrero State, and set fire to two of their vehicles.

On October 13, Guerrero state police shot at two Normalistas from the Vasco de Quiroga rural normal school trying to flee in a stolen vehicle during a car chase in Morelia city. The police injured one Normalista. Further Normalistas threw sticks and stones at the police, destroying one patrol car.

As in previous years, Normalistas protested in front of governmental and federal buildings vandalizing them to express their demands. For instance, on March 6, Normalistas protested in front of the National Palace in the capital Mexico City and destroyed its door. They demanded for the government to investigate the 2014 Iguala mass kidnapping of 43 Normalistas. On May 13, a further protest took place in front of the National Palace after the release from prison of eight soldiers involved in the kidnapping. During the event, several Normalistas launched fireworks at the palace walls injuring 26 police officers due to shrapnel caused by the explosions. fza

MEXICO, USA (BORDER SECURITY)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2005**

Conflict parties: Mexico, USA vs. illegal immigrants, refugees, smugglers

Conflict items: other

The violent crisis over border security between Mexico and the USA, on the one hand, and the heterogeneous group of refugees, illegal immigrants, and smugglers trying to cross the border into the US, on the other, continued.

By the end of October, 108 bodies had been recovered near the US-Mexico border in various locations and several violent incidents related to migration were recorded during the year. For instance, on January 4, armed men kidnapped 32 migrants in Tamaulipas state, northern Mexico. They were released the following day. On January 13, three people drowned in the Rio Grande river, near Eagle Pass town, Texas state, US, while attempting to cross from Mexico. During the incident, Texas military personnel prevented federal border officials from assisting them. On October 28, US Customs and Border Protection agents stopped a suspected smuggling vehicle resulting in the deaths of two migrants, in California state, US. On November 4, a Mexican National Guard member shot dead two migrants and injured four others while attempting to stop suspicious vehicles near Tecate, Baja California state, Mexico. On November 27, a US Border Patrol vehicle rammed into a small migrant group crossing the border, hitting one person, near San Diego, California state, US. On December 30, a group of migrants killed a Mexican immigration official who had attempted to check their identification documents in Chihuahua city, eponymous state, Mexico.

Governments shaped their policies with a view to decreasing illegal border crossings. On January 2, US authorities announced the reopening of four legal border crossings, citing a decrease in illegal migration. On February 21, the US government extended visa restrictions on transport operators to curb "irregular migration" responding to record numbers of illegal border crossings. On March 20, the US, Mexico, and Guatemala announced the formation of a trilateral working group focused on border security after talks in the US capital Washington D.C. On April 29, the US and Mexico pledged to intensify joint efforts to reduce illegal migration at their shared border. On June 4, US President Joe Biden issued a presidential proclamation which aimed to address illegal immigration at the US-Mexico border, followed by the issuing of an Interim Final Rule (IFR) by the US Homeland Security Secretary and the Attorney General. The IFR led to a decrease in encounters along the US-Mexico border, from 124,220 in January to 46,610 in November, as the US Border Patrol reported.

Both US presidential candidates called for stricter asylum policies in this year's presidential election campaigns with Donald Trump repeatedly advocating for the use of violence against migrants and making derogatory remarks. In November, in response to possible election results, approx. 5,500 migrants began traveling from southern Mexico to the US. elb

NICARAGUA (INDIGENOUS GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2015**

Conflict parties: Mayangna, Miskito groups, Rama, YATAMA vs. government, non-indigenous settlers

Conflict items: autonomy, resources

The violent crisis over resources and autonomy between the Nicaraguan government and non-indigenous settlers, on the one hand, and indigenous groups, mainly the Miskito, Mayangnas, Ramas as well as the indigenous party YATAMA, on the other, continued.

Throughout the year, arbitrary arrests of indigenous leaders remained widespread in Nicaragua and indigenous communities experienced human rights violations. These violations included murder, torture, threats, and arson.

For instance, on March 11, approx. 60 heavily armed settlers attacked the indigenous Mayangna community of Wilu, North Caribbean region, killing five community members, injuring two, and burning down all the residential buildings except the school and the church.

On March 22, armed settlers attacked two families from the indigenous territory Mayagna Sauni, RACCN region. During the attack, the settlers injured one person and burned down two houses.

On May 3, settlers killed an indigenous Miskito person from the community of Sangnilaya, Twi Yahbra territory, North Caribbean region of Nicaragua.

On July 11, organizations defending the rights of indigenous peoples denounced the violence against the Mayangna and Miskito peoples of the Northern Caribbean Coast of Nicaragua to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. According to the report, there were 58 cases of violence against women reported in 15 communities. Settlers abducted women and girls, subjecting them to violence and using them to claim land.

On November 8, settlers killed two indigenous people in Alto Wangki.

According to a report published on September 3 by the UN Human Rights Office, the human rights situation in Nicaragua has deteriorated in 2024, with an increase in cases of arbitrary detentions, intimidation of opponents, ill-treatment in custody, and attacks on indigenous peoples. Due to this, indigenous and Afro-descendant peoples were forced to migrate and the number of indigenous people in exile, especially in Costa Rica, continued to rise. spy

NICARAGUA (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **2008**

Conflict parties: anti-government protesters, opposition groups vs. government, paramilitary groups

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The non-violent crisis over national power, the orientation of the political system and ideology in Nicaragua between various opposition groups and anti-government protesters, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued. Throughout the year, the number of civil society organiza-

tions that were stripped of their legal basis for operations increased. On August 29, the government issued a resolution banning 169 non-governmental organizations for allegedly not complying with sector regulations. The organizations included charities, religious groups, livestock and agricultural associations, and foundations fighting diseases.

Over the course of the year, the government targeted people who they considered to oppose them by expelling them from the country. For instance, on July 10, the government expelled a journalist. On September 5, the government released 135 prisoners, including activists, journalists, and religious leaders, and expelled them to Guatemala.

Throughout the year, the government further targeted the Catholic church. For instance, on January 14, two bishops, 15 priests and two seminarians were released from custody and exiled to the Vatican. On March 25, eleven evangelical leaders were sentenced to prison terms of between twelve and 15 years, along with fines of over USD 80 million each.

On November 22, a so-called "partial reform" of Nicaragua's Political Constitution was approved in the first legislature. The reform restructured the state by elevating the vice president, Daniel Ortega's wife Rosario Murillo, to co-president, effectively dismantling the constitutional division of powers. Additionally, it eliminated the right not to be tortured, and affected the freedom of expression and religion and the prosecution of law enforcement personnel. spy

PARAGUAY (EPP, AGRARIAN MOVEMENTS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↑** | Start: **1989**

Conflict parties: agrarian movements, EPP vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, resources

The dispute over resources and the orientation of the political system between the Paraguayan People's Army (EPP) and the government escalated to a violent crisis.

The head of the Paraguayan army confirmed that the EPP was still active in northern Paraguay. It was estimated that the group had 14 members.

The EPP continued to demand political, societal, and agrarian reforms. As in previous years, the conflict was marked by violent incidents and criminal activities. For instance, on January 29, the EPP attacked a ranch in the Mennonite colony of Rio Verde, in the San Pedro department. Two members captured a farm worker, burned a tractor, and left pamphlets and a threat video. Furthermore, on February 13, a truck loaded with marijuana exploded on a rural road between Amambay and Concepción, leaving three dead and one injured. The attack, which involved explosives, was linked to drug trafficking activities in the region, an area known for the presence of criminal groups.

On October 15, Paraguay's Interior Minister announced that Manuel Cristaldo Mieres, a leader of the EPP, likely died from injuries sustained in a military clash on 23/10/22. His body has not yet been found.

The Paraguayan government raised the reward for reliable information on EPP members. The search continued for three kidnapped individuals, including former vice president Óscar Denis, who was kidnapped in 2020. cja

PERU (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **2** | Change: **↘** | Start: **2008**

Conflict parties: opposition movements vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, resources

The violent crisis over the orientation of the political system and resources between various opposition movements on the one hand, and the government on the other, de-escalated to a non-violent crisis.

Throughout the year, the anti-government protests against President Dina Boullarte, who took office in December 2022 following the ousting of President Pedro Castillo, were far less frequent, smaller-scale, and less violent.

On April 10, demonstrators peacefully blocked important transport routes in the Velille district, in the region of Cusco, against the Las Bambas copper mine. On July 18, the protests surrounding the construction of the Tia Maria mine in the region of Arequipa also remained peaceful.

On August 04, thousands of protesters clashed with security forces in Lima as they tried to make their way to parliament. mgm

PERU (SHINING PATH)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **1980**

Conflict parties: SL vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, subnational predominance, resources

The violent crisis over subnational predominance, resources, and the orientation of the political system between the left-wing Maoist rebel group Shining Path (SL) and the government continued.

The conflict, which is particularly intense in rural areas, is characterised by extreme violence from both sides. Although the SL was largely dismantled after the capture of its leader in 1992, its legacy and remnants continue to affect the country. SL was predominantly active in the Valley of the Apurímac, Ene, and Mantaro rivers (VRAEM), the main coca growing region in the country, covering parts of the Ayacucho, Cusco, Huancavelica, and Junín departments, with the government trying to force them out of the region. According to the government, SL is using drug trafficking to finance its operation. For instance, on April 15, alleged SL members killed a security officer during joint operations by law enforcement agencies, the Air Operational Command, and the VRAEM Special Command aiming to neutralize SL camps in the Junín region. On September 18, the head of the joint command of the armed forces announced that four alleged SL members had been arrested during the military operation "Leonides" in VRAEM in the province of Huanta, Ayacucho region.

On October 1, the government extended the state of emergency in the VRAEM region to combat SL by 60 days. mgm

USA – VENEZUELA

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **2001**

Conflict parties: USA vs. Venezuela
 Conflict items: system/ideology, international power

The non-violent crisis over ideology and international power between Venezuela and the USA continued.

On January 30, the US re-imposed sanctions against the Venezuelan state-owned mining company MINERVEN, in response to the disqualification of Maria Corina Machado, the winner of the opposition party's primary elections. The US claimed that Venezuela had violated the Barbados Agreement made on 10/18/23 [→ Venezuela (opposition)]. The same day, the Venezuelan vice president announced that Venezuela would reject US repatriation flights for Venezuelan migrants, if the US decided to intensify sanctions. On March 5, US President Joe Biden announced the renewal of targeted sanctions which blocked property and the entry of Venezuelan high officials into the US. Venezuelan and US government officials met several times to engage in political dialog. Nevertheless, on April 17, the US government declared that it would not renew the six month license that authorized transactions and operations with Venezuela's state-owned oil company PDVSA.

On July 28, the government-controlled National Electoral Council declared Nicolás Maduro as the winner of the presidential elections, a claim disputed by the opposition, the US, and the EU. On August 1, the US announced that it recognized opposition candidate Edmundo González as the legitimate winner. On April 21, González accepted the nomination as the new candidate, in place of Machado, by the oppositional Democratic Unitary Platform (PUD). The US raised concerns over electoral manipulation and anti-democratic actions, and criticized Maduro's response to the civil protests that ensued after the election results and had left 24 civilians dead [→ Venezuela (opposition)]. On September 12, the US imposed sanctions on members of Venezuela's Supreme Court and the National Electoral Council. Additionally, it enacted visa restrictions for 16 Venezuelan individuals close to Nicolás Maduro. On September 15, Venezuelan authorities arrested six individuals, including three US nationals, who were allegedly involved in a CIA-planned attempt to overthrow Maduro. lz

VENEZUELA (FARC DISSIDENTS)

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **2020**

Conflict parties: FARC EMC vs. ELN, FARC Segunda Marquetalia, government
 Conflict items: subnational predominance, re-sources

The non-violent crisis over subnational predominance and resources between FARC Central General Staff dissidents (EMC), on the one hand, and the Venezuelan government with the support of FARC Segunda Marquetalia and the National Liberation Army (ELN), on the other, continued.

Within the context of peace talks between irregular groups, including ELN and EMC, and the Colombian government [→

Colombia (FARC dissidents); Colombia (ELN)], Segunda Marquetalia, a FARC dissident group allegedly aligned with the Venezuelan government, joined the negotiations on February 9. On January 12, Segunda Marquetalia and ELN announced an agreement of so-called "unity and coordination". On June 24, the Venezuelan government hosted negotiation talks between Colombian representatives and leaders of the Segunda Marquetalia in the capital Caracas. On June 29, Segunda Marquetalia and the Colombian government declared a unilateral ceasefire, following a round of confidential negotiations. On November 1, peace delegations from the Colombian government and the ELN convened in Caracas once again to resume their negotiations aimed at advancing the peace process after the end of the negotiated bilateral ceasefire on August 3 [→ Colombia (ELN)].

lz

VENEZUELA (INDIGENOUS GROUPS)

Intensity: **2** | Change: ↘ | Start: **1988**

Conflict parties: indigenous groups vs. government, miners
 Conflict items: subnational predominance, re-sources

The violent crisis over subnational predominance and resources between indigenous groups, on the one hand, and miners, on the other, de-escalated to a non-violent crisis.

Throughout the year, no clashes between indigenous groups and miners were reported. However, according to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), indigenous leaders of the Yanomami people emphasized that the presence of illegal miners and the expansion of Brazilian and Colombian groups involved in illicit economies were increasing violence in the states of Amazonas, Bolívar, and Delta Amacuro, and forcing community displacement and human trafficking for sexual exploitation.

Starting in February, the National Bolivarian Armed Forces of Venezuela (FANB) conducted "Operation Neblina" in Alto Orinoco municipality, Amazonas state. The operation involved the destruction of mining supplies and officially aimed to end illegal mining. On February 24, an illegal gold mine near La Paragua city, Bolívar state, collapsed, killing at least 14 people and injuring eleven. Following the incident, FANB evacuated at least 300 people from the area. On April 21, residents of the Curripaco community expressed concerns about water contamination due to the operation of mining rafts in the Pasimoni and Yatua rivers, in Alto Orinoco Casiquiare Biosphere Reserve and Serranía La Neblina National Park, and its effects on tourism and fishing activities in Boca del Pasimoni. In August, the leader of the Pemón community in Maurak, Bolívar state, urged the mayor to prioritize peace, following threats against activists and two indigenous leaders. In October, the Regional Organization of Indigenous Peoples held a commemoration event to mark the 30th anniversary of the Yanomami massacre in Puerto Ayacucho, Amazonas state, on 07/26/1993. On November 12, the NGO SOS Orinoco stated that ongoing Venezuelan military actions were not effecting any reduction in illegal mining activities. The NGO also claimed that mining activities threatened biodiversity and were linked to the violation of human rights. krz

VENEZUELA (MEGA-GANGS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2014**

Conflict parties: Carlos Capa vs. Tren de Aragua vs. El Wilexis vs. Yeico Masacre vs. various gangs vs. government

Conflict items: subnational predominance, resources

The violent crisis over subnational predominance and resources such as drug and human trafficking, between various so-called mega-gangs and the government, continued.

Throughout the year, the government intensified its targeting of gangs nationwide. On January 27, authorities announced the deployment of troops and police to track down Tren de Aragua and its associated factions in Aragua state. On March 30, security forces killed a leader of the El Flipper gang near San Vicente town, Girardot municipality. The next day, in an alleged retaliation, individuals on a motorbike threw a hand grenade at a police station in Palo Negro, Libertador municipality, destroying parts of the station. On May 2, the National Police killed a Wilmer Guayabal gang member in Aragua's capital Maracay, Girardot municipality. On May 17, El Charra gang allegedly killed a police officer in front of his house in Camburito sector, Santa Rita parish, Francisco Linares Alcántara municipality.

An elite unit of the judicial police killed Luis Manilla, the leader of another Tren de Aragua-associated faction, in the area between José Rafael Revenga and Santos Michelena municipalities on October 3. On November 8, the government claimed the killing of three alleged Luis Manilla gang members in Santos Michelena. According to authorities, the gang was poised to spoil the presidential swearing-in ceremony on 01/10/25 [→ Venezuela (opposition)]. The clash left two others dead and two injured.

On July 11, the US government declared Tren de Aragua a "transnational threat" and a "source of instability for the Western Hemisphere", issuing sanctions against people associated with it [→ USA – Venezuela]. On the same day, the Venezuelan interior minister claimed the gang's "deactivation" due to the extradition of its leader's brother from Spain to Venezuela.

In Apure state, the government tracked down Tren del Llano members. On March 13, the National Police's anti-narcotics division killed two in Palambra sector, Pedro Camejo municipality. On April 3, Apure's state governor claimed that authorities had killed a leading member in Apure in March. He also asserted the gang's elimination in Guárico state, its traditional base of operations.

In a clash on August 7 in Guárico, El Pepón gang's leader and four other members were killed in Zaraza town, Pedro Zaraza municipality. A member of the national guard was also killed. On March 7 in Miranda state, security forces killed Carlos Capa, leader of the eponymous gang, in the mountain area of Ocumare del Tuy, Tomás Lander municipality. On November 1, a local counsellor and member of the socialist ruling party of Venezuela was assassinated in San José de Petare neighborhood, Petare parish. The assassination was allegedly ordered by El Wilexis. In the same neighborhood, on May 27, a clash between Los Pitufos and the national guard left a gang member dead and two policemen injured. run

VENEZUELA (MINING)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2006**

Conflict parties: El Perú vs. 3R vs. Tren de Guyana vs. El Talao vs. Sindicato de Barrancas vs. ELN, FARC dissidents, government, Juancho / Las Claritas Syndicate, various gangs

Conflict items: subnational predominance, resources

The violent crisis over subnational predominance and resources such as gold and rare earths, between mining gangs, such as El Perú, 3R, Tren de Guayana, El Talao, and Sindicato de Barrancas, and the government, alongside the National Liberation Army (ELN), former Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (People's Army guerrillas, now dissidents), and various other gangs, continued in southern Venezuela.

The military undertook operations against 3R in Bolívar and Amazonas states. On February 5, the military seized a satellite antenna from a 3R-mining camp in Sifontes municipality, Bolívar. On February 6, Armed Forces announced the seizing of mining equipment as part of Operation Neblina against probable Brazilian miners, also known as garimpeiros.

On September 30, investigative media reported that Tren de Guyana, a gang whose base of operations is San Félix city, Bolívar, took over El Callao municipality, traditional El Perú gang turf. Tren de Guyana took over Guasipati, a neighboring mining town in Bolívar. El Callao remains the most violent municipality of Venezuela.

By the end of the year, security forces raided at least seven penitentiary complexes in Guárico, Lara, Miranda, and Bolívar states. For instance, on November 5, 3,000 security and law enforcement officers raided El Dorado prison, Bolívar, to allegedly dismantle imprisoned Tren de Aragua and Tren del Llano's networks. According to independent reporting, however, Tren del Llano had no presence in the state [→ Venezuela (mega-gangs)].

In Bolívar, several incidents of gold theft led to fatalities. On April 2, undetermined criminals dressed as judicial police officers set up a checkpoint and stole six assault rifles and gold from real police officers in Los Rosos sector, Troncal 10 highway, Piar municipality. On May 9, Strategic Intelligence Division (DIE) officers clashed with Anti Narcotic Division police members (DCD) on the Upatá-San Félix highway, Caroní municipality. Reports alleged that DIE officers had been transporting gold when DCD shot at them, mistaking them for criminals. Two police and a civilian were killed in the clash. run

VENEZUELA (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: ↗ | Start: **1992**

Conflict parties: opposition parties vs. government, pro-government militias

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The non-violent crisis over the orientation of the political system and national power between the Venezuelan government and pro-government militias, on the one hand, and members of the opposition, which operate mainly under the

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Democratic Unitary Platform (PUD), on the other, escalated to a violent crisis.

After the presidential elections on July 28, the National Electoral Council declared Nicolás Maduro as the president-elect of Venezuela before the culmination of the vote count and without publishing the tally sheets. The same day, María Corina Machado, leader of Popular Will (VP) and vice-presidential candidate, announced that the Democratic Unity Roundtable (MUD) had collected 73 percent of the tally sheets, which proved that the opposition presidential candidate González Urrutia had received more votes than the incumbent president. As of December 31, the government has not released a detailed account of the votes cast.


The presidential elections on July 28 were marked by repression of protestors by both authorities and pro-government militias. Security forces have killed at least 24 civilians in 2024, mostly in the Capital District and in Aragua state, with eight and seven casualties respectively. The National Hospital Survey, a watchdog organization monitoring the number of protest-related victims in Venezuelan hospitals, reported at least 93 people were injured nationwide between July 28 and 30.

According to NGO Foro Penal, the authorities arrested at least 1,542 persons between July 29 and August 24 in connection

with the post-election protests, most of them in the Capital District, Carabobo, Anzoátegui, and Aragua states. On October 25, VP denounced that military counterintelligence (DGCIM) had arrested its founder and party director in Apure state on October 23. VP alleged the presence of the oppositional activist at DGCIM headquarters in Guasdalito, who was found dead shortly after. VP accused the government of the assassination.

Political prisoners also died under unclear circumstances in 2024. On November 14, a member of Vente Venezuela died in the so-called Puente Ayala prison, Anzoátegui state. The public ministry, an autonomous entity directed by the Attorney General of the Republic, stated that the prisoner had received medical care. Machado, on the contrary, claimed that the death was related to the “inhumane conditions” of his irregular arrest. On December 15, a second detainee of the post-election protests died in Tocuyito Penal Center, Carabobo state. According to the NGO Venezuelan Observatory of Prisons, authorities first denied the death and later did not disclose the cause of death despite the corpse showing signs of violent abuse. On December 16, a second prisoner died in Tocuyito. Relatives alleged that the victim had not received appropriate medical care. run


ASIA AND OCEANIA




VIOLENT CONFLICTS IN ASIA AND OCEANIA IN 2024
(SUBNATIONAL LEVEL)

- INTENSITY
- 5 WAR
 - 4 LIMITED WAR
 - 3 VIOLENT CRISIS


CONFLICT INTENSITIES IN ASIA AND OCEANIA IN 2024 COMPARED TO 2023



CONFLICT INTENSITIES BY CONFLICT ITEM IN ASIA AND OCEANIA IN 2024



CONFLICT INTENSITIES BY CONFLICT TYPE IN ASIA AND OCEANIA IN 2024



ASIA AND OCEANIA

Overview: Conflicts in Asia and Oceania in 2024

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
Bangladesh (Chittagong Hill Tracts)*	PCJSS, UPDF, UPDF-Democratic vs. KNF, MNP vs. Bengali settlers vs. government	autonomy, subnational predominance	1971	•	3
Bangladesh (Islamist groups)*	AAI, JMB vs. government, Hindus	system/ideology, subnational predominance	1971	•	2
Bangladesh (opposition)*	ADSM, BNP, Hel, ICS, Jel, LDA, students vs. AL, BGB, CL, government, RAB	system/ideology, national power, other	1991	↗	4
Bangladesh (RMG workers)*	RMG workers vs. factory owners, government	other	2006	•	3
Bangladesh (Rohingya / Cox's Bazar)*	Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army vs. Rohingya Solidarity Organization vs. Bangladeshi police vs. various gangs	subnational predominance	2018	•	3
Cambodia (opposition)*	opposition parties vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1997	•	2
China (Christians)*	Christians (PRC) vs. government	system/ideology	1949	↓	1
China (Falun Gong et al.)*	Falun Gong vs. government	system/ideology	1999	•	2
China (Hong Kong)*	pro-democracy Groups, pro-independence Groups vs. HKSAR government, PRC government	secession, autonomy, system/ideology	1997	•	2
China (Hui)*	Hui vs. government	system/ideology	1949	↓	1
China (Inner Mongolia)*	Mongolian ethnic minorities vs. government	autonomy, system/ideology, resources	1981	↘	2
China (Taiwan°)*	PRC vs. ROC	secession, system/ideology	1949	•	2
China (Tibet)*	CTA, ethnic Tibetans vs. government	autonomy, system/ideology, resources	1950	•	3
China (Uyghurs / Xinjiang)*	Uyghurs, WUC vs. government	autonomy, system/ideology	1949	↗	3
China – India*	PRC vs. India	territory, international power, resources	1954	•	2
China – Japan (East China Sea)*	Japan vs. PRC vs. ROC	territory, international power, resources	1971	•	2
China – South Korea*	PRC, ROK	territory, international power, resources, other	2003	•	1
China – USA*	PRC vs. USA	system/ideology, international power	1949	•	2
China – Vietnam et al. (South China Sea)*	PRC vs. Vietnam vs. Brunei vs. ROC vs. Malaysia vs. Indonesia vs. Philippines vs. USA	territory, international power, resources	1951	↗	3
India (Christians – Hindus)*	BD, BJP, Hindu Munnani, Hindus, RSS, VHP vs. Christians	subnational predominance	1999	•	3
India (Dalits / Adivasis)*	Adivasis (Scheduled Tribes), Dalits (Scheduled Castes) vs. upper caste members	system/ideology, subnational predominance	1948	•	3
India (farmers' protests)*	farmer unions vs. government	system/ideology	2020	NEW	3
India (Hindus - Muslims)*	BD, BJP, Hindus, RSS, VHP vs. JIH, Muslims, PFI, TJ	subnational predominance	1947	•	3
India (inter-communal rivalry / Assam)*	AASU, AJYCP, Assamese vs. AAMSU, ABYSO, Bangladeshi immigrants vs. Adivasis et al. vs. government	subnational predominance, other	1979	•	3
India (Islamist militant groups)*	IS, JeM, JMB, LeT, PFI, SIMI vs. government	system/ideology	2000	↘	1
India (Kashmir)*	Al Badr, APHC, HM, JeM, LeT vs. government	secession, autonomy	1947	•	3
India (Kukis – Nagas)*	KIM, KLA, KNA, KNO, Kukis vs. Nagas, NNGP, NSCN-IM	subnational predominance	1992	•	1
India (Mafia Raj)*	Sand Mafia, Timber Mafia vs. civil society actors, government	subnational predominance, resources, other	1986	•	3
India (Manipur)	JCILPS, KCP, KNF, Kukis, KYKL, PLA, PREPAK, PREPAK-Pro, UNLF, ZRO vs. government vs. Meiteis	secession, autonomy, system/ideology, subnational predominance	1964	↘	3
India (Meghalaya)*	ANSC, HNLC vs. government	autonomy	1992	↗	3
India (Nagalim)*	NSCN-IM, NSCN-K, NSCN-K-Khango, NSCN-K-NS, NSCN-KK, NSCN-KYA, NSCN-NK, NSCN-R, NSCN-U vs. government	secession, autonomy	1947	•	3
India (Naxalites)*	Naxalites vs. government	system/ideology	1967	↗	4
India (NLFT factions et al. / Tripura)*	NLFT, NLFT-BM, NLFT-PD vs. government	secession, autonomy	1978	•	1

ASIA AND OCEANIA

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
India (Scheduled Tribes / Scheduled Castes et al.)*	Gujjars, Jats, Marathas, Moran-Motok, Rajputs vs. government	system/ideology	1981	↘	2
India (Sikhs)*	Khalistan supporters, KTF, SFJ vs. government	secession	1947	↘	2
India (ULFA-I et al. / Assam)*	AANLA, APLA, BLA, DNLA, KLO, KLO-KN, NLFB, ULFA, ULFA-I vs. government	secession, autonomy	1979	↘	2
India – Pakistan*	India vs. Pakistan	territory, international power, resources	1947	•	3
Indonesia (Aceh regional government – opposition / Aceh)*	opposition vs. Aceh regional government	subnational predominance, resources	2006	•	1
Indonesia (Aceh)*	Aceh regional government, KPA, PA vs. Indonesian government	autonomy, resources	1953	•	1
Indonesia (Ahmadi)*	Ahmadi vs. Muslims	subnational predominance	1980	•	1
Indonesia (Christians – Muslims)*	Christians vs. Muslims	subnational predominance	1998	•	2
Indonesia (Islamist militant groups)*	JAD vs. government	system/ideology	1981	↓	1
Indonesia (Papua)*	OPM, ULMWP et al. vs. government	secession, resources	1961	•	3
Indonesia – Timor-Leste*	Indonesia vs. Timor-Leste	territory, other	2002	•	1
Japan – Russia*	Japan vs. Russia	territory, international power, resources	1945	↘	1
Japan – South Korea*	ROK vs. Japan	territory, other	1951	•	1
Japan, South Korea, USA – North Korea*	Japan, ROK, USA vs. DPRK	system/ideology, international power, other	1993	↘	1
Kazakhstan (opposition)*	opposition vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2004	•	2
Kyrgyzstan (opposition)*	opposition vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2005	↘	2
Kyrgyzstan – Uzbekistan – Tajikistan (border communities / Fergana Valley)*	Kyrgyz border communities, Kyrgyzstan vs. Uzbek border communities, Uzbekistan vs. Tajik border communities, Tajikistan	territory, international power	2000	•	3
Laos (Buddhists – Christians)*	Buddhists vs. Christians	system/ideology	1975	↗	3
Laos (Hmong)*	Hmong vs. government	system/ideology	1975	•	2
Malaysia (Chinese, Indian, indigenous Malaysians – Malays)*	Chinese Malaysians, Indian Malaysians, Indigenous Malaysian minorities vs. Malay Malaysians	system/ideology, subnational predominance	1946	•	1
Malaysia (Eastern Sabah)*	Philippines, Sultanate of Sulu and North Borneo vs. government	secession	2013	NEW	1
Maldives (opposition)*	opposition vs. government	national power	2003	•	3
Myanmar (AA / Rakhine State)*	AA vs. Myanmar Army	autonomy	2015	↗	5
Myanmar (Chin Brotherhood - Chinland Council / Chin State)*	Chin Brotherhood vs. Chinland Council	subnational predominance	2024	NEW	3
Myanmar (inter-militant rivalry / Shan State)*	UWSA vs. Ta'ang National Liberation Army vs. Restoration Council of Shan State vs. SSPP	subnational predominance	2015	•	3
Myanmar (KIA, KIO / Kachin State)*	KIA, KIO vs. Myanmar Army	autonomy, resources	1961	↗	5
Myanmar (KNU, KNLA, KNDO et al. / Karen State, Kayah State)*	Karenni Army, KNDF, KNDO, KNLA, KNPLF, KNU, People's Revolution Alliance (Magway) vs. Myanmar Army	autonomy	1948	↗	5
Myanmar (MNDAA / Shan State)*	MNDAA vs. Myanmar Army	autonomy, subnational predominance	1989	•	4
Myanmar (opposition)*	National League of Democracy, National Unity Government, People's Defense Forces vs. Myanmar Army, Pa-Oh National Organisation, Pyu Saw Htee militia	system/ideology, national power	1962	•	5
Myanmar (Rohingya)*	ARSA, Rohingya, RSO vs. Myanmar Army	subnational predominance, other	2012	↗	4
Myanmar (socioeconomic protests)*	local protesters vs. ethnic Armed organizations, Myanmar Army, PRC state-owned enterprises	resources	2007	•	3

ASIA AND OCEANIA

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
Myanmar (SSA / Shan State)*	RCSS (SSA-S), SSPP (SSA-N) vs. Myanmar Army	autonomy	1952	•	3
Myanmar (TNLA / Shan State)*	TNLA vs. Myanmar Army	subnational predominance, resources	2013	↑	5
Myanmar (UWSA, NDAA / Shan State)*	NDAA, UWSA vs. Myanmar Army	autonomy	1988	•	1
Nepal (Kiratis / Kosi, Mechi, Sagarmatha)*	Kiratis, Limbuwan Rastriya Mukti Morcha, various indigenous groups vs. government	autonomy, subnational predominance	1992	•	3
Nepal (Madhesis, Tharus / Terai)*	Janamat Party, JSPN, JTMM vs. government	autonomy	2004	↑	3
Nepal (opposition)*	opposition vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2008	•	3
Nepal (right-wing Hindu groups)*	RPP, RPP-D, SNN vs. government	system/ideology	2006	•	3
North Korea – South Korea*	DPRK vs. ROK	territory, system/ideology, international power	1948	•	2
North Korea, China (defectors)*	defectors (network) vs. DPRK, PRC	system/ideology, other	2000	↓	1
Pakistan (Balochistan)*	BLA, BLF, BLT, BNA (militant group), BNA (political party), BNP-M, BRG vs. government	secession, resources	1948	•	3
Pakistan (Islamist militant groups)*	al-Qaeda et al., IS-K, LeJ, TTP vs. government, political parties	autonomy, system/ideology, national power	2001	•	4
Pakistan (opposition)*	opposition parties vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1973	•	3
Pakistan (Pashtuns / PTM)*	Pashtuns, PTM vs. government	autonomy	2018	•	3
Pakistan (religious groups – Sunni militants)*	IS-K, JuA, JUI-F, TTP vs. Ahmadis, Christians, Hindus, Shiites, Sufis	subnational predominance	1985	•	3
Pakistan (Sindh)*	MQM vs. PLM-N, PPP vs. PTI vs. ANP vs. Pakistan Rangers, Sindh Rangers	subnational predominance, resources	1947	•	3
Pakistan (SRA / Sindh)*	SRA vs. government	secession, resources	2020	•	3
Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)*	Autonomous Bougainville Government vs. national government	secession, resources	1964	•	1
Papua New Guinea (inter-communal rivalry)*	Aiyala vs. Hulis vs. Engans vs. Nomali vs. Min vs. Punano vs. Yauna vs. various other tribes	subnational predominance, resources	1975	•	3
Papua New Guinea (opposition)*	opposition vs. government, various electoral supporters	system/ideology, national power	2011	•	2
Papua New Guinea (socioeconomic protests)*	customary landowners vs. government, resource companies	autonomy, resources	1995	•	1
Papua New Guinea (urban tensions)*	highlanders vs. lowlanders vs. ethnic Chinese	subnational predominance	1975	•	1
Philippines (BIFF)*	BIFF vs. government	secession, subnational predominance	2008	•	3
Philippines (CPP, NPA)*	CPP, NPA vs. government	system/ideology	1968	•	3
Philippines (drugs)*	cartels, drug syndicates vs. human rights activists vs. government	resources	2016	•	3
Philippines (Islamist militant groups)*	ASG, DI vs. government	system/ideology	1968	•	3
Philippines (MILF – MNLF)*	MILF vs. MNLF	subnational predominance	2009	↑	3
Philippines (MILF)*	MILF vs. government	autonomy, system/ideology, resources	1977	•	3
Philippines (MNLF)*	MNLF vs. government	secession, system/ideology, resources	1969	↘	1
Sri Lanka (inter-religious tensions)*	Sinhalese Buddhist Nationalists vs. Muslims, Hindus vs. Christians	system/ideology	1948	↘	2
Sri Lanka (Northern Province, Eastern Province)*	BBS, JHU, JVP, Sinhalese Nationalists vs. Tamils, TNA vs. government	autonomy, system/ideology	2009	•	2
Sri Lanka (opposition)*	opposition groups vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2022	↘	2
Tajikistan (Gorno-Badakhshan)*	drug traffickers, Pamiris vs. government	autonomy, subnational predominance	1992	↘	2
Tajikistan (Islamist groups)*	Islamist groups vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1997	•	3

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
Thailand (Islamist separatists / southern border provinces)*	BRN, PULO vs. government	secession, system/ideology	1902	•	3
Thailand (opposition)*	pro-democracy activists vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2006	•	3
Uzbekistan (Karakalpakstan)*	Karakalpaks vs. government	autonomy	2022	•	1
Vietnam (Montagnards)*	Montagnard ethnic group, Montagnard Stand for Justice, Montagnard Support Group Inc. vs. government	system/ideology	1958	↘	2
Vietnam (socioeconomic protests)*	factory workers, environmental activists, peasants vs. government, manufacturing companies	resources, other	1986	↘	2

¹ Conflicts marked with * are without description

² Mentioned are only those conflict parties relevant for the period under review

³ Change in intensity compared to the previous year: ↑ or ↗ escalation by one or more than one level of intensity; ↓ or ↘ deescalation by one or more than one level of intensity; • no change

⁴ Levels of intensity: 5 = war; 4 = limited war; 3 = violent crisis; 2 = non-violent crisis; 1 = dispute

⁵ HIIK considers statehood to be non-contested if the state is an official UN members state.

Disputed statehood is marked with a ° if a territory is recognized by at least one other official UN member state ("limited recognition")

This text will be made available within April 2026.

BANGLADESH (CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1971**

Conflict parties: PCJSS, UPDF, UPDF-Democratic vs. KNF, MNP vs. Bengali settlers vs. government

Conflict items: autonomy, subnational predominance

The violent crisis over autonomy and subnational predominance of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) between indigenous Jumma, Chakma, Kuki-Chin and Marma, and the government, as well as Bengali settlers, continued.

The conflict centered around the implementation of the 1997 Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord and the regional autonomy of the region. On March 5, the Kuki Chin National Front (KNF) and government's Peace Establishment committee held a peace conference to end the fighting.

However, on April 2, KNF conducted three bank robberies in Bandarban district, abducting a bank manager and looting a weapons depot. Following this incident, security forces were deployed to the area to prevent further large-scale criminal actions. On April 4, in a combined effort, the Border Guard Bangladesh and the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) rescued the bank manager. On April 16, army and police officials arrested 53 people in connection with the bank robberies. On June 11, 30 of these detainees were transferred from the Chittagong Central Jail to Bandarban District Jail due to shortage of space. On May 19 and 23, police and army officials conducted joint operations, during which they killed five KNF members. The army focused on destroying weapon depots in June, with a view to ending the continuing violence.

Throughout the rest of the year, security forces engaged the KNF in several clashes and killed 11 militants. For instance, on July 24 the RAB killed two KNF members in an anti-terror operation. The situation calmed significantly towards the end of the year. On September 25, a court granted bail to 28 members of the KNF. Amid concerns over unrest, the local administration issued a travel warning for the hill districts on October 10. pkb

BANGLADESH (ISLAMIST GROUPS)

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **1971**

Conflict parties: AAI, JMB vs. government, Hindus

Conflict items: system/ideology, subnational predominance

The non-violent crisis over ideology and religious predominance between various Islamist militant groups, on the one hand, and the government and religious minorities, such as Hindus, on the other, continued.

Throughout the year, security forces such as the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), the Anti-Terrorism Unit (ATU) and the Counter-Terrorism and Transnational-Crime-Unit continued nationwide operations against Islamist militant groups such as Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen (JMB) and Ansar al-Islam (AAI), which is also known as the Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT). Operations were primarily carried out in the divisions of Dhaka, Rangpur, and Chittagong. For instance, on February 2 and 20, the ATU arrested several suspected members of AAI. On

March 2, three further members were arrested by the ATU. Such arrests continued throughout the year.


On August 1, the government issued a ban of the country's biggest Islamist party Jamaat-e-Islami and its student wing Shibir, in the wake of nationwide unrest in July [→ Bangladesh (opposition)]. Following the resignation of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, and the change in government, Bangladesh's interim government led by Muhammed Yunus reversed the ban in the hope of establishing a level playing field for all political parties. On August 26, Mufti Jashimuddin Rahmani, chief of the ABT, was released from the Kashimpur High Security Central Jail, Dhaka division. pkb

BANGLADESH (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **4** | Change: ↗ | Start: **1991**

Conflict parties: ADSM, BNP, Hel, ICS, Jel, LDA, students vs. AL, BGB, CL, government, RAB

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power, other



The violent crisis over national power and the orientation of the political system between opposition parties, such as the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Jamaat-e-Islami (Jel), on the one hand, and the government, led by Awami League (AL) on the other, escalated to a limited war. The year was marked by large-scale protests in July and August, which protested the implementation of a new quota system for government jobs, and ultimately with the resignation of then-Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina.

The Bangladesh Civil Service quota system was introduced in 1972 as a means to reserve some government positions to certain demographic groups, most notably the freedom fighters of Bangladesh war of Independence and their descendants. This system was lifted in 2018. However, on June 5 of this year, the Bangladesh High Court ruled the lifting to have been illegal and reinstated the quota system.

In July, escalating student-led protests during the Bangla Blockade led to increasing unrest, with highways and intersections blocked across major cities in Dhaka, Chittagong and Khulna division. Tensions rose further as police threatened legal action, the Chhatra League (BCL) accused political exploitation, and Rajshahi University students blocked a railway in response to police violence. By mid-July, the government escalated measures by shutting down mobile internet in Dhaka.

In response, clashes between students, police and BCL intensified. For example, on July 15, students and members of BCL clashed in Dhaka, leaving 60 injured. Around midnight, students and BCL clashed again, with police firing tear gas indiscriminately and using rubber bullets, injuring four journalists and bringing the number of injured across the country to 320.

On July 16, clashes escalated with the police killing at least five and injuring hundreds in Dhaka and Chittagong, including the coordinator of the Anti-Discrimination Student Movement (ADSM). Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) were deployed to tighten security as violence increased. On July 18, police

fired tear gas and rubber bullets to break up protesters in Dhaka. As a result, eleven people died in clashes with police in Dhaka, two were killed in Narayanganj, Dhaka division, and two people were killed in Chittagong. Further protests and clashes across the country left 32 dead.

On July 19, the government imposed a curfew and an indefinite suspension of public gatherings and processions, shut down internet and train service between Dhaka and the rest of the country, and deployed military forces. Subsequently, negotiations began between representatives of the government and the ADSM.

On July 22, after the Bangladesh Supreme Court reduced the quota for reserved government jobs by 49 percent, ADSM announced a two-day suspension of protests. Arrests of students and ADSM leaders continued, with 2,500 people arrested by July 25. In response, on July 29, protesters resumed demonstrations across the country, leading to a further 2,822 protester arrests.

On July 31, during ADSM-led protests in several major cities including Dhaka, Chittagong, Khulna, Barisal, Rajshahi, and Sylhet, police injured 90 people and arrested 100. On August 1, the government banned Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI), its student wing, and other associate bodies following their alleged involvement in the protest.

Despite the release of student leaders, protests continued on August 2 with demands for PM Hasina's resignation and trial. The protest continued until August 3, when ADSM announced a countrywide non-cooperation movement, demanding Hasina's resignation. In the clash between protesters and police that followed, 97 people were killed in Dhaka and neighboring districts, including 13 police officers. Many more were injured.

On August 5, Hasina announced her resignation and fled to India. On August 8, an interim government was formed, led by Muhammad Yunus. On October 17, a special court issued arrest warrants for Hasina and her close aides on charges of crimes against humanity during the July protests.

Following the unrest, providing an accurate estimate of casualties proved difficult. A preliminary UN report released on August 16 stated that around 650 people were killed during the protests. Of these, approx. 400 were killed in the initial protest from July 16 to August 4, and 250 in later-stage protests on August 5 or 6. A later report from the interim health ministry stated that over 1,000 people had been killed, based on data from local administrations and hospital records. isw

BANGLADESH (RMG WORKERS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2006**

Conflict parties: RMG workers vs. factory owners, government

Conflict items: other

The violent crisis over social security, working conditions, and pending payments between ready-made garment (RMG) workers, on the one hand, and factory owners and the government, on the other, continued.

Throughout the year, workers demanded payment of due wages, increased salaries, the reopening of factories, and the withdrawal of legal charges. In the first half of the year, protests were smaller and localized, but these spread throughout the country in the second half of the year.

In the context of increased minimum wages and revised pay

grades implemented by the government in 11/23, localized protests of garment workers demanding higher payment from their respective factory owners took place in the first part of the year. For example, on January 4, workers from Doreen Garments protested in the Nabi Textile area of Nabinagar-Chandra highway, Dhaka division, creating a 12km-long traffic jam. On January 10, workers in Gazipur, Dhaka, absented themselves from work due to dissatisfaction over the new pay scale. Localized protests continued in March and April.

The second half of the year was marked by nationwide protests during the quota reform protest [→ Bangladesh (opposition)]. In July, workers joined students across the country protesting the implementation of job quotas. On July 17, the police and protesters clashed, leaving one worker dead. In late July, workers were laid off after factories were closed due to the government imposed curfews.

Following the quota reform protest and the resignation of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, protests continued to erupt sporadically, with workers demanding unpaid wages since the start of the unrest. On September 10, protests by workers demanding backwages, bonuses, and allowances caused 90 garment factories in Ashulia, Dhaka, to be closed. This number increased to 183 by September 14. On September 30, police shot dead a garment worker and injured at least 20 others during a violent clash with protesting workers, which led to the closure of several factories. On October 1, another protest occurred in Savar, Ashulia, when workers demanded unpaid wages.

The largest protest outside the quota reform protest took place in November. On November 9, TNZ Apparel Ltd workers staged a protest over unpaid wages, blocking Dhaka-Mymensingh Highway in Gazipur, Dhaka, for 55 hours, causing a 20km-long tailback. The protest ended for 2 hours before workers protested again on November 11. The protest eventually ended one day later after authorities assured workers that their wages would be paid by November 30. On November 18, workers, locals, and police clashed in Gazipur after workers demanded the reopening of their factories, following an indefinite closure notice. Protests continued until the end of the year. isw

BANGLADESH (ROHINGYA / COX'S BAZAR)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2018**

Conflict parties: Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army vs. Rohingya Solidarity Organization vs. Bangladeshi police vs. various gangs

Conflict items: subnational predominance

The violent crisis over subnational predominance in the Rohingya refugee camps of Cox's Bazar district, Chittagong Division, Bangladesh, between the main militant groups Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) and Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO), as well as various rivaling gangs and the Police, continued.

There have been a series of targeted murders that underscored the persistent instability and struggle for control within the camps. Besides murder by gun shots, incidents of stabbings, throat-slitting and hacking as well as abductions have increased. In 2024, a total of at least 27 deaths and 11 injuries took place in Cox's Bazar, Ukhiya campsite.

For instance, on January 13, a Rohingya man was stabbed and shot to death by unidentified assailants in Ukhiya camp, reportedly over issues of establishing supremacy. On April 6,

a man was hacked to death while another was injured in an attack by a rival group. In three separate incidents in May, unidentified groups were targeting Rohingya over enmity and predominance in the camp such as on May 5, a man’s throat was slit. Then, in two separate incidents, on May 11 and on May 13, a local Rohingya leader and another member of a rival group were shot dead. The conflict reached a peak on June 10, with a gunfight between ARSA and RSO in Camp-4 on June 10, leaving three dead and three injured. On July 2, a gunfight between ARSA and RSO led to the death of a security guard and injuries to two others. Another police officer was injured in a gunfight with ARSA militants on July 14, prompting heightened security measures. In October violence increased again, including a gunfight between ARSA and RSS on October 2, leaving one dead and five injured. On October 17, an armed clash between ARSA and RSO led to five people being shot and many injured.

In this year, the Rohingya community in Cox’s Bazar faced an increase of forced recruitments and abductions to fight for the ARSA in Myanmar. Furthermore, arrests and crackdowns have also increased. In two incidents, on April 28 and on June 10, the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) arrested five ARSA members, respectively, in a major crackdown. This marked a significant operation aimed at curbing the influence of militant groups within the camps.

The war in Myanmar [→ Myanmar (Rohingya); Myanmar (AA / Rakhine State)] continued to impact border areas of Bangladesh, with the government resettling refugees. On February 14 as well as on March 1, amid the escalating violence, 1,500 Rohingya refugees, respectively, were relocated from the camps in Cox’s Bazar to Bhasan Char Island, Noakhali district, even though safety could not be ensured for Rohingya. As a result, on December 25, 100,000 Rohingya protested amidst the repatriation efforts and called for international assistance. tln

CHINA (FALUN GONG ET AL.)

Intensity: 2 | Change: • | Start: 1999

Conflict parties: Falun Gong vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology

The non-violent crisis over the freedom to practice religion and system change in the PRC between the Falun Gong community and the PRC government continued. In addition to the allegations of torture and repression by the Falun Gong organizations, this year was marked by overseas judicial incidents involving Falun Gong practitioners and the US Senate passing the Falun Gong Protection Act in June.

On May 10, dozens of Falun Gong practitioners gathered in Manhattan, New York City, the US, to protest against the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and celebrate the 32rd anniversary of the Falun Gong day. On June 2, the chief financial officer of the pro-Falun Gong media, the Epoch Times, was arrested in New Jersey, the US, for allegations of money laundering and bank fraud. He pleaded not guilty. Following the indictment, the US Senate passed the Falun Gong Protection Act on June 24, voicing support for Falun Gong practitioners in China. On June 27, the Secretary of State of the US also addressed the issue of religious freedom in China.

On September 19, the Russian government arrested a Falun Gong practitioner in the Aksenovo village, Saransk, Mor-dovia, Russia for allegedly cooperating with the US authorities to destabilize the Russian government. The Epoch Times

claimed that the CCP kidnapped at least 435 Falun Gong practitioners in the PRC. fyn

CHINA (HONG KONG)

Intensity: 2 | Change: • | Start: 1997

Conflict parties: pro-democracy Groups, pro-independence Groups vs. HKSAR government, PRC government
 Conflict items: secession, autonomy, system/ideology

The non-violent crisis over autonomy, secession, and the orientation of the political system in Hong Kong between pro-democracy groups, pro-independence groups and individuals, on the one hand, and the governments of the People’s Republic of China and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, on the other, continued.

Arrests of individuals who engaged in protests by the local authorities occurred throughout the year. On May 30, six members of the Hong Kong pro-democracy party The League of Social Democrats were arrested after attempting to stage a protest outside a courthouse, where 14 pro-democracy activists were convicted of subversion under the national security law. On June 5, Hong Kong police arrested four people on the 35th anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown. These four people were apprehended on suspicion of acting with seditious intent under the city’s new security law.

Moreover, numerous trials and convictions took place, primarily targeting individuals who participated in protests in 2019 and 2020. On March 16, the Hong Kong judiciary prosecuted and jailed twelve individuals who entered the parliament building during the 2019 protests. On November 19, the Hong Kong judiciary convicted and sentenced 45 pro-democracy figures to between four and ten years in prison. They were convicted of conspiring to commit subversion under the National Security Law, after allegedly organizing an unofficial primary election in 2020.

Instances of groups and unions ceasing their operations due to legal risks or external pressure continued, albeit at a lower scale and pace. For instance, on March 30, the US-funded Radio Free Asia media entity shut down due to safety concerns, after it had been named as a foreign force by Hong Kong authorities. mrm

CHINA (INNER MONGOLIA)

Intensity: 2 | Change: ▼ | Start: 1981

Conflict parties: Mongolian ethnic minorities vs. government
 Conflict items: autonomy, system/ideology, resources

The violent crisis over autonomy, resources, and cultural repression in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (IMAR) between Mongolian ethnic minorities and the government, as well as the Han Chinese majority, de-escalated into a non-violent crisis.

In 2024, the Chinese government intensified its assimilation efforts, further undermining the cultural and linguistic heritage of the Mongolian minority. Mongolian teachers were

increasingly replaced by Mandarin-speaking educators. On November 3, Mongolian herders peacefully protested in the Heshigten Banner, IMAR, in front of the local government building, demanding the release of withheld compensation for the state-imposed grazing ban. Protesters reported being threatened by the Public Security Bureau for sharing their concerns about the sustainability of their livelihoods on social media. The suppression and silencing of dissenting voices persisted. On November 27, a blogger was arrested in the provincial capital Hohhot, IMAR, after posting about a protest by farmers opposing forced land seizures. Critics of Chinese policies from Inner Mongolia living in Japan were also intimidated by Chinese authorities. This included putting pressure on their relatives living in IMAR. *pst*

CHINA (TAIWAN^o)

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **1949**

Conflict parties: PRC vs. ROC
 Conflict items: secession, system/ideology

The non-violent crisis over the orientation of the political system and secession between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC), also referred to as Taiwan, continued.

Throughout the year, presidential elections in the ROC remained a point of contention. On January 13, Lai Chin-Te of the Democratic Progress Party (DPP), a pro-independence party, was elected President of the ROC. President Lai was sworn into office on May 20. In the following days, the PRC’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) conducted drills on May 23 around Kinmen, Matsu, Quiu islands, and Taiwan with 15 navy and 16 coast guard ships, as well as 33 aircraft. The drill was particularly noteworthy as it targeted all ROC controlled areas at once. Furthermore, on October 14, the PLA conducted drills around Taiwan, including 153 military aircraft and 14 navy ships, the largest amount of military aircraft ever mobilized in a drill by the PLA in the Taiwan Strait.

The ROC’s role in the international system remained a core dispute in cross-strait relations. Most notably, on January 15, Nauru ended diplomatic ties with the ROC. Nauru is the tenth diplomatic ally to cut ties with the ROC in favor of the PRC since the DPP took power in 2016, leaving the ROC officially recognized by only twelve states.

Lastly, strategic economic sectors, such as the semiconductor sector in Taiwan, remained a point of contention. On November 8, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), the largest contract chip maker in the world, informed PRC customers that it would no longer manufacture artificial intelligence (AI) chips at advanced process nodes of seven nanometres or smaller for them. *lja*

CHINA (TIBET)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1950**

Conflict parties: CTA, ethnic Tibetans vs. government
 Conflict items: autonomy, system/ideology, resources

The violent crisis over autonomy, the orientation of the political system, and resources between the Central Tibetan

Administration (CTA) and Tibetans, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued.

The Chinese government continued its Sinicization policy in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and ethnically majority Tibetan regions in the Qinghai and Sichuan provinces. Tibetans who did not conform to strict rules were arrested, detained, imprisoned and, in some cases, beaten, on grounds of most commonly sharing information with people outside Tibet, sharing and displaying materials related to the Dalai Lama, voicing criticism, online activism, or hoisting the Tibetan flag.

Between January 11 and 17, at least 35 monasteries in Palyul county, Garze autonomous prefecture, Sichuan province, were instructed by officials to denounce the Dalai Lama. On March 25, a monk was arrested in Ngawa County, Ngawa and Qiang autonomous prefecture, Sichuan province, after protesting the local police while holding a portrait of the Dalai Lama. In May, a Tibetan monk was arrested, imprisoned, and beaten in prison in Lhasa, TAR, for alleged communication with people outside of China.

Conflicts over resources increased. Tibetans protested against resource exploitation, forced relocations, and arrests against protesters by the government. On February 14, in Dege County, Garze Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan Province, hundreds of Tibetans protested forced relocations of six monasteries and two villages due to the construction of the Guangtuo hydroelectric power dam. Police arrested a total of over 1,000 protesters over the following weeks, among them over 100 monks from affected monasteries. Detainees were beaten and denied food before going to trial.

Both religious and cultural freedom have been further restricted by the government. Monasteries and schools teaching in Tibetan were targeted with forced closures. In Lhasa, local authorities issued prohibitions of religious and Tibetan language extra-curriculars for students during winter break, and enforced random checks of households. Additionally, Tibetan language schools in Machen County, Golog Prefecture, Qinghai Province, were closed on official orders on April 12 and students were forced to attend government run schools instead. Four students who refused the transfer were temporarily detained on October 2.

Internationally, the situation in Tibet continued to draw attention. On June 18, a bipartisan delegation of members of USA congress arrived in Dharamsala, Himachal Pradesh, India for talks with the CTA and a meeting with the Dalai Lama. US President Joe Biden signed the “Resolve Tibet Act” on July 12, leading the US to adopt a wider definition of Tibet including parts of China beyond the TAR. On October 23, at the UN, Australia issued a joint statement with 15 countries criticizing the human rights situation and demanding the release of political prisoners. *v*

CHINA (UYGHURS / XINJIANG)

Intensity: **3** | Change: ↗ | Start: **1949**

Conflict parties: Uyghurs, WUC vs. government
 Conflict items: autonomy, system/ideology

The non-violent crisis over secession and system/ideology between the Uyghur minority and the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) escalated to a violent crisis. The PRC implemented various practices to constrain Uyghur civil rights, including censorship, surveillance, and incarceration.

The PRC expanded its suppression by banning social media apps and targeting Uyghur rights groups. For instance, in October, the World Uyghur Congress reported harassment, including threats, hacking, and pressure from the PRC to disrupt the event, and to intimidate delegates prior to its General Assembly in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina. In June, the PRC launched a campaign to replace village names with religious, historical, or cultural significance with names reflecting the Chinese Communist Party ideology in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). Furthermore, Uyghurs were continually subjected to forced labor as well as high rates of imprisonment without trial. Severe repression and lack of accountability persist even within the detention centres. For instance, in early May, two brothers were fatally shot by a guard at Qarabughra Prison in Xinjiang's Kunes county, following a fight in which a third inmate was also injured. International criticism increased as the United Kingdom, the USA, and other countries condemned China's policies against Uyghurs during the UN's 45th session of the Universal Periodic Review, on January 23. On April 24, the European Parliament passed a legislation banning forced labor products from Chinese firms operating in XUAR, following the US Uyghur Forced Labor Act in 2022 [→ China – USA]. tln

CHINA – INDIA

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **1954**

Conflict parties: PRC vs. India
 Conflict items: territory, international power, resources

The non-violent crisis over territory, resources, such as water and international power between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and India continued. Contested construction continued on both sides of the line of actual control (LAC). For instance, on March 9, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi opened the Sela Tunnel in Arunachal Pradesh, India. As a result, on March 15, the Chinese Ministry of Defense called on the Indian government to cease any action that may complicate the boundary question. Furthermore, military drills were held on both sides of the LAC. For instance, on August 8, Indian troops carried out military drills in Ladakh, deploying loitering munitions, swarm drones, counter-drone systems, and surveillance technologies. On March 13, Chinese troops fired live ammunition at a subsonic target aircraft in a drill held across from the LAC to Eastern Ladakh, deploying an advanced surface to air missile system. PRC and India continued to engage in diplomatic talks over territorial disputes throughout the year. Most notably, on May 10, PRC named a new ambassador to India for the first time in 18 months, signaling an easing of relations. Furthermore, on October 21, PRC and India reached an agreement on patrol arrangements ahead of the first formal talks of the year between Prime Minister Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping at the BRICS summit in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan, Russian Federation, from October 22 to October 24. Furthermore, following this meeting, troops on both sides withdrew from Depsang, Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, PRC and Demchok, Ladakh, India and removed huts as well as vehicles from the area where a stand-off had previously occurred. lja

CHINA – JAPAN (EAST CHINA SEA)

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **1971**

Conflict parties: Japan vs. PRC vs. ROC
 Conflict items: territory, international power, resources

The non-violent crisis over international power, territory, and resources between the People's Republic of China (PRC), the Republic of China (ROC), and Japan continued. Throughout the year, all parties claimed authority over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, located northeast of Taiwan. For example, on January 4, President Xi Jinping called for efforts to keep ships near the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. There was also airborne presence on February 5 and August 27 where the Chinese were infiltrating Japanese airspace. Chinese vessels were continuously spotted near the disputed islands for more than 158 consecutive days by May 31. On other occasions such as February 6 and March 26, four Chinese vessels were spotted in the disputed territory. Despite the increased air and maritime activities, there were no violent outbreaks. Hence, the dispute remained a non-violent conflict. While the PRC's prohibition of fishing activities near the disputed territory on August 10 indicated efforts to assert authority through non-violent means, tensions remain. There were reports on April 15 regarding the presence of Chinese ships armed with a suspected "autocannon" patrolling the waters of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. On June 18, the PRC introduced a new law allowing for the detention of anyone entering what it considers to be its maritime territory. Furthermore, Japan lodged protests on July 7 and December 15 against Chinese ships nearing the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands. In addition, Japan allied with the Philippines to sign the Reciprocal Access Agreement on July 15, which aimed to counter the PRC's threat in the East and South China Sea disputes. Meanwhile, Japan and the US have also reaffirmed their commitment to expand military presence in a chain of Western Pacific Ocean islands near China. yll

CHINA – SOUTH KOREA

Intensity: **1** | Change: • | Start: **2003**

Conflict parties: PRC, ROK
 Conflict items: territory, international power, resources, other

The dispute over international power, resources, territory, and historical perceptions between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of Korea (ROK) continued. Throughout the year, several meetings and statements were held to improve relations, however, territorial issues remained a point of contention. On October 29, the PRC confirmed that it detained a South Korean citizen suspected of espionage, saying they advised embassy officials, but without identifying the individual or detailing the charges. The detention centers on the individual leaking semiconductor related information to South Korean authorities, while working at a Chinese chip firm. Such information is perceived as a national security threat by the Chinese authorities. On November 29, a total of five PRC and six Russian military

aircrafts entered the ROK's Air Identification Zone without prior notice. PRC's defense ministry called the flights "their ninth joint strategic patrol". Conversely, ROK responded with fighter jets. ROK's response did not result in any military response nor diplomatic statements issued from the PRC. nma

CHINA – USA

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **1949**

Conflict parties: PRC vs. USA
 Conflict items: system/ideology, international power

The non-violent crisis over international power and ideology between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the United States of America (USA) continued.

Economic tensions continued as both countries reinforced tariffs and other restrictive measures on trade and technologies. The US Bureau of Industry and Security added several Chinese companies to its Entity List throughout the year. On October 28, the US Treasury implemented investment restrictions on so-called national security technologies, effective 01/02/2025. On December 2, it announced the addition of 140 China-based companies and imposed harsher export restrictions on semiconductors. The Chinese Ministry of Commerce responded by banning exports of dual-use rare minerals to the US on December 3. On December 30, the US administration attributed a hack of the US Treasury to a PRC-backed cyber actor.

This year saw an increase in US legislative activity targeting the PRC. On April 24, US President Joe Biden signed the "Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act" into law which, for example, targets Chinese company ByteDance's ownership of TikTok. From September 9 to 11, the US House of Representatives passed 25 bills to restrict the economic, technological, and ideological influence of the Chinese Communist Party.

High-level communication between the US and PRC increased in 2024. The year marked the resumption of the US-PRC Defense Policy Coordination Talks and dialog between defense ministries. Collaborative engagement centred around artificial intelligence (AI) safety, climate change, and military-to-military communication. Escalating tensions over Taiwan [→ China (Taiwan)] and the South China Sea (SCS) [→ China – Vietnam et al. (South China Sea)], were points of contention. The US continued to oppose the PRC through its "Freedom of Navigation Operations" and exercises in the SCS. fka

CHINA – VIETNAM ET AL. (SOUTH CHINA SEA)

Intensity: **3** | Change: ↗ | Start: **1951**

Conflict parties: PRC vs. Vietnam vs. Brunei vs. ROC vs. Malaysia vs. Indonesia vs. Philippines vs. USA
 Conflict items: territory, international power, resources

The non-violent crisis in the South China Sea (SCS) over territory, international power, and resources between the People's Republic of China (PRC), Vietnam, the Republic of China (ROC), Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei, Indonesia, and

the USA, supported by Australia, escalated to a violent crisis. The PRC maintained its position of territorial assertions, and tensions with the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, the ROC, and Malaysia persisted. Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, the ROC, and Indonesia held talks throughout the year in different formations regarding the situation in the SCS. For instance, in January and February, Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines met separately to discuss their cooperation. Tensions between Indonesia and the PRC continued, with the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) patrolling disputed areas in the North Natuna Sea and Indonesian patrol vessels forcing them away on October 26. The situation between Vietnam and the PRC also remained tense. For example, Vietnamese fishermen were assaulted by Chinese law enforcement personnel on October 3. Vietnam asked the PRC to abide by the rule of law in the SCS on multiple occasions.

On January 1, then-Indonesian President Joko Widodo and then-Vietnamese President Vo Van Thuong agreed to push towards a Code of Conduct for the SCS during a meeting. On August 30, Vietnam and the Philippines agreed to sign a memorandum during a meeting in Manila, Philippines, which would boost their defense cooperation. On September 15, PRC and US military leaders held routine talks to discuss SCS tensions. On October 11, US Secretary of State, Anthony Blinken, told ASEAN leaders of the US' concern about PRC activities in the SCS during the annual ASEAN summit in Vientiane, Laos.

Tensions between the Philippines and the PRC continued. On March 5, CCG vessels blasted water cannons at a military contracted Philippine vessel, injuring four crew members. On April 30, the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) said that CCG vessels fired water cannons at two of its vessels near Scarborough Shoal, causing damage to them. On May 19, a CCG vessel rammed a PCG vessel, which Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., condemned. On July 1, a People's Liberation Army aircraft carrier of the PRC sailed near the Philippine Island of Luzon.

Several joint military exercises took place throughout the year. For instance, on April 7, the US, Australia, Japan and the Philippines conducted large-scale joint exercises in the SCS. On July 31, the Philippines and the US conducted a joint maritime activity. On August 7, the Philippines, the US, Australia, and Canada conducted joint air and naval maneuvers. On August 9, the Philippine and Vietnamese Coast Guards sailed together in the SCS in an exercise to bolster cooperation. lwi

INDIA (CHRISTIANS – HINDUS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1999**

Conflict parties: BD, BJP, Hindu Munnani, Hindus, RSS, VHP vs. Christians
 Conflict items: subnational predominance

The violent crisis over religious predominance between various Hindu groups, such as Vishwa Hindu Parisha (VHP) and Bajrang Dal (BD), on the one hand, and the Christian minority, on the other, continued.

Far-right Hindu groups tried to stop Christians from practicing their faith, accusing them of forced conversion, particularly in Chhattisgarh state. For instance, on January 14, a Hindu mob stormed three churches in Amdi village, Chhattisgarh, and the police arrested the pastor and three of his family members on charges of forced conversion. On January 21, Hindus attacked a local pastor and other church members in

Basudopur village, Chhattisgarh. On January 25, a group of Hindus beat up two Christians for practicing their faith and threatened them with further violence if they continued to practice Christianity, in Vijayapura city, Karnataka state. On February 13, BD members attacked Christians in Narsingi town, Telangana state, leaving eleven people injured. The Christians had expressed objections to the expansion of a road near their church. On April 16, Hindus vandalized a school and assaulted a priest in Kannepally village, Telangana. The Hindus accused the school of hurting religious sentiments by allowing students to come to class in religious clothing instead of their school uniforms. On May 4, a Hindu mob, allegedly led by his family, killed a recently converted Christian in Chhattisgarh, leading to his death. Five other Christian families fled the region due to the incident. On June 12, Hindus attacked and injured five Christians in Jagdalpur, Chhattisgarh, demanding they denunciate Christianity within ten days. On June 24, a Hindu killed a relative who had recently converted to Christianity in Toylanka village, Chhattisgarh. On July 7, Hindu extremists broke into a pastor's house in Arwal district, Bihar state, killing his son. On September 9, BD and Rashtriya Swamsevak Sangh members attacked members of a new church, accusing them of forced conversion in Bhubaneswar city, Odisha state. dju

INDIA (DALITS / ADIVASIS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1948**

Conflict parties: Adivasis (Scheduled Tribes), Dalits (Scheduled Castes) vs. upper caste members
 Conflict items: system/ideology, subnational pre-dominance

The violent crisis over the Hindu caste system and subnational predominance between Dalits and Adivasis, recognized by the government as Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, on the one hand, and members of upper castes, on the other, continued. Throughout the year, members of upper castes regularly denied Dalits access to locations and the practicing of customs they deemed reserved for upper caste members. For example, on January 1, a group of 15 upper caste members injured a Dalit for entering a temple in Chikkamagaluru district, Karnataka state, arguing that Dalits were not allowed to enter their street. On February 13, in Rangareddy district, Telangana state, a group of 200 belonging to upper castes attacked Dalits while they prayed in a church and destroyed a crucifix, leaving 20 injured. On November 26, eight people beat a Dalit to death following a dispute over a borewell in Shivpuri district, Madhya Pradesh state. On February 2, four men injured a Dalit groom while riding a horse during his wedding procession in Gandhinagar district, Gujarat state, claiming that this practice was only permitted for members of upper castes. On May 20, four upper caste members attacked a Dalit wedding procession in Gwalior district, Madhya Pradesh, insulting and injuring the groom. On March 25, Dalits and upper caste Hindus clashed during Holi celebrations in Bijnor district, Uttar Pradesh state, after a Dalit person joined the celebrations, leaving 15 injured. Dalits continued to face discrimination and violence over their political and ideological views. On May 31, the son of a Bharatiya Janata Party member of Gujarat legislative assembly and four other people kidnapped and injured a

Dalit student representative in Rajkot district, Gujarat. On January 22, a group of four men attacked and injured a Dalit in Humnabad city, Karnataka, for a social media post that depicted Hindu deity Rama with Dalit political leader Ambedkar. Members of security forces demonstrated their discrimination against Dalit people on multiple occasions. For example, on April 14, a police officer allegedly tortured a Dalit, who later died, in Rajkot. On October 11, a Dalit died in police custody in Lucknow city, Uttar Pradesh. Adivasi continued to protest against displacement and the destruction of their natural heritage. For instance, on September 12, approx. 700 Adivasis protested eviction from their ancestral lands in Nagarhole National Park, Karnataka. nkl

INDIA (FARMERS' PROTESTS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **NEW** | Start: **2020**

Conflict parties: farmer unions vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology

A violent crisis over crop pricing guarantees between farmer unions, such as so-called Sanmyukta Kisan Morcha (SKM), SKM (non-political), and Kisan Mazdoor Morcha (KMM) on the one hand, and the Bharatiya Janata Party-led government, on the other, erupted. On February 13, farmer protests, which had originally stopped in 2021 after the government had agreed to all demands and had repealed its agricultural act, broke out once more at the Shambhu and Khanauri border points located between Punjab and Haryana states. SKM (non-political), which is a splinter group of SKM, and KMM organized multiple protests throughout the year, arguing that the government had not fulfilled its promises. Farmers demanded that the government introduce a minimum support price for crops (MSP). Other requests from the farmer unions included pensions for farmers and farm debt waivers. During the first few weeks of protests, farmers clashed with police, injuring at least 46 and leaving one dead. For instance, on February 21, during an encounter with protesters, police allegedly shot dead one protester and injured 13, while twelve security personnel sustained injuries. Protesters accused police of firing rubber bullets and pellets into the crowd. Moreover, the police employed drones to drop tear gas shells on the protesters. Police claimed that the farmers used sticks and maces, and pelted stones at police officers. On November 26, one of the farmer union leaders started a hunger strike in Khanauri, to further pressurize the government. Allegedly due to the deteriorating health of the farmer union leader, a farmer attempted suicide at the Shambhu border point, on December 14, and later died in the hospital. On November 29, the agricultural minister stated that the government would pass a law fixing an MSP for crops so that farmers would be rewarded with 50 percent returns. However, farmer unions criticized the proposed MSP as it only included wheat and rice. Subsequently, the protests continued. On December 6, 8 and 14, hundreds of farmers tried to march from the Shambhu and Khanauri border points to New Delhi, National Capital Territory of Delhi. However, the police prevented the farmers. lrs

INDIA (HINDUS - MUSLIMS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1947**

Conflict parties: BD, BJP, Hindus, RSS, VHP vs. JIH, Muslims, PFI, TJ

Conflict items: subnational predominance

The violent crisis over religious predominance between various Hindu groups, on the one hand, and the Muslim minority, on the other, continued.

Throughout the year, Muslims were attacked on multiple occasions due to their religious beliefs. For instance, on January 3, two police officers injured and verbally abused two Muslim students in Ranchi city, Jharkhand state. On January 23, attendees of a Hindu nationalist rally stopped a vehicle to beat up its Muslim driver, using batons, iron chains and flag staffs in Mumbai city, Maharashtra state. On February 8, violence broke out between Muslims, who were protesting the demolition of a mosque, a Hindu mob, and the police, in Haldwani town, Uttarakhand state. At least six people died and at least 124 were injured in the violence. The Muslim minority accused the state government of Uttarakhand that the demolition was politically motivated.

On March 16, Hindus attacked Muslims praying on a university campus in Ahmedabad city, Gujarat state, injuring five. On April 24, Hindu school boys attacked a Muslim classmate on his way to daily prayer in Wanaparthy city, Telangana state. On July 29, a Hindu group in Ranchi forced a Muslim to chant a Hindu slogan while beating him with sticks. On September 5, a group of Hindus attacked a Muslim shop owner in Baksa district, Assam state. Two people were injured, including the shop owner. On October 17, a Hindu injured five Muslims with a spade in Revadi Talab village, Uttar Pradesh state.

Hindus held several protests in Maharashtra to show their support for Bangladeshi Hindus. Bangladeshi Hindus were frequently the targets of violent assaults, after the government of Bangladesh was overthrown on August 5 [→Bangladesh (Opposition)]. On August 16, both groups clashed, throwing stones at each other, in Nashik city. Six police officers and two civilians were injured when police tried to separate the groups. dju

INDIA (INTER-COMMUNAL RIVALRY / ASSAM)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1979**

Conflict parties: AASU, AJYCP, Assamese vs. AAMSU, ABYSO, Bangladeshi immigrants vs. Adivasis et al. vs. government

Conflict items: subnational predominance, other

The violent crisis over subnational predominance and the issue of Bangladeshi immigration and Bengali-speaking Muslims in Assam state between various ethnic groups, notably those identifying as Indigenous versus perceived outsiders, and the government, continued.

Eviction drives to clear the lands of perceived illegal encroachers continued this year, rendering thousands of families homeless. On January 10, the police carried out an eviction drive in the Pancharatna Reserve Forest area in Goalpara district, destroying the homes of approx. 50 Muslim families. Subsequently, on January 13, a Muslim man who

had been evicted died of cold, after sleeping in the open. On June 24, the Assam government evicted 1,500 Muslim families in Morigaon district, with residents alleging bias against Bengali-origin Muslims, while Hindu families' homes were spared. Similar accusations of selective evictions occurred throughout the year. For example on September 12, in Kachutali, Kamrup district, alleged illegal Muslim settlers clashed with officials, leaving two dead and 33 injured after police opened fire during eviction resistance.

On August 28, protesters at the Assam Legislative Assembly in Guwahati district accused the government of providing illegal migrants with compensation, while offering none to Indigenous Assamese. During the protest, a police officer injured a protester.

Issues regarding the Citizenship Amendment Act, for which the rules were released on March 11, continued. Students and organizations staged multiple protests against its enforcement, including one at Cotton University on March 11 and one at Gauhati University on March 12, Guwahati city.

Anti-Muslim campaigns persisted. On February 8 and March 24, Assam's Chief Minister (CM) urged forcibly converted Muslims to reclaim Indigenous status and to renounce polygamy, limit children, and return to their "original identity".

Thousands of Bengali-origin Muslims were excluded from voting on April 19, 26, and May 7, as their citizenship remains unclear pending tribunal decisions on actions like detention or deportation.

On April 19, the CM assured Bengali Hindus of citizenship to resolve their "D-voter" status, which bars them from voting until Tribunal verification. twm

INDIA (KASHMIR)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1947**

Conflict parties: Al Badr, APHC, HM, JeM, LeT vs. government

Conflict items: secession, autonomy

The violent crisis over autonomy or secession of the Indian-administered union territory of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) between Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC), as well as Al-Badr, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued.

Throughout the year, at least 33 militants belonging to HM, JeM, LeT and its alleged proxy, the Resistance Front (TRF), at least 19 civilians and at least twelve security personnel were killed in clashes. Approx. 44 civilians and 35 security personnel were also injured.

Security forces clashed with militants on multiple occasions. For instance, on May 7, two TRF militants were killed in a clash with security forces in Kulgam district, J&K Union territory. On June 3, two LeT militants, including one high-ranking commander, were killed in a clash with security forces in Nehama village, Pulwama district. On July 6 to 7, security forces clashed with HM militants in two encounters, killing six HM and two security personnel in Chinigham and Mudergham, Kulgam district. On September 11, security forces killed two JEM militants near Basantgarh, near the Kathua and Udhampur district border. On November 2, security forces clashed with LeT militants on two separate occasions in Srinagar and Anantnag districts, leaving three militants dead and injuring four security personnel. On December 19, security forces killed five HM militants, including one commander, in the

Behibagh area of Kader village, Kulgam district. Militant groups also continued to attack civilians. For instance, on June 9, nine people were killed and 33 were injured after TRF militants fired upon a bus carrying pilgrims from a shrine in Jammu and Kashmir's Reasi district. On October 20, TRF militants attacked the construction site of the Sonamarg Tunnel between Gagangair and Sonamarg, Ganderbal district, killing at least six civilians and injuring several others. On November 3, LeT militants threw a grenade at security forces at a Sunday market in Srinagar, injuring at least eleven people. An additional person was injured in the attack and later died in hospital. sag

INDIA (MAFIA RAJ)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1986**

Conflict parties: Sand Mafia, Timber Mafia vs. civil society actors, government
 Conflict items: subnational predominance, resources, other

The violent crisis over natural resources, the protection of the environment, and subnational predominance in various states between the Sand and Timber Mafia, on the one hand, and the government and civil society actors, on the other, continued.

Throughout the year, the Sand Mafia engaged in several violent encounters with security forces. For instance, on May 4, when three police officers tried to arrest a Sand Mafia member for transporting illegally mined sand in Shahdol district, Madhya Pradesh state, the mafia member ran over one of the police officers with his tractor trolley, killing him. In a similar incident, on June 8, in Nagla Chandan village, Uttar Pradesh state, a Sand Mafia member killed a police officer by crushing him with his tractor. Sand Mafia members and local villagers injured at least four police officers while they were checking out illegal sand mining activities, in the Guguldih area, Bihar state, on September 12.

There were also several incidents in which journalists were targeted by the Sand Mafia. For instance, on June 12, alleged members of the Sand Mafia beat up two journalists trying to investigate an illegal sand mining site in Kotna village, Gujarat state.

Journalists accused state actors of colluding with the Sand Mafia on multiple occasions. For example, on August 9, at least four journalists investigated a truck, which was transporting illegally mined sand, following it to the police station in Konta town, Chhattisgarh state. A day later, on August 10, the police arrested the journalists on charges of drug possession and beat them with belts, injuring them. The journalists denied the charges and accused the police of having planted marijuana in their car in retaliation to exposing their alleged ties to the Sand Mafia.

The forest department and the Timber Mafia engaged in violent altercations with one another throughout the year. For example, on September 5, a Timber Mafia member attempted to run over forest department officials with his truck when they tried to arrest him for transporting illegal timber near Malikpur Bangar village, Haryana state.

The alleged involvement of the forest department with the Timber Mafia led to multiple protests throughout the year. For example, on August 16, villagers staged a protest when the forest department allegedly sold timber harvested from a reserve forest to the Timber Mafia, in Rairangpur town,

Odisha state. lrs

INDIA (MANIPUR)

Intensity: **3** | Change: ▼ | Start: **1964**

Conflict parties: JCILPS, KCP, KNF, Kukis, KYKL, PLA, PREPAK, PREPAK-Pro, UNLF, ZRO vs. government vs. Meiteis
 Conflict items: secession, autonomy, system/ideology, subnational pre-dominance

The limited war over either subnational predominance, the status of Scheduled Tribes (ST), autonomy, or secession of Manipur state between militant groups, activist groups, Meiteis, Kukis, and the government de-escalated to a violent crisis.

Violent confrontations between Kuki and Meitei groups continued. On January 1, 20 people dressed in police uniforms killed four Meitei Pangals and injured over 14 in Thoubal district during a house looting. On January 10, armed Kuki militants allegedly abducted and killed four Meitei woodcutters in the buffer zone between Bishnupur and Churachandpur districts. On April 13, Meitei militants, allegedly collaborating with central security forces, killed and mutilated two Kuki people in Kangpokpi district.

On June 6, a Meitei mob torched abandoned Kuki homes in the Jiribam district and demanded guns after discovering a Meitei man's body in Mulargaon district. On August 9, a gunfight in Tengnoupal district between a United Kuki Liberation Front militant and three villagers left all four people dead.

Throughout the year, militant groups frequently attacked villages and clashed with security forces. On January 17, a gunfight between Kuki, Meiteis, and security forces killed two officers and injured five officers and two civilians in Moreh town, Tengnoupal. On July 14, Meitei militant and insurgent groups, including the Arambai Tenggol, attacked Sejang and Mongbung villages in Jiribam, killing one Central Reserve Police Force officer. On November 11, security forces killed ten alleged Kuki militants attacking the Borobekra police station in Jiribam. The Kuki militants had allegedly abducted six civilians from relief camps.

Several protests erupted in response to the violent confrontations. On February 16, during a clash between protesters and security forces in Churachandpur district, two people were killed and 25 injured. After the April 13 Kuki killings, thousands protested in Kangpokpi on April 14, demanding justice. Following the deaths of six Meiteis abducted on November 11, protests erupted in Jiribam and Imphal on November 16, targeting legislators' houses and storming residences of legislative assembly members and ministers. twm

INDIA (NAGALIM)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1947**

Conflict parties: NSCN-IM, NSCN-K, NSCN-K-Khango, NSCN-K-NS, NSCN-KK, NSCN-KYA, NSCN-NK, NSCN-R, NSCN-U vs. government
 Conflict items: secession, autonomy

The violent crisis over either secession or autonomy between factions of the militant National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued. The Naga ethnic minority predominantly lives in the states of Nagaland, Manipur, Assam, and Arunachal Pradesh.

Throughout the year, the NSCN-IM faction clashed with regional security forces, such as the Assam Rifles (AR) and the police. In most cases, the encounters with security forces ended in arrests of NSCN-IM cadres. For instance, on January 11, the police apprehended six NSCN-IM cadres in Longding district, Arunachal Pradesh, and recovered an arms cache. On March 3, AR interrupted the movement of NSCN-Khaplang Niki (NSCN-K (Niki)) faction members in Mon district, Nagaland. In the gunfight, a NSCN-K (Niki) cadre was killed and one was arrested by the AR. On October 26, AR members shot dead an NSCN-Khaplang Yung Aung cadre in Longding. According to the police, the cadre initiated the shooting and was killed in retaliatory action.

There were several violent confrontations throughout the year. For instance, on February 21, unidentified attackers shot dead the deputy leader of NSCN-Isak Muivah (NSCN-IM) at his residence in Tizit village, Nagaland.


The riots between the Kuki and the Meitei people in Manipur [→ India (Manipur)], which began in 05/03/23, continued to have an impact on Nagaland. On March 7, the National Investigation Agency (NIA) filed a charge sheet in a Guwahati Court, accusing the NSCN-IM China-Myanmar module of supporting two banned Meitei outfits, the People's Liberation Army and Kanglei Yaol Kanba Lup, to infiltrate India. The charge sheet alleged that the NSCN-IM China-Myanmar module aimed to exploit the current ethnic unrest in Manipur and to wage a war against the government. On May 15, the NSCN-IM issued a statement denying any assistance for the banned outfits in Manipur, and accusing security forces of helping Kuki militant groups against Meitei people in Manipur.

On March 7, the government and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland signed an extension of the ceasefire agreement for a further period of one year, starting on April 28. Similarly, on September 4, the government and the NSCN-K (Niki) signed an extension of their ceasefire agreement for another year. On November 8, NSCN-IM stated that they were willing to resume the violent armed resistance if the government was not meeting their demands to have a national flag and a constitution for the Naga people. NSCN-IM issued the statement after unsuccessful peace talks between the two parties. jwn

INDIA (NAXALITES)

Intensity: **4** | Change: **↗** | Start: **1967**

Conflict parties: Naxalites vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology



The violent crisis over the orientation of the political system between the left-wing extremist Naxalites, primarily organized into the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-M)

and into splinter groups such as the Jharkhand Jan-Mukti Parishad, and the People's Liberation Front of India (PLFI), on the one hand, and the government on the other, escalated to a limited war. The government was supported by the Border Security Force (BSF), District Reserve Guard (DRG), the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), especially the Commando Battalion for Resolute Action (CoBRA), and state- and district-level police forces.

Throughout the year, violent encounters, IED explosions, and other attacks resulted in the deaths of at least 379 people, including Naxalites and security forces. At least 94 were also injured. While Naxalites were mainly active in the federal states of Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand, violence also occurred in the states of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Odisha, and Telangana.

Security forces continued to carry out anti-Naxalite- and search operations, which often resulted in clashes. For instance, during an encounter with security forces on March 19, four Naxal were killed in Gadchiroli district, Maharashtra. On April 16, Naxalites opened fire upon BSF and DRG personnel conducting an anti-Naxalite operation in Kanker district, Chhattisgarh. The encounter left 29 Naxalites dead, and three security force personnel injured. In a similar incident on May 10, at least 12 Naxalites were killed in a clash with DRG, Bastar Fighter, CRPF and CoBRA, while an IED blast injured two security personnel during the encounter. On October 4, security forces killed 38 Naxalites during an anti-Maoist operation in the forest of Abhujmad on the Narayanpur-Dantewada district border, Chhattisgarh.

As in previous years, IEDs planted by Naxalites resulted in the injuries or deaths of civilians and security forces. For instance, on July 17, an IED blast resulted in the deaths of two security personnel, while four others were injured in Bijapur district, Chhattisgarh. On October 18, a civilian was killed by an IED planted by Naxalites in West Singhbhum district, Jharkhand.

Throughout the year, Naxalites carried out abductions and assassinations of civilians, security forces, and former members of the CPI-M on suspicion of being police informants. For instance, on February 23, Naxalites killed a rural doctor accused of being a police informant in Bandabera village, West Singhbhum district.

Naxalites continued to target infrastructure. On January 6, Naxalites targeted a construction site, torching three farming machines in Latehar district, Jharkhand. In a similar incident, on March 30, Naxalites set four trucks on fire as they carried iron ore from a mine in Narayanpur district, Chhattisgarh.

As in previous years, Naxalites continued to surrender before security forces. For instance, on April 24, 18 Naxalites surrendered to the police and CRPF in Dantewada district, Chhattisgarh. iha

INDIA (SCHEDULED TRIBES / SCHEDULED CASTES ET AL.)

Intensity: **2** | Change: **↘** | Start: **1981**

Conflict parties: Gujjars, Jats, Marathas, Moran-Motok, Rajputs vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology

The violent crisis over benefits under the reservation system between various communities, most prominently the Marathas, Jats and Moran-Motok, on the one hand, and the

central government as well as the governments of the respective federal states, on the other, de-escalated to a non-violent crisis. The reservation system allocates jobs in the public sector and access to public education based on a community's status as either Scheduled Caste (SC), Scheduled Tribe (ST), or Other Backward Castes (OBC).

Throughout the year, a prominent Maratha activist held several hunger strikes to achieve OBC status for the Maratha community by recognizing them as Kunbi, who have OBC status. For instance, on February 10, he initiated a hunger strike that lasted ten days and drew 25,000 supporters in Jalna district, Maharashtra state.

From June 13 to June 20, two activists held similar hunger strikes to protest reservation quotas for Marathas in education and for government jobs in Jalna.

Other communities also staged protests to advocate for OBC recognition. On January 17, a group of several hundred Jats protested in Bharatpur district, Rajasthan state, calling for the state government to include them in the OBC list.

On November 9, several hundred students from the Moran-Motok community held protests in Tinsukia district, Assam state, over a delay in recognition as Scheduled Tribes. nkl

INDIA (SIKHS)

Intensity: **2** | Change:  | Start: **1947**

Conflict parties: Khalistan supporters, KTF, SFJ vs. government

Conflict items: secession

The violent crisis over the secession of Khalistan between various Sikh groups, such as Sikhs for Justice (SFJ), and the government, de-escalated to a non-violent crisis.

This year, the killing of the leader of the Khalistan Tiger Force (KTF), Hardeep Singh Nijjar, on 06/18/23 in Surrey city, British Columbia province, Canada, remained central to the conflict. Multiple violent encounters involving Khalistan militants linked to the killing have subsequently taken place. For instance, on November 3, at least three Khalistan activists linked with the SFJ were involved in beatings, one using a pole, during Hindu demonstrations outside a Hindu Temple in Surrey, British Columbia. Moreover, on October 10, a bomb caused an explosion outside the School of the Central Reserve Police Force in the North-West Delhi district, National Capital Territory of Delhi. SFJ claimed responsibility for the attack, describing it as an act of retaliation. No one was injured.

Throughout the year, the diplomatic dispute between Canada and India continued. For instance, on May 3, the Canadian police arrested three suspects in British Columbia for their involvement in Nijjar's killing, leading to heightened tensions. On October 14, Canada and India each expelled six top diplomats in response. mbb

INDIA – PAKISTAN

Intensity: **3** | Change:  | Start: **1947**

Conflict parties: India vs. Pakistan

Conflict items: territory, international power, resources

The violent crisis over the status of the Kashmir region, international and regional power and water distribution between India and Pakistan continued.

The conflict centered around Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) and Pakistan-administered Azad Jammu and Kashmir, with a rise in violent encounters compared to 2023, totaling 21 encounters and four arrests along the Line of Control (LoC). For example, on April 4, the Indian Army killed two Pakistani militants allegedly infiltrating the Uri sector of Baramulla district in J&K. On June 28, the Pakistani and Indian Armies exchanged fire in the Krishna Ghati sector of Poonch district in J&K with no casualties. On July 18, the Indian Army killed two Pakistanis along the LoC in the Keran sector of Kupwara district in J&K. On August 31, the Indian Army fired warning shots across the LoC in reaction to construction work by the Pakistani Army in Gurez sector, Bandipore area of J&K, without casualties. On September 11, Indian and Pakistani troops fired at each other along the LoC in the Akhnoor area of Jammu district of J&K, injuring one Indian soldier.

On February 12 and July 8, Indian Border Security Forces shot down a Pakistani drone along the LoC and, on August 23, an Indian drone accidentally crossed the LoC and was captured by the Pakistani Army.

Diplomatic tensions between India and Pakistan over the Kashmir region, water distribution, and extraterritorial killings remained high. However, accusations of state-sponsored terrorism decreased, with the issue being raised only three times by India on March 23, July 20 and on December 13. Pakistan accused India of extraterritorial killings in Pakistan-administered Kashmir and other countries on January 25, April 4, and May 2. Diplomatic confrontations also occurred at UN meetings, for example with India responding to Pakistan's comments on the Kashmir region on February 29 at a UNHCR meeting, and Pakistan accusing India of threats to cross the LoC in a speech at the UNGA on September 27.

Amidst these tensions, there were occasional attempts at diplomatic normalization. A Pakistani delegation visited India on June 24 to inspect water power projects in India, marking the first Pakistani inspection in India since 2019. Furthermore, in October, the Indian Foreign Minister traveled to Pakistan for a meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), marking the first visit by an Indian Foreign Minister in Pakistan since 2015.

Notably, also on September 9, while honoring fallen soldiers, Pakistan for the first time admitted its involvement in the 1999 Kargil War with India. On September 18, India issued a notice to Pakistan requesting changes to the Indus Water Treaty due to concerns including changes in population demographics and environmental challenges. ezu

INDONESIA (ACEH REGIONAL GOVERNMENT – OPPOSITION / ACEH)

Intensity: **1** | Change:  | Start: **2006**

Conflict parties: opposition vs. Aceh regional government

Conflict items: subnational predominance, resources

The dispute over subnational predominance in Aceh between Aceh's regional government and the opposition continued.

In the 2024 general elections, the Aceh Party (PA), the political party of the former Free Aceh Movement, retained its majority in Aceh's House of Representatives for the fourth consecutive time. However, like other local parties, the PA lost seats at the city and district level, attaining no seats in the city council of the provincial capital, Banda Aceh. Instead, national parties, including the National Awakening Party (PKB), gained significant votes at the district level.

Unlike much of the rest of Indonesia, where now President Prabowo Subianto dominated votes, PKB-supported candidate Anies Baswedan won a majority vote in Aceh.

Subsequently, former president Joko Widodo dismissed Achmad Marzuki as Acting Governor of Aceh, replacing him with Bustami Hamzah. However, in the gubernatorial election on November 27, incumbent governor Hamzah was defeated by the Aceh Party's Muzakir Manaf.

INDONESIA (ISLAMIST MILITANT GROUPS)

Intensity: **1** | Change: **↓** | Start: **1981**

Conflict parties: JAD vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology

The violent crisis over the orientation of the political system between Islamist militant groups, such as Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) and Jamaah Islamiyah (JI), on the one hand, and the government, on the other, de-escalated to a dispute.

On January 30, 16 senior members of JI announced that the organization was disbanding, via a video posted online. The authenticity of the statement was then confirmed by the Indonesian Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict on July 4.

JI agreed to submit to revisions of the educational curriculum of its 60 Islamic boarding schools (date unclear). Additionally throughout the year JI and the Indonesian counterterrorism squad Densus 88 toured the country in an effort to prevent the formation of splinter groups and convince grassroots JI members to disband. jbu

INDONESIA (PAPUA)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **1961**

Conflict parties: OPM, ULMWP et al. vs. government

Conflict items: secession, resources

The violent crisis over secession rights and resources between the Free Papua Movement (OPM), including associated opposition groups, and the Indonesian government continued. The conflict led to significant violence and displacement. Ongoing clashes between Indonesian security forces and the West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB), the armed wing of OPM, displaced more than 79,867 of individuals in West Papua as of late September 2024.

TPNPB maintained its strategy of targeting government buildings and civilian infrastructure, aiming to expel Indonesian migrants from the region. For instance, on July 13, TPNPB operatives burned down all elementary, middle, high, and vocational schools in Kampung Borban, Pegunungan Bintang Regency. On July 31, a truck driver was tortured and killed by TPNPB members in Masi Village, Yahukimo Regency.

On September 21, TPNPB fighters released a New Zealand pilot. The pilot had been kidnapped on 02/07/23, after he

landed a plane in Nduga Regency. While TPNPB had released the passengers, they retained the pilot captive for 19 months. The Indonesian military and police conducted raids and operations in response to TPNPB activities. For instance, on April 5, a shootout in Kali Kabur area, Mimika Regency, resulted in the deaths of two TPNPB leaders.

Security forces faced allegations of human rights violations, including torture and extrajudicial killings. For instance, a series of videos circulated online showed what appeared to be soldiers punching, kicking, and slicing a Papuan man in a barrel. das

KAZAKHSTAN (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **2** | Change: **•** | Start: **2004**

Conflict parties: opposition vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The non-violent crisis over national power and the orientation of the political system between opposition groups, such as the banned Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan (DVK), the Democratic Party of Kazakhstan (DPK), and individual activists, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued.

Tensions arose particularly surrounding the national referendum on the construction of a nuclear power plant (NPP), which took place on October 6 and in which 71.12% of participants voted in favor. In response, those opposing the plan held a press conference on October 9, alleging violations during the voting process and detentions of activists. For instance, on September 29, police detained twelve opponents of nuclear power in the city of Almaty, eponymous region. The village of Ülken, also in the Almaty region, is one of the proposed sites for the NPP.

Selective detentions of opposition activists and subsequent prison sentences continued throughout the year. On March 1, police detained a DPK activist in Almaty who claimed that authorities used excessive force during his arrest. On August 2, a court in the town of Konaev, Almaty region, sentenced a journalist to seven years in prison for alleged ties to the DVK. On August 11, he went on hunger strike in response. Similarly, on January 24, the imprisoned leader of the "Alga, Kazakhstan!" movement also went on hunger strike to protest the living conditions in prisons. Meanwhile, his movement unsuccessfully attempted to officially register as a political party, submitting its registration documents for the 25th time on November 20. s.s.

KYRGYZSTAN (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **2** | Change: **↘** | Start: **2005**

Conflict parties: opposition vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The violent crisis over the orientation of the political system and national power between the opposition and the government de-escalated to a non-violent crisis.

Regarding issues of national power, there were several attempts of coup d'etat. On January 10, the State Committee for National Security (SCNS) stated that a businessman and an activist had been planning a coup. On March 27, the SCNS confirmed the detention of the ex-deputy Head of Customs

and his brothers for ties to an organized criminal group from Azerbaijan plotting the assassination of members of President Sadyr Japarov's government. On July 5, the SCNS stated that five people had been preparing another coup during sports games in the capital Bishkek. Moreover, on November 12, a district court in Bishkek detained an ex-deputy Prosecutor General and six others for organizing a violent seizure of power.

The ideological confrontation between the opposition and the government also remained salient. Japarov's political course was focused on limiting alleged foreign interference in the civil and information space. On April 2, he passed a law regulating foreign-funded NGOs. Furthermore, on January 16, the Ministry of Internal Affairs opened a criminal case against the media outlet Temirov Live for receiving grants from abroad, and arrested eleven journalists in Bishkek. On October 10, two of the journalists were sentenced to prison and two were placed on probation. The other seven were acquitted earlier in the year.

Foreign affairs also caused tensions within Kyrgyz society. A district court in Bishkek extended the ban on rallies in the center, which has been in place since 03/22, until December 31, on account of the Ukrainian crisis [→ Russia – Ukraine]. There was also a relaxation of restrictions against civil society. On June 14, a district court in Bishkek acquitted 27 activists in the Kempir-Abad case, who protested against a border deal with Uzbekistan in 10/22 [→ Kyrgyzstan – Uzbekistan – Tajikistan (border communities / Fergana Valley)]. agl

while the presidency has been held by the PNC since last year.

On January 28, President Mohamed Muizzu failed to secure the approval of three of his ministers, which led to a physical brawl in the parliamentary building in the capital Malé between PNC and opposition lawmakers, leaving several individuals injured. One MP was taken to hospital on account of their injuries. The following day, the opposition parties, MDP, and The Democrats, united to impeach Muizzu. The Supreme Court suspended the impeachment attempt, however. Subsequently, on January 30, Muizzu reappointed his three ministers.

In response to the power struggle between the executive and legislative branches, MDP and The Democrats boycotted Muizzu's annual presidential address on February 5.

One month before the parliamentary elections on March 23, a campaign event involving an MDP candidate and PNC supporters turned violent on Maamendhoo island, Gaafu Alifu Atoll, injuring two.

Parliamentary elections were held on April 21. The PNC won a supermajority, securing more than two thirds of the seats in parliament, which enabled Muizzu to amend the constitution. On October 20, Muizzu used his supermajority to extend executive powers and changed regulations to allow him to unseat lawmakers who change parties, strengthening his control over the party. The MDP organized protests against this amendment around the parliamentary building at the time of its passage. mam

LAOS (BUDDHISTS – CHRISTIANS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↗** | Start: **1975**

Conflict parties: **Buddhists vs. Christians**
 Conflict items: **system/ideology**

The non-violent crisis over the right to practice religious beliefs between the Christian minority and Buddhist majority escalated to a violent crisis.

On February 4, approx. 50 villagers and local officials burned down a house church in Kaleum Vangke, Savannakhet Province. Bibles and other symbols of Christianity were torched.

On June 22, authorities arrested a pastor and five other practicing Christians during a prayer meeting at his home in Tahae, Khammouane Province. Authorities later released the apprehended persons.

Most significantly on July 22, two Buddhist gunmen on a motorbike shot a pastor in his garden in the town of Vanghay, Oudomxay Province. Both gunmen were arrested. pbu

MALDIVES (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **2003**


Conflict parties: **opposition vs. government**
 Conflict items: **national power**

The violent crisis over national power between the Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) and The Democrats, on the one hand, and the government, currently consisting of the People's National Congress (PNC), on the other, continued. At the beginning of the year the MDP held a congressional majority

MYANMAR (AA / RAKHINE STATE)

Intensity: **5** | Change: **•** | Start: **2015**

Conflict parties: **AA vs. Myanmar Army**
 Conflict items: **autonomy**



The war over autonomy between Arakan Army (AA) and the Myanmar Army (Tatmadaw) in Rakhine State continued. Over the course of the year, at least 861 people were killed and at least 248 injured. At least 268 of the casualties were civilians. Critical infrastructure, such as hospitals, were damaged throughout the year, which further complicated the living conditions in the already fragile state.

Over the course of the year, both parties intensified their endeavors about gaining territory in Rakhine State. At the beginning of the year, the AA launched attacks on several junta outposts, including an outpost in Kyauktaw township, Mrauk-U district, on January 11, 2024. These attacks were shortly followed by the capture of 100 army soldiers by the AA on the outposts in Rathedaung township, Sittwe district, on January 16. Due to the significant personnel and territorial losses across Myanmar, the junta introduced a conscription law on February 10, to counteract the extent. Starting in April, it was planned to draft approximately 5,000 people per month, including Rohingyas [→ Myanmar (Rohingya); Bangladesh (Rohingya / Cox's Bazar)]. Despite the juridical actions taken by the junta, the AA gained important control over miscellaneous townships and command outposts. On March 11, the AA took control of Ponnagyun town. The

AA further consolidated their power and influence by the capturing of Buthidaung and Maungdaw townships on May 18. On December 21, the AA extended their position and seized the military's Western Command in Ann Township. The Western Command was the military's second regional command to fall into the Ethnic Armed Organisation's hands in 2024 [→ Myanmar (MNDAA / Shan State)].

In addition to this, attacks on villages and towns in Rakhine occurred throughout the whole year. Between January 25 and January 28, at least twelve civilians were killed in Buthidaung township, and more than 30 others were injured by the military. In addition to this incident, the military attacked civilians at a market on February 29. At least twelve civilians were killed and over 80 were injured in the explosion. Moreover, systematic airstrikes were conducted in various parts of the State, targeting villages, schools, and hospitals. During the capture of Buthidaung of the AA in months of April and May alone, at least 40 villages were burned down. These destruction caused over 70,000 IDPs, reported by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. The situation escalated further, especially from May onwards. During two days between May 29 and 31, in a massacre in Byian Phyu, Sittwe district, approximately 70 civilians were killed by the military. Furthermore, on June 3, the Army massacred at least 50 residents of Sittwe township, eponymous district. However, the AA also attacked various civilians and important infrastructure. On May 17, the AA attacked a school and burnt various homes in Buthidaung, leaving at least twelve people dead.

Due to the escalating situation, Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders) decided to withdraw their staff from northern Rakhine State. The humanitarian situation in Rakhine State deteriorated drastically; food supplies for the local population became scarce, leading to looting. For instance, on June 22, a World Food Programme warehouse was looted and set on fire. The precarious situation was further emphasized in a report by the UNDP in October, which highlighted that only 20 percent of the required food supplies would remain available in Rakhine State by March 2025, making a famine increasingly likely. [isf](#)

MYANMAR (CHIN BROTHERHOOD - CHINLAND COUNCIL / CHIN STATE)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **NEW** | Start: **2024**

Conflict parties: Chin Brotherhood vs. Chinland Council

Conflict items: subnational predominance

A new violent crisis over subnational predominance between the Chin Brotherhood and the Chinland Council erupted in Chin State, Myanmar. In 2023, the Chin National Front (CNF) withdrew from the Interim Chin National Consultative Council (ICNCC), established in 2021, and formally announced the formation of the Chinland Council on June 12, 2023, together with the Matupi CDF Brigade II, aiming to unify Chin communities. The CNF was supported by its armed wing, the Chin National Army (CNA). In response, other Chin armed groups opposed the Chinland Council over representation concerns, leading to the formation of the Chin Brotherhood Alliance (CBA) on December 30, 2023. The CBA includes the Maraland Defense Force (MDF), Zomi Federal Union, Chin National Organization, Mindat Chin National Council, Kampelet Chin

Defense Force, and Matupi CDF Brigade I, with support from the Arakan Army [→ Myanmar (AA / Rakhine State)].

In violent confrontations between the coalitions, at least 21 people were killed and 8 injured throughout the year. On January 5, the MDF detained four members of the Chinland Defence Force-Mara (CDF-Mara) near Shwe Laik Wa village, Paletwa township. From January 31 to February 3, Chinland Council forces attacked MDF camps in Matupi district using drones, killing two fighters and injuring three others. Between February 21 and 23, Chinland Council forces bombed Para village, Paletwa, —an area controlled by the MDF—injuring one person and damaging seven houses. On February 27, clashes between MDF and CNA-CDF-Mara forces near Paiktay village, Paletwa, resulted in the deaths of four CNA fighters. On June 18, CBA and Arakan Army (AA) forces clashed with CNA troops near Matupi town, resulting in two fatalities. Between July 2 and 7, Chinland Council forces conducted drone bombings and four ambushes against CBA forces in Matupi town, killing more than 10 members of the CBA. On July 13, an hour-long shootout occurred near Lailinte Village between advancing MDF-AA forces and the CNA-CDF-Mara coalition. On July 18, MDF and AA forces launched clearance operations near Lailenpi, Matupi district, temporarily forcing CNA-CDF-Mara forces to retreat.

Following these developments, peace talks planned for August 15 in New Delhi under Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) mediation were delayed due to security concerns. Shortly after, India launched a separate initiative to mediate broader negotiations with Myanmar's resistance groups. On September 21, the CNF and the ICNCC/Chin Brotherhood met in Aizawl, Mizoram State, facilitated by the Zo Reunification Organization (ZORO), and reached a preliminary peace agreement. They agreed on five points, including a commitment to refrain from using armed means to resolve internal disputes and the establishment of a peace committee. [Isr](#)

MYANMAR (INTER-MILITANT RIVALRY / SHAN STATE)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **2015**

Conflict parties: UWSA vs. Ta'ang National Liberation Army vs. Restoration Council of Shan State vs. SSPP

Conflict items: subnational predominance

The violent crisis over subnational predominance in Shan State between various Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs), including the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP), and the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), continued. Territorial gains by the TNLA and the MNDAA in Northern Shan State during Operation 1027 [→ Myanmar (TNLA / Shan State); Myanmar (MNDAA / Shan State)] resulted in tensions with the KIA. On February 4, TNLA troops forcibly removed flags in Kutkai Town, which were placed by the KIA and Kachin civilians to celebrate the Kachin Revolution Day. On March 15, both groups engaged in a gunfight at a checkpoint between Mantong and Namkhan Townships. Throughout April and May, multiple mediation talks were held between the TNLA and the KIA to resolve their dispute. However, tensions continued. On May 29, TNLA troops forced a KIA-run school to close in Kutkai Town and prevented the local Kachin people

from registering their children to attend classes. In Namtu Township, KIA soldiers obstructed two roads by inserting iron rods and digging trenches to hinder the movement of TNLA troops on June 10, while TNLA troops arrested ten KIA members on July 10 in Namtu Town for alleged possession of pistols. Similar events unfolded between the MNDAA and the KIA. In April, MNDAA troops attacked KIA soldiers at a checkpoint in Kutkai Township and prevented the opening of a KIA-run school in Tangyan Township on June 10.

Despite being allies, gunfights broke out between the TNLA and the MNDAA on April 19 and 27 in Kutkai Township. On the same day, over 100 MNDAA troops arrested 36 TNLA members, seizing their weapons.

In Southern Shan State, tensions between the SSPP and the RCSS escalated in Lawksawk Township. Both EAOs engaged in four armed clashes throughout June. On June 25, two civilians were killed and four injured when a landmine detonated. It is unclear which party planted the landmine [→ Myanmar (SSA / Shan State)].


MNDAA and TNLA troops engaged in violent clashes with the SSPP. On March 26, over 200 MNDAA troops launched a drone attack on SSPP troops stationed in Hseni Township and attacked their camps for two days. In the following days, both groups arrested one another's members. On June 26, TNLA troops sealed off public facilities in Nawngping Town, Kyaukme Township, denying SSPP troops and civilians of Shan ethnicity access. One week later, on July 5, SSPP troops attacked TNLA positions, killing seven TNLA members and detaining and disarming 20 others. A resolution meeting between TNLA and SSPP officials was held on July 15, freezing the conflict between both EAOs. tri

MYANMAR (KIA, KIO / KACHIN STATE)

Intensity: **5** | Change: **↗** | Start: **1961**

Conflict parties: KIA, KIO vs. Myanmar Army

Conflict items: autonomy, resources



The limited war over autonomy of Kachin State and resources between the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), politically represented by the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), and the Myanmar Army (Tatmadaw), escalated to a war.

Throughout the year, the conflict between the KIA and the military intensified significantly and resulted in at least 600 fatalities. Additionally, at least 30,000 civilians were internally displaced due to ongoing hostilities. Furthermore, hundreds of buildings, including homes, schools, and churches, were damaged or destroyed in the conflict.

A new offensive launched by the KIA and its allies on March 7 led to a series of territorial gains, with the KIA capturing multiple strategic towns and military outposts. In June, the KIA made further advances, including the capture of five military bases on June 11 and the strategic seizure of the last border trade route connecting Myanmar to China on June 14, which demonstrated a critical setback for Army's operations. By July 27, the KIA and its allies had seized over 200 Army positions in Kachin. By November 4, they had seized around eleven towns in Kachin as well as six towns in Sagaing and

Mandalay Regions and northern Shan State. By November 20, the KIA took control of Kanpaikti town, Waingmaw township, Myitkyina district, Kachin State, a crucial trading town and rare earth mining hub, dealing another blow to the Army's economic interests. By December 4, the KIA and its allies had captured approximately 300 Army positions in Kachin.

The Army responded to these setbacks with an escalation in airstrikes, targeting both KIA positions and civilian areas. This caused widespread destruction and further displacement of people. For example, intensified fighting in Mansi and Momauk townships, both Bhamo district, in May, forced an estimated 10,000 civilians to flee daily Army airstrikes. By December, at least 30,000 civilians, particularly from Bhamo and Mansi townships, were displaced as clashes escalated, further exacerbating the humanitarian crisis.


The KIA and its allies also intensified control over trade routes along Myanmar's border with China, isolating military outposts in the region. In October, China responded by closing several key border crossings with Kachin. These closures, affecting Lweje, Laiza, Pajaung, and Phihmaw towns in Myitkyina and Bhamo districts, blocked the movement of goods and people between KIA-controlled territories and China. tsr

MYANMAR (KNU, KNLA, KNDO ET AL. / KAREN STATE, KAYAH STATE)

Intensity: **5** | Change: **•** | Start: **1948**

Conflict parties: Karenni Army, KNDF, KNDO, KNLA, KNPLF, KNU, People's Revolution Alliance (Magway) vs. Myanmar Army

Conflict items: autonomy



The war over autonomy between the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), the armed-wing of Karen National Union (KNU), in alliance with the Karen National Defense Organization (KNDO), the Karenni Nationalities Defence Force (KNDF), the Karenni National People's Liberation Front (KNPLF), the Karenni Army (KA) on the one hand, and the Myanmar Army (Tatmadaw) as well as Pa-O National Organisation (PNO), on the other, continued.

On January 25, the Border Guard Forces (BGF) of Kayin and Mon State renamed themselves Karen National Army (KNA) and declared independence from both KNU as well as their former ally, the Army. This can be seen as an important change of alliance for BGF's 7,200 troops. However, on April 10, the KNA supported the Army forces against KNLA troops in clashes between KNLA and the Army in Myawaddy District, Karen State.

Throughout the year, the conflict killed at least 956 people, left 422 injured, and internally displaced 387,000 people in Kayin and Kayah. In April alone, 14,000 people fled the conscription drive in Kayin to seek refuge in neighboring Thailand. Both conflict parties used light and heavy weapons, with the Army dominating the airspace. Besides the States of Karen and Kayah, which were the main areas of the conflict, violence spread into the neighboring regions of Kachin State, Shan State, Mon State as well as Bago State, and the

Tanintharyi Region.

On January 8, the KNDF captured the police station of Pekon Township, Taunggyi District, Shan State, and killed 20 SFs. The Army forces continued to retaliate their losses with airstrike-shelling on civilian targets at Kawkareik township, eponymous district and Myawaddy township, eponymous district, both Karen State, destroying at least 60 houses and displacing 30,000 civilians in Kawkareik only. On January 31 and July 31, the junta extended the emergency rule for another six months, each postponing announced elections. On February 10, the junta passed a new conscription law.

On April 1, the junta announced the launch of operation "Aung Zay Ya", within which they hoped to recapture Myawaddy town, eponymous district, Karen State. On April 18, the KNLA and KNDO attacked a reinforcement convoy of the Army in the Mawda Hills on the way to Myawaddy town, killing at least 100 and injuring another 100 SFs. On April 24, the KNLA withdrew from Myawaddy town. Between May 13 and May 24, the KNLA, KNDF and People's Defense Forces (PDF) captured the Pho Chi Mu Camp, Kyainseikgyi District, Karen State, killed 20 SFs, and captured at least 74. During the attacks 27 KNDF forces were killed and ten KNLA forces injured. Between May 29 and June 2, the Army recaptured significant parts of Loikaw town, eponymous district, Kayah State, and burnt at least 60 houses. On June 17, the KNLA captured the Aungtharwara military base in Myeik-Dawei District, Tanintharyi Region, and killed 50 SFs. During the month of July the junta displaced 75,000 people in Kayin State, Mon State, and Tanintharyi Region and destroyed at least 2,200 houses in Kayah State. For instance, on July 16 and July 25, the Army breached Moe Bye Dam and Mongpai Dam, which left at least 2,200 civilians displaced and destroyed over 10,000 acres of crop, causing food scarcity and infections.

On August 8, KNLA and KA captured the Yaykyaw military base in Kayah State, killing at least five SFs. On September 14, the junta released water from the Moe Bye Dam and flooded parts of Kayah State, trapping KNLA troops and killing at least three civilians. The floodings caused food scarcity, shortages in humanitarian aid, accelerated the spread of skin infections, and displaced at least 10,000 civilians. On September 24, fighting between the Army and the PNO on the one side and KNLA, PDF, and KNDF erupted in 16 villages between Pinlaung and Pekon Townships at the border of Shan State with Karen State. The Army attacked KNLA, KNDF, and Bamar People's Liberation Army (BPLA) forces evacuating flood victims, killing at least 60 and injuring 14. Between September 24 and 31, the junta reinforced fighting with 1,000 Army and PNO troops, of which the KNLA and KNDF forces killed at least 70.

On October 12, KA and PDF captured Htoo Chaung Base between Bawlakhe and Hpasauung Township, Karen State. On October 17 and 29, KNLA, PDF, and BPLA captured two military bases in Karen State; firstly the Lay Kay Kaw artillery base, Myawaddy District, killing at least ten SFs and leaving 15 injured, while the junta injured at further 15 KNLA and PDF troops, and, secondly, the Khawpoke military base, Hpapun Township, killing at least 16 SFs and leaving 17 injured, while the junta killed at least one BPLA combattant and injured five KNLA troops.


On November 9, the KNLA and KNDF forces captured Kuseik military base, Hpapun District, Karen State, killing at least eight SFs. On December 2, KNLA and PDF captured two Myanmar Army military camps in Dwe Loh Township, Mu Traw District, Karen State, killing at least six junta troops, capturing 30. On December 16, KNLA forces recaptured the Manerplaw area, Hpapun District, Karen State, from the Army, killing at

least ten SFs. nif

MYANMAR (MNDAA / SHAN STATE)

Intensity: **4** | Change: **•** | Start: **1989**

Conflict parties: MNDAA vs. Myanmar Army
 Conflict items: autonomy, subnational predominance



The limited war over autonomy and subnational predominance of the Kokang region, Shan State, between the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and the Myanmar Army continued. The conflict has seen a shift away from a resource focus. Whilst the MNDAA previously fought for control of the region for financial gain through drug trade, they now predominantly aim to provide autonomy for the Kokang people.

The MNDAA conducted their offensives as head of the Brotherhood Alliance, which comprises two other ethnic rebel groups, the Arakan Army (AA) and Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), continuing Operation 1027 against the Myanmar Military [→ Myanmar (TNLA / Shan State)]. Throughout the year, there were at least 16 separate fatal instances, leaving a minimum of 229 dead and 201 injured. On January 3, after prolonged fighting against the military, the MNDAA and Brotherhood Alliance won control of Laukkaing, Shan State, the cultural capital of the Kokang people. This resulted in a ceasefire agreement, which the junta subsequently broke on January 24 when they recommenced shelling in the Kokang region, killing one MNDAA member. This junta re-offensive continued, resulting in the deaths of nine civilians on February 13 via airstrikes from junta fighter jets.

The MNDAA was largely criticized on April 24, including a condemnation by the UN, due to the perceived illegitimate trial and subsequent execution of three MNDAA members due to abuse of power charges. The second phase of Operation 1027 began in early July, aiming to capture the Lashio, the largest town in northern Shan State. Heavy artillery fire in Lashio from both sides resulted in 15 civilian deaths between July 3 and 8. Furthermore, the junta struck the market town of Hsenwi by air on July 19, killing a further 15 civilians. This prompted the mass evacuation of the region, with approx. 80,000 people fleeing.

On July 31, the MNDAA ambushed a large junta convoy of 400 soldiers between Tangyan Town and Nampawng Town, killing over 50 of them. Shortly after, on August 2, in Lashio, the MNDAA attacked a junta hospital and killed at least 100. This was subsequently condemned by the Brotherhood Alliance due to the overly violent nature of the attack. The junta subsequently withdrew from northern Shan state, giving over control of the junta's northeastern command base in Lashio to MNDAA and Brotherhood Alliance.

Shortly after gaining control of the region, on August 19, the MNDAA announced an end to its offensive against the junta, feeling they had achieved their goal of regional autonomy. The Chinese government played a key role in this decision, after increasing its pressure on the MNDAA to halt operations. This was due to unwanted disruption along the Chinese


border, as well as China being allied with the Myanmar junta. This reduced the number of violent instances in the months of September to December. Two separate junta airstrikes occurred in Lashio on September 24 and October 25, killing one person. pbu

MYANMAR (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **5** | Change: **•** | Start: **1962**

Conflict parties: National League of Democracy, National Unity Government, People's Defense Forces vs. Myanmar Army, Pa-Oh National Organisation, Pyu Saw Htee militia

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power



The war over national power and the orientation of the political system between the National League of Democracy (NLD) party, its interim government, the National Unity Government (NUG), and aligned localized People's Defense Forces (PDF), on the one hand, and the Myanmar Army (Tatmadaw) and affiliated militias, on the other, continued.

The Myanmar Army now faces several Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) and aligned PDFs on multiple fronts [→ Myanmar (AA / Rakhine State); Myanmar (KIA, KIO / Kachin State); Myanmar (KNU; KNLA, DKBA et al. / Karen, Kayah State); Myanmar (TNLA / Shan State)] with fighting having greatly intensified after the Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BHA), made up of the Arakan Army, the Ta'ang National Liberation Army, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, and multiple PDFs launched "Operation 1027" in 10/2023. While fighting remained concentrated in Myanmar's border regions, with opposition forces gaining ground across the periphery, opposition troops also launched an increasing number of attacks in Bago Region, Mandalay Region and Naypyidaw Union Territory. Over the course of the year, violence resulted in at least 985 confirmed civilian deaths, 1,113 injured civilians, 285 deaths of Myanmar Army and 15 opposition personnel (although official numbers of personnel casualties are likely severely underreported), and more than 450,000 displaced persons.

The majority of civilian deaths resulted from the over 600 airstrikes carried out by the Army, which primarily targeted civilian populations in areas slipping from Army control. Most occurred in Rakhine State [→ Myanmar (Rohingya)] and Sagaing Region and killed at least 590 civilians, displaced tens of thousands, and destroyed multiple villages, at least ten hospitals and health centers, 23 schools, and 26 religious institutions. The deadliest reported airstrikes occurred between June 4 and 5, when the Army bombed Sin Gaung village, Thandwe township, eponymous district, Rakhine State, in response to fighting in nearby Gawt village in the same district. The attack killed between 64 and 100 civilians, and caused residents of Sin Gaung and nearby villages to flee. PDF troops also carried out aerial and rocket attacks, mostly targeting military infrastructure. For instance, on April 4, in a rare incident in Naypyidaw, the country's capital and army stronghold, a PDF unit carried out a drone attack, launching

30 drones on several military sites, including the residence of Army chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing and the headquarters of the State Administration Council (SAC). The extent of the damage to military infrastructure remains unknown.

Moreover, PDFs conducted raids on strategic Army locations including convoys, bases, outposts, and camps. In one incident on April 9, seven allied PDFs captured two army camps between Homalin township, Mawlaik district, and Paungbyin township, Hkamti district, both in the Sagaing Region. 120 army soldiers surrendered and PDFs gained full control over the strategically important Chindwin River. PDF troops also targeted strategic economic locations, seizing a cement factory in Madaya township, Aungmyethazan district, Mandalay Region on July 14, and taking control of a nearby gold mine on August 6.

In another incident on September 30, PDFs attacked an Army column, killing at least 31 soldiers and capturing 42 in Budalin Township, Sagaing Region. In retaliation, between October 2 and 20, the army conducted 17 airstrikes and raids on villages in Budalin township, Monywa district, Sagaing Region, killing at least 25 civilians, taking 20 captives as human shields, burning down over 300 houses and displacing over 100,000 civilians in the region.

The army also received support from various aligned militias, including the Pyu Saw Htee militia and the Pa-Oh National Organization, who arrested, tortured, and killed civilians for allegedly being members of or supporting PDFs. For instance, on May 21, Pyu Saw Htee militia members raided Taung Ywar Thit village, Pale township, Yinmabin district, Sagaing Region, and detained and tortured 23 people for allegedly supporting PDFs operating in the area. Four died from torture, others were released for ransom.

In response to the intensified fighting and increasing loss of territory, on February 10, the SAC enacted a mandatory conscription law to replenish Army ranks. The implementation of the law led to reports of forced conscription, several suicides, and a new wave of possibly affected people fleeing the country to escape conscription. In December alone, Myanmar security forces arbitrarily arrested at least 200 civilians on the streets of major cities, most in Yangon city, eponymous region, in an alleged forced conscription drive.


The Army also continued its arrests and executions of political opponents throughout the year. For instance, on September 24, the Army executed two anti-coup activists for their alleged involvement in a bombing attack on Insein Prison in 10/2022. A further 29 political opponents have also reportedly died from torture, bad conditions, and denial of treatment across prisons in Myanmar. jsu

MYANMAR (ROHINGYA)

Intensity: **4** | Change: **↗** | Start: **2012**

Conflict parties: ARSA, Rohingya, RSO vs. Myanmar Army

Conflict items: subnational predominance, other



The violent crisis over subnational predominance in Rakhine State and ethnic rights of Rohingya between the Rohingya

ethnic group and Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs), such as the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) and Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO), on the one hand, and the Myanmar Army (Tatmadaw), on the other, escalated to a limited war.

On January 25, local authorities arrested 153 Rohingya in Eastern Mon State as they tried to flee the country. Between January 25 and 28, Army's shelling of Hpon Nyo Lake village, Buthidaung township, Maungdaw district, Rakhine State, during fighting between the Arakan Army and the Army [->Myanmar (AA / Rakhine State)] killed twelve people and injured 32. The attacks targeted civilians in the mostly ethnic Rohingya village, destroying more than 40 homes and displacing 15,000 people from several surrounding villages. Throughout February, the Army forced at least 100 Rohingya from several villages and camps in Rakhine State to undergo military training. On March 1, Army forces abducted and injured 40 Rohingya at the Kyauk Ta Lone IDP camp, Kyaukphyu township, eponymous district, Rakhine State, as they tried to flee forced conscription. On March 11, Army shelling in Sittwe city, eponymous district, Rakhine State killed eight and injured nine Rohingya. A further 22 Rohingya were killed, by airstrikes in Minbya township, Mrauk-U district, Rakhine State, March 18. A day after, the Army forced 21 Rohingya to join the military in Rakhine State. On March 21, the Army arrested 80 Rohingya as they tried to flee the country in Mon State. The day after, Army bombing killed 23 Rohingya and injured another 20 in Minbya township. On April 3, Army forces killed six Rohingya and injured 16 by airstrikes and artillery attacks around Myitna village, Minbya township, Mrauk-U district. In another incident on April 15, airstrikes killed a further 25 civilians and forced 3,000 residents to leave their homes in Buthidaung township.

On May 8, 2024, at least 40,000 Rohingya fled from around 10 villages in Maungdaw and Buthidaung township, Rakhine State due to intense fighting between the Arakan Army and junta forces.

On May 18, the Army set fire to Buthidaung township, killing 31 Rohingya, injuring 200, and destroying 400 houses. On May 29, Army forces killed at least 53 Rohingya by beating and shooting them in the village of Byain Phyu, near Rakhine State's capital of Sittwe.

On August 6, drone strikes on the Naf River in Rakhine State killed between 70 and 200 Rohingya, depending on different witness accounts, with both the Army and the AA accusing each other of the attack. Many of them were reportedly children and women. The Rohingya fled to the Naf River to seek protection from escalating violence, hoping to cross into Bangladesh to escape the conflict.

On October 17, human traffickers abandoned 70 Rohingya refugees from Rakhine State in southern Thailand's Mae Sot district, Tak province, where Thai authorities later found them. Two of the refugees had died, and at least ten were critically injured. On November 11, at least 174 Rohingya drowned in the sea as they tried to flee Myanmar by boat.

nha

MYANMAR (SOCIOECONOMIC PROTESTS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **2007**

Conflict parties: local protesters vs. ethnic Armed organizations, Myanmar Army, PRC state-owned enterprises

Conflict items: resources

The violent crisis over resources, such as the mining of copper, gold, jade and rare earths in Kachin State, Shan State, and the Sagaing Region, as well as over infrastructure projects between local protesters, on the one hand, and predominantly Chinese State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), backed by the Myanmar Army and Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs), on the other, continued.

Throughout the year, the Chinese SOE-run Letpadaung copper mine in Salingyi township, Sagaing Region, was the scene of protests and attacks by EAOs. On January 6, troops of the Burma Liberation Democratic Front (BLDF) attacked Myanmar Army soldiers deployed as security guards on the mining site, killing two. On June 2, hundreds of protesters staged demonstrations against the continuation of mining operations. A series of violent events unfolded in September. Resistance forces bombed the mining site with a series of drone attacks between September 4 to 6 and a Myanmar Army column, dispatched to protect transport trucks, was hit by a landmine on September 11, killing one soldier and injuring five. The next day, Myanmar Army soldiers stationed at the mine detained, interrogated, and tortured 23 civilians.

On February 14, soldiers of the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), an EAO active in Kachin State, dispersed a protest against rare-earth mining in Chipwi township, by firing grenades into the crowd, injuring an unknown number and detaining at least 40 people. In June, rare earth mining in Kachin State caused two landslides, killing five people, while 50 went missing. In mid-November the KIO announced the intention to intensify its rare-earth mining operations. These developments stand in contrast to 04/2023, when local protesters achieved the ceasing of KIO-operated rare-earth mining in Mansi township.

At the International Day of Action Against Dams and for Rivers on March 14, 1,400 members of Karen Rivers Watch, a coalition of civil society groups and villagers, protested the continuation of Thailand-backed hydropower projects at the Salween River in Shan and Karen State. On July 14, a dam at the Amarapura Urban Project construction site, operated by the Singaporean company MORROW, collapsed in Amarapura Township, Mandalay Region, resulting in the deaths of nine workers.

Gold and coal mining in Shan State caused an increase in flash floods during August, destroying over 9,000 acres of farmland in Langhko District. A study conducted by Thailand's Department of Natural Resources in October shows that the United Wa State Army (UWSA) operated gold mining in Shan State caused increased flooding in Northern Thailand.

In early August, the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) announced the suspension of large-scale ruby mining in Mogoke township, Mandalay Region, in favor of small-scale mining, while promoting environmentally friendly practises.

tri

MYANMAR (SSA / SHAN STATE)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **1952**

Conflict parties: RCSS (SSA-S), SSPP (SSA-N) vs. Myanmar Army

Conflict items: autonomy

The violent crisis over the autonomy of Shan State and the political system in Myanmar between the Shan State Army North (SSA-N) and its political wing, Shan State Progressive Party (SSPP), and the Shan State Army South (SSA-S) and its respective political wing, Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), on the one hand, and the Myanmar army, on the other, continued.

After a party meeting from January 26 to 28, RCSS issued a peace statement, declaring their commitment to resolving political issues through talks and negotiations in Loi Tai Leng, Shan State. However, on February 19, RCSS introduced a new conscription policy, expanding forced recruitment in Mong Hset Township, southern Shan, adding 2,000 new recruits.

From March 17 to 19, a peace summit was held involving RCSS and seven Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement-signatory Ethnic Armed Organisations, in Chiang Mai, eponymous province, Thailand. The summit discussed the ongoing implementation challenges of the agreement. On April 24, SSPP/SSA-N declared war on the Myanmar military, stating that conventional means of political resolution had been futile.

On May 5, SSPP/SSA-N withdrew its war declaration, signaling a shift in their stance towards the Myanmar military. On May 17, a violent clash occurred between RCSS/SSA-S and SSPP/SSA-N, supported by the United Wa State Army in Lawksawk Township, Shan State. Clashes between RCSS and SSPP forces flared up in June, leading to two deaths and four people injured [→ Myanmar (inter-militant Rivalry / Shan State)].

On September 19, junta and militia forces launched a joint attack on an RCSS base in Mongping Township, Shan State. Approx. 100 junta soldiers and militia members assaulted the RCSS base in Yangkam Village Tract, Mongping Township, Kengtung District, resulting in gun clashes. sbo

MYANMAR (TNLA / SHAN STATE)

Intensity: **5** | Change: **↑** | Start: **2013**

Conflict parties: TNLA vs. Myanmar Army

Conflict items: subnational predominance, resources



The violent crisis over subnational predominance in Northern Shan State and Northeastern Mandalay Region between the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Mandalay People Defense Force (PDF), on the one hand, and the Myanmar Army, supported by the People's Republic of China (PRC) on the other, escalated to a war.

Operation 1027, a large-scale military offensive, initiated by

the Brotherhood Alliance on 10/27/2023 against the Myanmar Army, continued in January. As part of the Brotherhood Alliance, TNLA forces continued their operations in Northern Shan State, clashing intensively with the Myanmar Army in Kutkai, Mongmit, Nawngkio and Hsipaw Townships. On January 7, TNLA forces defeated the Myanmar Army in Kutkai, taking full administrative control of the seventh township since Operation 1027 started. A China-brokered ceasefire deal between both actors, the Haigeng Agreement, was enacted for Northern Shan State on January 11.

Despite the ceasefire, the Myanmar Army continued to utilize fighter aircraft and mortars to attack residential areas under TNLA control. From January to April, Myanmar Army forces killed a minimum of 24 civilians and injured 15, while destroying dozens of houses in Northern Shan State. In late April, clashes broke out in Nawngkio again, displacing over 5,000 people. Throughout early June, the Myanmar Army launched several air, drone, and artillery strikes against TNLA positions in Mongmit and Nawngkio, killing three TNLA soldiers and injuring eight.

In response to the Myanmar Army continuing to breach the ceasefire agreement on several occasions, the TNLA relaunched Operation 1027 with thousands of soldiers. On June 25, TNLA forces initiated military operations against the Myanmar Army in Kyaukme, Nawngkio, Mongmit, and Hsipaw Townships. As part of the Brotherhood Alliance, TNLA troops took part in the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army led offensive in Lashio Township, initiated on July 2 [→ Myanmar (MNDAA / Shan State)]. On July 10, TNLA forces conquered Nawngkio, followed by the occupation of Mongmit on July 31. On August 6, TNLA troops conquered Kyaukme. In a public statement, the Myanmar government declared the TNLA a terrorist group on September 2. On October 13, Hsipaw was taken by TNLA forces. Throughout November, the TNLA offensive stopped and shifted into a defensive strategy. Clashes between TNLA forces and the Myanmar Army continued in Nawngkio. The resumption of Operation 1027 internally displaced over 40,000 civilians, while the Myanmar Army continued to launch air and artillery strikes, killing around 200 civilians. On one occasion on July 4, the Myanmar Army allegedly used chemical weapons, most likely chlorine, against TNLA troops in Nawngkio, injuring eight.

As part of Operation 1027, TNLA forces, together with the Mandalay PDF, extended their operations into Mogkoke Township in Mandalay Region on June 25. Mongmit was occupied by joint TNLA and Mandalay PDF forces on July 31. Myanmar Army air and artillery strikes killed at least 48 civilians throughout both months. On November 11, the Myanmar Army conducted an airstrike on Mogkoke Town, killing 20 civilians and injuring 13.

While casualty numbers are mostly unknown, it is suspected that TNLA troops killed hundreds of Myanmar Army forces and vice versa throughout the year in Northern Shan State and Northeastern Mandalay Region. TNLA troops captured a Myanmar Army base in Mogkoke Township, Mandalay Region, on July 22, killing 20 Myanmar Army soldiers. Two days later, on July 24, TNLA forces killed a further 54 Myanmar Army soldiers during a clash in Kyaukme Township, Shan State. Dozens of such clashes occurred throughout the year.

The PRC played a more significant role in the conflict. The PRC government blocked 80 percent of trade towards TNLA-held territory and imposed a ban on the entry of fuel and medicine from June 25. On August 29, the PRC government released an official warning against the TNLA, demanding that all TNLA forces should discontinue hostilities against the

Myanmar Army, while threatening otherwise to enact violent measures. The TNLA declared its willingness for peace talks on November 25, resulting in a China-brokered ceasefire deal between the TNLA and the Myanmar Government in early December. ^{tri}

NEPAL (RIGHT-WING HINDU GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2006**

Conflict parties: RPP, RPP-D, SNN vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology

The violent crisis over the orientation of the political system between right-wing Hindu groups, such as the Rastriya Prajatantra Party, vowing for a constitutional monarchy and a nationalist Hindu state, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued.

In 11/2023, the conflict intensified when pro-monarchy and pro-Hindu groups staged large-scale protests in Kathmandu. Protesters marched in the capital, and attempted to breach police barricades, prompting the intervention of riot police to disperse the crowd. These dynamics eased off over the course of 2024. Furthermore, large-scale arrests or acts of terrorism, as witnessed in 2023 and before, were not reported.

Led by political activist and medical entrepreneur Durga Prasai, protests were particularly intense in the months of February and April. For instance, on February 21, the Rastriya Prajatantra Party staged a demonstration demanding among others the reintroduction of the monarchy and Hindu state, with several leaders of the party participating in the protest march. Two months later, on April 9, hundreds of party cadres and supporters rallied in Kathmandu. Protesters called to overthrow the government, and again to reinstate the constitutional monarchy and to establish a Hindu state. The main goal was the amendment of the 2015 constitution. The demonstration turned violent after the police attempted to stop cadres from advancing into restricted areas, using water cannons and batons to disperse crowds, while protesters hurled stones at the police. While some media outlets reported approx. a dozen protestors were injured, there were reportedly no major injuries or fatalities during the confrontation. ^{pbi}

NORTH KOREA – SOUTH KOREA

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **1948**

Conflict parties: DPRK vs. ROK
 Conflict items: territory, system/ideology, international power

The non-violent crisis over international power, ideology, and territory between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), supported by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Russian Federation (RF), on the one hand, and the Republic of Korea (ROK), supported by the USA, on the other, continued.

DPRK continued the development of its nuclear and military weapons program, conducting 17 missile tests, along with trials of rocket launchers and drones. For example, on October 31, DPRK fired a new Hwasong-19 intercontinental ballistic

missile that marks the longest flight time of a North Korean rocket to date.

Tensions along the inter-Korean border have increased, marked by proactive actions and policy shifts that have further strained relations on the Korean Peninsula. Exemplarily, the DPRK dispatched approximately 6,000 balloons since early 2024 carrying waste, leaflets, and occasionally GPS transmitters into South Korean territory. ROK reacted by resuming loudspeaker broadcasts along the border on June 9, airing messages critical of DPRK leadership, news and K-Pop songs. Furthermore, ROK recommenced fire drills near the inter-Korean land and sea borders, including a heavy artillery exercise on October 17. Several speeches highlighted increasing tensions, including Kim Jong Un’s October 3 warning of nuclear retaliation if DPRK sovereignty was threatened and South Korea’s declaration of martial law against perceived “antistate forces,” albeit ultimately failing.

These hostilities were further exemplified on the international stage. On the one hand, DPRK and the RF formalized their security cooperation on June 19, with Kim Jong Un and Vladimir Putin signing a defense treaty ensuring mutual military aid in the event of an attack. On the other hand, on October 16, ROK, US and Japan pledged to strengthen their trilateral security partnership during a foreign ministerial meeting in Seoul City. ^{akw}

NORTH KOREA, CHINA (DEFECTORS)

Intensity: **1** | Change: ↓ | Start: **2000**

Conflict parties: defectors (network) vs. DPRK, PRC
 Conflict items: system/ideology, other

The violent crisis over the orientation of the political system in form of North Korean defectors’ (NKDs) right to migrate between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Russian Federation (RF) on the one hand, and NKDs and their support networks on the other, de-escalated to a dispute.

The conflict remained intense, with continued forced repatriations, surveillance, and arrests involving NKDs and their networks. At the same time, support efforts persisted, highlighting the ongoing struggle over migration rights and political dissent.

On August 31, DPRK authorities executed two NKDs forcibly repatriated by PRC police on charges of human trafficking. Eleven NKDs were sentenced to life in prison on the same charges. Furthermore, the DPRK arrested a total of over 50 NKDs and NKD network members.

PRC police arrested a total of 22 NKDs and expanded surveillance of NKDs cohabiting with PRC citizens. During an operation on April 26, the police forcibly repatriated around 200 NKDs from Jilin Province to the DPRK.

The involvement of the RF in this conflict increased, as Russian authorities detained two foreign nationals with alleged connection to NKD networks. On the other side, NKDs supported psychological operations aimed at DPRK soldiers deployed to the Russo-Ukrainian War [→ Russia – Ukraine]. In the ROK, NKD support networks conducted six campaigns to send information and humanitarian goods into the DPRK [→ North Korea – South Korea]. Furthermore, the ROK Ministry of Unification commemorated the first North Korean Defectors’ Day on July 14.

According to the ROK Ministry of Unification, 181 NKDs arrived in the ROK as of October 22. ^{lhö}

PAKISTAN (BALOCHISTAN)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1948**

Conflict parties: BLA, BLF, BLT, BNA (militant group), BNA (political party), BNP-M, BRG vs. government

Conflict items: secession, resources

The violent crisis over the secession of Balochistan province and the control of its gas, oil, coal, and mineral resources between several Baloch militant groups, allegedly supported by Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan [→ Pakistan (Islamist militant groups)], and political parties, on the one hand, and the government, supported by China, on the other, continued.

Confrontations between Baloch militants and security personnel as well as violence against civilians left at least 233 people dead, among them 83 Baloch militants, 74 security personnel, and 67 civilians, and at least 201 people injured, among them 14 Baloch militants, 54 security personnel, and 73 civilians.

As in previous years, Baloch militants continued to attack sites and projects related to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). On March 20, Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) launched a major attack on the Gwadar Port Authority complex, which oversees the city's port, an important part of CPEC. Two security personnel and eight BLA militants were killed, while BLA claimed to have killed 45. Five days later, BLA attacked a Pakistani naval air base stationing Chinese drones in Turbat. In the ensuing shootout, all five attackers died and BLA killed at least one soldier. Attacks also targeted Chinese civilians. For instance, on October 6, BLA attacked a convoy of Chinese investors and engineers with a vehicle-borne IED in Karachi, killing at least two Chinese civilians and injuring a further Chinese civilian and nine bystanders.

Attacks by Baloch militant attacks against security forces this year showed a higher degree of coordination. On January 29, BLA launched a series of three attacks in Mach town, Kachhi district, using rocket launchers and mortars and damaging a jail and government buildings as well as entering a military base and a railway station. In the clash, at least four security personnel, nine BLA attackers, and three civilians died. BLA claimed to have killed 45 soldiers. According to the government, security forces killed 24 BLA attackers in subsequent clearance operations. On August 25, BLA launched a series of attacks in the provincial capital Quetta, Sibi district, Kech district, Turbat, Gwadar, and Mastung, which targeted police, a military camp, civilians, and interrupted traffic and railway lines. Overall, at least 73 people died in the attack, among them 14 security personnel, 21 BLA, and 38 civilians.

Civilians were also the target of Baloch militants, often assumed to be government collaborators or informants. On April 13, BLA abducted nine Punjabi civilians from a bus on a highway in Nushki district. BLA subsequently shot all nine dead.

The government continued its efforts to thwart militant activities in Balochistan. During a military operation on July 25, security forces shot dead one BLA attacker and injured two others in Kech district.

Throughout the year, other Baloch militant groups also claimed responsibility for attacks. For instance, Baloch Raajj Ajoi Sangar, a coalition of several groups, claimed 20 attacks on February 7 in the context of the national general elections. The Baloch Republican Guard claimed to have killed


two soldiers with an IED on June 20 in the Nari Gaj area of Sibi. hbe

PAKISTAN (ISLAMIST MILITANT GROUPS)

Intensity: **4** | Change: • | Start: **2001**

Conflict parties: al-Qaeda et al., IS-K, LeJ, TTP vs. government, political parties

Conflict items: autonomy, system/ideology, national power



The limited war over national power, autonomy of the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and the orientation of the political system between Islamist militant groups, such as Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP) and Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K), on the one hand, and the government and political parties, on the other, continued.

In violent confrontations between Islamist militant groups and government forces, at least 412 people were killed and at least 202 injured. It is difficult to link many of these incidents to a specific group. Moreover, injured persons are less often reported than casualties, so unrecorded cases might increase these numbers. The main territory of the conflict continued to be Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), while an increasing amount of measures took place in Balochistan and Sindh provinces. The most prominent Islamist militant groups remained TTP and IS-K.

The vast majority of incidents involved TTP, mostly attacks on Security Forces (SFs) and raids against the militant outfit. For instance, on January 8, TTP attacked a police vehicle with an IED, killing seven officers and injuring 22 people, among them several civilians. On February 5, 30 TTP members attacked a police station in Dera Ismail Khan district, KP, killing ten police officer and injuring six. On March 16, TTP's Hafiz Gul Bahadur faction attacked a military post in Mir Ali area, North Waziristan district, KP, with a vehicle loaded with explosives, killing seven soldiers. Six militants were killed in the subsequent clearance operation. On September 19, TTP combatants killed six SFs and injured eleven in an attack on an SF post in Mishta village, South Waziristan district, in which five TTP combatants were also killed. On October 5, TTP conducted an attack against an SF convoy in Spinwam area, North Waziristan district, resulting in six dead and 23 injured SFs and six TTP casualties. On November 19, TTP's Hafiz Gul Bahadur faction attacked an SF checkpoint using an explosive-laden vehicle, leaving 18 dead and ten injured. A rare attack against foreign nationals took place on March 26, when a TTP suicide bomber attacked a convoy of Chinese officials who were on their way to the Dasu Hydropower Project, Upper Kohistan. Five Chinese nationals and a Pakistani bus driver were killed when he rammed his explosive-laden vehicle into the convoy in Besham area, Shangla district, KP.

Regular raids by SFs targeting TTP hideouts also resulted in casualties and injured persons. For example, on March 17, SFs killed seven TTP militants in Madi Khel area, North Waziristan district, who were allegedly involved in an attack the day before. On April 17, SFs killed seven Hafiz Gul Bahadur faction members in Ghulam Khan tehsil, North Waziristan district,

who were alleged to have infiltrated the Pakistan-Afghan border. On May 27, SFs raided a TTP Lashkar-e-Islam faction hideout, with the resultant exchange of fire leaving five soldiers and seven militants dead, and two further militants injured. On August 28, SFs killed twelve TTP members during a raid in Tirah Valley, Khyber district, KP.

On an organizational level, TTP reintegrated its former faction Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA) into the group's structures. On March 11, TTP announced that it had resolved its past differences with JuA and that important JuA members were to be given key positions within a new TTP organizational structure.

IS-K was less active than in 2023. Particularly measures against Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazl (JUI-F) were significant. The most violent took place on February 7, when IS-K detonated an IED near the central election office of JUI-F in Killa Saifullah town, eponymous district, Balochistan, killing twelve people and injuring 14. IS-K was also responsible for target killings of prominent JUI-F leaders. For instance, on April 2, IS-K shot dead a local JUI-F leader in Miranshah town, North Waziristan district. On the other hand, on February 11, SFs killed a top IS-K commander in Jabbar Mela area, Khyber district, who was allegedly the primary planner of several terrorist attacks.

Ongoing political tension between Afghanistan and Pakistan since 2021 was the root cause of multiple violent incidents between both countries' forces [→ Afghanistan – Pakistan]. On September 9, Pakistani and Afghan SFs exchanged fire on the border at Shorko area, Kurram district, KP, leaving eight dead and seven injured Afghan Taliban and five injured Pakistani SFs. On December 28, a clash between border forces of both countries, including TTP militants fighting on Afghan SFs's side, in Kurram District, KP, left 24 dead and eleven injured. [ith](#)

PAKISTAN (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1973**

Conflict parties: opposition parties vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The violent crisis over national power between Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) and the government continued.

In January, the Peshawar High Court reversed a PTI symbol ban, but this was overturned by the Supreme Court on January 23. Military-affiliated figures reportedly pressured journalists to limit PTI media coverage ahead of the February 6 election. On January 28, PTI protesters demanding the former Prime Minister Imran Khan's release were arrested in Karachi, Sindh province.

On January 30, Khan was sentenced to ten years for leaking state secrets, and both he and his wife faced charges of the illegal sale of state gifts. The following day, they were sentenced to 14 years and fined USD 5.3 million. Court proceedings continued into February, with a Rawalpindi court sentencing them to seven years for violating Islamic law, though they were acquitted on July 13.

On February 9, amid PTI campaign repercussions, protests for fair elections erupted in Lahore, Punjab province. After the election, both Khan and Shehbaz Sharif claimed victory, but political uncertainty followed, with both parties alleging vote rigging. On February 11, thousands protested in Lahore, Peshawar, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, and the capital Islamabad, resulting in approx. 100 arrests.

On April 1, the Islamabad High Court suspended the cor-

ruption charges against Khan and his wife. On April 2, the Election Commission delayed PTI's reserved seats. On June 3, the Supreme Court ruled PTI eligible for these seats, and the Islamabad High Court nullified Khan's state secrets sentence. On July 15, the government moved to ban PTI for anti-state activities, reportedly followed by the abduction of five PTI members. On July 22, police raided PTI's headquarters in Islamabad. The government accused PTI of inciting violence, including the protests in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa which demanded the release of PTI leaders.

Protests continued despite restrictions, leading to 34 arrests in August and September. In October, protests intensified. On October 6, one police officer died during a rally in Islamabad. Khan was charged with attempted murder on October 9. On the same day, 25 PTI leaders were indicted for inciting violence. Khan's wife was released on bail on October 23. Protests persisted in Islamabad throughout November, with 50 PTI members charged under terrorism laws on November 3. On November 25, a protest march demanding Khan's release was held in Islamabad, resulting in 610 arrests and the deaths of six PTI members and five police officers. Talks were announced between the factions in the aftermath of this violence. On December 21, 25 PTI supporters were arrested after attacking military facilities and were later charged by a military court in Islamabad. [lhf](#)

PAKISTAN (PASHTUNS / PTM)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2018**

Conflict parties: Pashtuns, PTM vs. government

Conflict items: autonomy

The violent crisis over autonomy between the Pashtuns, organized into groups such as the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM), and the government continued.

The arrest of group leaders continued to be of importance. PTM leader Manzoor Pashteen, who had been arrested in 2023, was granted bail. On January 5, however, he was re-arrested by police forces on unrelated charges. In accordance with developments in previous years, protests arose following his rearrest.

On January 28, during a protest advocating for Pashteen's release in Lahore City, Punjab province, four protesters were arrested by police for violating prohibition of various forms of political assemblies. International protest rallies and sit-ins were organized by PTM affiliated groups to highlight the human rights situation, in Geneva, eponymous canton, Switzerland, in Vienna, Austria, and in Washington D.C., USA. Another protest was held in front of the UNHCR in Geneva, Switzerland, on March 19.

On April 26, Pakistani Armed Forces abducted a PTM activist and his father in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. On May 4, police forces abducted six Pashtun activists and detained five others.

In June, the PTM organized a range of protests condemning further military activity in the Waziristan region by the army, which continued into the following month [→ Pakistan (Islamist militant groups)]. On June 26, local police forces attempted to arrest a senior PTM member. On July 7, a senior PTM leader, Gilaman Wazir, died after an attack by unknown actors in Islamabad. On July 19, during a protest rally in Bannu, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, police forces fired upon the protesters, leaving three dead and 20 injured. International protests broke out following the incident. On August 12, po-

lice arrested PTM leader Ali Wazir on charges of manhandling police officers after a traffic accident in Islamabad. On August 25, the Balochistan Home Department imposed a 90-day entry ban on Pashteen.

In October, the government took further legal action against PTM leaders. On October 2, police officials arrested 16 high ranking PTM members, following police raids in South Waziristan Province. Additionally, on October 6, the federal government imposed a ban on PTM, citing security concerns. On October 9, further travel restrictions, asset freezes, and enhanced government surveillance were imposed upon Pashteen and 44 others under anti-terrorism law. In Balochistan Province, 34 PTM members were placed under the same restrictions. On October 9 and 10, protests were held condemning the PTM ban, during which police forces killed six and injured eleven while upholding the assembly ban. Despite these incidents Pakhtun Qami Jirga, the traditional assembly of Pashtun leaders and elders, convened in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa from October 11 to October 13 to address key issues affecting the Pashtun community. They renewed their commitment to the movement’s goals. lhf

PAKISTAN (RELIGIOUS GROUPS – SUNNI MILITANTS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1985**

Conflict parties: IS-K, JuA, JUI-F, TTP vs. Ahmadis, Christians, Hindus, Shiites, Sufis

Conflict items: subnational predominance

The violent crisis over subnational predominance between the Sunni groups Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K), Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA), Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Fazl (JUI-F), and Thereeke-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP), on the one hand, and Ahmadis, Christians, Hindus, Shiites, Sufis, on the other, continued.

Throughout the year, members of the public continued to attack the Christian and Ahmadi community in Pakistan. For instance, on February 12, a group of 50 to 60 persons armed with hammers, shovels, sticks, and guns attacked the Ahmadi mosque in Kotli district, Azad Jammu and Kashmir, injuring at least eight Ahmadi people and damaging the mosque. On March 4, a local leader of the Ahmadi community was shot and killed by unknown attackers in Bahawalpur city, Punjab province. On June 8, unknown attackers separately shot dead two members of the Ahmadi community in Mandi Bahauddin district, Punjab province.

On May 25, a mob of hundreds of Muslims attacked a minority Christian settlement over blasphemy allegations in Mujahid Colony, Sargodha city, Punjab province, injuring at least five Christians and at least ten security personnel. The rioters hurled stones and bricks at police and ransacked and burned down a house, as well as a small shoemaking factory of a Christian man they accused of desecrating the Qur’an. On June 17, during Eid al Adha, a mob of more than 150 people attacked and destroyed an Ahmadiyya place of worship in Kotli District, Azad Jammu and Kashmir. On June 20, a man accused of desecrating the Qur’an was killed by a mob in Madyan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, when they stormed the police precinct where he was detained.

On July 7, the Counter-Terrorism Department arrested an alleged commander of the TTP group in Sindh province, who reportedly planned to target a Muharram procession with a suicide bomb in Karachi.

In the second half of the year, a land dispute between Shia-majority and Sunni-majority tribes led to continued clashes in Kurram district, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. For instance, clashes between July 24 and 31 left at least 49 people dead and at least 200 injured. On July 31, tribal elders agreed to a ceasefire. On November 22, unidentified gunmen opened fire on two separate convoys with Shia pilgrims, killing at least 42 people and injuring 20 others. No group claimed responsibility for the attack. In retaliation, later on the same day, a group of Shiites attacked Sunni locations, including the Bagan bazaar. Following that incident, armed Sunni and Shiite groups clashed, leaving at least 32 people dead and 25 injured. sag

PAKISTAN (SINDH)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1947**

Conflict parties: MQM vs. PLM-N, PPP vs. PTI vs. ANP vs. Pakistan Rangers, Sindh Rangers

Conflict items: subnational predominance, resources

The violent crisis over subnational predominance and resources in the Sindh Province involving the Mohajirs, Balochs, Sindhis, Pashtuns, and government-aligned paramilitary forces continued. Each ethnic group was supported by politically active parties: the Mohajirs by the two factions of the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), the Balochs and Sindhis by the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), and the Pashtuns by the Awami National Party (ANP).

Tensions remained high between the MQM-Pakistan (MQM-P) and PPP in the Sindh province, particularly in the first half of the year due to the presidential election on March 9. For instance, on January 20, the PPP alleged that between 20 and 50 MQM-P workers stormed a party candidate’s election office in Karachi, Sindh Province, damaging furniture and injuring four. Similarly, on January 28, a PPP rally in front of the MQM-P office in Karachi led to physical violence and indiscriminate shooting. A MQM-P political worker was shot dead and a PPP partisan injured. On February 2, ripping down of MQM-P posters by PPP started an altercation in which three were injured, including two children wounded by gunshots. Police and rangers arrested 34 persons on the same day, in a joint raid. On July 7, MQM-P leader accused the PPP of cultivating a culture of violence and discrimination against Sindhis. The PPP and the Sindh government rejected the criticism, claiming in response that MQM-P incites violence and terror by spreading ethnic politics. Sindh’s government stated it would not allow the MQM-P to disrupt peace in Karachi, amid rising political tensions.

Following the general election on February 8, the PPP formed a coalition with rival Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz. In a meeting on May 1 in Karachi, the MQM-P assured President Asif Zardari of its willingness to collaborate with any political party on urban issues in Sindh. On November 23, the proposal to dig six further canals from the Indus River was opposed by Sindh’s ruling and opposition parties, warning that the province’s residents would fiercely oppose such action.

Throughout the year, the ANP and the MQM-L remained sporadically active. On February 11, ANP’s province president, Aimal Wali Khan, contested the results of the general elections and demanded an investigation. On July 2, in London, United Kingdom, the founder of MQM-L criticized Pakistan’s military intervention in political and economic affairs, ethnic

division, and armed groups against Mohajirs, emphasizing his advocacy for the rights of oppressed communities. On December 9, Karachi police detained 24 MQM-L workers and leaders in a rally for Martyrs' Day, which was banned by the police commissioner, citing law and order issues. nmt

PAKISTAN (SRA / SINDH)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2020**

Conflict parties: SRA vs. government
 Conflict items: secession, resources

The violent crisis over the secession of the Sindh province and resources between the Sindhudesh Revolutionary Army (SRA) and the Pakistani government continued. Throughout the year, SRA mostly targeted politicians, law enforcement, civilians, and infrastructure in Sindh province. For instance, on January 2, SRA members attacked a Pakistani rangers' vehicle in Dadu city, Sindh. SRA claimed three Pakistani rangers were injured and two killed. On February 2, the SRA claimed responsibility for an IED explosion outside the Election Commission office in Karachi, Sindh, in protest of the upcoming election. No casualties were reported. On July 17, an explosion occurred at the Jamshoro Police Station, Jamshoro city, Sindh, injuring at least six. While law enforcement first assumed that the bombing occurred as the result of old grenades detonating on their own, SRA claimed it as a retaliation to the action of the Sindh Police and the Counter-Terrorism Department (CTD). Similarly, on October 15, two motorcycle riders threw a hand grenade into the home of the Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee and President of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) in Larkana, Sindh. An SRA spokesperson claimed the attack is a reprisal of PPP initiatives like the Green Pakistan Initiative and agricultural projects, highlighting the escalating exploitation and degradation of Sindh's resources and environment. On October 28, two SRA members killed a doctor at his private clinic in Sindh Industrial Trading Estate, Jamshoro district, Sindh. The SRA continued to challenge foreign economic involvement in Pakistan's Sindh region. On June 23, an SRA leader declared China "the biggest enemy" of Sindhis and an ally of the Punjabi, while reinforcing the SRA's hard stance for the Sindh independence. Pakistani authorities continued counterterrorism efforts against SRA. On February 6, Karachi Police arrested two SRA militants in Memon Goth, Karachi, Sindh, who planned to detonate explosives near the polling station and the election office. On July 29, the CTD apprehended two SRA militants in Hyderabad, Sindh, on suspicion of planning a terrorist attack on Pakistan's Independence Day. On August 8, the CTD arrested in Shaheed Benazirabad, Sindh, a SRA leader with explosive materials. To bolster counterterrorism efforts, Sindh Chief Minister, Syed Murad Ali Shah, opened the CTD Fusion Centre in Karachi, Sindh, on November 5. nmt

PAPUA NEW GUINEA (BOUGAINVILLE)

Intensity: **1** | Change: • | Start: **1964**

Conflict parties: Autonomous Bougainville Government vs. national government
 Conflict items: secession, resources

The dispute over secession and resources between the Autonomous Bougainville Government (ABG), on the one hand, and the national government, on the other, continued. The political impasse between the two sides, in particular about the tabling and ratification of the 2019 referendum results, continued.

On March 22, ABG stated that Bougainville could declare independence from Papua New Guinea unilaterally if the two sides could not reach consensus over the independence process. Subsequently, on April 19, Prime Minister James Marape reaffirmed that they would respect the referendum result and the process but that it must be in accordance with the law.

On September 10, the two governments appointed an international mediator to resolve this stalemate.

The devolution of powers and functions continued. ABG created the first draft of a constitution on July 27. Furthermore, on February 2, ABG issued an extension of an exploration license for the Panguna mine, which plays a key role in gaining international revenue to support independence. som

PAPUA NEW GUINEA (INTER-COMMUNAL RIVALRY)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1975**

Conflict parties: Aiyala vs. Hulis vs. Engans vs. Nomali vs. Min vs. Punano vs. Yauna vs. various other tribes
 Conflict items: subnational predominance, resources

The violent crisis between various tribes over subnational predominance and resources, including arable land and livestock continued.

On January 25 the Map tribe killed a finance officer from Karinz in Mendi, Southern Highlands. A tribal clash in Karinz followed and resulted in two others being killed.

On February 18, tribal violence between the Sikin, Kaekin, and Palinu tribes on one side, and the Ambulin and Sau Walep tribes, on the other in Wabag, Enga province, resulting in at least 49 people killed and more than 2,700 injured. On March 13, both tribes unconditionally agreed to a ceasefire for three months.

On March 31, in Kwapun village, East Sepik Province, a man was killed in a land dispute while 20 homes were burned down.

Tewai-Siassi District in Morobe Province experienced the most inter-communal violence throughout the year, particularly in April. For instance on April 5, four people died and 400 villagers were displaced across five villages in Sialum and Karako, both Tewai-Siassi District, Morobe Province after additional police pulled out of Siassi. On April 23, more than 30 people were killed and an unspecified number of people were displaced during a fight in Sialum, Tewai-Siassi, Morobe Province. The fighting started when villagers burnt down houses in Nanda village. Attackers additionally targeted property, namely destroying food crops and cash crops.

On April 25, seven people were killed following a land dispute between Nanda, Karako, and factions of Kanome village, and Ririwo, Zakupet, and other factions of Kanome village. Nunzeng villagers fled to neighboring villages.

On May 15, five people were killed and four others were

injured following a fight between two villages near Base Cam in Bogia. The fight began after six armed men intercepted a motor canoe along the Ramu River, suspecting it was carrying vanilla and cocoa money. The armed group capsized the vessel then retreated to the Korkam boat stop. This quickly escalated into a violent conflict involving neighbouring villages. A village court magistrate from Guaia was shot dead, and villagers from Guaia launched a counter attack on Kumnung village. 20 houses burned down in the aftermath. On July 1, ethnic clashes displaced hundreds while more than 20 people died, four villages burned down, and several food crops were destroyed in Sialum, Tewai-Siassi. Authorities arrested almost 30 suspects, and deployed police officers to stop the fighting between several other villages. Fighting negatively affected services like aid posts and schools. On July 16, around 30 assailants killed at least 26 people in an attack on three villages in East Sepik Province, displacing around 200 residents resulting from land disputes. On September 15 and 16 violence resulting from an illegal mining dispute around Porgera Gold Mine in Enga province killed at least 30. On October 11 members of the Malaput tribe ambushed a vehicle carrying members of the Sarake clan leading to a series of retaliatory shootings along Laiagam-Sirunki Highway in Enga Province killing ten. aev

PHILIPPINES (BIFF)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2008**

Conflict parties: BIFF vs. government
 Conflict items: secession, subnational predominance

The violent crisis between the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) and the Philippine Government, driven by disputes over secession and subnational predominance, continued. This conflict unfolded in the context of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM). The region was established through a peaceful agreement between the Philippine Government and former armed groups, including the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), signed in 2014 and implemented in 2019. While the agreement aimed to secure the rights and identity of the Muslim minority, the BIFF opposed the creation of BARMM and rejected its legitimacy. The conflict violence concentrated in the BARMM region, resulting in a reported death toll of ten individuals, including both BIFF members and Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) soldiers. Additionally, 129 BIFF members reportedly surrendered during the year, ceding their weapons to the local government. While these numbers reflect a decline in fatalities and surrenders compared to the previous year, military operations continued. March witnessed the highest intensity of violence, with five recorded incidents, including four in Maguindanao del Sur and one in Maguindanao del Norte. On March 9, over 100 armed BIFF members attacked a village, prompting the temporary evacuation of more than 350 residents. However, this incident did not result in any reported deaths. On March 17, BIFF killed four off-duty AFP soldiers in an ambush. On May 25, an AFP-led operation targeting a BIFF group resulted in a gunfight, which left one BIFF member dead. The operation concluded with the government seizing weaponry and explosives believed to have been used by the group,

demonstrating the AFP's efforts to weaken BIFF's operational capacity. The months of August and September were marked by significant surrenders, with 47 individuals handing over their arms to the authorities without reported altercations. On October 24, AFP forces encountered 21 BIFF members, all of whom were arrested. The operation left four injured, but there were no fatalities. fmi

PHILIPPINES (CPP, NPA)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1968**

Conflict parties: CPP, NPA vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology

The violent crisis over the orientation of the political system between the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the New People's Army (NPA) on the one hand, and the Philippine government on the other, continued. In 2024, the conflict claimed at least 124 lives, namely 107 NPA fighters, nine security personnel, and eight civilians. An additional 32 people, primarily security personnel, were injured. The clashes also displaced 5,998 individuals, a significant increase compared to 2023. Most clashes occurred in rural areas, including Bicol, Central Luzon, Western Visayas, Eastern Visayas, Calabarzon, Cagayan Valley, Caraga, and the Negros Island Region. AFP bombardments were a major driver of displacement throughout the year. One of the deadliest events unfolded on June 26 in Central Luzon, where the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) killed seven NPA members. Central Luzon also experienced the largest displacement incident, with 2,491 individuals forced to evacuate between May 20 and 28 amid clashes and aerial bombardments. Most reported civilian deaths resulted from targeted killings claimed by the NPA, allegedly targeting individuals suspected of being government assets. Between April 11 and May 3, the NPA purportedly conducted a series of assassinations, killing seven civilians. The AFP denied any connections to the victims. However, some of the victims' relatives and the NPA allege the AFP coerced individuals into intelligence gathering. Despite multiple attempts this year, negotiations for a bilateral ceasefire failed. Nevertheless, reported violent incidents have decreased year-over-year, while recorded NPA arrests and surrenders remain consistently high. However, residents and organizations have questioned the accuracy of these figures, accusing the government of falsely classifying deceased individuals, including relatives and friends, as "NPA surrenderers." Human rights groups have also criticized the government's practice of 'red tagging' - labeling political opponents as NPA affiliates to justify coercive actions. This practice has drawn widespread condemnation for escalating tensions and eroding civil liberties. aha

PHILIPPINES (DRUGS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2016**

Conflict parties: cartels, drug syndicates vs. human rights activists vs. government
 Conflict items: resources

The violent crisis over drug trafficking between drug cartels, drug users, drug dealers, and human rights activists, on the one hand, and the government on the other, continued. On March 22, mayor Sebastian Duterte declared a so-called “new war on drugs” during a speech for the turnover ceremony of the new chief of police in Davao City, Davao-Region. Less than 24 hours following Duterte’s declaration, Davao city police killed five suspects in two separate incidents.

As a result, the city police arrested more than 20 suspects, and shot dead approx. 12 suspects during “buy and bust operations” without due process between March and October in Davao city.

International and local forums expressed mixed responses towards the proceedings. The Commission on Human Rights launched an investigation into the drug-related killings on March 26, stating “grave concern” over the war on drugs and Duterte’s declarations. However, local authorities maintained a consistent rhetoric of support. On April 3, General Rommel Marbel, the new chief of Philippine National Police Force, pledged that the crackdown on drug syndicates would continue under his leadership.

On May 5, Davao’s Regional Internal Affairs (RIA) service, the national police internal watchdog office, recommended that 35 police personnel be placed in administrative relief in consideration of the RIA’s investigation into the killings of drug suspects in March. Duterte further condemned the removal of Davao City Police Office’s personnel as an “abuse of power from those in higher authorities”. ipa

PHILIPPINES (ISLAMIST MILITANT GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1968**

Conflict parties: ASG, DI vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology

The violent crisis between Islamist groups and the Philippine Government, driven by disputes over the orientation of the political system, continued. Key actors included the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and Dawlah Islamiya (DI), a splinter faction of ISIS in the Philippines. These groups primarily operated in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) and Northern Maguindanao, rejecting the BARMM framework and its role in representing the Muslim minority.

The conflict was marked by episodic violence, targeted operations, and significant surrenders. A total of 40 fatalities were recorded throughout the year, including members of Islamist groups, soldiers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), local police, and one civilian. Additionally, 112 Islamist group members surrendered to authorities, reflecting a significant decrease in violent activities compared to 2022.

In January, AFP operations intensified after a church bombing in December 2023 which killed eleven people, including key ASG members. In February, a clash with DI in Maguindanao del Norte caused six AFP and two DI deaths, with two additional DI operatives injured. On March 17, DI combatants killed four soldiers when they ambushed an AFP unit on a community outreach mission in Maguindanao del Sur.

Violence this year reached its peak in April, with three incidents. Two occurred in northern Maguindanao, when clashes between DI militants and AFP soldiers left DI members dead and five AFP soldiers injured. The third incident took place on the Basilan island where one ASG member was killed.

Between August and September, 47 Islamist group members surrendered, taking this year’s total to 112. Only one violent incident occurred during this period. On September 26, the ASG killed one civilian accused of aiding authorities against ASG operatives. On October 30, the AFP killed a DI leader and four associates during an operation in Northern Maguindanao. fmi

PHILIPPINES (MILF – MNLF)

Intensity: **3** | Change: ↑ | Start: **2009**

Conflict parties: MILF vs. MNLF
 Conflict items: subnational predominance

The dispute over subnational predominance between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) escalated to a violent crisis. Differences over the implementation of peace agreements with the Philippine government and the governance structure of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) continued to be relevant.

On July 29, in Barangay Lagandang, Isulan town, Sultan Kudarat province, government troops clashed with unidentified armed actors, allegedly affiliated with the MNLF and MILF, over a family or clan feud, also called rido. Authorities seized assorted high-powered and unlicensed firearms following a brief firefight, resulting in the deaths of two unidentified armed actors.

Despite these escalations, both MNLF and MILF continue to emphasize their commitment to maintaining peace and security in the region. For instance, in May, over 20,000 people affiliated with MNLF met in Cotabato City to renew their commitment to the peace process in the region. As part of the normalization process over 26,100 MILF combatants have been decommissioned from 2019 to August 2024 and in April over 100 former MNLF and MILF fighters graduated from the basic training of the Philippine National Police (PNP). The amnesty program, set up in November 2023, has so far, however, only received around 1000 applications from the former members of the armed groups.

The first parliamentary election of the BARMM region, the final step of the peace roadmap agreed upon between the MILF and the Philippine government in 2014 is, however, facing increasing challenges. The Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA), the regional Parliament, of which both MNLF and MILF members are part, issued a resolution to request the extension of the transitional period from 2025 to 2028 and thus a postponement of the elections due to a decision to exclude Sulu province from BARMM by the Philippine Supreme Court on September 10.

PHILIPPINES (MILF)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1977**

Conflict parties: MILF vs. government
 Conflict items: autonomy, system/ideology, resources

The violent crisis over the autonomy of the Bangsamoro Republic as well as the orientation of the political system and resources, between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF),

on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued.

The Office of the Presidential Adviser on Peace, Reconciliation and Unity (OPAPRU) and the Senate issued declarations to continue attempts for national peace this year.

In January, OPAPRU introduced the slogan “Peace: Bawat Buhay Mahalga” to guide its peace initiatives in 2024 and called on its staff to collaborate more strongly with other public organizations. On March 4, the Senate endorsed three resolutions for President Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr. to grant amnesty to militant groups who had committed political offenses to benefit approximately 400 MILF members.

National tensions persisted, however. Government forces periodically arrested MILF militants for offenses ranging from gun trading to homicide. Unidentified armed groups exacerbated the violence. For example, a notable case was the assassination of the MILF United Bangsamoro Justice Party deputy municipal executive officer in Buluan town, Maguindanao del Sur province, on September 17.

Clan wars also broke out between rival MILF factions, primarily motivated by land disputes. Infighting in Meta, Maguindanao del Sur province, on June 19 and 20 resulted in the displacement and relocation of approx. 100 civilians. On October 30, clashes over a rice field in Barangay Kilangan, Maguindanao, between the two rival MILF clans left 19 dead and five injured. Philippine authorities and an MILF ceasefire committee intervened to quell the violence and evacuate civilians.

The government hastened investigations to locate Mohammad Usman Alamada’s killers and intensified the deployment of armed and local official personnel to clan war sites. On December 16, a court in Taguig, Metro Manila, convicted two MILF-linked militia commanders on 35 counts of murder of police commandos related to a 2015 clash in Mamasapano town, Maguindanao province. The defendants were given up to 14 years in prison per homicide count. *tys*

PHILIPPINES (MNLF)

Intensity: **1** | Change:  | Start: **1969**

Conflict parties: MNLF vs. government
 Conflict items: secession, system/ideology, resources

The non-violent crisis over ideology, resources, and secession of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Republic of Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) between the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the government de-escalated to a dispute. Decades of armed struggle led to the 1996 Final Peace Agreement, which granted limited autonomy through the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). However, dissatisfaction with its implementation and competition over governance within the region persisted. The establishment of BARMM in 2019, following a separate peace agreement with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), further complicated the MNLF-government dynamic, with some MNLF factions feeling sidelined by the process [→ Philippines (MILF – MNLF)].

On June 27, in Midsayap, North Cotabato, Mindanao, an unidentified attacker killed a former MNLF commander. As a result, more than 1,090 households were displaced. On July 29, authorities killed two persons carrying weapons during a brief gunfight with MNLF and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and seized assorted high-powered and

unlicensed firearms in Barangay Lagandang, Isulan town, Sultan Kudarat province. Over 100 personnel from DG ECHO Partners and local GOP units participated in the operation. The government emphasized its commitment to maintaining peace and security in the region. An estimated 1,090 refugees were displaced, although there remain unreported individuals. *jsu, cys, tys.*

TAJIKISTAN (ISLAMIST GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change:  | Start: **1997**

Conflict parties: Islamist groups vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The violent crisis over the orientation of the political system, ideology and national power between Islamist opposition groups, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued.

On January 5, the official car of the regional chairman of the ruling People’s Democratic Party of Tajikistan in the Kulyab region exploded. The politician was injured in the blast. On January 30, Tajik authorities claimed that the event was a terrorist attack and arrested eight suspects who were reportedly connected with Islamist groups. On February 7, Tajik Islamist media accused the authorities of provoking the event to create a motive for their repressive policies.

On February 21, it was made public that the Tajik government has maintained contacts within the Afghan Taliban since 11/23 to discuss the issue of Ansarullah. Until this moment, Tajik government and Ansarullah agreed to maintain contact to negotiate a peace agreement. Starting on September 10, several media outlets reported contact between the State Committee for National Security of Tajikistan and Taliban authorities in the Afghan capital Kabul in the second half of August. Other than the establishment of relations with the Taliban, these talks aim to prevent Ansarullah’s activities. There was no official confirmation of the visit by Tajik authorities.

At the institutional level, on May 8, Tajikistan adopted two new laws on education and on “the regulation of celebrations and rituals” which introduced measures such as restricting children’s religious celebrations and banning the selling and wearing the hijab. On May 20, the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan expressed strong objections against it. *mdp*

THAILAND (ISLAMIST SEPARATISTS / SOUTHERN BORDER PROVINCES)

Intensity: **3** | Change:  | Start: **1902**

Conflict parties: BRN, PULO vs. government
 Conflict items: secession, system/ideology

The violent crisis over ideology and secession of several southern border provinces between various Islamist separatist groups, such as Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) and Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO), on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued.

Throughout the year, acts of violence between security forces and insurgents remained frequent despite ongoing peace talks with the BRN. These incidents predominantly took place in the four southern provinces of Yala, Pattani, Songkhla, and

Narathiwat.

The peace talks between the government and the BRN in the Malaysian capital Kuala Lumpur commenced on February 6 and were still ongoing in December. On January 10, four suspected members of insurgent groups opened fire on border patrol police in Bannang Sata, Yala province, injuring two officers. Furthermore, on February 19, suspected insurgents attacked and killed two defense volunteers with firearms in Tambon Pron, Narathiwat Province.

Security forces continued their campaign against secessionist groups. For instance, on March 14, rangers killed two suspected insurgents in Sai Buri district, Pattani province, during an attempted arrest that resulted in a shootout. On March 22, insurgents committed up to 40 arson attacks on convenience stores, private buildings, government buildings, and telephone poles in the four southern provinces.

On April 25, a group of ten suspected insurgents set fire to a car and a power plant in Mae Lan district, Pattani province. One day later, in Saba Yoi district, Songkhla province, suspected armed insurgents detonated a bomb near a power plant, damaging it in the process, and set several cars on fire. The toll of civilian casualties increased in May. On May 2, over 50 members of security forces surrounded a house of suspected insurgents in Thung Yang Daeng district, Pattani province, killing two in a shootout. On May 20, simultaneously to a peace workshop held by the BRN in Kuala Lumpur, two explosions took place in Narathiwat province. In Sukhirin district, an explosion killed one and injured six. In Cho Airong district, the explosion provoked a shootout, in which three were injured.

On June 25, in Yarang district, Pattani province, two assailants shot a prominent human rights defender. Moreover, on June 30, assailants detonated a car bomb in front of a police building in Bannang Sata, killing one and injuring 16, and damaging nearby houses and cars.

Two further bomb attacks by suspected insurgents took place on September 24 and 26 in Songkhla and Narathiwat provinces, one targeting an ATM and a local government office, the other one exploding at the roadside and injuring eight security force personnel.

In October, a series of four bomb attacks by various alleged insurgents were carried out in Narathiwat and Pattani provinces, leaving one dead and at least ten injured. lwi

VIETNAM (MONTAGNARDS)

Intensity: **2** | Change:  | Start: **1958**

Conflict parties: Montagnard ethnic group, Montagnard Stand for Justice, Montagnard Support Group Inc. vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology


The violent crisis between the Montagnards and the Vietnamese government de-escalated to a non-violent crisis.

On January 26, The People’s Court of Phu Yen province sentenced religious freedom activist Nay Y Blang to four years and six months in prison for holding prayer meetings in his home. On March 14, Thai police, accompanied by Vietnamese officers, conducted a raid in Bang Len district, Nakhon Pathom province, Thailand. They targeted Montagnards who had fled there to escape persecution and were seeking official refugee status. In March, Vietnam declared two political groups, US-headquartered Montagnard Support Group Inc (MSGI) and Montagnard Stand for Justice (MSFJ), as “terrorist organizations”. On June 11, Y Quynh Bdap, a co-founder of MSFJ, was arrested in Thailand. In late September, the Bangkok Criminal Court ruled that he should be extradited to Vietnam where he faces a 10-year prison sentence for “terrorism,” a charge issued in absentia by the Dak Lak People’s Court in January 2024. As of December 31, Y Quynh Bdap had not been extradited to Vietnam. On July 5, six Montagnards who had been sentenced between 2011 and 2016 to prison were declared missing by family members as authorities have not been able to prove their whereabouts. On August 17, Y Po Mlo was arrested for allegedly receiving instructions from Y Mut Mlo, an exiled FULRO and MSGI member who was sentenced to 11 years in prison for his involvement in the Dak Lak attack of 06/2023 in the beginning of this year. FULRO, also known as the United Front for the Liberation of Oppressed Races, existed from 1964 to 1992 and campaigned for the autonomy of minority groups in Vietnam, including Monganards, Cham and Khmer.

Despite the reduction in violence, the persecution and suppression of Montagnard activists contribute to human rights concerns. On April 11, in response to a statement by the US on the ongoing human rights violations against Montagnard and other religious and ethnic minorities, a Vietnamese government official held a press conference, denying any allegations of discrimination based on religion or belief. tln


WEST ASIA, NORTH AFRICA, AND AFGHANISTAN

VIOLENT CONFLICTS IN WEST ASIA, NORTH AFRICA, AND AFGHANISTAN IN 2024 (SUBNATIONAL LEVEL)




INTENSITY


- 5 WAR
- 4 LIMITED WAR
- 3 VIOLENT CRISIS




CONFLICT INTENSITIES IN WEST-ASIA, NORTH-AFRICA, AND AFGHANISTAN IN 2024 COMPARED TO 2023



CONFLICT INTENSITIES BY CONFLICT ITEMS IN WEST-ASIA, NORTH-AFRICA, AND AFGHANISTAN IN 2024



CONFLICT INTENSITIES BY CONFLICT TYPE IN WEST-ASIA, NORTH-AFRICA, AND AFGHANISTAN IN 2024



WEST ASIA, NORTH AFRICA, AND AFGHANISTAN

Overview: Conflicts in West Asia, North Africa, and Afghanistan

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
Afghanistan (IS)*	ISKP vs. government	system/ideology	2015	•	3
Afghanistan (opposition)*	AFF, ALM, NRF, other armed opposition groups vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2022	↘	3
Afghanistan (sedentary communities – Kuchi)*	sedentary communities vs. Kuchi	subnational predominance, resources	1878	•	3
Afghanistan – Iran*	Afghanistan vs. Iran	resources, other	2021	↘	2
Afghanistan – Pakistan*	Afghanistan vs. Pakistan	territory, international power, other	1949	•	3
Algeria (Berbers / Kabylia)*	Berbers vs. government	secession, autonomy, system/ideology	1963	•	2
Algeria (Islamist militant groups)*	Al-Mourabitoun, AQIM, Blood Signatories, IS, Jund al-Khalifa, MUJAO vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1998	↗	3
Algeria (opposition)*	Hirak movement, labor unions, opposition parties vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2011	•	2
Algeria - Morocco*	Algeria vs. Morocco	international power	1963	↓	1
Bahrain (opposition)*	opposition groups vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1975	•	3
Egypt (Christians – Muslims)*	Christians vs. Muslims	subnational predominance	1952	↗	3
Egypt (IS)*	IS vs. government	system/ideology, subnational predominance	2014	↓	1
Egypt (militant groups / Sinai Peninsula)*	militant groups vs. government	system/ideology, subnational predominance	2011	↓	1
Egypt (opposition)*	activists, journalists, opposition groups vs. government	system/ideology	1954	↗	3
Egypt - Sudan*	Egypt vs. Sudan	territory, resources	1958	•	1
Iran (opposition)*	intra-systemic opposition, non-systemic opposition vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1993	↘	3
Iran (People's Mujahideen)*	PMOI vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1979	•	1
Iran (PJAK)*	PJAK vs. government	autonomy	1979	•	3
Iran (Sunni militant groups / Sistan Baluchistan)*	Ansar al-Furqan et al., Jaish al-Adl vs. government	secession	1979	•	3
Iran – Israel*	Iran vs. Israel	system/ideology, international power	1979	•	3
Iran – Saudi Arabia*	Iran vs. Saudi Arabia	system/ideology, international power	1979	•	1
Iran – UAE*	Iran vs. UAE	territory	1971	•	2
Iran – USA*	Iran vs. USA	system/ideology, international power	1979	•	3
Iraq (IS)*	IS vs. government	system/ideology, national power, resources	2014	•	3
Iraq (KRG – opposition)*	KRG vs. opposition movement	system/ideology, subnational predominance	2011	•	1
Iraq (Kurdistan Regional Government)*	Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) vs. government	autonomy, resources	1971	↓	1
Iraq (opposition)*	opposition vs. government	system/ideology	2011	•	3
Iraq (Shiite militant groups)*	Ansar Allah al-Awfiya, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, Badr Organization, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, Islamic Resistance in Iraq, Kata'ib Hezbollah, Saraya al-Salam vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2004	•	3
Israel (Hamas et al.)*	Hamas, other Islamist groups, PIJ vs. government	secession, resources	1988	•	5
Israel – Lebanon*	Israel vs. Lebanon	territory, international power, resources	1948	↑	5
Israel – State of Palestine ^o (PNA)*	Palestinian protesters, PNA vs. government, Israeli settlement movement	secession, decolonisation, system/ideology, resources	1948	•	5
Israel – Syria*	Israel vs. Syria	territory, international power, resources	1948	•	3
Israel, Lebanon (Hezbollah)*	Hezbollah vs. government	territory, system/ideology	1982	↘	4
Israel, Yemen (al-Houthi forces)*	al-Houthi vs. Israel, UK, US et al.	system/ideology, other	2023	•	3

WEST ASIA, NORTH AFRICA, AND AFGHANISTAN

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
Jordan (opposition)*	opposition groups vs. government	system/ideology	2011	•	3
Jordan, Syria (Captagon)*	drug traffickers vs. government	resources	2021	•	3
Kuwait (Bedouns)*	Bedouns vs. government	other	1959	•	1
Kuwait (opposition)*	opposition movement vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2011	•	1
Lebanon (inner-Palestinian tensions)*	Ansar Allah et al. vs. Fatah vs. other Palestinian factions	subnational predominance	2006	•	3
Lebanon (IS)*	IS vs. government	system/ideology, subnational predominance	2011	↗	3
Lebanon (opposition)*	opposition vs. government	system/ideology, national power, resources	2019	↘	2
Libya (IS)*	ISL vs. GNU	system/ideology, national power, resources	2014	•	1
Libya (opposition)*	GNU vs. GNS	system/ideology, national power, resources	2011	•	3
Libya (tribes)*	Tebu vs. Tuareg vs. various other tribes vs. GNU, LNA	system/ideology, subnational predominance, resources, other	2012	•	3
Mauritania (anti-slavery activists)*	IRA, opposition groups vs. government	system/ideology	2015	•	3
Morocco (opposition)*	AMDH, Front Social, Justice and Spirituality, labor rights activists vs. government	system/ideology	2011	↗	3
Morocco (POLISARIO / Western Sahara ⁵)*	POLISARIO, Sahrawis vs. government	secession, decolonisation, resources	1975	•	3
Saudi Arabia (IS)*	IS vs. government	system/ideology, international power	2015	•	2
Saudi Arabia (opposition)*	opposition vs. government	system/ideology	1992	•	3
Saudi Arabia (Shiites)*	Shiites vs. government	system/ideology	1979	•	3
Saudi Arabia, Yemen (AQAP)*	AQAP vs. PLC, STC	system/ideology	1990	•	3
Syria (inter-opposition rivalry)*	HTS vs. SDF vs. SLF vs. HRE, SNA vs. various Islamist groups	system/ideology, subnational predominance, resources	2013	↗	4
Syria (IS)*	IS vs. government	system/ideology, subnational predominance, resources	2014	↗	4
Syria (Kurdish groups)*	KDPS vs. AANES vs. SDF vs. government	autonomy, subnational predominance, resources	1962	↘	3
Syria (opposition)*	FSA vs. HTS vs. NC vs. government	system/ideology, national power, resources	2011	↗	5
Syria (SDF – Türkiye / Northern Syria)*	HRE, SDF, YPG vs. FSA, Türkiye	autonomy, subnational predominance, resources	2018	↑	5
Syria – Türkiye*	Syria vs. Türkiye	territory, international power	1946	•	1
Syria – USA*	Syria vs. USA	system/ideology, international power	2003	•	2
Tunisia (Islamist militant groups)*	AQIM, Jund al-Khilafah (IS) vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2011	↘	2
Tunisia (opposition)*	civil society groups, opposition groups vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2010	•	2
Türkiye (IS)*	IS vs. government	system/ideology, national power, resources	2014	↗	3
Türkiye (opposition)*	CHP, DEM Party vs. National Alliance (AKP, MHP)	system/ideology, national power	2013	•	3
Türkiye (PKK, KCK)*	KCK, PKK vs. government	autonomy	1978	•	4
Yemen (al-Hirak / Southern Yemen)*	STC vs. PLC	secession	2007	•	3
Yemen (AQAP – al-Houthi forces)*	al-Houthi forces vs. AQAP	system/ideology, subnational predominance	2010	•	1
Yemen, Saudi Arabia (al-Houthi forces)*	al-Houthis vs. Saudi Arabia, PLC, UAE	national power	2004	•	4

¹ Conflicts marked with * are without description

² Mentioned are only those conflict parties relevant for the period under review

³ Change in intensity compared to the previous year: ↑ or ↗ escalation by one or more than one level of intensity; ↓ or ↘ deescalation by one or more than one level of intensity; • no change

⁴ Levels of intensity: 5 = war; 4 = limited war; 3 = violent crisis; 2 = non-violent crisis; 1 = dispute

⁵ HIIK considers statehood to be non-contested if the state is an official UN members state.

Disputed statehood is marked with a * if a territory is recognized by at least one other official UN member state ("limited recognition")

WEST ASIA, NORTH AFRICA, AND AFGHANISTAN

REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT

This text will be made available within April 2026.

AFGHANISTAN (IS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2015**

Conflict parties: ISKP vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology

The violent crisis over the orientation of the political system between the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP), and the Taliban-ruled Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA), continued. ISKP attacked Taliban authorities and religious minorities, predominantly using IEDs.

Throughout the year, a series of violent ISKP-attributed attacks across Afghanistan resulted in significant casualties. On January 4, ISKP announced a new campaign referred to as "And kill them wherever you find them". As part of the campaign, ISKP claimed responsibility for two IED explosions in the capital Kabul. Firstly, on January 6, an IED explosion targeted a public minibus in the predominantly Shi'a area of Dasht-e Barchi, killing five civilians and injuring 20 others. The second attack, on January 9, targeted a commuter bus carrying prison workers, killing three people and injuring 13 others in Alo Khil area. On March 21, an ISKP suicide bomber detonated his vest amidst a group of police officers in Kandahar, eponymous province, killing 25 individuals and injuring 50 others. ISKP claimed responsibility and cited police personnel as the target. On May 17, ISKP gunmen attacked foreign tourists and Afghan civilians with small arms in Bamyan city, eponymous province, killing six people and injuring eight.

Attacks continued in the second half of the year. For instance, on July 7, in a clash between the Taliban and ISKP in Momand Dara district, Nangarhar province, one ISKP militant was killed and five Taliban members injured. In response, on July 10, the Taliban arrested several ISKP militants in the 5th district of Kabul city. On September 2, a suicide attack in Qala-e-Bakhtiar area, Kabul city, killed six and injured 13 people. On September 12, gunmen killed 14 civilians and injured six others in Daikundi, Ghor province, targeting Hazara Shiite Muslims. ISKP claimed responsibility for both attacks. ISKP attacks on religious minorities continued on November 21, when gunmen attacked a shrine in Nahrin district, Baghlan province, killing ten and injuring five civilians.

Notably, on December 11, an ISKP suicide bomber killed IEA refugee minister Khalil-ur-Rehman Haqqani, along with four other Taliban members, inside the Ministry of Refugee and Repatriation in Kabul. Three other people were injured in the attack.

The Taliban also went after ISKP suspects within their own ranks. For instance, on October 14, the Taliban arrested seven of its own members suspected of collaborating with ISKP in Baharak district, Takhar province. Furthermore, on November 8, the Taliban killed two of its own members for alleged ISKP links in Firuz Koh district, Ghor Province. [lul](#)

AFGHANISTAN – IRAN

Intensity: **2** | Change: ▼ | Start: **2021**

Conflict parties: Afghanistan vs. Iran
 Conflict items: resources, other

The violent crisis over border security and water resources

between the Taliban-ruled Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) and Iran de-escalated to a non-violent crisis. Water disputes between the two states date back to as early as the 1870s.

Despite regular diplomatic exchanges between the two countries' foreign ministers, there remained political tensions over water rights with regard to the Helmand River. However, no violent incidents relating to the water and border dispute were recorded in this observation year.

Whilst an agreement was reached in August 2022 to supply Iran with water from the Helmand River, the agreement has not been implemented to date. On February 28, the IEA's deputy PM issued a statement in the Iranian capital Tehran that Iran would receive water from the Helmand River as soon as conditions of the agreement were met. However, on March 4, Iran accused the IEA of withholding its agreed water allocations. [emr](#)

ALGERIA (BERBERS / KABYLIA)

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **1963**

Conflict parties: Berbers vs. government
 Conflict items: secession, autonomy, system/ideology

The non-violent crisis over the orientation of the political system, self-determination, autonomy and secession of the Kabylia region between Kabyle activists, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued.

Government authorities continued to summon, arrest, and sentence Kabyle activists for alleged involvement with the Movement for the Self-Determination of Kabylie (MAK), which the government classified as a terrorist movement in 2021. For instance, on February 28, a Kabyle activist was placed in police custody in Bejaia, eponymous province, after voicing support for Kabyle detainees being prosecuted. From October 17 to 19, an Algerian journalist and member of the NGO Assemblée Mondiale Amazighe was kidnapped by two men in Barcelona, Catalunya, Spain, and found in Lebrija, Seville, Spain, tied up in a boat. Allegations by the victim of the involvement of Algerian authorities are the subject of an ongoing investigation.

Authorities continued to restrict cultural activities. For instance, on June 29, Algerian authorities closed a book signing event on a book about Kabyle history in the city of Bejaia and arrested several attendees for their participation in an unauthorized gathering. Opposition groups and Kabyle activists continued to operate from the diaspora. For instance, on April 20, the leader of the MAK and the provisional government-in-exile announced the rebirth of the "State of Kabylia" in front of the UN headquarters in New York City, USA, which the provisional parliament-in-exile had previously agreed upon on March 30.

The government and Kabyle activists continued to accuse each other of being responsible for the high death toll caused by yearly recurring fires. For instance, on October 2, a court in Paris, France, refused to extradite the MAK's presidential advisor on alleged charges of terrorist acts related to the fires, which had been made based on information provided by the Algerian government. On November 28, the Supreme Court granted the request for a retrial of 38 Kabyle citizens on death row. These individuals had been sentenced in 2023 for the alleged involvement in the murder of an individual believed to be responsible for the fires in August 2021. Hu-

man rights groups had expressed concerns that this previous trial was politically motivated. nfe

ALGERIA (ISLAMIST MILITANT GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↗** | Start: **1998**

Conflict parties: Al-Mourabitoun, AQIM, Blood Signatories, IS, Jund al-Khalifa, MUJAO vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The non-violent crisis over ideology, the orientation of the political system and national power between Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Islamic State (IS), and respective affiliated groups, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, escalated to a violent crisis.

Government counterterrorism activity increased in intensity from April onwards, while the second half of the year saw several arrests but a decline in fatal confrontations. For example, on April 21, units of the armed forces claimed the killing of a suspected AQIM affiliate in Médéa, eponymous province, during a raid. Subsequently, on April 27, military authorities claimed the killing of another suspected AQIM affiliate in Oued El Fedha, Chlef Province. Notably, units of the armed forces claimed the killing of three suspected militants in Tachta Zougagha, Ain Defla Province, on July 27. On September 18, military authorities claimed the killing of two further suspected militants in Tébessa, eponymous province. fka

ALGERIA (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **2** | Change: **•** | Start: **2011**

Conflict parties: Hirak movement, labor unions, opposition parties vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The non-violent crisis over the orientation of the political system and national power between trade unions, opposition parties, and the Hirak movement, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued.

The government continued to restrict opposition parties. On March 21, the presidential elections were moved from December to September 7, leaving the opposition with less time to prepare. On July 5, the Rally for Culture and Democracy announced its decision to boycott the elections and not to present a candidate. On July 13, the candidate of the opposition Worker's Party and Hirak activist withdrew from the presidential race, followed by other parties. On September 7, President Abdelmadjid Tebboune was re-elected with low voter turnout. On September 10, the opposition candidates and their parties legally challenged the election results in the capital Algiers and were joined by the President.

The government continued its repressive activities against Hirak activists, human rights advocates, and journalists. On February 22, several Hirak activists were arrested in the provinces Bejaia, Jijel and Annaba. On April 2, an amendment to the penal code further restricted freedom of expression and assembly. In the weeks leading up to the election on September 7, several activists were arrested across the country.

In response, several hunger strikes by detained Hirak activists took place throughout the year, for instance, on September 26 in Labiod Sidi Cheikh prison in El Bayadh. On October 29, the human rights organization League for the Defense of Human Rights (LADDH), which had been dissolved in 2022 by the authorities, filed the statutes under a changed name in Paris, and launched on December 10. On December 9 and 10, a human rights activist together with a newspaper outlet published a non-exhaustive list counting 215 prisoners of conscience. nfe

BAHRAIN (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **1975**

Conflict parties: opposition groups vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The violent crisis over national power and the orientation of the political system between oppositional groups, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued.

People protested against the government throughout the year. Protests often focused on Shia opposition to the government. For instance, a nationwide broadcast on the anniversary of the 02/14/11 uprising issued by Bahrain's leading Shia cleric, which calling for resistance against the 'US-backed monarchy', led to anti-monarchy protests in the Northern governorate. On March 19, Al-Wefaq Society, an influential opposition group, blamed the government for continuing to ignore calls to rebuild eleven Shia mosques destroyed by the military during the uprising. On July 20, police injured a protester in Diraz, Northern governorate. The police claimed that the protestors threw stones and iron rods at the police officers, engaged in vandalism and blocked streets.

The conflict repeatedly revolved around the issues of the incarceration and treatment of political prisoners. For instance, on April 8, a royal decree pardoned 1,584 prisoners, including political prisoners, in reaction to the King's silver jubilee, marking the biggest royal pardon in recent Bahraini history. Further royal pardons followed in June, September, and December freeing 2,238 detainees. On September 29, several civil rights groups sent a letter to the UNGA calling for the abolishment of the death penalty and the release of political prisoners.

The country's largest prison, Jau Prison, located in the village of Jaww, Southern governorate, was a focal point of the debate around the treatment of political prisoners. For instance, on August 15, the UN Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights issued a statement calling for immediate action to safeguard human rights in the prison. On November 5, allegations of illegal solitary confinement for four political detainees emerged.

Mass strikes emerged at Jau Prison due to worsening conditions after a detainee died in prison on March 25, allegedly due to delayed medical aid. In a similar incident, on December 5, a political activist at the prison died after collapsing in the prison yard, reportedly due to delayed first aid. The incident sparked a two-week siege, during which 68 political prisoners were deprived of food, water, and electricity. Critically ill detainees claimed that their repeated pleas for medical assistance were ignored. The situation sparked nationwide protests, with demonstrations happening in towns such as Diraz, Bani Jamra, and Abu Saiba, all Northern governorate. lst

EGYPT (CHRISTIANS – MUSLIMS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↗** | Start: **1952**Conflict parties: Christians vs. Muslims
Conflict items: subnational predominance

The non-violent crisis over subnational predominance between Christians and Muslims escalated to a violent crisis. Christian communities faced a series of violent attacks by Muslim residents, resulting in injuries and damage to property. At the same time, the government continued its efforts to improve conditions for the religious freedom of Christians, for example by legalizing churches and affiliated buildings. On April 23, dozens of Muslims in the village of Al-Fawakher, Saft Al-Khammar Al-Gharbiya, Minya governorate, set fire to and ransacked several houses belonging to Christians to protest the alleged construction of a church. On April 26, similar incidents occurred in the village of Al-Kom Al-Ahmar, Minya governorate, where Muslims attacked Christian houses with stones and damaged the construction site of an authorized church. On November 5, a group of Muslim men attacked Christians with knives in the village of Ashrouba, Beni Mazar, Minya governorate, injuring three people. On January 8 and October 21, the Cabinet approved the legalization of 187 and 293 unlicensed churches and affiliated buildings, respectively, bringing the total number of licensed churches and buildings in the country to 3,453. jbe

EGYPT (IS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **2014**Conflict parties: IS vs. government
Conflict items: system/ideology, subnational predominance

The violent crisis over ideology and subnational predominance in the Sinai Peninsula between the Islamic State's (IS) local affiliate, Sinai Province on the one hand, and the government on the other hand, continued. The Egyptian military carried out raids, destroyed hideouts, and implemented other security measures. Nevertheless, the IS affiliate managed to retain a notable presence in the region, using local grievances and smuggling routes to sustain its operations. In January, Egyptian forces discovered and destroyed several IS affiliate hideouts in North Sinai. Raids by the Egyptian military were accompanied by killing IS affiliated militants and increased over the course of the year. For example, on May 18, the military announced the killing of several high-ranking IS affiliated figures. On July 20, clashes in Arish, North Sinai Governorate, resulted in twelve suspected IS affiliated militants being killed. In August, army-aligned militias in North Sinai recruited young adolescents for combat operations. ole

EGYPT (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↗** | Start: **1954**Conflict parties: activists, journalists, opposition groups vs. government
Conflict items: system/ideology

The non-violent crisis over the orientation of the political system between the opposition and the government escalated to a violent crisis. The government prosecuted dozens of citizens, opposition members, and journalists, mainly on terrorism-related charges. It increasingly used violence to disperse protests and used forced disappearance and allegedly torture to threaten journalists and opposition members. It continued its practice of ordering and prolonging pre-trial detention while receiving recommendations to shorten the maximum period of pre-trial detention as part of the National Dialogue. The government intensified its persecution of journalists and public figures. For instance, on February 6, a misdemeanor court sentenced former presidential candidate Ahmed Tantawy, his campaign advisor, and 21 of his supporters to one year in prison for printing and distributing unauthorized support forms during his 2023 presidential bid. In addition, Tantawy was barred from running for national elections for five years. On May 27, Tantawy was imprisoned. On March 10, a journalist was arrested and held captive at an unknown location for 50 days and allegedly subjected to torture. On November 10, authorities sentenced him to 25 years in prison on charges of joining a terrorist organization and spreading fake news. In addition, on July 22, a journalist was arrested in Giza, eponymous governorate, on charges of joining a terrorist group. Following his arrest, he was held captive in an unknown location for two days and allegedly subjected to torture.

Over the course of the year, dozens of citizens were arrested for expressing their solidarity with the people of Palestine and Lebanon [→ Israel – State of Palestine^o (PNA); Israel (Hezbollah)]. For example, on March 8, security forces arrested six people in Dar El-Salam, Cairo governorate, and allegedly beat and threatened them during the arrest. In the face of rising prices and power cuts, individuals posted and circulated calls for protest against the government on July 12 on social media. Security forces arrested dozens of citizens in connection with these posts. For example, on July 11, the Supreme Public Prosecution ordered the detention of 33 people accused of joining a terrorist organization, using social media to promote their goals, and publishing and spreading fake news. jbe

IRAN (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↘** | Start: **1993**Conflict parties: intra-systemic opposition, non-systemic opposition vs. government
Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The limited war over ideology, the orientation of the political system and national power between opposition groups and large popular movements, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, de-escalated to a violent crisis.

Since the mass uprising in September 2022, the government continued to repress protests violently to maintain control, and carried out an increasing number of executions.

In contrast to last year, people engaged in smaller, decentralized protests. Throughout the year, people associated with the workers' movement, retirees, and farmers repeatedly protested against the sustained economic crisis across the country. Workers protested for an increase of wages in Tehran, on January 30 and May 5, and in Chabahar city, Sistan and Baluchestan province, on February 20. On April 3, a group of approx. 50 retirees demanded an increase in social welfare in Ahvaz city, Khuzestan Province. Similarly, on May 2, a group of less than 100 retirees of the telecommunications branch gathered peacefully in Tehran in front of the respective ministry.

Furthermore, the women's rights movement, student movement, and United Youth of Iran (UYI), an alliance of about 30 civil society and youth grassroots groups, which formed during last year's pro-women's rights mass uprisings, continued to organize protests, demanding civil and minority rights. On April 8, at least 200 students protested against government plans for a stricter veiling law. The new bill includes higher fines, longer jail time in case of misconduct, and the use of AI to enforce the regulation. On June 15, security forces detained at least 40 student protesters in Tehran, who conducted a sit-in protest against the respective law, injuring ten.

One exception to the small decentralized protests was witnessed on the one-year anniversary of Masha Amini's death in September 2022. Between September 16 and 25, people gathered during at least 25 protests all over the country to commemorate her death and protest the government. In response, authorities deployed troops to the cities of Saqqez, Baneh, and Marivan in Kurdistan Province between September 13 and 15, leading to the death of two protesters. The government also deployed security forces to Tehran, and the cities of Boukan, West Azerbaijan Province, and Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchestan Province. Furthermore, as a result of last year's mass uprisings, the government executed at least six people on related charges. One convict, for instance, was executed on November 28, in Hamedan city, eponymous province.

Following Hamas' attack on Israel on October 7 [→ Israel (Hamas et al.)], protesters expressed solidarity with the Israeli victims, while the government supported and condoned Hamas' actions [→ Israel – State of Palestine^o (PNA)]. emb

IRAN (PJAK)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1979**

Conflict parties: PJAK vs. government

Conflict items: autonomy

The violent crisis over autonomy between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK) continued. PJAK leaders state their long-term goal is to establish an autonomous Kurdish region within the Iranian state.

PJAK remained active, continuing to carry out attacks and engage in armed resistance against Iranian security forces, while the Iranian government persisted in its efforts to suppress the group through military and political means. For instance, on October 22, PJAK members clashed with Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) members, killing one IRGC officer and injuring three.

Iranian courts continued to bring charges against journalists and other politically motivated individuals accused of PJAK membership. For instance, on February 5, an Iranian court charged a civil rights activist with alleged PJAK membership, and on July 23, a court in Tehran sentenced a Kurdish women's rights activist to death for the same reason.

On April 27, PJAK held its seventh congress under war conditions in northwestern Iran, where the assembly elected two new co-chairs and expressed their intention to intensify cooperation with other Iranian liberation movements, especially among women and youth.

Türkiye also persisted in acting against PJAK, which it sees as an Iranian offshoot of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) [→ Türkiye (PKK, KCK)]. For instance, on July 14, Türkiye conducted an air raid in Penjwen District, Sulaymaniyah Governorate in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. Three Eastern Kurdistan Units (YRK) fighters, the armed wing of the PJAK, were killed. cfb

IRAN (SUNNI MILITANT GROUPS / SISTAN BALUCHISTAN)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1979**

Conflict parties: Ansar al-Furqan et al., Jaish al-Adl vs. government

Conflict items: secession

The violent crisis over secession of the Iranian region Sistan and Baluchistan between Iran and Sunni militant groups, such as Jaish al-Adl, continued. Numerous armed attacks took place using light weapons, especially against government forces, including police, border patrol, and military forces.

Throughout the year, numerous smaller attacks took place and further destabilized the Sistan and Baluchistan province by inflicting casualties on Iranian forces and militants as well as on civilians. For instance, on April 4, militants carried out a coordinated attack on two Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) headquarters in the Chabahar and Rask districts, Sistan and Baluchistan province. In addition to small arms, suicide vests were also used during the attack, which left ten Iranian security personnel and 18 militants dead, as well as ten people injured. Another example was an armed fight on May 19 in the city of Saravan, in which five people were killed.

An exchange of contained missile attacks on January 16 and 18 occurred between Iran and Pakistan [→ Pakistan (Balochistan)]. Both governments claimed that their attacks were aimed at militant groups operating in border areas. Both sides accused one another of destroying civilian infrastructure and causing civilian casualties on each other's territory during the attacks. This was followed by a tense diplomatic period and mutual recriminations, although initial steps were taken to cooperate in the fight against the insurgents. Eleven people were killed during the two attacks.

In November, Iranian forces started a so-called "clearance operation" in Sistan and Baluchistan Province in which 26 militants were killed and 50 detained. Four IRGC members were also killed. Given the numerous shootouts between Iranian forces and militants in the preceding months, the aim of the operation was to re-establish government control over the province. atk

IRAN – ISRAEL

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1979**

Conflict parties:	Iran vs. Israel	
Conflict items:	system/ideology,	international power

The violent crisis over international power and ideology between Iran and Israel continued. Israel's various interconnected conflicts with Iranian-backed groups in the region, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon [→ Israel (Hezbollah)], Hamas in Gaza [→ Israel (Hamas et al.)], the Houthis in Yemen [→ Israel, Yemen (al Houthi)], and militias operating in Syria and Iraq, saw significant developments which significantly shaped the conflict with Iran, and vice versa, throughout the year.

Israel continued its airstrikes in Syria [→ Israel – Syria], targeting Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) forces. On April 1, for instance, Israel attacked the Iranian embassy compound in the capital Damascus, eponymous governorate, with missiles, killing seven members of the IRGC. In retaliation, Iran launched its first ever direct attack on Israeli territory on April 13 and 14, employing 170 drones and 120 ballistic and cruise missiles. The attack left one person injured by missile shrapnel in Al-Fura village, Southern District. Most of the drones and missiles were intercepted by Israeli air defense systems and by US, UK, French and Jordanian military forces and caused only minor damage [→ Iran – USA]. Following the attack on April 14, Iran's mission to the UN stated that the attack could be "deemed concluded" and warned that Iran's response to any further Israeli attacks would be "more severe". Earlier on April 13, the IRGC had already seized a container ship in the Strait of Hormuz over its alleged ties to Israel. While the crew was released on May 3, the vessel remained under Iranian control as of December 31. On April 19, Israel retaliated with an airstrike on an air defense radar site protecting nuclear sites near the city of Isfahan, eponymous province. No casualties were reported.

Over the summer, Israel continued its covert actions in Iran, killing Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in the capital Tehran on July 31 [→ Israel (Hamas et al.)]. The assassination was condemned by Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who vowed to defend Iran's territorial integrity and retaliate against Israel.

Following the killing of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and an IRGC commander by an Israeli airstrike on the Hezbollah headquarters in the Lebanese capital Beirut on September 27 [→ Israel (Hezbollah)], Iran attacked Israel directly for a second time on October 1, using at least 180 missiles. While most missiles were intercepted by Israel, the US, the UK or France, some hit and damaged military facilities such as Nevatim Airbase in Southern District, around 1,000 homes in Hod Hasharon, Central district, and dozens of apartments in the capital Tel Aviv. One person was killed in the West Bank and two people injured in the attack. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu subsequently called the attack "a big mistake", stating that Iran "will pay for it". On October 26, Israel struck 20 military targets in Iran, deploying fighter jets. Among the targeted facilities were missile and drone factories, air defense sites, and a nuclear weapons research facility in Parchin, Tehran Province. Four soldiers were killed in the attacks.

Besides the military escalations, several cyberattacks and foiled assassination plots were reported throughout the year.

For instance, in February, a hacker group targeting aerospace and defense companies in Israel was identified as UNC1549 and linked to the IRGC. On September 19, Israeli intelligence agency Shin Bet announced the arrest of an Israeli citizen connected to an alleged Iranian plot to assassinate Prime Minister Netanyahu and other senior officials. agr

IRAN – USA

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1979**

Conflict parties:	Iran vs. USA	
Conflict items:	system/ideology,	international power

The violent crisis over the orientation of the political system and international power between Iran and the USA continued. The war between Israel and Hamas [→ Israel (Hamas et al.)] has continued to exacerbate tensions between the US and Iran, further fueling Iranian efforts to expel US forces from the region. Throughout the year, Iranian proxies carried out multiple attacks against US military outposts outside of Iran. On January 28, a drone strike on the Tower 22 military base in northeastern Jordan killed three US soldiers and injured more than 40. On February 2 and 3, the US responded with airstrikes on 85 Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Iran-backed militia targets in Syria and Iraq, reportedly killing 35 pro-Iranian fighters in Syria and at least 16 in Iraq. During Iran's attack on Israel on April 13 [→ Iran – Israel], the US military, together with its allies, intercepted over 300 drones, cruise- and ballistic missiles targeting Israeli territory. The same day, Iran signaled that any US retaliation would be met with direct consequences for US military bases in the region. The US agreed on mutual non-participation, urging Israel not to escalate. The same course of action was followed during and after Iran's second attack on Israel on October 1 [→ Iran – Israel]. While the US led a defensive coalition to defend Israel against the incoming barrage of ballistic missiles, it subsequently urged non-escalation in the region. However, it also warned Iran of "severe consequences" should it continue to conduct attacks on Israel. Subsequently, and following the Israeli attack on Iran on October 26, Iran threatened the US and Israel with a "crushing response" on November 2.

Diplomatic efforts between Iran and the US have been on hold and tensions between the two countries have risen again, despite US attempts both to defuse the conflict by waiving US sanctions on Iran on March 13 and to engage in diplomatic efforts following Iranian aggression towards Israel. Moreover, the US imposed sanctions on several Iranian individuals and entities on February 2 in response to an Iranian cyberattack on US infrastructure in late 2023. Additional sanctions were imposed on April 18 and October 11, in response to Iran's attacks on Israel. The US imposed other sanctions, for instance, on June 26, in response to Iran's increased nuclear enrichment and research efforts, or on September 29, for Iranian attempts to interfere in the US presidential election. Likewise, on May 2, the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs imposed sanctions on several American individuals, companies, and institutions in response to ongoing US support for Israel, further straining diplomatic relations between the two countries. jha

IRAQ (IS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2014**

Conflict parties: IS vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology, national power, resources

The violent crisis over ideology, national predominance and resources between the Islamic State (IS), on the one hand, and the Iraqi government, on the other hand, continued. This included bombings and ambushes targeting Iraqi security forces, civilians and American collaborators, alongside expanded territorial operations in rural areas. The Iraqi government responded with intensified counterterrorism efforts, including more frequent airstrikes and ground operations, leading to higher casualties on both sides. The total number of deaths on both sides rose from three deaths in 2023 to at least 130 in 2024.

IS employed sniper weapons, bombs, and semi-automatic guns in its attacks. For example, on January 14, IS killed three Iraqi soldiers and wounded one other at an army post near Haditha, al-Anbar Governorate. Similarly, on March 1, IS detonated a roadside bomb near an Iraqi army patrol in Tarmiya, Salah ad-Din Governorate, killing one soldier and wounding four others. Later in the year on October 2, the IS ambushed Iraqi security forces in Kirkuk Governorate, killing four and injuring three.

Over the course of the year, Iraqi and US forces conducted a total of 72 military operations across multiple Iraqi Governorates and in Raqqa, Syria [→ Syria (IS)]. For instance, on August 29, US forces conducted a joint raid with the Iraqi Security Forces in Anbar governorate, killing 15 IS members. In Diyala and Kirkuk Governorates, airstrikes destroyed key IS hideouts, including networks of tunnels and caves in the Hamrin Mountains, killing at least 75 IS fighters over the year. For instance, on September 19, Iraqi Air Force conducted an air strike in Kirkuk province, leaving six IS members dead.

Moreover, at least 88 IS members were arrested. For example, on April 4, when Popular Mobilization Forces carried out a security operation north of Baghdad, which resulted in the arrest of three IS members. On June 11, Iraqi Security forces conducted a military operation in Raqqa, Syria, killing an IS senior leader. On August 29, the Iraqi Air Force, in coordination with the American Joint Operations Command, launched a series of airstrikes in the Anbar Desert as part of a major counterterrorism mission. This operation resulted in the deaths of at least 16 IS fighters, disrupting their activities in a strategically significant area. Still, on September 27, the US announced to end its military mission to defeat IS in Iraq no later than September 2025. lka

IRAQ (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2011**

Conflict parties: opposition vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology

The violent crisis over the orientation of the political system between the opposition and the government continued. Protests due to the unemployment crisis persisted this year. On February 20, riot control forces attacked engineers

demonstrating for job opportunities in front of the South Gas Company on the Basra-Safwan road, Basra Governorate, leaving three protesters injured. On June 1, clashes erupted between security forces and temporary workers protesting for permanent employment by the state-owned Dhi-Qar oil company in Nasiriyah, Dhi Qar Governorate, resulting in injuries to 19 security personnel and four protesters. In the capital Baghdad, medical graduates demanding employment from the state protested outside the Ministry of Finance on August 19. Over 14 protesters were injured during clashes with security forces. These demonstrations resumed on September 3, leaving more than 25 protesters injured in further confrontations with security forces.

During the summer, the number of protests increased due to power and water outages. For instance, on June 24, approx. 1,500 people protested against the cuts in water supply for local farmers in Al-Shamli district, Babil Governorate. Subsequent clashes between security forces and protesters left 15 protesters injured. On July 12 and 13, hundreds of people took to the streets across southern Iraq's Diwaniyah province, notably in the Ghammas district and along the Najaf-Diwaniyah road, to protest poor services and frequent electricity shortages. At least four protesters were injured in ensuing clashes with security forces.

Throughout the year, the persecution of journalists and public media figures continued. For example, on March 17, clashes between protesters and security forces erupted in Nasiriyah, the capital of its eponymous governorate, following the arrest of a prominent activist over a social media post, which had been triggered by a lawsuit filed by a member of parliament. Additionally, on October 18, large-scale protests erupted in Nasiriyah, eponymous governorate, following more than 500 arrests targeting activists from the 2019 Tishreen movement. 23 security force personnel were injured in the ensuing clashes. tdi

IRAQ (SHIITE MILITANT GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2004**

Conflict parties: Ansar Allah al-Awfiya, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, Badr Organization, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, Islamic Resistance in Iraq, Kata'ib Hezbollah, Saraya al-Salam vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The violent crisis over the orientation of the political system and national power between Shiite militant groups and the government continued. The Shiite militias were organized into the Popular Mobilization Front (PMF) and include the Badr Organization, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), Kata'ib Hezbollah, Ansar Allah al-Awfiya as well as Saraya al-Salam, the former Mahdi Army, led by Moqtada al-Sadr. In addition, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI), which emerged in October last year and serves as an umbrella term for various Shiite militias, continued to play a significant role in the attacks on US troops.

Throughout the year, clashes between Shiite militant groups and government forces continued. On March 30, individuals affiliated with AAH militia killed a federal police officer and wounded two others during clashes with security forces in Baghdad's Kasra Wa'tash suburb. On August 22, troops from the Iraqi army clashed with PMF fighters in Karbala, eponymous governorate, leading to the arrest of six militiamen.

The violent rivalry between the two Shiite militias Saraya al-Salam and AAH continued. For instance, on February 4, two members of Saraya al-Salam were accused of assassinating a senior leader of AAH in Amara, Maysan Governorate. On May 19, the rivalry expanded to involve Ansar Allah al-Awfiya, an ally of AAH. Following an insult on Facebook, armed clashes between Saraya al-Salam and Ansar Allah al-Awfiya broke out in Baghdad's al-'Ubaydi district, leaving two members of Saraya al-Salam dead and seven people injured, including three police officers. On November 14, a Saraya al-Salam headquarter in Kan'an district, Diyala Governorate, was hit by a rocket-propelled grenade, injuring two members of the group. According to a local security source, the attack likely stemmed from disputes between Saraya al-Salam members and a rival faction.


Attacks on US bases also continued. Shiite militias launched numerous attacks using drones and rockets at military bases in al-Anbar Governorate and Arbil Governorate, most notably in January. While the majority of the attempts were unsuccessful, two attacks hit their targets. On January 20, Shiite militias launched a missile strike on the al-Asad airbase in al-Anbar Governorate, injuring five US and allied soldiers. In addition, on August 5, Iranian-aligned Shiite militias injured seven US soldiers in a rocket attack on the same airbase. US forces launched retaliatory strikes. For instance, on January 4, a US airstrike on a PMF headquarters in Baghdad killed three militiamen, including a leader of Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, and injured six others. On February 2, following the death of US troops in Jordan, the US launched multiple strikes in al-Qaim, Anbar Governorate, leaving at least 16 people dead and 25 injured, including civilians. On July 30, American forces killed four PMF combatants attempting to launch drones in Babil Governorate. tdi

ISRAEL (HAMAS ET AL.)

Intensity: 5 | Change: • | Start: 1988

Conflict parties: Hamas, other Islamist groups, PIJ vs. government

Conflict items: secession, resources



The war over the creation of a sovereign Palestinian state and resources between the state of Israel and Palestinian armed groups, most notably Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), continued. Following its escalation on 10/07/23, the fighting between the Israeli Military and Hamas (al-Qassam Brigades and other Palestinian armed factions) in the Gaza Strip, with some Hamas leaders being targeted abroad, continued throughout the year.

Over the course of the year, Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) launched multiple airstrikes against Hamas in the State of Palestine°, while Hamas retaliated with rocket attacks.

For instance, on January 1, an IDF airstrike killed the commander of Hamas' Nokhba forces in Deir al-Balah Governorate, Gaza. On January 8, Hamas conducted a rocket attack against Tel Aviv city, eponymous District, Israel. On January 29, Hamas's Al-Qassam Brigades conducted a rocket attack again targeting Tel Aviv city. On March 29, the IDF conducted

attacks against several targets in Khan Yunis governorate, Gaza, including operations around Nasser Hospital, where a shootout between Hamas and IDF took place. No deaths or injuries were reported. Similar to other health complexes and hospitals in Gaza, IDF allegedly suspect there are tunnels used by Hamas in the vicinity or under Nasser Hospital. Between March 10 and May 26, the IDF killed at least eleven high-ranking Hamas officials. On March 10, the Israeli Army launched several airstrikes on tunnel systems at the refugee camp of Al-Nuseirat, Gaza, and killed at least ten Hamas fighters, including Hamas senior commander Marwan Issa. During the Rafah offensive on May 26, the IDF shelled Tal al-Sultan IDP-Camp in Rafah, Gaza, killing at least 45 people, including two high ranked Hamas officials, and injuring 249 people [→ Israel – State of Palestine (°PNA)].

Furthermore, on June 15, Hamas allegedly fired five rockets from the humanitarian zone in the Gaza Strip into Israel. Throughout July, the IDF conducted a series of airstrikes in Gaza, often targeting schools and infrastructures where Hamas allegedly operated. For instance, on July 6, Israel launched airstrikes on a UN-led school in the Gaza Strip, killing at least 16 people and injuring more than 75 [→ Israel – State of Palestine° (PNA)]. Israel claims the attack targeted several Hamas cells operating near the Al-Jaouni School. On July 19, the IDF launched an attack on a building allegedly being used by the Hamas-linked Elkahira organisation to store, transfer, and operate terrorist activities. On July 27, the Israeli military launched an airstrike on the Khadija School, Deir al-Balah, Gaza Strip, killing 30 individuals and injuring at least 100. The school functioned as a refugee camp for approx. 4,000 displaced Palestinians. The IDF carried out the attack, claiming to target terrorists operating within the school compound.

On October 7, rockets were fired from Gaza in the direction of Tel Aviv and the Kerem Shalom border crossing, Rafah, and Kibbutz Holiz, triggering rocket alarms. On October 12, two rockets were fired from Gaza at Ashkelon, Southern District, Israel, leading to further alarms. Both rockets struck open ground.

On November 7, the IDF claimed to have demolished large tunnel systems in Southern Gaza with airstrikes and tanks, killing seven Hamas operatives.

On December 16, an airstrike targeting the civil defense service in Nuseirat Camp, which killed an Al Jazeera journalist among others, IDF claims to have targeted Hamas operatives [→ Israel – State of Palestine° (PNA)]. On December 22, the IDF conducted an airstrike against a Hamas operative embedded in a former school in Gaza currently being used as a shelter for displaced Palestinians. On December 28, the IDF intercepted two long-range rockets fired at Jerusalem from Gaza.

During the year, the IDF carried out several larger ground offensives across Gaza. For instance, between April 18 and 22, the IDF raided four places in the West Bank, the Nur al-Shams refugee Camp, Jenin, Nablus, and Tubas, killing at least 18 people, of whom eight were civilians and ten Hamas fighters, and arrested at least eight people for alleged terrorism.

On June 4, the military claimed its fighter jets had hit Hamas sites as ground troops operated in Bureij district, Deir el-Balah area, Central Gaza, leaving 15 individuals dead.

On June 27, Israeli tanks pushed into the Shuja'iyya neighborhood in the northern Gaza Strip, sparking fierce combat, with militants led by Hamas. No casualties were reported.

During the year, the military wings of Hamas et al. carried out attacks on Israeli targets. For instance, on August 13,

Hamas and PIJ fighters performed a series of attacks on Israeli soldiers, detonating mines and IEDs, leaving an unspecified number of dead and injured persons in the town of al-Qarara, Khan Younis governorate, Gaza. On October 25, three IDF soldiers were killed and several others injured in a bomb attack against an IDF tank in Jabalia Camp, Jabalia, North Gaza. On November 2, the IDF imprisoned 700 people, of which 300 are alleged Hamas fighters or other extremists groups members, in Jabalia. On November 12, four IDF soldiers were killed during firefights in the north of Gaza. On the same day, IDF forces located and destroyed Hamas rocket launchers aimed at Israeli border communities in Beit Layhia, North Gaza. On December 8, Qassam brigades attacked an Israeli tank in the Al-Fakhoura Jabalia Camp, killing three and injuring twelve IDF soldiers. On December 10, IDF soldiers killed ten Hamas operatives responsible for the tank attack in North Gaza two days prior.

On December 14, the IDF killed 15 alleged Hamas operatives to protect a truck from being looted. According to the IDF, dozens of militants were killed in an overnight raid on the same day, carried out by troops of the Givati Infantry Brigade in Beit Hanoun, North Gaza. On December 19, one Qassam brigade fighter stabbed four Israeli soldiers in the Jabalia camp and seized their personal weapons.

During airstrikes and ground offensives, IDF killed multiple high ranking Hamas officials. For instance, on July 31, an Israeli strike killed Ismail Haniyeh, Hamas’s political chief, along with his bodyguard while he was in Tehran for the inauguration of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian.

On August 1, Mohammed Diab Ibrahim Al-Masri, senior leader of Hamas and highest commander of the military wing of Hamas (known as the al-Qassam Brigades) was reported dead by Israeli and Palestinian reporting, in an Israeli airstrike in southern Gaza on July 13. On November 16, Israeli airstrikes killed two leaders of the PIJ, Abdel Asis Miawi and Rasmi Abu Issa, in Damascus capital, Syria.

On October 17, IDF reportedly killed the head of Hamas, Yahya Sinwar, in an operation which targeted a building in Rafah. On November 4, the IDF killed a member of the secret service department of the PIJ, who participated in the attack on 10/7/23. On December 6, IDF and Shin Beth reported to have killed another Hamas commander who led the attack on 10/07/23.

As of the start of 2024, 58 of the 136 Israeli hostages taken by Hamas at the beginning of the war 2023 have died, while seven have been rescued by the IDF.

On July 1, Israel released 54 Palestinians it had detained during the war. Among them was the director of Al Shifa Hospital, who reported abuse during detention, including being deprived of food and medicine. He also claimed that some detainees had died.

The war between Israel and Hamas led to international response in the field of law and politics. On January 26, the ICJ has ordered that Israel must take “all measures’ and “prevent and punish the direct and public incitement to commit genocide’ in Gaza. On May 20, the ICC filed arrest warrants for alleged crimes against humanity committed on the territory of Israel and ‘the State of Palestine’ against Hamas’ leadership, namely, Yahya Sinwar, Ismail Haniyeh, and Mohammed Al-Masri. On June 12, in two separate reports, the UN accused Israel and Hamas of war crimes and crimes against humanity [→ Israel – State of Palestine° (PNA)].

Peace talks over possible ceasefires and hostage releases began in early January. However, both sides rejected one another’s conditions, while mutually accusing each other for doing so. For instance, on January 23, Hamas rejected Israel’s

offer of a two month ceasefire in exchange for hostages. However, on February 7, Israel rejected plans for a ceasefire shortly after having declared dozens of Israeli hostages dead the same day. On February 16, US President Joe Biden advised Israeli President Benjamin Netanyahu to consider a ceasefire.

Negotiations rekindled between Hamas and the Israeli government on July 3, assisted by mediators Egypt and Qatar, yet eventually failed on August 26. On July 24, PM Netanyahu reinforced his stance on the Gaza conflict during his speech in Washington DC, the capital city of USA, vowing that it will not end until ‘total victory’ over Hamas and the release of all Israeli hostages was achieved. On November 4, Hamas and Fatah met in Cairo, the capital city of Egypt, to talk about the war in Gaza and potential ways for national action, suggesting the formation of a council to discuss the situation in Gaza. On November 15, Hamas declared it was open to a ceasefire and named terms. No ceasefire had been agreed upon by the end of 2024. Meanwhile, several EU member states, including France, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, criticized Israel for perceived negligence and significant civilian casualties as a result of the Israeli military operation against Hamas in Gaza, calling for an immediate ceasefire [→ Israel – State of Palestine° (PNA)] and thus diverging from the bloc’s official foreign policy.


Furthermore, the government of Iran has supported Hamas during the war, initiating airstrikes on Israel [→ Iran – Israel]. On April 1, the IDF attacked the Iranian Consulate in Damascus, Syria, killing at least 13 people and injuring three. On April 13, the Iranian Military retaliated against the attack on the Iranian Consulate in Damascus by shelling several Israeli targets with 120 ballistic missiles, 170 suicide drones, and 30 cruise missiles, from Hamas, Hezbollah, and Houthi positions in Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. Furthermore, on August 9, Israel launched an attack on Sidon, South governorate, Lebanon, killing Hamas official Samer al-Hajj, who was based at the Palestinian refugee camp of Ain al-Hilweh near Sidon. mma

ISRAEL – LEBANON

Intensity: **5** | Change: **↑** | Start: **1948**

Conflict parties: Israel vs. Lebanon

Conflict items: territory, international power, resources




The violent crisis over territory, international power, and resources between Israel and Lebanon escalated to a war. The conflict was closely intertwined with the war between Hezbollah and the state of Israel [→ Israel (Hezbollah)], as well as part of the spillover of the Israel–Hamas war [→ Israel (Hamas et al.)].

The conflict escalated on September 23, with intense Israeli airstrikes on south and east Lebanon, as well as the capital Beirut’s southern suburbs. An Israeli ground invasion began on October 1, claiming to target Hezbollah, leaving wide destruction in border villages and making only small advances into Lebanon, with more than 4,047 people killed and 16,638 people injured. Israel has reported that hundreds

of Hezbollah fighters were killed [→ Israel (Hezbollah)]. On November 26, the parties agreed to a ceasefire. A total of 227 ceasefire violations were observed. While 902,000 formerly IDPs returned, more than 179,000 remained displaced. Just days before the ground invasion, on September 24, some residents of southern Lebanon received phone calls urging them to leave their homes. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) spokesperson advised Lebanese civilians to evacuate from villages located close to areas used by Hezbollah for military purposes. This suspicion was later also used as a pretext to justify attacks on civilian infrastructures. At least 25 percent of Lebanese territory were under IDF displacement orders. On the first day of ground invasion, the IDF ordered the residents of 25 southern Lebanese villages to relocate north of the Awali River. Furthermore, residents should not move south of the Litani River. According to a UNSC resolution, no military and paramilitary troops are allowed south of the river except Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) personnel. On September 30, personnel of the LAF troops were pulled back from the border with Israel. Furthermore, UNIFIL withdrew from the border to a distance of five kilometers. Additionally, the IDF declared the communities of Metula, Kfar Giladi and Misgav Am, Northern District, Israel, as closed military areas. On October 3, the LAF fired back at IDF troops for the first time since the beginning of the escalation between Israel and Hezbollah, after a soldier was killed by Israeli fire. On October 24, an Israeli airstrike killed three Lebanese soldiers as they were evacuating wounded people at the outskirts of the village Yater, Nabatieh Governorate, Lebanon. At least eleven Lebanese soldiers have been killed since September 23. On October 2, an Israeli airstrike killed eleven people in Beqaa Valley. Additionally, the Lebanese media reported the use of white phosphorus bombs in the densely populated district of Bashoura, in Beirut. The use of phosphorus bombs in civilian areas is prohibited according to UN conventions. On several occasions, journalists were targeted by Israeli troops. The killing of journalists has prompted an international outcry from press advocacy groups and UN experts. Since the start of the year, six journalists have been killed and three wounded by Israeli fire in Lebanon. For instance, on October 3, two Belgian journalists were wounded in Beirut. On various occasions, IDF troops hindered UNIFIL personnel in their peacekeeping mission. For instance, on October 4, the IDF ordered an Irish UNIFIL unit to abandon their border outpost. On October 10, UNIFIL stated that the IDF fired at three of their peacekeeping missions, including the main base at Naqoura, South governorate, Lebanon. Two peacekeepers were injured. On October 11, UNIFIL reported significant damage to its buildings in Ramyah, Nabatieh governorate, Lebanon, due to explosions from nearby shelling and the injury of a peacekeeper who was hit by gunfire. On October 13, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu demanded the withdrawal of UNIFIL personnel from Lebanon, arguing that they were being used as human shields by Hezbollah. Later that day, IDF tanks destroyed the main gate of a UNIFIL post in Ramyah, Nabatieh governorate, Lebanon. Furthermore, 15 UNIFIL troops were injured when the IDF allegedly fired white phosphorus into the camp. On October 16, Israeli tanks fired at a UNIFIL watchtower in Kafr Kila, Nabatieh governorate, Lebanon, leading to structural damage. UNIFIL called the attack deliberate firing on a UNIFIL position. On November 7, five UNIFIL peacekeepers were injured by an Israeli missile strike on Sidon, South governorate, Lebanon. On several occasions, the IDF attacked civilian infrastructure

and historical sites. For instance, on October 16, IDF flattened the entire historical village of Mhaibib, Nabatieh governorate, Lebanon. Israeli forces announced they were targeting underground Hezbollah infrastructure. Furthermore, on October 30, Israel struck the historic city in Baalbek, Baalbek-Hermel governorate, Lebanon, killing 19 people. On October 23, an independent human rights expert expressed deep concern over Israel's bombing of financial institutions with links to Hezbollah in Lebanon, stating it violated international humanitarian law by targeting civilian infrastructure. As a consequence of Israeli attacks, at least 241 health and rescue workers across Lebanon were killed, in addition to material damage to 158 ambulances and 51 emergency medical centers. In addition, 19 Primary Health Care Centers have been targeted. For instance, on October 3, the WHO announced that 28 health care workers were killed in Lebanon within 24 hours. On November 27, a ceasefire mediated by France and the USA came into effect. It includes a 60-day halt to all hostilities, during which Israel must withdraw its forces from Southern Lebanon, and Hezbollah must withdraw its forces to north of the Litani River [→ Israel (Hezbollah)]. In Lebanon, 36 people were killed and 30 injured post-ceasefire. The war led to various reactions of the international community. Several countries evacuated their nationals, such as the USA, the United Kingdom, China and countries of the European Union. On October 14, Spain and Ireland requested the European Commission to suspend the EU-Israel Association Agreement as human rights were violated by Israel due to its invasion of Lebanon. An international summit for Lebanon raised a total of 1 billion USD in aid pledges. she

ISRAEL – STATE OF PALESTINE° (PNA)



The war over the creation and control of a sovereign Palestinian state, resources, decolonization, and the orientation of the political system between the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) and Palestinian population, on the one hand, and the Israeli government as well as Israeli settlers, on the other, continued. Throughout the year, the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) continued to raid villages in the occupied West Bank. For example, in a seven-day raid on villages in Jenin, Tulkarem, and Tubas governorates from August 28 to September 3, the IDF killed at least 30 people. Israeli settlers continued to attack villages in Palestinian territories. For example, on April 13, Israeli settlers attacked Palestinians in Mughayir, West Bank, upon the disappearance and murder of an Israeli. The settlers destroyed houses, cars, and critical infrastructure. On August 6, Israeli settlers assaulted and injured four Palestinian shepherds near Tuba

City, eponymous governorate, while trying to steal a herd of 400 sheep.

On June 17, armed Israeli settlers, who had newly established an extension to the Givat Assaf settlement outpost east of Deir Dibwan village, attacked a herding community near Khamat Al Maghara, Ramallah, and al-Bireh governorate. As Palestinians were evacuating the community along with their sheep, they were attacked by another group of armed Israeli settlers who opened fire and assaulted the community with clubs, injuring 15. In addition, Israeli settlers vandalized one ambulance and ten other vehicles. Due to this and other frequent intimidations and attacks by Israeli settlers on this herding community, a family of four was displaced.

The conflict is also highly affected by the ongoing war between Hamas and the State of Israel, which intensified with the Hamas' attack on Israel on 10/07/2023 [→ Israel (Hamas et al.)].

Throughout the year, the IDF continued to launch airstrikes into Gaza and the West Bank. Israeli artillery bombed the Nasser Hospital on January 19, the Al-Amal and Al-Khair hospitals on January 22, and other buildings in Khan Younis, Gaza, targeting Hamas militants presumed to be operating within these facilities. At least 29 people were killed and thousands displaced. On February 26, an Israeli airstrike near the Kuwaiti Specialized Hospital in Rafah, Gaza, killed at least eight people and injured dozens. At the time, the Kuwaiti Specialized Hospital served 1.5 million people and the Nasser Hospital sheltered thousands, being one of the last operating hospitals in the area. At least 600,000 people, a quarter of Gaza's population, have been displaced from Rafah since May 6. According to the UNRWA, at least 50,000 Palestinians were displaced from Rafah between May 6 and May 8, when Israeli forces began a ground invasion of the southern city. Since October 2023, about 1.5 million people in Gaza, which amounts to almost 70 percent of the total population, had sought safety in the Rafah region. Several Israeli allies, including the US and Germany, criticized the high number of civilian casualties resulting from the Rafah offensive and called on Israel not to aggravate the humanitarian crisis further.

On June 8, the IDF reportedly killed 274 Palestinians and injured 698 people during a military operation in Nuseirat Refugee Camp, Deir al-Balah Governorate, Gaza. On the same day, Israeli strikes on two schools in Gaza killed at least 15 Palestinians and injured another 30, as renewed evacuation orders were given to residents in several districts in eastern Khan Younis city.

On August 10, the IDF hit Al Tabi'een School in Gaza city, killing and injuring dozens of internally displaced people (IDPs) who had sought refuge at the school. According to initial reports from Palestinian Civil Defense (PCD), the IDF killed about 90 people and injured ten.

On November 20, Israeli forces killed at least 66 Palestinians with an explosive barrel that destroyed seven houses near Kamal Adwan Hospital in Beit Lahiya, Gaza. Due to the lack of ambulances, tools, and Civil Defense crews, community responders reportedly struggled to recover bodies and rescue the injured from under the rubble.

Furthermore, aid workers from International Humanitarian Organizations in Gaza and the West Bank were attacked during the year. On April 1, the IDF killed seven World Central Kitchen aid workers traveling in a convoy during an attack in Deir el-Balah, Gaza.

On May 29, the Palestine Red Crescent Society (PRCS) reported that two of its paramedics had been killed while on duty in Tal as Sultan area in western Rafah, Gaza. In a

statement on 30 May, PRCS claimed the killing was caused by an airstrike that hit one of three ambulances on a humanitarian mission. When the remaining ambulance crews tried to extinguish the fire, Israeli troops allegedly fired upon them, forcing them to withdraw.

On September 11, the IDF carried out two air strikes in Gaza on another school-turned-shelter, killing at least 18 people of which six were UNRWA staff. Around 12,000 displaced Palestinians were taking shelter there.

The conflict continues to shape international politics and law, driving diplomatic tensions, human rights debates, and legal challenges in global institutions.

On January 19, a UN Human Rights official urged Israel to observe and uphold international human rights and humanitarian law regarding Palestinian detainees held by Israel. On September 18, a UNGA resolution was adopted, which demanded the end of the unlawful presence of Israel in occupied Palestinian territory.

On November 14, the UN Special Committee on Palestine found Israeli war methods in Gaza consistent with genocide, including the use of starvation as a weapon of war. On November 21, the ICC issued warrants of arrest of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the former minister of defense for crimes against humanity and war crimes, such as intentionally and knowingly depriving the civilian population in Gaza of objects indispensable to their survival, including food, water, and medicine and medical supplies.

On November 22, Norway, Ireland, and Spain announced their recognition of Palestine as a sovereign state. In response, Israel recalled its ambassadors in Ireland and Norway for consultations. The foreign minister called the recognition an injustice to the victims of the terrorist attack on 10/07/2023. nsh

ISRAEL – SYRIA

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1948**

Conflict parties: Israel vs. Syria

Conflict items: territory, international power, resources

The violent crisis over territory, international power, and resources between Israel and Syria continued. Israel reinforced its attacks on the Syrian border region to Lebanon against the Hezbollah outposts, particularly connected to the escalation of the armed conflict between Israel and Lebanon on September 23 [→ Israel – Lebanon; Israel (Hezbollah)]. Israel continued to carry out airstrikes targeting Iranian infrastructure in Syria following the start of the war in Gaza on 10/07/23. Furthermore, since the fall of the regime of Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad on December 8, Israeli ground forces increased their military presence in the UN-supervised demilitarized buffer zone of the Syrian Golan Heights.

Aiming to destroy Syria's military infrastructure and alleged chemical weapons, Israel launched airstrikes on Syrian military positions. On March 29, in one of its deadliest airstrikes in months, Israel targeted weapon warehouses and air-defense force plants of the Lebanese Hezbollah in the Jabrin area near Aleppo airport, Halab Governorate, leaving at least 38 people dead, the majority of them Syrian regime soldiers. However, no strikes hit the airport. On June 3, Israel launched airstrikes on a copper processing factory in Hayyan, near Aleppo, and a weapons warehouse of Iranian-backed militias in the same area. 17 people were killed, amongst them three members

of Lebanese Hezbollah, one Iranian military advisor, and nine Syrian members of Iranian militias.


Between September 23 and the fall of Al-Assad on December 8, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) counted at least 75 Israeli attacks on Syria, in which Israel intended to hinder Lebanese Hezbollah from transferring weapons across the border into Syria and to obstruct the entry of humanitarian aid from Syria to affected people in Lebanon. On November 13, Israeli airstrikes struck eight positions in Al-Qusayr countryside, Homs Governorate, near the Syria-Lebanon border, targeting strategic points such as the regime forces checkpoint Al-Mashtal or the Al-Argoun bridge. 15 people were injured. On November 20, at least 38 people were killed and 50 wounded in an Israeli airstrike targeting three positions in Palmyra, Homs Governorate, one of them being a weapon warehouse that is inhabited by families of Iranian-backed militiamen.

Following December 8, Israel stated that they had carried out more than 350 airstrikes on Syrian military infrastructure in the 48 hours after the fall of Al-Assad. For example, on December 9, Israel launched airstrikes on the port of Latakia, Al Ladhqiyyah Governorate, where 15 vessels of Syria's naval fleet were docked. While the ships were heavily damaged, there have been no reports of casualties. On December 8, Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ordered ground forces to enter the buffer zone in the Syrian Golan Heights to prevent other actors from establishing power close to the Israeli border. Netanyahu argued that the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement, signed between Israel and Syria in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War, "collapsed" after the fall of the Al-Assad regime on December 8. Within this context, Israeli forces also took control over the Al-Wahda Dam near the Syrian border with Jordan, Daraa Governorate, on December 18, giving Israel control over one of the main water sources in Syria. *gew*

ISRAEL, LEBANON (HEZBOLLAH)

Intensity: **4** | Change:  | Start: **1982**

Conflict parties: Hezbollah vs. government
 Conflict items: territory, system/ideology



The war over ideology and territory between Hezbollah and the Israeli government de-escalated to a limited war. Throughout the year, Israeli military forces under the command of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) continued to carry out airstrikes on Lebanese Territory and started ongoing ground operations in southern Lebanon to restore a demilitarized buffer zone in the approx. 30 km wide area between the Litani river and the Israeli border, which was to be established by a 2006 UN resolution, to ensure the safety of 60,000 currently displaced Israeli residents upon their return to their homes in northern Israel. Israeli forces continuously clashed with Hezbollah. Hezbollah continued to fire rockets and missiles from the south of Lebanon and flew armed drones into Israel. The war is intertwined with the ongoing conflict between Hamas and Israel [→ Israel - Hamas et al.], with both organizations being part of the

Iranian-backed "Axis of Resistance".

At least 830,000 civilians were displaced by the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah and sought refuge in other parts of the country and neighboring Syria. On December 4, the Lebanese authorities stated that approximately 4,000 people have been killed in Lebanon this year. In Israel, 72 people were killed by Hezbollah attacks, including 30 IDF soldiers. More than 60,000 people were evacuated from the bordering regions of Northern Israel.

Israel's security forces aimed to destroy the Hezbollah command structures, by targeting high ranking personnel. On September 28, the IDF destroyed six residential buildings in a suburb of Beirut capital with approximately 80 bunker-breaking bombs, killing Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah's top commander, as well as the commander of Hezbollah's southern front and other members of the Lebanese militia. The Lebanese Health Ministry claimed a total of six people were killed and 91 injured in the bombardment.

On October 23, Hezbollah confirmed the death of Nasrallah's successor-to-be and head of the Executive Council of Hezbollah after the IDF carried out airstrikes on October 4. During the strike, the IDF targeted buildings in a residential area near Beirut's airport and a key crossing used by refugees fleeing into Syria. On September 17 and 18, the Israeli national intelligence agency Mossad exploded pagers and walkie-talkies, used by Hezbollah and affiliated persons for communication, killing at least 37 people, including a high-ranking Iranian diplomat, and injuring nearly 3,000. The attack sparked worldwide criticism by human rights organizations, calling the attack a possible war crime and violation of international law.

Since the beginning of the year, Hezbollah fired around 100-150 rockets into Israel daily, with degrading numbers in November due to the increased Israeli attacks on Hezbollah launch sites. For instance, on July 12, Hezbollah attacked the Druze village of Majdal Shams in the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, Syrian territory, with missiles, killing twelve civilians. On November 1, two separate Hezbollah airstrikes killed seven people in northern Israel, after the Lebanese militia fired barrages of rockets into the Krayot area north of Haifa, eponymous district, and at Israeli forces south of the Lebanese town of Khiam, Nabatieh governorate. On November 24, Hezbollah fired around 340 drones and missiles into Israel, targeting the Ashdod naval base, Southern district. *llo*

JORDAN (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change:  | Start: **2011**

Conflict parties: opposition groups vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology

The violent crisis over the political system between various civil and opposition groups, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued. Most large-scale protests were linked to the conflict in neighboring Israeli and Palestinian territories, particularly the Israel-Hamas War [→ Israel - Hamas, et al.], and spatially concentrated around the Israeli embassy in the capital of Amman. Protests were also aimed at the Jordanian government's ties with Israel and the military cooperation with the USA. Jordan has a large Palestinian community, with more than two million of Jordan's eleven million inhabitants being Palestinian.

Starting on February 9, activists and protesters began to rally over the duration of two weeks on the Sheikh Hussein bridge,

al-Balqa governorate, to protest the shipment of Israel-bound goods. The government denied its involvement in building a land bridge to Israel and bypassing the Houthi blockade of Israeli ports [→ Israel, Yemen, (al Houthi)].

Following large-scale detainments of protesters in late 2023, protests were on the decline before increasing in intensity and frequency in March, when thousands regularly rallied in Amman and other Jordanian cities. On March 25, the police fired tear gas to disperse protesters. On March 26 and 27, protesters and riot police units reportedly clashed in Amman, with police using batons and tear gas, following protesters' attempts to storm the perimeter around the Israeli embassy. During the incident, several protesters were injured and several others detained.

On April 15, Jordan helped to thwart an Iranian missile and drone attack on Israel [→ Iran – Israel], which was received negatively by protesters on the streets and on social media, where the Jordanian King was called a traitor.

On May 7, authorities shut down a TV channel linked to the Muslim Brotherhood.

Protests in Amman, especially close to the Israeli embassy after the Friday prayers, continued throughout May, June, and July, but no further violent clashes between protesters and security forces were reported. Nevertheless, detainments, sometimes under the cyber-crime law which came into force in 2023, were reported in August.

General elections were held on September 10, where the oppositional Islamic Action Front, the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood, tripled its number of parliamentary seats to 31 of 138, with the others being mostly independent tribal and local candidates.

Around 60 protesters began a hunger strike in November, demanding a stop to shipments to Israel and aid shipments for Gaza [→ Israel – State of Palestine^o (PNA)]. tsk

JORDAN, SYRIA (CAPTAGON)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2021**

Conflict parties: drug traffickers vs. government

Conflict items: resources

The violent crisis over resources at the Syria-Jordan border, as well as Jordan's southern border between drug smuggler groups suspected to have relations with Iran and its proxies, on the one hand, and the Jordan military and border forces, on the other, continued. Since 2021, the conflict has resulted in at least eight deaths through actions against drug smuggler lairs, and the detainment and seizure of drug shipments at the Syria-Jordan border. Jordan has conducted sporadic airstrikes in Syria's southern province since May 2023.

This year, the conflict was marked by airstrikes carried out by the Jordan military and border clashes. For instance, on January 17, the Jordan military conducted airstrikes against presumed drug smugglers lairs in the towns of Arman and Malh in As-Suwayda province, Syria, killing ten people and damaging two residential units. Further airstrikes took place on January 4 and 9, killing at least four people.

Five suspected smugglers were killed and one injured in clashes with Jordan border security forces on January 6, while 15 others were detained. On January 9, Jordan special forces conducted raids beyond the border, detaining seven alleged smugglers. Further clashes occurred, most notably on February 18, when five smugglers were killed and four others injured in an attempt to cross the border with large

quantities of narcotic substances.

The Jordanian government cited an increase in smuggling attempts and inaction of the Syrian government as reasons for the intensification of measures in January. Talks were held on February 17 between representatives of Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq, discussing the matter of Captagon trafficking in the region. The US imposed sanctions against the Assad regime on March 26, referring to the escalating Captagon trade. Drug shipments were seized throughout May and June, with large quantities of Captagon pills and some amounts of cannabis confiscated. Charges were hidden among goods about to pass the border.

Drone carriage became the main method of shipping in the second half of the year. For instance, on June 19, a drone was used to carry drugs across the border, but was subsequently shot down by the Jordanian military. Notable exceptions were on November 2, November 24 and December 6, when the military killed a smuggler trying to cross the border on each respective occasion. After the fall of the Assad regime in early December [→ Syria (opposition)], the rebel groups published further evidence for the involvement of the regime in the production and smuggling of Captagon and other substances. tsk

KUWAIT (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **1** | Change: • | Start: **2011**

Conflict parties: opposition movement vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The dispute over national power and the orientation of the political system between opposition groups and the government continued.

On May 10, the Emir of Kuwait dissolved the parliament for the second time this year after oppositional candidates won 29 out of 50 seats in the snap election on April 4.

The Emir also suspended constitutional articles that constrained legislative power for up to four years, claiming that he would not "allow democracy to be used to destroy the state".

On January 4, the Emir of Kuwait appointed a new Prime Minister and, on January 17, he appointed members of the cabinet. Soon after, on February 15, the Emir dissolved the parliament, claiming that parliamentarians violated "constitutional principles". mzu

LEBANON (INNER-PALESTINIAN TENSIONS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2006**

Conflict parties: Ansar Allah et al. vs. Fatah vs. other Palestinian factions

Conflict items: subnational predominance

The violent crisis over subnational predominance between Palestinian groups such as Hamas and Fatah, as well as other Palestinian factions and extremist groups, such as Al-Shabab Al-Muslim, Ansar Allah and Osbat al-Ansar, continued.

On June 24, an unknown Palestinian faction killed a member of Fatah in the Ain al-Hilweh Camp, South Governorate, where Fatah acts as a security service. Armed clashes broke

out the following night and early morning of June 25, with reported usage of automated weapons and a grenade. No further fights, deaths or injuries were reported. abl

LEBANON (IS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↗** | Start: **2011**

Conflict parties: IS vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology, subnational pre-dominance

The non-violent crisis over the orientation of the political system and subnational pre-dominance between the Lebanese government and Islamist militant group IS escalated to a violent crisis.

On July 5, a member of IS attacked the US embassy near Beirut, injuring one embassy guard in the gunfight. The attacker was shot and captured by Lebanese soldiers. In the aftermath of the embassy shooting, at least 14 IS members were arrested by the Lebanese Intelligence Directorate in the areas of Souairi and Majdal Anjar, Beqaa Directorate. lka

LEBANON (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **2** | Change: **↘** | Start: **2019**

Conflict parties: opposition vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology, national power, resources

The violent crisis over national power, resources and the orientation of the political system between the opposition and the government de-escalated to a non-violent crisis.

Demonstrations concerning the economic crisis, poor working conditions, and delayed salaries of civil servants continued, with numerous instances of protests and sit-ins at government sites.

On May 5, the Union of Workers of the Mechanical Inspection Center went on a general strike and protested against poor working conditions in front of the Interior Ministry in the capital Beirut. On June 4, civil servants of the Traffic and Vehicles Management Authority protested in front of the Interior Ministry against the delayed payments of salaries.

In another instance of protest on June 4, family members of the victims of the Beirut Port Blast in August 2020 erected roadblocks and burned tires in front of the Justice Ministry in Beirut to protest the stalling of the investigation into the causes of the explosion.

On July 24, professors of the Lebanese University gathered at the Ministry of Education in Beirut to protest the lack of full-time contracts in their profession.

On September 10, retired military personnel demonstrated for renewed policies to help retired soldiers, blocking traffic leading to the government seat in downtown Beirut. abl

LIBYA (IS)

Intensity: **1** | Change: **•** | Start: **2014**

Conflict parties: ISL vs. GNU
 Conflict items: system/ideology, national power, resources

The dispute over the orientation of the political system, national power and resources between the Islamic State in Libya (IS), on the one hand, and the Government of National Unity (GNU), on the other, continued.

On January 5, the Libya Deterrence Apparatus, a GNU-backed militia based in Tripoli, announced that an IS official linked to an organization known as Libya Province had been captured, leading to an effective eradication of terrorist organizations in the country. However, IS activities continued nationwide.

On February 13, the UN Secretary General issued a statement warning that IS still had a stronghold in the country and had begun human trafficking to finance their activities. In the southwest of the country, along the Nigerian border, IS forced migrants to work in gold mines to finance their passage north. In the report, the Secretary General claimed that IS leaders in the region cooperated with leaders of the Tebu and Tuareg tribes to avoid detection.

On March 22, a mass grave containing at least 65 bodies was discovered in al-Jahriya Valley, a former IS stronghold. The UN human rights chief vowed to investigate the mass grave on July 9. Only a week later on July 17, another mass grave containing at least two dozen bodies was discovered in Sirtre. The discovery of mass graves has been a recurring incident in the aftermath of IS' expulsion from the region. cke

LIBYA (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **2011**

Conflict parties: GNU vs. GNS
 Conflict items: system/ideology, national power, resources

The violent crisis over national power, resources, and the orientation of the political system between the UN-backed Government of National Unity (GNU), on the one hand, and the rival Government of National Stability (GNS), on the other, continued.

While there were no clashes between the GNU and the GNS this year, the GNU Prime Minister's residence was attacked by unknown persons with rocket-propelled grenades on March 31. There were no casualties.

The presence of armed groups allied with the GNU in the capital of Tripoli regularly led to fighting. For instance, on May 18, GNU-allied militias clashed in the city of Zawiya, eponymous district, killing at least one civilian and injuring 22. On August 9, GNU-allied militias clashed in Tripoli, killing nine people and injuring 16. On February 21, the GNU signed an agreement with at least five armed groups in Tripoli to leave the capital by April 9 and to be replaced by regular forces.

The political stalemate between the GNU and GNS also continued throughout the year. On August 13, the GNS-allied parliament voted to end the term of the interim GNU, declaring the GNS as the sole legitimate government until a new

unified government is chosen. Parliament also removed the role of high commander of the army from the GNU-allied Presidential Council and named the Speaker of Parliament as the army high commander, in line with the constitutional declaration.

The UN continued to explore options for a unified government. On February 15, the UN special envoy urged political actors to form a unified government and move towards elections to avoid further disintegration within the country. On April 16, the envoy resigned. On August 9, both the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) and the EU expressed their concern over recent military mobilization and movements, particularly in the southwestern region of the country. *sag*

LIBYA (TRIBES)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2012**

Conflict parties: Tebu vs. Tuareg vs. various other tribes vs. GNU, LNA

Conflict items: system/ideology, subnational predominance, resources, other

The violent crisis over the orientation of the political system, resources, subnational predominance, and minority rights between different tribes, such the Tuareg, Tebu, and Arab communities and the Karaghla and Qadhadhfa tribes, on the one hand, and the Libyan National Army (LNA) and the Government of National Unity (GNU), on the other, continued.

On January 7, a clash between the Shurafaa tribe and followers of a former tribal warlord occurred at the site of the GNU-backed National Oil Corporation (NOC) in al-Zawiya city, Tripolitania region, al-Zawiya district. The exchange led to a shootout, leaving one dead, two injured, and an oil tanker torched.

The clash has been considered a potentially isolated incident, despite ongoing negotiations between the NOC and the High Council of Tribes. In the months leading up to the clash, the NOC was subject to protests from the High Council of Tribes and the local community of Fezzan, Fezzan province, calling to recognize tribal rights. The protests and subsequent damage from the clash led to the NOC declaring a force majeure, halting oil production completely.

On April 19, the Head of the Supreme Council of Tribes was allegedly arbitrarily detained in Sabha after protesting the GNU's misallocation of resources.

Reconciliation efforts between the various tribes and the UN-recognized national government, the GNU, continued [→ Libya (opposition)]. On August 13, more than 60 southern tribe leaders and a representative of the GNU secretly met in Rome for a facilitated peace talk. A peace agreement was signed to facilitate new training procedures for the Libyan coast guard and to provide vocational training opportunities for young people, as part of an effort to secure the southern borders. On September 6, the LNA commander in chief supervised a peace agreement between the southern tribes to offer greater stability in the country and the neighboring Maghreb region. *cke*

MAURITANIA (ANTI-SLAVERY ACTIVISTS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2015**

Conflict parties: IRA, opposition groups vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology

The violent crisis over the orientation of the political system between the Initiative for the Resurgence of the Abolitionist Movement (IRA) as well as other opposition groups, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued.

The government continued to suppress IRA members, other activists, and Black Mauritians on multiple occasions, particularly during the first half of the year. On February 1, protests by Haratine farmers, supported by the IRA, erupted following a disputed redistribution of arable land in R'Kiz, Trarza province. The protests lasted for a week. Police authorities injured at least two protesters and arrested several people, including anti-slavery activists.

On February 20, the Bureau of the National Assembly lifted the immunity of opposition presidential candidate and anti-slavery activist Biram Dah Abeid. On May 12, police authorities arrested an opposition MP and anti-slavery activist following a dispute with members of the El Insaf party in the capital Nouakchott. She claimed to have caught members of the El Insaf party buying voter cards.

Violence escalated during protests following the presidential election on June 29. On June 29 and on July 1, the police arrested two campaign directors of the opposition presidential candidate Abeid in Nouakchott. Protests broke out on July 1 in Nouakchott, Kaédi, Gorgol province, Rosso, Trarza province, Boghé, Brakna province, and Nouadhibou, Dakhlet Nouadhibou province. The unrest followed an announcement on June 30 that President Mohamed Ould Ghazouani had won a second term, according to provisional results. His main rival Abeid rejected the results over alleged irregularities. On July 1, the government cut mobile internet for two weeks. Police forces arrested hundreds of people, while the IRA claimed 1500 arrests. At least three protesters were killed in Kaédi, while the IRA claimed five deaths due to torture in police stations, after protesters clashed with police forces. Investigations to determine the cause of these deaths were stopped by state authorities. *tku*

MOROCCO (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: ↗ | Start: **2011**

Conflict parties: AMDH, Front Social, Justice and Spirituality, labor rights activists vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology

The non-violent crisis over the orientation of the political system between opposition groups, including the parliamentary opposition led by the Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires (USFP), syndicates and labor rights activists, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, escalated to a violent crisis.

From July 9 to 11, several hundred medical students as well as syndicate members, namely of the Fédération nationale de la santé (FNS) and Union Marocaine du Travail (UMT),

protested against the government's reform of the medical sector in the capital Rabat. The government dissolved the protests by sending police forces to employ water cannons, injuring more than five and arresting 22. From January 3 to 4, 50,000 teachers in Morocco went on strike to protest an education system reform deal between syndicates and the government, claiming the syndicates did not represent them. On April 15, infighting broke out within the parliamentary opposition, which had been relatively unified until that point. The biggest opposition party USFP claimed the presidency of the commission on justice, legislation, and human rights in parliament, which was until then held by the second biggest opposition party, Mouvement Populaire (MP). However, on April 24, the opposition unified again to criticize the government of PM Aziz Akhannouch harshly because of the high unemployment rate, especially amongst young people. On June 24, the opposition quit the parliamentary session collectively, as the parliamentary president would not formally allow them to ask questions in session. lwb

MOROCCO (POLISARIO / WESTERN SAHARA^o)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1975**

Conflict parties: POLISARIO, Sahrawis vs. government
Conflict items: secession, decolonisation, resources

The violent crisis over the secession, decolonization of the territory and resources of the two former Spanish colonial regions Saguía el-Hamra and Río de Oro, commonly known as Western Sahara, between the Popular Front of the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro (POLISARIO), supported by Algeria, on the one hand, and the Moroccan government, on the other, continued.

The first half of the year was characterized by increased violence. On January 1, Moroccan drone strikes killed twelve POLISARIO fighters and injured three in Mehaires, Laâyoune-Sakia al Hamra region. On March 20, a Moroccan drone strike killed three and injured seven POLISARIO fighters in Mahbes, Guelmim-Oued Noun region. They claimed to have prepared a rocket strike on Moroccan army bases within the border wall. Moreover, on April 7, a Moroccan drone strike killed at least two people in Mijek, Dakhla-Oued Ed-Dahab region. From May 18 to 19, POLISARIO fighters fired shells on the village of Smara, Laâyoune-Sakia al Hamra region. No casualties or material damage were reported.

In November, Moroccan armed forces renewed their attacks in the Dakhla-Oued Ed-Dahab region. On November 5, they attacked a POLISARIO convoy east of the sand wall in Gleibat El Foula with drones, killing two and injuring three. On November 9, POLISARIO fighters fired at least four rockets, targeting the festivities of the 49th anniversary of the Green March, the Moroccan movement to occupy Western Sahara, in Al Mahbes. No casualties were recorded in the attack.

In response, on November 10, Moroccan armed forces attacked a group of POLISARIO fighters in Al Mahbes with drones, killing five.

On April 6, the French minister for foreign trade confirmed support for French investments in Western Sahara in cooperation with the Moroccan government. On the same day, POLISARIO responded with threats of violent repercussions against French activities in the area. These threats were not put into action. On July 30, French President Emmanuel Macron openly supported the Moroccan autonomy plan for Western Sahara for the first time. Later that year, on October

18, the UN Special Envoy for Western Sahara proposed a partition plan for Western Sahara, taking the Moroccan sand wall as a reference point for a proposed border between a Moroccan and an independent Western Sahara. This plan was rejected by all parties.

POLISARIO committed human rights abuses in Tindouf, eponymous province, Algeria. On January 7, POLISARIO fighters burnt a Sahrawi woman's documents to hold her hostage after visiting Spain, sending death threats to members of the organization that facilitated her visit.

On July 16, around 100 POLISARIO fighters defected in Camp Rabouni, Tindouf Province, Algeria, in protest against the state of the POLISARIO army and its leaders. lwb

SAUDI ARABIA (IS)

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **2015**

Conflict parties: IS vs. government
Conflict items: system/ideology, international power

The non-violent crisis over ideology and international power between IS and affiliated militant groups, on the one hand, and Saudi Arabia, supported by the USA and the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS (GCDI), on the other, continued.

By December, Saudi Arabia had executed approx. 300 people, at least 45 of which were charged with terrorism-related activities. Approx. 200 executions took place in September alone. Among the executed, 100 individuals were allegedly foreign nationals.

On February 27, Saudi Arabia executed seven people for setting up and financing terror organizations. On May 13, Saudi Arabia again executed one person for unspecified terrorism charges. Similarly, on August 8, Saudi Arabia sentenced a person to death. On December 4, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights expressed concern over the execution of foreign nationals, a day after Saudi Arabia executed three Egyptians.

Related backlash ensued on social media, demanding the release of people detained for expressing their opinion, before Saudi Arabia would host the 19th UN Internet Governance Forum (IGF) from December 15 to 19 in the capital Riyadh. Some of the detained were allegedly framed as supporting terrorism in the context of their stance toward the war between Israel and Hamas in Palestine [→ Israel (Hamas et al.)]. Over the course of the year, Saudi Arabia participated in a series of international initiatives to reaffirm its intent to counter ISIS.

For instance, on January 30 and 31, Saudi Arabia, the US, and Italy hosted the 19th meeting of the Counter ISIS Finance Group (CIFG), a working group of the GCDI. Following the meeting, CIFG issued a joint statement on agreed measures, in particular in Africa and Asia, to globally disrupt terror financing. On February 3, Saudi Arabia pledged USD 26.6 million to the Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition (IMCTC). Furthermore, on May 16, Saudi Arabia signed an agreement with Iraq in the Saudi capital Riyadh to start a new training program to combat terror financing.

Furthermore, on November 18, a call for "shedding blood" in Saudi Arabia appeared in a pro-IS news outlet and, on November 26, a pro-IS video appeared online calling for a Jihad in the "peninsula" and for renewed expansionism of IS. tcr

SAUDI ARABIA (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1992**

Conflict parties: opposition vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology

The violent crisis over the orientation of the political system between various opposition groups and the Saudi Arabian government continued.

According to various human rights organizations, throughout this year, authorities executed 330 people, constituting the highest number of executed people ever accounted. Additionally, the European Saudi Organization for Human Rights reported the increased number of unprecedented cases of treason before the Specialized Supreme Court (SSC), which sentenced 50 people on political charges to death.

In April 2024, the Court of Appeal approved two death sentences for Saudi nationals, who were accused of having committed protest-related crimes as children. The two sentences raised international concern as the death penalty against minors was officially abolished in May 2023.

On January 9, the SSC sentenced a 29-year-old women's rights activist to eleven years in prison for "terrorist offences" in a secret trial. The prosecution charged her with violating cybercrime law while campaigning for women's rights online and for posting a photo without an abaya. On September 1, the activist reported having been attacked by guards and inmates for her activism, resulting in a broken leg and severe facial wounds.

On May 29, a teacher was found guilty of several criminal offenses related to his online expression of opinion. The teacher had published posts on social media in which he criticized the government's Vision 2030 project and expressed his condolences on the death of a human rights activist who had died in custody.

The government also continues to issue travel bans for activists and opposition figures. On February 14, Al-Hathloul, one of Saudi Arabia's most known advocates for women's rights, attempted to travel abroad but was stopped at the border, as she remained under a permanent travel ban. On July 4, authorities sentenced the producer of a prominent Netflix series to 13 years in prison and a 13-year travel ban after a court found him guilty of promoting homosexuality and mocking the government. On May 2, security forces reportedly arrested at least three people for publicly criticizing the Israeli regime's ongoing war in the Gaza Strip, as the Crown Prince Muhammed Bin Salman sought to normalize diplomatic relations with the State of Israel. llo

SAUDI ARABIA, YEMEN (AQAP)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1990**

Conflict parties: AQAP vs. PLC, STC
 Conflict items: system/ideology

The violent crisis over the orientation of the political system between al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), on the one hand, and the internally divided Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) comprised in part of the Southern Transitional Council (STC) and Saudi-backed forces of the former government, on the other, continued.

Throughout the year, fighting occurred between AQAP and STC-led forces predominantly in the Abyan and Shabwah governorates, often utilizing drones and IEDs. For instance, on February 6, AQAP targeted STC-affiliated militia in Abyan governorate, resulting in the deaths of two military personnel and injuring at least two others. On March 24, a clash broke out in Abyan governorate after AQAP members attacked an STC patrol vehicle, leading to the death of two STC-affiliated soldiers and several AQAP militants. On May 17, an AQAP drone attack injured three STC-affiliated fighters and, on July 14, AQAP performed an IED which killed two soldiers from the STC First Brigade forces and injured one. Both occurred in Wadi Oemran, Abyan governorate.


On August 16, in Madiyah, Abyan governorate, a suicide attack by AQAP targeting an STC military base killed 16 STC soldiers and injured 18 others. On October 7, in Shabwa governorate, AQAP militants also targeted a water tanker of the STC-affiliated Southern Forces with an IED.

Throughout the year, PLC and STC continued to confront AQAP. On May 19, the PLC defense minister issued a statement describing the readiness of pro-government forces to fight al-Houthi-affiliated organizations, specifically mentioning AQAP, despite them being unaffiliated. The so-called Arrows of the East military campaign by the STC continued. For instance, on August 5, STC forces shot down an AQAP drone in Wadi Oemran, Abyan governorate. On August 18, STC-affiliated forces performed a military operation in Madiyah, Abyan governorate, leaving a senior AQAP leader dead. STC forces also repelled several AQAP attacks on their positions, for example on July 14 in Wadi Oemran, Abyan governorate, and on November 21 in Abyan governorate. vbo

SYRIA (INTER-OPPOSITION RIVALRY)

Intensity: **4** | Change: ↗ | Start: **2013**

Conflict parties: HTS vs. SDF vs. SLF vs. HRE, SNA vs. various Islamist groups
 Conflict items: system/ideology, subnational pre-dominance, resources



The violent crisis over subnational predominance, the orientation of the political system, and resources between various Islamist groups, such as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), different factions of Syrian National Army (SNA) as well as the Syrian Liberation Front (SLF), and the Afrin liberation forces escalated to a limited war. Following an offensive led by armed opposition groups including HTS that began in northwest Syria on November 27, the Syrian regime led by President Bashar al-Assad collapsed on December 8, leaving HTS in power.

During the first half of the year, most clashes occurred between SDF and SNA in the governorates of Halab and Dayr az Zawr. For instance, on January 17, factions of SNA clashed with the Manbij Military Council, which is part of SDF, in Manbij countryside, Halab governorate, leaving a member of the Al-Sultan Murad SNA faction dead. On January 30, the pro-Kurdish Afrin Liberation Forces clashed with the Ashmat and Hamzah Divisions of SNA on the frontline of Kimar in Ha-

lab governorate, leaving five members of the Afrin Liberation Forces dead. In November, the intensity of the fighting in Halab governorate increased. For instance, on November 25, 15 members of the SNA affiliated Ahrar Al-Sharqiya militia were killed in clashes with the Manbij Military Council. On November 24, SDF fired multiple rockets at al-Bab city in eastern rural Aleppo.

In Dayr az Zawr governorate, SDF continued violent attacks against civilians. For example, on February 20, SDF soldiers killed a child in Theban town and, on March 26, SDF shot dead two children during a raid in the same town in the eastern part of the governorate. In April and May, conflict intensified in Ar Raqqa governorate. On April 20, an SDF sniper shot a civilian farmer in Um al-Baramil village and, on May 27, SDF patrolmen shot two civilians in a dispute near the national stadium in Raqqa city, killing one.


Up until the end of November, civilians repeatedly protested against HTS in the governorates of Halab and Idlib. They demanded an end to HTS rule and the dissolution of its security apparatus. For instance, on September 6, security forces beat several women with cudgels and sticks at a protest in Idlib city, eponymous governorate. On April 4, former HTS leader Al-Qahtani was killed in a suicide attack in the Harem district, Idlib governorate.

During and after the opposition's offensive that led to the fall of the Assad regime [→ Syria (opposition)], fighting increased in the governorate of Halab. On December 2 and 3, SDF launched several rockets on villages in eastern Halab countryside, killing four civilians. SNA and the Manbij Military Council repeatedly clashed in Manbij and Aleppo cities, for instance on December 8 and 9 and on December 27, leading to at least 163 casualties, including five civilians. On December 13 and 17, SDF and SNA clashed in Ar Raqqa, eponymous governorate, leaving eight fighters dead. SDF and SNA killed six civilians in eastern Halab governorate between December 24 and 30. hwa

SYRIA (IS)

Intensity: **4** | Change: **↗** | Start: **2014**

Conflict parties: IS vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology, subnational pre-dominance, resources



The violent crisis over ideology, subnational pre-dominance, and national resources between so-called Islamic State (IS), on the one hand, and the Syrian government, on the other, increased to a limited war.

Throughout the year, the level of violent activity by IS increased. Attacks expanded geographically, targeting both regime positions and civilians. In January, IS carried out 33 attacks during the global campaign "And kill them where you find them". For instance, in Homs governorate, IS killed at least 31 regime soldiers and two civilians, and injuring at least 48 soldiers and civilians. On January 9, IS carried out an IED attack on a military bus on a motorway in Homs governorate, killing ten regime fighters and wounding 23. IS activities peaked in March, with 69 attacks. This made it the

most violent month since 2017, according to the Counter Extremism Project.

Attacks against civilians continued, especially during the truffle season. For instance, on March 2, two truffle pickers were killed by a mine in the desert outside Masrib, west Deir Ez Zor governorate. On March 29, IS fighters shot one truffle picker south of Ithriyah, Hamah governorate.

There remain concerns about the potential for IS to exploit the power vacuum since the fall of the Assad regime on December 8 [→ Syria (opposition)]. On December 10, the most violent attack of the year took place in the Sukhna area, Homs governorate, when IS executed 54 regime soldiers who were fleeing military service.

At the end of the year, counterterrorism operations, particularly led by the US, focused primarily on containing increased IS activities, especially in the central Syrian desert. On December 9, the US Department of Defense issued a statement announcing that the US Mission to defeat IS in Syria will remain in place despite the change in Syrian leadership. For instance on December 19, in Dayr az Zawr governorate, the US conducted an airstrike, killing IS leader Abu Yusif aka Mahmud and another IS member, and leaving one injured. zey

SYRIA (KURDISH GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↘** | Start: **1962**

Conflict parties: KDPS vs. AANES vs. SDF vs. government
 Conflict items: autonomy, subnational predominance, resources

The limited war over autonomy, subnational predominance, and resources between the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and Kurdish dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), affiliated militias, as well as the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Syria (KDPS), on the one hand, and the Syrian government and pro-government forces, de-escalated to a violent crisis.

Throughout the year 2024, the area controlled by the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) faced ongoing instability. Protests, tribal infights, criminal activities and violent incidents destabilized the de-facto administration. The perpetrators often remained unclear or contested, but included government affiliated militias, local residents or allegedly members of the Islamic State (IS) [→ Syria, Iraq et al. (IS)]. For instance, an armed group, affiliated to the government, targeted a military post of the SDF, killing five of their members, on February 9 at al-Shaafa, Dayr az-Zawr governorate. Raids, curfews and arrests conducted by SDF and Asayish, as well as reported forcibly recruitment including minors, sparked further resistance in parts of the population.

Lethal tensions in between government forces and SDF erupted in sporadic exchanges of fire, mutual shellings, small scale operations and infiltration attempts, especially along the line of contact at the banks of Euphrates River, which also affected civilians. For instance, on February 28, mutual shelling led to the harming of three civilians by SDF, of whom two eventually died, in al-Mayadeen, Dayr az-Zawr governorate.

August saw a massive flare-up in hostilities between the two sides. An infiltration attempt by pro-government forces, accompanied by attacks on military posts of SDF, started the fiercest clashes since almost a year, in the dawn of August

7, at countryside of Dayr az-Zawr governorate. The heavy fighting continued for six consecutive days before the bloodshed subsided. Around 50 people died in those clashes and more than 70 were wounded. For instance, on August 8, in al-Dahlah, Dayr az-Zawr governorate, eleven civilians died due to artillery shelling from government-held areas.


A significant shift in the conflict was caused by the massive military operation by opposition forces against the government-controlled areas, and their swift advance towards the Syrian capital Damascus, starting on November 27 [→ Syria (Opposition)]. Over the course of this dynamic, SDF-affiliated Dayr az-Zawr Military Council (DMC), advanced towards the so-called "Seven villages" area in the countryside of Dayr az-Zawr governorate. Intensive shelling, as well as increased bombardment with fighter jets by the International Coalition/ USA supported the operation, which led to SDF conquering the contested area, on December 3. On December 6, SDF took over control of Dayr az-Zawr, eponymous governorate, after government forces withdrew.

The fighting between AANES and Syrian government ceased, when Opposition forces toppled Syrian Government on December 8. In an act for rapprochement, AANES handed over Dayr az-Zawr, eponymous governorate, to the new interim government of Syria, dominated by Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). In the aftermath, AANES and HTS-dominated new Syrian government started political talks. AANES stated their claim for a democratic, de-centralized Syria, with constitutional Kurdish rights, autonomy and protection against Türkiye and its proxies. HTS in the contrary stated their will to create a unified, strong Syrian state without any form of segregation or federalism. som

SYRIA (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: 5 | Change: ↗ | Start: 2011

Conflict parties: FSA, HTS, NC vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology, national power, resources




This conflict text will be made available within April 2026. For an earlier access, please contact us. nub

SYRIA (SDF – TÜRKIYE / NORTHERN SYRIA)

Intensity: 5 | Change: ↑ | Start: 2018

Conflict parties: HRE, SDF, YPG vs. FSA, Türkiye
 Conflict items: autonomy, subnational predominance, resources



The violent crisis over subnational predominance, autonomy, and natural resources between Türkiye and the Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army (FSA) on one hand, and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and affiliated groups, such as the People's Protection Units and Afrin Liberation Forces (HRE), on the other, escalated to a war. Türkiye continued its military operations against SDF-controlled areas using UAVs, warplanes, artillery, and tanks, focusing on the Aleppo, Al Hasakah, and Raqqa governorates. Throughout the year, at least 1,174 casualties were reported, with 770 killed and 404 injured.

The violence reached its peak in December 2024, as the Assad regime's fall led to escalated offensives by both sides, causing a surge in casualties and destruction, especially in Aleppo, eponymous governorate, and Al Hasakah, eponymous governorate. Kurdish and Kurdish-affiliated sources reported at least 598 were killed and 223 injured in Aleppo in December alone. During the Manbij offensive (December 6 to December 11), Turkish-backed forces captured the city after five days of intense fighting, resulting in the deaths of at least 112 SDF fighters, 60 SNA fighters, and eleven civilians. Following a US-brokered ceasefire, the SDF launched the East Aleppo offensive, regaining control of the Tishrin Dam and several villages southeast of Manbij, Aleppo governorate. Clashes near Abu Qalqa, Aleppo governorate, between December 27 and 31, left at least 50 SNA and twelve SDF fighters dead, while Turkish-backed forces established military bases near Manbij, further escalating the conflict.

The rest of 2024 was also characterized by increased violence and conflict in northern Syria, driven by Turkish forces and their allied groups, and causing widespread destruction to civilian infrastructure and agricultural areas. Persistent violence resulted in significant casualties among civilians, SDF fighters, and other armed groups, while thousands were displaced.

In January, heightened hostilities in Afrin, Aleppo governorate, led to the deaths of four civilians. Turkish forces and allied factions launched 126 attacks in February, using heavy weapons by targeting 37 villages and towns and conducted nine drone attacks that killed three civilians, among others. Throughout March and April, Turkish drone strikes continued, resulting in multiple civilian casualties. On March 7, a drone strike near Manbij injured two civilians, followed by clashes that killed five pro-Turkish fighters. In April, drone attacks in Koban, Aleppo Governorate, injured two civilians. Drone strikes also persisted throughout May and June, with at least two SDF fighters killed in Til Koçer and Til Hemis on May 31. In July, Turkish forces and allied groups continued their military operations. For example on July 1, protests in Afrin led to four protester deaths and injuries to more than 20 others. On July 16, Afrin Liberation Forces reported striking Turkish forces in the Bab region, leaving two Turkish soldiers dead and three injured.

Turkish forces continued demographic change policies in The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, deporting 600 Syrian refugees from Türkiye and handing them over to paramilitary forces in Girê Spi (Tal Abyad). By the end of July, 36,400 refugees, including 72 Iraqis, were resettled in occupied territories. Turkish forces cut down over 1,900 trees and burned 572 hectares of forest area in Afrin.

Between September and October, military activity in northern and eastern Syria escalated significantly. In early September, Turkish-backed forces attempted to infiltrate Manbij, resulting in significant casualties among allied mercenaries. Between October 23 and 27, Turkish forces conducted approximately 68 drone and airstrikes that targeted civilian

infrastructure, including oil fields, power stations, and water wells. These strikes resulted in at least 17 civilian deaths and left a further 66 civilians injured. The SDF launched operations against Turkish bases in the occupied zone, reportedly leading to casualties. Fighting also caused the destruction of critical infrastructure, including 604 water wells, which worsened the humanitarian situation.

In November, Turkish forces continued airstrikes and artillery attacks, resulting in civilian casualties and widespread destruction of civilian infrastructure. On November 3, airstrikes targeted agricultural areas in Afrin's Sherawa district, killing four civilians and injuring seven others. Between November 7 and 9, Turkish forces carried out drone and artillery attacks, killing at least six civilians and injuring 15. On November 23, Türkiye claimed a military operation targeting Kurdish groups in retaliation for an attack in Ankara capital, Türkiye, leading to twelve civilian deaths and leaving 30 injured. jkl

SYRIA – TÜRKIYE

Intensity: **1** | Change: • | Start: **1946**

Conflict parties: Syria vs. Türkiye

Conflict items: territory, international power

The dispute between Syria and Türkiye over territory (the Hatay province) and international power continued. Whilst both conflict parties were involved in fighting within Syria, the attacks did not directly target one another [→ Syria (Türkiye – SDF / Northern Syria)].

Diplomatic talks continued throughout the year, for instance on January 24 and 25, when the deputy foreign ministers of Türkiye, Syria, Russia, and Iran met in Astana, Kazakhstan, to discuss the normalization of the Syrian-Turkish relations. On September 17 and 18, civilians protested against the normalization of Turkish-Syrian relations, rejecting open border crossings in Afrin city and Al-Bab city in Halab governorate. After the fall of the Assad regime [→ Syria (opposition)], Türkiye recognised the new transitional government of Syria and reopened its embassy in Damascus on December 14. Türkiye continued its military campaign against Kurdish forces in the northern part of the country [→ Syria (Türkiye – SDF / Northern Syria)]. Russia and Türkiye announced their intention to continue the Astana talks to find a sustainable solution to the conflict in Syria. On December 9, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced the reopening of the Yayladagi border gate to facilitate the voluntary return of Syrian refugees to Syria. hwa

SYRIA – USA

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **2003**

Conflict parties: Syria vs. USA

Conflict items: system/ideology, international power

The non-violent crisis over international power, system and ideology between Syria and the USA continued. This year was marked by the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime and potential developments regarding US sanctions.

On February 14, the Assad Regime Anti-Normalization Act of 2023 was passed by the US House of Representatives and

subsequently presented to the Senate on February 26. The bill enhances the ability of the US government to impose sanctions on any person or entity that provides significant financial, material or technological support to specific Syrian groups and companies and, thus, aimed to normalize relations with then-Syrian President al-Assad [→ Syria – USA].

On May 8, US President Joe Biden extended the National Emergency Executive Order 13894 for one year. The national emergency has been effective since 10/14/2019 and was declared in response to Türkiye's Operation Peace Spring, which was launched in October 2019 as a military offensive into northeastern Syria. After the fall of the Assad regime on December 8 [→ Syria (opposition)], the US announced its support for the new transitional government.

Throughout the year and with increasing intensity towards the end of the year, the US Army targeted military infrastructure and personnel belonging to the Islamic State as well as Iranian-backed groups and the Al-Qaeda-linked group Hurras al-Din in Syria, causing dozens of casualties [→ Iran – USA; Syria (IS)]. For example, on December 9, US Central Command forces conducted dozens of precision airstrikes targeting known IS camps and operatives in central Syria [→ Syria (IS)]. gew

TUNISIA (ISLAMIST MILITANT GROUPS)

Intensity: **2** | Change: ▼ | Start: **2011**

Conflict parties: AQIM, Jund al-Khilafah (IS) vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The violent crisis over ideology and the orientation of the political system between Islamist groups and the government de-escalated to a non-violent crisis.

On February 25, in Sfax, eponymous governorate, the courtyard of an abandoned synagogue was set on fire, damaging windows in the main building. The police apprehended a suspect. Due to the ongoing conflict in Israel and the State of Palestine° [→ Israel – State of Palestine° (PNA); Israel (Hamas et al.)] and a deadly Islamist attack last year, the El Ghriba Synagogue festival, Medenine Governorate, was scaled down. Only a dozen pilgrims attended compared to the usual thousands.

Several arrests occurred throughout the year. On April 18, the Emir of Jund al-Khilafah, a local IS affiliate, was arrested in the mountains of Kasserine, eponymous governorate. On May 20, three individuals in Tunis capital were arrested for alleged membership in a terrorist organization and sentenced to prison terms ranging from six to 16 years. On October 21, a suspected member of a terrorist organization in Menzel Temime, Nabeul governorate, was detained by the National Guard. On March 27, the sentencing of a total 23 defendants took place in Tunis, following their involvement in an Islamist-motivated assassination on a left-wing politician in 2011. sdr

TUNISIA (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **2010**

Conflict parties: civil society groups, opposition groups vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The non-violent crisis over the orientation of the political system between various opposition and civil society groups, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued. On February 19, the head of the main opposition party Ennahda began a hunger strike in prison in support of other opposition politicians. He joined those who had already been on a hunger strike for eight days. On September 13, over 1,000 people protested against President Kais Saied in front of the Ministry of Justice in the capital Tunis. The protests were organized by several opposition parties and NGOs. Subsequently, over 100 members of Ennahda were arrested within a week.

On May 12, police forces arrested three radio and TV moderators on charges of disinformation and criticizing the government. In the context of these arrests, opposition parties from a wide spectrum called for protests for the liberation of these prisoners and a set date for the next presidential elections. Several hundred people joined the protest. On July 3, President Saied announced October 6 as the date for the presidential election. On September 6, the only candidate opposing Saied, Ayachi Zammel, was imprisoned after being accepted as candidate. He was sentenced to 20 months of prison on September 20. On October 4, all opposition parties, with the exception of Ennahda, called for a boycott of the elections. Two days later, President Saied won the election with over 89 percent of the vote, with a voter turnout of 28 percent. lwb

TÜRKIYE (IS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: ↗ | Start: **2014**

Conflict parties: IS vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power, resources

The non-violent crisis over the orientation of the political system, national power, and resources between the so-called Islamic State (IS) on the one hand, and the government, on the other, escalated to a violent crisis.

Throughout the year, the Turkish government conducted raids against members of IS as part of counterterrorism operations across the country, including in regions along the Syrian border.

On January 28, two gunmen opened fire on worshippers at a church in Sarıyer district, Istanbul, killing one. The attack was claimed by IS on its social media channels. Following the attack, Turkish security forces increased the scope of their operations against IS suspects and regularly conducted mass raids. In the first half of the year, Turkish security forces detained at least 629 individuals with suspected ties to IS. For instance, on February 8, as part of the "Heroes-49" operation, security forces arrested 147 suspects across 33 provinces. On May 1, Turkish security forces detained 41 IS suspects in raids across twelve provinces, including Istanbul, Gaziantep,

and Şanlıurfa provinces. Police also seized several unlicensed pistols, digital materials, and large amounts of both foreign currencies and Turkish lira as part of the operations.

In the second half of the year, Turkish security forces detained at least 1380 individuals for their alleged connection to IS. For instance, on August 30, Turkish authorities announced that security forces had detained 119 suspects in a nationwide "Gürz-10" operation across 23 provinces over five days, including Istanbul and the capital Ankara. On October 28, as part of the operation "Gürz-23", Turkish security forces captured at least 216 suspected IS members in nationwide raids across 45 cities including Istanbul, Ankara, and Antalya. On December 31, the Interior Ministry announced that security forces had detained 536 suspects in 57 provinces over the past twelve days under 'Operation Mace'. sag

TÜRKIYE (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2013**

Conflict parties: CHP, DEM Party vs. National Alliance (AKP, MHP)

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The violent crisis over national power and the orientation of the political system between the Republican People's Party (CHP) and the Peoples' Equality and Democratic Party (DEM) on the one hand, and the Turkish government run by the People's Alliance, led by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP), on the other, continued.

In March 2024, local elections took place throughout the country's 81 provinces. Various metropolitan, municipal, and local non-partisan positions were filled, such as neighborhood representatives. The CHP achieved a significant win in the elections and made unexpected gains in traditionally government-controlled areas, garnering 37.77% of the votes. This marked, for the first time since 1977, that the CHP led the popular vote. Meanwhile, the AKP maintained a narrow lead in district mayoralties.

Leading up to the elections, the CHP criticized the state media agency TRT for a strong bias in favor of the AKP. For example, on March 9, the CHP filed complaints with the country's electoral commission over unfair allocation of airtime. On April 1, the Council of Europe stated that the elections were only partially conducive to local democracy.

After the elections, authorities dismissed various Kurdish mayors based on allegations of terrorism and replaced them with government-appointed trustees. For example, on June 3, authorities arrested Hakkary mayor Mehmet Siddik Akis on charges of links to the PKK [→ Türkiye (PKK)]. On June 4, a peaceful protest of DEM party members in support of Akis led to a fistfight with the AKP in parliament, leading to two people being injured. On May 16, a Turkish court sentenced the former pro-Kurdish Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) leader to 42 years in jail for inciting terrorism during the deadly Kobani riots in 10/2014. Two people were charged and at least ten others were acquitted on similar charges, while another leading pro-Kurdish politician was sentenced to just over 30 years. Other HDP figures were convicted, among a total of 108 defendants who were charged. The court order was later endorsed by President Erdogan and, the next day, protests were prohibited in 20 provinces. On June 24, the Turkish government imposed a travel ban on pro-Kurdish mayors


without a court order. Overall, Turkish authorities detained at least 3,948 people and arrested 632 others throughout the year as part of an intensified crackdown on the DEM party. [goy](#)

TÜRKIYE (PKK, KCK)

Intensity: **4** | Change: • | Start: **1978**

Conflict parties: KCK, PKK vs. government

Conflict items: autonomy



The limited war over autonomy between the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and its alleged umbrella organization called the Kurdish Communities Union (KCK), on the one hand, and the Turkish government, on the other, continued. Throughout the year, at least 871 people were killed, including 853 PKK members, and 34 others were wounded. The largest number of fatalities during a single clash on January 12, when the PKK attempted to enter a Turkish military base in Duhok Governorate, Iraq. The base is a key location for Operation Claw-Lock, which was launched to target PKK positions within the semi-autonomous federal borders of Iraqi Kurdistan. Nine TAF members and 48 PKK members were killed, and four TAF members wounded. Turkish security forces arrested 462 members of the PKK while twelve surrendered to the Turkish police within the borders of Türkiye. The TAF continued to fight the PKK, primarily on territory belonging to Operation Claw-Lock. Operations to hit PKK hideouts were conducted throughout the year in both countries. On March 6, operations were conducted by 204 TAF teams consisting of 2,866 security personnel, which resulted in the seizure of various types of weapons in PKK shelters across southern and eastern Turkish provinces, including Hatay, Tunceli, Diyarbakir, and Hakkari. On October 23, the PKK attacked the headquarters of a Turkish defense company in the capital Ankara, killing seven people, including two PKK attackers, and injuring 22 people. The TAF launched a series of airstrikes on the same and the following day, killing a significant number of PKK members and destroying 34 targets across the Arbil, Duhok, and Nineveh Governorates, northern Iraq.

The dynamics of the intrastate conflict appeared to signal a shift in political rhetoric in favor of peace negotiations. On October 22, the leader of the Turkish Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) put forth the proposition that imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan be granted the opportunity to address parliament to renounce violence and announce the dissolution of the PKK. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan expressed support for the proposition but ultimately rejected the prospect of direct negotiations with PKK leaders. Öcalan indicated a willingness to engage in political and legal dialog if proper conditions were met. On December 28, members of the Peoples' Equality and Democracy Party met with Öcalan in prison where he reaffirmed his commitment to make a statement in support of the peace initiative that had begun in October.

At the same time, the level of military cooperation between Türkiye and Iraq to tackle the PKK increased significantly in

2024. On March 14, the foreign ministers of both countries convened in the Iraqi capital Baghdad, resulting in the National Security Council of Iraq's designation of the PKK as a "banned organization". On April 22, the presidents of both countries met and signed 24 memoranda of understanding (MoUs). Additionally, in April, Iraqi security forces established two military bases in Kshani village, Duhok Governorate, with the objective of countering PKK activities. On August 6, the Iraqi Supreme Judicial Council dissolved three political parties: the Yazidi Freedom and Democracy Party, the Democratic Struggle Front, and the Tavgarî Azadi Party. These parties' were accused of alleged connections to the PKK. On August 15, high-level discussions between the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister resulted in the signing of a MoU on cooperation in security, military, and counterterrorism. In accordance with the terms of the document, both countries agreed to establish a joint security coordination center in Baghdad and a joint training and cooperation center in Bashika, Nineveh Governorate, aimed at combating terrorism. On November 26, the Turkish Defense Minister announced that the TAF had succeeded in establishing control in the Zap region, Duhok governorate, Iraq. [sak](#)

YEMEN (AL-HIRAK / SOUTHERN YEMEN)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2007**

Conflict parties: STC vs. PLC

Conflict items: secession

The violent crisis over secession of Southern Yemen between al-Hirak, also known as the Southern Movement and dominated by the Southern Transitional Council (STC) and backed by the United Arab Emirates (UAE), on the one hand, and the other factions of the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), backed by Saudi Arabia (KSA), on the other, continued. The PLC has been the de facto government of Yemen since 2022. Throughout the year, the STC repeatedly declared its intention to secede from Yemen, weakening the PLC.

Following the appointment of a new Prime Minister on February 7, whom the STC accused of being aligned with the KSA, the STC announced the formation of its own "mini-government" in Yemen's temporary capital Aden, located in Southern Yemen on February 12. On March 3, the STC president called for independence. On April 23, the STC announced the creation of a specific organizational branch, seeking to return Yemen to its pre-unification state before May 1990. On August 15, the STC banned all party-political activities, including those affiliated with the PLC government. Tensions escalated on December 31, when STC forces stormed the seat of the government Ma'ashiq Palace in Aden. This resulted in violent clashes and an unknown number of casualties.


On several occasions, violent tensions erupted between STC- and KSA-affiliated militias in the PLC. On August 3, a UAE commander affiliated with the STC was injured during an assassination attempt in Al-Fyoush Market, Lahij governorate. On August 8, unknown gunmen attacked a STC military patrol in the Mualla area of Aden. No casualties were reported. On August 18, fighting broke out between STC-affiliated militias and pro-government factions in Abyan governorate, leaving four dead. On August 31, fighting broke out between STC- and KSA-affiliated militias in the Al-Hawasheb area, Lahij governorate, killing eight, after KSA-affiliated militias established

a camp in the region. Throughout the year, KSA reinforced its military presence in Southern Yemen. For instance, on March 3, more than 43 Saudi military vehicles arrived in Aden. On April 27, KSA-affiliated militias imposed full military control over the strategically important Tor Al-Baha district, Aden governorate. On May 24 and June 9, Saudi Arabia announced its intention to support and finance a new southern political bloc to challenge the STC's monopoly on representing the South. On July 24, Saudi Arabia deployed hundreds of military vehicles to Shabwa governorate to regain its presence in southern and eastern Yemeni provinces, counterbalancing UAE-funded factions. lab

YEMEN, SAUDI ARABIA (AL-HOUTHİ FORCES)

Intensity: 4 | Change: • | Start: 2004

Conflict parties: al-Houthis vs. PLC, Saudi Arabia, UAE
 Conflict items: national power



The limited war over national power between Ansar Allah, commonly known as the al-Houthi, supported by the Iranian government, on the one hand, and the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), partly comprised by former government factions, and supported by the Saudi Arabia-led coalition, anti-Houthi popular resistance, and tribal forces, on the other, continued. Both conflict factions remained

internally divided with the PLC for instance facing internal demands for an independent Southern Yemen [→ Yemen (Al-Hirak / Southern Yemen)].

Armed clashes continued in contested regions such as Al-Dali and Lahij governorates. For example, on January 18, al-Houthi forces launched a surprise attack on military installations aligned with the former government in Shabwah governorate killing four. On February 16, al-Houthi forces launched another attack on military targets in Sa'dah, eponymous governorate, killing three. On March 17, in Al-Dali governorate, al-Houthi forces attacked military bases belonging to PLC-affiliated troops, killing one.

Heavy fighting also occurred on the border between the al-Houthi-controlled Lahij and the PLC-controlled Taizz governorates. For instance, al-Houthi forces attacked PLC-affiliated military bases in Lahij on April 3, leaving 21 dead, and launched a drone that killed three PLC soldiers on April 12. On June 6, al-Houthi forces again launched an attack on PLC military installations in Lahij governorate, resulting in 18 casualties.

Fighting subsided in the second half of the year with the only notable clash in Lahij occurring on September 6, when an al-Houthi raid on PLC military installations left three dead. In Taizz governorate, alleged al-Houthi forces attacked a populated market with a suicide drone on December 2, killing six, and launched drones at PLC military installations on December 23, killing four.

Attempts by both sides to open several roads connecting the most populated cities in Yemen failed repeatedly this year. For instance, on February 23, an attempt by PLC forces to open the road between Ma'rib and Sana'a governorates resulted in an al-Houthi attack on a military checkpoint, leaving one dead. On March 12, al-Houthi-aligned media reported that anonymous gunmen had injured two al-Houthi officials attempting to reopen the road between Sana'a and al-Dali governorates. awo

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