



CONFLICT BAROMETER | 2025

Heidelberg Institute for
International Conflict Research



disputes
non-violent crises
violent crises
limited wars
wars

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Printed in Heidelberg, Germany.

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The HIIK evolved from the 1991 research project COSIMO (Conflict Simulation Model), led by Prof. Dr. Frank R. Pfetsch, University of Heidelberg, and financed by the German Research Foundation (DFG).

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HIK

Heidelberg Institute for
International Conflict Research

CONFLICT BAROMETER 2025

Analyzed Period: 01/01/25 – 12/31/25

PREFACE

With the 34th edition of the Conflict Barometer, the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK) continues its annual study on global conflict.

Since 1992, the Conflict Barometer has qualitatively and quantitatively recorded the dynamics of political conflicts, both violent and non-violent, worldwide. In accordance with the HIIK methodology, violent conflicts are classified according to their intensity into violent crises (intensity 3), limited wars (intensity 4), and wars (intensity 5). Non-violent conflicts are divided into disputes (intensity 1) and non-violent crises (intensity 2). The annual report is supplemented by conflict maps, graphics, and datasets as well as Spotlight texts that shed light on the wider context of current conflict dynamics.

The year 2025 was marked by a slight reduction of conflicts worldwide. However, the number of violent conflicts increased, just like the number of full and limited wars:

Throughout the year, the HIIK and its 201 researchers documented a total of 359 conflicts worldwide, an overall decrease of five conflicts. Of these, 221 were violent (62 percent) and 138 non-violent (38 percent). While 59 conflicts escalated and 45 de-escalated, 255 conflicts remained with the same intensity as in 2024. The HIIK opened six new conflicts in 2025 and four more retroactively. Compared to the previous year, the number of wars rose from 27 to 28. The Cambodia – Thailand (border), Pakistan (Islamist militant groups), South Sudan (opposition), and Iran – Israel conflicts escalated to full wars. Additionally, one conflict in Syria (Suwayda / Southern Syria) erupted at the level of war as well. Five wars de-escalated, while 23 kept their intensity to 2024. The number of limited wars increased by two from 23 to 25 in 2025. The number of non-violent conflicts decreased from 155 to 138. Two conflicts were settled by the conflict parties themselves: Türkiye (PKK, KCK) and Myanmar (UWSA, NDAA / Shan State). Six more closed due to inactivity. As in previous years, the most common types of conflict were intrastate with 241, followed from afar by 60 interstate conflicts, then 41 substate, and finally, 17 transstate conflicts. While the number of inter- and intrastate conflicts remained constant, transstate conflicts increased by one and substate conflicts decreased by six. The most common of the ten methodically followed conflict items, material or immaterial goods which are sought by the direct conflict actors through conflict measures, were system/ideology (in 162 conflicts), resources (in 102 conflicts), and subnational predominance (in 88 conflicts), closely followed by national power (in 87 conflicts).

The Board of Directors would like to thank all researchers, heads of regional working groups, and everyone else who contributed to this report for their outstanding efforts, especially during the final stages of editing. Without your commitment, a publication like this would be impossible. When time resources seem to be more limited than ever, voluntary efforts spent on a project like this become even more extraordinary.

The Board of Directors of the HIIK, overseeing the 2025 Conflict Barometer

Vojtěch Borusík, Silvan Ergican, Paul Dießelberg, Lillie Hafner, Santiago Moncada, Rafael Uribe-Neira, and Thomas Zhou

Heidelberg, July 2026

TABLE OF CONTENTS

METHODOLOGY	9
GLOBAL CONFLICT PANORAMA	14
Global Development	19
Global Conflict Statistics 2025	23
SPOTLIGHTS	29
"Gen Z" Protests - Comparing Contemporary Protest Dynamics <i>Lillie Hafner, Sabrina Gabel, Christopher Buchauer</i>	30
A Snake without a Head? The Post-Assad Levantine Captagon Trade <i>Till-Sebastian Krause, Kim Neumann, Nele-Sophie Harle, Thomas Cranshaw, Essraa Hamadeh</i>	33
Haiti: A Unique Challenge to International Intervention. Recent Evolutions <i>Aurélie Berthot</i>	38
Beyond Bombs: The Cyber War Beside the War <i>Alisa Jazxhi</i>	41
A Turning Point at Last? Assessing the Ankara-PKK Peace Process <i>Sabina Kulueva</i>	42
EUROPE	46
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA	69
THE AMERICAS	111
ASIA AND OCEANIA	147
WEST ASIA, NORTH AFRICA, AND AFGHANISTAN	187
IMPRINT	223

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Methodology

METHODOLOGY


Since 1991, conflict research at HIIK has analyzed political conflicts by focusing on conflict processes rather than purely quantitative thresholds of casualties. Thus, HIIK's methodology is based on a set of specified actions and acts of communication between conflict parties. This process-oriented approach enriches the analysis of political conflicts with a broader and more detailed empirical foundation.

Located at Heidelberg University, HIIK has continuously taken steps to further elaborate its methodological approach. Notably, in 2011 the institute revised its definition of political conflicts and restructured its conflict intensity assessment. The latter now accounts for not only the intensity of a given conflict area in a given year, but also determines the intensity of a conflict for first-level subnational political units and per month. As such, it allows for a much more detailed measurement of conflict dynamics.

Furthermore, conflict actions and acts of communication can be operationalized with the help of qualitative and quantitative indicators of the means and consequences of violence. This allows for a more comprehensive overview of political dynamics and intensities.

Most recently, in 2017, HIIK introduced the concept of inactive conflicts to widen the span of observed cases and create space for dormant dynamics that may become active again within three years. These changes have further enhanced the accuracy, reliability, and reproducibility of the conflict information provided.

HIIK's Basic Concept of Political Conflict



According to HIIK's approach, a political conflict is an incompatibility of intentions between at least individual or collective actors. Such an incompatibility emerges in the form of observable and interrelated actions and acts of communication (measures) with regard to certain positional differences of values (issues) relevant to society and threatening (the continuity of) state functions or the international order. Actors, measures, and issues are the constitutive attributes of political conflict.

CONFLICT ACTORS

Conflict actors are collective actors or individuals as part of a collective in direct pursuit of a conflict item, which are acknowledged by other conflict actors in their decision-making processes and are thus perceived to be relevant. Their actions must in turn provoke reaction; there must be reciprocity between actors to fulfill the definition. Collective actors such as states, international organizations, and non-state actors share a certain level of unitary conception, internal cohesion and a common structure of preferences. Actors may be considered as a coalition if their preferences are on the same side of a conflict dynamic and contrary to those of another actor or coalition. There may also be indirect actors involved: so-called supporters help a direct actor to claim or aspire to the conflict item, while so-called interveners wish to end the conflict without supporting either coalition in their actions regarding the item.

CONFLICT MEASURES

Conflict measures are actions and acts of communication carried out by a conflict actor in the context of a political conflict. They are constitutive for a conflict and its intensity if they occur outside established regulatory procedures and – possibly in conjunction with other measures – if they threaten the international order or a core function of the state or have the prospect to do so. Established regulatory procedures are defined as those mechanisms of conflict management that are accepted by all conflict actors in their respective context and performed without the use or threat of physical violence. Examples of conflict regulations include elections, court proceedings, public fora, round tables, or other forms of negotiations. Core state functions encompass the provision of security for a given population, as well as the guarantee of integrity of a given territory and of a specific political, socioeconomic, or cultural order. If, from a conflict actor's point of view, the fulfilment of state functions or the maintenance of the local or global order cannot be upheld, established procedures are threatened.

CONFLICT ISSUES

Conflict issues are material or immaterial goods pursued by conflict actors via conflict measures. They can become relevant for the entire society if they impact the coexistence of individuals or groups within a given polity or the relations between polities. Conflict issues are classified on the basis of ten items representing common objectives of conflict actors: (i) System/Ideology is encoded if a conflict actor aspires to change the ideological, religious, socioeconomic or judicial orientation of the political system or of the regime type itself. (ii) National Power refers to the power to govern a state, whereas (iii) Autonomy refers to attaining or extending the political self-rule of a population within a state or of a dependent territory without striving for independence. (iv) Secession refers to the aspired separation of a territory of a state aiming to establish a new state or to merge with another state. Furthermore, the goal of (v) Decolonization is the independence of a dependent territory. (vi) Subnational Predominance focuses on the attainment of the de-facto control by a government or a non-state actor over a territory or a population. The item (vii) Resources is encoded if the possession of raw materials, pasture, or the profits gained thereof, are pursued. (viii) Territory refers to a contested change of the delimitation of an international border. (ix)

International Power as an item describes an aspired shift in the power constellation in the international system or a regional system therein, through the change of military or institutional capabilities, related violent measures, or of an actor's political or economic influence. The item (x) Other is used as a residual category. Conflict actors can have multiple demands, and thus claim more than one item at the same time.

CONFLICT TYPES

IIK's methodology distinguishes between interstate, intrastate, substate, and transstate conflicts. While interstate conflicts only involve internationally recognized state actors, intrastate conflicts involve both state actors and non-state actors. Statehood is viewed as non-contested if the state is an official UN member state; states with limited recognition that are recognized by at least one other official UN member state are marked with a °. Substate conflicts are carried out solely among non-state actors. Transstate conflicts involve at least two sovereign states, both of which meet the criteria of a political conflict, and (at least) one non-state actor. This means that the actors are in conflict with each other and pursue their goals through conflict measures on the territory of at least two states.

CONFLICT START, INACTIVITY AND CLOSURE

When assessing levels of violence, IIK differentiates between violent and non-violent conflicts. A conflict is observed in the Conflict Barometer if it fulfills the minimum criteria defining a conflict. It may start at any level of intensity, therefore also at a non-violent level. As the start date, we define the day of the first recorded constitutive measure. Conflicts may be opened in retrospect.

Should the basic conflict criteria be fulfilled but no active measures can be observed at any specific time, a conflict's status can be set to inactive. An inactive conflict only comprises so-called persistent measures in which claims and goals are not renewed but implied without actions or statements, such as the tacit stipulation of a goal in a charter or effective declaration of the actor, dormant territorial demands or ongoing demobilization processes. The absence of reporting within this period is an indicator for continued inactivity. After 24 months of inactivity, a conflict is usually seen as passively closed at the end of the year, unless a re-occurrence of any violent or non-violent measures continues to be likely.


A conflict is actively closed if the basic conflict criteria are no longer fulfilled, with a set date of closure that justifies the decision. This may be the day a peace agreement is enforced between all conflict actors, for instance. Other forms of closure include the annihilation of a conflict actor, its dissolution, or unification with another.

ASSESSING THE INTENSITIES OF VIOLENT CONFLICTS

THE CONCEPT OF CONFLICT INTENSITY

intensity Level	terminology	level of violence	intensity class
1	dispute	non-violent conflicts	low intensity
2	non-violent crisis		
3	violent crisis	violent conflicts	medium intensity
4	limited war		high intensity
5	war		

In order to measure the three levels of violent conflict, five proxies are used to indicate their means and consequences. The dimension of means encompasses the use of weapons and deployment of personnel, the dimension of consequences, the number of casualties, refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), and the level of destruction.



Each indicator is scored on a ternary scale. Aggregating the five individual scores results in the total regional monthly intensity (RMI). The regions are the first-level administrative units of a country.

		conflict means		
		0 points	1 point	2 points
conflict consequences	0 points	violent crisis	violent crisis	limited war
	1 point	violent crisis	limited war	war
	2 points	limited war	war	war

WEAPONS

		weapons employment	
		light	heavy
weapon type	light	0 points	
	heavy	1 point	2 points

The weapons indicator determines whether light or heavy arms are used (e.g. handguns or hand grenades vs. artillery or heavy bombs, respectively). Regarding the extent to which the fighting capacity of heavy arms is exploited, we differentiate between limited and extensive use. The former is characterized by a light exertion of violence compared to its actual capacity, the latter by a powerful exertion of violence.

PERSONNEL

low	medium	high
≤ 50	$> 50 \leq 400$	> 400
0 points	1 point	2 points

The personnel indicator measures the highest number of participants in an individual measure. All persons are counted who, by their engagement in a concerted action, represent a conflict actor in the context of a violent measure. Low, medium, and high numbers of personnel are distinguished, based on two thresholds: 50 and 400 persons.

CASUALTIES

low	medium	high
≤ 20	$> 20 \leq 60$	> 60
0 points	1 point	2 points

Third, the overall number of casualties in the conflict in a region per month is counted, comprising the number of deaths from violent measures or their direct consequences. They include combattants as well as civilians who were injured or killed. Persons dying due to indirect effects, e.g. starvation or disease, are not included. The thresholds employed for the indicator are 20 and 60 persons killed.

REFUGEES & IDPs

low	medium	high
≤ 1 000	> 1 000 ≤ 20 000	> 20 000
0 points	1 point	2 points

Fourth, the overall number of cross-border refugees and IDPs in a region per month is tallied. Displacement is defined as the migration of human beings provoked by conflict measures, e.g. by the creation of inhumane living conditions. Taken into account is flow, not stock data. The thresholds employed for the indicator are 1,000 and 20,000 refugees, respectively.

DESTRUCTION

low	medium	high
within 0 dimensions	within 1 - 2 dimensions	within 3 - 4 dimensions
0 points	1 point	2 points

Lastly, destruction resulting from the conflict in a region per month is determined by four dimensions that are considered essential for civilian populations: (civilian and military) infrastructure, habitation, economy/self-sufficiency, and identity-establishing goods. The level of destruction is classified as low, medium, or high, depending on the number of dimensions affected. Any form of destruction counted within this indicator has to be on a massive scale, i.e. the damaged object must be crucial for the functioning of the category in question.

UP- AND DOWNGRADING

Regional monthly intensities (RMIs, see above) are the first pillar for determining the yearly conflict intensity of a specific conflict region (region/year intensity) as well as the overall yearly conflict area intensity (area/year intensity). A conflict area usually equals an internationally recognized country and is the sum of all subnational units affected by the respective conflict. Typically, the area/year intensity is equal to the highest RMI in a given area per year. As such, intensities of a certain spatiotemporal unit would directly translate to a corresponding yearly conflict intensity level. However, methodological issues such as a considerable variance in the size of administrative regions might threaten the comparability between different conflicts on the same intensity level. Thus, up- and downgrading becomes the determining factor when reassessing the given RMIs, if violence occurred. For instance, two conflicts might have an area/year intensity of a violent crisis according to the assessment based on the first pillar. The first conflict accounted for 30 casualties in three RMIs with ten fatalities each, while the second conflict accounted for more than 370 casualties in 37 RMIs. In this case, it might be disproportional to assign the same conflict intensity to both conflicts. Therefore, we apply up- and downgrading rules – the second pillar of our conflict intensity assessment –, which allows us to fine-tune conflict intensities to ensure comparability.

This decision is based on the conflicts' annual and area-wide numbers of refugees and IDPs, and casualties. A violent crisis must thereby be upgraded to the level of a limited war if more than 360 casualties or more than 18,000 refugees and IDPs were counted in the whole year in the conflict area. A limited war must be upgraded to the level of a war if more than 1,080 casualties or more than 360,000 refugees and IDPs were counted. In contrast, a limited war must be downgraded to the level of a violent crisis if less than 120 casualties and less than 6,000 refugees and IDPs were counted. Likewise, a war must be downgraded to the level of a limited war if less than 360 casualties and less than 120,000 refugees and IDPs were counted. In the Conflict Barometer, the area/year intensity is displayed above each conflict description and in the regional conflict overview.

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
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Methodology Revision in 2011 by:


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Global Conflict Panorama

CONFLICTS IN 2025 (NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEVEL)




VIOLENT CONFLICTS IN 2025 (SUBNATIONAL LEVEL)



INTENSITY



MARITIME CONFLICTS IN 2025



HIGHLY VIOLENT CONFLICTS IN 2025

LIMITED WARS (25)

WARS (28)

WEST ASIA, NORTH AFRICA, AND AFGHANISTAN

Israel, Lebanon (Hezbollah)
Yemen (Red Sea)
Syria (SDF – Türkiye / Northern Syria)

Iran – Israel
Israel (Hamas et al.)
Israel – Lebanon
Israel – State of Palestine° (PNA)
Syria (opposition)
Syria (Suwayda / Southern Syria)

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Burkina Faso (inter-communal rivalry)
Central African Republic (militant groups)
Burundi, DR Congo (FNL, RED-Tabara, Forebu)
DR Congo (Mayi-Mayi et al.)
DR Congo (Mobondo – Teke)
DR Congo, Uganda (ADF)
Ethiopia (inter-communal rivalry)
Ethiopia (OLA / Oromia)
Mozambique (ASWJ)
Nigeria (farmers – pastoralists)
Nigeria (ISWAP – JAS)
Somalia (ISS)
Somalia (Jubaland)
Tanzania (opposition)

DR Congo (AFC / M23)
DR Congo (Ituri militias)
Ethiopia (Fano militias / Amhara)
Mali, Burkina Faso et al. (JNIM et al.)
Niger, Mali et al. (IS Sahel)
Nigeria (bandits)
Nigeria, Chad et al. (ISWAP)
Nigeria, Chad et al. (JAS – Boko Haram)
Somalia, Kenya (al-Shabaab)
South Sudan (opposition)
Sudan (Darfur)
Sudan (inter-communal rivalry)
Sudan (opposition)

THE AMERICAS

Brazil (drug trafficking organizations)
Colombia (inter-cartel rivalry, neo-paramilitary groups, left-wing militants)
Colombia (neo-paramilitary groups, drug cartels)
Mexico (inter-cartel rivalry, paramilitary groups)
USA – Venezuela

Haiti (gangs)

ASIA AND OCEANIA

India – Pakistan
Myanmar (Rohingya)
Pakistan (Balochistan)

Cambodia – Thailand (border)
Myanmar (AA / Rakhine State)
Myanmar (KIA, KIO / Kachin State)
Myanmar (KNU, KNLA, KNDO et. al. / Karen State, Kayah State)
Myanmar (opposition)
Myanmar (TNLA / Shan State)
Pakistan (Islamist militant groups)

EUROPE

Russia – Ukraine

GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT

The year 2025 was marked by a slight reduction of conflicts worldwide. However, the number of violent conflicts increased as well as the number of full and limited wars. HIIK observed a total of 359 conflicts worldwide. Compared to 2024, the overall number of conflicts decreased by five. Out of the total, 221 conflicts or 62 percent were fought violently, while 138 or 38 percent were on a non-violent level. This represents a slight increase in the amount of conflicts which saw the use of violence (209 or 57 percent) and a reduction of those who took place without resorting to the use of force (156 or 43 percent). HIIK also observed an increase of high intensity conflicts from 50 to 53. Full wars increased from 27 to 28 and limited wars from 23 to 25.

HIIK opened six new conflicts which erupted in 2025: two in Asia & Oceania, one in Sub-Sahara Africa, one in West Asia and North Africa (WANA), one in the Americas, and one in Europe. HIIK opened another four retroactively. It also ended the observation of six conflicts after two or more years of inactivity and of two active conflicts due to the signing of peace agreements [→ Türkiye (PKK, KCK); Myanmar (UWSA, NDAA / Shan State)]. Those closed and merged conflicts as well as another eleven current conflicts set as inactive in the 2025 Conflict Barometer are not reflected in the above figures and following statistics.

WARS

HIIK observed 28 wars in 2025, one more than in 2024. While one dispute escalated to a war, two violent crises and one limited war escalated to the level of full war. Additionally, one new conflict erupted at the level of war. In 2025, the institute observed two new wars in Asia & Oceania [→ Cambodia – Thailand (border); Pakistan (Islamist militant groups)], two in WANA [→ Iran – Israel; Syria (Suwayda / Southern Syria)], and one in Sub Saharan Africa [→ South Sudan (opposition)]. Globally, five full-scale wars de-escalated to limited wars or violent crises in 2025. 23 wars continued at the same intensity as last year.

Seen by region, Asia & Oceania saw an increase of two wars, and WANA saw an increase of one, while the number of wars remained unchanged in both Europe, and the Americas with one respectively. In Sub-Saharan Africa, although the number of wars decreased from 15 to 13, the region numbered the highest number of conflicts at the level of a full-scale war: Twelve conflicts continued at the level of war, two de-escalated to violent crises and one to a limited war. In contrast, one violent crisis escalated to a full-war.

In Sub-Saharan Africa, twelve full wars continued, while one war de-escalated to the level of limited war [→ DR Congo, Uganda (ADF)] and two to the level of a violent crisis [→ Cameroon (English-speaking minority); South Sudan (inter-communal rivalry)]. One violent crisis escalated to a war.

In Nigeria, the war over subnational predominance between ethnic Fulani pastoralists and the government continued in northwestern states. Pastoralists rustled cattle, destroyed small business, kidnapped political figures, village and religious leaders. Activities concentrated in Zamfara, Katsina, Kaduna, Niger, Sokoto, Benue, Kebbi, Kogi, Plateau and Taraba states. The government mobilized both police and military to counter pillaging activity. Furthermore, bandits surrendered their weapons and released 16 hostages, on June 15, as part of a peace deal in Katsina State. On August 28, approx. 200 bandits engaged in peace talks with the Zamfara State Government and concluded a peace deal, releasing 142 hostages. At least 900 people were killed this year [→ Nigeria (bandits)].

In Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, JAS, a splinter group of the Islamist militia Boko Haram, clashed with security forces in a war which claimed at least 750 lives. The conflict took place in Borno state and the border area of Nigeria's Yobe [→ Nigeria, Chad et al. (JAS-Boko Haram)]. Regional governments also conducted a war with ISWAP, the Islamic State West Africa Province, another Islamist militia, in the Lake Chad Basin [→ Nigeria, Chad et al. (ISWAP)].

In predominantly Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Benin, and Togo, the war over international power and the orientation of the political system between the Islamist group Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin' (JNIM), various of its subsects and other al-Qaeda-affiliated Islamist militant groups, on the one hand, and predominantly Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, but also other West African countries as well as international government alliances, on the other hand, continued in 2025 [→ Mali, Burkina Faso et al. (JNIM et al.)]. The HIIK counted well over 3,000 deaths across the region, and with that, a total rise in casualties compared to the previous years. Overall violence especially intensified in Burkina Faso, where JNIM for the first time in this conflict's history showed more violent involvement compared to Mali, which traditionally had been the conflict-country with the most recorded measures. Especially noteworthy for this conflict has once again been the southern strengthening of JNIM, particularly in and around Benin and Togo. In Benin, JNIM increased its activity by a large multiplier.

In Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso, the war over international power and the orientation of the political system between the Sahel offshoot of the so-called Islamic State IS Sahel and Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso continued. While IS Sahel drastically lost its influence in Mali and Burkina Faso to JNIM this year, it was responsible for more violence in Niger. Over 700 of the conflict's 1,100 counted casualties occurred in the Nigerien Tillabéri, Dosso, and Tahoua Departments [→ Niger, Mali et al. (IS Sahel)].

In Somalia, the war between the Islamist militant group al-Shabaab and the government, backed up by Kenya, the African Union and the US, left at least 1,697 people dead throughout the year, marking the highest mortality rate of all conflicts in Somalia. [→ Somalia, Kenya (al-Shabaab)].

In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the war between CODECO, FPOC, FRPI, MAPI, and CRP militias, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued. Militias fought over the control of gold, challenging the UN-MONUSCO-backed central government. The conflict left at least 365 casualties throughout the year [→ DR Congo (Ituri militias)]. Another war between the Alliance Fleuve Congo / March 23 Movement and the government continued. Although both the government and AFC/M23 signed the Doha Framework for a Comprehensive Peace Agreement, including a protocol on ceasefire oversight

on November 15, violence continued in November and December. Throughout the year, the militia launched a series of offensives and clashed repeatedly with security forces and local militias, and expanded its territorial control, leading to at least 4,546 deaths throughout the year [→ DR Congo (AFC / M23)].

In Ethiopia, the war between the Ethiopian National Defense Force's (ENDF) and a plethora of Fano militias continued in the Amhara region [→ Ethiopia (Fano militias / Amhara)].

In Sudan, the war over national power between the de facto military government of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary group Rapid Support Forces (RSF) continued [→ Sudan (opposition)]. On March 26, SAF recaptured the capital Khartoum from the RSF, regaining control of the capital for the first time since the start of the war. Fighting concentrated in North Darfur, North Kordofan and West Kordofan, Khartoum, South Kordofan, and South Darfur. In February, RSF-backed groups signed a charter for the creation of a parallel government in RSF-controlled territories, a move that the African Union's Peace and Security Council criticized given that it could lead to the division of the country. The conflict, which escalated to a war on April 15, 2023, when the RSF attacked SAF positions in the capital Khartoum, reached since 2023 a total death toll of around 150,000 people this year. Notably, heavy clashes in North Darfur, particularly around El Fasher, intensified from April on, as the RSF stepped up their efforts to drive the army out of its final bastion in the Darfur region, which itself was heavily affected by a continuing war this year [→ Sudan (Darfur)]. By October 28, reports emerged of widespread killings in El Fasher, indicating at least 1,500 deaths, including 460 people at the Saudi Maternity Hospital.

While the inter-communal rivalry war in Sudan continued its intensity this year [→ Sudan (inter-communal rivalry)], in South Sudan, the violent crisis over national power and the orientation of the political system between the government of Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), led by President Salva Kiir, and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM/A-IO-RM), led by First Vice President Riek Machar, on the one hand, and several opposition groups, including the National Salvation Front (NAS) and the White Army, on the other hand, escalated to a war. The conflict intensified in mid-February as a SPLA-IO aligned youth militia attacked SSPDF (South Sudan People's Defence Force) positions in Nisar Town, Upper Nile State [→ South Sudan (opposition)].

Asia & Oceania consolidated as the region with the second highest number of wars with seven conflicts. HIIK observed two new wars which escalated from one limited war [→ Pakistan (Islamist militant groups)] and one a dispute [→ Cambodia – Thailand (border)]. Five wars remained at the same level as in 2024, while no war de-escalated.

At the Cambodian-Thai border, a dispute escalated to war for the first time since 2011, resulting in the Thai Royal Army and Airforce killing a confirmed minimum of 123 Cambodian soldiers and injuring 426, further killing 33 civilians and injuring 159. In turn, the Royal Cambodian Army killed at least 33 Thai soldiers and injured 145, while killing 15 civilians and injuring 44. Throughout the year, a confirmed total of around 720,000 Cambodian and 540,000 Thai civilians became internally displaced people (IDPs). A ceasefire was signed on December 27 [→ Cambodia – Thailand (border)].

In Pakistan, the limited war between Islamist militant groups, such as Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP) and Islamic State Khorasan Province (IS-KP), on the one hand, and the government, on the other, escalated to a war. The war over national power, autonomy of the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) led to clashes between Islamist militants and government forces throughout the year. The confrontation resulted in at least 1,067 people killed, at least 311 individuals injured, and more than 10,000 people displaced, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and increasingly in Balochistan [→ Pakistan (Islamist militant groups)].

The bulk of the wars in Asia & Oceania were in Myanmar where ethnic groups fought the ruling military Junta and other ethnic groups for the fourth year. An intensity 7.7 strong earthquake on March 28 set the conditions for a ceasefire between the multiple Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) and the Junta, which allowed the provision of humanitarian aid. However, fighting continued [→ Myanmar (opposition)]. EAOs, sometimes in alliance with the People's Defense Forces, expanded their military operation in areas of influence, seeking regional independence based on ethnic boundaries. In Kachin state, the Kachin Independence Army expanded its influence [→ Myanmar (KIA, KIO / Kachin State)], while the Arakan Army advanced in Rakhine state [→ Myanmar (Arakan Army / Rakhine State)]. In contrast, ethnic fighting groups stalled in Karen and Kayah states [→ Myanmar (KNU, KNLA, KNDO et al. / Karen State, Kayah State)]. Nonetheless, the Junta continued to dominate the airspace, largely using it to target civilian residential areas. For instance, in January, airstrikes killed at least 40 people and destroyed more than 500 homes in Kyauk Ni Maw village, Kyaukpuyu District.

In West Asia, North Africa, and Afghanistan, HIIK observed six full-scale wars and three limited wars in 2025. This represents an increase of one full war and a decrease of two limited ones, compared to the previous year. While four full wars kept their intensity [→ Israel (Hamas et al.); Israel – Lebanon; Israel – State of Palestine° (PNA); Syria (opposition)], one violent crisis escalated to a full war [→ Iran – Israel]. Additionally, one new war erupted in 2025 [→ Syria (Suwayda / Southern Syria)]. In contrast, two wars de-escalated to limited ones [→ Israel, Lebanon (Hezbollah); Syria (SDF – Türkiye / Northern Syria)].

In Syria, the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024 marked a major political change. The new interim government under Ahmed al-Sharaa sought to consolidate authority across the country but faced resistance. Most notably, clashes between government forces and armed groups linked to the former regime escalated in Latakia and Tartus governorates in March, resulting in more than 2,611 casualties and the displacement of 21,000 people from western Syria into neighboring Lebanon [→ Syria (opposition)]. In southern Syria, a war over disputed local authority and security arrangements erupted into a war between Druze factions, Bedouin armed groups, and government forces in Suwayda governorate, causing nearly 2,000 fatalities [→ Syria (Suwayda / Southern Syria)].

The violent crisis between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Israel escalated to a war, reaching a violent peak in June during twelve days of intense direct warfare between both states, with the overall respective death tolls reported by Israel as 33 and by Iran as at least 1,060 [→ Iran – Israel]. The US joined the conflict on Israel's side, striking Iranian nuclear facilities during its Operation "Midnight Hammer", leading Iran to retaliate by striking a US military base in Qatar [→ Iran – USA]. This so-called Twelve-Day War was further influenced by Israel's various interconnected conflicts with Iranian-backed groups in

the region, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, the Houthis in Yemen, and militias in Syria and Iraq [→ Israel, Lebanon (Hezbollah); Israel (Hamas et al.); Israel, Yemen (al Houthi)].

In the Levante region, Israel fought against its neighboring actors. The war over the creation of a sovereign Palestinian state and resources between the state of Israel and Palestinian armed groups, most notably Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), continued throughout the year. Following its escalation on 10/07/2023, fighting between the Israeli Military and Hamas (al-Qassam Brigades and other Palestinian armed factions) in the Gaza strip continued, and with some Hamas leaders reportedly being targeted abroad, continued throughout the year [→ Israel (Hamas et al.)].

The war between Israel and Lebanon also continued. The ceasefire agreed upon in 11/2024 between Israel and Hezbollah did not lead to a complete cessation of hostilities [→ Israel (Hezbollah)]. Israel failed to meet the initial deadline of January 27, to withdraw from Southern Lebanon. On February 17, after the US facilitated an extension, Israel announced that it would only partially withdraw, citing ongoing security concerns. Israel retained positions at five strategic points near the border. Efforts to stabilize the border region have produced mixed results. While international actors, including the US and France, continued to engage diplomatically, intermittent hostilities have hindered long-term de-escalation. Although Lebanon's president declared on November 28 that he would be open to negotiations for a permanent solution, the repeated escalation complicates this effort. UNIFIL's mandate was extended on August 28, amid intense debate, for one last time until 2026, with a planned withdrawal in 2027 [→ Israel – Lebanon].

The war over the creation and control of a sovereign Palestinian state, resources, decolonization, and the orientation of the political system between the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) and the Palestinian population, on the one hand, and the Israeli government, military, as well as Israeli settlers, on the other, continued. Throughout the year, the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) continued to launch airstrikes and ground attacks in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank [→ Israel – State of Palestine^o (PNA)].

In the Americas, the sole war between gangs and the Haitian government backed up by a multinational UN contingent continued. The Viv Ansanm gang coalition and the Gran Grif gang controlled more than 85 percent of the capital Port-au-Prince. Violence took place not only in the West department, but also in North and Artibonite throughout the year. On June 21, the head of the Transitional Presidential Council confirmed the presence of private military companies and the use of UAVs for anti-gang operations in the capital. Security forces and the UN-backed Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission were unable to stop gangs [→ Haiti (gangs)].

In Europe, the war between Russia and Ukraine continued, characterized by high casualties, injuries, and destruction of critical infrastructure. Russian forces advanced over at least 5,300 square kilometers in Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. In April, Russian forces drove out Ukrainian elements from the Russian Kursk oblast and advanced on the neighbouring Ukrainian Sumy oblast. The conflict parties conducted large scale drone and missile strikes against industrial, energetic, military, and civilian targets. While Ukrainian security forces attacked oil refineries and industrial plants across Russia and suspected private Russian oil tankers under foreign flags in the Black Sea, Russia focused on Ukrainian energy infrastructure. US efforts to mediate the conflict under the lead of President Donald Trump, most notably on August 15 in Anchorage, Alaska, did not bear tangible results. Conservative estimations set the number of deaths by at least 14,130 Ukrainian and 22,992 Russian soldiers. On the civilian side, 2,514 dead and 12,142 injured were reported. The number of refugees globally from Ukraine decreased from 6,863,400 to 5,898,150, while the number of internally displaced persons increased from 3,669,000 to 3,712,000 in 2025.

LIMITED WARS

The total number of limited wars increased by two from 23 in 2024 to 25 this year. Ten conflicts continued on the same level as in the previous year. Eleven other conflicts escalated from limited crises and one from a non-violent dispute. While only one limited war, located in Asia & Oceania, escalated to a full war, three full wars de-escalated to a limited war level. Sub-Saharan Africa remained as the region with the highest number of limited wars, totaling 14, six of which escalated from violent crises. Another one de-escalated from a full war [→ DR Congo, Uganda (ADF)].

In Sub-Saharan Africa, the limited war in Burkina Faso over subnational predominance and resources between various ethnic groups, such as Mossi, Gourmantche, Dogon et al., with their Koglweogo self-defense militias, and Volunteers for the Defence of the Fatherland (VDP), on the one hand, the Fulani ethnic group, on the other, and Islamist groups as a third party, continued [→ Burkina Faso (inter-communal rivalry)]. This year, the VDPs, supported by the government and Russian paramilitary forces, were accused of increasingly killing large numbers of civilians in their fight against Islamist forces in the country. In Nigeria, inter-group limited war clashes between the Islamist groups JAS and ISWAP continued [→ Nigeria (ISWAP – JAS)]. In a new development, the violent crisis over subnational predominance and resources between pastoralist herders and sedentary farmers escalated to a limited war, where several interest groups, such as farmer vigilante groups and Fulani organization Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association (MACBA) supported conflict actors [→ Nigeria (farmers – pastoralists)]. Boundaries with other conflicts, such as those involving bandits and jihadists, increasingly blurred [→ Nigeria (bandits); Nigeria (ISWAP JAS)]. In April alone, over 170 people were killed in the conflict. Furthermore, in Somalia, the violent crisis over subnational predominance and the orientation of the political system in Jubaland between the Jubaland Regional Government and the Federal Government of Somalia, which started in 2024 escalated to a limited war. This was mainly due to high levels of violence in July and August, which led to significant destruction and displacement [→ Somalia (Jubaland)]. In Ethiopia, the violent crisis between the ENDF and the Oromia Liberation Army (OLA) escalated to a limited war [→ Ethiopia (OLA / Oromia)]. Further South, in the Central African Republic (CAR), the limited war over national power and resources between militant groups and anti-Balaka militias, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued. The security situation remained volatile, with multiple clashes throughout the year. However, on April 19, the government

signed a ceasefire agreement with two militias [→ Central African Republic (militant groups)]. Also the limited war between the Islamist militia Ahlu Sunnah wa Jama'a (ASWJ) and the Mozambican government in northern Mozambique continued [→ Mozambique (ASWJ)]. Despite ongoing military operations supported by regional and international partners, violence continued to affect Cabo Delgado and periodically spread into neighboring provinces. Civilians remained the primary targets of attacks, suffering inter alia from increasing child abductions and internal displacement which rose substantially during the second half of the year. In the Great Lakes region, the conflict involving Burundian rebel groups escalated to a limited war [→ Burundi, DR Congo (FNL, RED-Tabara, Forebu)]. Several Burundian militant groups reportedly joined broader coalitions that also included Congolese armed actors, linking the conflict more closely to developments in eastern DR Congo [→ DR Congo (M23 factions)]. In total, the region saw limited wars in Burkina Faso, Burundi, the CAR, DR Congo, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Somalia, and Tanzania.

The Americas had the second-highest number of limited wars this year, with five conflicts; an increase of two compared with 2024. While two limited wars remained at the same level, two escalated from violent crises and another one from a non-violent crisis. In contrast, one limited war de-escalated to the level of violent crisis. In Venezuela, the non-violent crisis between the United States and the Caribbean country escalated to a limited war after the US administration tied migration and oil to security concerns and unilaterally escalated the conflict demanding regime change. A buildup of regional forces in Puerto Rico, Trinidad and Tobago conducted a campaign of airstrikes against boats bound north, allegedly transporting drugs in August. The campaign also expanded to the North Pacific Ocean, leaving at least 65 killed in the Pacific and another 61 in the Caribbean. Additionally, by mid-December, a CIA-conducted airstrike destroyed a suspected dock facility in the Venezuelan Alta Guajira region, Zulia state [→ USA – Venezuela]. In Brazil, the violent crisis over subnational predominance between the main drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) and the government escalated to a limited war. In Rio de Janeiro, security forces killed 128 people during the so-called Operação Contenção in Alemão and Penha favelas on October 28 [→ Brazil (drug trafficking organizations)]. Most notably, in Mexico, the limited war over subnational predominance, the trade and trafficking of illegal drugs, and other illicit activities between various drug cartels and their respective splinter groups continued [→ Mexico (inter-cartel rivalry, paramilitary groups)]. And, finally, in Colombia, the violent crisis over resources and subnational predominance between neo-paramilitary groups and drug cartels, on the one hand, and the government, on the other hand, escalated to a violent crisis [→ Colombia (neo-paramilitary groups, drug cartels)], while the limited war between FARC dissident factions, the ELN, and the government continued, concentrating in Antioquia, Cauca, Guaviare, Nariño, Norte de Santander, and Valle del Cauca [→ Colombia (inter-cartel rivalry, neo-paramilitary groups, left-wing militants)]. Its deadliest episode occurred in Catatumbo, where FARC dissidents and ELN fighting from January 16 killed over 80 people and displaced more than 53,000 civilians, prompting a state of emergency and the deployment of 5,000 additional troops.


Both Asia & Oceania and WANA shared the third highest-number of limited wars with three conflicts each.

In WANA, HIIK observed one limited war escalating from a violent crisis [→ Yemen (Red Sea)] and another two de-escalating from full wars [→ Israel, Lebanon (Hezbollah); Syria (SDF – Türkiye / Northern Syria)]. Specifically, in Yemen, the limited war over national power between Ansar Allah, commonly known as the al-Houthi, supported by the Iranian government, on the one hand, and the PLC, supported by the Saudi Arabia-led coalition, anti-Houthi popular resistance, and tribal forces, on the other, de-escalated to a violent crisis [→ Saudi Arabia, Yemen (Al Houthi)]. Both conflict factions remained internally divided, with the PLC experiencing violent infighting [→ Yemen (Al-Hirak / Southern Yemen)], while al-Houthi struggled with severe losses of political leadership and infrastructure through air strikes by Israel [→ Israel, Yemen (al-Houthi)] and an USA-UK coalition [→ Yemen (Red Sea)]. Following a ceasefire agreement on 11/27/2024, the war between Hezbollah and the Israeli government over ideological and territorial disputes de-escalated to a limited war. The agreed ceasefire entailed the disarmament of Hezbollah by the Lebanese government as well as the withdrawal of Hezbollah fighters from the south of the Litani river, as well as IDF forces from its posts in southern Lebanon. Both sides were directed to halt any offensive operations, however, neither fully complied with the agreement [→ Israel, Lebanon (Hezbollah)]. In northern Syria, hostilities between Türkiye and the SDF continued at a lower intensity than in the previous year [→ Syria (SDF – Türkiye / Northern Syria)], still fulfilling the limited war category, however.


Additionally, another two limited wars de-escalated to the level of a violent crisis [→ Syria (IS); Yemen, Saudi Arabia (al-Houthi forces)]. Last year's limited war over autonomy between the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and its alleged umbrella organization called the Kurdish Communities Union (KCK), on the one hand, and the Turkish government, on the other, was shaped by de-escalation and successful peace negotiations this year, leading to its closure [→ Türkiye (PKK, KCK)].

In Asia & Oceania, while the Myanmar limited war over subnational predominance between the Arakan Army (AA), operating under the United League of Arakan (ULA), and the Myanmar military junta remained at the same level [→ Myanmar (Rohingya)], two others escalated from limited crises. First, the violent crisis in Pakistan over territorial secession and resources, such as gas, oil, coal, and minerals, between Baloch separatist nationalists, other militant groups, and the Chinese-supported government escalated to a limited war. Violent clashes and attacks left at least 623 people dead and 521 injured throughout the year [→ Pakistan (Balochistan)]. Finally, between May 7 and 11, both Pakistan and India conducted airstrikes, drone attacks, and fire exchanges along the Line of Control, killing 21 Indian and 52 Pakistani civilians and soldiers and injuring around 60 more people on each side before a ceasefire agreement was reached on May 10 [→ India – Pakistan], also constituting a limited war intensity.


GLOBAL CONFLICT INTENSITIES IN 2025 COMPARED TO 2024




FREQUENCY OF REGIONAL CONFLICT INTENSITIES IN 2025 AND 2024




FREQUENCY OF CONFLICT INTENSITIES BY CONFLICT TYPE IN 2025 AND 2024




GLOBAL CONFLICT INTENSITY CHANGES IN 2025



FREQUENCY OF CONFLICT INTENSITIES BY CONFLICT ITEM IN 2025



CONFLICT INTENSITIES IN EUROPE IN 2025 COMPARED TO 2024



Spotlights

"GEN Z PROTESTS" - COMPARING CONTEMPORARY PROTEST DYNAMICS IN NEPAL, MOROCCO, PERU, MADAGASCAR, AND BULGARIA

Between September and December of 2025, a temporally clustered wave of protest movements erupted in several countries around the world. While the context, scale, and outcomes differed between the countries, they shared two distinct characteristics: Mobilization was largely driven by Generation Z (Gen Z) and was marked by rapid escalation. Since this is a rather new phenomenon, this Spotlight aims to shed light on the characteristics of the mobilization and the mechanisms through which Gen Z shaped the trajectories and outcomes of the late-2025 protest wave. To do this, the spotlight selects five country cases, one for each HIIK-defined region, based on their divergent geographical scope, variation in outcomes, and fast-paced protest developments. These five cases can be divided into three phases. The first phase in early September saw protests erupt in Nepal [→ Nepal (opposition)]; this was followed by a second phase in late September with protests in Morocco [→ Morocco (opposition)], Peru [→ Peru (opposition)], and Madagascar [→ Madagascar (opposition)]. Finally, in late November, the third protest phase started in Bulgaria [→ Bulgaria (opposition)]. Across all five cases, this Spotlight will analyze the various protest movements triggers, organizational structures, the digital tools used, state responses, institutional mediation capacity, and escalation outcomes.

TRIGGERS

While the political and material triggers of the protest movements varied, each case demonstrates a rapid transformation beyond initial triggers to include preexisting and underlying grievances. In Nepal, the legislative ban of popular social media platforms sparked a wave of protests that were aggravated by existing grievances regarding chronic unemployment, governance failure, and elite corruption. In Morocco, outrage over the deaths of pregnant women in a public hospital in Agadir triggered protests that highlighted systemic neglect in healthcare and education. Peru's protest wave erupted after a pension reform package was passed amidst historically low government approval ratings and grievances surrounding systemic corruption and surging crime. The chronic underdevelopment in Madagascar, reflected by frequent electricity and water outages, found expression in mass protest movements in late September. Protests framed sudden cuts as emblematic of a corrupt, clientelist state that failed to improve living conditions for its citizens. Bulgaria saw a wave of organized protests after a prominent oligarch moved to nationalize Russian-linked energy assets amid EU-US sanctions; additionally, a hastily passed budget bill quickly became the central focus of popular backlash. The major urban centers of Kathmandu, Agadir, Lima, Antananarivo, and Sofia functioned as focal points for all five cases as protests quickly spread out to include numerous other cities and towns. In sum, all five cases demonstrate that the triggers functioned more as a tipping point of underlying grievances channeled through Gen-Z-driven protest movements.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND DIGITAL TOOLS

In terms of organizational structure and leadership, the protests displayed varying degrees of centralization, hierar-

chy, and social heterogeneity. In Peru and Bulgaria, younger generations were central to the movements, yet they operated within broader coalitions of actors organizing the protests. For instance, in Peru, indigenous organizations and transport workers had long been at the forefront of mobilization, with transport unions repeatedly protesting extortion and violence (Aquino and Villegas, 2025). In Bulgaria, initial demonstrations were called by the opposition coalition, but the movement was quickly expanded and digitally amplified by younger activists through social media and community platforms (Dinev, 2026). These cases illustrate a symbiosis between established organizations such as unions and political parties, characterized by more traditional, structured forms of mobilization, and younger generations that rely on decentralized, dynamic modes of protest organization.

In comparison, a different organizational logic emerged in Nepal, Morocco, and Madagascar, where protest movements showed unprecedented, digitally centered forms of organization widely associated with "Gen Z". These cases were characterized by highly decentralized and non-hierarchical coordination. The predominant organizational structures constitute a counterpoint to existing political processes, reflecting a growing disillusionment regarding established political stakeholders, such as parties and trade unions, among younger generations (Raissouni, 2025). The movement in Nepal was the first to mobilize extensively through Discord, an online communication platform, establishing a model later adopted by other youth-led protests. Discord functioned as a central organizational anchor where strategies were discussed, logistics coordinated, and collective positions formed. In the Nepalese movement, one channel rapidly grew to over 160,000 members, effectively becoming the movement's primary channel for coordination. As a secure, anonymized, and decentralized platform enabling real-time communication and planning, Discord allowed activists to coordinate logistics efficiently while reducing exposure to surveillance. The platform also served as a space for internal democratic decision-making. For example, in Nepal, the online community organized a digital election for a new prime minister, which the incumbent government later acknowledged (Suwal, 2025). Similarly, in Morocco, the biggest online community held a vote on whether to continue public demonstrations after incidents of police violence. At the same time, the anonymous and decentralized, somewhat "leaderless" structure of these protest movements hampered direct negotiation and dialogue with authorities and complicated the articulation of a wider set of demands (Shaer, 2025; Shi, 2025).

Alongside these internal coordination tools, mainstream social media platforms played a complementary role in external communication and visibility. While Discord was mainly used for deliberation and organization, platforms such as Instagram, TikTok, and Facebook amplified the protests to wider audiences. In the case of Madagascar, Facebook played an important role in attracting attention during the initial phase of the protests as well as during ongoing demonstrations (Shi, 2025).

STATE RESPONSE AND INSTITUTIONAL MEDIATION CAPACITY

Moving from the organizational structure of the youth protests to the reactions of respective government institutions, it becomes evident that state responses varied significantly in speed, severity, and legality across the five countries, shaping conflict trajectories and outcomes. While eventually, all governments turned to force, they did so at

different points during the protests. Nepal and Madagascar saw the most violent responses from security forces, with several protesters being killed in clashes with security forces early on in the protests. For instance, in Madagascar, in the first week of the protests, at least 22 people were killed, including protesters and bystanders who died after police fired at crowds (Rosen, 2026). In Peru, clashes between protesters and police prompted human rights organizations to accuse the police of excessive violence. Further, by declaring a state of emergency in the capital of Lima, the government restricted the right to assembly, thereby hampering protests. By contrast, Morocco stuck to standard policing, crowd control, and arresting protesters; however, at times, arrests were made as a preemptive measure with NGOs and families accusing authorities of unlawful abuse of detainees (Boskaljon, 2025). Similarly, despite a large police presence, Bulgaria only witnessed minor clashes, and the government instead rapidly conceded, preventing further escalation.

Looking more closely at the role of security forces, including the military, only some of the chosen cases showed close alignment with their respective governments. In Morocco and Bulgaria, police stayed loyal, united, and focused on protest containment. In Nepal, however, by taking control of the situation, the army took decisive action, thereby indicating a shift in civil-military relations. Similarly, in Madagascar, security forces were instrumental in influencing the course of the protests. The elite military unit CAPSAT defected and took the side of the protesters, which defined a tipping point that widely signaled a loss of trust in the president and the government, eventually leading to a regime collapse (RLI, 2025).

Bridging protesters and governments, some institutions assumed the role of mediators, significantly influencing the developments and outcome of the protest movements. For instance, Morocco's monarchy mediated between protesters and the government, taking up protesters' demands for social reforms. Strikingly, formal institutions in Madagascar did not mediate but instead contributed actively to the fragmentation of the government, with the National Assembly, presidency, courts, and military competing for authority. Most notably, the High Constitutional Court's post hoc legitimization of the military-led transition underscored how an institutional breakdown can lead to a quick resolution while sidelining constitutional rules.

PROTEST OUTCOMES

The outcomes of the protest movements discussed above varied significantly from limited reform to full regime collapse and large-scale violence. In Peru, the impeachment of President Dina Boluarte was followed by the inauguration of Congressman José Jerí in what amounted to a reshuffling of elites that did not produce the structural leadership change demanded by protesters. A similarly weak leadership change could be seen in Morocco, as the monarchy intervened and announced increased spending on healthcare and education, but promised only limited political reforms. While in both Peru and Morocco, the limited concessions led to a cessation of the protests, it is not clear whether the underlying issues raised by protesters were sufficiently addressed.

In sharp contrast, the escalation of protests in Bulgaria led to political concessions in short order. Under mounting public pressure, the government withdrew the contested legislation and resigned shortly after. This reflects a mixture of institutional weakness and high responsiveness to pressure from forces outside the government.

Lastly, Madagascar and Nepal stand out due to the speed and depth of their respective escalation and outcomes. In Madagascar, the elite military unit CAPSAT defected after youth-led protests led to increased pressure on the government. President Rajoelina fled the country while a military-backed transition was institutionalized as the former constitutional order broke down. Similarly, Nepal, the most radical outcome of these cases, saw rapidly escalating violent protests lead to a regime collapse, an intervention by the army, the fleeing of Prime Minister Sharma Oli, and the establishment of an interim authority. The Gen-Z-driven regime change in Nepal is striking; however, protesters' achievement comes at a significantly higher human and material cost when compared to the case of Madagascar.

CONCLUSION

Youth-driven protests are certainly not a new phenomenon, and all the chosen country cases show a significant share of young people aged 15-24 years within the total population, ranging from 20 percent in Madagascar and Nepal, over 16 percent in Peru and Morocco, to just over nine percent in Bulgaria (UN DESA, 2024). Corruption, youth unemployment, and related socio-economic concerns, present in all of the analyzed movements, have long acted as central factors for mass mobilization. While their onset was largely unanticipated and highly dynamic, the protests were nevertheless rooted in longstanding discontentment as well as disillusionment with established political and societal institutions. What is new, however, is the mode of mobilization, movement organization, and a strong bottom-up control over information. The use of Discord as a digital community platform, alongside other social media channels, has enabled digitally centered and decentralized mobilization, coordination and amplification of protests. Digital organization has furthermore facilitated the rapid proliferation of protests through mutual inspiration and learning across movements in different world regions, allowing forms of protest to be adopted by societies across diverse cultural, political, and geographical contexts within a short period of time. As such, the protests point towards a new trend of globalized yet decentralized protest culture. Ultimately, however, protest outcomes depended on the extent to which state institutions were able to maintain control over protests and channel public pressure into sustainable reforms. This underscores the persistent relevance of institutional capacities in influencing protest outcomes and conflict trajectories.

LILLIE HAFNER, SABRINA GABEL, CHRISTOPHER BUCHAUER

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A SNAKE WITHOUT A HEAD? THE POST-ASSAD LEVANTINE CAPTAGON TRADE

The fall of the Assad regime in December 2024 marked a major turning point in the political and security landscape of the Middle East. One of its least examined features is the trade of the amphetamine-type Captagon. For years, Syria functioned as the central hub of global Captagon production and distribution. The trade carries wide regional implications heavily impacting trade and mobility, financing political-military groups, fueling cross-border conflicts, and essentially sustaining the Al-Assad regime. Hence, the end of the Assad regime as a turning point for the Captagon trade demands closer inspection. This Spotlight examines how Captagon production, smuggling routes, and the actors involved have evolved since the regime's collapse, and what the networks' response to political upheaval and shifting state control implies for their future capacity and regional trajectory.

Our data indicate a loss of production and trade capacity in Syria: relevant events at the Syrian-Jordanian border fell by circa 50 percent between 2024 and 2025. A consequence of changing power relations. Yet the once financial backbone of the Assad regime was not eliminated but rather dissolved and fragmented into smaller networks which relocated and adapted to the fragmented power distribution in Syria. We read this as a shift from a hierarchical- to a market-network logic, which is more adaptable but lower in capacity and requires broader, more structural countermeasures.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Syria was a site of drug production, consumption, and trade well before the Syrian revolution and had long produced synthetic substances such as amphetamine-type drug Captagon (Robins 2016). Neighboring areas in Lebanon, largely under Hezbollah control, established cannabis trade networks, the same clandestine networks later used in Captagon trade from Lebanon. The civil war gave rise to the demand, due to its use as a stimulant and endurance enhancer (Rose and Söderholm, 2022, 6 f.). As war damage, territorial conflicts and shifting international support for the Assad regime from Russia and China and the regime's continuous economic crisis, Captagon shifted from a battle drug to a central source of revenue (Pergolizzi Jr et al., 2024, 5).

As a consequence of the Assad regime's loss of every major international financial inflow in 2018/2019, the production capacities expanded to a semi-industrial state, bolstering drug-related income flows (COAR, 2021, 10). Another driving factor for the industrialization is the relatively easy accessibility of necessary manufacturing components and manufacturing processes (Pergolizzi Jr et al., 2024, 4). As the Syrian civil war unfolded, it laid a fertile ground for drug trafficking operations with laboratories built across western regions, central Syria and the south – notably Dara'a and Suwayda bordering Jordan – shifting the drug into an export commodity spanning across the Gulf markets (Steenkamp, 2025, 493; Rose, 2025, 31). The trade's regional diplomatic weight became clear in 2021, when Saudi Arabia halted imports from Syria and Lebanon citing trafficking; a decision reversed only in 2025, following anti-trafficking efforts by Syrian and Lebanese officials (Al Arabiya, 2025).

DYNAMICS IN THE REGIONAL DRUG TRADE

2024 AND BEFORE

Production and smuggling of Captagon were secured by influential actors within the Syrian security apparatus, foremost among them Maher al-Assad, the brother of President Bashar al-Assad, who commanded both the Presidential Guard and the Fourth Division of the Syrian Army. Additionally, one of Assad's cousins – Samer – is explicitly stated to have directly controlled production sites in Latakia and southern Syria (US_DoT, 2023). The Fourth Division seems to have been closely involved in trafficking networks and cooperation with Hezbollah and other figures (Alghadawi, 2021; US_DoT, 2023). The southern actor landscape is said to be highly dispersed, with a Jordan Army colonel estimating around 160 groups in 2022 (BBC, 2022), in spite of reported decrease in 2023 (Etana Syria, 2023). A tribal component is attributed to with-in regional smuggling (Krohley & Larson, 2025, 1). Of actors in the smuggling network, 79 percent in Suwayda and 63 percent in Daraa were reportedly controlled by the Assad regime's military intelligence (Etana Syria, 2023). Connections between the Fourth Division and Hezbollah indicate that relevant capacities were present in Lebanon, especially in areas under strong Hezbollah influence, such as the Bekaa Valley in the Baalbek region in the north-east of the country.

The main destination markets are Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (Rose and Söderholm, 2022, 9 ff.; Pourahmadi, 2022). This is validated by clashes at the Jordan-Syrian border, when bands of drug smugglers try to cross the border with illicit substances. This predominantly occurs in the more rural desert areas of As-Suwayda and rural Damascus provinces. Jordan adopted violent measures to disperse cross-border smuggling efforts, which were especially frequent in the Suwayda desert in the northeast of the country. A "shoot-to-kill policy" was adopted responding to border incursions in 2022, which enables border forces to engage with lethal force against drug smugglers (BBC, April 2022). However, a change in trafficking tactics – with the proliferated usage of drones over incursions by groups of smugglers – was observed in the second half of 2024. Jordan also frequently conducts operations against domestic distribution actors, as not only does the country serve as a transit hub towards the Arabic peninsula, but also around one-fifth of imported drugs are consumed domestically (Steenkamp, 2025, 482).

In 2024, at least 21 incursions resulting in 38 deaths and an additional 23 drone interceptions have been reported, as seen in the "comparisons of events"-section below. The coded data indicate that the modus operandi shifted from incursions to drones over 2024 [→ Syria; Jordan (Captagon), 2024]. Apart from border incursions, shipments are usually hidden in private vehicles and corporate shipments of goods. The U.S. Department of Treasury sanctions two enterprises from Lebanon for drug shipments, whose owner is said to have connections to both Hezbollah and the former Fourth Division (US_DoT).

Jordan conducted airstrikes in Suwayda in January and December 2024, targeting warehouses and homesteads of suspected drug traffickers. Airstrikes also occurred in the previous year, with an important smuggling figure having been killed in May 2023, which reportedly led to a major disruption in cross-border smuggling operations (Etana Syria, 2023).

Saudi-Arabia answered the rising numbers of drug trafficking with strict laws (Mol) and death sentences against drug traffickers, and Captagon users. For two years in a row, the number of death penalties in the country have reached a

new record high, with 356 people executed (Reprieve) by the Kingdom's authorities in 2025. 240 of the 365 were killed based on drug offense convictions. Anti-drug trafficking efforts also included a number of security and customs control operations.

Already in 2023 and 2024 – even before Assad's fall – Captagon production and smuggling had become increasingly fragmented and transnationalized. As part of the Assad regime's regional normalization policy, some production shifted to Iraq and Lebanon, while smuggling routes diversified. Initial discoveries of Captagon laboratories, including in Germany, also indicate that the drug has by now reached Europe and has been proliferated beyond the region. The northern part of the Syria territory is under control by various groups, independent from the former regime and not controlled by the central Syrian government. Of those, the Syrian National Army (SNA) were reported to partake in small-scale drug production and shipment, especially towards Türkiye (Banks & Haupt, 2025).

CHANGES IN 2025

With the rapid fall of the Assad regime on December 8, 2024, leaving a power vacuum, dominant drug networks in Syria were thrown into disarray. The Islamist Hayat Tahrir asch-Scham (HTS), which has governed since then under interim president Ahmad al-Shara, officially declared war on Captagon; production sites and large pill seizures were publicly destroyed. The HTS government announced the total disassemblment of all former Captagon labs by June 2025 (Al Arabiya, 2025 B). Furthermore, Syria joined agreements with Jordan on December 22, 2024, with the common aim to mitigate regional Captagon and overall drug trade (Enab Baladi, 2025 B). Iraqi security entities operated in Damascus in an action against drug networks, aiding Syrian forces on July 30 (Arab News, 2025). The events for 2025 can be seen on the map at page .

Between Suwayda and northeastern Jordan, at least nine thwarted infiltration attempts resulting in 17 deaths have been coded. At least ten drone interceptions were reported. This indicates a decrease of more than 50 percent compared to 2024 and can be seen in the "comparisons of events"-section below. A relevant issue is the limited control of the HTS government over Suwayda (Tagesschau, 2025 A). Furthermore, local conflicts between the Druze minority and bedouin tribes were reported, with Israel intervening by targeting Syrian armed forces [→ Syria (Suwayda / Southern Syria)]. With Suwayda being a focal point, especially for cross-border smuggling between Syria and Jordan, this issue is a complex but relevant feature of the overall dynamics. Importantly, airstrikes by the Jordan military in the As-Suwayda region were reported to target warehouses of smuggling groups in 2025 as well. The strikes were conducted in January and December and concentrated in rural areas.

Seizures of Captagon in corporate shipments and private vehicles occurred at the most relevant border crossings, the Jaber-Nassib between Syria and Jordan and the Omari-Haditha crossing from Jordan to Saudi-Arabia. The "comparisons of events"-section below also gives a comparison of seizures at both crossings. Finally, drug shipments were seized in the Levantine ports of Latakia in Syria and Beirut in Lebanon, as well as in the Saudi ports of Duba, on two different occasions, and Jeddah. At least one seizure was reported in Oman and three in Yemen, en route to Saudi-Arabia. Six shipments were intercepted, when approaching Saudi-Arabia from Qatar, Kuwait, and Oman, indicating the

globality of Captagon routes. The overall size of seized shipments ranges from a few thousand up to 9.5 Mio. pills, with the latter being the primary seizure at Omari-Haditha crossing in 2024. We therefore refrain from making capacitive assumptions based on the number and amplitude of seizures.

COMPARISON OF EVENTS (own research)

Jordan-Syria: infiltration events (deaths/injuries):
2024: 21 (38/16+); 2025: 9 (17/4+)

Jordan-Syria: drone interceptions:
2024: 23; 2025: 10

Jordan-Syria: Jaber-Nassib seizures (minimums):
2024: 2 (870.000 Pills); 2025: 6 (600.000 Pills)

Jordan - Saudi-Arabia: Omari-Haditha seizures (minimums):
2024: 4 (12 Mio. Pills); 2025: 4 (933.500 Pills)

A spatial cluster of clashes and raids in and around the Baalbek region of Lebanon, continuing into Syria, can be seen on the map. As Baalbek and the Beqaa Valley are reported strongholds and retreats for Hezbollah, this may be seen as a response by the Lebanese government to limit Hezbollah's capabilities to profit from Captagon. The relation between Hezbollah and the Lebanese state is complex. Whereas Hezbollah may have yielded relevant political influence in the past, Lebanon's new president seeks to monopolize the usage of violence in the hands of the state (BBC, Feb. 2025). One seizure and one clash event were coded each en route from Lebanon to central Syria and Damascus, visible on the focus map. However, monitoring capacities of the new Syrian government likely remain limited, hence this is likely only a fraction of shipments. With the reported – yet unconfirmed – dismantling of Syrian drug labs by mid-2025, Lebanon likely became more relevant as a producer.

DISCUSSION

Drug networks share organizational similarities to global value chains (Sánchez-Perez et al., 2023, 6). We also use the logic of enterprise interactions to describe the interplay of relevant groups. Relevant steps in the value chain with regards to Captagon are the production, country and border area specific transportation and distribution to the consumers. These steps can either be strongly integrated by and tailored to a central corporate element – the lead firm – in a hierarchical or "captive" network, or organized in a more loose, market-based network (Bathelt & Glückler, 2018, 309 ff.). Higher integration results in more rigid structures but lower interaction costs and hence yields higher capacities (Bathelt & Glückler, 2018, 310). The opposite are flexible, highly adaptive factors, which in turn have a lower capacity due to lower systemic trust and higher efforts for effective cooperation.

From the situation and reports in 2024 and before, it is reasonable to attribute the Assad regime, or more precisely the Fourth Division and distinct actors related to Bashar al-Assad, with the role as lead firm in a hierarchical network. The ousting of the Assad regime and the decline in events both suggest a shift in network logic. The anti-drug policy of the HTS government is likely an additional driver to this. Market networks are highly flexible and adaptive and comparatively easy to establish, when resulting from a former strongly hierarchical structure with existing social capital and

connections. Also, given (local) distribution is seen as the primary task, high modularity can be assumed. Restructured Syrian-Lebanese, however, did not even need to generate new inter-group relations and technical capabilities, as they inherited both from the Assad era.

The shift between 2024 to the post-Assad era went hand in hand with a de-centralisation of the Captagon value chain. The post-Assad situation might be of special interest, as actors inherit systemic relations, making the system still more effective than a newly formed smuggler network elsewhere. However, whereas deterrence and violent responses might be to some degree suitable to counter rigid, hierarchically organized networks, we theorize that market logic demands a more individual-based incentivized approach based on socio-economic alternatives. Border control mechanism alone, as deployed by Jordan and aided by the EU with 11 Mio. EURO (Steenkamp, 2025, 490) are likely less effective in the future, without changes in the relevant areas in Syria.

Two sub-national areas are of special interest. The Baalbek region with the Bekaa valley in Lebanon and As-Suwayda in southern Syria. Both regions are intertwined with other conflicts [→ Lebanon (Hezbollah)] and [→ Syria (Suwayda / Southern Syria)], respectively. The Jordanian airstrikes on Suwayda in 2015 are likely related to the low governmental control. The reported effects of the killing of a central actor of infiltration networks by airstrikes in Suwayda in May 2023 (Etana Syria, 2023) may have resulted from the stronger hierarchy during this time and are probably not replicable under a more pronounced market logic in the post-Assad environment. Under a market proposition, inter-group violence might prevail, as interactions and competencies are no longer overseen centrally. With the tribal component to Suwayda groups, this may play into the local conflict landscape. Given the propositions of economies of violence, creating a stable environment for peaceful economic endeavours might be crucial in undermining the individual mobilization of drug networks, which is a relevant part in a market logic scheme. The call for governmental control in Suwayda has to be counter-balanced with domestic justice and human rights claims.


In theory, the decline of Syria's Captagon economy could open the relevant markets for new players. Small-scale, mobile Captagon labs and stationary assignments were reported to be operated in Sudan (Krohley & Larson, 2025, 19; New Arab, 2025; Rose & Lipschitz, 2025), and the geocoded seizure events in Yemen for 2025 could be interpreted as signs of emerging productive and smuggling capacities. The Rapid Support Force - the adversary of the regular army in the ongoing Sudanese civil war - and the Houthi militia in Yemen as pivotal actors, and the spatial proximity of both Sudan and Yemen to Saudi-Arabia, might be notable here. Actors formerly present in Syria are reported to have become active in Sudan (New Arab, 2025), providing expertise and lowering the costs of interaction building. Whether Sudan will become an internationally important hub also depends on the further trajectory of the civil war. The production in Yemen may cover domestic demands as a combat drug, but no economies of scale are likely in the near future. Production in Jordan is possible in theory, but not indicated by reports. In one instance, precursor materials were seized at the border to Syria (Roya News, 2025).

CONCLUSION

From our results, we derive that the fall of the Assad regime marks a major change in the regional Captagon trade,

as it adapted to new political powers. Theoretically, this is in line with the assumptions of drug value chains, as existing lines are likely to persist, but also that market value chains yield lower capacities, while being further mitigated by rising state efforts in Syria, Jordan, and beyond. The snake may have lost its head, but only for many minor ones to replace it. The overall trajectories will indeed be co-determined by governmental actions and strategies. Regional governments have signaled their willingness to counter drug networks. It is likely that individual mobilization to engage in drug smuggling is diametral to economic alternatives and social institutions, as regional conflicts continue to promote illicit drug trafficking as a lucrative source of income. This makes it unlikely that violent countermeasures alone will have an ultimate mitigative effect, but that institution building and post-conflict reconciliation are highly relevant. For international actors and aid givers, this is a relevant learning and a pathway to engage in fostering regional stability and subsequent peace. It remains to be seen if the Captagon trade continues to spread in neighboring conflict areas across the Red Sea and other conflict areas.

TILL-SEBASTIAN KRAUSE, KIM NEUMANN, NELE-SOPHIE HARLE, THOMAS CRANSHAW, ESSRAA HAMADEH



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HAITI: A UNIQUE CHALLENGE TO TRADITIONAL APPROACHES OF INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION. RECENT EVOLUTIONS

A HISTORY OF FAILED INTERVENTIONS

As the first independent Black Republic in the world (1804), Haiti was a pioneer in the history of decolonization. However, the country has, ever since, been struggling to maintain “two conditions of sovereignty: recognition and respect” (Byrd, 2023, 220). Furthermore, the crippling financial “indemnity” conceded by Haiti in 1825 to its former colonial power, France, plunged the country into a debt spiral that would still affect its economy to this day (UN News, 2025).

Haiti’s early independent history has also been marked by foreign interference, often fueled by neocolonial aspirations and narratives of a Black Republic doomed to failure. These narratives justified foreign interventions, culminating in the first U.S. invasion of the country in 1915 (Byrd, 2023). Despite a “second independence” in 1934 following the withdrawal of U.S. forces, this military occupation had successfully restored imperial practices in the country and the prevalence of authoritarian nationalism. What ensued was a period of repression and political violence under the Duvalier dynasty, who, from 1957 to 1986, turned the country into a military-supported dictatorship. The Duvaliers largely made use of the anti-communist support from the U.S. to spread corruption in the country (Byrd, 2023) and increasingly used paramilitary forces – the “Macoute” – who soon became the country’s main security forces and counterbalanced the power of the regular army (Walker, 2022).

In 1986, the hope that followed the fall of Jean-Claude Duvalier and his dictatorship was quickly crushed by a period of instability marked by successive coups and coup attempts. In the 1990s and 2000s, violent clashes between political groups (OPL, Fanmi Lavalas, PHTK, and later, Pitit Desalin), each supported by militias and paramilitary groups, were frequent and political elites quickly shifted towards increasingly authoritarian tendencies. International interventions were once again considered as the solution by the international community to restore peace and democracy in Haiti. During this period, the U.S. intervened both politically and militarily, reinstating President Aristide after a coup in 1991, and the United Nations deployed the MINUSTAH mission between 2004 and 2017.

However, these international interventions were not merely motivated by humanitarian or democratic concerns. Indeed, the U.S. intervention in 1994 was largely motivated by internal politics of the Clinton administration (Carey, 1997). Thereby, international law was bended by the UN Security Council to adopt Resolution 940 (July 31, 1994), authorizing an intervention in – and ultimately invasion of – a country that posed no threat to international security, a legal requirement for international interventions. Moreover, the Organization of American States (OAS), through the Santiago Resolution (Resolution 1080, June 5, 1991) became crucial in regionally justifying a forced intervention into a sovereign country for the sole purpose of “democratization” (Byrd, 2023).

Haiti therefore represented a shift in the perception and rhetoric surrounding international interventions. However, these interventions were often not conceived to create a healthy, sustainable political landscape, which would have meant tackling structural corruption, and forcing disagreeing parties to discuss and govern together. While the long period of UN/U.S. presence that followed did improve the humanitarian situation – especially following the 2010 earthquake

that devastated the country – and brought down criminality rates, these positive developments hid the broader structural problem of corruption of political figures by interest groups and gangs. Parallely, the issue of weapons smuggling from the U.S. to Haiti continued to increase (U.S. GAO, 2024), fueling the endemic gang violence, and highlighting the lack of coherency of U.S. intentions. As a consequence of this long history of failed and interested interventionism, defiance towards international actors became widespread within the Haitian population, who often saw these actions as foreign interferences into Haitian politics (Etienne, 2025).

VIV ANSANM: FROM INTER-GANG RIVALRY TO GANGS’ SOLIDARITY

Already facing a dire economic situation, chaos in Haiti reignited following the assassination of Prime Minister Jovenel Moïse in 2021. The ensuing stride for power has placed civilians at the heart of violence and human rights violations, with gangs simultaneously becoming the main source of political destabilization.

The centrality of armed groups and gangs in Haitian life has never ceased to increase since the 1990s – themselves being the heirs of the dictatorship’s paramilitary groups. While violence was, until then, restricted to inter-gang rivalries, the creation, in 2024, of the coalition Viv Ansanm (“living together”), uniting former rival gangs G9 and Gpèp under the leadership of former police officer Jimmy “Barbecue” Chérizer, marked a fundamental shift towards violence against civilians and police forces for territorial and political control. Indeed, in a country where political powers seemed either weak or corruptible, gangs soon realized that their territorial control, and subsequent de-facto domination of local populations and economies, could be leveraged for greater political goals (Almond, 2024). Viv Ansanm continuously expanded its territorial control, sometimes even cooperating with other gangs (e.g., Gran Griff), thereby proving its commitment to greater political goals. Some previously relatively peaceful departments (North and North-West), and major towns and cities in some of the country’s most demographically and economically important regions have become the center of gang violence. In many of these areas, gangs used as a recruiting tool the resentment of the local youth towards the police, often accused of extrajudicial murders, the failed justice system, and a corrupt political system that had left them feeling abandoned, and with no hope for a brighter future (Chalandon & Gacon, 2026).

Despite the intervention of the UN-backed Multinational Security Support Mission (MSS), little operational progress was achieved, especially due to a lack of equipment, internal issues in leader-nation Kenya (Opala & Le-Cour-Grandmaison, 2025), and general disinterest towards Haiti within the international community. Moreover, major political disagreements between members of the Transitional Presidential Council (TPC), some of which are even accused of serving gangs’ interests, and the transitional government have prevented any concrete, long-term measures to be implemented. This result demonstrated that the rhetoric of pacification and democratization once again displayed by the international community to justify its intervention, failed to address the structural issues that plague the Haitian political system and that continue to fuel gangs’ rhetoric.

Despite a seemingly renewed international interest over the security issues in Haiti, with, for example, the designation of Haitian gangs as “terrorist organizations” by the U.S. government in May 2025 (Garcia & Alcindor, 2025), one

can wonder to what extent any new intervention framework would resemble previous interventions, motivated by “the neoliberal impulse of modern-day ‘humanitarianism’” (Byrd, p.243), and ultimately failing to meet Haitians’ demands for accountability and sovereignty as a starting point for the development of a political, economic, and social justice (Byrd, 2023).

2025: NEW ACTORS, SAME PROBLEMS – A NEVER ENDING CONUNDRUM

As civilians have become the main victims of violence, the country reached in 2025 a record 1.4M internally displaced people, and many refugees have fled the country. Faced with gang violence and the inability of the government or the international community to protect those who stayed, a new kind of popular response emerged: local armed self-defense groups (e.g., Bwa Kalé). For anthropologist and sociologist Gédéon Louis, they represent “an outcry, a profound echo of the collective hopelessness of an abandoned people”; people who looked for “a violent reappropriation of power [...] where the rule of law has vanished” (in Jean Noel, 2025). These groups have been central to help Haitian security forces in resisting gangs’ offensives but have also fueled the cycle of violence by leading retaliatory attacks against gang members, also denoting the new centrality of unconventional actors in this war.

In parallel to these security issues, other groups of civilians have led various rounds of protests and symbolic actions throughout the country to demonstrate their anger at the TPC. Unlike self-defense groups, these protesters have been mostly non-violent, however, the use of live ammunition by the police against civilian crowds during some of the early protests in 2025 was representative of an overwhelmed security apparatus, resorting to indiscriminate violence against civilians. Additionally, many other instances of extra-judicial killings committed by official security forces have been reported by the BINUH.

In this context of high tension and a need to prove strong commitment for the pacification of the country, the TPC confirmed the presence of Private Military Companies (PMCs), operating in the country since March 2025, and using new methods, largely differing from traditional international missions (Hirtenstein et al., 2025). Indeed, FPV kamikaze drones have been their main operational tool. While no official report has been made public about the operations led by these PMCs, it appears that they assist and train the Haitian Police (PNH) and military (Fad’H) in the adoption of these new technologies in their anti-gang operations, especially in Port-au-Prince. However, their operational efficiency is largely debated and accidents are frequent, with bystanders – often children – regularly reported as victims of these drone explosions (Hawaleshka, 2025). Similarly, the decision of the TPC to use the BSAP, a rogue government environmental unit with a long history of abuses against civilians and co-optation by gangs, to assist the national security forces, has been debated both nationally and internationally. Moreover, PMCs seem to be a new short-term solution for a longer-term problem: they are intrinsically focused on immediate anti-gang operations but cannot tackle the structural governance problems in Haiti.

More traditional approaches – that include both a military and political aspect – are still favored by most international actors. Indeed, under the impulse of the U.S. and Panama, the MSS was transformed into a new UN-backed Gang Suppression Force (GSF), which aims at providing further military

personnel and equipment for anti-gang operations and to secure peaceful presidential elections in 2026. International actors and organizations, such as the U.S., the OAS and CARICOM have also increased their diplomatic pressure towards the TPC to ensure a lawful electoral process – e.g. the U.S. has imposed visa restrictions on some of its members who are accused of collaborating with gangs (Pigott, 2025). However, doubt remains high over the results the GSF will be able to achieve, and recent declarations by members of the TPC, disavowing PM Alix Didier Fils-Aimé, further question the political willingness of Haitian elites to work together and peacefully cede power to the soon-to-be elected government.

CONCLUSION

Despite Louis-Joseph Janvier’s famous saying, “Haiti for the Haitians” (1884), Haiti has been struggling for most of its history to maintain its democratic sovereignty, faced on the one hand with the authoritarian aspirations of a corrupted political elite, and, on the other, with a paternalistic vision from an international community who “implied the need for outside intervention to “democratize” Haiti, writing of Haitians’ supposedly innate preference for “brutal and tyrannical rulers” as if the disaster of recent U.S. occupation had never happened” (Byrd, 2023, 241-242). While humanitarian and security assistance for the Haitian population seems more needed than ever, the very structure of these international interventions and their undertones can be challenged. Moreover, regional organizations such as the OAS and CARICOM often struggle to find the right balance between a need to provide regional support, and the respect for political independence of the Haitian people.

Parallely, new forms of international presence, while they do not have high moral claims, spark controversy on their methods and aims, and do not allow the Haitian society to solve its chronic political issues. Part of the solution lies perhaps in the hands of the Haitian population, who, defiant of international missions and tired of the failure of its political elite, took the streets to protest against the dire economic, security and political situation, organizing their own resistance movements. However, in this context of widespread violence, especially targeted at civilians, Haitians must be supported, and a sound coordination between national and international actors, both in the political and security realms seems necessary to stabilize the security environment, and push political elites to work together for the prosperity of their population and of their nation.

AURÉLIE BERTHOT

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BEYOND BOMBS: THE CYBER WAR BESIDE THE WAR

Shortly after midnight on June 13, 2025, Israeli drones and aircraft struck radar sites, missile facilities, and nuclear installations across Iran, officially opening the twelve-day conflict that the Conflict Barometer 2025 records as a war, the highest intensity level, escalating from the crisis status the year before [→ Iran – Israel]. The kinetic story is rather well documented: roughly two hundred aircraft, strikes on Natanz and Isfahan, ballistic missiles targeting Tel Aviv and Haifa, and a death toll that Iranian sources placed above one thousand.

Alongside it ran a second war that left no casualties and therefore no obvious trace in most conflict statistics. On June 17, as airstrikes continued and Iran's wartime chief of staff was killed in Tehran, a group called Predatory Sparrow, widely believed to be linked to Israeli military intelligence, erased the data of the state-owned Bank Sepah (Pearson and Vicens, 2025; European Repository of Cyber Incidents, 2025). Branches closed, credit cards stopped working, and some government and security personnel even experienced delays in receiving their salaries. A day later, the same group destroyed roughly ninety million dollars held at the Nobitex exchange, transferring the funds to unreachable addresses rather than stealing them directly, a move widely interpreted as an attempt to damage the financial arteries of the Revolutionary Guard rather than generate profit (Berwick 2025).

Iran's response focused less on physical destruction than on disruption and perception. State-aligned actors and a surge of more than sixty pro-Iran hacktivist groups flooded Israeli systems with so-called denial-of-service attacks, ultimately peaking at 40 claimed strikes on June 14. At the same time, spoofed emergency alerts warned civilians of fuel shortages and imminent bombings in an attempt to sow panic (Radware 2025). Radware recorded a 700 percent increase in cyberattacks against Israel within two days of the initial strikes (Meyran 2025). Much of this activity was publicly visible but caused limited direct damage, which is precisely what made it relevant to the dynamics of this conflict dyad: signaling reach, creating uncertainty, and shaping perceptions of vulnerability (Atlantic Council 2025).

It is worth keeping these strands terminologically apart, since they are often folded together in public commentary and media reports as though "cyberwar", "hybrid war", and "grey-zone" referred to the same phenomenon. Kinetic operations are the missiles and airstrikes that the Barometer already captures. Cyber operations, such as the attacks on Bank Sepah and Nobitex, do not necessarily cause physical

harm in themselves, but they can nevertheless disrupt critical systems, affect financial networks, and impose strategic costs. Information operations, such as the false alerts, target perceptions rather than systems. The grey zone, meanwhile, describes the deniable space in which proxies increasingly act on a state's behalf while keeping attribution deliberately unclear (Kaunert and Wertman 2020).

This is where the Conflict Barometer's strength lies: its systematic and consistent coding allows it to be read alongside datasets built on comparable logic. EuRepoC, for its part, has drawn on HIIK's conflict data in tracing how cyber activity develops alongside geopolitical tensions. Read together, the two records describe the same war from different angles. The 2025 confrontation, which crossed from crisis into open conflict before a fragile ceasefire and a brief American intervention [→ Iran (opposition); → Iran – USA], may ultimately be remembered as much for the coordination between its digital and physical fronts, as for the destruction left behind by missiles.

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A TURNING POINT AT LAST? ASSESSING THE ANKARA-PKK PEACE PROCESS

The armed conflict between the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and the Turkish government commenced in 1984. According to the findings of the Conflict Barometer research, conflict intensity ranged from level 2 to level 5, and depending on the dynamics, it was described as (non-)violent crisis, limited war, and war, respectively. Over the course of more than four decades, numerous attempts were made to resolve the issue peacefully. The present initiative started in October 2024 by Devlet Bahçeli, the leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), who engaged in a handshake with representatives of the Peoples' Equality and Democracy Party (DEM). This was followed by Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, calling for the dissolution of the military group, and was subsequently approved by Turkish President Recep Erdoğan (Daily Sabah, 2025a). The long-term nature of this peace process has been a matter of some debate (Aydın, 2025; Gunter, 2025, 1), and this Spotlight piece aims to present a compelling argument in support of its viability. Following sections will outline past peace efforts, differences between past and current initiatives, examine the conflict parties' motivations for ceasing hostilities, and explain why there now is a greater likelihood of a successful peace process.

PAST PEACE EFFORTS

Despite over four decades of violent hostilities, already from the early 1990s, the conflict parties sought to resolve the issue peacefully. For example, in 1993, PKK proclaimed a unilateral cessation of hostilities, a development that emerged as a consequence of Turkish President Turgut Özal's endeavors. However, a combination of factors, including the sudden death of the politician, a series of PKK attacks, and the government's hawkish political stance, hindered the progression of the process. Military groups repeatedly engaged in such political acts, notably during 1995-1996 and 1999-2003. For instance, following his capture in 1999, Öcalan instructed Ali Sapan, the leader of the PKK's European branch and seven other prominent figures, to surrender to the Turkish government as a gesture of "goodwill" (Gunter, 2025, 8). However, this initiative did not result in reciprocal action from the other party.

Similar efforts were maintained throughout the 2000s. Key phases in this process include the "Democratic Opening" from 2005 to 2009, the secret negotiations known as the "Oslo Process" from 2009 to 2011, Ankara's engagement with Öcalan in 2012, and the commencement of the "Solution Process" (Pope, 2014). At the inception of the peace negotiations in 2005, then-Prime Minister Erdoğan acknowledged the existence of the "Kurdish problem" and conceded that there had been mistakes in addressing it (Briefing Ankara, 2005). By 2015, Ankara had taken steps to promote Kurdish rights, namely education in their mother language (Daily Sabah, 2025f).

Finally, in his Newroz speech of 2015, Öcalan urged the PKK "to hold a congress to stop the armed struggle [...] and to establish the societal strategies and tactics that are suitable for the new period" (Öcalan, 2015). At that time, however, he did not call for disarmament, and only one decade later was this demand voiced.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE PAST AND CURRENT PEACE PROCESSES

The present peace process shows greater potential for success than previous ones due to a combination of specific internal and external factors that motivate the key actors to negotiate peace. First and foremost, one should take into account that a considerable shift in the regional geopolitical dynamics occurred during the 2023-2024 period, compelling Ankara to undertake a review of its long-standing policies in the region. In the wake of the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023, the Israeli government adopted a hardline stance in its regional foreign policy and initiated military strikes against non-governmental groups supporting Hamas in neighboring countries. However, the Israeli foreign minister Gideon Saar's stance regarding the Kurdish issue, namely depicting the Kurds as "a victim of oppression from Iran and Turkey" and reportedly expressing support for "the rights of Kurds", (Daily Sabah, 2025a) coupled with Israel's engagement with the People's Protection Units (YPG) and Druze in the north and south of Syria, respectively, altogether heightened Ankara's concerns. Importantly, in their public statements, Erdoğan and Bahçeli have identified Israeli actions as a potential threat to Türkiye's political and territorial integrity, and the possibility of the country becoming the next target of Israel's "expansionist policies" (Daily Sabah, 2025b).

Meanwhile, considerable decrease in support from Russia, which had been engaged in a war against Ukraine since February 2022, combined with the weakening of Hezbollah due to the actions of Israel in Lebanon altogether, led to the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. If, during the Assad period, both Syria and Türkiye held a similar stance towards the Kurds, namely the prevention of the establishment of an autonomous region, the emergence of a new Syrian government with its pro-democratic stance, and its interest in improving relations with the US, raised concerns in Ankara. In particular, the new Syrian government signed an agreement with the YPG, stipulating that the Kurds residing in Syria will be entitled to assert their cultural, social, and political rights on the basis of equal citizenship (Ataman, 2025a). Given that already in 2005, Kurds of Iraq established an autonomous region, it is logical to infer that success of the aforementioned agreement in Syria would send a strong signal to Turkish Kurds, and consequently reduce Ankara's influence over the internal Kurdish issue. Subsequently, the political and military tensions between Israel, the United States, and Iran compelled Ankara to seriously consider domestic political stabilization due to the possibility of regional conflict spillovers on its territory.

Apart from geopolitical changes, it is vital to consider domestic factors as well. The MHP's shift in stance on the Kurdish issue is a significant development as for many decades, the party was known for its staunch opposition to the peaceful resolution of the Kurdish issue. Indeed, the initiative started by Bahçeli in October 2024 caught the political establishment by surprise. This process was publicly endorsed by Erdoğan and garnered support from various political parties, though with certain reservations. In August of 2025, the Turkish Parliament established a 51-member committee known as the National Solidarity, Brotherhood and Democracy Commission. It includes representatives from the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and the DEM Party, as well as from MHP and the Republican People's Party (CHP), thereby demonstrating the initiative's multilateral support. Convening a parliamentary commission to administer the legal aspects of the peace initiative points to the adoption of a more formalized and open process compared to prior endeavors. This commission is chiefly responsible for recom-

mending legislative reforms, monitoring sensitive political process, and operates within the Turkish Parliament, thereby engendering a more institutionalized and predictable framework (Gasco, 2025).

Simultaneously, both former success and perseverance of pro-Kurdish political parties, namely the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) and DEM Party, respectively, which has been a vital element in the dialogue with Öcalan, complement the change in the political orientation of the PKK, shifting from "demand for independence to calls for cultural rights and regional autonomy based on the concept of democratic confederalism" (Gasco, 2025).

Finally, significant changes were identified among the sentiments of the Kurdish demographic as well. A survey conducted prior to 2024 revealed a significant decrease in the number of Kurds who favored the use of violent means to pursue their rights. In particular, while 65 percent of the Kurdish population aspire to achieve the political goal peacefully, only 15 percent still support violent measures, and the remaining 20 percent are uncertain (Daily Sabah, 2025d). Of equal importance is the general perception of the Turkish population regarding the Kurdish issue. According to the survey conducted in late 2025, while 87.8 percent of participants disapproved of Öcalan's release and 69.3 percent stated that Kurds in Türkiye are also Turks, 44 percent indicated their support for the integration of the Kurdish language into the school curriculum as an elective course, and 42.8 percent advocated for the amendment of the constitution to include other ethnic groups (Rojhelati 2025, 3). Consequently, changes happened at various level and altogether paved the way for the current peace initiative.

INTERESTS OF THE CONFLICT PARTIES IN THE PEACE PROCESS

The resolution of this protracted armed dispute would yield numerous advantages for the conflict parties. To start with, signing a peace treaty would enhance Türkiye's soft power and further solidify its reputation as a peace mediator. Although Ankara has facilitated a variety of peace negotiations, acting as a mediator is distinct from resolving decades-long domestic violent conflicts. A genuine exemplar of success would undoubtedly enhance the country's prestige on both regional and international levels.

As armed struggle becomes unnecessary for the defense of political rights, it is expected that the number of parties advocating for the minority rights will increase. While the fundamental articles of the constitution pertaining to the nation's name or official language are not subject to revision, Articles 66 (concerning citizenship) and 42 (addressing educational rights) may be amended to reflect forthcoming changes (Gasco, 2025). Overall, this shift would reinforce the foundations of liberal democracy. This, in turn, would significantly increase the likelihood of Türkiye's accession to the European Union, as the infringement of human rights and democratic backsliding constitute one of the key impediments to this goal.

At the same time, engaging in warfare is a costly endeavor. Negotiating a long-term agreement with the PKK would allow military expenditures to be allocated toward civil purposes aimed at improving the overall welfare of the population, enhancing economic growth in the southeastern region of the country, and attracting investments, etc. According to Erdoğan, the war against the PKK has reached 2 trillion USD, a considerable sum particularly in light of the country's dire economic situation (Gunter, 2025, 5). Similarly, the proposed peace deal would have a positive impact on the northern

Iraqi region, which has historically served as a refuge for the PKK due to its mountainous terrain. This enhanced political stability is expected to translate into a strengthening of the bilateral trade relations.

The political ambitions of Erdoğan should be considered as well. The success of the peace initiative shall ensure the political support of the DEM party, which, according to Gasco (2025), is "the only possible way to achieve a constitutional amendment", and would enable Erdoğan to remain in power for a third term. The regime's critics posit that this will result in an increase in votes for the incumbent president in the upcoming presidential elections. The results of the 2024 local elections demonstrate that the CHP exercise a greater degree of political influence in comparison to the AK Party.

As for the PKK, a resolution to the conflict would entail a series of measures, including the rehabilitation of its members, the expansion of the Kurdish population's rights, and the conversion of the PKK's military into a political one. Notably, the DEM party, which plays an active role in mediating the peace process, has the potential to evolve into a formidable political entity comparable to the CHP, MHP, or AK Party and emerge as a prominent advocate for Kurdish rights.

Even in the event of failure, the PKK can still leverage the situation to its advantage. Öcalan's formal call for disarmament, the ceremony of burning weapons, and the decision to leave Turkish territory and camps in Iraq altogether, portray the PKK as an organization genuinely seeking to establish a peace agreement. If the Turkish side does not uphold its commitments, this would only serve to enhance the organization's appeal, fortify its support base, and provide substantial grounds to justify the resumption of violence.

Finally, securing a comprehensive, long-term agreement would yield substantial political dividends for Öcalan as well. At present, he is concerned that the Syrian Kurds may enter into an agreement with Israel, which could potentially diminish or even halt his influence (Aydın, 2025). This strategic maneuver allows him to secure the agreement with Turkish governments on his own terms, while also maintaining his influence among Syrian Kurds.

Consequently, success of the peace initiative would benefit not only conflict parties per se, but also welfare of the population and political might of the certain actors as well.

WHY WILL THIS PEACE PROCESS BE STABLE?

Ensuring long-term peace is contingent upon success of numerous elements. And one of the important factors indicative of the actors' serious intentions is the covert nature of the negotiations. This strategy prevents the opposition of the peace initiative to garner sufficient support to impede its progress. The Turkish government has justified the secrecy surrounding its actions by underscoring the delicate nature of the process designed to conclude over four decades of violence (Daily Sabah, 2025e). For instance, following the delegation's visit with Öcalan, numerous political groups and parties called for the authorities to disclose the contents of the meeting. However, once revealed, the statements made by the parties involved could be misinterpreted or taken out of context (Ataman, 2025b). Thus, the negotiation parties are shielded from domestic pressures, and room for compromise is established. However, critics of the peace process emphasize the Turkish government's alleged betrayal of its population, claiming that it disregarded the memory of those killed by the PKK. They simultaneously criticize Erdoğan for his perceived lack of concern for Kurdish rights and assert that he seeks to garner the votes of the Kurdish population

in the 2028 presidential elections.

The extent to which the conflict parties will refrain from resorting to violence is well explained by the concept of commitment, which, in essence, entails that both sides maintain their obligations, with this commitment being reinforced by either a binding legal agreement, as reflected in the nation's legal framework, including the constitution, or by third-party guarantors. Put differently, the PKK should receive legal guarantees that, in exchange for their complete disarmament, the other side will democratize Türkiye and thus grant Kurds rights and take legal steps regarding the future of the PKK. Trust and commitment to the peace deal depends on internal consensus within the PKK. At present, the majority of group members complied with Öcalan's call, though some factions expressed reluctance to cease armed struggle. It is argued that the TUSAŞ terror attack in October 2024 was executed by a PKK faction opposed to peace and that the group's European wing favors extending the war, expecting to achieve strategic gains if Iran experiences military losses from U.S.-Israeli attacks on its territory (Cengiz, 2025, 4).

So far, the PKK's seriousness has been demonstrated by its withdrawal from Turkish territory in October 2025, the abandonment of caves, and the closure of camps in Iraq (e.g., the withdrawal from the Zap camp in November 2025). Importantly, Öcalan assured the Commission that he does not advocate for the establishment of a federation, a separate state, or autonomy, stating that these requests were not articulated in his February 27 declaration (Daily Sabah, 2025g).

In its turn, Ankara's commitment to dialogue is evidenced by the formation of a special commission comprising multiple political parties, as well as the visit of Öcalan on November 24, 2025, by a parliamentary delegation consisting of representatives from the AK Party, the MHP, and the DEM Party. Moreover, in December of 2025, Bahçeli highlighted the seriousness of the government's stance on the matter, stating: "We burned the ships. Our determination is resilient and undisputed" (Daily Sabah, 2025e). Ankara's strategy entails the Commission's examination of perspectives articulated by diverse actors during its hearings, complemented by comprehensive reports submitted by political parties, delineating their vision for the future of the PKK. Subsequent to this, the Commission will formulate recommendations for the Turkish parliament. In turn, the latter will draft bills that may encompass amendments to the Penal Execution Law, the Turkish Penal Code, and the Anti-Terror Law.

Considering the internal and external factors that shape the interests of the conflict parties, as well as their level of commitment to the process, it can be concluded that the current negotiations have a higher chance of success than previous attempts.

CONCLUSION

This Spotlight presented arguments in support of the hypothesis that the current peace negotiations are likely to result in success. While there are numerous reasons why a resolution would be beneficial for both conflict parties, it is important that the resulting peace deal is presented uniformly to both sides. The Turkish government should take measures to persuade the population of the benefits of the conflict resolution, and the critics of the peace deal that the government is not negotiating with terrorists and that it does not forget the victims of the terrorist attacks. Conversely, the PKK should persuade its members and supporters of its

military approach to conflict resolution, that achieving peace will yield a genuine solution to their political aspirations, including the completion of democratization in Türkiye as well as the substantial expansion of their rights and the effective rehabilitation of the organization. When these conditions are met, there is a strong probability that the four-decade-long conflict will not resume.

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
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EUROPE


VIOLENT CONFLICTS IN EUROPE IN 2025 (SUBNATIONAL LEVEL)

INTENSITY


- 5 WAR
- 4 LIMITED WAR
- 3 VIOLENT CRISIS




CONFLICT INTENSITIES IN EUROPE IN 2025 COMPARED TO 2024



FREQUENCY OF CONFLICT INTENSITIES BY CONFLICT ITEM IN EUROPE IN 2025



FREQUENCY OF CONFLICT INTENSITIES BY CONFLICT TYPE IN EUROPE IN 20245



REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT

In Europe, HIIK observed one war in 2025 [→ Russia – Ukraine]. In total, 47 conflicts were observed in the region, an increase of one compared to the year 2024. Twelve conflicts were violent, including eleven violent crises.

The whole of Europe and especially the East remained strongly affected by the war over territory, international power, system/ideology, and resources between Russia and Ukraine [→ Russia – Ukraine]. Compared to 2024, the war of attrition continued, characterized by intense fighting, high military casualties, and infrastructure destruction. The total yearly confirmed military deaths amount to at least 14,130 Ukrainian and 22,992 Russian military personnel. An unprecedented characteristic of this year was a fourfold increase in deserted soldiers of the Ukrainian army: from 42,000 in 2024 to 161,500 in 2025, which may also include deaths. Regarding civilian casualties, there were at least 2,514 killed and 12,142 injured. The number of refugees globally from Ukraine decreased from 6,863,400 to 5,898,150, while the number of internally displaced persons increased from 3,669,000 to 3,712,000 in 2025.

The conflict remained the central driver of regional security developments and influenced several other conflicts across the region. The non-violent crisis between Russia and Estonia over territory and international power continued [→ Estonia – Russia]. The ongoing tensions led to further military preparedness measures in Estonia. The war also affected the non-violent crisis over the secession of Transnistria between the self-proclaimed Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (PMR), supported by Russia, and the Moldovan government [→ Moldova (Transnistria)]. Following the expiration of a gas transit agreement between Russia's Gazprom and Ukraine's Naftogaz, Transnistria faced severe energy shortages, while the Moldovan government accused Russia of orchestrating a humanitarian crisis to destabilize the region [→ Moldova (Transnistria)].

In addition, Russian influence remained a central issue in several domestic and interstate conflicts. The non-violent crisis over international power and Russian regional influence in South Ossetia and Abkhazia between Georgia and Russia continued and was highlighted by ongoing protests against the Georgian government [→ Georgia – Russia; Georgia (opposition)]. Similarly, the non-violent crisis over national power and the orientation of the political system between the Belarusian opposition and the government under President Alyaksandr Lukashenka, supported by Russia, continued amid reports of politically motivated repression and detentions [→ Belarus (opposition)].

Conflicts over political power and political orientation also persisted within Russia and Ukraine. In Russia, the violent crisis over ideology and secession between Islamist militant groups and the central and regional governments continued, with most violent incidents occurring in Dagestan [→ Russia (Islamist militants / Northern Caucasus)]. At the same time, the violent crisis over national power and the orientation of the political system between the opposition and the government de-escalated to a non-violent crisis, although authorities continued to prosecute opposition figures [→ Russia (opposition)]. In Ukraine, the violent crisis over national power and the orientation of the political system between right-wing groups, opposition parties, minorities, civil-rights groups, the Orthodox Church, and the government continued, with authorities taking measures against clerics linked to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) [→ Ukraine (right-wing / opposition)].

Beyond this region, EU, USA et al. – Russia, classified as a non-violent crisis over ideology and international power, remained a significant conflict and continued to have substantial, widespread effects through developments on NATO's eastern flank, security dynamics in the Baltic Sea area, sanctions regimes, nuclear signaling, and alleged hybrid activities [→ EU, USA, et al. – Russia]. The primary conflict parties remained the EU, the USA, NATO member states and partner countries on one side, and Russia, supported by states including Belarus, China, Iran and North Korea, on the other. Russia's strategic nuclear exercise in October, involving launches from land-, sea-, and air-based systems, highlighted the continued risk of escalation.

Further North and closely linked to this conflict, the non-violent crisis over territory, resources and international power in the Arctic region. The conflict involved Russia and Arctic NATO members, including Canada, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden and the United States. Military exercises, armament measures, surveillance activities and symbolic political actions contributed to a persistently tense environment. Norway played a particularly important role, notably through the Joint Viking 2025 exercise in Troms County and Russia's protest against the alleged militarization of Svalbard [→ Norway et al. – Russia (Arctic)].

Further down South, in Europe's South East, 2025 saw the re-emergence of Bulgaria's opposition conflict as a violent crisis after years of inactivity [→ Bulgaria (opposition)]. Triggered by a controversial 2026 state budget that proposed a doubling of dividend taxes and higher pension contributions, mass protests erupted in the capital Sofia from late November onwards. On December 1, clashes between masked individuals and police forces left 71 people detained and several hospitalized; a power outage in central Sofia was described by officials as possible deliberate interference. A third demonstration on December 10 drew around 100,000 to 150,000 participants in Sofia. On December 11, the then PM Rosen Zhelyazkov announced the government's resignation live on air minutes before a no-confidence vote, initiating Bulgaria's at least seventh government formation process since 2021.

Greece saw the second major escalation of the year, with the conflict involving social groups, trade unions and left-wing militants escalating from a dispute to a violent crisis [→ Greece (social protests, left-wing militants)]. The unresolved 2023 Tempi train crash remained the central grievance; on February 28, approximately 430,000 people demonstrated in Athens alone according to organizers, with clashes involving petrol bombs, stun grenades and water cannons. Further violent confrontations followed in March after the government survived a no-confidence vote. Four joint general strikes paralyzed transport across the country throughout the year. The conflicts involving right-wing militants and the inter-militant conflict between left-wing and right-wing groups remained stable at non-violent crisis [→ Greece (left-wing militants – right-wing militants); Greece (right-wing militants)].

Serbia's opposition conflict continued as a violent crisis [→ Serbia (opposition)], sustained by mass protests following the 2024 Novi Sad railway station collapse. On March 15, between 275,000 and 300,000 people gathered in Belgrade in the largest demonstration in the country's modern history according to independent monitors, with allegations of sonic weapon deployment prompting an interim measure from the European Court of Human Rights. Clashes in June left over seventy people injured and seventy-seven arrested, while pro-government groups attacked protesters with batons in Vojvodina in

August.

Kosovo^o-Serbia remained a non-violent crisis with EU-mediated dialogue producing no substantive progress [→ Kosovo^o – Serbia]. The Kosovo^o opposition conflict stayed at dispute level [→ Kosovo^o (opposition)], as did the border dispute between Croatia and Slovenia and the ethnic Croat-Serb minority conflict in Croatia [→ Croatia (ethnic Croats – Serb minority)]. Montenegro's opposition conflict remained a non-violent crisis; a three-month parliamentary boycott was resolved through EU mediation in March [→ Montenegro (opposition)]. North Macedonia's Albanian minority conflict de-escalated from a non-violent crisis to a dispute [→ North Macedonia (Albanian minority – ethnic Macedonians)], while the opposition conflict remained stable as a non-violent crisis [→ North Macedonia (opposition)]. Bosnia and Herzegovina's Republika Srpska conflict escalated to a non-violent crisis [→ Bosnia and Herzegovina (Republika Srpska)].

Albania's opposition conflict remained a non-violent crisis ahead of parliamentary elections [→ Albania (opposition)]. Hungary's conflict with Romania, Slovakia and Ukraine over Hungarian minority rights remained a dispute, though Slovakia's December law criminalizing the public questioning of the Beneš Decrees brought the conflict to the boundary of a non-violent crisis [→ Hungary – Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine (Hungarian minorities)]. Hungary's domestic conflict involving right-wing movements remained a dispute [→ Hungary (minorities – right-wings)].

The non-violent crisis over territory in the Aegean Sea between Greece and Türkiye continued. Throughout the year, naval standoffs in the Aegean and Turkish incursions into Greek airspace occurred [→ Greece – Türkiye (Aegean Sea)].

The non-violent crisis over resources and maritime territory between Cyprus, Greece, and the European Union, on the one hand, and Türkiye and Libya, on the other, de-escalated to a dispute, following negotiations between Libya (GNU) and Greece to delimit their EEZs and the latter's announcement to revive the Eastern Mediterranean Forum, this time including the previously excluded Türkiye and Libya [→ Cyprus, Greece et al. – Türkiye, Libya (Eastern Mediterranean)].

Furthermore, the non-violent crisis over resources and secession of Northern Cyprus between Türkiye and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC^o), on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued. Peaking in March and April, protesters took to the streets throughout the year to protest Türkiye's influence in the TRNC^o. On October 20, Tufan Erhürman was elected president of the TRNC, defeating the incumbent president Ersin Tatar, who strongly favored integration with Türkiye while rejecting reunification with the south [→ Cyprus – Türkiye (Northern Cyprus^o)].

The violent crisis over territory between Armenia and Azerbaijan de-escalated to a non-violent crisis [→ Armenia – Azerbaijan]. The crisis revolved around the issue of the border demarcation between the two countries and was closely related to the 2023 war between the self-proclaimed Republic of Artsakh and Azerbaijan [→ Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh)]. Negotiations for a peace treaty between both countries continued.

In Armenia, the violent crisis over political power and the design of foreign policy between the Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and his ruling party "Civil Contract" and the opposition continued [→ Armenia (opposition)]. The main points of contention were the peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the related territorial concessions towards the latter.

The dispute over international power and historical perceptions between Armenia and Türkiye continued, yet both countries engaged in normalization efforts [→ Armenia – Türkiye]. And by January 1, Armenia assumed full control of its borders with Türkiye and Iran by deploying its own border guards, replacing Russian personnel.

In Azerbaijan, the violent crisis over the orientation of the political system and national power between opposition groups and the government continued. The municipal elections, held on January 29 in 685 municipalities, were officially reported with a 31.45 percent turnout but were widely criticized by oppositional groups for widespread electoral fraud, including alleged ballot stuffing and harassment of observers. Opposition parties mostly boycotted the election or failed to secure seats and throughout the year, the government continued to target and prosecute a broad spectrum of critics, particularly journalists, researchers, and activists [→ Azerbaijan (opposition)].

In Georgia, the violent crisis over the orientation of the political system and national power between civil society and political opposition groups, on the one hand, and the government, led by the Georgian Dream party, on the other, continued. The main points of contention were electoral reforms, political transparency, and judicial independence, as well as questions of international affiliation. The latter issue particularly revolved around the accession to the EU vis-à-vis alignment with Russia. Daily anti-government and pro-European demonstrations continued to take place in the capital Tbilisi throughout the whole year, drawing crowds ranging from hundreds to several thousand participants. Protesters voiced growing dissatisfaction with the government's perceived backsliding on democratic reforms and its increasingly confrontational stance toward the European Union and other Western countries [→ Georgia (opposition)].

The non-violent crisis over the secession of South Ossetia and subnational predominance between the government of the self-proclaimed Republic of South Ossetia - the State of Alania^o, supported by Russia, on the one hand, and the Georgian government, on the other, continued [→ Georgia (South Ossetia^o)], while the dispute over the secession of the Republic of Abkhazia^o and the Georgian government likewise continued [→ Georgia (Abkhazia^o)].

In Western Europe, a major cluster comprised violent internal security conflicts. The most severe remained Sweden (organized crime), a violent crisis over resources and subnational predominance involving rival criminal networks and the Swedish state. Relevant actors included milieus associated with Foxtrotnätverket, Dödspatrullen, Östbergnätverket and Södertäljenätverket. Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö remained key hotspots. While the number of shootings declined, bomb detonations increased significantly, indicating a shift towards strategic intimidation, extortion and attacks against buildings and businesses [→ Sweden (organized crime)].

In Germany, the anti-immigration conflict, a violent crisis over the orientation of the political system, particularly regarding asylum and immigration policy, continued. Right-wing groups and xenophobic individuals opposed government policies and targeted people perceived as having a migration background as well as asylum-related infrastructure. Official statistics recorded high levels of right-wing politically motivated crime and hundreds of injured persons. Demonstrations demanding stricter migration controls also resulted in clashes with police and arrests [→ Germany (anti-immigration)].

In the United Kingdom, [→ United Kingdom (nationalists/Northern Ireland)] continued as a violent crisis over secession and subnational predominance involving dissident republican and nationalist actors, loyalist and unionist groups, and the

EUROPE

government. Although no conflict-related fatalities were reported, paramilitary-style violence, bomb attacks, assaults, arrests under counter-terrorism legislation and confrontations surrounding commemorations and parades demonstrated that the conflict remained active.

Furthermore, several non-violent secessionist and territorial conflicts were recorded across Western Europe. [→ United Kingdom (Scottish nationalists/Scotland)] remained a non-violent crisis over secession between the SNP-led Scottish government, pro-independence organizations, on one side, and the British government together with pro-union actors, on the other. The conflict was driven primarily by verbal and symbolic measures related to demands for a second independence referendum.

In Spain, [→ Spain (Catalan nationalists/Catalonia)] continued as a dispute over secession and demands for greater autonomy. Catalan pro-independence parties and civil society organizations remained opposed to the central government and unionist political forces. However, declining support for independence and lower levels of mobilization during La Diada suggested a continued de-escalation of the conflict. [→ Spain (Basque Provinces)] likewise remained a dispute concerning autonomy and secession, involving EH Bildu, PNV, Basque nationalist civil society actors, and the central government. [→ Spain – United Kingdom (Gibraltar)] persisted as a non-violent territorial crisis. Post-Brexit negotiations led to progress regarding border management and Schengen-related arrangements, but Spanish and British/Gibraltar positions on sovereignty and maritime jurisdiction remained contested.

Overview: Conflicts in Europe in 2025

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
Albania (opposition)*	opposition groups, opposition parties vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2017	•	2
Armenia (opposition)*	opposition groups vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2003	•	3
Armenia – Azerbaijan*	Armenia vs. Azerbaijan	territory	1987	↘	2
Armenia – Türkiye*	Armenia vs. Türkiye	international power, other	1991	•	1
Azerbaijan (opposition)*	opposition groups vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2003	•	3
Belarus (opposition)*	civil society activists, opposition movement, opposition parties vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1994	•	2
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Republika Srpska)*	government of Republic of Srpska vs. government, government of Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina	secession	1995	↗	2
Bulgaria (opposition)*	opposition, protesters vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2025	NEW	3
Croatia (ethnic Croats – Serb minority)*	ethnic Croats vs. Serb minority	subnational predominance	1991	•	1
Cyprus – Türkiye (Northern Cyprus ^o)*	Türkiye, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus ^o vs. Cyprus	secession, resources	1963	•	2
Cyprus, Greece et al. – Türkiye, Libya (Eastern Mediterranean)*	Cyprus, EU, Greece, Israel vs. Libya, Türkiye	territory, resources	2019	↘	1
Estonia – Russia*	Estonia vs. Russian Federation	territory, international power	1991	•	2
EU, USA, et al. – Russia*	EU, USA, et al. vs. Russian Federation	system/ideology, international power	2007	•	2
France (Corsican nationalists / Corsica)*	Corsican regional government, FC, FLNC, nationalist activist groups vs. government	secession, autonomy	1975	•	2
France – United Kingdom (fishery)*	France vs. United Kingdom	resources	2021	•	1
Georgia (Abkhazia ^o)*	Republic of Abkhazia ^o vs. government	secession	1989	•	1
Georgia (opposition)*	opposition groups vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2007	•	3
Georgia (South Ossetia ^o)*	Republic of South Ossetia / State of Alania ^o , Russian Federation vs. government	secession	1989	•	2
Georgia – Russia*	Georgia vs. Russian Federation	international power	1992	•	2
Germany (anti-immigration)*	various right-wing groups, xenophobes et al. vs. government	system/ideology	2014	•	3
Greece (left-wing militants – right-wing militants)*	left-wing militants vs. right-wing militants	system/ideology	1976	•	2
Greece (right-wing militants)*	right-wing militants vs. government	system/ideology	1985	•	2
Greece (social protests, left-wing militants)*	left-wing militants, social groups, worker's union vs. government	system/ideology	2010	↑	3
Greece – Türkiye (Aegean Sea)*	Greece vs. Türkiye	territory	1973	•	2
Hungary (minorities – right-wings)*	Arrow Cross Party - Hungarist Movement, Carpathian Brigade, Fidesz, Jobbik, Légió Hungária, Magyar Önvédelmi Mozgalom, Mi Hazánk Mozgalom vs. activists (allies), Jewish community, LGBTQI+ groups, Muslim community, refugees	system/ideology, subnational predominance	2008	•	1
Hungary – Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine (Hungarian minorities)*	Hungarian minorities (Transylvania / southern Slovakia / Transcarpathia), Hungary vs. Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine	system/ideology, international power	1989	•	1
Kosovo ^o (opposition)*	opposition groups, opposition parties vs. government	system/ideology, national power, subnational predominance	2015	•	1
Kosovo ^o – Serbia*	Kosovar government vs. Serbian government, Serbian minority (in Kosovo ^o)	secession	1989	•	2
Latvia – Russia*	Latvia vs. Russian Federation	international power	1994	•	1
Moldova (opposition)*	opposition parties vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2009	•	1

EUROPE

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
Moldova (Transnistria°)*	Transnistria regional government° vs. government	secession	1989	•	2
Montenegro (opposition)*	opposition groups, opposition parties vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2015	•	2
North Macedonia (Albanian minority – ethnic Macedonians)*	Albanian (minority) vs. ethnic Macedonians	subnational predominance	1991	↘	1
North Macedonia (opposition)*	opposition groups vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2014	•	2
Norway et al. – Russia (Arctic)*	Canada, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, USA vs. Russian Federation	territory, international power, resources	2001	•	2
Russia (Islamist militants / Northern Caucasus)*	IS Caucasus Province, other Islamist militant groups vs. government	secession, system/ideology	1991	•	3
Russia (opposition)*	opposition groups, opposition parties vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2001	↘	2
Russia – Ukraine*	Russian Federation vs. Ukraine	territory, system/ideology, international power, resources	2003	•	5
Serbia (opposition)*	opposition parties vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2018	•	3
Spain (Basque provinces)*	EH-Bildu vs. government	secession, autonomy	1959	•	1
Spain (Catalan nationalists / Catalonia)*	Catalan civil society groups, Catalan regional government vs. government, Spanish civil society groups	secession, autonomy	1979	•	1
Spain – United Kingdom (Gibraltar)*	EU, Spain vs. United Kingdom	territory	1954	•	2
Sweden (anti-immigration)*	various right-wing groups, xenophobes vs. government	system/ideology	2015	•	2
Sweden (organized crime)*	14K vs. Österberganätverket vs. Bandidos vs. Black Cobra vs. Dödspatrullen vs. Foxtrotnätverket vs. Hells Angels vs. Satudarah MC vs. Södertäljenätverket vs. Serbian-Motenegrin Mafia vs. various criminal organisations vs. Zerolätverket vs. government	subnational predominance, resources	2002	•	3
Ukraine (right-wing / opposition)*	right-wing groups vs. civil right groups, minorities, oppositional parties vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2013	•	3
United Kingdom (nationalists / Northern Ireland)*	DUP, Red Hand Commando, UDA, UVF vs. Army of the Republic, Óglaigh na hÉireann, IRA, nationalist youth, NIRA, Sinn Féin vs. government	secession, subnational predominance	1968	•	3
United Kingdom (Scottish nationalists / Scotland)*	AUOB et al., SNP vs. government	secession	2007	•	2

¹ Conflicts marked with * are without description

² Mentioned are only those conflict parties relevant for the period under review

³ Change in intensity compared to the previous year: ↑ or ↗ escalation by one or more than one level of intensity; ↓ or ↘ deescalation by one or more than one level of intensity; • no change

⁴ Levels of intensity: 5 = war; 4 = limited war; 3 = violent crisis; 2 = non-violent crisis; 1 = dispute

⁵ HIIK considers statehood to be non-contested if the state is an official UN members state.

Disputed statehood is marked with a ° if a territory is recognized by at least one other official UN member state ("limited recognition")

ARMENIA (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **2003**

Conflict parties: opposition groups vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The violent crisis over political power and the design of foreign policy between the Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and his ruling party "Civil Contract" and the opposition continued. The main points of contention were the peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the related territorial concessions towards the latter [→ Armenia – Azerbaijan].

On June 25, Bagrat Galstanyan, leading opposition activist and archbishop of the Armenian Apostolic Church, and 14 of his supporters were detained by police in the capital Yerevan, accused of plotting terrorist acts and inciting a coup. On July 10, seven other members of the opposition were arrested on charges of terrorism in Yerevan. Police alleged that they had illegally possessed hand grenades. Police also presented voice recordings of Galstanyan and his supporters, displaying their plans of disrupting vital energy and internet supplies, and setting up road blockades. Galstanyan denied the allegations, claiming that the audio was manipulated. On October 15, an additional 13 clergymen were arrested in Yerevan, two of them being accused of forcing the other clergymen to attend opposition rallies. Nikol Pashinian called for the ousting of the current head of Armenian Apostolic Church, the Cathelicos Garegin II, in a joint statement with eight archbishops on November 28. The Church consequently accused Pashinian of trying to divide the clergy.

Accusations aimed at Nikol Pashinyan claimed he had created a hostile political environment after an oppositionist mayor and one of his colleagues were fatally shot on September 24 in Merdzavan, Armavir province. On October 13, thousands of supporters of the assassinated mayor gathered to commemorate him, blaming the former, pro-government mayor of Merdzavan of being complicit in the murder, citing that he had left Armenia ten days before the assassination. In another instance, an opposition activist was beaten in Yerevan by five masked men in broad daylight on December 8 and had to be hospitalized.

On February 20, the police forcefully detained and injured the oppositional mayoral candidate, Vardan Ghukasyan, and his bodyguard in Gyumri, Shirak province, accusing the former of illegal arms possession. The mayoral candidate, who was released two hours later, claimed that the real purpose of the police actions was to coerce him to not stand in the election. On October 20, Ghukasyan, who had won the mayoral election in March, was arrested in his municipal building in Gyumri on charges of receiving bribes in the amount of USD 10,400. His supporters initially blocked police from entering the building, leading to the arrest of 37 protesters on the charges of obstruction of justice. Ghukasyan was suspended from office on October 21 as the Armenian court declared he would remain in custody for at least 2 more months. Other politically motivated arrests occurred as Armenia will hold parliamentary elections in 2026. For instance, on December 30, eight opposition members were arrested in the town of Vagharshapat, Armavir province, being charged with vote-buying in the municipal elections. sgr

ARMENIA – AZERBAIJAN

Intensity: **2** | Change: **↘** | Start: **1987**

Conflict parties: Armenia vs. Azerbaijan
 Conflict items: territory

The violent crisis over territory between Armenia and Azerbaijan de-escalated to a non-violent crisis. The crisis revolved around the issue of the border demarcation between the two countries and was closely related to the 2023 war between the self-proclaimed Republic of Artsakh and Azerbaijan [→ Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh)].

Numerous clashes between the armed forces of Armenia and Azerbaijan occurred in the first half of the year along the southern and middle parts of the Armenian-Azerbaijani border. These clashes, which were most intense in March and April, reportedly did not result in casualties, but led to the destruction of individual residential and administrative buildings. For instance, on April 13, Azerbaijani armed forces opened fire in the direction of the village of Khnatsakh, Syunik region, damaging the House of Culture and on May 29, Azerbaijani forces shelled the village of Khotsnavar, Syunik region, damaging a residential building. The countries repeatedly accused each other of violating the ceasefire, while denying the accusations. On February 12, Azerbaijan filed a lawsuit in The Hague, demanding compensation from Armenia for environmental damage. On February 27, Armenia, recalling the 1988 Sumgait pogrom, declared ethnic cleansing. The countries also accused each other of genocide, deportation, and escalation of the conflict.

Nonetheless, negotiations for a peace treaty between both countries continued. For instance, on January 16, the state commissions of Armenia and Azerbaijan met to delimit the border, and on February 7, the commissions met to address the issues of prisoners of war and missing persons. Also, on July 10, the Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev met in Abu Dhabi in a first bilateral meeting. On August 8, both leaders initiated a declaration on the cessation of hostilities during the meeting in Washington, D.C., and relations between the countries entered the negotiating stage. In October, both countries lifted restrictions on the transit of goods between them. Despite demands from the Armenian opposition, Pashinyan further dismissed the idea of a return of former Artsakhi residents to Nagorno Karabakh as unrealistic and potentially threatening to peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan in a statement on December 11 [→ Armenia (opposition)]. mts

ARMENIA – TÜRKİYE

Intensity: **1** | Change: **•** | Start: **1991**

Conflict parties: Armenia vs. Türkiye
 Conflict items: international power, other

The dispute over international power and historical perceptions between Armenia and Türkiye continued. Throughout the year, both countries have engaged in normalization efforts.

On January 1, Armenia assumed full control of its borders with Türkiye and Iran by deploying its own border guards, replacing Russian personnel. On January 19, Armenian extra-

dited two individuals to Türkiye under an Interpol Red Notice, which Türkiye publicly acknowledged. On February 28, Armenian border guards took over operations at the Margara border crossing. In mid-March, the Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan stated that normalization with Türkiye was “inevitable” and indicated that international recognition of the Armenian Genocide was not a current policy priority. On June 20, Pashinyan met Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan for a meeting in the Turkish capital of Istanbul to discuss regional developments and bilateral normalization. On September 12, Armenia and Turkish special representatives met in the Armenian capital of Yerevan, agreeing to accelerate prior commitments, launch technical studies for reopening the Gyumri-Kars railway, and expand cooperation in transport and education. Throughout September and October, Armenian officials reiterated readiness to restore relations and reopen the border and, on October 22, Pashinyan stated that both sides were technically prepared. In November, Armenia introduced new passport stamps without Mount Ararat as a confidence-building measure. Throughout the month, Türkiye repeatedly reiterated that full normalization remained contingent on an Armenia-Azerbaijan peace treaty. jpr

AZERBAIJAN (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2003**

Conflict parties: opposition groups vs. government
Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The violent crisis over the orientation of the political system and national power between opposition groups and the government continued.

The municipal elections, held on January 29 in 685 municipalities, were officially reported with a 31.45% turnout but were widely criticized by oppositional groups for widespread electoral fraud, including alleged ballot stuffing and harassment of observers. Opposition parties mostly boycotted the election or failed to secure seats.

Throughout the year, the Azerbaijani government continued to target a broad spectrum of critics, particularly journalists, researchers and activists. On June 23, for instance, a scientist and peace activist received a 15-year sentence for alleged treason. An oppositional politician connected to the Musavat Party was sentenced to nine years in prison over alleged fraud charges. Following his sentence, the politician went on hunger strike, which led to a deterioration of his health. An Azeri journalist, who was detained in Georgia, also went on hunger strike while awaiting his extradition to Azerbaijan. The family of an imprisoned journalist claimed, she was beaten and threatened with sexual violence during interrogation. On October 14, the former head of the presidential administration was arrested on charges of treason, forcible seizure of power, and legalization of criminally obtained property. The investigation was later expanded to include other former senior officials.

On November 25, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Azerbaijan violated freedom of expression by unfairly fining a newspaper over a 2013 article, which criticized a state official. On December 12, an opposition activist, who had been imprisoned since 2023 for having sprayed a statue of former president Heydar Aliyev with graffiti, committed suicide in prison. On December 27, police raided a queer-friendly bar in the capital Baku, detaining over 100 people,

reportedly subjecting them to violence and abuse. mdi

BULGARIA (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **NEW** | Start: **2025**

Conflict parties: opposition, protesters vs. government
Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The conflict over national power and systemic corruption in Bulgaria between the opposition coalition We Continue the Change - Democratic Bulgaria (PP-DB) and civil society groups on the one hand and the government of Prime Minister Rosen Zhelyazkov (GERB-UDF coalition) on the other re-emerged as a new violent crisis in 2025.

The protests were triggered by the government’s proposed 2026 state budget, which included a doubling of dividend taxes, increased pension contributions and higher social security charges. On November 26, approximately 20,000 protesters gathered outside the parliament and government buildings in Sofia. Objects were thrown at the police cordon guarding the National Assembly, a gendarmerie van was surrounded and pushed, and three police officers were injured. On December 1, protests expanded massively, with 50,000 to 100,000 people in Sofia and tens of thousands more across other major cities. Following the main rally, a smaller group of masked individuals attacked the headquarters of the ruling GERB, the TISP and the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS). Dumpsters were set alight, police vehicles vandalized and chairs thrown at buildings and officers. Police deployed pepper spray, several protesters were hospitalized and 71 people were detained. A power outage in central Sofia was classified by the Ministry of Energy as a likely act of sabotage. The following day, the government withdrew the 2026 budget draft from parliamentary consideration. President Rumen Radev addressed the nation, calling the government “disgraced” and demanding its resignation and early elections.

On December 10, a third major demonstration drew between 150,000 and 250,000 participants in Sofia, with a student march joining the main rally and at least 30 people arrested. Coordinated diaspora protests took place in Austria, Belgium and the Czech Republic.

On December 11, Prime Minister Zhelyazkov announced the government’s resignation in a televised statement, minutes before parliament was scheduled to vote on a sixth no-confidence motion, citing the protest movement as the primary reason. The government had been in office for eleven months and its fall initiated Bulgaria’s seventh caretaker government formation process since 2021.

On December 18, protesters gathered again ahead of the parliamentary Christmas recess, demanding the removal of state security protection for oligarch Delyan Peevski and former Prime Minister Boyko Borisov, fair elections with fully machine-based voting, the removal of the acting Prosecutor General and an independent judiciary. alj

CYPRUS – TÜRKİYE (NORTHERN CYPRUS^o)

Intensity: **2** | Change: **•** | Start: **1963**

Conflict parties: Türkiye, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus^o vs. Cyprus

Conflict items: secession, resources

The non-violent crisis over resources and secession of Northern Cyprus between Türkiye and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC^o), on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued.

Throughout March and April, protesters took to the streets to protest Türkiye's influence in the TRNC^o. On March 26, teachers' unions organized a protest in front of the Turkish Embassy in Nicosia, placing a black wreath and criticizing what they described as Ankara's political and religious influence on the education system. A larger protest followed on April 11, when an estimated 13,000 people protested against a regulation that permitted the wearing of headscarves (hijab) in public schools. Although widely framed as an issue of upholding secularism, many protesters linked their participation to broader issues such as autonomy and governance. A counter demonstration was organized by the pro-Turkish Rebirth Party, which emphasized unity and loyalty to the motherland Türkiye and generally favors increased integration with Türkiye.

During the visit of Turkish President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, to the TRNC for the inauguration of the new presidential complex on May 3, six protesters were detained by Turkish Cypriot police following demonstrations criticizing Erdoğan's presence and Ankara's influence. During his visit, Erdoğan criticized the protests against the new headscarf regulation. On October 20, Tufan Erhürman was elected president of the TRNC, defeating the incumbent president Ersin Tatar, who strongly favored integration with Türkiye while rejecting reunification with the south. mdi

CYPRUS, GREECE ET AL. – TÜRKİYE, LIBYA (EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN)

Intensity: **1** | Change: **↘** | Start: **2019**

Conflict parties: Cyprus, EU, Greece, Israel vs. Libya, Türkiye

Conflict items: territory, resources

The non-violent crisis over resources and maritime territory between Cyprus, Greece, and the European Union, on the one hand, and Türkiye and Libya, on the other, de-escalated to a dispute.

On May 1, Greece approved a tender to energy companies in its claimed EEZ, which, on October 24, was awarded to a conglomerate of US-American and Greek energy companies. On May 27, Libya's Government of National Unity (GNU) issued a diplomatic note to the UN, declaring its continental shelf. These claims partially conflicted with Egyptian, Greek and Maltese claimed EEZs, causing them to reject Libya's claims. On June 25 Türkiye's and Libya's state energy companies signed a memorandum of understanding to conduct a seismic study in maritime areas partially claimed by Greece, which Greece and the EU objected to.

On September 21, however, both Libya (GNU) and Greece

started negotiations on delimiting their EEZs. On October 19 Greece announced plans to revive the Eastern Mediterranean Forum, this time including the previously excluded Türkiye and Libya. On December 12, the Libyan Government of National Stability's speaker of the House of Representatives declared the 2019 Turkish-Libyan maritime deal as invalid, claiming it needed to be ratified by the parliament. tph

EU, USA, ET AL. – RUSSIA

Intensity: **2** | Change: **•** | Start: **2007**

Conflict parties: EU, USA, et al. vs. Russian Federation

Conflict items: system/ideology, international power

The non-violent crisis over ideology and international power between the EU, USA, and several others, on the one hand, and Russia, supported by states such as Belarus, China, Iran and North Korea, on the other, continued. In 2025, tensions further intensified through sustained accusing and threatening rhetoric, nuclear signaling, large-scale military deployments and exercises, and mutually reinforced sanctions regimes, while alleged hybrid operations and counter-measures increasingly shaped the security environment in the Baltic Sea region and along NATO's eastern flank.

Regarding nuclear posture and escalation risks: Russia sustained a high-tempo deterrence narrative and combined it with visible strategic messaging. For instance, Russia conducted a strategic nuclear forces exercise on October 22, involving multiple launches across its nuclear triad, of sea, air and land based systems, as publicly announced and personally supervised by the Russian President Vladimir Putin. A land based "Yars" intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) was launched from Plesetsk Cosmodrome, close to Mirny town, Arkhangelsk Oblast, targeting Kura Missile Test Range, Kamchatka Krai, Far Eastern Federal District, a "Sineva" submarine/sea-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) was launched from the Russian nuclear submarine Byransk in the Barents Sea, and TU-95MS strategic bombers deployed air-launched cruise missiles resembling Kh-101 or Kh-102 variants, the later of which is nuclear-capable.

Additionally, on December 21, Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka stated that Russia had delivered the first batch of approx. 10 "Oreshnik" hypersonic ballistic missile systems to Belarus and that deployments were underway, reinforcing the continued role of Belarus in Russia's nuclear-capable forward posture. NATO conducted its yearly nuclear drill, called Steadfast Noon 2025, simultaneously, from October 13 to 24, across Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and the UK. The exercise involved 14 NATO member countries, up to 70 aircraft including various nuclear-capable fighter jets and bombers in operation and approx. 2,000 military personnel, specifically training on how to use tactical nuclear weapons systems such as upgraded variants of the US-made B61 thermonuclear gravity bomb [→ Russia – Ukraine].

Concerning military mega-exercises and conventional strategic posturing: NATO and Russia both conducted large-scale maneuvers intended to demonstrate readiness and strategic resolve. NATO's Steadfast Dart 25, which took place from January to February, in Bulgaria, Greece, and Romania among others along NATO's eastern flank, tested the rapid deployment of the Allied Reaction Force to NATO's south-eastern "vigilance area," with NATO reporting over 10,000 personnel, 1,500 vehicles, and maritime and air assets participating. In

the Baltic Sea region, the annual BALTOPS 25 exercise, took place from June 5 to 20, involving allied maritime and air forces, including roughly 40 ships, 25 aircraft, and approx. 9,000 personnel, according to U.S. and host-nation releases. On the other side, Russia conducted the “July Storm” naval drill, from July 23 to 27, involving large components of the Russian fleet in the Pacific and Arctic Oceans as well as in Baltic [→ Estonia – Russia; Latvia – Russia] and Caspian Seas, involving up to 150 ships and 15,000 military personnel. From September 12 to 16, Russia undertook the Zapad-2025 exercise with Belarus, in Grobno Oblast, Belarus, close to the Polish and Lithuanian borders, during which Russia allegedly test-fired a “Zircon” hypersonic missile. The exercise involved approx. 13,000 military personnel in Belarus and up to 30,000 in Russia, as well as troops from allegedly China, India and Iran, with hundreds of tanks, artillery, and armored vehicles testing and training strategies related to ground, and drone warfare.

Throughout the year, hybrid-security dynamics remained salient, particularly around critical infrastructure and airspace integrity. Undersea cable disruptions in the Baltic Sea continued to trigger sabotage investigations and elevated military vigilance: on January 26, damage to a Latvia–Sweden fibre-optic cable led to seizures and inquiries; Swedish prosecutors later stated the damage was accidental, illustrating both attribution difficulties and heightened alertness. Against the backdrop of repeated incidents, NATO launched the mission “Baltic Sentry”, on January 14, to strengthen surveillance and protection of critical undersea infrastructure. At year’s end, Finnish police seized a vessel on suspicion of sabotaging an undersea telecoms cable in the Gulf of Finland, on December 31, again underscoring the escalation potential inherent in contested attribution and reactive force protection measures. In air and air-defense signaling, Russian drones and aircraft repeatedly tested NATO’s responsiveness. On September 10, Poland reported that 19 objects entered its airspace during a major Russian attack on Ukraine and stated it had shot down those posing a threat, triggering NATO Article 4 consultations; NATO subsequently launched “Operation Eastern Sentry”, on September 12, to bolster posture along the eastern flank. Romania also scrambled jets after a drone breached its airspace during Russian strikes near the border.

In the Baltic, NATO’s air policing remained active; Lithuania’s Ministry of Defence reported multiple interceptions of Russian aircraft over or near the Baltic Sea routes to Kaliningrad, including documented late-September incidents.

Beyond Europe’s immediate theatre, Russia’s external security instruments and alignments continued to affect the wider conflict constellation. Russian state-linked expeditionary structures expanded in Africa: Allegedly Russia backed a Sahel joint force and noted the increasing role of the “Africa Corps” in Mali after the drawdown of earlier formations.

The EU also listed Russian General Andrey Aveyanov in May, citing his role in directing the Africa Corps as part of Russia’s destabilizing activities abroad.

In the Middle East, after the overthrow of Syria’s Assad regime in December 2024, Russia sought to preserve its strategic military footprint. Reuters reported in March that Moscow was negotiating with Syria’s new interim leadership to retain access to the Tartus naval facility and Hmeimim air base under revised political conditions, linking base diplomacy to broader leverage and accountability issues.

In East Asia, Russia’s confrontation with the U.S.-aligned security order remained visible in its tightening ties with partners and its stance toward Japan. Reuters reported in April that Russia saw “no reason” to discuss a peace treaty with Japan,

reflecting the broader collapse of bilateral engagement amid Japan’s sanctions alignment; later in the year, senior Russian official Nikolai Patrushev warned Japan against “militarization” and deeper alignment with NATO, explicitly framing the dispute in strategic terms. Russia also deepened military cooperation with China through joint naval drills such as “Joint Sea-2025” in the waters near Vladivostok, Far Eastern Federal District, in August [→ China – USA; Japan – Russia].

In terms of sanctions and economic warfare, 2025 saw repeated escalatory steps. The EU adopted successive sanctions packages targeting Russia’s energy revenues, shadow fleet logistics, finance, and military-industrial procurement: the 16th package, on February 24, expanded vessel listings and entity designations; the 17th, on May 20, added a large number of shadow-fleet vessels and further third-country circumvention entities; the 18th, on July 18, introduced additional energy and banking restrictions, including a lower oil price cap and a transaction ban affecting Nord Stream 1 and 2; and the 19th, on October 23, further targeted Russian energy, third-country enablers, including in finance and crypto technologies and currencies, and selected Chinese operators facilitating revenue streams.

In parallel, the United States expanded energy-related sanctions: on January 10 it targeted major Russian oil producers and over 180 vessels linked to exports, and on October 22 it designated Russian energy, gas and oil multi-companies Rosneft and Lukoil and related subsidiaries. The United Kingdom likewise announced its largest sanctions package since 2022 on February 24, including measures against supply chains, financial facilitators, and vessels supporting Russia’s oil export evasion. tcr

GEORGIA (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2007**

Conflict parties: opposition groups vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The violent crisis over the orientation of the political system and national power between civil society and political opposition groups, on the one hand, and the government, led by the Georgian Dream (GD) party, on the other, continued. The main points of contention were electoral reforms, political transparency, and judicial independence, as well as questions of international affiliation. The latter issue particularly revolved around the accession to the EU vis-à-vis alignment with Russia.

Daily anti-government and pro-European demonstrations continued to take place in the capital Tbilisi throughout the whole year, drawing crowds ranging from hundreds to several thousand participants. Protesters voiced growing dissatisfaction with the government’s perceived backsliding on democratic reforms and its increasingly confrontational stance toward the European Union and other Western countries. On February 2, for instance, large-scale protests erupted again in the capital, with demonstrators staging road blockades and clashing with police. Several opposition figures were among those arrested. On March 31, tens of thousands of Georgians rallied in Tbilisi on the anniversary of the country’s independence referendum, expressing opposition to the government’s foreign policy. On the same day, the controversial Foreign Agents Registration Law came into effect. Critics warned that the law’s vague wording could be used to suppress dissent and limit the activities of civil society

groups and independent media. Protests intensified again on May 27, Georgia's Independence Day, with thousands taking to the streets in renewed anti-government demonstrations. Just days later, on May 30, a Georgian court placed a prominent opposition leader in pre-trial detention. His detention drew widespread criticism, with opposition leaders accusing the government of using the judiciary to silence dissent. On June 13, another high-profile opposition figure was placed in pre-trial detention for up to nine months. On July 9, Georgian police arrested multiple political activists and opposition members during an alleged anti-drug operation in Tbilisi. On the same day the European Parliament adopted a document which criticized "the backsliding of the rule of law as well as the growing Russian influence on the ruling party". On September 8, tensions escalated further when supporters of the ruling Georgian Dream party reportedly attacked anti-government demonstrators gathered in front of the re-election headquarters of the Tbilisi mayor, throwing bottles and stones.

During the subsequent local elections on October 4, large-scale protests again erupted in the capital. Riot police used pepper spray and water cannons to disperse demonstrators who attempted to approach the presidential palace, some of whom threw objects and damaged the fence of the building. Five activists were detained and charged with attempting to overthrow the government. Between October 23 and November 1, 89 people were reportedly arrested for protest-related offenses following the introduction of new laws. These laws allow police to immediately detain individuals for actions such as blocking roads or covering their faces during rallies, and they introduce criminal liability of up to one year in prison for repeated offenses. mrm

GEORGIA – RUSSIA

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **1992**

Conflict parties: Georgia vs. Russian Federation
Conflict items: international power

The non-violent crisis over international power and Russian regional influence in the two breakaway regions of South Ossetia [→ Georgia (South Ossetia)] and Abkhazia [→ Georgia (Abkhazia)], between Georgia and Russia continued. Tensions were highlighted by the ongoing protests against the Georgian government, which is assumed to be pro-Russian [→ Georgia (opposition)].

On January 28, the Georgian-Russian Business Association was established to deepen relations of 60 Georgian and Russian companies operating in agriculture, energy and trade.

On February 7, Russia resumed flights to the Abkhazian city of Sukhumi. On March 5, Russian president Vladimir Putin promised to continue electricity supplies to Abkhazia in a meeting with de facto-President of Abkhazia Badra Gunba in Moscow, Russia.

Several Russian officials have called out for a restoration of Georgian-Russian relations. On April 14, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin and on December 16, the director of the Fourth Department of the Commonwealth of Independent States at Russia's Foreign Ministry Mikhail Kalugin called for restoration of diplomatic relations with Georgia. On April 22, the ultra-conservative, pro-Russian Alt-Info movement was registered by the Georgian public registry as the political party "Conservatives for Georgia". On May 7, a group of pro-Russian politicians and public figures in Georgia

met in Tbilisi, Georgia to launch a signature campaign calling for restoring diplomatic relations between Georgia and Russia.

On May 17 and July 17, President Vladimir Putin signed two decrees simplifying the procedure for granting Russian citizenship to residents of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region, South Ossetia.

In August, Russian-linked Advanced Persistent Threat group "Curly COMrades" was documented, which is hijacking government networks, steal access data and spy on data in Georgia and Moldova.

In two separate statements by the UNSC on August 18 and by the OSCE Group of Friends of Georgia on September 19, Russia's invasion of Abkhazia and South Ossetia continued illegal military presence were condemned. On November 17, the ECHR ruled that Russia is liable for compensation for human rights violations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

During the Geneva International Discussions from November 11-12, the Russian delegation tried to convince the Georgian representatives to sign an agreement renouncing the use of force in relation to the territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Georgia rejected this and demanded humanitarian concessions, e. g. the return of internally displaced persons. On December 07, the plan of construction of a new motor-transport transit hub in the Gali region, Abkhazia was reported, which is intended to serve as an alternative transportation link between Georgia and Russia. The Georgian government distanced itself from these plans on December 10. jdo

GERMANY (ANTI-IMMIGRATION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2014**

Conflict parties: various right-wing groups, xenophobes et al. vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology

The violent crisis over the orientation of the political system, in particular asylum and immigration policies, between right-wing groups, as well as xenophobic individuals, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued.

Until the end of September, federal criminal statistics counted 12,340 politically motivated criminal offenses with right-wing background. In total, 303 people were injured.

Over the course of the year, xenophobes attacked and threatened people with alleged migration background and infrastructure for asylum seekers. For instance, on March 11, three individuals attacked a refugee shelter in the city of Stahnsdorf, Brandenburg state. The public prosecutor's office opened an investigation on suspicion of aggravated assault. Regarding protests, on April 27, nationwide protests demanding stricter migration controls led to clashes and arrests in several cities, with one police officer injured. Two individuals were reported to have used the Hitler salute during a protest in Dortmund.

On May 2, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) published a report classifying the Alternative for Germany (AfD) as a proven right-wing extremist organization, however, the classification remains legally contested. On August 14, the BfV officially classified the party's Brandenburg state branch as proven right-wing extremist as well, highlighting their systematic racism and violations of democratic principles.

In the context of border security and deportations, the newly

elected government announced changes to migration policy. On May 6, the Federal Interior Minister announced intentions to increase border controls and reject asylum seekers. On June 2, the Berlin Administrative Court ruled that the rejections violated European Union (EU) law and ordered the policy's removal. Since the introduction of increased border controls, 33,338 unauthorized entries were recorded, and 24,440 individuals were refused entry in 2025. On December 5, the Bundestag approved further migration policy measures, enabling the federal government to designate "safe countries of origin" without Bundesrat approval. On June 27, the Bundestag voted to suspend family reunification for refugees with subsidiary protection for two years, allowing only hardship cases, to limit migration. On July 18, Germany carried out the first deportation flight to Afghanistan in over a year, deporting 81 people to the capital Kabul. Shortly after, on July 24, plans for a deportation terminal at the airport in the city of Munich, Bavaria state, were reported. Several months later, on October 6, Government officials negotiated with the Taliban to initiate regular deportations of criminals and dangerous persons to Afghanistan. A DIW Study published on August 27 showed rising concerns about xenophobia and a decline in refugees feeling welcome in Germany, decreasing from 84 percent in 2017 to 65 percent in 2023. frh

GREECE (RIGHT-WING MILITANTS)

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **1985**

Conflict parties: right-wing militants vs. government
Conflict items: system/ideology

The non-violent crisis over the orientation of the political system between right-wing militants and the government continued.

Following the conviction of Golden Dawn (GD) as a criminal organization in 2020 and its resulting dissolution, the right-wing militant scene fragmented into several successor groupings, including the largely inactive "Holy Corps," "AME-Combat 18," and "Propatria," as well as the more recently active "Golden Dawn Youth Front" and "Nationalist Youth of Thessaloniki/Defend Salonica."

No violent acts between the conflict parties were recorded in 2025. On April 14, police searched GD offices in Thessaloniki, confiscating material linked to the Youth Front. On May 5, GD supporters vandalized a school in Illo, Attica. In May, more than two dozen members of the Nationalist Youth of Thessaloniki were convicted in Thessaloniki for robbery and forming a criminal organization.

In January, parliament suspended funding for the far-right Spartan party; in July, the party was stripped of three parliamentary seats following a trial that found it had committed electoral fraud, as Ilias Kasidiaris, not the nominal leader Vasilis Stigkas, was determined to be its actual leader. Kasidiaris continued serving a 13-year prison sentence for his role in GD. On June 30, the Lamia First Instance Prosecutor recommended his conditional release; on July 18, the Lamia Three-Member Council rejected the recommendation. Former GD leader Nikos Michaloliakos was released from prison on September 12, serving the remainder of his 13-year sentence at home on health grounds, after a first release ruling had been annulled in 2024. The second-instance appellate trial of GD before the Court of Appeals continued; in December,

the state prosecution argued that GD constituted a criminal organization with hierarchical structures. lar

GREECE – TÜRKİYE (AEGEAN SEA)

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **1973**

Conflict parties: Greece vs. Türkiye
Conflict items: territory

The non-violent crisis over territory between Greece and Türkiye continued.

On February 3, Greece sent out two non-military vessels for a surveying operation for a possible cable-laying between Greece and Cyprus near the Greek island of Kasos in the South Aegean. In response to this, Turkey sent out one of its military vessels to monitor the movements of the survey ships, leading to one Greek corvette and one Greek frigate being tasked with monitoring the movements of the Turkish vessel.

On March 28, a Turkish coast guard ship violated Greek waters near the island of Imia, leading to a standoff between the Turkish ship and two Greek military vessels. The situation was de-escalated as the Greek and Turkish coast guard commanders held a phone call on their "orange hotline" and the Turkish vessels returned to Turkish waters. On September 3, Turkish fishermen were operating at 10 km from the Greek coast near the Greek island of Samothrace, leading to several Greek fishing vessels sailing out to confront them. Both sides exchanged threats and verbal insults, with the Turkish fishermen subsequently shooting at their Greek counterparts. During the incident, no one was injured.

On October 6, a Turkish F-16 entered Greek airspace in the Southern Aegean, prompting Greek fighter jets to intercept the Turkish airplane and escort it out of Greek airspace. On December 13, four Turkish F-16 breached Greek airspace in the Central Aegean, leading to Greek fighters escorting the Turkish aircraft back to Turkish airspace. In another instance, two Turkish F-16 with armaments crossed into Greek airspace on December 19 near the islands of Lemnos and Lesbos, ultimately leaving Greek airspace after being accompanied by Greek jet fighters.

sgr

HUNGARY – ROMANIA, SLOVAKIA, UKRAINE (HUNGARIAN MINORITIES)

Intensity: **1** | Change: • | Start: **1989**

Conflict parties: Hungarian minorities (Transylvania / southern Slovakia / Transcarpathia), Hungary vs. Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine
Conflict items: system/ideology, international power

The dispute between Hungary and the governments of Romania, Slovakia, and Ukraine over minority rights and international power continued.

In Ukraine, Hungary suspended minority rights negotiations on May 11 following Kyiv's announcement of an uncovered Hungarian-linked intelligence network. On November 6, Ukrainian authorities detained Hungarian minority uni-

versity students in Transcarpathia for conscription purposes; they were released following diplomatic pressure. Also on November 6, Ukraine submitted a draft education language law to Hungary addressing five of Budapest's eleven demands concerning minority rights in Zakarpattia.

In Slovakia, on December 11 the parliament passed a law criminalizing the public questioning of the Beneš Decrees, carrying a penalty of up to six months' imprisonment; President Pellegrini signed it into law on December 23. On December 17, Hungarian Prime Minister Orbán stated that Hungary did not accept collective guilt and would seek talks with Prime Minister Fico on the matter.

In Romania, the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) endorsed presidential candidate Nicușor Dan in May, contributing to his victory over far-right candidate George Simion. On December 1, local authorities restored Hungarian-language public signage in several locations following prolonged disputes. *mak*

MOLDOVA (TRANSNISTRIA^o)

Intensity: **2** | Change: **•** | Start: **1989**

Conflict parties: Transnistria regional government^o vs. government

Conflict items: secession

The non-violent crisis over the secession of Transnistria between the self-proclaimed Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (PMR), supported by Russia, on the one hand, and the Moldovan government, on the other, continued.

Tensions between the parties persisted. Following the war in Ukraine [→ Russia – Ukraine] a gas transit deal between Russia's Gazprom and Ukraine's Naftogaz that supplied Transnistria was discontinued after its expiration on 12/31/24. As a consequence of the resulting energy shortage, Transnistria faced severe problems to ensure heating during winter and several companies had to stop operating. The Moldovan government accused Russia of orchestrating a humanitarian crisis to destabilize the region.

The energy shortage also increased tensions between Moldova and Transnistria. On January 16, Transnistrian officials rejected Moldova's proposal for a meeting between political representatives. On January 24, several hundred people across several Transnistrian cities protested to demand that the Moldovan government facilitate the delivery of Russian gas to end the energy crisis. The Moldovan government condemned the protests as provocations from Russia. On February 2, the Transnistrian government refused an EU energy package. Instead the government opted for an arrangement in which the Moldovan government would allow gas transits. In exchange, the Transnistrian government released political prisoners and permitted Moldovan television broadcasts in Transnistria. *lit*

NORTH MACEDONIA (ALBANIAN MINORITY – ETHNIC MACEDONIANS)

Intensity: **1** | Change: **↘** | Start: **1991**

Conflict parties: Albanian (minority) vs. ethnic Macedonians

Conflict items: subnational predominance

The non-violent crisis over the minority rights of ethnic Albanians in North Macedonia de-escalated to a dispute at the beginning of 2025.

Political contestation continued to focus on the implementation of the 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement. Ethnic Albanian parties repeatedly urged the government to fulfill its commitments, including on language use, representation and decentralization.

Debates about modifying national symbols and the national anthem led to exchanges between ethnic Albanian parties and the ruling Macedonian party VMRO-DPMNE (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity). VMRO-DPMNE argued that the current symbols contained "communist elements", while ethnic Albanian parties demanded greater inclusivity in any redesign. In May, the Alliance for Albanians withdrew from the VLEN coalition, citing "unfulfilled promises", which also resulted in its departure from the ruling coalition. The government's parliamentary majority was not affected.

Several polarizing incidents occurred at sporting events. In early August, during a national basketball match between North Macedonia and Romania, some Macedonian fans chanted anti-Albanian slogans. Senior officials present at the match faced public criticism, and police opened an investigation shortly thereafter. Three days later, during a football match in Skopje, some ethnic Albanian fans chanted slogans referring to a "Greater Albania".

During the September election campaign, DUI chairman Ali Ahmeti stated that the Ohrid Framework Agreement had not been fully implemented and reiterated long-standing demands for equal minority rights.

In the local elections held on October 19, VMRO-DPMNE achieved strong results in majority ethnic Macedonian municipalities. In majority ethnic Albanian areas, competition between Albanian parties was close. Several municipalities proceeded to a second round in early November. *ahk*

NORWAY ET AL. – RUSSIA (ARCTIC)

Intensity: **2** | Change: **•** | Start: **2001**

Conflict parties: Canada, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, USA vs. Russian Federation

Conflict items: territory, international power, resources

The non-violent crisis over territory, resources, and international power in the Arctic region between Russia on the one hand and the local NATO members Canada, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and the United States on the other continued.

Over the course of the year, although no direct confrontation occurred, military activities, increased armament, and political posturing on both sides contributed to a sustained high-tension environment. Both sides conducted multiple large-scale military exercises and expanded the deployment of military and intelligence capabilities in the Arctic.

Russia also tested and deployed upgraded nuclear-capable submarines as well as new icebreaking patrol vessels throughout the region.

NATO members, in turn, strengthened their presence with new investments in naval vessels, radar infrastructure, and missile systems [→ EU, USA et al. – Russia; Russia – Ukraine]. On March 14, Russia summoned the Norwegian ambas-

sador over the alleged militarisation of Norway's Svalbard archipelago.

Notably, the large-scale exercise Joint Viking 2025, held in Troms County, Norway, from March 3 to 14, involved over 10,000 personnel from Norway, Canada, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Russia in turn held live-fire naval drills off the Russian Rybachy Peninsula, Murmansk Oblast, near the Norwegian border on April 15. Additionally, Russia deployed over 15,000 personnel in the July Storm exercise from July 23 to 28 near the Kola Peninsula, Murmansk Oblast, Russia. As in previous years, NATO intercepted Russian aircraft near NATO airspace for instance, on February 2, August 24, 26, and 27. Also, on August 27, Norway launched its new comprehensive Arctic strategy, which designates the region as its top security priority.

Simultaneously, geopolitical competition over Greenland intensified, introducing dynamics that could significantly reshape the strategic landscape of the Arctic. The United States, for instance, put forward symbolic legislation proposing the acquisition of Greenland, following assertive rhetoric by central government representatives, and have been accused of employing covert influence operations within Greenland. This prompted strong diplomatic responses from both Denmark and Greenland as well as other European and NATO partners. Denmark and its European partners additionally deployed naval assets to the island and pledged to further increase their presence in Greenland and the broader Arctic region. yas

RUSSIA (ISLAMIST MILITANTS / NORTHERN CAUCASUS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1991**

Conflict parties: IS Caucasus Province, other Islamist militant groups vs. government

Conflict items: secession, system/ideology

The violent crisis over ideology and secession between militant groups, most of them fighting under the umbrella of the self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS) Caucasus Province, on the one hand, and the central and regional governments of Russia, on the other, continued. The IS Caucasus Province tries to establish an independent Islamic Emirate in the North Caucasus Federal District, comprising the Republics of Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia, and North Ossetia-Alania, as well as the Stavropol Krai region.

A total of seven people was killed and one was injured until November. Most incidents, in which people were killed or harmed, occurred in the Republic of Dagestan: On March 5, members of IS opened fire on a group of police officers in the village of Semender. The police returned fire, killing all four attackers. On April 22, police officers killed an alleged Islamist militant in Derbent after he refused an inspection of his car and opened fire on the police officers, injuring one. According to its own statements, the Russian Federal Security Services killed three men during an arrest, who were allegedly planning an attack on police facilities, in the Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria on August 4. bba

RUSSIA (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **2** | Change: ↘ | Start: **2001**

Conflict parties: opposition groups, opposition parties vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The violent crisis over national power and the orientation of the political system between the opposition which consists of various opposition groups, parties and activists, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, de-escalated to a non-violent crisis. The government continued the prosecution of opposition figures, such as politicians, activists and journalists.

Throughout the year, authorities arrested at least ten people, linked to the late opposition leader Alexei Nawalny, on opposition and criticism charges. On January 17, a court convicted three lawyers, already in custody since October 2023, who once represented Nawalny, to prison sentences. Additionally, on April 15, four journalists linked to Nawalny were sentenced for the same reasons. On May 5, a court in Saint Petersburg, Leningrad Oblast, issued an arrest warrant for an activist for displaying extremist symbols over an online post featuring a photo of Navalny. On August 12, a Russian violinist was placed under house arrest because of donations made to Nawalny's Anti-Corruption Foundation. Finally, on August 31, local authorities arrested a former election monitor, who worked on Nawalny's campaign, in Kazakhstan.

Moreover, on February 2, a Russian court in the Republic of Bashkortostan sentenced six people to prison over their participation in mass protests in Bashkortostan last year. Later, on February 28, the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) arrested two Russian Orthodox Church figures over an alleged plot to kill a priest close to President Vladimir Putin.


In addition, several activists were arrested for criticizing the war in Ukraine [→ Russia – Ukraine]. For example, on February 25, security forces detained a Russian journalist on charges of spreading "fake news" and put under house arrest from which she escaped on April 13. On March 21, the FSB arrested a prominent anti-war journalist on charges of "terrorist propaganda" in the Republic of Sakha. On June 10, security forces arrested an opposition politician in Pskov, eponymous Oblast, charging them with discrediting the Russian army. On October 1, authorities arrested the deputy chairman of the liberal Yabloko party on criminal charges of spreading false information about the military. On December 26, the Second Western District Military Court of Moscow sentenced the political activist Sergei Udaltsov to 6 years of prison for "justifying terrorism". Udaltsov is part of the political left wing and a prominent opposition figure. cap

RUSSIA – UKRAINE

Intensity: **5** | Change: • | Start: **2003**


Conflict parties: Russian Federation vs. Ukraine

Conflict items: territory, system/ideology, international power, resources




EUROPE


RUSSIA – UKRAINE




January




February




March




April




May




June




July




August




September



October



November



December

The war over territory, international power, system/ideology, and resources between Russia, supported by Belarus, Iran, and North Korea on the one hand, and Ukraine, supported by the USA, UK, the EU, and Japan, on the other, continued.

Compared to 2024, the war of attrition continued, characterized by intense fighting, high military casualties, and infrastructure destruction. The total yearly confirmed military deaths amount to at least 14,130 Ukrainian and 22,992 Russian military personnel. An unprecedented characteristic of this year was a fourfold increase in deserted soldiers of the Ukrainian army: from 42 thousand in 2024 to 161,5 thousands in 2025, which may also include deaths. Regarding civilian casualties, there were at least 2,514 killed and 12,142 injured. The number of refugees globally from Ukraine decreased from 6,863,400 to 5,898,150, while the number of internally displaced persons increased from 3,669,000 to 3,712,000 in 2025.

Throughout the year, Russian forces increased their advances, gaining, according to different estimates, 5,300 up to 6,300 square kilometers, including the following significant towns: Kurakhove, Toretsk, Chasiv Yar, Myrnohrad, Pokrovsk, Siversk (Donetsk Oblast), Huliaipole (Zaporizhzhia Oblast). On April 26, Russian forces regained all of Kursk Oblast, occupied by Ukraine since 08/2024, and started the offensive operation in the neighbouring Ukrainian Oblast, Sumy. On June 10, the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation announced that Russian forces had crossed Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.

Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted numerous large scale drone and missile strikes, often times involving hundreds of drones. For example, on January 8, Russia launched aerial bombs on the Motor Sich plant in Zaporizhzhia, a producer of engines for fighter drones, leaving 14 dead and 115 injured employees. On April 13, Russian forces launched ballistic missiles on the city centre of Sumy, where, according to Ukrainian authorities, there were at least 34 dead and 117 wounded. According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, the strike targeted the meeting of the command staff of the Siversk operational-tactical group, a claim confirmed by a Ukrainian member of Parliament. On June 24, a missile attack on Dnipro and Samar killed 21 and injured at least 295, significantly affecting residential areas and damaging a passenger train with civilians on board. The alleged targets were the Yuzhmash plant, a missile producer, and military logistic hubs. On July 31, Russia launched a large-scale strike on Kyiv, targeting mainly a depot with American air defense systems "Patriot", killing 32 and wounding 159, using Iskander missiles and third-generation drones Geran-3 with jet engines and composite materials. On November 11, Russian troops attacked a military-industrial enterprise "Orion" and a nearby apartment building in Ternopil, killing 38 and injuring 94.

Regarding the destruction of civilian infrastructure, Russia, launched missile attacks focusing on Ukrainian energy infrastructure, while Ukraine carried out numerous drone attacks on oil refineries and industrial plants across Russia. Moreover, Ukrainian forces attacked private oil tankers under foreign flags in the Black and Mediterranean Seas, presumably related to Russia, although never confirmed officially by Russian authorities. The attacks on infrastructure also include the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) in the city of Enerhodar, Zaporizhzhia, controlled by Russia since 03/22. Due to attacks, on September 23, the ZNPP lost grid connection and operated on emergency diesel generators

until October 23. Russia and Ukraine mutually accused each other of damaging the ZNPP. The potentially extremely dangerous situation could be resolved by repairs under help of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

International rivalry also extended to the economic and financial spheres. Throughout the year, the EU adopted four sanction packages against Russia: 16th on February 24, 17th on May 20, 18th on July 18, and 19th on October 23. They targeted operations with maritime vessels, payment systems, oil & gas supply, dual-use technologies, Nord Stream, as well as individuals. The US sanctions, imposed on January 10 and 15 and October 22, targeted the Russian energy sector and aimed to disrupt sanctions evasion.

Regarding the opposite coalition, Russia and Iran signed a treaty on a comprehensive strategic partnership on January 17. The agreement implies cooperative initiatives in defense, counter-terrorism, energy, finance, and culture for the next twenty years, however, without mutual defense obligations. Another strategic decision concerned Belarus, which, from December 17, deployed the Russian hypersonic missile system Oreshnik on its territory.

The number of peace proposals and negotiations increased in 2025 after Donald Trump's inauguration as the 47th US president, as it was part of his presidential campaign. His political stance on Ukraine included: rejecting Ukraine's NATO membership, the impossibility of returning to the 2014 borders, demanding Ukraine to repay for US military aid, and refusing to guarantee Ukraine's security after the end of the war. On February 12, a phone conversation between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin, the president of Russia, took place, announcing the beginning of negotiations between Russia and Ukraine [→ EU, USA et al. – Russia]. The first high-level meeting between the US and Russia since 02/22 took place on February 18 in Saudi Arabia. On February 28, a meeting between Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky took place at the White House, escalating into an unprecedented public confrontation. The US stopped providing financial support to Ukraine, requiring the latter to sign a mineral resources agreement to repay previous US support, which was finalized on April 30 by establishing the United States - Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund. Meanwhile, the UK and some EU countries confirmed their support for Ukraine at the London Summit on March 3, announcing a coalition of the willing and declaring their readiness to send troops to Ukraine. During peace talks, Ukraine and the EU proposed the idea of a full ceasefire, which conflicted with Russia's insistence that any ceasefire must be tied to a broader political settlement. In addition to procedural disagreements, Russia also maintained key territorial demands, most notably the withdrawal of all Ukrainian military forces from the entire Donbas region. These incompatible positions prevented the parties from reaching a peace agreement, as they were unable to bridge the gap between their fundamental differences regarding territorial control and the terms of a negotiated settlement. The culmination of peace negotiations occurred during the summit between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin in Anchorage, Alaska, USA, on August 15; however, the meeting did not produce any tangible results. Throughout 2025, direct talks between Russia and Ukraine took place as well, on May 16, June 2, and July 23, resulting in POWs and fallen soldiers exchanges. By the end of 2025, 2,300 military personnel returned to Russia and 2,400 to Ukraine. Meanwhile, Russia handed over about 14,480 fallen bodies to Ukraine and received 391 from Ukraine. agl, elb, lma, hal, jop, tzo, tcr, ame

SPAIN (BASQUE PROVINCES)

Intensity: **1** | Change: • | Start: **1959**

Conflict parties: EH-Bildu vs. government
Conflict items: secession, autonomy

The dispute over the Basque Country between the left-wing pro-independence coalition Euskal Herria Bildu (EH Bildu), with ties to individuals linked to the 2018 self-dissolved terrorist group, Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA), seeking autonomy and secession, and the Basque nationalist party Eusko Alderdi Jeltzalea (PNV) seeking autonomy, on the one side, and the central government, on the other, continued.

In January, SARE-movement, supported by EH Bildu leaders and Catalan nationalist figures, organized a demonstration against allegedly harsher treatment for former ETA members in Bilbao, the Basque Country. In April, PNV, EH Bildu, and EH Bai organized separate Aberri Eguna celebrations to promote competing visions of Basque nationhood. PNV held a rally in Bilbao emphasizing gradual nation-building within Spain, EH Bildu led a 15,000-strong march in Pamplona advocating steps toward an independent Basque Republic, and EH Bai gathered in Donibane Garazi to advance a cross-border nationalist agenda. In June, a symbolic dispute over national recognition arose between the Basque Country and the government after the Basque Country was allowed to compete as a nation in international pelota vasca competitions, leading the Spanish federation to initiate legal proceedings before the Court of Arbitration for Sport. In September, EH Bildu pushed for a new political status for the Basque Country, framing it as a defense of sovereignty. Simultaneously, the 50th anniversary and commemoration of ETA members' executions prompted a societal debate. In December, the Spanish government and the Basque Government implemented agreements reached in September to transfer five competencies to the Basque Country, including unemployment benefits, non-contributory social assistance, maritime rescue, school insurance, and the Barakaldo machinery verification center. While the Basque Government assumed administrative management, the Spanish State retained normative authority, ensuring the transfers respected national legislation and the unified Social Security system. kcp

SPAIN (CATALAN NATIONALISTS / CATALONIA)

Intensity: **1** | Change: • | Start: **1979**

Conflict parties: Catalan civil society groups, Catalan regional government vs. government, Spanish civil society groups
Conflict items: secession, autonomy

The dispute over secession or further autonomy of the autonomous community of Catalonia between the Catalan regional government and various civil society groups, on the one hand, and the central government as well as political parties, on the other, continued.

On March 27 a survey pointed out that the support for independence was further on decline. The figures showed the lowest support for independence since the movement gained momentum back in the year 2011.

On September 11, during the rally for the Catalan national

day "La Diada", around 28,000 attendees demonstrated in Barcelona for independence. This number set another low point in support for the independence movement.

The policy of de-escalation and rapprochement between the Spanish Socialist Workers' party (PSOE) governing in Madrid, as well as Catalan pro-independence parties, continued. In exchange for their support of PSOE in Spanish Parliament, the independence movement received concessions for their own political agenda. For instance, on March 4, an agreement was found to broaden the control of Catalan administration concerning migration issues, as well as widening the responsibilities of Catalan police force "Mossos". Furthermore, according to an agreement from July 14, beginning in the year 2028, the government of Catalonia will take over tax collection duties from the central government.

However, on October 30, Together for Catalonia (JxCats) ended the backing of PSOE. This led to PSOE losing their majority in Spanish Parliament and to a blockade of the national government.

The acknowledgment of Catalan language within the European Union is still in suspense. Although supported by national government of Spain, this matter was postponed on May 27, due to several countries having unresolved issues. som

SPAIN – UNITED KINGDOM (GIBRALTAR)

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **1954**

Conflict parties: EU, Spain vs. United Kingdom
Conflict items: territory

The non-violent crisis over territory of the British overseas territory of Gibraltar between the UK and Spain continued.

Post-Brexit negotiations with the EU from 2024 continued this year and shaped Gibraltar's legal status. On June 11, UK and on the other side, EU and Spanish officials agreed on the core of a treaty about future relations. Specifically, the removal of border checks, a customs union with the EU, Schengen checks at Gibraltar's airport and port by Spanish authorities, and Gibraltar retaining control over immigration, justice, and policing.

Despite this development, sovereignty claims remained contested. On May 9, Spanish authorities attempted to assert jurisdiction by monitoring Gibraltar's Eastside land reclamation project, a move rejected by Gibraltar, reflecting continued disagreement over maritime sovereignty. On May 19, a Spanish officer ordered passport stamping for Gibraltar's Chief Minister, violating interim agreements that permitted crossing without such checks. On September 2, a Spanish warship, SPS Centinela, entered British Gibraltar waters, prompting a half-hour standoff with the Royal Navy's HMS Dagger before leaving, and later that month, on September 19, a Spanish aircraft disrupted a British Airways aircraft landing. On October 30, Spain's Deputy PM tied Gibraltar's delisting from Spain's tax-haven list to the UK-EU treaty, undermining earlier commitments. On November 17, Spain imposed flight restrictions over Gibraltar's airspace, requiring UK military aircraft operating from Gibraltar to avoid Spanish-controlled airspace, increasing logistical complexity and costs for the RAF. kcp

SWEDEN (ORGANIZED CRIME)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2002**

Conflict parties:	14K vs. Österberganätverket vs. Bandidos vs. Black Cobra vs. Dödspatrullen vs. Foxtrotnätverket vs. Hells Angels vs. Satudarah MC vs. Södertäljenätverket vs. Serbian-Motenegrin Mafia vs. various criminal organisations vs. Zerolätverket vs. government
Conflict items:	subnational predominance, resources

The violent crisis over resources and subnational predominance between and within criminal organizations and milieus, such as several rival networks, mafias, gangs, clans, and outlaw motor-cycle clubs, associated with Foxtrotnätverket, Dödspatrullen, Österberganätverket, Södertäljenätverket, as well as the government against those continued.

Criminal activity was particularly high in the metropolitan areas of the capital Stockholm, Göteborg city, Västra Götaland County, and Malmö city, Skåne County.

Police annual statistics recorded 158 shootings and 189 confirmed bomb detonations nationwide; however shootings continued on a downward trend, while explosions increased markedly, with police describing more "strategic" attacks against building entrances and businesses in connection with threats and extortion.

On April 29, for instance three people were shot dead in the Vaksala torg area of central Uppsala, Uppsala city, eponymous county; police opened a murder investigation and examined possible links to gang violence while stressing the situation was not treated as terrorism. Similarly, a man was shot dead a bus stop, with multiple minors witnessing the incident, on April 27, in Årby area, Eskilstuna city, Södermanland County. On September 2, police responded to a suspected serious violent crime in Lunden area, Göteborg city; media later reported two men were found shot dead in a car, amid assessments of links to ongoing local conflicts.

Furthermore, on 26 September, a bomb explosion at a stairwell on Bennets väg 7A, Rosengård area, in Malmö, triggered temporary disruption to train stops at Rosengård area of Malmö city. The police suspected a hand-grenade was the cause.

On December 13, an explosion in Glasberga area, Södertälje city, Stockholm County, damaged a car and a building; however, no injuries were reported.

Authorities expanded preventive tools and enforcement: police reported using security zones and issuing preventive stay bans during 2025 to reduce risks of retaliatory attacks. tcr

UKRAINE (RIGHT-WING / OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2013**

Conflict parties:	right-wing groups vs. civil right groups, minorities, oppositional parties vs. government
Conflict items:	system/ideology, national power

The violent crisis over national power and the orientation of

the political system between right-wing groups, opposition parties, alongside minorities and civil-rights groups, the Orthodox church, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued.

Throughout the year, at least two dozen clerics with ties to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) (UOC-MP) were investigated, arrested or imprisoned by the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU).

Furthermore, the SSU targeted online pro-Russian agitators. On January 8, the SSU detained an individual in the region of Bukovyna in Cherkasy oblast, which has been spreading pro-Russian content justifying Russia's war against Ukraine [→ Russia – Ukraine]. On August 1, the SSU exposed four pro-Russian internet agitators who justified war crimes and called for the capture of Ukraine in Chernihiv oblast, Poltava oblast, Kharkiv oblast, and Zakarpattia oblast. On October 17, the SSU detained two pro-Russian agitators in Luhansk oblast and Kyiv oblast.

Throughout the year, the work of politicians from the government as well as from the opposition were endangered by several violent attacks. On January 20, the SSU and the National Police prevented the murder of the First Deputy Minister of Health in the city of Kyiv. On March 14, a Ukrainian deserter shot the activist Demian Hanul in the city of Odesa. On May 1, volunteer and activist Serhiy Sternenko was attempted to be shot in Kyiv. On July 10, senior official in the SSU Ivan Voronych was shot dead in Kyiv. The Ukrainian cell of the neo-Nazi group "The Base" claimed responsibility for the assassination later on. On August 30, Ukrainian politician Andriy Parubiy was shot dead in the city of Lviv.

The work of the opposition was also endangered by various government decrees. On February 14, the former head of Lviv regional organization of the banned opposition party "Platform – For Life" was convicted to a real term of imprisonment for high treason in the city of Lviv. On February 15, President Volodymyr Zelensky signed a decree approving the National Security and Defence Council's decision to impose sanctions on former president and leader of the largest opposition group in parliament "European Solidarity", Petro Poroshenko, along with the four oligarchs Ihor Kolomoisky, Hennadiy Boholyubov, Kostyantyn Zhevago, and Viktor Medvedchuk. On September 6, the SSU and the Office of the Prosecutor General detained a member of Parliament and the "Platform – For Life" party. On September 11, the SSU declared former Minister of Revenue and Duties of Ukraine Oleksandr Klymenko a suspect of helping Russia financing the war against Ukraine. On October 20, the SSU and National Police exposed eight individuals plotting to revive Soviet Union in Ukraine in Kyiv oblast, Cherkasy oblast, and Kharkiv oblast. On December 03, a former functionary of the "Party of Regions" was sentenced to 15 years in prison for adjusting Russian strikes on Sumy region.

Moreover, the government targeted especially the work of the anti-corruption institutions in Ukraine and their members. On July 21, the SSU arrested officials of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau and carried out around 70 searches on the accusation of spying for Russia. On July 22, President Volodymyr Zelensky introduced into law a bill that effectively abolishes Ukraine's two key anti-corruption institutions, which led to protests of several thousands in the cities of Kyiv, Lviv, Dnipro, and Odesa. As a reaction to that, President Volodymyr Zelensky signed a law passed by the parliament on July 31 that restores the independence of two principal anti-corruption bodies. On October 20, the SSU conducted searches at the homes of relatives of a NABU detective in Kyiv. jdo

UNITED KINGDOM (NATIONALISTS / NORTHERN IRELAND)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1968**

Conflict parties: DUP, Red Hand Commando, UDA, UVF vs. Army of the Republic, Óglaigh na hÉireann, IRA, nationalist youth, NIRA, Sinn Féin vs. government

Conflict items: secession, subnational predominance

The violent crisis over secession between nationalist and dissident republican groups on the one hand and unionists, loyalists and the government on the other, as well as over subnational predominance both between and within these antagonistic communities and the government, continued. Until year's end, the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) recorded no security-related deaths, noting that the last such death occurred in Belfast, the capital of Northern Ireland, in 01/24, furthermore stating that overall several so-called paramilitary-style indicators declined: PSNI recorded of 9 shootings, injuring 3 people, and several assaults in this context, leading to 21 casualties, 12 of these assaults took place in Belfast. By contrast, bombing incidents increased from previously 6 to 12, with 7 of the 12 recorded in Belfast as well. The number of counter-terrorism related arrests also declined: PSNI recorded 21 arrests under Section 41 of the Terrorism Act 2000, and 8 persons were subsequently charged.

PSNI and dissident republican actors continued to confront one another in the context of commemorations and parades. On 21 April, Easter Monday, a dissident republican parade involving around 200 people in Derry/Londonderry, Derry and Strabane District Council, was followed by petrol-bomb attacks on PSNI vehicles; two men were later arrested as part of a proactive police operation.

Attacks on infrastructure also occurred, however whether these attacks were primarily attacks against the government or had different motivations remained not entirely clear.

In a series of arson attacks targeting telecommunication, PSNI issued appeals after a 5G mast was set on fire in south Belfast on August 14, and after a further arson attack in the Beechmount Avenue area of west Belfast on August 16.

In early June, 14 fire attacks on 5G masts across west Belfast occurred. In September, PSNI announced an arrest of a man on suspicion of 26 counts of arson connected to the wider investigation into 5G mast attacks in Belfast.

Within loyalist communities, public messaging combined condemnation of disorder with continued claims of local control.

On July 12, Irish media quoted an UDA leader criticizing street violence as damaging to loyalism's reputation while simultaneously presenting paramilitary influence as a form of community "order".

PSNI linked parts of xenophobic activities that took place throughout the year to both sides of the antagonistic communities' paramilitary arms. On 9 June 2025, public disorder erupted in Ballymena town, Mid and East Antrim County, following an alleged sexual-assault case and spread to other towns. The unrest involved sustained attacks on police and homes, including the use of petrol bombs, with the PSNI treating elements of the violence as hate crimes. According to police, 107 officers were injured during the incidents. By

early July, PSNI arrested approx. 50 subsequently arrests remanding approx. 30. Furthermore, during the July bonfire season, controversy escalated around the Moygashel bonfire, of Moygashel village, County Tyrone, Mid Ulster District, where life-sized effigies depicting migrants in a boat were burned; PSNI stated it was treating the incident as a hate incident, and the display drew condemnation across parties. Politically, the constitutional question remained salient. In April, Sinn Féin leader Mary Lou McDonald reiterated calls for a referendum on Irish unity, the so-called "border poll" for the first time within the decade.

In parallel, the governments of the UK and Ireland pursued renewed approaches to reducing paramilitary influence: in February, both governments were considering whether to engage in talks aimed at encouraging remaining so-called paramilitary groups to disband; in September, Ireland's government confirmed the joint appointment of an Independent Expert to conduct that scoping and engagement exercise. tr

UNITED KINGDOM (SCOTTISH NATIONALISTS / SCOTLAND)

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **2007**

Conflict parties: AUOB et al., SNP vs. government

Conflict items: secession

The non-violent crisis over secession between the Scottish regional government of the Scottish National Party (SNP) supported by nationalist civic organizations such as All Under One Banner (AUOB) and pro-independence supporters, on the one hand, and the British government supported by pro-unionists, on the other, continued.


In 2025, the conflict primarily featured verbal and symbolic measures regarding demands for a renewed referendum on independence. First Minister John Swinney repeatedly reaffirmed independence as a strategic objective of the SNP and argued that a pro-independence majority in the Scottish Parliament could serve as a democratic mandate for a second referendum. On September 4, Swinney called for another vote on independence, stating that a "fresh vote has never been more important, urgent or necessary," and urged Westminster to respect Scotland's right to decide its future in connection with a new Scottish Government paper.

In addition, an MSP of the SNP publicly suggested that favorable opinion polling could justify renewed referendum demands. UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer rejected these demands and reiterated that he would oppose a second referendum even in the event of a pro-independence majority in the 2026 election.


On May 15, SNP MSPs addressed Scotland's constitutional future during the Scottish Parliament debate "Scotland in today's Europe", repeatedly linking independence to renewed international engagement; no legislative initiatives followed. Within party dynamics, Anas Sarwar used the Scottish Labour Party conference in February to criticize the SNP's record in government and promote alternative models for Scotland's future within the UK. In March, the Alba Party elected Kenny MacAskill as party leader, who renewed the party's commitment to independence and called for coordination among nationalist forces.

During his campaign for deputy leader of Alba, stated that he had discussed to build a new Scottish town named "Independence" to support renewable energy and pro-independence objectives. evi


SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA




VIOLENT CONFLICTS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA IN 2025
(SUBNATIONAL LEVEL)




CONFLICT INTENSITIES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA IN 2025 COMPARED TO 2024



CONFLICT INTENSITIES BY CONFLICT ITEM IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA IN 2025



CONFLICT INTENSITIES BY CONFLICT TYPE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA IN 2025



REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT

In 2025, the HIIK observed 86 active conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa, a decrease of two compared to the previous year. Overall, 66 conflicts were on a violent level, three more than last year. Twelve full wars continued, while one war de-escalated to the level of limited war, and two to the level of a violent crisis. As in the previous year, Sub-Saharan Africa was the region with the most observed conflicts at war level. Moreover, the institute observed 14 limited wars, an increase of four compared to the previous year. Seven limited wars took place on the same level as in 2024, while six violent crises escalated to the level of a limited war, and three limited wars de-escalated to violent crises. In total, the HIIK observed 27 highly violent conflicts in the region in 2025, two more than in the previous year.

Once again, West Africa and the Sahel was heavily affected by the Islamist violence that spread across the whole region. Especially, the war over international power and the orientation of the political system between the Islamist group Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin' (JNIM), various of its subsects and other al-Qaeda-affiliated Islamist militant groups, on the one hand, and predominantly Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, but also other West African countries as well as international government alliances, on the other hand, continued in 2025 [→ Mali, Burkina Faso et al. (JNIM et al.)]. The HIIK counted well over 3,000 deaths across the region, and with that, a total rise in casualties compared to the previous years. Overall violence especially intensified in Burkina Faso, where JNIM for the first time in this conflict's history showed more violent involvement compared to Mali, which traditionally had been the conflict-country with the most recorded measures. Between January and May alone, JNIM and defending forces were responsible for over 1,000 people killed across Burkina Faso, with a focus on the Boucle du Mouhoun, Est, and Nord regions. In Mali, Al-Qaeda-related violence intensified towards the second half of the year and showed its effect throughout the whole country. While traditionally, Mopti had been the region of most HIIK-measures recorded for Mali in this conflict, 2025 showed JNIM's new influence in the Sikasso and Bamako regions. As in previous years, violence in Niger predominantly appeared in the Tillabéri Department, mostly during the first half of the year. Especially noteworthy for this conflict has once again been the southern strengthening of JNIM, particularly in and around Benin and Togo. In Benin, JNIM increased its activity by a large multiplier. HIIK counted over 200 people killed last year across the Atakora and Borgou Provinces and noted the first monthly limited war intensity in the history of HIIK's observation of the country. Similarly, the war over international power and the orientation of the political system between the Sahel offshoot of the so-called Islamic State IS Sahel and Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso continued. While IS Sahel drastically lost its influence in Mali and Burkina Faso to JNIM this year, it was responsible for more violence in Niger. Over 700 of the conflict's 1,100 counted casualties occurred in the Nigerien Tillabéri, Dosso, and Tahoua Departments [→ Niger, Mali et al. (IS Sahel)]. In Burkina Faso, the limited war over subnational predominance and resources between various ethnic groups, such as Mossi, Gourmantche, Dogon et al., with their Koglweogo self-defense militias, and Volunteers for the Defence of the Fatherland (VDP), on the one hand, the Fulani ethnic group, on the other, and Islamist groups as a third party, continued [→ Burkina Faso (inter-communal rivalry)]. This year, the VDPs, supported by the government and Russian paramilitary forces, were accused of increasingly killing large numbers of civilians in their fight against Islamist forces in the country. The parallel violent crisis in Mali over subnational predominance and resources between the Dogon and Bambara ethnic communities and their Dozo and Donso self-defense militias, on the one hand, the Fulani ethnic community, on the other hand, and Islamist groups continued, but once again showed a drastic decrease in violence this year [→ Mali (inter-communal rivalry)]. Instead, violence continued in the north of the country, specifically with last year's intensification of the limited war over autonomy of the so-called Independent State of Azawad between the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), the Coordination of Azwad Movements (CMA), on the one hand, the so-called Platform, and the government, on the other hand [→ Mali (FLA, CMA et al. / Azawad); Mali (inter-militant rivalry / northern Mali)]. This year, the conflict de-escalated to a violent crisis, but still showed heavy fighting with government forces, resulting in at least 64 people killed. While the opposition conflicts in Burkina Faso and Niger continued as violent crises [→ Burkina Faso (opposition); Niger (opposition)], protest and security force activity stayed peaceful in Mali, where the conflict de-escalated to a non-violent crisis [→ Mali (opposition)].

Similar opposition dynamics continued in violent and non-violent crises throughout West Africa, often fueled by unstable military governments and civilian protests against deteriorating security in the countries due to JNIM's and IS Sahel's growing influence across the region [→ Côte d'Ivoire (opposition); Gambia (opposition); Guinea (opposition); Guinea-Bissau (opposition); Senegal (opposition); Sierra Leone (opposition); Togo (opposition)].

Although peace efforts of the past years have recently shown relative success, the non-violent crisis over secession of the religiously and ethnically distinct Casamance area between the government and the Movement of Democratic Forces in Casamance (MFDC) continued as a violent crisis in 2025 again [→ Senegal (MFDC / Casamance)].

Nigeria was the singular country with the most overall conflicts observed in Africa. The country counted ten conflicts this year, of which three were continuing full wars, next to two limited wars. Specifically, the war over subnational predominance in specifically the Northwestern Nigerian states between bandits and the government continued. Criminal gangs, predominantly ethnic Fulani pastoralists referred to as bandits, arose from the conflict between the mainly christian farmers and the predominantly muslim Fulani pastoralists, and this year, their activities included raids on villages, looting, cattle rustling, and kidnapping for ransom, particularly targeting civilians with political power, such as village heads and religious leaders. At least 900 people have been killed throughout the year, with violent activities being concentrated in Zamfara, Katsina, Kaduna, Niger, Sokoto, Benue, Kebbi, Kogi, Plateau, and Taraba states [→ Nigeria (bandits)]. Furthermore, the war over international power and the orientation of the political system between the so-called Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), on the one hand, and the governments of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, on the other, continued [→ Nigeria, Chad et al. (ISWAP)]. In the first half of the year, ISWAP carried out a series of deadly attacks against military and civilian targets across the Lake Chad Basin. In April and May, ISWAP's attacks became more organized and deadly, due in part to improved coordination and the tactical use of surveillance drones. However, from late May onward, the Nigerian Army regained momentum, killing or capturing several key ISWAP leaders and severely disrupting their operational capabilities in the region. Equally, the war over the orientation of the political system between Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'Awati Wal-Jihad

(JAS), a splinter group of Boko Haram, and the governments of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger continued [→ Nigeria, Chad et al. (JAS-Boko Haram)]. JAS is opposed to secular and liberal values seeking to establish an Islamic caliphate in the region. This year, at least 750 people have been killed and several others have been injured, although the exact numbers are unknown. Similar to the previous years, JAS operated mainly in the southeast of Borno State, around the Sambisa Forest, which continued to be disputed territory between JAS and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), another Boko Haram splinter group, as well as in the Mandara Mountains in the border area of Nigeria's Yobe and Borno States. Limited war clashes between JAS and ISWAP continued [→ Nigeria (ISWAP – JAS)]. In a new development, the violent crisis over subnational predominance and resources between pastoralist herders and sedentary farmers escalated to a limited war, where several interest groups, such as farmer vigilante groups and Fulani organization Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association (MACBA) supported conflict actors [→ Nigeria (farmers – pastoralists)]. Boundaries with other conflicts, such as those involving bandits and jihadists, increasingly blurred [→ Nigeria (bandits); Nigeria (ISWAP – JAS)]. In April alone, over 170 people were killed in the conflict. Besides, various violent crises kept their intensity in Nigeria, compared to the previous year [→ Nigeria (APC supporters – PDP supporters); Nigeria (Islamic Movement); Nigeria (pro-Biafra groups / Biafra)], while one conflict de-escalated to a non-violent crisis [→ Nigeria (Ansaru)].

Further East, Sudan and South Sudan saw a total of four full-blown wars in 2025. Most notably, the war over national power between the de facto military government of Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary group Rapid Support Forces (RSF) continued in 2025 [→ Sudan (opposition)]. The conflict, which escalated to a war on April 15, 2023, when the RSF attacked SAF positions in the capital Khartoum, reached a since 2023 total death toll of around 150,000 people this year. Notably, heavy clashes in North Darfur, particularly around El Fasher, intensified from April on, as the RSF stepped up their efforts to drive the army out of its final bastion in the Darfur region, which itself was heavily affected by a continuing war this year [→ Sudan (Darfur)]. By October 28, reports emerged of widespread killings in El Fasher, indicating at least 1,500 deaths, including 460 people at the Saudi Maternity Hospital. While the inter-communal rivalry war in Sudan continued its intensity this year [→ Sudan (inter-communal rivalry)], the war in South Sudan between various local communities over subnational predominance and resources, especially cattle and land, de-escalated to a violent crisis [→ South Sudan (inter-communal rivalry)]. Cyclical violence related to cross-border cattle raiding persisted among the tri-state borders of Warrap, Unity, and Lakes States. Among these, Warrap had the highest casualty rate, with inter-communal clashes between the Thiik and Luanyjang communities leaving 144 people dead and more than 181 persons injured. Similarly, the violent crisis over subnational predominance and resources in the disputed Abyei border region between the Ngok Dinka community and the Misseriya community, as well as between the Ngok Dinka and Twic Dinka community, continued [→ Sudan, South Sudan (inter-communal rivalry / Abyei)]. Due to its substantial oil reserves, the region remains of strategic interest to the governments of Sudan and South Sudan, both of whom claim Abyei as part of their own territory. Finally, the violent crisis in South Sudan over national power and the orientation of the political system between the government of Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), led by President Salva Kiir, and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM/A-IO-RM), led by First Vice President Riek Machar, on the one hand, and several opposition groups including the National Salvation Front (NAS) and the White Army, on the other hand, escalated to a war [→ South Sudan (opposition)]. The conflict escalated significantly from mid-February, as the SPLA-IO-aligned White Army - a youth militia from VP Machar's Nuer ethnic group - launched several attacks on SSPDF (South Sudan People's Defence Force) positions in Nisar Town, Upper Nile State. The town was captured later that month. The situation intensified on March 17, when a UN airlift to rescue SSPDF Major General Dak came under intense fire from White Army troops.

In Djibouti, the violent crisis over national power and system/ideology between Le Bloc pour le Salut National (BSN) and the government continued [→ Djibouti (opposition)]. Especially in the second half of the year, tensions between the opposition and the government increased in light of the presidential elections in April 2026.

In Eastern Africa, also throughout Somalia, wars, limited wars, and violent crises have been recorded. As in previous years, the conflict in Somalia and Kenya continued as a war. At least 1,697 people died throughout the year, marking the highest mortality rate of all conflicts in Somalia [→ Somalia, Kenya (al-Shabaab)]. Furthermore, the violent crisis over subnational predominance and the orientation of the political system in Jubaland between the Jubaland Regional Government and the Federal Government of Somalia, which started in 2024 escalated to a limited war. This was mainly due to high levels of violence in July and August, which led to significant destruction and displacement [→ Somalia (Jubaland)]. Further, significant tension between substate governments in Somalia have been recorded in the north of Somalia, where the self-declared federal member state of SSC-Khaatumo was officially recognized as the Northeastern State by the federal government of Somalia, after tensions with the Puntland regional government and the Somaliland government have de-escalated to a violent crisis throughout the year [→ Somalia (Somaliland – Northeastern State – Puntland)].

Ethiopia's conflict landscape was characterized by the Ethiopian National Defense Force's (ENDF) conflicts with several ethnic militias. Most noticeably, the war over subnational predominance and autonomy against different Fano militias, which mainly operate in the Amhara region [→ Ethiopia (Fano militias / Amhara)], continued, and the violent crisis between the ENDF and the Oromia Liberation Army (OLA) escalated to a limited war [→ Ethiopia (OLA / Oromia)]. The Ethiopian Fano conflict was significantly characterized by the use of heavy weapons, such as drones, and multiple counteroffensives from both sides throughout the year. Additionally, a new conflict involving transnational intercommunal rivalry in the border region between Kenya and Ethiopia erupted [→ Kenya, Ethiopia (inter-communal rivalry)].

In Kenya, violent conflicts continued between the government and opposition parties [→ Kenya (opposition)], as well as in inter-communal rivalry constellations [→ Kenya (inter-communal rivalry)].

Throughout all three countries in the region, inter-communal conflicts, predominantly over resources, have been observed [→ Kenya (inter-communal rivalry); Somalia (sub-clan rivalry); Ethiopia (inter-communal rivalry)].

The Central African region was marked by continuous militant activity, in particular in the Central African Republic (CAR) and Cameroon, but also in Chad.

In the CAR, the limited war over national power and resources between militant groups and anti-Balaka militias, on the

one hand, and the government, on the other, continued. The security situation remained volatile, with multiple clashes throughout the year. However, on April 19, the government signed a ceasefire agreement with two militias [→ Central African Republic (militant groups)].

In Cameroon, the war over autonomy or secession of the Southern Cameroons region between various groups of the English-speaking minority and the Southern Cameroons Defense Forces (SOCADEF), on the one hand, and the French-speaking Cameroonian government, on the other, de-escalated to a violent crisis. Most of the fighting occurred in the anglophone Northwest region (NW) and the Southwest region (SW), where separatists repeatedly ambushed government forces [→ Cameroon (English-speaking-minority)].

In Chad, the non-violent crisis over national power between various militant groups, on the one hand, and the government of Chad, on the other, escalated to a violent crisis [→ Chad (militant groups)]. On January 7, heavily armed fighters stormed the presidential palace in N'Djamena. The subsequent clashes with security forces left at least 19 people dead.

While the violent crisis over national power between opposition groups and the government in Chad de-escalated to a non-violent crisis [→ Chad (opposition)], the non-violent crisis over national power between various opposition parties and the ruling National Resistance Movement Party (NRM) in Uganda escalated to a violent crisis [→ Uganda (opposition)]. Throughout the year, the government continued to target opposition parties and prominent members of the opposition. In the run-up to the 2026 presidential election, rallies and campaigns from the main opposition party were marred by occasional clashes between opposition supporters and security forces.

Furthermore, in Madagascar a violent crisis over national power erupted between youth-led protesters under the collective "Gen Z Madagascar" and the government [→ Madagascar (opposition)]. On September 25, protests had started against persistent water and electricity outages, but quickly extended to other areas of discontent, including the cost of living, lack of professional opportunities, corruption and nepotism among the elite, calling for political reform and the president's resignation.

In Chad, the violent crisis over subnational predominance between farmers and herders (or pastoralists) continued. Throughout the year, farmers and pastoralists clashed on multiple occasions over the control of dwindling resources, such as grazing land and water [→ Chad (inter-communal rivalry)].

The most severe conflict in the subregion remained the limited war between the Islamist militia Ahlu Sunnah wa Jama'a (ASWJ) and the Mozambican government in northern Mozambique [→ Mozambique (ASWJ)]. Despite ongoing military operations supported by regional and international partners, violence continued to affect Cabo Delgado and periodically spread into neighboring provinces. Civilians remained the primary targets of attacks, suffering inter alia from increasing child abductions and internal displacement which rose substantially during the second half of the year. Alongside continued counterinsurgency efforts, the government signaled openness to dialogue and established mechanisms aimed at strengthening engagement between local communities and the central government.

The year was also marked by increasing cross-border interconnectedness of conflicts in the Great Lakes region. The conflict involving Burundian rebel groups escalated to a limited war [→ Burundi, DR Congo (FNL, RED-Tabara, Forebu)]. Several Burundian militant groups reportedly joined broader coalitions that also included Congolese armed actors, linking the conflict more closely to developments in eastern DR Congo [→ DR Congo (M23 factions)]. Deteriorating relations between Burundi and Rwanda further illustrated the interconnected nature of conflicts in this region, as both governments accused each other of supporting armed non-state actors operating across borders. Tensions escalated from a non-violent to a violent crisis by the end of the year, after an alleged Rwandan bomb strike on Burundian territory [→ Burundi – Rwanda].

As in previous years, the majority of conflicts in the subregion were of an intrastate nature and concerned political competition and opposition-state relations. Across several countries, governments further restricted political competition and civic space, resulting in escalations of opposition conflicts. Tanzania's opposition conflict escalated dramatically in the days following contested general elections on October 29, with a violent crackdown on protests, resulting in up to 1,000 casualties [→ Tanzania (opposition)]. In Burundi, legislative and local elections on June 5 further consolidated the power of the ruling CNDD-FDD, while opposition and civil actors continued to face intimidation and violence [→ Burundi (opposition)]. In Rwanda, the arrest of opposition leader Victoire Ingabire contributed to an escalation of the conflict to a non-violent crisis [→ Rwanda (opposition)]. By contrast, Mozambique witnessed a partial de-escalation, after 2024's post-election protests had left hundreds dead and injured. Despite continued violence, dialogue initiatives, presidential pardons for protesters, and the authorization of a new party signaled efforts for national reconciliation [→ Mozambique (opposition)]. Similarly, Zimbabwe's opposition conflict de-escalated to a non-violent crisis with a comparatively low intensity, despite continued restrictions on civic and political space [→ Zimbabwe (opposition)].

Another notable intrastate conflict concerned xenophobic mobilization against foreign nationals in South Africa, which escalated to a violent crisis. Throughout the year, xenophobic groups increasingly targeted migrants' access to public services, particularly healthcare, and employment opportunities [→ South Africa (xenophobes)].

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Overview: Conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa in 2025

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
Angola (FLEC et al. / Cabinda)*	FLEC, MIC vs. government	secession	1975	•	3
Angola (opposition)*	UNITA vs. MPLA	national power	1975	•	2
Burkina Faso (inter-communal rivalry)*	Gourmantché, Koglweogo et al., Mossi vs. Fulani vs. Islamist groups vs. government, VDP	subnational predominance, resources	2016	•	4
Burkina Faso (opposition)*	opposition groups vs. government vs. military	national power	2014	•	3
Burundi (opposition)*	ADC-Ikibiri, CNL, RED-Tabara, UPRONA vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2006	•	3
Burundi – Rwanda*	Burundi vs. Rwanda	international power	2015	↗	3
Burundi, DR Congo (FNL, RED-Tabara, Forebu)*	Burundi, DR Congo vs. FNL, Forebu, RED-Tabara	national power	2005	↗	4
Cameroon (English-speaking-minority)*	English-speaking minority vs. government	secession, autonomy	2016	↓	3
Central African Republic (militant groups)*	militant groups vs. government	national power, resources	2012	•	4
Chad (inter-communal rivalry)*	pastoralists vs. farmers	subnational predominance	1947	•	3
Chad (militant groups)*	CCSMR, CSD, FACT, UFR vs. government	national power	2005	↗	3
Chad (opposition)*	opposition groups vs. government	national power	1990	↘	2
Côte d'Ivoire (militant groups)*	militant groups vs. government	national power	2012	•	2
Côte d'Ivoire (opposition)*	opposition groups vs. government	national power	1999	•	3
Djibouti (opposition)*	BSN vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2011	•	3
DR Congo (AFC / M23)*	AFC/M23 vs. government vs. other militias	national power, subnational predominance, resources	2004	•	5
DR Congo (Bantu – Batwa)*	Bantu militias vs. Batwa militias	subnational predominance	2013	•	3
DR Congo (Ituri militias)	CODECO, CRP, FPIC, FRPI, MAPI, Zaire militia vs. government	subnational predominance, resources	1999	•	5
DR Congo (Kata Katanga)*	Kata Katanga vs. government	secession, subnational predominance, resources	2011	•	3
DR Congo (KN)*	KN vs. government	subnational predominance	2016	•	2
DR Congo (Mayi-Mayi et al.)*	NDC-R vs. APCLS vs. Babembe militias vs. Nyatura groups vs. FPP/AP vs. Banyamulenge militias vs. Bafuiliro militias vs. Mayi-Mayi groups et al. vs. government	subnational predominance, resources	2003	↗	4
DR Congo (Mobondo – Teke)*	Mobondo vs. Teke	subnational predominance	2022	•	4
DR Congo (MONUSCO protests)*	MONUSCO personnel vs. civil society	other	2022	•	3
DR Congo (opposition)*	church groups, civil society groups, opposition parties vs. government	national power	1997	↘	2
DR Congo – Rwanda*	DR Congo vs. Rwanda	international power, other	1998	•	3
DR Congo, Uganda (ADF)*	ADF vs. DR Congo, Uganda	system/ideology, subnational predominance, resources	1995	↘	4
Egypt – Ethiopia, Sudan (GERD)*	Egypt vs. Ethiopia vs. Sudan	resources	2011	↘	1
Eritrea (RSADO)*	RSADO vs. government	autonomy	1999	•	1
eSwatini (opposition)*	COSATU, PUDEMO, SUDF vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1998	•	2
Ethiopia (Fano militias / Amhara)*	Fano militias vs. government	autonomy, subnational predominance	2023	•	5
Ethiopia (inter-communal rivalry)*	Oromo vs. Amhara vs. Konso vs. Ale vs. Issa vs. Afar vs. other ethnic groups	subnational predominance, resources	2017	•	4
Ethiopia (OLA / Oromia)*	OLA vs. government	subnational predominance	1992	•	4
Ethiopia (opposition)*	opposition groups vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2005	•	2
Ethiopia, Eritrea (TPLF / Tigray)*	Eritrea, Ethiopia vs. TPLF	system/ideology	2020	↗	3
Gabon (opposition)*	opposition groups vs. government	national power	2009	↘	1
Gambia (opposition)*	opposition groups vs. government	national power	2016	↗	3

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
Ghana (HSGF et al. / Western Togoland)*	HSFG et al. vs. government	secession	2017	•	2
Guinea (opposition)*	opposition groups vs. government	national power	2006	•	3
Guinea-Bissau (opposition)*	opposition groups vs. government	national power	1998	•	3
Kenya (inter-communal rivalry)*	Akamba vs. Borana vs. Orma vs. Pokot vs. Rendille vs. Toposa vs. Turkana vs. various other tribes	subnational predominance, resources	1963	•	3
Kenya (opposition)*	Azimio la Umajio One-Kenya Coalition vs. government	national power	1999	•	3
Kenya, Ethiopia (inter-communal rivalry)*	Turkana vs. Aari, Dassanach	subnational predominance, resources	1918	•	3
Madagascar (opposition)*	civil society groups, Gen-Z students, opposition parties vs. government	national power	2025	NEW	3
Mali (FLA, CMA et al. / Azawad)*	CMA, FLA vs. Platform et al. vs. government	autonomy	1989	↘	3
Mali (inter-communal rivalry / central Mali)*	Bambara, Dogon, Dozo vs. Fulani vs. Islamist groups vs. government	subnational predominance, resources	2012	•	3
Mali (inter-militant rivalry / northern Mali)*	CMA, FLA vs. Platform et al. vs. Islamist groups	system/ideology, subnational predominance	2012	↘	2
Mali (opposition)*	opposition groups vs. government	national power	2012	↘	2
Mali, Burkina Faso et al. (JNIM et al.)*	Al-Mourabitoun, Ansar Dine, Ansaroul Islam, AQIM, JNIM, Macina Liberation Front vs. Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Chad, France, Mali, Nigeria, Togo, USA	system/ideology, international power	1998	•	5
Mozambique (ASWJ)*	ASWJ vs. government	system/ideology	2017	•	4
Mozambique (opposition)*	PODEMOS, RENAMO, RENAMO Military Junta vs. government	national power	2012	•	3
Niger (opposition)*	opposition groups vs. government	national power	2009	•	3
Niger, Mali et al. (IS Sahel)*	IS Sahel vs. Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger	system/ideology, international power	2016	•	5
Nigeria (Ansaru)*	Ansaru vs. government	system/ideology	2012	↘	2
Nigeria (APC supporters – PDP supporters)*	APC supporters vs. PDP supporters	system/ideology, national power	1960	•	3
Nigeria (bandits)*	bandits vs. government	subnational predominance, other	2016	•	5
Nigeria (EndSARS)*	protester groups vs. government	system/ideology	2020	END	1
Nigeria (farmers – pastoralists)*	farmers vs. pastoralists	subnational predominance, resources	1960	↗	4
Nigeria (Ijaw groups / Niger Delta)*	CEND, DSF, Force of Egbesu, Ijaw groups, NDA, RNDA vs. government, international oil companies	autonomy, resources	1997	•	2
Nigeria (Islamic Movement)*	IMN vs. government	system/ideology	1991	•	3
Nigeria (ISWAP – JAS)*	ISWAP vs. JAS	system/ideology, subnational predominance	2016	•	4
Nigeria (pro-Biafra groups / Biafra)*	pro-Biafra groups vs. Cameroon, Nigeria	secession	1967	•	3
Nigeria, Chad et al. (ISWAP)*	ISWAP vs. Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria	system/ideology, international power	2015	•	5
Nigeria, Chad et al. (JAS-Boko Haram)*	JAS vs. Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria	system/ideology	2003	•	5
Republic of Congo (opposition)*	opposition groups vs. government	national power	2015	↑	3
Rwanda (opposition)*	FDU-Inkingi vs. government	national power	2003	↗	2
Rwanda – Uganda*	Rwanda vs. Uganda	international power	2018	END	1
Senegal (MFDC / Casamance)*	MFDC vs. government	secession	1982	↗	3
Senegal (opposition)*	opposition groups vs. government	national power	2023	↘	2
Sierra Leone (opposition)*	APC vs. government	national power	2007	•	2
Somalia (ISS)*	ISS vs. al-Shabaab vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2015	↗	4
Somalia (Jubaland)*	Jubaland Regional Government (JRG) vs. Federal Government of Somalia (FGS)	system/ideology, subnational predominance	2024	↗	4

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
Somalia (Somaliland – Northeastern State – Puntland)*	regional government of Puntland vs. regional government of Somaliland vs. regional government of Northeastern State	subnational predominance	1998	↘	3
Somalia (Somaliland)*	regional government of Somaliland vs. government	secession	1991	↘	1
Somalia (subclan rivalry)*	Hawiye subclans vs. Rahanweyn subclans vs. Darod subclans vs. Dir subclans vs. Isaaq subclans vs. various other clans	subnational predominance, resources	2012	↘	3
Somalia, Kenya (al-Shabaab)*	al-Shabaab vs. Kenya, Somalia	system/ideology, national power	2006	•	5
South Africa (opposition)*	civil rights groups, EFF, MK vs. government	national power	2015	•	3
South Africa (socioeconomic protests)*	marginalized groups, residents of informal settlements vs. government	system/ideology	2018	↗	3
South Africa (xenophobes)	immigrants vs. xenophobes	system/ideology	1994	•	3
South Sudan (inter-communal rivalry)*	Murle vs. Dinka vs. Nuer	subnational predominance, resources	2011	↓	3
South Sudan (opposition)*	NAS, SPLM/A-IO-Kitwang vs. government, SPLM/A-IO-RM	system/ideology, national power	2011	↑	5
Sudan (Darfur)*	“non-Arab” communities vs. RSF, ‘Arab’ militias	subnational predominance, resources	2003	•	5
Sudan (inter-communal rivalry)*	Fulani et al., Fur, Masala vs. Hawazma et al., Misseriya, Taisha	subnational predominance, resources	2007	•	5
Sudan (opposition)*	RSF vs. SAF	national power	2011	•	5
Sudan, South Sudan (inter-communal rivalry / Abyei)*	Balanda vs. Murle vs. Dinka vs. Nuer vs. Azande	subnational predominance, resources	2011	•	3
Tanzania (opposition)*	ACT-Wazalendo, CHADEMA, CUF vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1993	↗	4
Togo (opposition)*	opposition groups vs. government	national power	1963	•	3
Uganda (opposition)*	DP, FDC, Jeema, NEED, NUP, PFT, UPC vs. government	national power	2001	↗	3
Zimbabwe (opposition)*	CCC vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2000	↘	2

¹ Conflicts marked with * are without description

² Mentioned are only those conflict parties relevant for the period under review

³ Change in intensity compared to the previous year: ↑ or ↗ escalation by one or more than one level of intensity; ↓ or ↘ deescalation by one or more than one level of intensity; • no change

⁴ Levels of intensity: 5 = war; 4 = limited war; 3 = violent crisis; 2 = non-violent crisis; 1 = dispute

⁵ HIIK considers statehood to be non-contested if the state is an official UN members state.

Disputed statehood is marked with a * if a territory is recognized by at least one other official UN member state ("limited recognition")

ANGOLA (FLEC ET AL. / CABINDA)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1975**

Conflict parties: FLEC, MIC vs. government
 Conflict items: secession

The violent crisis over the secession of Cabinda between the Front for the Liberation of Cabinda (FLEC) and its armed wing, the Armed Forces of Cabinda (FAC) on the one hand, and the government and its armed forces (FAA), on the other, continued.

As in previous years, reports of conflict incidents and casualties are primarily based on statements by FLEC, with the Angolan government largely refraining from acknowledging an active armed struggle in the province.

On April 14, FLEC announced a two-month unilateral ceasefire, catalysed by a peace initiative by Angola's largest opposition party, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). The Angolan government criticised the actions by UNITA, proclaimed on April 16 that the situation in Cabinda was stable and publicly presented 285 alleged FLEC defectors.

Nevertheless, according to FLEC statements, the conflict intensified. FLEC reported engaging in several violent clashes with FAA forces. On March 3, FLEC claimed to have killed 32 FAA soldiers in a clash in Tando-Maselelee Nviedi, Belize region. On March 13, a clash at the Kinsembo-Maduda border to DR Congo reportedly resulted in the death of nine FAA soldiers and two civilians. On May 15, another military engagement allegedly caused the deaths of 18 FAA soldiers and three European citizens and injured seven civilians in Mbamba-Kibuendi, Belize region. On August 11, FLEC clashed with FAA soldiers, killing 26 and injuring 15 in Lukiengi, northern Cabinda.

In response to these military engagements, FLEC reported multiple instances of attacks on civilians by government forces. Government forces allegedly attacked civilians in Ntando-Masele on March 3 and 13, killing two people in both instances. On May 19, in Mbamba, FAA troops reportedly killed three civilians in what FLEC described as a retaliatory measure.


Fighting also extended to the border region with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). On May 5, a clash between FLEC and the FAA in Kimbanza-Mbemba, resulted in the reported deaths of 16 FAA soldiers. Another twelve FAA soldiers reportedly died in a clash in Mbuku-Yola, on June 25. FLEC also alleged that FAA forces targeted Cabindan refugees within the DRC border region. During an attack on a refugee camp in Yema-Di Yanga on February 28, government forces reportedly killed five civilians and injured four. In an act described by FLEC as retribution following the clashes on June 25, the FAA allegedly executed five civilian refugees in Kimbanza-Memba and Mbuku-Yola on the same day. who

BURKINA FASO (INTER-COMMUNAL RIVALRY)

Intensity: **4** | Change: • | Start: **2016**

Conflict parties: Gourmantché, Koglweogo et al., Mossi vs. Fulani vs. Islamist groups vs. government, VDP

Conflict items: subnational predominance, re-sources



The limited war over subnational predominance and resources between various ethnic groups, such as Mossi, Gourmantche, Dogon et al., with their Koglweogo self-defense militias, and Volunteers for the Defence of the Fatherland (VDP), on the one hand, the Fulani ethnic group, on the other, and Islamist groups as a third party, continued with at least 382 counted casualties throughout the year. This year, the VDPs, supported by the government and Russian paramilitary forces, were accused of increasingly killing large numbers of civilians in their fight against Islamist forces in the country [→ Mali, Burkina Faso et al. (JNIM et al.); Niger, Mali et al. (IS Sahel)].

A MORE DETAILED CONFLICT DESCRIPTION WILL BE ADDED BY THE END OF JULY. pad

BURUNDI (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2006**

Conflict parties: ADC-Ikibiri, CNL, RED-Tabara, UPRONA vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The violent crisis over national power and the orientation of the political system between various members of the opposition coalition ADC-Ikibiri, especially the National Freedom Council (CNL), on the one hand, and the government, led by the National Council for Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) with support by its armed youth wing Imbonerakure, on the other, continued.

The legislative and local elections on June 5 saw the ruling party CNDD-FDD win with 96.5 percent of votes and all parliamentary seats. The elections were marked by the intimidation of the opposition and a lack of competition as the government had blocked CNL candidates from competing. Throughout the year, Imbonerakure violently attacked, and in some instances tortured, many opposition members. For example, on January 11 Imbonerakure youths attacked two CNL party members in Rugombo, Cibitoke province, injuring them severely. On May 15, Imbonerakure ambushed and injured a provincial representative and several members of the opposition coalition at Caga hill, Ngozi province. On August 20, Imbonerakure tortured a man for supporting a local candidate advocating for change on Murengeza hill, Bujumbura province. On September 15, a leader of the UPRONA party and his family experienced a violent attack by Imbonerakure in Musongati, Burunga province. Violence also turned against

people only loosely affiliated with the opposition. For example, on June 9, three Imbonerakure severely beat a man for refusing to hand over his voter card on Gitwe hill, Kayanza province.

Opposition activity was also suppressed by police and the National Intelligence Service (SNR). Especially the electoral run-up was marked by a series of persecutions against CNL affiliates. For example, on April 7 SNR arrested two CNL leaders in Mukaza, Bujumbura province. One week later, on April 14, police and Imbonerakure arrested two CNL activists in Kayogoro, Makamba province. Opposition affiliates were also kidnapped. For instance, on April 21, unidentified individuals kidnapped a treasurer of the CNL party in Mutimbuzi, Bujumbura province. On October 11, in Kibago, Makamba province, police arrested and then exfiltrated a CDP party leader to an unknown destination. On December 14, SNR, in cooperation with Imbonerakure, abducted a CNL activist from his residence in Mwaro, Gitega province.

The year also saw the freedom of expression and press restricted. On April 21, in Bujumbura, eponymous province, police and SNR dispersed a protest around a microfinance institution, arresting approx. 50 people for allegedly destabilizing the electoral environment. They also arrested two journalists covering the event, accusing them of insurrection. One week later, on April 28, Imbonerakure attacked and seriously injured one of these journalists while reporting on Mutanga campus, Bujumbura province. anh

BURUNDI – RWANDA

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↗** | Start: **2015**

Conflict parties: Burundi vs. Rwanda
Conflict items: international power

The non-violent crisis over international power between Burundi and Rwanda escalated to a violent crisis.

The year was first characterized by non-violent but tense relations between the two states before turning violent in December, based on Burundian allegations.


The border between Burundi and Rwanda remained closed. On multiple occasions, Burundian President Ndayishimiye and other Burundian officials claimed that Rwanda wanted to attack Burundi and threatened regional stability. They also accused Rwanda of supporting RED Tabara [→ Burundi, DR Congo (FNL, RED-Tabara, Forebu)] while Rwanda accused Burundi of collaborating with the Rwandan rebel group FDLR. In February, the Burundian authorities arrested more than 200 Congolese refugees on accusations of espionage for Rwanda. Throughout the year, multiple rounds of negotiations were held between security and intelligence officials of both countries to ease tensions and avoid confrontations.

Yet, the Burundian foreign ministry accused Rwanda of a bomb strike which allegedly hit Burundian territory near Cibitoke, eponymous province, injuring two civilians on December 7. There were no independent reports confirming this. According to media reports from regional and international news outlets, tensions at the common border are rising as both countries increase their military presence. ttl

BURUNDI, DR CONGO (FNL, RED-TABARA, FOREBU)

Intensity: **4** | Change: **↗** | Start: **2005**

Conflict parties: Burundi, DR Congo vs. FNL, Forebu, RED-Tabara
Conflict items: national power



The violent crisis over national power in Burundi between the heterogeneous field of militant groups, including the Resistance for Rule of Law in Burundi (RED-Tabara), the Popular Forces of Burundi (Forebu/FPB), and a militant faction of the National Forces of Liberation (FNL), on the one hand, and the governments of Burundi and the DR Congo (DRC), on the other, escalated to a limited war. The DRC armed forces (FARDC), together with pro-government Wazalendo militias, support the Burundi armed forces (FDNB).

This year marked the formation of various alliances. Although RED Tabara on December 3 denied to be part of any coalition, according to corresponding media reports RED Tabara formed an alliance with the Congolese Twirwaneho militia in January. Both groups are part of the Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC), led by M23 [→ DR Congo (M23 factions)]. Moreover, according to media reports from August, the FNL likewise joined the AFC rebel alliance.

The conflict now mainly takes place in the eastern DRC. On many occasions, RED Tabara fought against FARDC or Wazalendo in South Kivu region, DRC, oftentimes supporting Congolese militants. On January 19, the FARDC repelled an attack by RED Tabara and the Makanika terrorist group on a DRC military position in South Kivu, killing six rebels and injuring eight. RED Tabara claimed an attack on FDNB camps in Itombwe, South Kivu, resulting in the death of nine soldiers on January 24 and 25. From March 1 to 5, the coalition attacked Wazalendo positions in a village near Mikenge, burning down houses. Wazalendo killed one Twirwaneho commander and retook the village. On March 19, clashes re-occurred in the same territory, resulting in five dead coalition members and several injuries. On April 2, in clashes between the same actors in the Fizi region, South Kivu, Wazalendo killed 17 fighters of the coalition and captured several more. On May 6, the RED Tabara-Twirwaneho coalition ambushed FARDC forces in Uvira territory, killing two soldiers. On July 27, Burundian officials arrested two Congolese diplomats in Bujumbura city over accusations of a collaboration with RED Tabara and other rebel groups. Clashes between RED Tabara and Wazalendo forces caused the death of at least 46 persons in November. After the retreat of FARDC and FDNB from Kipupu village, South Kivu, RED Tabara and Twirwaneho forces seized the village on December 13. Clashes between the RED Tabara-Twirwaneho coalition on one side and the Wazalendo, supported by the FARDC, on the other, erupted on December 26 around Twetuwe in Itombwe. ttl

CAMEROON (ENGLISH-SPEAKING-MINORITY)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↓** | Start: **2016**

Conflict parties: English-speaking minority vs. government

Conflict items: secession, autonomy

The war over autonomy or secession of the Southern Cameroons region between various groups of the English-speaking minority, such as the Ambazonia Defense Forces (ADF), the Ambazonia Self-Defense Council (ASC), and the Southern Cameroons Defense Forces (SOCADEF), on the one hand, and the French-speaking Cameroonian government, on the other, de-escalated to a violent crisis.

The ASC and ADF were attached to the main political wings of the self-declared Federal Republic of Ambazonia, the Interim Government (IG) of the Federal Republic of Ambazonia, and the Ambazonia Governing Council (AGovC), respectively. The Cameroonian government was led by President Paul Biya and his Cameroon People's Democratic Movement.

Throughout the year, violent clashes between government forces and separatists resulted in at least 176 deaths and at least 102 people injured.

Most of the fighting occurred in the anglophone Northwest region (NW) and the Southwest region (SW). The conflict only occasionally spread to the neighboring francophone West region and the Nigerian border region. For instance, on June 18, separatist fighters attacked a military control post in Maloun le Petit, West region, killing three soldiers, injuring two, and seizing weapons, ammunition and tactical equipment from the post.

As in previous years, the separatists repeatedly ambushed government forces in the anglophone NW and the SW. For instance, on April 9, ADF separatists attacked a police control post in front of a hospital in Bamenda, NW, killing one police officer and injuring another. On September 5, an IED planted by separatists of the Unity Warriors of Fako group exploded and killed seven soldiers in Malende, SW.

The Cameroon Armed Forces (FAC) put pressure on separatist groups. For example, on February 9, FAC raided a separatist camp, killing two separatist fighters, arresting three. Further, on December 5, security forces killed five separatist fighters alongside four civilians in Bafut, NW. Security forces also targeted civilians. On May 15, security forces arrested more than 100 students in Bambili, NW. Further, on April 27, security forces raided a civilian's home, killing him in the process. Separatists enforced their curfews and other self-imposed rules in NW and SW with violence. For example, on February 22, separatist fighters abducted several people and stole five cars in Kedjom Ketinguh, NW. On March 17, rebels killed two taxi drivers who refused to color their yellow taxis blue and white – the color of the Ambazonian flag – in Buea, SW. Further, on March 26, fighters confiscated Cameroonian IDs, declaring the IDs would no longer be recognized in NW and SW regions. On May 10, rebels killed a civilian for consuming banned products of a state-owned brand. On June 30, fighters attacked a neighborhood in Buea, SW, killing one civilian, injuring at least two and forcing residents to hide inside for hours. The attackers also set fire to four taxis and a motorcycle to enforce the "Monday ghost town" curfew. On August 19, government forces killed a cab driver and three passengers in Bamenda, NW, when he did not stop at a security post.


Throughout the year, several separatists, including senior leaders, surrendered to Cameroonian authorities, and proceeded to Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) centers. For instance, on March 1, nine separatist fighters including one commander surrendered in Bali, NW, and publicly apologized for their actions in an official ceremony. 104,997 Cameroonian refugees were registered in Nigeria in December 2025, an increase to December 2024 by 383. At least 334,098 people were internally displaced – an increase by 42,541 people compared to the previous year. ^{ast}

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (MILITANT GROUPS)

Intensity: **4** | Change: **•** | Start: **2012**

Conflict parties: militant groups vs. government

Conflict items: national power, resources



The limited war over national power and resources between militant groups, such as the Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC), the Military Coalition for the Salvation of the People and Recovery (CMSPR) and anti-Balaka militias, on the one hand, and the government, supported by the Central African Armed Forces (FACA), the Wagner ti Azande (WTA) and MINUSCA, as well as Russian private military contractors (PMCs), on the other, continued.

In 2020, the Union for Peace in the Central African Republic (UPC), Patriotic Front for the Renaissance in the Central African Republic (FPRC), Return, Reclamation and Rehabilitation (3R), as well as Patriotic Movement for the Central African Republic (MPC) and Mokom and Ndomaté anti-Balaka wings had formed the CPC with the aim of disrupting national security and capturing the capital of Bangui.

The security situation remained volatile, particularly in the west and east. There was an increase in attacks by armed groups on civilians, humanitarian workers, national defence and security forces, and MINUSCA. Tensions around mining sites and migration corridors escalated due to clashes between migrant herders and armed groups. Over the year, at least 258 people were killed and at least 111 injured.

Throughout the year, FACA, WTA and PMCs clashed with militant groups on multiple occasions. For instance, on January 15, CPC claimed to have killed four PMCs in an ambush near the village of Bogali, Ouham-Pendé Prefecture. Between April 30 and May 1, militants clashed with FACA and PMCs near Zémio, Haut-Mbomou Prefecture, leaving four FACA soldiers dead and two others injured. On June 1, militants clashed with PMCs in the same area, killing three PMCs. On December 2, FACA and PMCs launched an operation against FPRC rebels, killing three near the Aouk River in Vakaga prefecture. On December 25, PMCs carried out further operations in Sarayebo, Vakaga prefecture, killing eight. The following day, on December 26, PMCs returned with helicopters and armoured vehicles, killed 24 people, and burned down the market buildings. Hundreds of residents fled to Chad or to cities further south. Authorities alleged all victims had been

part of rebel groups operating in the area, yet local sources spoke of civilians.

Further, the Military Coalition for the Salvation of the People and Recovery (CMSPR) emerged as a new militant group. On 05/25/24, former rebel leader Armel Sayo founded the CMSPR, bringing together several armed organizations with the proclaimed objective “to restore peace, security and order”. On February 3, CMSPR clashed with FACA in the village of Bodjomo, Ouham Prefecture, killing five soldiers and injuring three others. On February 26, CMSPR reportedly clashed with security forces near the Balaka mining site, Ouaka Prefecture, leading to nine deaths, including six civilians.

Militants supported by herders also repeatedly attacked civilians. For instance, on January 22, WTA attacked a Fulani camp near Mboki, Haut-Mbomou Prefecture, over alleged association with UPC and the Muslim community with machetes, resulting in the death of 13 civilians. Following the incident, on January 23 and 24, security forces arrested 16 WTA militants. On February 25, Fulani herders and 3R attacked the village of Nzoro, Lim-Pendé Prefecture, killing at least 10 civilians, burning at least 760 houses, and forcing around 5,000 residents to flee to surrounding areas. Between February 14 and March 9, herders and suspected 3R militants clashed with local self-defence groups near Bozoum, Ouham-Pendé Prefecture, resulting in the death of at least 20 civilians and the displacement of approximately 10,000 civilians. On March 17, 3R militants attacked Pama village, near Boda, Lobaye Prefecture, while pursuing Fulani herders, triggering clashes. In response, local youth organized a self-defence group to protect the herders, killing one militant. The following day, the militants allegedly retaliated, killing eight civilians.

Furthermore, rebels tried to prevent elections in some localities. For instance, on December 28, election day, rebels abducted two officials and took control of the town of Bambouti in Haut-Mbomou prefecture.

Unidentified militants attacked MINUSCA throughout June. For instance, on June 21, unidentified militants killed a peacekeeper after attacking a MINUSCA force patrol 34 kilometres north-east of Birao, Vakaga prefecture. This attack came a few days after the wounding of two Nepalese peacekeepers on June 14 near Zémio, Haut-Mbomou prefecture. In recent months, MINUSCA has maintained or established temporary operating bases in Bambouti, Mboki and Dembia to prevent additional violence.

On April 19, the government in the capital of N'Djamena signed an agreement with 3R and UPC which outlines provisions for a ceasefire, the dissolution of both groups and the establishment of cantonment sites to support disarmament and reintegration. In a subsequent statement on April 25, the leaders of 3R and UPC called on their members to lay down their weapons. On June 16, CPC issued a statement criticizing the 3R's decision to rejoin the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic (APPR-RCA), claiming it resulted from political pressure intended to divide armed groups. [jug](#)

CHAD (INTER-COMMUNAL RIVALRY)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **1947**

Conflict parties: pastoralists vs. farmers
Conflict items: subnational predominance

The violent crisis over subnational predominance between

farmers and herders (or pastoralists) continued.

Natural disasters, the drying up of Lake Chad, increased desertification, and soil degradation exacerbated inter-communal tensions over the control of dwindling resources such as grazing land and water. Conflict often stemmed from pastoralists' animals encroaching onto farmer agricultural land.

While a large number of casualties remained unreported throughout the year, farmers and pastoralists clashed on multiple occasions. For instance, on May 15, Ngambaye farmers and Fulani herders clashed in the village of Mandakao, Logone-Occidental, allegedly over grazing and farming areas. The clashes left at least 35 people dead and at least six people injured. Following the clashes, the military was deployed to the area.

Further, on September 21, a pastoralist killed one farmer after a dispute over grazing land in Baké, Kouh-Ouest, Logone-Oriental. As a result, further clashes ensued, leaving seven more people dead and at least seven others injured. Security forces arrested some suspects.

On 4 November, two communities in Adidebé in Hadjer-Lamis Province clashed over a well which is vital for providing water to the region, leaving at least 13 people dead. [twe](#)

CHAD (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **2** | Change: **↘** | Start: **1990**

Conflict parties: opposition groups vs. government
Conflict items: national power

The violent crisis over national power between opposition groups and the government de-escalated to a non-violent crisis.

On January 22, opposition leaders in the capital of N'Djamena protested the election results that had been published by the Constitutional Council a day before. On January 28, opposition leader Succès Masra announced his intention to work alongside Déby's government to ensure the stability and development of the country.

On May 16, security forces arrested Masra at his home in the capital N'Djamena, accusing him of inciting hatred in connection with deadly clashes on May 14 between farmers and herders in the south-west of the country [→ Chad (inter-communal rivalry)]. Masra denied all charges. His Transformers party accused the government of kidnapping. Succès Masra, originally from the south of the country, enjoys widespread popularity among the predominantly Christian and southern populations, who feel marginalized by the predominantly Muslim regime in N'Djamena.

From June 24 - 30, Masra went on a hunger strike to protest his custody. On July 7, Masra's lawyers issued a formal appeal to French President Emmanuel Macron, urging him to intervene in what they described as a politically motivated legal case. On August 9, a court in N'Djamena sentenced Masra to 20 years in prison for allegedly disseminating racist and xenophobic messages that incited violence.

On September 15, the National Assembly and on October 3, the Parliament approved a bill introducing constitutional amendments. The bill extends the presidential term from five to seven years, removes term limits, and allows the president to hold partisan positions. Opposition parties boycotted the vote and Human Rights Watch condemned the bill as a setback for rule of law and democracy in the country. [dak](#)

CÔTE D'IVOIRE (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1999**Conflict parties: opposition groups vs. government
Conflict items: national power

The violent crisis over national power between the ruling Rally of Houphouëtists for Democracy and Peace (RHDP), led by President Alassane Ouattara, and opposition parties, primarily the Democratic Party of Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI-RDA) and the African People's Party–Côte d'Ivoire (PPA-CI) led by former president Laurent Gbagbo, continued. Pre-electoral tensions emerged ahead of both the presidential and legislative elections.

Legal and state restrictions were taken to limit political activity and opposition participation. On June 4, the Independent Electoral Commission (CEI) disqualified several opposition figures, including Tidjane Thiam (PDCI), Laurent Gbagbo, Charles Blé Goudé, and Guillaume Soro, from the October presidential election due to nationality and judicial eligibility issues. On October 18, authorities imposed a nationwide ban on political demonstrations, exempting only the five approved presidential candidates. In December, PDCI-RDA legislative candidates in Port-Bouët reported the disappearance of approximately 36,000 voter cards from polling stations while under CEI custody.

Physical confrontations, demonstrations, with resulting casualties or property damage between groups occurred.

On August 1, unidentified armed individuals attacked opposition supporters with machetes, severely injuring one person and damaging a bus and a police vehicle. In October, the intensity escalated. On October 11, protests against the exclusion of opposition candidates took place in Abidjan; security forces killed one person and used checkpoints and tear gas to disperse demonstrators. On October 13, barricades were erected on the main road to Ghana, resulting in one death. Between October 19 and 21, road blockades in Bla, Tchébléguhé, Sapia, and Daloa led to one death and property damage. On October 25, demonstrators attacked CEI offices in Gbolouville and clashed over voting activities in Nahio, causing three deaths, nineteen injuries, and property destruction.

Arrests and detentions specifically targeted members of the PDCI, PPA-CI, and union leadership. Between July and October, authorities carried out multiple arrests targeting opposition figures and networks. In September, further arrests targeted opposition networks. Amid the protests, at least 700 people were arrested. Following the elections, senior PPA-CI figures were summoned by police, and Damana Pickass, a senior PPA-CI leader, was arrested near Abidjan.

Alassane Ouattara secured a fourth mandate in the October presidential election after major opposition figures were excluded from the ballot. Opposition actors challenged the legitimacy of the process, citing candidate disqualifications, restrictions on opposition activities, and low turnout in several regions. On November 6, the PPA-CI announced its boycott of the legislative elections scheduled for December 27. Furthermore, Laurent Gbagbo published an open letter announcing his intention to request the ICC to reopen investigations into the 2002–2011 Ivorian crises.

Legislative elections were held on December 27 to renew the National Assembly. The ruling RHDP won 197 of 255 seats, while the PDCI-RDA secured 32 seats.

The outcome consolidated government power while intensifying political polarization over political inclusion and legitimacy. pzu

DJIBOUTI (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2011**Conflict parties: BSN vs. government
Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The violent crisis over national power and system/ideology between Le Bloc pour le Salut National (BSN) and the government continued.

On January 30, the government carried out a drone strike on the buffer zone in Siyaru Kebele, Elidar District, along the free zone between Ethiopia and Djibouti, killing at least eight civilians. According to the government, the attack targeted fighters of the Front pour la restauration de l'unité et de la démocratie (FRUD), (an armed group that had emerged in 1991 from the Afar–Issa conflict and had since operated primarily as a political party). On March 2, the state filed an appeal in the trial over the release of Yacoub Omar Ali, a Belgian–Djiboutian national who criticized the government and had been arrested upon entering the country in November 2024 in Djibouti-Ville, Djibouti region.

On June 15, security forces summoned Adan Mohamed Abdou and Dr. Kadar Abdi Ibrahim, co-chairs of the opposition alliance Bloc pour le salut national (BSN), for alleged criticism of President Ismaël Omar Guelleh at a party conference and confiscated their passports. In the same month, police arrested Abdirazak Bandouq, a former Ministry of Budget employee, in Djibouti-Ville, Djibouti region after he allegedly photographed the car of presidential advisor Alexis Mohamed, the president's nephew. On June 19, police arrested Ali Mirah Chehem Daoud, former Minister for Maritime Affairs, in Djibouti Ville on alleged political grounds.

In the second half of the year, tensions between the opposition and the government increased in light of the presidential elections in April 2026.


On September 29, security forces in Ali-Sabieh, Ali-Sabieh region, arrested opposition member Ali Mahamoud Doualeh of the Mouvement pour le Renouveau Démocratique et le Développement (MRD), who had been arrested multiple times in the past. On October 23, police detained two young men in the Hodan district, Djibouti region, for expressing opposition on social media to a potential sixth presidential term and the planned constitutional amendment. In November, the National Assembly adopted the constitutional revision (Law No. 192/AN/25/9th L) that removed the presidential age limit, enabling a potential sixth term for President Ismaël Omar Guelleh, and introduced a five-year residency requirement restricting opposition and diaspora candidates. On November 20, young students organized a demonstration against unemployment, which took place amid a broader tightening of state control marked by an increased number of arrests of journalists and political critics toward the end of the year. vne

DR CONGO (AFC / M23)

Intensity: **5** | Change: • | Start: **2004**

Conflict parties: AFC/M23 vs. government vs. other militias

Conflict items: national power, subnational predominance, resources



The war over national power, subnational predominance and resources between the Alliance Fleuve Congo/March 23 Movement (AFC/M23), the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), and the Armed Forces of the DR Congo (FARDC), supported by MONUSCO and the Southern African Development Community Mission in the DR Congo (SAMIDRC), and local militias, continued in the North Kivu and South Kivu provinces, eastern DR Congo.

According to UN investigations, the AFC/M23 were supported by the government of Rwanda, including the Rwandan Defence Force (RDF). Even though on November 15 the government of the DRC and AFC/M23 signed the Doha Framework for a Comprehensive Peace Agreement, including a protocol on ceasefire oversight, violence continued throughout November and December. Throughout the year, the militia launched a series of offensives and clashed repeatedly with FARDC and local militias, and expanded its territorial control, leading to at least 4,546 deaths throughout the year.

On January 27 AFC/M23 expanded its territorial control to the city of Goma, North Kivu, supported by RDF aerial strikes. Fighting between AFC/M23, Wazalendo, FARDC, MONUSCO and SAMIDRC led to an estimated 2900 deaths, among them three MONUSCO peacekeepers and at least ten SAMIDRC soldiers. On April 19, SAMIDRC troops started withdrawing from Goma, ultimately completing their withdrawal from the DRC on May 1, ending the mission mandate.

Clashes in North Kivu continued throughout the year, following the capture of Goma. For instance, on April 11, Wazalendo, FARDC and FDLR attacked AFC/M23 positions in Goma, leaving 52 dead. AFC/M23 withdrew from Kagheri on March 6, following an attack by FARDC, after they previously captured the village on February 2. On April 2, FARDC and Wazalendo recaptured the strategic mining town Walikale. On June 15 and 16, AFC/M23 clashed with Wazalendo militiamen, leaving at least seven dead. On December 29, FARDC, supported by Wazalendo, clashed with AFC/M23 and recaptured the village of Katoyi.

AFC/M23 continued its advance to South Kivu throughout the year. For instance, on February 17, AFC/M23 captured the town of Bukavu. Clashes with FARDC led to at least 26 deaths. March 10, FARDC troops shelled the Minembwe airfield, destroying aircrafts and leading to the death of 20 AFC/M23 militiamen. On December 2, FARDC and AFC/M23 clashed in the villages of Kaziba and Kamanyola, South Kivu. During the fighting a shell hit a residential building, leaving thirteen civilians killed. On December 12, the town of Uvira, provincial capital of South Kivu, was captured by the AFC/M23. An estimated 10 000 civilians fled the area.

Civilians were continuously affected by clashes and violence. For instance, on March 12, AFC/M23 set fire to around 200 houses in the villages of Tongo and Bambo, North Kivu. On May 20, 3,600 civilians were internally displaced in Kalehe, South Kivu, due to fighting between Wazalendo and AFC/M23. On July 16, at least 19 civilians were killed in Bukera, South Kivu, during an attack by AFC/M23. From July 21 to 22, fighting in the villages of Kasenyi, Katobotobo, Karoba, Luke, Bukumbiriri, Muko, Nkobe and Banakindi, North Kivu, between Wazalendo and AFC/M23, led to the death of at least eight civilians and seven injured. In an act of reprisal, AFC/M23 killed 20 civilians on October 12 in the villages of Lukweti and Kibati, North Kivu. On December 14, AFC/M23 forced 23,000 civilians to be displaced from several villages in the Ikobo group, North Kivu. pha, Iha

DR CONGO (BANTU – BATWA)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2013**

Conflict parties: Bantu militias vs. Batwa militias

Conflict items: subnational predominance

The violent crisis over subnational predominance between the Bantu and Batwa people in Tanganyika province continued.

On March 7, Twa and Bakata Katanga militia [→ DR Congo (Kata Katanga)] attacked the village of Kamena, Moba territory. During the resulting clash with the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC), three militiamen died and one soldier was wounded. No further incidents between Twa and Bantu militia were reported from April onwards.


Since April 9, the DR Congo has regained eligibility for the UN Peacebuilding Fund, enabling continued financing of various peacebuilding projects in the province through this mechanism. Peacebuilding efforts between Bantu and Batwa communities continued in Tanganyika province. Several projects aimed at strengthening peaceful coexistence were implemented, focusing on both social cohesion and economic recovery. These initiatives included the construction of schools, houses, and health centers, as well as support for education, community markets, and agricultural activities. agr

DR CONGO (ITURI MILITIAS)

Intensity: **5** | Change: • | Start: **1999**

Conflict parties: CODECO, CRP, FPIC, FRPI, MAPI, Zaire militia vs. government

Conflict items: subnational predominance, resources



The war over subnational predominance and resources, especially gold, between the militant groups Cooperative for the Development of Congo (CODECO), Patriotic and In-

tegrationist Force of Congo (FPIC), Zaïre militia, Front for Patriotic Resistance in Ituri (FRPI), Mouvement d'autodéfense populaire de l'Ituri (MAPI), and Convention pour la libération Populaire (CRP), on the one hand, and the government, supported by MONUSCO and the Uganda Peoples' Defence Forces (UPDF), on the other, continued in the Ituri province, eastern DR Congo.

Despite the ongoing declaration of a state of siege by the government and the signing of the Aru 2 peace agreement on June 28 between CODECO, FRPI, FPIC, MAPI, and Zaïre Militia, the security situation remained critical in Djugu and Mahagi territories, as well as in the north of Irumu territory and Mambasa territory. In Djugu territory the highest activity of militias was reported, whereas the situation in Aru territory stabilized. Throughout the year, various Ituri militias, armed with rifles and machetes, attacked and abducted civilians, looted livestock, burned down houses, fought over the control of goldmines and clashed with the Armed Forces of the DR Congo (FARDC) and MONUSCO, as well as the UPDF, leading to at least 635 deaths.

Throughout the year, CODECO, an umbrella association subsuming different factions of militants primarily from the Lendu community, remained the most active of all Ituri militias. For instance, on February 11, CODECO attacked the villages of Laudjo, Lindu, and Lodja, near the IDP site of Djaiba, Djugu, killing 58 civilians with rifles and machetes and burning down at least 30 houses. On June 5, CODECO attacked the village of Tsotso, Djugu, killing at least six civilians. On July 21, several hundred CODECO militiamen attacked the villages of Lopa and Nizi, Djugu. The raid led to 21 civilians killed, an estimated 20,000 IDPs and the vandalization of the catholic church in Lopa.

From mid-March onwards, the UPDF expanded its Operation Shujaa, primarily targeting ADF (→ DR Congo, Uganda (ADF)), to Djugu and Mahagi, repeatedly clashing with CODECO. In Djugu, from March 18 to 19, UPDF and CODECO clashed in the village of Fataki, which killed at least 240 people. Both clashed again in the village of Bethlehem, on March 25, leading to at least nine deaths. On April 17, UPDF bombed alleged CODECO camps in the villages of Mbuchama, Buchu, and Kana, destroying at least 126 houses. Civilians from nine surrounding villages fled from the area. On May 18, CODECO ambushed an UPDF convoy in the village of Lidda, leaving at least six killed.

Zaïre militia, comprising mainly of members of the Hema community, had formed in 2020 as a self-defense group following persistent attacks against their communities, allied with the Convention pour la libération Populaire (CRP) militia, that emerged in March. Allegedly, the CRP stands in partnership with AFC/M23 (→ DR Congo (AFC/M23)). On various occasions, CRP and Zaïre militia clashed with FARDC. For instance, on March 3, FARDC captured the village of Nyamamba, Djugu, using military helicopters and artillery. On April 14, CRP and Zaïre militia attacked the FARDC 332nd Naval Base in the village of Joo, Djugu, leaving at least ten militiamen and one FARDC soldier killed. On May 16, CRP and Zaïre militia clashed with FARDC in the villages of Malabo, Virakpa, and Pri, Djugu, with FARDC, using helicopters and bombs. At least 14 people were killed, and civilians from more than 37 villages fled the area. On August 13, CRP clashed with FARDC in the villages of Nizi and Lopa, Djugu, leading to a nearby IDP camp hit by shells fired from both sides. At least 19 civilians and 12 CRP militiamen were killed in the clash.

On April 16, two factions of the FPIC clashed in the village of Kunda, Irumu territory. Iha

DR CONGO (KATA KATANGA)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **2011**

Conflict parties: Kata Katanga vs. government

Conflict items: secession, subnational predominance, resources

The violent crisis over subnational predominance and secession between the Kata Katanga militia and the government continued. This year, Kata Katanga operated in Tanganyika province.


On March 7, the Kata Katanga militia, reportedly allied with the Twa (→ DR Congo (Bantu - Batwa)), attempted to raid the village of Kamena, Moba territory. The ensuing clash between the militia and the Armed Forces of the DR Congo (FARDC) resulted in the deaths of three militiamen and the injury of one FARDC soldier. ssc

DR CONGO (MAYI-MAYI ET AL.)

Intensity: **4** | Change: **↗** | Start: **2003**

Conflict parties: NDC-R vs. APCLS vs. Babembe militias vs. Nyatura groups vs. FPP/AP vs. Banyamulenge militias vs. Bafuliro militias vs. Mayi-Mayi groups et al. vs. government

Conflict items: subnational predominance, resources



The violent crisis over subnational power and resources in the eastern provinces of South Kivu (SK), North Kivu (NK), and Ituri escalated to a limited war. The conflict involved not only clashes between local armed groups and the Armed Forces of the DR Congo (FARDC), supported by MONUSCO, but also frequent fighting among the militias themselves.

From January to December, Mayi-Mayi militias' dynamics across eastern DRC were driven by new alliances, territorial gains, and persistent clashes with the FARDC. As fighting between M23 and FARDC continued in eastern Congo (→ DR Congo (AFC / M23)), various Mayi-Mayi factions engaged FARDC, contributing to widespread displacement.

On February 26, Twirwaneho, backed by Red Tabara rebels, officially joined the AFC/M23. On March 7, General Kasereka Kasiano, known as Kabido and leader of the Front of Patriots for Peace/People's Army (FPP/AP), also aligned with AFC/M23, confirmed the group's adhesion to the Front Commun de la Résistance (FCR), a coalition including FPP/AP and Nduma Defence of Congo-Renovated/Mapenzi (NDC-R/M). Not all Mayi-Mayi groups accepted the alliance. The Kifuafrica group rejected Kabido's move, saying their movement remains ideologically and operationally independent from both FPP/AP and AFC/M23.


Violence increased in North Kivu province. For instance, on January 31, a Union of Patriots for the Liberation of Congo

(UPLC) fighter died in a militia clash in Ngazi, Lubero territory. On February 7, UPLC gunmen killed five civilians and injured four others in Beni territory. On June 12, FARDC arrested Kabido, the FPP/AP leader, in Butembo city, transferring him to the capital Kinshasa. The FARDC-UPDF coalition, primarily focused on fighting ADF [→ DR Congo, Uganda (ADF)], engaged Mayi-Mayi forces in Lubero territory. For instance, on June 28, they bombed Mayi-Mayi camps in Muhola, displacing civilians. By July 4, they recaptured Muhola hill, a key base of Mayi-Mayi commander “Le Blanc” and regained several localities in Lubero territory, causing mass displacement. On August 8 and 9, the FARDC attacked Mayi-Mayi positions in Manzia groupement, Lubero Territory, and retook several areas. On December 13, a land dispute in Waloa Loanda groupement, Walikale territory, led a Kifuafua militiaman to kill an FDLR soldier. In reprisal, on December 15, FDLR fighters under self-proclaimed General Mudayongwa clashed with Mai-Mai Kifuafua militiamen in Tuonane village, Walikale territory, killing at least four, including two Kifuafua fighters. Hundreds of residents fled across the Hombo agglomeration, including the villages of Kifuruka, Kaundju, Katambira, and Busurungi. On February 19, the FARDC killed Twirwaneho commander Col. Rukunda “Makanika” in a drone strike in Minembwe, Fizi territory, South Kivu province. On February 21, Twirwaneho forces captured Minembwe, followed by Mikenge on February 25, forcing FARDC and Force de Défense Nationale du Burundi to withdraw. On August 9, AFC/M23 and Mayi-Mayi Twirwaneho captured the villages of Kaniola, Mulamba, Muhola and seized Nzibira, a strategic locality in Walungu Territory that hosts a government airfield, completing their control of three key positions. In Ituri province, local Mayi-Mayi factions clashed. Between July 21 and 23, clashes between FPP/AP and UPLC militias in Babila Babombi, Mambasa territory, displaced residents from three villages to Biakato and Mangina in North Kivu province. nme

DR CONGO (MOBONDO – TEKE)

Intensity: 4 | Change: • | Start: 2022

Conflict parties: Mobondo vs. Teke
Conflict items: subnational predominance



The limited war over subnational predominance in western DR Congo, mainly across Mai-Ndombe, Kwango, Kinshasa, and Kwilu provinces, between Teke-aligned communities and the government, on the one hand, and the Mobondo militia, associated with Yaka communities, on the other, continued. The conflict, rooted in land and customary disputes dating to 2022, saw intensified military operations under Operation Ngemba. The year saw at least 191 deaths directly caused by the conflict and a rise in kidnappings by the Mobondo militia. Between January 1 to 7, the Armed Forces of the DR Congo (FARDC) engaged Mobondo units along the Kwamouth–Bagata axis, spanning Mai-Ndombe and Kwilu provinces, and killed twelve militiamen. On January 31,

clashes with the FARDC occurred in Nkomakiro village, Mai-Ndombe province, resulting in seven deaths among the militiamen. On February 7, FARDC forces repelled a Mobondo militia attack on Bunsele village, Mai-Ndombe province, killing six. On February 22, fighting in Ntomo village, Mai-Ndombe province, and near Mongata, Kinshasa province, resulted in nine Mobondo militia and six military deaths. Between March 2-5, FARDC operations dismantled five Mobondo bases across Kwamouth Territory and resulted in 15 fatalities among militiamen. On April 15, Mobondo militiamen ransacked an electricity post in Tobakita, near Kinsele, Kinshasa province, forcing personnel to flee and causing power outages in the region. Factional tensions emerged in May. On May 17 and May 19, rival Mobondo factions clashed near Kinsele village, Kwamouth territory, Mai-Ndombe province, killing six combatants, destroying farms, and displacing villagers. On August 7, militiamen assaulted travelers on National Road 1 in Kenge territory, Kwango province, looting vehicles and stealing nearly 20 million Congolese francs. Between August 9 and 10, clashes between Mobondo militia and FARDC in Mbankana, Kinshasa province, resulted in three militia deaths. Attacks on civilians by the Mobondo militia persisted throughout the year. On April 1, the Mobondo militia decapitated thirteen civilians at Ferme Kabiyala, near Mayala village, Kwilu province. In response, FARDC operations neutralized five assailants and recovered military weapons. On July 21, Mobondo militia abducted several civilians near Mbankana, Kinshasa province, resulting in one death. On September 23, members of the Mobondo militia decapitated a farmer in Nke, Kinshasa province. On October 25, Mobondo fighters hijacked a vehicle carrying agricultural goods in Wamba, Bagata territory, Kwilu province, seizing over 100 sacks of produce and injuring crew members. On November 23, Mobondo militiamen attacked the village of Nkana, Mai-Ndombe province, and clashed with FARDC, killing six civilians, five militiamen and one military. On December 29, FARDC and the Mobondo militia clashed in Kikwit, Kwilu province, resulting in the death of five soldiers and 15 militiamen, as well as the seizure of several weapons. aca

DR CONGO (MONUSCO PROTESTS)

Intensity: 3 | Change: • | Start: 2022

Conflict parties: MONUSCO personnel vs. civil society
Conflict items: other

The violent crisis over foreign presence between anti-MONUSCO protesters, heterogeneous local aggregations and the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), supported by the Congolese government, continued. The conflict escalated in July 2022, when demonstrations in Goma and Butembo, North Kivu province, and Uvira, South Kivu province, against MONUSCO’s perceived ineffectiveness in protecting civilians led to at least 36 deaths and the destruction of UN facilities. In January 2025, renewed tensions emerged amid the rapid M23 advance and capture of Goma, North Kivu [→ DR Congo (AFC / M23)]. On January 28, protests in Kinshasa, Kinshasa province, spread to several districts surrounding UN and foreign diplomatic compounds, where demonstrators damaged property and clashed with police forces who dispersed them using tear gas. Further demonstrations occurred on 17 Febru-

ary in Goma, where around 100 protesters gathered outside MONUSCO bases demanding the mission's departure. [aca](#)

DR CONGO (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **2** | Change:  | Start: **1997**

Conflict parties: church groups, civil society groups, opposition parties vs. government

Conflict items: national power

The violent crisis over national power between opposition parties, civil society groups, and church groups, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, de-escalated to a non-violent crisis.

The conflict between the government and the AFC/M23 [→ DR Congo (AFC / M23)], as well as the oppression of the opposition through DRC's juridical system unified the oppositional parties against the government. On January 24, representatives of Ensemble pour la République, LGD, ACRDe, ECIDE, PPRD, and COFEDEC published a statement, condemning the measures taken by the government against AFC/M23. On January 27, riots broke out in Kinshasa condemning inaction of the international community [→ DR Congo (MONUSCO protests)].

On January 15, the Episcopal Conference of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (CENCO) and the Church of Christ in the Congo (ECC) announced their collaboration for a roadmap to peace between AFC/M23 and the DRC. CENCO/ECC faced suppression by the government. For instance, on February 26, officials of the Airport in Lubumbashi, Haut-Katanga province, confiscated the passport of CENCO's Secretary General, Donatien Nshole.


Different opposition leaders continued to be targets of oppression. For instance, on January 15 intelligence agents arrested the spokesperson of Ensemble pour la République. On April 20, the DRC's Constitutional Court sentenced former prime minister, Augustin Matata Ponyo and the former governor of DR Congo's central bank, Deogratias Mutombo, to ten and five years of forced labor. Subsequently, Ponyo went into exile. On April 19, President Félix Tshisekedi suspended former president Joseph Kabila's People's Party for Reconstruction and Democracy (PPRD). On May 22, the DRC's senate voted in favor of lifting former president Joseph Kabila's immunity over his alleged links to the AFC/M23. On September 30, the High Military Court of the DRC sentenced former president Joseph Kabila to death. After Kabila invited several opposition figures on October 14 to a meeting in Nairobi, Kenya, the Ministry of Interior and Security suspended 12 political parties. [nif](#)

DR CONGO, UGANDA (ADF)

Intensity: **4** | Change:  | Start: **1995**

Conflict parties: ADF vs. DR Congo, Uganda

Conflict items: system/ideology, subnational pre-dominance, resources



The war over the orientation of the political system, sub-national predominance, and resources between the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) on the one hand, and the governments of DR Congo and Uganda, supported by MONUSCO, on the other, de-escalated to a limited war. ADF is also referred to as the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (ADF-NALU), Madina at Tauheed Wau Mujahedeen (MTM), or the Congolese branch of Islamic State's Central Africa Province (ISCAP-DRC).

The Islamist militants mostly attacked civilians through raids on villagers and farmers, ambushes on the road, and attacks to the infrastructure, such as health clinics or mining sites. The group mainly operated in DR Congo's eastern regions, predominantly in the Ituri and North Kivu Provinces, and to a much smaller extent in the Maniema and Tshopo Provinces. Its activities in Uganda were limited. This year, the conflict accounted for at least 862 deaths.

In DR Congo, North Kivu was particularly affected by violence from ADF. There were at least 656 deaths. In January alone, ADF killed 180 civilians. Between December 30 and January 3, ADF attacked Manzia village in Lubero territory, North Kivu, and set multiple homes on fire, killing at least 91 civilians. This modus operandi has been consistent with further ADF activities during the year. Between February 12 and 15, ADF militants took 100 civilians hostage. The bodies of 70 civilians were discarded in a protestant church. On May 8, ADF rebels targeted three villages in the Lubero Territory. They killed 30 civilians and led to a massive displacement wave of people trying to flee towards safer areas. On September 9, ADF rebels targeted civilians at a funeral ceremony. 89 civilians were killed, hundreds of families displaced, and the mining operations in the area disrupted. On October 13, ADF militiamen targeted two villages in Lubero Territory, killed 19 civilians, injured two, and set over 20 houses on fire.

Ituri Province was the second most impacted by ADF raids. For instance, between February 1 and 4, ADF militiamen attacked multiple villages on RN4 and killed at least 23 civilians. On July 12, an ADF cell targeted Otmaber village and killed four civilians. On July 27, ADF targeted a night vigil in Komanda village, killed 43 civilians, injured 9, and took more than 30 people hostage, prompting thousands to flee the area. ISIS claimed responsibility for this attack on their Telegram channel. On August 15, ADF rebels targeted multiple towns simultaneously, killed four civilians and set fire to houses. On September 18, ADF members crossed RN4 multiple times, prompting hundreds of civilians to flee. The violent attacks in Ituri diminished towards the end of the year.

To counter the violence, the DRC and Uganda extended the mandate of Operation Shujaa until September 2025. On July 6, joint FARDC-UPDF forces launched an operation against ADF bases in the Mambasa Territory. Their main target was ADF leader Musa Baluku. They managed to weaken the ADF stronghold in the region. At the same time, Baluku escaped, ADF rebels split into small groups, and got revenge on the local population. Between July 8 and 10 they killed at least 33 civilians with machetes and firearms and took dozens hostage.

ADF militants further collided with local militia. For instance, on June 25 ADF rebels fought against Maï-Maï militiamen, killed two of them and took about 40 civilians hostage. They were also involved in a skirmish with Wazalendo forces on September 22 in Lubero Territory, killing two of them and

injuring two civilians.

ADF also targeted mining operations, for instance by attacking the Angola 1 and Angola 2 mining camps in Banango, Lubero Territory, on June 7. Additionally, they captured cattle and agricultural goods. The biggest cattle theft of the year occurred on February 8, when ADF militiamen raided multiple villages in the Bapere sector, collecting over 918 animals from civilians. fma

EGYPT – ETHIOPIA, SUDAN (GERD)

Intensity: **1** | Change:  | Start: **2011**

Conflict parties: Egypt vs. Ethiopia vs. Sudan

Conflict items: resources

The non-violent crisis over the water allocation of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) between Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia de-escalated to a dispute.

In July, the United States renewed its diplomatic involvement in the GERD dispute. President Donald Trump publicly stated that his administration was working to resolve the disagreement over the Nile waters. However, the initiative did not result in new formal negotiations.

On September 9, the dam was officially inaugurated. The event was boycotted by Egypt and Sudan, both of which reiterated calls for a legally binding agreement to govern the dam's operation. On the same day, Egypt sent a letter to the President of the UN Security Council, highlighting international law violations by the GERD's operation.


Flooding in parts of Sudan and southern Egypt occurred in October. Egyptian officials attributed the flooding to uncoordinated water releases from the GERD, while Ethiopia rejected the accusation, asserting that the dam had in fact mitigated the floods. epa

ETHIOPIA (FANO MILITIAS / AMHARA)

Intensity: **5** | Change:  | Start: **2023**

Conflict parties: Fano militias vs. government

Conflict items: autonomy, subnational predominance



The war over subnational predominance and autonomy between the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF), federal security forces, and allied regional units on one side, and the different Fano militias, most notably the Amhara Fano National Force (AFNF), on the other, continued in the Amhara region. Both sides repeatedly used heavy weapons and conducted operations in populated areas, leading to military as well as civilian casualties.

In the first months of the year, federal forces increasingly relied on drone strikes that repeatedly hit residential areas. For instance, on February 9, a drone strike by ENDF, allegedly targeted against Fano militias, hit a house in Zenbo Kebele,

Amhara Region, and killed three civilians. Four days later, on February 13, another drone strike killed four civilians and destroyed several houses in Jibgodo, Amhara Region. On February 20, a further strike in East Gojjam Zone killed 16 people and injured 10.

Clashes intensified in the year, especially around several counter offensives from Fano militias, as well as the ENDF. The first counter operation, "Operation Unity", was declared by Fano militias on March 18. In the coming weeks, fighting intensified. For instance, on April 4, Fano fighters allegedly killed 50 government forces in Kutaber area, Amhara Region. During the counteroffensive, violence against civilians has been reported on both sides. For instance, a drone strike by ENDF killed 33 civilians in Central Gondar, Amhara Region. Clashes between ENDF and Fano militias have been reported in the area in the weeks before. In another instance, on March 31, government security forces allegedly killed at least 40 civilians in a house to house search in North Gojjam Zone, Amhara Region. On the other hand, Fano militias killed at least 20 civilians in Abe Dongoro District, Oromia Region, and abducted at least 3 civilians. Clashes stayed intense with high casualties throughout April, May, and June. For instance, on April 17, a drone strike of the ENDF killed allegedly at least 100 civilians who prepared for the upcoming Easter celebration.

At the end of June, the ENDF moved a large number of troops and started their counteroffensive, "Operation Tide". Clashes have been reported all over Amhara Region, with ENDF claiming that their forces killed at least 83 Fano militias in the week between June 25 and July 2. On the other hand, Fano militias claimed to have killed 170 ENDF forces in the end of July in Belay Zelek Zone, Amhara Region.

The offensive by the ENDF was quickly followed by the counter offensive, "Operation Semaetat", by Fano militias, which started on August 25 all over the Amhara Region. Reportedly, the clashes in the two following months killed at least 300 persons. For instance, on September 3, Fano fighters killed at least 31 people in Abe Dongoro district, Amhara Region.

Further instances of humanitarian workers being attacked have been reported. For example, on August 15, alleged Fano militias abducted three Ethiopian Red Cross Society staff members in North Gondar Zone, Amhara Region. Fano militias tortured one of them, who died from his injuries later, prompting public condemnation from the Red Cross.

Across the year, sources such as EHRC, Human Rights Watch, and humanitarian organizations documented widespread abuses, including extrajudicial killings, abductions, drone and artillery strikes on civilian areas, and attacks on schools and health facilities, while analytical and protection reports indicated that clashes and military operations persisted into the last months of 2025, even where detailed event-level information remained scarce. adr


ETHIOPIA (INTER-COMMUNAL RIVALRY)

Intensity: **4** | Change:  | Start: **2017**

Conflict parties: Oromo vs. Amhara vs. Konso vs. Ale vs. Issa vs. Afar vs. other ethnic groups

Conflict items: subnational predominance, resources

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA



The limited war over resources and subnational predominance between ethnic groups escalated continued.

Early in the year, attacks by unidentified militants dominated the pattern of violence. On March 11, unidentified gunmen killed three local officials, including the district administrator of Werebabo district, South Wollo Zone. On March 22, attackers shot and killed two children in a raid near Arba Minch, Gamo Zone.

On April 9, unidentified armed gunman killed seven civilians and injured four more in an attack on public transport in Abe Dongoro district, Horo Guduru Wollega Zone. In Gambella Region, recurrent raids targeted Anuak herders. For instance, on May 6, militants stole 100 livestock in Nine Kebele, Abobo district, Gambella Region. On June 15, gunmen killed two civilians, while stealing 20 cattle, in a raid nearby Chebo village, Gambella Region. A cross-border attack on May 25 by South Sudanese Murle militants in Dimma district, Gambela Region, killed five Ethiopian civilians, injuring a further five. In late June a surge of killings and abductions occurred. Unidentified gunmen killed three monks and abducted five at Zequala Monastery on June 22. The following day, the unidentified gunmen sixteen truck drivers and abducted five more on Gondar–Metema Road.

Political tensions also resurfaced on July 31, when the Afar People's Party condemned recent administrative restructuring by the Somali Regional Council, warning that it threatened the fragile peace agreement along the Somali–Afar border that was reached in late 2024.

In late October, a series of religiously motivated attacks by unidentified militants in East Arsi Zone, Oromia Region, killed eight Christian civilians and led to four abductions. Violence escalated in Bakuji Kebele of Bulen Woreda, in Benishangul-Gumuz Region on November 22 when Shene militants killed 44 civilians.

At the end of the year a series of attacks by unknown militants killed 4 and injured 8 Nuer civilians on December 12 in Gambella City, Gambella Region. This led to 18 of the accused perpetrators on December 14 being arrested. This resulted in a mutiny within the Gambella city police on December 16, when defecting members of the police killed the police chief due to ethnic divisions. Fighting along ethnic lines continued until December 17 and killed further 10 civilians and injured 50. Large scale attacks on December 24 by unidentified militants killed 47 and injured 100 civilians and fighters alike, in the deadliest escalation of inter-communal violence in 2025. bmo

The limited war over subnational predominance between the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) and the Ethiopian federal government, including the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF), continued.

OLA's main goal is to fight for the self-determination of the Oromo ethnic group, claiming that the Ethiopian government neglects and represses Oromo interests. The government, on the other hand, considers OLA a terrorist organization and has intensified military operations to suppress the group in recent years.


Despite the signing of a peace agreement with an OLA splinter faction in 12/24, and a subsequent decrease in insurgencies at the beginning of the year, conflict peaked again in April and May. On April 4, ENDF killed one of OLA's regional senior commanders and other militants in Haro Limmu District, Oromia region. As self-proclaimed acts of retaliation, several violent clashes on behalf of OLA were recorded at the beginning of April. On the same day, OLA members killed 20 Amhara civilians in Amaya district, Oromia region. On April 7, OLA forces abducted and killed a former OLA member and five of his family members in Garba Gudina town, Oromia region, accusing them of having provided government forces with information on the whereabouts of the previously killed OLA senior commander. The following day, on April 8, OLA forces abducted and killed another former OLA member and seven family relatives in Sugee, Oromia region, also assuming their help in ENDF's killing of OLA's senior commander on April 4. Between April 8 and 12, OLA forces returned to the villages of both previous attacks and killings and killed another 12 family relatives of the former OLA-fighters and other civilians. The remaining family members fled the region. Later in April, several abductions and kidnappings of civilians were reported and attributed to OLA forces. On April 27, OLA abducted an unspecified number of passengers after stopping a vehicle near Abomsa Town, Oromia region. In a different attack, on the same day, in Gumi Idalo, Oromia region, OLA militants abducted 18 civilians, including 13 government employees, after stopping a vehicle on its way to a meeting in Gumi Idalo, Oromia region. On April 29, OLA abducted 50 civilians from a vehicle travelling from Sire district to Adama, Oromia region.

On May 27, during the celebration of Eid al-Adha, OLA militants killed at least 11 members of regional special forces. During the celebrations, perpetrators killed and abducted numerous civilians in Bulen town, Oromia region. On June 6, government security forces again clashed with OLA members in Bulen town, Oromia region, the clash killed more than ten people and injuring several others. On July 9, OLA fighters attacked and killed at least 16 local officials and militia members allied with federal forces in Degem district, Oromia region. On July 16, ENDF killed at least three civilians and destroyed multiple homes during a raid, accusing the civilians of having harbored OLA fighters in Nopha district, Oromia region. On September 10, OLA killed the senior police commander of Oromia's regional special forces in an unknown location in Oromia region. jkn

ETHIOPIA (OLA / OROMIA)

Intensity: **4** | Change: • | Start: **1992**

Conflict parties: OLA vs. government
Conflict items: subnational predominance



ETHIOPIA (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **2005**

Conflict parties: opposition groups vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The non-violent crisis over national power and the orientation of the political system, between various opposition groups such as Enat Party (Enat), Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP), All Ethiopian Unity Party (AEUP) and Boro Democratic Party (BDP), and the federal government of Ethiopia continued. Throughout the year oppositional parties suffered restrictions and detentions, but no cases of violence were reported.

On February 11, the Ethiopian opposition parties Enat, EPRP and AEUP published a statement wherein they criticized the ruling Prosperity Party (PP) for claiming "economic, diplomatic, and political victories" as they see the country on the brink of collapse. On February 23, Enat, EPRP, All Ethiopian Unity Organization (AEO) and Amahra Nationalist Movement published a statement criticizing the government's use of drone strikes on civilians in East Gojjam [→Ethiopia (Fano)]. On March 9, oppositional politician Yohannes Tessema (BDP) was arrested by regional security forces in Benishangul-Gumuz after he criticized the council's seat increase from 99 to 165 unconstitutional. On May 12, Enat, EPRP, AEO and Amahra Nationalist Movement published a statement calling for the urgent need of political and security reforms before Ethiopia's seventh general election in 2026 guaranteeing fair media and ensuring free operating civic institutions. Otherwise, the election might lose credibility. On September 16, the four parties Enat, AEUP, EPRP, Amhara Giyonawi Movement (AGM), and One Ethiopia Democratic Party (OEDP) formed the "Coalition for Ethiopian Unity" to challenge the ruling PP in the upcoming election. In November there were accusations against Ethiopia's National Electoral Board after they suspended a member of the Coalition for Ethiopian Unity and excluded Enat from the coalition, due to "incomplete" requirements. Between December 6 and 7, EPRP announced an open discussion in Addis Ababa to address the situation in Ethiopia. According to the party, the event was cancelled due to unspecified reasons. alg

GABON (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **1** | Change: ▼ | Start: **2009**

Conflict parties: opposition groups vs. government
 Conflict items: national power

The non-violent crisis over national power between the government, on the one hand, and opposition parties, on the other, de-escalated to a dispute.

On 30/08/2023, following presidential elections, the government was ousted from power by the military junta which later formed the Comité pour la transition et la restauration des institutions led by General Brice Oligui Nguema. Based on the constitutional referendum approved on 16/11/24, presidential elections took place on April 12. Nguema won the election with 90% of the vote. Ahead of the vote, the opposition spoke out against the new constitution and electoral code as well as Nguema's candidacy. After the election,

the opposition raised concerns about the fairness of the vote. On October 11, Nguema's Democratic Union of Builders won 102 out of 145 parliamentary seats in the first and second round of legislative elections.

After being released from house arrest, the former ruling family of Ali Bongo left Gabon for Angola on May 17. On November 11, a court tried Bongo's wife and son in absentia and sentenced them to 20 years imprisonment for embezzlement of public funds and other charges.

On November 23, Gabon and France formalized several major bilateral agreements in Libreville to support the transitional government in economic, institutional, and infrastructural reforms. sag

GUINEA (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2006**

Conflict parties: opposition groups vs. government
 Conflict items: national power

The violent crisis over national power between various opposition groups and the ruling military junta under President Mamady Doumbouya continued.

After the coup d'état in 2021, the military junta proposed a 36-month timeline to general elections, which was approved by the interim legislative body, the National Transitional Council (CNT). ECOWAS demanded a shorter timeline for the transition in 2022 and pressured the transition government with sanctions. They agreed on a 24-month transition timeline, starting in January 2023, resulting in elections before the end of 2024. In March 2024, the prime minister stated that the return to civilian rule will delay until at least 2025. This caused a huge outcry among the opposition parties, who want the junta to hold on to the elections in 2024.

In January, the opposition leader Aliou Bah from the Liberal Democratic Movement was sentenced two years for insulting and offending President Doumbouya. In May, the sentence was confirmed in the appeal process.

On January 6, there have been large scale demonstrations in the capital city of Conakry after the junta's failing to meet the deadline for holding elections and establishing a new constitution. The opposition and civil society demanded the return to democracy. One person was fatally shot by the police. Many others were injured and arrested.

In August, the transitional authorities suspended three major opposition parties for 90 days, effectively excluding them from participation in the constitutional referendum scheduled for September 21. The affected parties were the Rally of the Guinean People (RPG), led by former President Alpha Condé, the Union of Democratic Forces of Guinea (UFDG) under former Prime Minister Cellou Dalein Diallo, and the Party of Renewal and Progress (PRP).

On September 21, Guinea held a constitutional referendum. Major opposition parties boycotted the vote and called on the population to abstain from participating in the process. The referendum passed with more than 90 percent voting in favor of the new constitution, according to official results.

In December, Guinea held a presidential election intended to formalize the political transition following the 2021 coup. Junta leader Mamady Doumbouya won the vote with 86.7 percent, according to the country's supreme court. Several major opposition figures were banned from contesting, and civil society organizations and opposition candidates criticized the process as lacking competitiveness and transparency. ssc

KENYA (INTER-COMMUNAL RIVALRY)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1963**

Conflict parties: Akamba vs. Borana vs. Orma vs. Pokot vs. Rendille vs. Toposa vs. Turkana vs. various other tribes

Conflict items: subnational predominance, resources

The violent crisis over resources and subnational predominance between various communities continued.

On March 4, two separate attacks occurred in Kerio Valley killing four people. The first incident took place in Dira, Baringo County, where armed bandits killed a herder and took away an unspecified number of livestock. After the first attack, a retaliatory ambush in Soka Bora, Elgeyo Marakwet County, left 3 people dead.

Around June 5, two people were killed in an intercommunal clash between the Turkana and Samburu communities in Matigari Village, Laikipia County. Several houses were torched in the clash.

On August 30, community clashes in the Mau Narok area, Nakuru County, killed one person, injured eight, set several houses on fire, and left dozens displaced. More than 200 people reportedly invaded the area. Authorities reacted by imposing a seven-day dusk-til-dawn curfew. It remains unclear to which communities the invaders and inhabitants belong to.

In Insiya, Kajiado County, a 71-year old man died after inhaling tear gas following police intervention after the clash of two rival communities. The groups clashed after one group torched two motorbikes belonging to the other group. Police made 7 arrests.

On December 20, in Angata Barikoi, Narok County, intercommunal clashes between the Maasai and Kipsigi communities resulted in the death of at least one person. The clash destroyed 253 houses and displaced at least 1,800 people. The violence is reportedly linked to land and resource disputes between pastoralist communities. [lav](#)

KENYA (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1999**

Conflict parties: Azimio la Umajo One-Kenya Coalition vs. government

Conflict items: national power

The violent crisis over national power between the Communist Party Marxist Kenya (CPM), People's Liberation Party, DAP-K, Civilians on the one hand, and the government of the Kenya Kwanza Alliance (KKA), on the other, continued. As in previous years, protests focused on Nairobi capital and spread countrywide.

On January 11, eight unidentified assailants attempted to assassinate the General Secretary of CPM Kenya. The General Secretary killed one assailant in the process.

Dozens of prominent anti-government critics have gone missing since a youth-led protest movement erupted in June 2024 against a controversial finance bill. Several people were taken after posting cartoons critical of Kenyan President William Ruto and his government to social media in

December 2024. At least 82 critics have gone missing since June. Ruto, police and the government claimed for months that the abductions were misinformation. The activists that have returned were intimidated and threatened into silence. On February 6, the High Court of Kenya declared the ban of protest by the police as unconstitutional and overruled the decision. Security forces met anti-government protests with violence in June and July, killing at least 18 people. For instance, on June 18, protesters clashed with groups carrying clubs and allegedly loyal to the government, in Nairobi. The police shot and injured one person. The protesters demanded the dismissal of the police officer they claim was responsible for the death of a person in custody ten days prior.

On the same day, leading members of the opposition (People's Liberation Party and DAP-K) accused President Ruto's administration of ordering extrajudicial killings, deploying rogue police units, and forming illegal alliances with militia gangs. They are said to be compiling evidence for submission to the International Criminal Court, seeking to have President Ruto held accountable for alleged crimes against humanity. On June 25, protesters gathered to mark the anniversary of last year's deadly anti-tax protests. The protest turned violent when alleged undercover security officials attacked protesters with whips and clubs. Police used live fire, rubber bullets, water cannons and tear gas to disperse the demonstrators. The protests killed at least 8 people and injured approximately 400.

Further, on July 7, police forces killed ten people during anti-government protests. Protesters attacked the police with stones. Police fired and hurled tear gas canisters, injuring demonstrators. [lav](#)

KENYA, ETHIOPIA (INTER-COMMUNAL RIVALRY)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1918**

Conflict parties: Turkana vs. Aari, Dassanach

Conflict items: subnational predominance, resources

The violent crisis over resources and subnational predominance between Turkana on the one hand, and Dassanech and Aari on the other, continued along the Kenya–Ethiopia border, rekindling a cycle of cross-border inter-communal violence that is historically rooted in competition over resources and transnational predominance. The primary conflict remains between Kenya's Turkana pastoral community and Ethiopia's Dassanech & Aari pastoral community, centered around Lake Turkana.

The crisis re-ignited on February 20 and 23, when militants from the Kenyan Turkana region launched cross-border raids into Dassanech Woreda in South Omo Zone, killing two herders and 13 Ethiopian villagers respectively. The attackers looted boats, hundreds of fishing nets, and large stores of dried fish. Ethiopian militants retaliated against Turkana communities, killing at least 20 Kenyan fighters and civilians alike. The clashes caused up to 10 000 people to flee from their homes on the Ethiopian side of the border.

On March 22, violence spilled into Kukruk Kebele, South Omo Zone, when armed groups on both sides attempted mass cattle thefts, leading to clashes killing four Ethiopians, wounding three, and killing one Turkana civilian. In the aftermath, armed Turkana tribesmen attempted to steal hundreds of cattle. Local Ethiopian Dassanech resisted, recovering much of the herd.

On August 10, communities from Turkana and Dassanech Woreda began organizing the symbolic return of stolen livestock, signaling steps to de-escalate the community conflict. These gestures were repeated on August 13.

On September 16, a Turkana raid in the Dassanech district, South Omo Zone, killed one civilian and, while the militants stole more than 2,000 cattle. The following day, five armed Turkana men returned for another incursion, triggering a gunfight. Further violence erupted on November 11, when a clash between Ethiopian Dassanech militiamen and Turkana groups injured four Ethiopians and displaced further civilians. On November 22, a targeted raid by Kenyan militants across the border into Ethiopia's Moyale killed one administrative official and captured two other local officials. bmo

MADAGASCAR (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **NEW** | Start: **2025**

Conflict parties: civil society groups, Gen-Z students, opposition parties vs. government

Conflict items: national power

The new violent crisis over national power erupted between youth-led protesters under the collective "Gen Z Madagascar" and the government.

On September 18, Gen Z Madagascar launched on Instagram and three days later, on September 21, on Facebook. On September 25, Gen Z Madagascar started protesting against persistent water and electricity outages in the capital of Antananarivo, barricading roads with burning tires and rocks, setting fire to several stations of the new cable car system, and looting various stores and banks across the city. Security forces used tear gas and rubber bullets to disperse the protesters. Continuing over the following days, the protests quickly extended to other areas of discontent, including the cost of living, lack of professional opportunities, corruption and nepotism among the elite, calling for political reform and the president's resignation. On September 29, the UN stated that at least 22 people were killed and more than a hundred injured in the first days of protests and accused security forces of violently suppressing what began as peaceful demonstrations. On the same day, President Andry Rajoelina dismissed the prime minister and the entire government in an effort to appease the protesters.

On October 7, responding to a 48-hour ultimatum protesters set for the government to agree to their demands, Rajoelina offered to hold a "national dialogue" with various groups. However, the protesters rejected his offer and called for the protests to continue. During protests in the capital on October 11, soldiers from Capsat, an elite unit of the army, defected and supported protesters in entering the capital's May 13 Square, a central square linked to previous uprisings and cordoned off by security forces. There, the unit's commander, Colonel Michael Randrianirina, declared that his soldiers would disobey orders to suppress the protests and called on President Rajoelina to resign. On October 13, Rajoelina declared in a speech on social media that he had fled Madagascar and asserted that he was still the country's leader.

A day later, on October 14, Colonel Randrianirina announced the military had taken control of the country, after politicians in the national assembly voted to impeach President Rajoelina. Colonel Randrianirina added that the military was dissolving all institutions, except for the lower house of par-

liament. Further, he shared that a committee led by the military would rule the country for a period of up to two years alongside a transitional government before organizing new elections. While there were celebrations in the streets of the capital of Antananarivo following the Colonel's announcement, on October 16, the UN condemned the military takeover and called for the immediate restoration of constitutional order. sag

MALI (FLA, CMA ET AL. / AZAWAD)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↘** | Start: **1989**

Conflict parties: CMA, FLA vs. Platform et al. vs. government

Conflict items: autonomy

The limited war over autonomy of an independent state of Azawad and subnational predominance between the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) and the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA), on the one hand, and the Malian government, on the other, supported by Wagner PMC and the Russian Africa Corps, de-escalated to a violent crisis.

Since Malis independence in 1960, Touareg groups have rebelled several times against the Malian government in order to gain independence or secure autonomy for northern Malis Azawad territory. After the Libyan civil war, having gained military experience, many Touareg groups returned to Mali and trooped together to form the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). In January 2012, MNLA joined forces with jihadist militias to launch an offensive in northern Mali. In April 2012, MNLA declared Azawad an independent state. MNLA lost control of the region because of inter-militia fighting against the jihadist groups before a French military intervention and MINUSMA returned control over Azawad to the Malian government. Peace talks between the government, pro-government Platform and the newly formed pro-independence Coordination of Azawad Movements resulted in the signing of the Algiers Peace Agreement in June 2015. Violence declined in the following years, although the agreement was never fully implemented. In 2023, CMA forces clashed with the Malian Armed Forces (FAMA) and supporting Wagner troops over the control of former UN controlled areas in the Tombouctou region. CMA declared war on the government in September 2023, but lost control over all major cities. In late 2024, rebel groups including MNLA merged in the new political-military coalition Azawad Liberation Front (FLA).

Violence continued this year, and regions most affected by violent measures were Gao, Kidal, and Tombouctou. On February 16 and 17, fighting erupted in Gao and Kidal regions, killing five FLA fighters as well as 24 civilians. On April 3, Nigerien security forces arrested prominent FLA commander Inkinane Ag Attaher near the Niger-Nigeria border. On May 23, FLA launched a drone strike on Soumpi Military camp in Tombouctou region leaving no casualties. On June 13, FLA forces ambushed a military convoy with heavy weapons in Kidal region killing at least 15 fighters and destroying a number of vehicles. In a separate incident, on June 13, a Russian SU-24M warplane crashed in Gao region leaving both pilots injured. FAMA claimed bad weather conditions caused the crash, while FLA claimed responsibility for the downing. On July 14, FLA ambushed another FAMA and Russian Africa Corps convoy. Media reported a possible coordination between FLA and jihadist organization JNIM. On September

29, a FLA spokesperson confirmed a non-aggression pact between FLA and JNIM but denied any cooperation between both organizations. On November 13 and 14, FAMA drone strikes killed at least eleven civilians in Tombouctou region as reported by FLA and civilian sources. fth

MALI (INTER-COMMUNAL RIVALRY / CENTRAL MALI)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2012**

Conflict parties: Bambara, Dogon, Dozo vs. Fulani vs. Islamist groups vs. government
Conflict items: subnational predominance, re-sources

The violent crisis over subnational predominance and re-sources between the Dogon and Bambara ethnic communities and their Dozo and Donso self-defense militias, on the one hand, the Fulani ethnic community, on the other hand, and Islamist groups as well as the government continued, but once again showed a drastic decrease in violence this year. Just like last year, violence shifted to the north of the country [→ Mali (FLA, CMA et al. / Azawad); Mali (inter-militant rivalry / northern Mali)]. Still, the conflict resulted in at least 174 people killed throughout the year.

A MORE DETAILED CONFLICT DESCRIPTION WILL BE ADDED BY THE END OF JULY. pad

MALI (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **2** | Change: ↘ | Start: **2012**

Conflict parties: opposition groups vs. government
Conflict items: national power

The violent crisis over national power between the Malian military government and the opposition de-escalated to a non-violent crisis.

On January 29, Mali, together with Niger and Burkina Faso withdrew from ECOWAS block, after diplomatic tensions caused by ECOWAS' response to the coup d'état in Niger. The three countries are now organized in new regional block Alliance of Sahel States (AES). On February 5, Malian security forces arrested or abducted Daouda Magassa, supporter of opposition and religious leader Imam Mahmoud Dicko. On February 14, the Malian government deployed over a thousand security forces in the capital of Bamako who arrested nine supporters of Dicko after his return to Mali was announced. On March 14, police arrested activist and government critic Badara Alou Sacko, after he criticized new tax laws.


On April 29, the military junta announced the dissolving of all political parties in Mali. The national transitional council also recommended to grant military leader Goïta a renewable 5-year mandate as president. Following this decision on May 3 and 4, several hundred protesters gathered in Bamako. On May 8, security forces separately abducted the leaders of opposition parties El Béchir Thiam and Alhassane Abba. The Malian government formally dissolved all political parties on May 13. On June 11, the government announced a

5-year extension of the transition period. On October 27, a Malian court sentenced former PM Moussa Mara to two years in prison after he criticized the government online. On December 12, Imam Dicko announced the launching of a new coalition of forces for the republic (CFR) in non-violent opposition to the government. Dicko advocated a return to democratic order and to resume the national dialogue. On December 31, PM Goïta announced new consultations on rules in the process of re-establishing parties in April 2026. fth

MALI, BURKINA FASO ET AL. (JNIM ET AL.)

Intensity: **5** | Change: • | Start: **1998**

Conflict parties: Al-Mourabitoun, Ansar Dine, Ansaroul Islam, AQIM, JNIM, Macina Liberation Front vs. Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Chad, France, Mali, Nigeria, Togo, USA
Conflict items: system/ideology, international power



The war over international power and the orientation of the political system between the Islamist group Jama'a Nus-rat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin' (JNIM), various of its subsects and other al-Qaeda-affiliated Islamist militant groups, on the one hand, and predominantly Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, but also other West African countries as well as international government alliances, on the other hand, continued in 2025. The HIIK counted well over 3,000 deaths across the region, and with that, a total rise in casualties compared to the previous years. Overall violence especially intensified in Burkina Faso, where JNIM for the first time in this conflict's history showed more violent involvement compared to Mali, which traditionally had been the conflict-country with the most recorded measures. Between January and May alone, JNIM and defending forces were responsible for over 1,000 people killed across Burkina Faso, with a focus on the Boucle du Mouhoun, Est, and Nord regions. In total, over 1,550 casualties occurred in Burkina Faso this year. In Mali, Al-Qaeda-related violence intensified towards the second half of the year and showed its effect throughout the whole country. While traditionally, Mopti had been the region of most HIIK-measures recorded for Mali in this conflict, this year showed JNIM's new influence in the Sikasso and Bamako regions. At least 782 deaths were recorded for Mali last year. As in previous years, violence in Niger predominantly appeared in the Tillabéri Department, mostly during the first half of the year, and accounted for in total at least 345 casualties. Especially noteworthy for this conflict has once again been the southern strengthening of JNIM, particularly in and around Benin and Togo. In Benin, JNIM increased its activity by a large multiplier. Over 237 people got killed last year across the Atakora and Borgou Provinces, which resulted in the first monthly limited war intensity in the history of the this conflict in the country.


A MORE DETAILED CONFLICT DESCRIPTION WILL BE ADDED BY THE END OF JULY. pad, rof, jak

MOZAMBIQUE (ASWJ)

Intensity: **4** | Change: • | Start: **2017**

Conflict parties: ASWJ vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology



The limited war over the orientation of the political system between the Islamist militia Ahlu Sunnah wa Jama'a (ASWJ), locally referred to as "al-Shabaab", and the government continued. The government's army, the Mozambique Armed Defence Forces (FADM) remained supported by various actors, primarily the Rwandan Defense Forces (RDF), the EU and Mozambique's Local Force militia.

Most recorded incidents occurred in Cabo Delgado province, with occasional spreads of violence to Niassa and Nampula provinces. At least 311 people were killed and about 350,000 people were internally displaced in the provinces of Cabo Delgado, Niassa, and Nampula over the course of the year. Displacement surged in the second half of the year, with November attacks in Erati and Memba districts of Nampula province leading to displacement of about 120,000 people. In June, President Daniel Chapo signaled openness to dialogue with ASWJ while maintaining counter-insurgency efforts. No formal talks occurred, but an Inclusive National Dialogue team was formed to engage communities with the central government.

Civilians remained the primary target of ASWJ, with at least 104 village attacks reported, often accompanied by looting and arson. Beheadings of civilians were frequent, with at least nine incidents recorded over the year. Child abductions increased, with at least 123 cases recorded. Kidnapping for ransom also remained common: For example, ASWJ abducted groups of fishermen in six separate incidents in January, March, April and August off the coasts of Mocímboa da Praia and Macomia, demanding payment for their release. ASWJ undertook a series of offensive actions targeting FADM, RDF and local militia positions. For example, on May 8, ASWJ attacked an outpost in Primeiro de Maio village, killing eleven FADM soldiers. On June 27, ASWJ attacked a military base in Quiterajo city, claiming to have killed up to 30 FADM soldiers. On July 28, ASWJ killed at least 18 members of local force militia in an ambush in Melija village. On October 21, ASWJ attacked a police convoy in Muidumbe district with a rocket-propelled grenade, killing at least one.

Violence spread to Niassa Province in April, as a series of ASWJ attacks targeted conservation and security sites. On April 19, ASWJ looted a luxury hunting reserve, killing two guards, taking hostages and seizing significant equipment. On April 29, ASWJ attacked the Mariri Environmental Centre, killing at least four FADM soldiers and wounding several others.

Violence also reached Nampula province in late September. ASWJ attacks included the burning of houses and looting of supplies, mainly in the Memba and Erati districts. The

assaults persisted until November, resulting in a peak in displacement.

FADM, RDF and Local force militia launched several counter actions against ASWJ to ambush the insurgents and defend villages. For instance, on February 18, the Local Force militia repelled an attempted ASWJ attack on the village of Chai, killing two insurgents. On March 14, FADM killed seven ASWJ insurgents in an ambush in Nguida village. FADM ambushed ASWJ fighters in Montepuez district on June 3, killing at least 12. In November, FADM and Local Forces ambushed ASWJ fighters in Muidumbe district, killing at least 6. A clash between RDF and ASWJ in December in Macomia district, caused at least 35 casualties, including civilians.

Civilians, especially fishermen, also became targets of FADM operations. In several instances, civilians along the coast were detained under the suspicion of collaborating with ASWJ. During events from July to October, FADM navy patrols allegedly opened fire on civilian fishermen, killing at least 25. FADM denies involvement in the attacks. aoe

MOZAMBIQUE (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2012**

Conflict parties: PODEMOS, RENAMO, RENAMO Military Junta vs. government

Conflict items: national power

The violent crisis over national power between Mozambique's ruling party Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) and the opposition continued.

Protests called upon by former independent presidential candidate Venâncio Mondlane since last year's general elections, which saw Daniel Chapo elected president under widespread fraud suspicions, continued at the beginning of the year. Chapo's inauguration on January 15 was accompanied by mass protests to which the police responded with violence. Three protesters died in each Maputo city and province, five in Nampula province, two in Zambézia province, one in Sofala province, and three were injured in Inhambane province. At the beginning of February, Chapo declared openness to dialogue and political reconciliation. The subsequent agreement on a "Political Commitment for an Inclusive National Dialogue" was signed on March 5 between Chapo and representatives of nine political parties. In response to his exclusion from the talks, Mondlane led a protest in the capital Maputo on the same day. Police dispersed the protesters and injured 16 people, according to Mondlane's spokespersons. Also in Maputo city, on March 18, two people died when the police opened fire on a crowd gathered during the first nationwide protest called by Mondlane in weeks. Tensions further manifested in Quelimane city, Zambezia province, on April 13, when unknown assailants attempted to assassinate an activist in support of Mondlane.

The year also marked efforts to ease tensions. Chapo and Mondlane met for the first time on March 23 and a second meeting followed on May 20, both times in Maputo city. The Public Prosecutor's Office, on July 22, filed multiple legal charges against Mondlane in connection with the protest movement, including accusations of instigating terrorism. However, on September 1, Chapo swore Mondlane in as his advisor in the Council of State, making him immune. Moreover, the Mozambican Ministry for Justice authorized the creation of Mondlane's own party, called National Alliance for a Free and Autonomous Mozambique, Anamola, on August

15. On December 18, Chapo announced a presidential pardon that applied to the incarcerated post-election protesters. Yet, by the end of the year, over 2,700 protesters remained in prison.

RENAMO (Mozambican National Resistance), once the main opposition force, lost their importance in the last elections and is now absorbed in internal party issues. Its members tried to force the resignation of leader Ossufo Momade, inter alia by means of a camp outside the headquarters in Maputo city on May 15. The police cleared the place on May 28, injuring at least one person. Furthermore, in July, RENAMO members repeatedly tried to close provincial party offices as a form of protest. [anh](#)

NIGER (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **2009**

Conflict parties: opposition groups vs. government
Conflict items: national power

The violent crisis over national power between the Conseil National pour la Sauvegarde de la Patrie (CNSP) military regime and armed opposition groups continued. The opposition - comprising the Front Patriotique de Libération (FPL), its splinter Mouvement Patriotique pour la Liberté et la Justice (MPLJ), the Front Patriotique pour la Justice (FPJ), and the Forces Armées Libres (FAL) - claimed to fight for the restoration of constitutional order and the release of former President Mohamed Bazoum, who remained under house arrest since the July 2023 coup. The year witnessed both partial reconciliation efforts and sustained armed resistance, with opposition groups increasingly targeting economic infrastructure.

On January 31, over 200 former rebels from the Union des Forces de la Résistance Patriotique (UFPR), FPL, and Mouvement pour la Justice et la Réhabilitation du Niger (MJRN) began training for integration into national armed forces. However, reconciliation did not extend to all factions. On May 4, FPL fighters attacked a military position in Séguédine, Agadez region, killing several soldiers. On September 2, MPLJ insurgents assaulted a National Guard post in Abalama, Aderbissinat, killing one soldier and two attackers while wounding three soldiers.

Opposition groups escalated economic warfare throughout the year. On November 15 and 16, MPLJ militants attacked oil pipeline infrastructure in Agadem, Diffa region. On December 21, MPLJ struck a pipeline section south of Jaouro, Agadem, disrupting crude supply to the Société de Raffinage de Zinder (Soraz) refinery, a joint venture between the Niger government and China National Petroleum Corporation. The group stated attacks would continue until the junta addressed political demands.

The CNSP regime consolidated power throughout the year. On March 26, General Abdourahmane Tiani signed the "Charter of Refoundation," officially assuming the presidency for a five-year transition, dissolving all political parties, and granting amnesty to coup plotters. On April 1, following a February National Dialogue, the junta released approximately 50 detainees, including former ministers, a journalist, and soldiers. However, Bazoum remained in detention throughout 2025, held for over 29 months by year's end.


Civil society resistance emerged on September 6, when the G25 Coalition criticized the junta and called for constitutional order, Bazoum's release, and a new counter-insurgency strat-

egy. On December 3, Alternative Espaces Citoyens organized a solidarity event marking one year since human rights defender Moussa Tchangari's arrest. The CNSP strengthened regional cooperation, with Tiani meeting Malian President Assimi Goïta on September 30 to discuss the Alliance des États du Sahel (AES) joint force. On December 23, AES leaders formalized the confederation and launched a 5,000-strong military force. Throughout the year, Bazoum's continued detention, dissolution of political parties, and rejection of democratic transition timelines underscored deepening consolidation of the CNSP regime despite limited reconciliation efforts. [vka](#)

NIGER, MALI ET AL. (IS SAHEL)

Intensity: **5** | Change: **•** | Start: **2016**

Conflict parties: IS Sahel vs. Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger
Conflict items: system/ideology, international power



The war over international power and the orientation of the political system between the Sahel offshoot of the so-called Islamic State IS Sahel and Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso continued. While IS Sahel drastically lost its influence in Mali and Burkina Faso to the al-Qaeda-affiliate JNIM this year (→ Mali, Burkina Faso et al. (JNIM et al.)), it was responsible for more violence in Niger. Over 700 of the conflict's 1,100 counted casualties occurred in the Nigerien Tillabéri, Dosso, and Tahoua Departments, while in Mali, at least 148, and in Burkina Faso, at least 165 deaths were counted.

A MORE DETAILED CONFLICT DESCRIPTION WILL BE ADDED BY THE END OF JULY. [pad](#), [vka](#), [jak](#)

NIGERIA (APC SUPPORTERS – PDP SUPPORTERS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **1960**

Conflict parties: APC supporters vs. PDP supporters
Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The violent crisis over the orientation of the political system and national power between supporters of the northern-based ruling party, the All Progressives Congress (APC), and supporters of the southern-based main opposition, the People's Democratic Party (PDP), continued, particularly in the context of local elections. Though no nationwide elections were held, violent clashes occurred around the Osun State local government area elections on February 22. No direct confrontations between APC and PDP supporters were reported during the Niger State local government area elections on November 1 or the Anambra governorship election on November 8.

On February 6, APC and PDP supporters clashed in Ilesa, Osun State, during a PDP campaign rally, with several supporters

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA


of both parties sustaining injuries. On February 17, violence escalated as APC-backed former council officials attempted to retake offices of the local government secretariats in Osun State. At least seven people were killed and more than fifty were injured in the Boripe, Olaoluwa, Isokan and Ilesa West local government areas. In the aftermath, the PDP accused APC affiliates and security forces of attacking its members. On January 15, a masked gunman wearing PDP apparel fired shots outside the Edo State Governorship Election Tribunal in Benin City. Although no casualties were reported, APC and PDP issued statements accusing each other of instigating the incident. vro

NIGERIA (BANDITS)

Intensity: **5** | Change: **•** | Start: **2016**

Conflict parties: bandits vs. government

Conflict items: subnational predominance, other



The war over subnational predominance in specifically the Northwestern Nigerian states between bandits and the government continued.

Criminal gangs, predominantly ethnic Fulani pastoralists referred to as bandits, arose from the conflict between the mainly christian farmers and the predominantly muslim Fulani pastoralists. While initially driven by ethnic and religious clashes, today bandits focus on economic opportunism and extraction. The spread of banditry was reinforced by the proliferation of illegal firearms, particularly from the Sahel, and the limited presence of Nigerian security forces in the northwest due to active conflict with Boko Haram [→ Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Niger (JAS-Boko Haram)]. The Nigerian army collaborated more frequently with local police and volunteer security operatives named vigilantes. Throughout the year, their activities included raids on villages, looting, cattle rustling, and kidnapping for ransom, particularly targeting civilians with political power, such as village heads and religious leaders.

At least 900 people have been killed this year, with violent activities being concentrated in Zamfara, Katsina, Kaduna, Niger, Sokoto, Benue, Kebbi, Kogi, Plateau, and Taraba states. For instance, on March 17, approx. 50 bandits attacked Yar Tsakuwa community in Malumfashi Local Government Area of Katsina State, killing 5 people, injuring 3, and abducting 1. The attackers further rustled cattle, destroyed shops, and looted valuables. On July 27, approx. 200 bandits killed 35 hostages in Banga village of Zamfara State, after receiving 50m ransom. On October 31, approx. 50 bandits attacked Kurawa village of Sokoto State, killing 3 people, including the village head, rustling 40 cattle, and abducting several people. On November 15, approx. 200 bandits attacked villages in Mashegu local government area of Niger State, killing 16 vigilantes and abducting 42 residents. On December 4, approx. 5 bandits attempted to steal yoghurt in Danjibga village of Zamfara State, killing 3 people, including the shop owner. On February 7, approx. 50 bandits abducted 10 worshippers in a mosque, including the Imam, in Bushe community, Sabon

Birni local government area of Sokoto State. On August 3, approx. 50 bandits abducted 23 women in Moriki town, Zurmi Local Government Area of Zamfara State while they were collecting firewood. On September 15, approx. 100 bandits abducted 40 worshippers in a mosque in Gidan Turbe village, Tsafe Local Government Area of Zamfara State. On September 21, approx. 50 bandits attacked a mine in Yagba West local government area of Kogi State, killing 1 soldier and abducting 4 Chinese workers. On November 17, approx. 100 bandits attacked Government Girls Comprehensive Senior Secondary School in Danko/Wasagu Local Government Area, Kebbi State, and abducted 26 school girls.

Besides recurring bandit attacks on villages, on June 24, the Nigerian Army launched an attack on bandit hideouts to kill bandit leader, Bello Turji, in Shinkafi Local Government Area of Zamfara State, killing 25 bandits, and killing 25 and injuring 21 soldiers. On June 27, over 300 bandits attacked, looted, and destroyed a police outpost in Makuku village, Zuru Local Government Area of Kebbi State. On November 11, bandits kidnapped six officials of the Nigerian Federal Ministry of Defence along the Kabba-Lokoja highway in Kogi state.

In response to the bandit activity, on January 19, following a bandit attack on Ruwan-Doruwa village, Dutsin-Ma Local Government Area of Katsina State, the Nigerian Army and joint security personnel responded, killing 7 bandits and retrieving 107 livestock. On March 26, the Nigerian Army, Sector 2 and the Nigerian Air Force Operation Fansan Yamma conducted air and ground attacks in Kankara district of Katsina State and Shinkafi in Zamfara State, killing 20 bandits, destroying bandit camps, and rescuing 101 people. On August 6, the Nigerian Air Force bombed a bandit wedding in Tsafe Local Government Area of Zamfara State, killing 10 and injuring 33 bandits. On December 10, Troops of the 8 Division of the Nigerian Army and Sector 2 of Operation Fansan Yamma intercepted a bandit attack in Kurawa village in Sabon Birni local government area, Sokoto State, killing 11 bandits, recovering eight AK-47 rifles, five extra magazines, and 26 rounds of 7.62mm ammunition.


Alongside military operations, de-escalation efforts took place. On June 15, as part of a peace deal in Dan Musa local government area of Katsina State, bandits surrendered their weapons and released 16 hostages. On August 28, approx. 200 bandits engaged in peace talks with the Zamfara State Government and concluded a peace deal, releasing 142 hostages. mas

NIGERIA (FARMERS – PASTORALISTS)

Intensity: **4** | Change: **↗** | Start: **1960**

Conflict parties: farmers vs. pastoralists

Conflict items: subnational predominance, re-sources



The violent crisis over subnational predominance and re-sources between pastoralist herders and sedentary farmers escalated to a limited war.

economic issues. Attacks by predominantly armed ethnic Fulani herder groups on predominantly farming individuals and village communities occurred mainly in Nigeria's central fertile Middle Belt region. Benue state, Jigawa state and Plateau state were the states most affected by the crisis. Small armed groups or individuals, using guns and machetes, killed between one and 100 people in 50 reported violent attacks, often prompting acts of revenge. More than 650 people were killed and many injured in 2025. The conflict caused widespread destruction of housings, agricultural areas and the killing of cattle. At least 20,000 people were displaced. Federal and state governments, police, and armed forces acted as interveners. Several interest groups, such as farmer vigilante groups and Fulani organization Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association (MACBA) supported conflict actors. Boundaries with other conflicts, such as those involving bandits and jihadists, increasingly blurred [→ Nigeria (bandits); Nigeria (ISWAP – JAS)].

From February 15 to February 18, suspected herders killed 32 residents within four days. Thousands fled due to the attack in Kwande area, Benue state. On April 2, suspected Fulani, killed 48 villagers in an attack in several farming villages in Bokko LGA, Plateau state. The attackers destroyed 383 houses and displaced over 1,000 people. On April 13, accused Fulani attackers killed 51 villagers in Zike and Kimakpa village, Bassa LGA, Benue state and burnt down 30 houses. On April 18, suspected herders killed 56 villagers in multiple villages in Benue state. In April, in total 170 people were killed, marking the deadliest month of 2025. On May 23, suspected herders killed 40 residents in Karim Lamido, Taraba state. They destroyed 62 houses and displaced 5000 people. On June 14, armed herders killed more than 100 villagers in Yelewata village, Guma LGA, Benue state. They injured more than 24 people, displaced 3941 people and burnt several houses down, marking the deadliest attack of 2025. From October 24 to October 26, a vigilante group killed 37 herders in multiple attacks in Argungu, Arewa and Bunza LGA, Kebbi state. The vigilante group damaged 200 houses and many people were displaced. lsc

NIGERIA (ISLAMIC MOVEMENT)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1991**

Conflict parties: IMN vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology

The violent crisis over the orientation of the political system between the Islamic Movement Nigeria (IMN) and the government continued. Members of the IMN follow Shia Islam and advocate for a transformation of the political system through the installation of Islamic law, which positions them against the stance of the current government. Despite its prohibition since 2019, the group continues its activities and operates several institutions of caritative and educational character, like the Resource Forum and the Fudiyah Islamic School.

On February 14, the police dissolved an unregistered IMN commemoration in the capital Abuja. The Resource Forum made accusations of violent conduct and unlawful disruption of its activities against the police.

On March 28, as in the previous year, the International Quds Day marked a large protest of the IMN, which triggered violent tensions with government forces. At the procession in Abuja, clashes between Nigerian soldiers and IMN members resulted in the death of one police man and five IMN mem-

bers, several injured members and soldiers, and arrests. Both parties accused the other of attacking with live ammunition. Following the events on March 28, IMN leader Ibraheem Zakzaky issued threats and accusations against the government, local police, and soldiers on March 30. The IMN furthermore called for justice and a reappraisal of the Quds Day events, following the death of one protester in police custody on April 7.

The movement reiterated similar accusations between April 11 and 14 during the 4th Kano Conference on Islamic Thought, an event hosted by the Academic and Sisters Forum of the IMN. Participants discussed and criticized the current state of Nigeria and its government, recited allegations, and spread a message that the only solution to current societal problems is resistance and to follow the teachings of Zakzaky. On October 7, the IMN published a statement praising Nigerian Senators Abdul Ningi and Muhammad Adamu Alerio who had expressed support for Palestinian freedom during a plenary meeting that day.

After a claim by the US about a Christian genocide in Nigeria, the IMN, through the Resource Forum, communicated its satisfaction with the response by the Nigerian government and asked for corresponding action by the government in a written statement on November 2nd.


In the context of the commemoration of the Zaria massacre of December 2015, Zakzaky criticized the past and current administrations' action surrounding the massacre during a press conference on December 10. Two blog articles, published on December 14 by the IMN, stated the names of politicians and military personnel that apparently were responsible for, or complicit in the crimes surrounding the massacre. jne

NIGERIA (ISWAP – JAS)

Intensity: **4** | Change: • | Start: **2016**

Conflict parties: ISWAP vs. JAS

Conflict items: system/ideology, subnational pre-dominance



The limited war between the two Islamist insurgent groups Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'Awati Wal-Jihad (JAS) and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) over subnational predominance and the orientation of the political system continued. The conflict centered on territorial control and taxation rights across the Lake Chad Basin in Borno State. Despite their historical antagonism since the 2016 split, both groups conducted joint operations against Nigerian security forces, demonstrating pragmatic cooperation alongside violent competition. Most significantly, on March 24-25, ISWAP and JAS executed coordinated simultaneous assaults on separate military installations. The groups maintained informal taxation zone agreements, with disputes triggering targeted violence when boundaries were violated.

In January, ISWAP launched offensive operations against JAS positions in Mobbar Local Government Area (LGA). Between January 20 and 21, clashes erupted at Lamburam and Kachalla Kelori villages, where ISWAP forces armed with AK-

Kachalla Kelori villages, where ISWAP forces armed with AK-47 rifles engaged JAS militants in territorial ground assaults. More than 50 JAS fighters died in the confrontations. Inter-factional violence intensified in February. On February 14, ISWAP and the Bakura faction of JAS clashed at ISWAP camps in Toumbun Gini and Toumbun Ciki, deploying multiple waterborne vessels and small boats. Thirty-one ISWAP fighters died alongside significant JAS casualties. The following day, armed clashes erupted between ISWAP and the Bakura Doro-led JAS faction east of Mallam Fatori near the Niger border. Hundreds of fighters from both groups deployed AK-47 rifles in sustained combat, killing dozens of fighters on both sides with total casualties approaching 100. After a recurring pause in fighting, ISWAP militants killed Abu Abass, a senior JAS tax collector operating in the Lake Chad area, using small arms in a targeted assassination that reflected escalating competition over civilian taxation revenues in mid-September. On October 26, JAS forces launched a coordinated ground assault on ISWAP positions at Toumbun, armed with AK-47 rifles. The attack killed dozens of ISWAP militants.


The deadliest confrontations occurred in early November when JAS forces under Bakura Doro initiated a multi-day naval offensive across Lake Chad. The Bakura Doro-led faction had emerged as ISWAP's primary JAS rival following intensified February territorial disputes. On November 5, commanders launched amphibious assaults using motorized waterborne vessels against ISWAP positions on Sahel 1 Island in Abadam LGA. Between November 5 and 6, the offensive extended to Dogon Chuku Island in Kukawa LGA, where JAS deployed motorized gunboats and heavy weapons, killing 200 fighters. On November 6 and 7, JAS operations extended to Margori riverine basin in Mobbar LGA. ISWAP mounted counteroffensives across multiple islands on November 7, deploying heavy weapons. Engagements concluded on November 8 at Toumbun Gini, where four JAS fighters died. Throughout 2025, the inter-factional conflict resulted in more than 400 militant deaths across both groups. vka

NIGERIA, CHAD ET AL. (ISWAP)

Intensity: **5** | Change: **•** | Start: **2015**

Conflict parties: ISWAP vs. Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria

Conflict items: system/ideology, international power



The war over international power and the orientation of the political system between the so-called Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), on the one hand, and the governments of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, on the other, continued. The group's main area of operation is the Lake Chad Basin, comprising parts of northeast Nigeria, namely Borno State and Yobe State, as well as Cameroon's Far-North Region, Niger's Diffa Department and Chad's Lac Region. In the first half of the year, ISWAP carried out a series of deadly attacks against military and civilian targets across

the Lake Chad Basin. In April and May, ISWAP's attacks became more organized and deadly, due in part to improved coordination and the tactical use of surveillance drones. However, from late May onward, the Nigerian Army regained momentum, killing or capturing several key ISWAP leaders and severely disrupting their operational capabilities in the region.

ISWAP launched several attacks against military bases. For example on January 24, ISWAP launched a major assault against the Nigerian Army's Malam-Fatori military base, where ISWAP fighters killed 20 soldiers, among them was the lieutenant of the 149 Battalion. On January 26, ISWAP launched a suicide attack on a military convoy between Borno and Yobe States, killing 27 soldiers, including their commanding officer. On March 24, an attack by ISWAP fighters on a Nigerian Army base in Borno State saw 16 soldiers dead. One day later, on March 25, fighters of ISWAP attacked an outpost of the MNJTF in Fotokol, Cameroon, bordering Nigeria. The terrorists killed twelve soldiers and injured twelve more.

On May 5, ISWAP attacked a Cameroonian Armed Forces site near the Nigerian border, killing three soldiers and seizing heavy weaponry, including a rocket launcher. On the same day, in Diffa region, Niger, ISWAP stormed and destroyed a police headquarters, killing two officers and looting weapons. On May 12, after a battle with Nigerian troops, ISWAP fighters took control of the city of Marte, Borno State, capturing several soldiers. In simultaneous attacks on the cities of Rann and Dikwa, Borno State, fighters used drones for surveillance, breached defenses, and caused mass displacement of civilians toward the Cameroonian border. On September 5, ISWAP attacked the town of Darul Jamal, Borno State and killed 63 people, including 5 soldiers. On October 22, troops of the Nigerian Army got into a severe gunfight with ISWAP fighters near the towns of Mafa and Dikwa at the border between Borno and Yobe States. The confrontation left 50 ISWAP fighters dead, while the army allegedly also suffered casualties.

Moreover, civilians remained a target of ISWAP attacks throughout the year. For instance, on July 3, ISWAP fighters stormed the town of Malam Fatori, Borno State, killed 11 civilians, injured 20 others and burned down a hospital as well as several other buildings.

On the other hand, the Nigerian Army intensified counterterrorism efforts. On April 4, in a major air operation over Katsina State, 100 fighters were killed, among them a senior commander. Moreover, as part of the year-round Operation Hadin Kai, troops conducted a week-long offensive in May, targeting ISWAP infrastructure in northeastern Nigeria, which resulted in the elimination of numerous fighters, including three commanders. On multiple occasions, the Nigerian Air Force (NAF) struck ISWAP hideouts in the Timbuktu Triangle, reportedly neutralizing scores of militants and destroying weapons depots and logistics hubs. On May 29, the NAF reportedly eliminated Abu Fatima, who was one of ISWAP's top commanders along with two lieutenants, during a precision strike in Borno State. On June 3, during a failed ISWAP attack on Damboa, Borno State, Nigerian soldiers killed 16 fighters, including two commanders. On June 16, troops repelled an attack on the town of Gwoza, Borno State, with former ISWAP leader Abou Moussad Albarnawi allegedly being wounded or eliminated. On June 18, the Nigerian Navy successfully defended its base on Lake Chad, eliminating various fighters. In response to an ISWAP attack on civilians and civil infrastructure on July 3, in Malam Fatori city, Borno State, that killed eleven civilians, injured 20 others, the Nigerian Defence Forces killed 40 ISWAP fighters near the city.

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

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
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NIGERIA, CHAD ET AL. (JAS-BOKO HARAM)

Intensity: **5** | Change: **•** | Start: **2003**

Conflict parties: JAS vs. Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria

Conflict items: system/ideology



The war over the orientation of the political system between Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'Awati Wal-Jihad (JAS), a splinter group of Boko Haram, and the governments of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger continued. JAS is opposed to secular and liberal values seeking to establish an Islamic caliphate in the region. This year, at least 750 people have been killed and several others have been injured, although the exact numbers are unknown.

Similar to the previous years, JAS operated mainly in the southeast of Borno State, around the Sambisa Forest, which continued to be disputed territory between JAS and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), another Boko Haram splinter group, as well as in the Mandara Mountains in the border area of Nigeria's Yobe and Borno States. Clashes between JAS and ISWAP continued [→ Nigeria (ISWAP – JAS)]. Throughout the year, government military operations by both the Nigerian Army and the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) resulted in the death of at least 350 JAS members or "suspected members". For instance, in the context of Operation Hadin Kai on January 23, Nigerian troops eliminated approx. 100 insurgents. Nigerian Army troops also claimed to have killed over 200 militants during a gunfight on July 24 in Niger State, with the Nigerian Air Force conducting four coordinated airstrikes. In additional instances, the Nigerian Army and Air Force also carried out airstrikes against Boko Haram insurgents on several occasions throughout the first half of the year. On occasions such as on January 28 and May 30, the heavy weaponry allegedly caused the deaths of at least 20 people. Additionally, on July 6 and 23, the Nigerian

Air Force conducted airstrikes against Boko Haram, killing the top Boko Haram commander, Ibn Khalid during the latter operation.

JAS frequently attacked civilians in local communities. For instance, on January 12, JAS killed 40 fishermen and farmers using firearms in Kukawa Local Government Area (LGA), Borno State. On the same day, in a separate attack also in Borno State, terrorists killed two civilians and burned down cultural sites and civilian infrastructure in the Chibok LGA. In February, an IED linked to the group killed another two civilians, injuring four others between Borno and Adamawa States. In April, another IED caused the death of another 26 civilians in Gamboru LGA, Borno State, and on the same day insurgents killed 18 fishermen in another attack. On June 21, JAS conducted suicide bombings in Konduga LGA, which lead to the death of five civilians and left ten others injured.

Another notorious Boko Haram attack happened on September 5 when members attacked a village in Borno State, killing between 55 and 70 civilians and setting multiple houses on fire. This caused the increase of the total number of deaths caused by this conflict to over 700 until November 1, including Boko Haram members, military members, and civilians.

There were two major news stories this year that mentioned Boko Haram, but which are not consistent with the group's modus operandi or areas of operation. First, the attack to Chad's Presidential Palace in January was attributed to the terrorist group, but was conducted with the use of knives, while the group almost always carries out their attacks using AK-47s. Second, the U.S. intervention in Nigeria on the 25th of December, which current U.S. President said was targeting groups such as Boko Haram, also should be noted. However, this claim is inconsistent, since the bombings happened in Northern Nigeria, while the group mostly acts in Southeastern Nigeria, mainly in Borno State, but also in the States of Yobe and Adamawa. [hpa](#)

REPUBLIC OF CONGO (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↑** | Start: **2015**

Conflict parties: opposition groups vs. government

Conflict items: national power

The dispute over national power between the ruling Congolese Party of Labour and various opposition parties escalated to a violent crisis.

In anticipation of the March 2026 elections, several politicians announced their candidacy for the presidential role. On January 18, Destin Gavet, leader of the Republican Movement, reaffirmed his intention to run for office. On July 19, Frédéric Bintsamou, alias Pastor Ntumi, current leader of the National Council of Republicans and former leader of the Ninja militia, announced his candidacy. On December 30, the ruling Congolese Labour Party stated that it had selected President Denis Sassou Nguesso as its presidential candidate. The electoral commission urged Congolese nationals who were registered for the upcoming presidential election to visit administrative districts and verify that their names are listed on the provisional voter's roll on December 11.

On May 11, unidentified armed men abducted presidential candidate and leader of The Socialists Lassy Mbouity from his house in the capital Brazzaville. On May 21, he was found naked with signs of torture in the Madoukou River in Poto-Poto, 3rd district of Brazzaville. The Socialists released

a statement accusing the government of engineering the kidnapping. ttu

RWANDA (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **2** | Change: **↗** | Start: **2003**

Conflict parties: FDU-Inkingi vs. government

Conflict items: national power

The dispute over national power between the opposition, mainly United Democratic Forces (FDU-Inkingi), and the Rwandan government, led by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), escalated to a non-violent crisis.

On June 19, authorities of the Rwanda Investigation Bureau arrested opposition leader Victoire Ingabire in the capital Kigali for allegedly forming a criminal group and planning activities aimed at inciting public disorder. The High Court denied her bail mid July. This arrest stands in the context of a broad trend of repression of the opposition. Ingabire had already served a prison sentence from 2010 to 2018. Formerly president of FDU-Inkingi, she created the new party Dalfa-Umurinzi in 2019. Rwandan authorities have refused to officially register the party. Moreover, several of its members have died or disappeared under unclear circumstances during the last years. anh

SIERRA LEONE (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **2** | Change: **•** | Start: **2007**

Conflict parties: APC vs. government

Conflict items: national power

The non-violent crisis over national power between the opposition party All People's Congress (APC) and the ruling Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) continued.

Throughout the year, several aspects of Resolution 4 of the Agreement for National Unity (ANU) signed 10/18/2023 were implemented and helped ease hostilities, though relations between the two parties remained strained.

On February 4, the cyber crime unit of the Criminal Investigations Department (CID) summoned the APC's 2023 presidential candidate after he allegedly referred to himself as the "President-elect of Sierra Leone." In connection with the alleged coup attempt and prison break of 11/26/2023, police arrested three individuals on April 25. However, in line with Resolution 4 of the ANU, the government later dropped charges against several APC members.

On June 10, the APC's parliamentary leader announced the party's suspension from parliamentary sittings and committee activities, following the Clerk of Parliament's decision to pursue an executive position within his political party and APC demands for his resignation. On July 16, the leader of the opposition protested the appointment of a new electoral commissioner for the Eastern Region, claiming it violated constitutional procedures. The APC also criticized SLPP remarks calling on security forces, including the military, to safeguard the 2028 elections. Further disputes arose over proposed electoral and administrative reforms, particularly the creation of new districts, which the APC accused the government of gerrymandering. Despite opposition, the cabinet approved the new districts on August 20.


While tensions persisted ahead of the 2028 elections, both parties signed a peace agreement on November 11 in Free-town under the supervision of the Political Parties Regulation Commission (PPRC). In November, the PPRC fined both parties for breaches of the 2022 Political Parties Act. The APC paid its fine on December 2, following debates over the PPRC's independence. On December 12, the Sierra Leone Police approved the APC's Pre-Convention Elections Sensitization Tour, scheduled from December 15 to January 4, 2026. hme

SOMALIA (ISS)

Intensity: **4** | Change: **↗** | Start: **2015**

Conflict parties: ISS vs. al-Shabaab vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power



The violent crisis over national power and the political orientation of Somalia between the Islamic State in Somalia (ISS) and the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) – supported by the Puntland Security Force (PSF) of the semi-autonomous Puntland state and the US Africom – escalated to a limited war.

In January 2025, heavy fighting erupted in the Puntland state, where PSF forces clashed with ISS fighters across several areas. On January 25, PSF forces killed at least 50 militants, while militants killed 15 PSF soldiers, further the battle injured 50 combatants.

February was marked by continued intense clashes between the ISS and PSF, alongside several U.S. airstrikes. On February 1, US Africom airstrikes killed over 46 people. On February 11, the ISS launched a major assault on a PSF military base killing 100 people and wounding 60.

Throughout the spring, the United States conducted multiple airstrikes targeting ISS positions in Puntland and the surrounding areas of Bosaso, Bari region.

In August, a two-week joint operation against the ISS was carried out by the FGS and the US Africom. Later that month, on August 22, the ISS launched coordinated attacks on PSF units in three separate engagements, resulting in further casualties.

In October, U.S. airstrikes targeted ISS positions in the Golis Mountains, Togdheer region, continuing the aerial campaign against militant strongholds in northern Somalia.

November renewed ground fighting, as ISS carried out attacks against Puntland soldiers in northeastern Somalia, killing at least 10 and injuring around 20, followed later in the month by clashes involving U.S. special forces and Puntland counterterrorism units in the Balade Valley, Bari region.


In December, Puntland counterforces launched operations in the Al Miskaad mountains, Bari region, sustaining pressure on remaining ISS elements in the region. isf

SOMALIA (JUBALAND)

Intensity: **4** | Change: **↗** | Start: **2024**

Conflict parties: Jubaland Regional Government (JRG) vs. Federal Government of Somalia (FGS)

Conflict items: system/ideology, subnational predominance



The violent crisis over subnational predominance and the orientation of the political system in Somalia between the Jubaland Regional Government (JRG) on one hand and the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) on the other hand, escalated to a limited war. The Gedo region (Jubaland) has been particularly affected by violent clashes between the two conflict actors, specifically between July and August, resulting in significant destruction and displacement of people. In January and February, occasional fighting between the JRG forces and FGS troops in Ceel Waaq and Baardheere, Gedo Region, killed at least eight people and injured dozens. Between February and July, no violent clashes were reported. From late July until mid-August, fighting resumed in several towns within Gedo Region, causing several deaths and significant destruction. For instance, on July 22 violent clashes between both forces erupted in Beled Hawo, Gedo Region, resulting in at least 5 dead and dozens injured. The fighting continued between July 23 and 26, killing least one civilian and injured more than three. The fighting caused significant damage to private property and public infrastructure through the use of heavy shelling and explosive weapons, resulting in the displacement of 38,094 individuals. In the night of July 27 to 28, Jubaland forces, allegedly supported by Ethiopian troops, attacked the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) camp in Dolow town, Gedo Region, resulting in significant destruction, casualties on both sides and several injured people. On August 5, Ethiopian troops stationed in Gedo reportedly issued an ultimatum for FGS forces to vacate the town of Beled Hawo, Gedo Region, which the FGS had previously occupied. Six days later, renewed fighting between the two forces in Beled Hawo, Gedo Region, resulted in two deaths, at least two injured, and the displacement of 15,180 individuals. On September 18, forces affiliated with the FGS and JRG were involved in renewed clashes following a border incursion.

Between August and December, mediation efforts between the JRG and FGS continued without concrete outcomes, including mid-September negotiations brokered by the United Arab Emirates. On October 2, the JRG, Puntland and several Somali opposition leaders established the Somali Future Council (SFC) to align their positions and activities on Somalia's political developments. Since its formation, the SFC has held repeated meetings on Somalia's political developments and electoral reforms, including a conference between December 18 and 20 calling on the FGS to convene consultative meetings with all political stakeholders on the electoral process. On December 8, the speaker of the Jubaland parliament announced the amendment of the

Jubaland constitution replacing the term "regional state" with "Jubaland government". [amg](#)

SOMALIA (SOMALILAND – NORTHEASTERN STATE – PUNTLAND)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↘** | Start: **1998**

Conflict parties: regional government of Puntland vs. regional government of Somaliland vs. regional government of Northeastern State

Conflict items: subnational predominance

The limited war over subnational predominance between the self-declared state of Somaliland, the semi-autonomous state of Puntland and the self-declared federal member state of SSC-Khaatumo (Khaatumo), supported by the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) de-escalated to a violent crisis. The Sool, Sanaag and Cayn regions that form SSC-Khaatumo are claimed by Somaliland and Puntland, resulting in conflicting territorial claims.

On January 11 to 12 the leader of Khaatumo released a statement in which he called on his community to make preparations to reconquer Erigabo, Sanaag region. On January 30, Somaliland and Khaatumo forces clashed in the Shangeed area, Togdheer region.

On January 31, a conference of the Khaatumo aligned Harti Subclan, in Badhan, Sanaag region concluded with a call to seize back Erigabo. On the same day, the president of Puntland called for dialogue and deescalation of tensions in Erigabo.

On March 7 Somaliland and Khaatumo forces clashed again, this time in the village of Budqdharkayn, Sool region.

On April 12, the Prime Minister of Somalia, Hamza Abdi Barre, visited Lasanod the informal capital of Khaatumo. The visit was criticized by both Puntland and Somaliland, which saw it as a step to transform Khaatumo into a full member state.

On April 15, the FGS officially recognized SSC-Khaatumo as a full member state.

On April 17 Somaliland and Khaatumo forces clashed over the control of the Sanaag region in the town of Daanweyne.

In July efforts by the defected former Puntland Parliament speaker, Abdirashid Yusuf Jibriil, to integrate the Sanaag region into Khaatumo led to a clash between his forces and Puntland's in Ceelbuh. The battle left at least one civilian dead and several other persons injured. Between July 14 and July 16 Puntland forces fought against clan militias aligned to Khaatumo in Dahar, Sanaag region. Subsequently, killing at least four soldiers.

The battle coincided with the beginning of the Lasanod conference on July 13, which aimed the finalization of Khaatumo as a full member state. On July 30, the conference concluded and Khaatumo was transformed to Northeastern State. Puntland and Somaliland separately criticized the creation of Northeastern State as a fragmentation of Somalia (Puntland) and as a threat to Somaliland's territorial integrity. On August 17, the members of parliament were announced and on August 30 Northeastern State voted for a President, finalizing the state formation process of the Northeastern State. [nkr](#)

SOMALIA (SUBCLAN RIVALRY)

Intensity: **3** | Change:  | Start: **2012**

Conflict parties: Hawiye subclans vs. Rahanweyn subclans vs. Darod subclans vs. Dir subclans vs. Isaaq subclans vs. various other clans

Conflict items: subnational predominance, resources

The limited war over subnational predominance and resources among various Somali clans de-escalated to a violent crisis. The Somali society is structured into different clans with clans employing their own militia to fend for its interests. Resources and subnational predominance played a key role in the conflict between the Hawadle and Abgaal clans. On January 18, militias of the two clans clashed in Calaag, Hirshabelle State in a dispute killing and injuring several militia over grazing land. On February 4, Abgaal militia members killed a Hawadle elder in Halfooly, Hiiraan region.

Conflicts over the administration and governance of the city and district of Luuq, Gedo region, as well as revenge killings were of importance in multiple violent clashes. The aligned Reer-Hassan and Gabaweyn clans fought from February 9 to February 11, in the city of Luuq against the Ma'alim Weyne clan. The clans used heavy and light weaponry, the fighting killed at least ten people, injured two and residents reported the sound of explosions. On February 21, the Jubaland administration tried to broker a peace agreement, however on February 26, the rival local clan militias clashed again which caused low numbers of casualties. Another incident occurred on April 11, when the two militias fought again in the city of Luuq with light and heavy weapons. Lastly the clans fought also on September 21 between the towns of Luuq and Yurkud, Gedo region. The battle killed least four people died and injured several more.

In the town of Dinsoor, Bay region, sexual assaults and subsequent retaliatory sexual assaults led to a violent clash between the Geedledle and Dabarre clan between October 21 and October 26. Overall the clash, killed 15 persons and injured 21 more.


On November 8 twenty people beat a man until he lost consciousness and burned him alive in the village of Duudumaay, Lower Shabelle region, as a part of a part of retaliatory killings. As a result, the two involved clans fought on November 9 in the Wanlaweyne area, Lower Shabelle region, killing seven and internally displacing approximately 1500 families. On November twelve and 13 the Somali Minister for the interior hosted a meeting between local stakeholders to resolve the tension. On November 23, the military court issued death and prison sentences for people allegedly involved in the killing of November 8 and the ensuing violence. To enforce the ruling a military operation by troops of the federal Government and by Southwest State was dispatched into Wanlaweyne area, Lower Shabelle region, which resulted in at least three deaths. nkr

SOMALIA, KENYA (AL-SHABAAB)

Intensity: **5** | Change:  | Start: **2006**

Conflict parties: al-Shabaab vs. Kenya, Somalia

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power



The war over national power and the orientation of the political system between the Islamist militant group al-Shabaab and the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) continued. The FGS is supported by local security forces, the Kenya Defense Forces (KDF), the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), and the U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM). At least 1,697 people died throughout the year.

Over the year, al-Shabaab initiated and continued its Shabelle offensive, which led to an increase in violence in the Hirshabelle and South West states. The Shabelle offensive mainly targeted territories in the Lower and Middle Shabelle regions which the militant group had lost during the 2022-2023 counterinsurgency offensive by the FGS. Consequently, the Somali National Army (SNA) and the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) increased their counterinsurgency efforts with ground operations and airstrikes. Similarly, USAFRICOM significantly increased its airstrike activities. Recognizing the threat posed by al-Shabaab, on December 23, UNSC extended its authorization of AUSSOM until 31/12/2026.

Within the Hirshabelle state, al-Shabaab's Shabelle offensive spanned across the Middle Shabelle and Hiiraan regions, where fighting between al-Shabaab and government forces led to at least 826 deaths. On February 20, fighting between al-Shabaab and SNA broke out after al-Shabaab had tried to advance into the towns of Al-Kowthar, Cali Fouldheere, Ceel Baraf, Daaruu Nicma, and El Ali Axmed, Middle Shabelle region, leaving 228 dead. Fighting over the town of Al-Kowthar continued throughout the first half of the year where NISA and SNA conducted military operations and airstrikes. For instance, NISA killed 32 al-Shabaab militants in two airstrikes on February 25 and April 4. Counterinsurgency efforts continued in the town of Raage Celle, Middle Shabelle region, where on April 1, SNA targeted al-Shabaab fighters with an air and ground attack, killing 40 al-Shabaab militants. On April 16, al-Shabaab seized the town of Adan Yabaal, Middle Shabelle region, after it had attacked SNA soldiers. Fighting continued on April 21, when SNA together with local fighters counter-attacked al-Shabaab. After approximately two weeks of fighting in surrounding areas, on July 7, al-Shabaab seized control of the town of Moqokori, Hiiraan region, after it had clashed with SNA and local forces, allegedly killing 47 SNA soldiers.

Over the second half of the year, the FGS's counterinsurgency concentrated on airstrikes in the Hiiraan and Middle Shabelle regions, which killed 57 al-Shabaab fighters. On August 1, SNA launched multiple airstrikes targeting al-Shabaab positions in the Abooreey and Maxaas areas, Hiiraan region, killing 40 al-Shabaab militants. Additionally, SNA continued

ground operations to secure towns in Hirshabelle state. On December 31, it attacked al-Shabaab positions in Jabad-Godane, Middle Shabelle region, killing 29 militants.

Fighting in the South West State concentrated on the towns of Afgoye, Awdheegle, Bariire, Canoole, Gaalware, and Sabiid in the Lower Shabelle region, which led to at least 597 deaths. On March 21, NISA together with the Somali Air Force carried out six airstrikes on the towns of Sabiid and Canoole, killing 82 al-Shabaab fighters. On July 20, al-Shabaab seized control of both towns after AUSSOM and SNA soldiers had withdrawn following a VBIED attack on July 15, killing 20 Ugandan peacekeepers, nine SNA soldiers, and wounding 43 more. On August 5, after a week of fighting between SNA and al-Shabaab, SNA took control of the town of Bariire, Lower Shabelle region, leaving 100 al-Shabaab fighters and two SNA soldiers dead. Two weeks later, on August 19, SNA together with international partners conducted an air and ground assault targeting al-Shabaab in Awdheegle, allegedly killing 100 al-Shabaab militants and taking control of the town. Throughout November, SNA intensified its ground operations in the Lower Shabelle region, killing 56 al-Shabaab militants in three operations targeting al-Shabaab positions in Bulo-Madino and Omar Beere.

Al-Shabaab targeted government and military personnel with several suicide bombings in Mogadishu, leading to at least 30 fatalities. For example, on March 18, al-Shabaab targeted the convoy of Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, killing at least four people.

SNA and al-Shabaab further engaged in fighting in Jubaland in late June and Galmudug in September. In Jubaland fighting concentrated on the towns of Maqooqaha and Baqooqaha in the Lower Juba region. In two military operations on June 28 and 30, SNA together with Jubaland Darawish forces attacked al-Shabaab positions in the towns, killing 56 al-Shabaab fighters. Al-Shabaab killed two SNA soldiers in the clashes [→ Somalia (Jubaland)].

In September, heavy fighting between al-Shabaab and SNA broke out in the Ceel Dheer and Nooleeye, Galguduud region, Galmudug state. On September 12, al-Shabaab and SNA forces clashed in Ceel Dheere after al-Shabaab had launched an attack on the town. SNA allegedly killed 60 militants and wounded 50 more. During the clashes, USAFRICOM launched an airstrike on al-Shabaab in Ceel Dheere in support of SNA. Throughout the year, USAFRICOM on behalf of the FGS conducted several airstrikes supporting SNA's counterinsurgency. Compared to last year, USAFRICOM almost quadrupled its airstrikes to 37, targeting areas in Galmudug, Hirshabelle, Jubaland, Puntland, and South West state.

Al-Shabaab carried out attacks on KDF soldiers, Kenyan police personnel, and civilians at the Kenyan-Somali border in Mandera and Garissa County, North Eastern region, killing 16 persons. fzi

SOUTH AFRICA (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **2015**

Conflict parties: civil rights groups, EFF, MK vs. government

Conflict items: national power

The violent crisis over national power between the Government of National Unity (GNU) and a heterogeneous opposition, particularly the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), the uMkhonto we Sizwe (MK) Party, and civil society actors in-

cluding trade union federations continued.

Violence occurred in the form of several allegedly political killings throughout the year. On February 5, two assailants shot dead an ANC councillor in his home in Mandeni, KwaZulu-Natal province. On March 7, an gunman killed an activist and whistleblower outside her house in Gqeberha, Eastern Cape Province. On May 4, an assailant killed a DA Councillor in Stellenbosch, Western Cape Province.

The year saw struggles around coalition stability amid political disputes and recurrent protests concerning decision-making, economic mismanagement, and austerity.

On January 25, the DA declared a formal dispute with the GNU in parliament due to the GNU's alleged lack of consulting coalition partners. On January 30, the South African Municipal Workers' Union announced a picket in Johannesburg, Gauteng Province, over a procurement scandal. Following the postponement of the budget speech on February 19, Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) mobilized nationwide marches against austerity and a planned VAT hike, in which parties like the EFF and MKP participated. COSATU led further the marches on February 26 in Western Cape Province against teacher cuts. From March to April, parliamentary and street confrontations intensified. Opposition parties rejected the revised budget on March 12 and jointly opposed the fiscal framework on April 2. The Defend South Africa movement demanded President Cyril Ramaphosa's resignation in Pretoria on April 4. After coalition pressure, the government withdrew the VAT hike on April 24, and the Western Cape High Court suspended it three days later. After repeated delays, the government passed the budget on July 23.

Mid-year saw renewed labour and service unrest. Demonstrations in August and September addressed labor rights, environmental issues, and water shortages. Based on various socio-economic demands, COSATU organized a nationwide protest on October 7. anonymous

SOUTH AFRICA (SOCIOECONOMIC PROTESTS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↗** | Start: **2018**

Conflict parties: marginalized groups, residents of informal settlements vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology

The non-violent crisis over the orientation of the political and economic system between marginalized groups, particularly residents of informal settlements, and the government escalated to a violent crisis.

As in previous years, the conflict was marked by decentralized and spontaneous protests for the provision of basic public services such as housing, electricity, water, and infrastructure.

Two protests turned deadly. On April 15, a protest on WSU campus, Eastern Cape Province against conditions in university residences left one student dead and three injured after a staff member allegedly opened fire on the crowd. On May 19, residents in Diepkloof, Soweto township, Gauteng province, took to the streets in a housing protest directed at the provincial government, engaging in road blocks and looting. Two civilians were killed by fleeing vehicles. Also, clashes with the police left three people injured.

Road blocks continued to be a common protest measure. For example, on January 15, about 80 residents of the Khoisan settlement protested the lack of water and basic

services, blocking the N2 highway in Grabouw, Western Cape Province, for hours, burning rubble. On March 21, residents of Eldorado Park, Gauteng Province, blocked the N12 highway to protest against inadequate service delivery in their community. On July 22, villagers from Ga-Sekgopo, Limpopo Province, blocked the R81 road in response to a three-month water outage.

The year also witnessed several big marches. On February 20, for instance, various social movements and trade unions marched to Parliament in Cape Town, Western Cape Province to oppose austerity and privatization. On May 23, residents from several cities in Gauteng Province marched to the Johannesburg mayor's office against the housing, water, infrastructure and unemployment crisis. anonymous

SOUTH AFRICA (XENOPHOBES)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **1994**

Conflict parties: immigrants vs. xenophobes
Conflict items: system/ideology

The violent crisis over labor market shares, cultural hegemony, and access to the social security system between xenophobic South African nationals and groups of immigrants continued.

On May 12, vigilantes killed a foreign national in Marapong, Limpopo Province. On May 26, mob violence against Zimbabwean immigrants in Addo, Eastern Cape Province, displaced hundreds of people from their homes and left three dead and ten injured. A fourth fatal victim of the Addo riots died from injuries on June 1. Targeted attacks on businesses also persisted. On October 15, five unknown assailants opened fire in a supermarket in Philippi, Western Cape Province, killing a shopkeeper and injuring two more people.

Throughout the year, xenophobic groups, including Operation Dudula, systematically blocked foreign nationals from accessing healthcare services with tensions escalating mid-year. On July 29, the "March and March Movement" assaulted a pensioner at a Durban hospital, KwaZulu-Natal Province, for failing to prove South African birth. By August, Doctors Without Borders reported systematic blockades of clinics in the Provinces of Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal. On November 4, the High Court granted an interdict restraining Operation Dudula from harassing the public or demanding IDs. Finally, on December 4, the Gauteng High Court ordered the government to prevent vigilantes from blocking access to clinics. On November 29, police used rubber bullets and tear gas to disperse Operation Dudula protesters who breached the G20 summit security zone in Johannesburg, Gauteng Province. who

SOUTH SUDAN (INTER-COMMUNAL RIVALRY)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↓** | Start: **2011**

Conflict parties: Murle vs. Dinka vs. Nuer
Conflict items: subnational predominance, resources

The war between various local communities over subnational predominance and resources, especially cattle and land, escalated to a violent crisis. Overall, violent confrontations

between and within local communities such as the Dinka, Nuer, and Murle communities, as well as their various sections, increased in number. The Head of the UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) urged authorities to address inter-communal conflicts and underlying grievances to build peace.

Cyclical violence related to cross-border cattle raiding persisted among the tri-state borders of Warrap, Unity, and Lakes States. Among these, Warrap had the highest casualty rate, with inter-communal clashes between the Thiik and Luanyjang communities leaving 144 people dead and more than 181 persons injured. As stated by the report of the UN Secretary-General, retaliatory attacks by the Thiik and Luanyjang communities in July, August, and October, left 114 people dead and 82 injured.

In Tonj East County, Warrap State, attacks and counterattacks among Dinka sub-groups continued, with cross-border tensions involving armed Nuer from Unity State and other communities from Lakes, Abyei, and Western Bahr el Ghazal. For instance, on March 15, Nuer youth from Unity's Mayom County raided cattle in Warrap's Gogrial East, leaving 17 dead and twelve injured. Between August and October, clashes between the Luachjang and Akook sections intensified in Tonj East. On August 9, Luachjang youth attacked Akook communities in Ngapagok Payam, prompting retaliation on August 10 and leaving six Luachjang members dead in Majak Amal Village. In total, 16 were killed and twelve injured. On September 28, a Pan Kuei member killed a Pan Arek member in revenge for a past murder, sparking a retaliatory attack on September 29 that left 20 dead and 37 injured. Violence within the Lou Ariik community of Alabek Payam on October 12 led to 20 deaths and 38 injured persons.

Communal clashes over land led to heavy fighting in the Lakes region. On January 31, cattle keepers from Luanyjang, Warrap and Pakam, Lakes clashed in Alor Payam in Rumbek North County, Lakes which left 38 dead and 34 injured.

In Jonglei State, attacks, incursions, and abductions, allegedly by the armed Murle elements of the Greater Pibor Administrative Area against the Nuer and Dinka communities in Greater Jonglei, remained a concern for local civilian communities. On March 19, 15 people were killed during an ambush by the youth from the Anyuak community in the Pibor area. Among the dead were Boma's deputy army commander, government officials, and the county commissioner's bodyguards. Moreover, Boma County has experienced periodic violence between the Murle and Anyuak communities, as well as with other ethnic groups from neighboring Jonglei State. On March 31, armed Murle youth attacked Ajwara Payam on the northern outskirts of Pochalla town, killing ten people and injuring another ten. Between June 5 and 19, several attacks were carried out again by armed Murle youth in different payams in Duc and Nyirol County, Jonglei. 18 people were killed and 14 others were wounded in these clashes.

In Eastern Equatoria State, cyclic retaliatory violence between communities and civil defense groups, such as the Toposa, Lango, and Lopit communities, persisted. On February 12, clashes erupted between the Toposa communities of Buno and Nyianginyang over ownership of the Lokisele Lopua water point in Kapoeta East County, a resource claimed by both groups. As a result, nine people were injured and 11,000 displaced. On April 26, armed Murle youth attacked eight cattle camps in the Kauto area, Kapoeta East County, Eastern Equatoria. 32 people were killed, 22 wounded, and 90 women and children abducted in this attack. The attacks also displaced approx. 6,500 people to mountain areas. Consequently, the UNMISS deployed additional peacekeepers and

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

launched urgent patrols at the conflict hotspot in Kapoeta East County.

Border areas between Western Bahr el Ghazal and Warrap States have experienced recurring violence. Between February 2 and February 3, inter-communal fighting between the Marial-Wau community of Jur River County and Apuk Giir Thiik of Gogrial East County, Warrap State, killed more than 20 people in Tharkueng, Jur River County, Western Bahr el Ghazal. Shops and houses were also burned down during the attack. Nearly the entire population of approx. 20,000 people was displaced to neighboring villages.


In Upper Nile State, tensions remained high. On May 30, an outbreak of violence between the Shilluk and Dinka communities left at least eight persons dead and several injured. Nearly 600 people fled to the Malakal Protection of Civilians site. sek

SOUTH SUDAN (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **5** | Change: **↑** | Start: **2011**

Conflict parties: NAS, SPLM/A-IO-Kitwang vs. government, SPLM/A-IO-RM

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power



The violent crisis over national power and the orientation of the political system between the government of Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), led by President Salva Kiir, and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM/A-IO-RM), led by First Vice President Riek Machar, on the one hand, and several opposition groups including the National Salvation Front (NAS) and the White Army, on the other hand, escalated to a war.

The year began with little change from 2024. Tensions between the SPLM and the SPLM-IO remained high, with several violent measures and political oustings recorded throughout January and early February.

The conflict escalated significantly from mid-February, as the SPLA-IO-aligned White Army - a youth militia from VP Machar's Nuer ethnic group - launched several attacks on SSPDF (South Sudan People's Defence Force) positions in Nisar Town, Upper Nile State. The town was captured later that month. The situation intensified on March 17, when a UN airlift to rescue SSPDF Major General Dak came under intense fire from White Army troops. Dak, SSPDF 27 troops, and a UN crew member were killed in the incident.

In response, the SSPDF under President Kiir confined VP Machar to house arrest in Juba. Over the following months, SSPDF forces pushed to retake Nasir Town and attack SPLA-IO and White Army positions in the Upper Nile, Central and West Equatoria, Jonglei, and Unity states through airstrikes and ground offensives. Meanwhile, the SPLM undertook a purge of SPLM-IO affiliated officials across South Sudan, arresting and dismissing those loyal to Machar. As SSPDF operations and SPLA-IO counterattacks intensified, thousands of SPLA-IO and SPLM-IO officials and soldiers defected to join SSPDF forces and SPLM civil teams.

The situation deteriorated further in September, with the


SPLM charging Riek Machar for his alleged involvement in the February/March attacks on Nasir Town. The SPLM reacted by calling for regime change, and refuting the charges against former VP Machar. Armed conflict between the SPLA-IO and SSPDF continued unabated throughout September. dbu

SUDAN (DARFUR)

Intensity: **5** | Change: **•** | Start: **2003**

Conflict parties: "non-Arab" communities vs. RSF, 'Arab' militias

Conflict items: subnational predominance, re-sources




rsa

SUDAN (INTER-COMMUNAL RIVALRY)

Intensity: **5** | Change: **•** | Start: **2007**

Conflict parties: Fulani et al., Fur, Masala vs. Hawazma et al., Misseriya, Taisha

Conflict items: subnational predominance, re-sources




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SUDAN (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **5** | Change: **•** | Start: **2011**

Conflict parties: RSF vs. SAF

Conflict items: national power




The war over national power between the de facto military government of Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary group Rapid Support Forces (RSF) continued in 2025. The conflict escalated to a war on April 15, 2023, when the RSF attacked SAF positions in the capital Khartoum.


In January 2025, fighting primarily took place in Gezira,

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA


SUDAN (OPPOSITION)




January




February




March




April




May




June




July




August




September



October



November



December

North Darfur, Khartoum, and South Darfur. Overall, the SAF gained control over territories in parts of Gezira and Khartoum. For example, on January 7, the SAF recaptured parts of Omdurman, killing at least 20 people. Throughout January, an RSF-backed group discussed possibilities for building a parallel government in Sudan. On February 22, over 20 groups then signed a charter for a parallel government in the RSF-led territories. On March 11, the step was criticized by the African Union's Peace and Security Council, stating that this could lead to the division of the country. Additionally, fighting took place in various states throughout February. In a three-day assault starting on February 15 on villages around the town of al-Gitaina in the White Nile state, the RSF killed more than 200 people. On March 26, the SAF fully recaptured Khartoum from the RSF, putting the SAF in control of the capital for the first time since the start of the war.

Heavy clashes in North Darfur, particularly around El Fasher, continued in April as the RSF stepped up their efforts to drive the army out of its final bastion in the Darfur region. On April 13, the RSF announced complete control of the Zamzam IDP camp, killing or wounding hundreds of people, causing thousands to flee the camp and destroying infrastructure and accommodation. In May, the war spread for the first time to Port Sudan, the de facto headquarters of the military-led government and the main gateway for humanitarian aid. Fighting continued in other areas of Sudan. For example, a drone strike on May 15 on a SAF hospital in El Obeid, North Kordofan killed four and injured 60 others. On June 18, a cholera outbreak spread across the Darfur region, an area with a high number of displaced persons who have limited access to clean water and sanitation facilities. While the intensity of fighting decreased in Khartoum for the first time since the beginning of the war, clashes continued in North and South Darfur and intensified in Kordofan states. On June 12, SLM-Minawi, a SAF-allied group, accused the RSF of abducting 100 people fleeing El Fasher.

In July, fighting escalated in North Kordofan. For example, on July 12, the RSF was accused of killing more than 200 civilians in a series of attacks on various villages. Heavy clashes continued in North Darfur with El Fasher being at the center of the fighting. On August 30, RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo ("Hemedti") was appointed head of a parallel government in Nyala, further fueling fears of a division of Sudan. Also, the RSF renewed their offensive on the North Darfur state capital El Fasher, breaching several defensive lines. In September, fighting continued in El Fasher as the RSF advanced into the city. On September 12, the USA, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the UAE proposed a roadmap for a ceasefire and transition to a civilian-led government.

On October 26, the RSF captured El Fasher, finalizing control over the Darfur region. By October 28, reports emerged of widespread killings in El Fasher, indicating at least 1,500 deaths, including 460 people at the Saudi Maternity Hospital. In November, the war continued across several states in Sudan. For example, the SPLM-N claimed that on November 29, the SAF killed 45 civilians in a drone strike on a village in South Kordofan. On November 23, the leader of the SAF, al-Burhan, rejected a US-backed ceasefire. Although the RSF declared a unilateral truce, the following day it launched new offensives around Babanusa, West Kordofan. In December, the war further intensified in the Kordofan states. For example, on December 1, the RSF completely captured Babanusa in West Kordofan. In Kagoli, South Kordofan, 79 people, including 43 children, were killed in a strike, for which the RSF was accused.

The death toll since the beginning of the war in April 2023

until December 2025 reached around 150,000. During this period, an estimated twelve million people have been internally displaced, and four million have become refugees. In addition, an approximate twelve million people are at risk of gender-based violence, and 26 million people across Sudan are affected by acute hunger at the end of December 2025.

vko

SUDAN, SOUTH SUDAN (INTER-COMMUNAL RIVALRY / ABYEI)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **2011**

Conflict parties: Balanda vs. Murle vs. Dinka vs. Nuer vs. Azande

Conflict items: subnational predominance, re-sources

The violent crisis over subnational predominance and resources in the disputed Abyei border region between the Ngok Dinka community and the Misseriya community, as well as between the Ngok Dinka and Twic Dinka community, continued. Due to its substantial oil reserves, the region remains of strategic interest to the governments of Sudan and South Sudan, both of whom claim Abyei as part of their own territory.

On January 13th, a South Sudanese People's Defence Forces' (SSPDF) officer was robbed of his AK-47 and shot and wounded while traveling from Agok to Madou. Suspicion of a pattern of targeted attacks across the Agok-Madou road increased, particularly after SSPDF Major General Deng Mou was killed by unknown assailants on the 27th, in Majok-Kol, Rum Amer. In both instances, the attackers remained unidentified and stole their victim's weapons.

Sporadic inter-communal clashes continued throughout the year. Armed youths from Twic county kidnapped three young men on the Abyei-Twic road on February 19th. On April 4th, Twic Dinka youths also attacked several dwellings in Abyei village, killing at least nine civilians and wounding four over two days.

Additionally, tensions between the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya intensified on July 21st, when Misseriya nomads attacked Amiet's common market and police station in an attempt to free prisoners. At least nine were killed and a further 12 wounded in the raids and Ngok Dinka counterattacks. The clashes came despite a renewed commitment to peaceful coexistence that had been signed by tribal leaders in June.

Rising political tensions in bordering South Sudan surfaced in Abyei in October, when members of the SSPDF and Sudanese People's Liberation Army in Opposition (SPLA-IO), who had together formed the Unified VIP Protection Forces in the region, clashed outside Abyei Box. The firefight, which began as a misunderstanding between officers on the 7th of October, resulted in at least 15 deaths and 20 injuries. SPLA-IO troops withdrew from Abyei in the days after the event.


In November, tensions de-escalated slightly, with leaders from the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya signing a UN-overseen commitment to avoiding violence during the upcoming bi-annual cattle migration on the 26th of November. dbu

TANZANIA (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **4** | Change: **↗** | Start: **1993**

Conflict parties: ACT-Wazalendo, CHADEMA, CUF vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power



The violent crisis over national power and the orientation of the political system between the main opposition parties ACT-Wazalendo, CHADEMA, and CUF, on the one hand, and the Tanzanian government under Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), on the other, escalated to a limited war.

The year was marked by large-scale police violence against protests that erupted after the general elections on October 29, which saw President Samia Suluhu Hassan re-elected with 98% of the vote. Protesters took to the streets nationwide, particularly in Dar es Salaam, Mwanza, and Arusha, against suspected fraud and the exclusion of opposition candidates. Security forces responded with tear gas and live ammunition, resulting in approx. 700 casualties during three days of protests. Some sources estimate a final death toll of approx. 1,000, but precise figures remain contested.

Subsequently, in the beginning of November, the government launched a systematic crackdown on opposition structures, arresting and prosecuting more than 200 individuals on charges such as treason and incitement. Already starting before the elections, the opposition faced a series of arrests and disappearances of key party figures throughout the year. On April 9, police arrested the CHADEMA party leader during a protest in Mbinga, Ruvuma Region, charging him with treason the following day. He had launched the nationwide campaign No Reforms, No Elections, urging electoral reform. On May 12, police arrested CHADEMA's deputy secretary general at Julius Nyerere International Airport, Dar es Salaam Region, as well as later in the year, on November 8 in Arusha, eponymous region, for a second time. On October 6, a former Tanzanian ambassador and outspoken government critic was allegedly abducted from his home in Dar es Salaam, eponymous region. On October 22, police arrested CHADEMA's vice chairman on charges of terrorism when he arrived at the trial of a party member at the High Court in Dar es Salaam, eponymous region.

Opposition activity was further restricted by exclusions from the elections. In May, the National Electoral Commission barred CHADEMA from participating in the upcoming general elections, citing violations of electoral regulations. In August, the commission likewise disqualified presidential candidate of ACT-Wazalendo, Luhaga Mpina, from running for office. Although a court temporarily reinstated his candidacy in mid-September, the electoral authorities again disqualified him on 15 September. nao

TOGO (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **1963**

Conflict parties: opposition groups vs. government

Conflict items: national power

The violent crisis over national power between several opposition groups and the government of Faure Gnassingbé and his party Union for the Republic (UNIR) continued.

Following the adoption of a new constitution in 2024 that transformed the country from a presidential into a parliamentary system, senatorial elections were held on February 15 and boycotted by major opposition parties, including the National Alliance for Change (ANC) and the Democratic Forces for the Republic (FDR). On May 3, former president Faure Gnassingbé was sworn in as President of the Council of Ministers, a powerful position without term limits. Opposition parties and civil society denounced the move as a "constitutional coup."

In addition, social media activists such as rapper Tchala Esowè Narcisse "Aamron" mobilized dissent. Their arrests triggered protests led by the coalition "Don't Touch My Constitution," comprising opposition parties and civil society groups. Despite a protest ban since 2022, demonstrations took place in the capital Lomé on June 5 and 6. Security forces used tear gas, injuring dozens and arresting over 50 people, including journalists. Police forced reporters to delete footage, and on June 16, Togo's High Authority for Audiovisual and Communication (HAAC) suspended Radio France International (RFI) and France24 for three months for alleged biased reporting.

Renewed protests between June 26 and 28 involved opposition and youth movements. Security forces again used tear gas and batons, while protesters threw stones. Over 60 people were arrested, dozens injured, and at least five people died. The government attributed the deaths to drowning. Human rights groups documented allegations of torture and ill-treatment in detention, which authorities denied.

On July 1, the ECOWAS Commission expressed concern calling for restraint and dialogue. In July, authorities issued arrest warrants against members of the 6 July Movement (M66) and banned further marches, enforcing restrictions through a heavy security presence. Municipal elections on July 17 were held amid unrest in Lomé, including street blockades and burning tires. The ruling UNIR party won the vote, though turnout was low, influenced by diaspora-led boycott calls and security measures. Between late June and October, authorities restricted access to Facebook, TikTok, and YouTube.

Police arrested two key protest figures. Former defense minister Essozimna Marguerite Gnacadè was detained on September after posting a video critical of Gnassingbé. "Aamron" was arrested on September 19 for, among other reasons, inciting revolt, and later released under judicial supervision, while Gnacadè was indicted. On October 29, Irish prisoner Abdoul Aziz Goma announced a renewed hunger strike starting November 5, joined by 38 other detainees. Following growing domestic and international pressure, the Council of Ministers pardoned 1,511 political detainees on December 30.

Despite isolated protests during the Pan-African Congress in Lomé in December, the overall situation remains tense, with civil society organizations expressing continued concern over shrinking public freedoms. hme

UGANDA (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↗** | Start: **2001**Conflict parties: DP, FDC, Jeema, NEED, NUP, PFT, UPC
vs. government

Conflict items: national power

The non-violent crisis over national power between various opposition parties and the ruling National Resistance Movement Party (NRM) escalated to a violent crisis. Different opposition parties, such as the National Unity Platform (NUP), the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC), the Democratic Party (DP), the Uganda People's Congress (UPC), the People's Front for Transition (PFT), the National Economic Empowerment Dialogue (NEED), and the Justice Forum Party (Jeema) collaborated to disempower the NRM government and President Yoweri Museveni.

Throughout the year, the government continued to target opposition parties and prominent members of the opposition. After his abduction in Nairobi, Kenya, on 11/16/24, opposition leader Kizza Besigye remained in custody. Despite a Supreme Court ruling against trying civilians in military courts on January 31, a civilian court charged Besigye with treason on February 21. On July 1, an MP accused the government of abducting and torturing him. On October 1, security forces abducted two Kenyan activists after attending a campaign event for opposition leader Bobi Wine in the capital of Kampala.

General Muhoozi Kainerugaba, President Museveni's son, targeted members of the opposition directly as well. For instance, on social media he threatened to behead Bobi Wine, on January 5. On April 27, unidentified individuals in both civilian and military clothes abducted Wine's bodyguard in Kiwango, Central Region. On May 1, Kainerugaba confirmed his detention in his basement.

After Bobi Wine's candidacy in the 2026 presidential election was confirmed on September 24, rallies and campaigns from his NUP were marred by occasional clashes between opposition supporters and security forces. For instance, on November 24, the police used tear gas to disperse supporters at an NUP rally at Kawempe Growers Playing Ground, Kampala, leaving at least six security officers injured. Further on November 28, police and the military used tear gas and live bullets to disperse NUP supporters at a campaign rally in

Iganga District, Eastern Region killing at least one civilian and injuring three others. On November 25, NUP accused security forces of having detained more than 300 of their supporters and officials. sag

ZIMBABWE (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **2** | Change: **↘** | Start: **2000**

Conflict parties: CCC vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The violent crisis over national power and the orientation of the political system between the government of Zimbabwe under Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) and the opposition, especially Citizens Coalitions for Change (CCC) and aligned civic actors, de-escalated to a non-violent crisis.

While the overall intensity of the conflict remained low and no violence occurred, coercive state behavior persisted and the government maintained tight control over civic space through preventive policing, judicial repression, and restrictive legislation.


A major direct confrontation happened on March 31, when approx. 200 protesters took to the streets in the capital Harare against the backdrop of a nationwide shutdown to demand President Emmerson Mnangagwa's resignation. Protesters allegedly threw stones, while the police responded with tear gas and batons, arresting approx. 95 protesters and temporarily detaining several journalists reporting on the event. This protest happened in response to efforts by ZANU–PF in January to anti-constitutionally extend Mnangagwa's term limit to three.


Aside from this incident, coercive state tactics shaped the conflict. On February 24, the police arrested a journalist on charges of alleged incitement to violence and damaging property. He was provisionally released 72 days later. Furthermore, on July 1, another journalist was temporarily detained for allegedly undermining state authority. On April 11, the president signed the Private Voluntary Organisation (PVO) Amendment Act, further restricting civic engagement and NGO operations. Tactical preventive police deployments as well as announcements cautioning against protest participation aimed at deterring demonstrations in October and November. nao

THE AMERICAS


VIOLENT CONFLICTS IN THE AMERICAS IN 2025 (SUBNATIONAL LEVEL)

INTENSITY







CONFLICT INTENSITIES IN THE AMERICAS IN 2025 COMPARED TO 2024



CONFLICT INTENSITIES BY CONFLICT ITEM IN THE AMERICAS IN 2025



CONFLICT INTENSITIES BY CONFLICT TYPE IN THE AMERICAS IN 2025



REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Numbering 62, the active conflicts observed by HIIK in the Americas region remained the same in comparison to last year. While with counting one, the number of wars remained unchanged, the number of limited wars increased from three to five. In 2025, 44 conflicts were carried out violently, which marks an increase of nine compared to 2024.

Once again, Haiti saw the most violence this year, with the continuation of war between gangs and the government backed up by a multinational UN contingent. The Viv Ansanm gang coalition and the Gran Grif gang controlled more than 85 percent of the capital Port-au-Prince. Violence took place not only in the West department, but also in North and Artibonite throughout the year. On June 21, the head of the Transitional Presidential Council confirmed the presence of private military companies and the use of UAVs for anti-gang operations in the capital. Security forces and the UN-backed Multinational Security Support Mission (MSS) were unable to stop gangs [→ Haiti (gangs)]. At the same time, the violent crisis over national power and the orientation of the political system among parties and civil society representatives grouped in the Transitional Presidential Council (TPC), on the one hand, and between the TPC and civil society protesters, on the other, continued. Anti-government protesters went to the streets demanding better security conditions. In March, police shot live ammunition, killing at least two protesters and injuring several others in Port-au-Prince. In rural areas of Mirebalais city, Centre Department, demonstrators shut down the city electricity grid after the fall of the city in the hands of gangs in May [→ Haiti (opposition)]. Gang-related attacks fueled the population's anger at the TPC and raised skepticism over its ability to organize Presidential elections expected to be held on 08/30/26. On October 9, shots outside the national palace interrupted a high-level TPC meeting to decide next year's national budget.

Between January 1 and November 31, the UN Security Council reported at least 8,100 deaths due to gang violence. As a result, 1.4 million people were internally displaced. Haitian refugees sought protection in neighboring Dominican Republic, whose president Luis Abinader extended the current border wall another 13 km to block the entering of migrants into the country, and deepened measures to deport Haitians residing in the Caribbean country in public hospitals [→ Dominican Republic – Haiti].

In Venezuela, the non-violent crisis between the United States and the Caribbean country escalated to a limited war after the US administration tied migration and oil to security concerns and unilaterally escalated the conflict demanding regime change. A buildup of regional forces in Puerto Rico, Trinidad and Tobago conducted a campaign of airstrikes against boats bound north, allegedly transporting drugs in August. The campaign also expanded to the North Pacific Ocean, leaving at least 65 killed in the Pacific and another 61 in the Caribbean. Additionally, by mid-December, a CIA-conducted airstrike destroyed a suspected dock facility in the Venezuelan Alta Guajira region, Zulía state [→ USA – Venezuela].

While US President Donald J. Trump claimed to be fighting the Tren de Aragua gang on US soil and the Caribbean, the Venezuelan government targeted the so-called mega-gangs throughout the country. The violent crisis over subnational predominance and resources between gangs and the government continued. The government attacked gangs in the capital Caracas, Miranda, Guárico, and Aragua states. In the latter, the government declared that Tren de Aragua and Tren del Llano gangs dismantled and claimed that the US used the gangs as a “construct” to destabilize the country and topple his government [→ Venezuela (mega-gangs)].

In south Venezuela, the violent crisis over subnational predominance and over gold and rare earths between mining gangs and the government, alongside the National Liberation Army (ELN) and FARC dissidents continued. Authorities claimed to have seized illegal gold mines and assets belonging to the gang known as the 3R Organization. However, environmental activists noted that military operations are not stopping illegal mining, but directly profiting from them in exchange for the right of exploitation. On June 9, an alleged infighting within Negro Fabio's gang left six injured in a guesthouse in Sifontes municipality, Bolívar state [→ Venezuela (mining)].

In Amazonas state, the non-violent crisis over subnational predominance and resources between indigenous communities and miners escalated to a violent crisis. On January 22, miners injured members of the Ye'kwana villagers of Tencua community, Manapiare municipality. On November 23, a Yanomami community seized a boat at the shores of Padamo river, allegedly transporting supplies for a mining site in Alto Orinoco municipality [→ Venezuela (indigenous groups)].

In West and South Venezuela, the non-violent crisis among FARC Central General Staff dissidents (EMC), FARC Segunda Marquetalia (SM), and the National Liberation Army (ELN), the latter with the support of the Venezuelan government, on the other, escalated to a violent crisis. Both the government and ELN clashed with FARC dissidents. The ELN Northeastern War Front's incursion against FARC 33rd Front in El Catatumbo, Norte de Santander, Colombia [→ Colombia (inter-cartel rivalry, neo-paramilitary groups, left-wing militants)] precipitated a wave of seizures and raids against dissidents infrastructure along the border. In July, a clash between the national guard and the ELN in Zulía left two killed and one injured. ELN and FARC Segunda Marquetalia (SM) entered into an unprecedented confrontation in Venezuelan territory. On August 5, presumed ELN fighters killed the deputy commander of SM most visible leader, Iván Márquez, in Apure state. The confrontation left a total of five dead and at least two injured. A further clash in Atures municipality, Amazonas state, left at least one militant and one civilian dead and another injured on October 27. On October 2, the minister of defense confirmed for the first time in public the presence of ELN and FARC dissidents in the country [→ Venezuela (FARC dissidents)].

The non-violent crisis over Esequibo with neighboring Guyana escalated to a violent crisis. Tensions escalated along the border around the Venezuelan regional elections in the federal state of Guyana Esequiba on May 25. On February 17, unknown gunmen from the Venezuelan side shot at Guyanese soldiers in the Cuyuni river, injuring six soldiers. On August 31, unknown gunmen from the Venezuelan side again attacked Guyanese police officers and election officials in Sifontes municipality, along the upper Curuni River in Bolívar State, on the eve of Guyana's general and regional elections. On August 22, the US issued a joint statement with Guyana asserting that Venezuela was a threat to regional security under President Maduro's authority. The Venezuelan president rejected the accusation on the same day [→ Guyana – Venezuela].

In Brazil, the violent crisis over subnational predominance between the main drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) and the government escalated to a limited war. Police carried out operations against drug dealers in Rondônia, Ceará, Goiás, and São

Paulo states. In Rio de Janeiro, security forces killed 128 people during the so-called Operação Contenção in Alemão and Penha favelas on October 28 [→ Brazil (drug trafficking organizations)].

The violent crisis over land and housing between left-wing Landless Workers' Movement (MST) and right-wing groups alongside local security forces continued. Police violently dissolved protests part of the MST-led Red April Campaign in Tocantins and Mato Grosso do Sul states. In Pernambuco state, a civilian driver ran over two MST activists, killing one and injuring the other one. For the remainder of the year, violence was observed in Bahia, Pará and São Paulo states. For instance, on September 13, gunmen threatened and shot at families who reoccupied a camp in Planaltino, Bahia, after military police evicted them on August 26. In São Paulo state, armed men killed two and injured another six settlers on January 10 [→ Brazil (MST, MTST)].

Civilian and security forces also attacked indigenous groups in Brazil. The violent crisis over the demarcation of indigenous territories, resources, and self-determination continued. Between April 7 and 11, about 7,000 indigenous protesters mobilized against Law 14.701 which foresaw the restriction of indigenous people's access to people occupied before the Constitution of 1988. Violence against indigenes was mostly observed within this framework in Bahia, Mato Grosso do Sul, Pará, and Roraima states. Security forces and unknown individuals shot at protesters attempting to occupy ancestral territory or rejecting gold miners. November marked the most violent observed month due to uprisings by miners against communities rejecting gold extraction in Roraima state [→ Brazil (indigenous groups)].

In Jamaica, the violent crisis between drug gangs and security forces continued. The HIIK observed most of the violence in the Kingston, Saint Catherine, and, especially, St Andrew parishes. In the latter, the police killed leading figures. On January 22, the Joint Anti-Gang Task Force killed the leader of the One Order Gang. On April 16, the police shot at a high-ranking member of 7s gang in Red Hills. On August 9, the so-called Katon Defence Force Gang attacked a policeman and his family, killing one and injuring two. In the subsequent security operations, the police shot the alleged leader of the gang in Shooters Hill on August 11 [→ Jamaica (drug trafficking organizations)].

In Bolivia, the dispute over the political system, ideology, and resources between various social groups and the government escalated into a violent crisis. The fragmentation of the ruling Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) and the exclusion of its leader and former president, Evo Morales, from the electoral process further deepened political polarization in the country. Transportation, industrial, commercial and agricultural workers joined forces with traditional protest groups to organize road blockades and demonstrations nationwide, resulting in several deaths and hundreds of injuries [→ Bolivia (opposition); Bolivia (socioeconomic protests)].

In Ecuador, the dispute between opposition groups and the government escalated from a non-violent to a violent crisis. Political tensions following the removal of diesel subsidies, culminated in nationwide protests during September. Indigenous organizations, transport workers, and farmers organized demonstrations and road blockades across several provinces, leading to deadly confrontations with security forces and the declaration of a state of internal emergency on October 6 [→ Ecuador (opposition)].

While political competition intensified in Bolivia and Ecuador, Nicaragua and El Salvador experienced continued restrictions on political opposition and civic space. In Nicaragua, the non-violent crisis between opposition groups and the government continued as authorities intensified repression against political opponents, journalists, religious actors, and exiled dissidents. On November 11, the government expanded censorship measures through a new telecommunications law, closing independent digital spaces [→ Nicaragua (opposition)]. Similarly, in El Salvador, tensions between opposition groups and the government persisted amid the continued concentration of power under President Nayib Bukele. On May 20, the parliament passed a restrictive law for NGOs. This law imposed a 30 percent tax on foreign donations, raising concerns about human rights, civil society independence and freedom of expression in the country. [→ El Salvador (opposition)].

In Honduras, the conflict over national power between the government and opposition groups escalated to a violent crisis in the context of the November general elections. Accusations of electoral manipulation, disputes over electoral procedures, and challenges to the election results triggered protests and clashes between party supporters, politicians, and security forces [→ Honduras (opposition)]. Organized crime and drug trafficking remained major sources of violence in the country. The government intensified counternarcotics operations, coca eradication campaigns, and interdiction efforts against trafficking networks operating along the country's principal drug transit corridors [→ Honduras (drug trafficking organizations, organized crime)]. Conflicts over land, resources, and territorial control also remained prominent in Honduras. The violent crisis in the Bajo Aguán region continued, with paramilitary groups and unidentified armed actors repeatedly targeting peasant organizations, cooperative members, and environmental activists [→ Honduras (Bajo Aguán)]. In fact, On July 17, armed men ambushed and killed two members of the cooperatives La Aurora and Gregorio Chávez, and on August 11, unidentified men attacked and killed a member of the Unified Peasant Movement of Aguán in Tocoa, Cónon region. Similarly, in Nicaragua, the conflict over autonomy and resources between indigenous groups, settlers, and the government escalated into a violent crisis. Unknown armed settlers killed two Miskito indigenous group members during the year: one on April 25 and the other on September 10 [→ Nicaragua (indigenous groups)].

Further North, in Cuba, the non-violent crisis over freedom of expression, food, water, and electricity between civil society protesters and student groups, on the one hand, and the government of President Miguel Díaz-Canel (Partido Comunista de Cuba, PCC), on the other, continued [→ Cuba (social protests)]. Protest activity remained low but recurrent and was mainly triggered by electricity shortages, rising internet costs, and food scarcity. Besides, the dispute and non-violent crisis between Cuba and the USA continued [→ Cuba – USA (Guantanamo); Cuba – USA (system)]. Following President Donald Trump's re-election, the US administration announced on January 29 that it would expand detention operations at the US naval base in Guantanamo Bay, and Cuban authorities criticized the decision in connection with Cuba's claim to the territory.

In Guatemala, the violent crisis over subnational predominance and resources between organized crime actors and the state continued [→ Guatemala (drug cartels)]. Between July and September alone, documented incidents included at least twelve fatalities and multiple dozen arrests and raids, concentrated in urban areas like Guatemala City and border corridors such as La Mesilla. State actors (Policía Nacional Civil, SGAIA, Ejército and special units) mounted sustained operations, but persistent

corruption and penetration of local institutions limited long-term disruption of criminal networks.

A total of eight domestic conflicts were observed in Mexico this year. Most notably, the limited war over subnational predominance, the trade and trafficking of illegal drugs, and other illicit activities between various drug cartels and their respective splinter groups continued [→ Mexico (inter-cartel rivalry, paramilitary groups)]. The groups most visibly involved were the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG), Sinaloa Cartel (CDS), Northeastern Cartel (CDN), Santa Rosa de Lima Cartel (CSRL), Gulf Cartel (CDG), and the cartel alliance United Cartels (CU). As in previous years, the detention or killing of cartel leaders triggered internal succession struggles [→ Mexico (drug cartels)]. In a new development, the non-violent crisis between feminist groups, human rights activists, mothers of the disappeared, and indigenous and local women's organizations, on the one hand, and governmental and judicial institutions at municipal, state, and federal levels, on the other, escalated to a violent crisis [→ Mexico (women's protests)]. Protesters focused on femicides, disappearances, reproductive rights, institutional impunity, and shortcomings in protection mechanisms, including the gender-violence alert system. The largest mobilizations occurred on March 8, when tens of thousands participated in Mexico City and more than seventy people were injured, primarily during clashes with security forces. The violent crisis over the orientation of the political system and the management of public security between teacher trainees from rural colleges, known as Normalistas, and allied movements, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued [→ Mexico (public security)]. Further North, the violent crisis over border security between Mexico and the USA, on the one hand, and migrants and smugglers attempting to cross into the US, on the other, continued. During the year, reported unauthorized crossings at the US–Mexico border declined to their lowest level in decades, contributing to an overall decrease in violent incidents [→ Mexico, USA (border security)].

In the USA, two domestic violent crises continued, one over systematic and institutional racism, particularly within the justice system and law enforcement, between anti-discrimination protesters and civil society groups, on the one hand, and the US government and right-wing extremist groups, on the other [→ USA (racial tensions)]. And one over the orientation of the political system between various right-wing extremist groups, Christian nationalist groups, on the one hand, and the government, on the other [→ USA (right-wing extremists)].

Further South, Colombia remained affected by seven political conflicts, ranging from disputes to limited wars - five violent, two non-violent - cementing its position as one of the most conflict-affected states in the Americas. Overall, violence in Colombia intensified compared to 2024.

The limited war between FARC dissident factions, the ELN, and the government persisted, concentrating in Antioquia, Cauca, Guaviare, Nariño, Norte de Santander, and Valle del Cauca [→ Colombia (inter-cartel rivalry, neo-paramilitary groups, left-wing militants)]. Its deadliest episode occurred in Catatumbo, where FARC dissidents and ELN fighting from January 16 killed over 80 people and displaced more than 53,000 civilians, prompting a state of emergency and the deployment of 5,000 additional troops.

Two further violent crises continued in the country: Indigenous communities faced continued assassinations of leaders and mass displacement amid armed-group violence in Catatumbo and Cauca [→ Colombia (indigenous groups)], while civil society's confrontation with the government intensified, after the July 15 assassination of presidential pre-candidate Miguel Uribe Turbay sparked nationwide protests [→ Colombia (social protests)].

Besides, a new dispute emerged with Peru over the disputed Amazonian island of Santa Rosa de Yavarí, after Peru incorporated it into a new district; Colombia rejected this as a treaty violation, and both sides reinforced military presence without violent clashes [→ Colombia – Peru (Santa Rosa de Yavarí)].

Chile remained affected by low-intensity political conflicts throughout the year, none escalating beyond a violent crisis. Violence in the south initially dropped by roughly half early in the year before a wave of arson attacks in November reversed the trend ahead of December's presidential election.

The violent crisis between Mapuche organizations, including the Coordinadora Arauco-Malleco (CAM) and Resistencia Mapuche Malleco (RMM), and the government over autonomy and ancestral territory in the Araucanía region continued. Arson attacks targeted forestry infrastructure in January and June, eighteen Mapuche prisoners began a hunger strike in Angol in June, and the disappearance of Mapuche environmental defender Julia Chuñil drew renewed national attention in October after an intercepted call suggested she had been killed. President Boric responded in May by announcing a constitutional reform to recognize indigenous rights, following recommendations from the Commission for Peace and Understanding. In November, the Weichán Auka Mapu (WAM) carried out eleven coordinated arson attacks on logging trucks and farm equipment within a single week, shortly before the election [→ Chile (Mapuche / Araucanía)]. Finally, a minor conflict involving anarchist cells persisted at low intensity, marked by repeated arson and small explosive attacks on public buses and infrastructure in Santiago, without reported fatalities [→ Chile (anarchist groups)].

THE AMERICAS

Overview: Conflicts in the Americas in 2025

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
Argentina – United Kingdom (Falkland Islands / Islas Malvinas)*	Argentina vs. United Kingdom	territory, resources	1833	•	1
Belize – Guatemala*	Belize vs. Guatemala	territory	1981	•	1
Bolivia (opposition)*	opposition groups and parties vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2017	•	3
Bolivia (socioeconomic protests)*	various social groups vs. government	system/ideology, resources	1983	↑	3
Bolivia – Chile (access to sea)*	Bolivia vs. Chile	territory	1883	•	1
Brazil (drug trafficking organizations)*	drug trafficking organizations, militias vs. government	subnational predominance	2008	↗	4
Brazil (indigenous groups)*	indigenous groups vs. agribusiness, government, landowners, loggers, miners, Zero Invasion	autonomy, resources, other	1988	•	3
Brazil (MST, MTST)*	MST, MTST vs. agribusiness, government, landowners, Zero Invasion	resources	1996	•	3
Brazil (opposition)*	Bolsonaro supporters vs. Lula supporters	system/ideology	2014	•	3
Chile (anarchist groups)*	anarchist groups vs. government	system/ideology	2014	↘	2
Chile (Mapuche / Araucanía)*	CAM, Mapuche, RML, WAM vs. government	autonomy, resources	2008	•	3
Chile (social protests)*	ACES, CONES, CONFECU, CUT vs. government	system/ideology	2006	•	3
Chile – United Kingdom (Antarctica)*	Chile vs. United Kingdom	territory	2007	•	1
Colombia (artisanal miners / Antioquia)*	artisanal miners vs. AGC vs. government	resources	2017	•	3
Colombia (ELN)*	ELN vs. government	system/ideology, subnational predominance, resources	1964	•	3
Colombia (FARC dissidents)*	FARC dissidents vs. government	system/ideology, subnational predominance, resources	2017	↘	3
Colombia (indigenous groups)*	indigenous groups vs. government	resources	2005	•	3
Colombia (inter-cartel rivalry, neo-paramilitary groups, left-wing militants)*	AGC vs. CDF vs. Los Caparros vs. ELN vs. FARC dissidents vs. EPL vs. Los Rastrojos vs. ASCM	subnational predominance, resources	2013	•	4
Colombia (neo-paramilitary groups, drug cartels)*	drug cartels, neo-paramilitary groups vs. government	subnational predominance, resources	1983	↗	4
Colombia (social protests)*	Comité Nacional de Paro, Primera Línea vs. right-wing opposition vs. government	system/ideology	2019	↗	3
Colombia – Nicaragua (sea border)*	Colombia vs. Nicaragua	territory, resources	1825	•	1
Colombia – Peru (Santa Rosa de Yavarí)*	Colombia vs. Peru	territory	2025	NEW	1
Colombia – Venezuela (border security)*	Colombia vs. Venezuela	other	2015	↗	2
Cuba (social protests)*	civil society groups, pro-democracy groups, social protesters vs. government	system/ideology	2021	•	2
Cuba – USA (Guantanamo)*	Cuba vs. USA	territory	1959	•	1
Cuba – USA (system)*	Cuba vs. USA	system/ideology, international power	1960	•	2
Dominican Republic – Haiti*	Dominican Republic vs. Haiti	resources, other	2009	•	2
Ecuador (FARC dissidents)*	Border Commandos, Carolina Ramírez Front, Nariño's Self-Defense Forces, Oliver Sinisterra Front, other militias vs. government	subnational predominance, resources	2018	↗	3
Ecuador (inter-gang rivalry)*	Choneros et al. vs. Lobos et al. vs. R7	subnational predominance, resources	2021	•	3
Ecuador (opposition)*	opposition groups vs. government	system/ideology, resources	1980	↗	3
El Salvador (drug trafficking organizations)*	drug trafficking organizations vs. government	subnational predominance	2003	•	3
El Salvador (opposition)*	civil society groups, opposition parties vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2020	•	2
Guatemala (drug cartels)*	drug cartels vs. government	subnational predominance, resources	2009	•	3

THE AMERICAS

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
Guatemala (opposition)*	opposition groups vs. government	system/ideology	1985	•	2
Guyana – Venezuela *	Guyana vs. Venezuela	territory, resources	2015	↗	3
Haiti (gangs)*	Gran Grif, Viv Ansanm vs. MSS, security forces, TPC vs. vigilante groups	subnational predominance, resources	2020	•	5
Haiti (opposition)*	Inite / Montana Accord vs. Fanmi Lavalas vs. Struggling People's Organization vs. EDE / RED-Historic Compromise vs. 21 December Agreement vs. Platfòm Pitit Desalin vs. civil society representatives vs. FREN vs. anti-government protesters	system/ideology, national power	1986	•	3
Honduras (Bajo Aguán)*	peasants, peasants unions vs. government, land-owning companies	territory, resources	2009	•	3
Honduras (drug trafficking organizations, organized crime)*	criminal organizations, drug trafficking organizations vs. government	subnational predominance, resources	2012	•	3
Honduras (opposition)*	opposition government vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2009	↗	3
Jamaica (drug gangs)*	drug gangs vs. government	subnational predominance	2010	•	3
Mexico (CNTE)*	CNTE vs. government	system/ideology	2006	•	2
Mexico (drug cartels) *	drug cartels vs. vigilante groups vs. government	subnational predominance, resources	2006	•	3
Mexico (EZLN / Chiapas)*	EZLN vs. government vs. ORCAO	autonomy, system/ideology, resources, other	1994	↘	1
Mexico (inter-cartel rivalry, paramilitary groups)*	CJNG et al. vs. CU et al. vs. CSRL et al. vs. CDS et al. vs. CDN et al. vs. CDG et al.	subnational predominance, resources	2005	•	4
Mexico (opposition) *	opposition groups vs. government	system/ideology	2006	•	3
Mexico (public security)*	normalistas, social movements vs. government	system/ideology	2014	•	3
Mexico (women's protests)*	feminist groups, human rights activists, women's rights groups vs. government	system/ideology	2020	↗	3
Mexico, USA (border security)*	Mexico, USA vs. illegal immigrants, refugees, smugglers	other	2005	•	3
Nicaragua (indigenous groups)*	Mayangna, Miskito groups, Rama, YATAMA vs. government, non-indigenous settlers	autonomy, resources	2015	↗	3
Nicaragua (opposition)*	anti-government protesters, opposition groups vs. government, paramilitary groups	system/ideology, national power	2008	•	2
Paraguay (EPP, agrarian movements)*	agrarian movements, EPP vs. government	system/ideology, resources	1989	•	3
Peru (opposition)*	opposition movements vs. government	system/ideology, resources	2008	↗	3
Peru (Shining Path)*	SL vs. government	system/ideology, subnational predominance, resources	1980	↘	2
USA (racial tensions)*	anti-discrimination protesters vs. right-wing extremist groups vs. government	system/ideology	2014	•	3
USA (right-wing extremists)*	right wing extremist groups vs. government	system/ideology	1990	•	3
USA – Venezuela *	USA vs. Venezuela	system/ideology, international power	2001	↑	4
Venezuela (FARC dissidents)*	FARC EMC vs. FARC Segunda Marquetalia vs. government, ELN	subnational predominance, resources	2020	↗	3
Venezuela (indigenous groups)*	indigenous groups vs. government, miners	subnational predominance, resources	1988	↗	3
Venezuela (mega-gangs)*	El Adriancito vs. El Conas vs. Tren de Aragua vs. Tren del Llano vs. Yeico Masacre vs. various gangs vs. government	subnational predominance, resources	2014	•	3
Venezuela (mining)*	El Perú vs. 3R vs. Tren de Guyana vs. El Talao vs. Sindicato de Barrancas vs. ELN, FARC dissidents, government, Juancho / Las Claritas Syndicate, various gangs	subnational predominance, resources	2006	•	3
Venezuela (opposition)*	opposition parties vs. government, pro-government militias	system/ideology, national power	1992	•	3

THE AMERICAS

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
¹ Conflicts marked with * are without description ² Mentioned are only those conflict parties relevant for the period under review ³ Change in intensity compared to the previous year: ↑ or ↗ escalation by one or more than one level of intensity; ↓ or ↘ deescalation by one or more than one level of intensity; • no change ⁴ Levels of intensity: 5 = war; 4 = limited war; 3 = violent crisis; 2 = non-violent crisis; 1 = dispute ⁵ HIIK considers statehood to be non-contested if the state is an official UN members state. Disputed statehood is marked with a * if a territory is recognized by at least one other official UN member state ("limited recognition")					

BELIZE – GUATEMALA

Intensity: **1** | Change: • | Start: **1981**

Conflict parties: Belize vs. Guatemala
Conflict items: territory

The dispute between Belize and Guatemala over territory continued. Guatemala maintained a position difference with Belize over the international boundary and related territorial claims. Both states pursued settlement through the ICJ, based on their Special Agreement of 12/08/08, and the Court was seized of the case on 06/12/19.

On September 10, a contingent associated with the Guatemalan Armed Forces hoisted a Guatemalan flag on Sarstoon Island, a contested area, and Belize protested the incident through diplomatic channels. The same day, officials intervened and the flag was removed. Between September 10 and September 13, Guatemala accused Belizean defense forces of unauthorized presence on the Sarstoon River, while bilateral military-to-military dialog ended the episode without reported violence against persons. gro

BOLIVIA (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2017**

Conflict parties: opposition groups and parties vs. government
Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The violent crisis over the ideological orientation of the political system and national power between various opposition parties and groups, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued.

The conflict, which originally started over the decision of the Supreme Court of Justice to allow former President and MAS-leader Evo Morales to run for re-election, has been significantly impacted by Morales' exit from the MAS party and the resulting division of the party base. The polarization is further intensified by the ongoing judicial proceedings and outstanding arrest warrant against Morales after he was allegedly accused in October 2024 of having sexual relations with a minor during his presidency in 2016.

On January 22, President Luis Arce held a speech condemning the ongoing polarization of the political system and presenting a five-item plan to unify the country.

On February 2, Morales announced that he would be leaving MAS and that the Frente para la Victoria (FPV) would instead support his presidential campaign.

On March 31, Morales and supporters founded the political party Estamos Volviendo Obedeciendo al Pueblo (abbreviated as EVO Pueblo). However, as EVO Pueblo is not a registered and legally recognized party, it could not support Morales' presidential campaign.

On May 15, supporters of Morales gathered in Parotani, Cochabamba, forming a caravan toward La Paz expressing their support for his presidential campaign. On May 16, supporters of Morales clashed with police during protests near the Supreme Electoral Court (abbreviated as TSE) in La Paz. Protesters threw stones and fireworks while the police used tear gas and rubber bullets, leaving multiple people injured. On May 20, the TSE announced that neither EVO Pueblo,

nor Pan-Bol are recognized political parties and thus cannot support Morales' presidential bid, therefore excluding him from the elections. Following this decision, Protests near the TSE lasted for four days between May 26 and May 29, with clashes between the police and protesters, resulting in 26 arrests and at least three injured persons.

On June 1, political opposition instated roadblocks in La Paz, Cochabamba and Copacabana and socio-economic protests [->Bolivia (socio-economic protests)] coinciding with pro-Morales protests. The former group principally criticized Arce's economic policies, specifically also the unavailability of US-Dollars, while the latter group continued its protest in support of Morales presidential campaign. The roadblocks were suspended two weeks later.

On June 15, Two civilians and four police officers were killed during the protest and at least 31 persons were injured in the departments of Potosí and Cochabamba. The protest movement stated that they would maintain the pressure on Arce's Government.

On August 17, General Elections were held. Rodrigo Paz of the Partido Demócrata Cristiano (abbreviated as PDC) emerged as the front-runner for President, followed by former President and Libre Candidate Jorge Quiroga. MAS, who had been leading the country for the past two decades, suffered a historic loss, with his presidential candidate exiting the presidential race in the first round, and the party losing most of its seats in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate.

On October 19, Rodrigo Paz of the PDC became President after winning the second round of elections and was inaugurated on November 8.

On November 6, former interim President Jeanine Áñez was released from prison after her 10-year sentence was overturned by the Supreme Court due to a retroactive change in the underlying offense. She had been imprisoned since June 2022 for her actions during the 2019 political crisis. However, Áñez still faces prosecution in multiple other offenses. On December 10, former President Luis Arce was arrested on charges of corruption and, on December 12, ordered to five months of pre-trial detention. He is accused of misappropriating funds while serving as economy minister during the Presidency of Evo Morales. Court judgments and criminal sentences against members of former governments continue to fuel the conflict between the opposition and the current government in the country. jas

BOLIVIA (SOCIOECONOMIC PROTESTS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: ↑ | Start: **1983**

Conflict parties: various social groups vs. government
Conflict items: system/ideology, resources

The dispute over system, ideology and resources between various social groups, on the one hand, and the government on the other, escalated to a violent crisis.

Throughout the year, Bolivia faced several major disputes across key productive, labor, and economic sectors. Transportation, industrial, commercial, and agricultural workers joined forces with traditional protest groups, such as miners, teachers, and coca growers, to organize road blockades and demonstrations nationwide. They confronted the government regarding limited access to essential resources, such as fuel, foreign exchange, public budgets, employment, and subsidies.

On April 21, the Urban Teachers' Union (CTEUB) organized


marches in La Paz to demand higher education funding, more positions, and full-salary pensions. Police used tear gas to disperse protesters attempting to reach the Ministry of Education building, while protesters responded with paint and firecrackers. Authorities arrested two teachers and one police officer resulted injured. On May 29, demonstrators in La Paz confronted police during a march criticizing the economic situation and demanding responses to the sharp rise in the prices of basic foodstuffs. Protesters used dynamite and stones during the clashes. Authorities reported 26 arrests and four injured officers.

Between June 3 and June 15, farmers, rural workers, transport operators, and other social groups aligned with the political party Evo Pueblo organized widespread protests and road blockades nationwide, escalating violence amid dollar shortages, fuel scarcity, and a broader political crisis. For instance, on June 11, demonstrators ambushed and killed three police officers in Llallagua in the Potosí Department. Meanwhile, confrontations between residents and road blockers in other parts of the department left at least 34 people injured. On 12 June, another police officer died in an explosion in Cochabamba amid the protests. The Ombudsman's Office stated that the June demonstrations resulted in at least 200 people injured and eight fatalities, including four law enforcement officers and four civilians.

On December 23, miners associated with the Bolivian Workers' Union (COB) clashed with police during a march in Plaza Murillo, in La Paz's city center. The miners marched against Bill 5503, demanding its repeal. The confrontation escalated from firecrackers to tear gas and explosives, resulting in two injured officers. The bill 5503 includes measures such as freezing public sector wage increases and restricting internal credits from the Central Bank of Bolivia to public companies, as well as setting the new minimum wage at 3,300 Bolivianos. The government stated that these measures are necessary to address the foreign exchange shortage and the deterioration of public finances. On 24 December, COB protesters continued to clash with police, setting off explosives and injuring four officers. Bolivian authorities arrested three demonstrators linked to the attack. On 30 December, several syndicalist groups protested the removal of fuel subsidies by setting off dynamite and fireworks in La Paz. The police responded by firing tear gas and rubber bullets to disperse the crowd. dll

BRAZIL (DRUG TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS)

Intensity:	4	Change:	↗	Start:	2008
Conflict parties:	drug trafficking organizations, militias vs. government				
Conflict items:	subnational predominance				



The violent crisis over subnational predominance between the main drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), such as Comando Vermelho (CV), Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC), Família do Norte (FDN), and various militias on the one hand, and the government on the other, escalated to a limited war. Police targeted hotspots of DTO activity in the state of Rio de Janeiro. On February 15, armed criminals attacked a

police station in an attempt to free prisoners, injuring two officers. In the subsequent operation, police killed five people in the Baixada Fluminense region. On March 30, an unknown gunman killed a police officer while returning home in Grotá Funda, a neighborhood of Rio de Janeiro city. This incident prompted a mission during which authorities killed five suspected traffickers on April 15. On May 13, police killed three more suspects during an operation in the Complexo da Maré. On June 10, four civilians were injured in a confrontation between criminals and the Civil Police in the Complexo do Israel. Later, on June 30, police killed four CV drug traffickers in the Vicente de Carvalho district during another police operation. During an operation on September 4, police fatally shot eight people in the city of Rio de Janeiro. On October 28, the police carried out operation "Operação Contenção" in the Alemão and Penha favelas in Rio de Janeiro, killing 128 people, mainly alleged members of CV, while itself suffering five casualties. Amnesty International condemned the operation, calling it a massacre with extrajudicial killings rooted in systemic racism. Further, UN experts expressed concern and called on Brazilian authorities to ensure an independent investigation, which, according to Human Rights Watch, was not carried out. The operation corresponded to patterns identified in a United Nations report published at the beginning of 2025, which stated that Brazil's police culture and public security policy rely on repression, violence, and hypermasculinity. In contrast, a slight majority or 57 percent of the capital residents and the metropolitan area considered the operation a success, while another 39 percent disagreed.

Police also targeted DTOs in other parts of the country. On January 17, police killed six civilians and five gang members in the city of Porto Velho, Rondonia state. In the state of Ceará, police operations left five suspects were dead on March 31, two in the municipality of Cascavel and three in Santana do Acaraú. In the state of Goiás, Águas Lindas municipality, military police fatally shot a member of a criminal faction linked to the PCC on July 26. In São Paulo state, Praia Grande municipality, PCC members assassinated a former police chief on September 15. On December 19, police shot a person while carrying out a search and seizure warrant in the Favela do Moinho, São Paulo. sw

BRAZIL (INDIGENOUS GROUPS)

Intensity:	3	Change:	•	Start:	1988
Conflict parties:	indigenous groups vs. agribusiness, government, landowners, loggers, miners, Zero Invasion				
Conflict items:	autonomy, resources, other				

The violent crisis over the demarcation of indigenous territories, autonomy, and resources between various indigenous groups on the one hand, and the government as well as different resource extractors, on the other, continued. Land demarcation remained a central issue. Miners, loggers, poachers, farmers and landowners continued to enter into confrontations with indigenous groups. The most prominent indigenous groups were the Pataxó, the Munduruku, the Avá-Guaraní, the Kaiowá and the Parakanã.

The annual gathering of the Acampamento Terra Livre in the capital Brasília from April 7 to April 11 mobilized about 7,000 individuals from different ethnic groups. On April 10, military police clashed with protestors and used stun grenades, tear

gas and pepper spray against them. Furthermore, on June 9, nationwide roadblocks and protests took place in Brasília, Paraíba, Santa Catarina, Rio Grande do Sul and Rio de Janeiro. Protestors mobilized against Law 14.701, which would restrict indigenous peoples' access to land to the areas they occupied before the coming into effect of the Constitution of 1988, a position known as the marco temporal thesis. On December 19, the Brazilian Supreme Court ruled that the marco temporal was unconstitutional marking a milestone judgement in the struggle for land demarcation in Brazil.

Within this context, violence against indigenous communities disputing ancestral territory took place in Bahia state. In Porto Seguro city, unknown gunmen shot one Pataxó villager and killed another from Barra Velha do Monte Pascoal, an area inhabited and exclusively possessed by indigenous people known as Terra Indígena, Indigenous Territory (IT) on March 10. On April 4, a farmer killed one Pataxó activist during an attempt to occupy a farm located in the IT Comexatibá on the BR-101 road. On October 1, unknown gunmen opened fire on a group of Pataxó protesters at Kaí village, rural area of Prado municipality injuring two, including a chief.

On October 17, military police evicted and injured ten Guaraní and Kaiowá activists with rubber bullets in Caarapó municipality, Mato Grosso do Sul. On October 25, after the abduction and sexual abuse of a Guaraní-Kaiowá teenage girl the same day, about 30 indigenous people set fire to a farm and a tractor on the IT Guyaroká.

November had the highest number of incidents and fatalities throughout the year. On November 4, a motorized vehicle drove through a village on IT Iguatemipecuá, Mato Grosso do Sul State, and fired shots, injuring one person. The same IT was the site of violence on November 16, when about 20 gunmen, who, according to the victims, belonged to an agromilitia, shot at indigenous occupiers of a farm on the IT. They used rubber and live ammunition, killed one person and injured four more. On November 28, two goldminers were shot and killed by Yanomami people in a remote area of Roraima State, marking the end of the deadliest month of 2025.

Indigenous groups led protests of thousands of individuals, expressing the political struggle for problems they deem existential during the 30th United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, in Belém, Pará, which took place between November 10 and 21 [→ Venezuela (indigenous groups)]. On November 11, a group of indigenous protesters violently entered a secluded area, injuring two security guards. mok

BRAZIL (MST, MTST)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1996**

Conflict parties: MST, MTST vs. agribusiness, government, landowners, Zero Invasion

Conflict items: resources

The violent crisis over land and housing, involving leftist organizations such as the Landless Workers' Movement (MST) and the Homeless Workers' Movement (MTST), on the one hand, and right-wing groups alongside local security forces under President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva on the other hand, continued.

In April, protests took place against the backdrop of the National Day of Struggle in Defense of Agrarian Reform, also called the Red April Campaign. The military police dispersed around 400 MST protesters from a sugarcane processing plant

in Mill in Rio das Pedras municipality, São Paulo state, on April 7, using tear gas, shotguns, patrol cars and a helicopter. The intervention left one person injured. On April 15, during a Red April march in Recife, Pernambuco state, a driver ran over and injured two MST activists, one of them fatally. On April 17, police evicted MST families from the Taboca Settlement in Serra do Taquarucu, Tocantins state. Authorities threatened the settlers, burned down a shed, destroyed their possessions and detained 23 people. On April 27, the Department of Border Operations (DOF), a state police unit, dismantled all MST shacks at the Esperança Camp in Dourados, Mato Grosso do Sul state.

For the remainder of the year, violence against MST broke out in Bahia, Pará and São Paulo states. In Bahia, around 340 MST activists occupied an animal breeding research center in Itabela between July 22 and 23. Federal officials accused the activists of disrupting the center's international research activities. MST's alleged intention was to pressure the federal government to resume the negotiations on land reform in Bahia. On July 26, unknown shooters attacked the Osmar Azevedo MST-camp in Itabela. On August 26, the military police evicted around 42 families from Baixinha do Bom Jesus camp in Planaltino. They reoccupied the camp on September 13, while being threatened by gunmen who shot at them and destroyed their shacks and crops.

In Pará state, an unidentified group attacked the Terra Cabana Camp in Benevides, destroying the entrance gate and burning down a nursery, on July 13. MST attributed, however, the attack to an entrepreneur and former city councillor candidate of Benevides municipality. In São Paulo state, ten armed men entered the Olga Benario Settlement, opening fire on MST families, killing two people and injuring six on January 10. fho

BRAZIL (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2014**

Conflict parties: Bolsonaro supporters vs. Lula supporters

Conflict items: system/ideology

The violent crisis between supporters of former President Jair Messias Bolsonaro and current President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva continued, with the Brazilian government acting as an intervener.

On May 18, an unknown shooter in Santana do Ipanema municipality killed a former Workers' Party candidate for city council in Dois Riachos, Alagoas state.

On July 25, the former army general and a member of the general secretariat of the presidency under Bolsonaro admitted in Supreme Court testimony that he crafted a plan to assassinate President-elect Lula in 2022. This was part of an alleged coup attempt to keep Bolsonaro in power, which also targeted the Vice President and a Supreme Court Justice. Prosecutors alleged Bolsonaro was aware of the plot and led the failed coup. As a consequence, on August 4, the Supreme Court placed Bolsonaro under house arrest.

On September 12, Bolsonaro was sentenced to 27 years and 3 months in prison for leading a military coup to stay in power after the 2022 election. The Supreme Court found him guilty of conspiring with military allies, discrediting the electoral system, and knowing of plans to assassinate Lula. The sentence prevented him from holding office until 2060, remaining under house arrest while formally appealing the

decision filed on October 27. On November 25, the Supreme Court concluded the legal proceedings, and Bolsonaro was ordered to begin the 27-year prison sentence. Later, on December 17, the Senate approved a revised version of the Dosimetry Bill which could potentially cut Bolsonaro’s prison sentence to just over two years. fho

CHILE (MAPUCHE / ARAUCANIA)

Intensity:	3		Change:	•		Start:	2008
Conflict parties:	CAM, Mapuche, RML, WAM vs. gov- ernment						
Conflict items:	autonomy, resources						

The violent crisis over autonomy and resources between Mapuche groups and the government continued, fueled by enduring demands for autonomy and territorial restitution. Militant organizations such as Resistencia Mapuche Malleco (RMM) and the Coordinadora Arauco-Malleco (CAM) intensified their actions, while state institutions pursued parallel legal and political responses. On January 4 in the Araucanía Region, two Mapuche-Lavkenche women were violently detained while inspecting ancestral lands. On January 10, coordinated protests erupted across different Chilean cities, demanding appearance of Julia Chuñil, a 73-year-old Mapuche activist from the Los Ríos Region who disappeared in November 2024. On January 15 and on January 23 in the Araucanía Region, arson attacks attributed to RMM and CAM targeted forestry infrastructure. On April 25 in Temuco, RMM leader Federico Astete Catrileo was arrested after years in hiding. Meanwhile, institutional responses progressed. On May 1, the Commission for Peace and Understanding in Santiago issued reform proposals addressing historical grievances. On May 22, President Boric announced a constitutional reform to recognize the rights of Indigenous peoples, including the Mapuche, following recommendations from the Commission for Peace and Understanding. A further arson attack on June 5 in the Araucanía Region destroyed industrial machinery. On June 12, eighteen Mapuche political prisoners initiated a hunger strike in Angol Prison, the Araucanía Region. On June 26, Lonko Juan Pichún Collonao was detained in Traiguén under contested circumstances. On July 29, residents in the Araucanía Region blocked a major road to protest explosions from nearby operations at Cerro Cunco, which they claimed were harming both their health and livestock. On August 2, Mapuche-Pewenche communities organized demonstrations against the authorization to fell 96 trees for a road expansion project. Protesters argued that the measure endangered their ancestral lands and sacred species in the Araucanía Region. On October 1, renewed attention focused on the case of Julia Chuñil, who disappeared on November 8, 2024, while defending native forests and land rights. A reportedly intercepted phone call in which a businessman stated “la quemaron” (“they burned her”) intensified public scrutiny. The prosecution has faced criticism for delays, limited disclosure of information, and possible non-transparent handling of the case. The case has drawn national and international attention, with Amnistía Internacional Chile urging authorities to

expedite the investigation, citing Chuñil’s dual status as an Indigenous and environmental human rights defender. On December 14, the right-wing conservative politician José Antonio Kast won the presidential election in Chile against the communist government candidate Jeannette Jara. mgs

CHILE (SOCIAL PROTESTS)

Intensity:	3		Change:	•		Start:	2006
Conflict parties:	ACES, CONES, CONFECH, CUT vs. gov- ernment						
Conflict items:	system/ideology						

The violent crisis over the orientation of the political system and ideology between various social movements, such as the Central Worker’s Union (CUT), and the government continued. Political unrest, rooted in economic inequalities that intensified since October 2019, manifested in commemoration protests throughout September and October, while the rest of the year was marked by mostly non-violent protests for workers rights, women and LGBTQ rights, and international events such as the Israel-Hamas war [→ Israel (Hamas et al.)]. In the first Quarter of 2025, social protests were marked by a focus on labor and environmental issues. Demonstrations often included groups of workers advocating for better working conditions. For example, protests occurred against a mega mining and port project, called “Dominga” s in La Higuera, Coquimbo on January 9. On April 3, the Central Unitaria de Trabajadores (CUT) called for a national strike for workers rights. On March 27, violent protests by artisanal fishermen took place in the regions of Coquimbo, Valparaíso, and Maule. The protesters were demanding new legislation from congress regarding their fishing rights. Clashes with security forces and injured persons occurred on both sides. The second quarter of 2025 was marked by a continuation of the protests regarding the “projecto de Ley de Fraccionamiento” and protests for a better educational system, for instance the teachers strikes on June 5 in Valparaíso. Throughout the third quarter of 2025, Chile experienced increased social unrest, as commemorative protests intensified. On September 8, protestors gathered for the yearly demonstration of the 52nd anniversary of the coup d’état led by Pinochet on September 11, 1973. On September 11, protests occurred due to the anniversary of the military coup. Protesters damaged buses and stores . In October, commemorative demonstrations peaked albeit with less intensity than in previous years. During the protest on October 18, protesters blocked roads, built barricades, and damaged public and private property. jju

COLOMBIA (ARTISANAL MINERS / ANTIOQUIA)

Intensity:	3		Change:	•		Start:	2017
Conflict parties:	artisanal miners vs. AGC vs. govern- ment						
Conflict items:	resources						

The violent crisis over resources between Artisanal Miners and the government, mining companies and neo-paramilitary groups, including the Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colom-

bia (AGC), also known as Clan de Golfo, FARC dissident forces, and the National Liberation Army (ELN), continued. For instance, on January 17 in Buriticá, Antioquia, illegal miners tied to the Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC) bombed the Chinese mining company Zijin, leaving one person injured. In response, the government launched a department-wide operation against illegal mining on January 22. On February 10 in Puerto Nare, Antioquia, police dismantled three mines, arresting five people. Days later, on February 16, the Colombian armed forces destroyed mining equipment belonging to the AGC in a river in Cocorná. On February 21, Antioquia police conducted a multi-day operation targeting illegal mining in the Río Porce, where two mines were destroyed. On March 10, the armed forces killed two AGC members in a clash with those suspected of murdering mining leader Jaime Alonso Gallego Gómez in Vegachí, Antioquia. On May 23, police forces launched another large-scale, multi-day operation against illegal mining. In Caucasia, Zaragoza, Segovia, San Roque, Remedios, Buriticá, and Caracolí, authorities seized mining equipment and exploited resources. Additionally, the National Police and Colombian Air Force dismantled five illegal gold extraction fronts in rural Zaragoza. On June 4, two teenagers were killed while engaging in artisanal mining in Alto del Zapatillo in Anorí, Antioquia, after stepping on a landmine. Later that month, on June 24 in the village of Chilona Abajo in Zaragoza, Antioquia, the Colombian armed forces and National Police destroyed equipment used for illegal gold mining, linked to the AGC. On June 29, in La Vega (rural San Francisco department, Cundinamarca), troops of the National Army killed an alleged zone leader of the Clan del Golfo, known as alias Malacara, during a confrontation. On July 3, an intervention in Nechí, Antioquia, led to confrontations after six dredges were destroyed. The clash left 4 police officers and 6 miners injured. On July 24, in Buriticá, Antioquia, three security guards were injured in a bombing attack on Zijin mine. On August 22, a bomb-attack was foiled in El Valle, Toledo, North Antioquia, after the Army discovered explosives intended for an ambush by the 36th Front of the FARC dissidents. Throughout September and October, the National Policy and the Colombian army coordinated operations in municipalities such as Amalfi, Urrao, Córdoba and Bajo Cauca dismantled mining units and froze assets worth billions of pesos. eca

COLOMBIA (FARC DISSIDENTS)

Intensity:	3	Change:	↘	Start:	2017
Conflict parties:	FARC dissidents vs. government				
Conflict items:	system/ideology, subnational pre-dominance, resources				

The limited war over the orientation of the political system, subnational predominance, and resources between several dissident groups of the former Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the government de-escalated to a violent crisis. Throughout the year, the different dissident groups remained active, most notably in the departments of Antioquia, Cauca, Guaviare, Nariño, Norte de Santander and Valle del Cauca. The conflict was dominated by persistent disputes over ter-

ritorial control and drug trafficking routes. Amid this context, FARC dissidents were involved in confrontations with both the Colombian and the Ecuadorian government, as well as with other paramilitary groups [→ Colombia (inter-cartel rivalry, neo paramilitary groups, left-wing militants)]. Throughout the year, FARC dissident groups, like the Estado Mayor Central de los Bloques y Frente (EMBF), the Estado Mayor Central (EMC), or the Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano (CNEB) remained loosely organized. On April 18, the Colombian government announced the suspension of the ceasefire which had been maintained with the EMBF since December 2023. However, peace talks resumed on July 23. On November 21, the EMBF and the government reached six agreements aimed at de-escalating the conflict. Furthermore, on October 10, the government signed a decree suspending military operations to facilitate the destruction of 14 tons of war material belonging to the dissident group CNEB. Nevertheless, on July 2 and November 26, two new dissident fronts were announced. Violence in the course of the conflict was particularly expressed through fighting between FARC dissident groups and the government. For instance, on April 6, security forces killed seven and arrested four dissident combatants in the municipality of Neiva, Huila. On August 21, FARC dissidents attacked a military base in the city of Cali, Valle del Cauca, killing at least six and injuring at least 75. On the same day, FARC dissidents shot a police helicopter in Amalfi municipality, Antioquia. At least 13 police officers were killed. During a military operation against the EMC in the Guaviare department on November 10, 19 dissidents were killed, including nine minors. As a result the EMC warned the government of interference in the 2026 presidential and legislative elections. As in previous years, the civil population was affected by violent attacks and threats by FARC dissident groups. For example, in January, fighting between FARC dissidents groups and the National Liberation Army (ELN) in the Catatumbo region, Norte de Santander, left more than 80 dead and 12 injured, and forcibly displaced over 40,000 civilians. Consequently, on January 24, the government declared a state of emergency in Catatumbo region. Thus, the National Army deployed more than 5,000 soldiers to the area as part of "Operation Catatumbo". Throughout the year, over 78,000 civilians were forcibly displaced due to the clashes in Catatumbo region. Over the year, FARC dissidents continued to kidnap both security forces and civilians. On October 14, two indigenous girls were kidnapped, released and then abducted again by another dissident group. Dissidents also targeted public figures: According to the Instituto de estudios para el desarrollo y la paz, the number of community leaders assassinated in 2025 was 187. Many either assassinated in areas controlled by FARC dissidents or other illegal armed groups. For instance, on July 1, the bodies of eight religious and social leaders, who were previously abducted by dissidents were found in a mass grave in the Calamar municipality, Guaviare. In addition, FARC dissidents carried out several attacks using drones. For instance, on June 10, numerous coordinated attacks by using explosive-laden drones in the departments of Cauca and Valle del Cauca, killed seven and injured 28. hmn

COLOMBIA (INDIGENOUS GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2005**

Conflict parties: indigenous groups vs. government
 Conflict items: resources

The violent crisis over resources and autonomy between indigenous communities, criminal groups and the Colombian government continued, marked by assassinations of community leaders, protests, and forced displacements.

On January 16, clashes between the ELN and FARC dissidents in the Catatumbo region, Norte de Santander, triggered a humanitarian crisis, with communities reporting over 80 people killed and thousands displaced.

Throughout the year there were multiple targeted killings of Indigenous leaders. For instance: On March 9, recognized Awa leader Cristian Fernando Guanga was assassinated at the entrance of the Piguambi Palangala Reservation in Tumaco, Nariño. On May 11, Nasa spiritual elder and Indigenous leader Teófilo González Coqui was found murdered in Inzá, Cauca. On June 6, Indigenous leader Aurelio Araujo Hernández and his bodyguards were assassinated in Ricaurte, Nariño. On July 27, Indigenous leader Aída Damaris Flor Camayo was assassinated in Morales, Cauca.

On April 14, armed clashes between the ELN and FARC dissidents in Totoró and Silvia, Cauca, confined over 2,000 indigenous and campesino community residents.


On May 1, inter-community conflict between Arhuaco and Kankuamo erupted in Cesar over a 24-hectare property. On June 8, community leaders of the Motilón Barí reservation in Catatumbo reported the forced recruitment of 246 Barí children by armed groups.

Between September 12-13, two human rights defenders from the Regional Indigenous Council of Cauca (CRIC) were kidnapped on the Inzá-Popayán road near Totoró. The Indigenous Guard launched a rescue operation and secured their release. On September 29, around 900 Indigenous community members from the Catatumbo region travelled to Bogotá to protest the government's failure to comply with a Constitutional Court ruling mandating delineation and expansion of their ancestral reservations. eca

COLOMBIA (INTER-CARTEL RIVALRY, NEO-PARAMILITARY GROUPS, LEFT-WING MILITANTS)

Intensity: **4** | Change: • | Start: **2013**

Conflict parties: AGC vs. CDF vs. Los Caparros vs. ELN vs. FARC dissidents vs. EPL vs. Los Rastrojos vs. ASCM
 Conflict items: subnational predominance, resources



The limited war over subnational predominance and resources between Colombian non-state armed groups, par-

ticularly the ELN, FARC dissident factions (EMC, EMBF, and fronts aligned with "Calarcá"), and the AGC, continued, as the actors expanded their competition for control over strategic corridors, coca-producing regions, and drug trafficking routes across Norte de Santander, Caquetá, Guaviare, Cauca, Meta, and Chocó. The year opened with large-scale confrontations in Catatumbo, where ELN offensives using explosives, drones, and small arms caused more than 240 deaths between January 16 and 29, while the fighting displaced or confined over 124,000 civilians.

In February, an ELN-imposed armed strike in Chocó paralyzed regional mobility and public services, reflecting the group's growing territorial assertion. From April onward, intra-dissident tensions deepened as EMC, EMBF, and the Calarcá-aligned Frente Carolina Ramírez engaged in armed clashes, roadblocks, coercive control, and forced recruitment in Caquetá and Guaviare. On April 28, dissidents ambushed a military unit in Guaviare, killing six soldiers, followed by additional attacks on state forces in Cauca and Meta. On June 10, the EMC carried out 24 coordinated attacks on public facilities, killing seven and injuring 28, marking a high point in dissident operational reach.


The second half of 2025 saw increasing violence against civilians, including systematic assassinations of social leaders, Indigenous authorities, trade unionists, and ex-combatants across multiple departments. Armed groups imposed paros armados and mobility restrictions, most notably in Guaviare, where EMC dissidents confined tens of thousands. In December, the ELN demonstrated sustained operational capacity by launching a 72-hour nationwide armed strike, while renewed ELN-FARC dissident clashes in Catatumbo caused additional displacement during the holiday period. By late 2025, renewed clashes between the ELN and FARC dissidents in Catatumbo resulted in additional deaths and contributed to further displacement.

Overall, 2025 was characterized by heightened inter-group rivalry, expanded dissident capabilities, persistent attacks on state institutions, and severe impacts on civilian life, including widespread displacement, confinement, and the disruption of essential services. jbe

COLOMBIA (NEO-PARAMILITARY GROUPS, DRUG CARTELS)

Intensity: **4** | Change: ↗ | Start: **1983**

Conflict parties: drug cartels, neo-paramilitary groups vs. government
 Conflict items: subnational predominance, resources



The violent crisis over subnational predominance and resources between neo-paramilitary groups and drug cartels, including the Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AGC), also known as the Gulf Clan; Los Caparrapos; Los Costeños, also known as Caribbean Resistance Bloc, The Conquering Self-Defense Forces of the Sierra (ACSN), also known as Los Pachencas, on the one hand, and the government, on

the other, escalated to a limited war. On January 3, the AGC launched an explosive attack on the 17th Brigade of the National Army in the municipality of Turbo, Antioquia department, resulting in one soldier killed and twelve injured. On February 16, an armed clash between the AGC and the armed forces in the municipality of Segovia, Antioquia department, resulted in the deaths of five soldiers and injuries to seven more. One day later, in response to these events, President Gustavo Petro issued an ultimatum to the AGC to cease their illicit activities, threatening a potential state offensive otherwise. On February 22, a clash between the Colombian National Army and the Clan del Golfo in Puerto Triunfo, Antioquia, left six group members dead, including leader “Terror,” and resulted in the seizure of weapons and high-value assets. On February 25 and March 19, the AGC reiterated their willingness to engage in political peace negotiations with the government under the “Total Peace” government policy and maintain the unilateral ceasefire. On March 17, military and police forces killed three ELN members in San Juan, Chocó, and seized weapons, explosives, and communication equipment. On March 25, Colombian forces conducted an airstrike in Segovia, Antioquia, killing nine Clan del Golfo members, including two leaders as well as capturing one, and seizing thirteen rifles. On April 8, 2025 a clash between the Colombian National Army and a Clan del Golfo faction in Cáceres and Tarazá, Antioquia, left at least eight members of the group dead and two captured, one soldier was also killed. On May 2, it requested the suspension of arrest warrants against its leaders, including its head Jobanis de Jesús Ávila Villadiego “Chiquito Malo”, to continue with the peace negotiations. Through a resolution signed on August 1, the Government declared the initiation of talks with the ACSN, and on August 5, it announced its intention to negotiate with the AGC as well. As of December 2024, the peace talks have not progressed. Throughout the year, the AGC carried out targeted killings against civilians in the departments of Antioquia, Magdalena and Cauca. For instance, on May 14, AGC members killed three civilians at their home in the municipality of San Zenón, Magdalena department. Despite the ongoing peace talks, on October 1, the AGC killed five civilians that were traveling from Yondó, Antioquia department, to Cantagallo, Bolivar department. Among the victims were two community leaders from local villages. Over the year, the AGC utilized gender-based violence as a weapon of warfare. For instance, on September 23, the AGC threatened at least 27 women in Quibdó, Chocó department, for their alleged connections to local rival gangs, such as RPS, Los Mexicanos, Locos Yam, and compelled them to flee their territories. Between February and May, armed clashes between the AGC and the ACSN led to forced confinements and the displacement of at least 90 families in La Guajira and Magdalena departments, many of whom belong to the Wiwa people, native to the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta. run, spy

COLOMBIA (SOCIAL PROTESTS)

Intensity:	3	Change:	↗	Start:	2019
Conflict parties:	Comité Nacional de Paro, Primera Línea vs. right-wing opposition vs. government				
Conflict items:	system/ideology				

The non-violent crisis over the orientation of the political

system between Primera Linea and the Comité Nacional de Paro (CNP), supported by student groups, workers associations, and indigenous communities [→ Colombia (indigenous groups)], on the one hand, and the government on the other hand, escalated to a violent crisis. Since the beginning of Gustavo Petro’s presidency in 2022, demonstrations underwent a notable shift in actors and demands compared to prior administrations. In the course of the year protests and blockades have united Indigenous communities, civil society organizations, feminist activist groups, diverse labour unions and peasants in collective mobilizations against social inequality, political tensions, and the unmet reform promises; beyond simple support or opposition to the government. In the first half of the year, on February 17, March 4 and July 14 rice farmers staged several blockades in response to rising production cost and low rice prices. For instance, on February 17, they blocked a highway in the municipality of Campoalegre, Huila. During the year, Petro called upon the population to support his government’s reforms. For instance, from March 18 to 22, several social organizations, with an estimated four million participations, held demonstrations in the capital Bogotá in support of the Petro’s administration proposed labour reform. On August 25, prisoners in the city of Bucaramanga, Santander, protested for improved living conditions in prisons, leaving 14 people injured. Throughout the year, protest were held in response to the escalating conflicts across the country [→ Colombia (neo-paramilitary groups, drug cartels)]. On April 1, for instance, several indigenous communities from the department of Cauca urged the national government in Bogotá to provide security guarantees and to uphold existing agreements as violence in their territories increased. Moreover, on July 15, leading opposition figures called for massive mobilizations across the country following the assassination of Centro Democrático senator and presidential pre-candidate Miguel Uribe Turbay. As a result over 70,000 civilians demonstrated in more than 20 cities, demanding an end to the ongoing violence. hmn

COLOMBIA – PERU (SANTA ROSA DE YAVARÍ)

Intensity:	1	Change:	NEW	Start:	2025
Conflict parties:	Colombia vs. Peru				
Conflict items:	territory				

A new dispute between Peru and Colombia over Santa Rosa/Yavarí Island, in the Amazon tri-border area with Brazil, erupted in 2025. The island emerged from river sedimentation, creating ambiguity in applying the 1934 Rio de Janeiro Protocol, which originally defined the border. Tensions escalated in July when Peru created the district “Santa Rosa de Loreto”, reinforcing its administrative presence and sending military personnel to raise Peruvian flags on the island. Colombia denounced the move as a unilateral appropriation of territory. The conflict deepened after a Colombian flag was found raised on the island, prompting Peruvian soldiers to remove it, further inflaming diplomatic tensions. Both countries have since increased their military presence: Peru on the island itself, and Colombia in Leticia, framing the dispute as a defense of sovereignty. Diplomatic meetings happened and the situation remains a non-violent but escalating territorial

crisis. gar

COLOMBIA – VENEZUELA (BORDER SECURITY)

Intensity: **2** | Change: **↗** | Start: **2015**

Conflict parties: Colombia vs. Venezuela

Conflict items: other

The dispute over border security between Colombia and Venezuela escalated to a non-violent crisis.

On January 10, Táchira's governor announced the closure of the border, citing an "international conspiracy" on the eve of Maduro's inauguration as president as the reason. The Venezuelan government reopened the border on January 13. On May 23, all borders between the countries were closed in the context of alleged mercenaries arriving in Venezuela from Colombia. On May 26, the border was reopened with air travel being reinstated on May 27. On July 25, all borders were closed again, with Venezuela citing security measures concerning the regional elections on July 27 [→ Venezuela (opposition)]. On July 28, all borders were reopened.

Despite the tensions along the border, both presidents declared their intentions to stabilize the border zone with the long term goal of an open binational economic zone, on July 17. The initiative, called "Zone of Peace, Union and Binational Development", fostered security cooperation as well. The two states cooperated militarily in the border region on several occasions. For instance, on December 2, a joint operation led to the capture of a high-ranking member of FARC EMC's 33th Front in Simón Bolívar municipality, Táchira [→ Venezuela (FARC dissidents); Venezuela (mega-gangs); Venezuela (mining); Colombia (inter-cartel rivalry, neo-paramilitary groups, left-wing militants)]. Nicolás Maduro suggested to advance military and administrative coordination with Colombian security forces on August 12. His counterpart, Gustavo Petro, rejected this proposal on December 18, after Maduro called on Colombian forces to help defend the region's sovereignty against the USA [→ USA – Venezuela]. Petro emphasized the people's will as the deciding factor on whether an integration could be implemented, stating that he commands Colombia's forces while Venezuela's armed forces take their orders from Maduro. mok, run

CUBA (SOCIAL PROTESTS)

Intensity: **2** | Change: **•** | Start: **2021**

Conflict parties: civil society groups, pro-democracy groups, social protesters vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology

The non-violent crisis over freedom of expression, food, water, and electricity between civil society protesters and student groups, on the one hand, and the government of President Miguel Díaz-Canel (Partido Comunista de Cuba, PCC), on the other, continued. Protest activity remained low but recurrent and was mainly triggered by electricity shortages, rising internet costs, and food scarcity.

In June 2025, three student protests occurred at the Universidad Central "Marta Abreu" de Las Villas (UCLV), the University of Holguín, and the Universidad Tecnológica de La

Habana (CUJAE), where participants demanded lower internet tariffs and broader access to online learning platforms. At UCLV, security forces, including the Policía Nacional Revolucionaria (PNR) and Seguridad del Estado, intervened to disperse gatherings and prevent wider mobilization. According to independent media, plainclothes officers entered university premises, interrogated participants, and temporarily detained several organizers. No fatalities or injuries were reported.

Outside academic settings, small neighborhood protests over food and electricity shortages occurred sporadically in Havana, Santiago de Cuba, and Matanzas. In most instances, PNR officers dispersed demonstrators and carried out arrests. The Cuban Observatory of Human Rights documented thirty-nine arbitrary arrests in September 2025. While no use of lethal weapons was reported, threats of legal action against protesters and the continued deployment of security personnel characterized the state's response.

By the end of 2025, the government maintained control through policing and surveillance measures. Although protests persisted at a localized scale, no escalation to organized or widespread violence occurred. kre

CUBA – USA (GUANTANAMO)

Intensity: **1** | Change: **•** | Start: **1959**

Conflict parties: Cuba vs. USA

Conflict items: territory

The dispute between Cuba and the USA continued. Following President Donald Trump's re-election, the US administration announced on January 29 that it would expand detention operations at the US naval base in Guantanamo Bay, and Cuban authorities criticized the decision in connection with Cuba's claim to the territory.

On February 4, the first group of detained migrants arrived at the naval base despite Cuba's rejection, and Cuban officials reiterated demands to end the US presence and return the area. International solidarity organizations, including Ecuador's Human Rights Documentation Center "Segundo Montes Mozo S.J." (CSMM), publicly supported Cuba's position and criticized the US occupation in January and February. In Cuba, residents and civil society groups staged protests calling for the base's closure and the return of the territory. On February 26, protesters in Guantanamo condemned US detentions at the base and repeated demands for restitution. In the USA, civil rights groups pursued legal measures. On February 12, immigrants' rights advocates, backed by the ACLU, filed suit to secure attorney access to detainees transferred to Guantanamo Bay. On March 1, they sought to halt further transfers and challenged detention conditions, while US Department of Justice attorneys argued that ICE was authorized to hold migrants with final removal orders at Guantanamo Bay. rch

CUBA – USA (SYSTEM)

Intensity: **2** | Change: **•** | Start: **1960**

Conflict parties: Cuba vs. USA

Conflict items: system/ideology, international power

The non-violent crisis between Cuba and the USA continued. Tensions escalated after President Donald Trump returned Cuba to the list of state sponsors of terrorism and reinstated a broad set of sanctions following his re-election on January 20. This move reversed earlier actions by the preceding administration and expanded restrictions on trade, financial transactions, and visa access.

On February 20, Cuba's foreign minister publicly denounced cuts by the US to international aid programs affecting human rights promotion, which Havana described as destabilizing. In the ensuing months, the US government imposed visa restrictions on Cuban officials and revoked visas of several Cuban diplomats and workers, actions linked by Washington to concerns over alleged abuses and forced labor on overseas missions. Cuban officials repeatedly criticized these sanctions as hostile measures.

Cuban authorities brought the dispute over US unilateral coercive measures to the UN, and on November 21, UN human rights experts called on the US to lift sanctions against Cuba. In response, US representatives sought to counter these efforts through diplomatic engagement. Independent human rights experts also expressed dismay at the US decision to reinstate Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism and urged compliance with international law.

Throughout the year, Cuban officials expressed dissatisfaction with US policies and reiterated support for Venezuela's government, claiming US actions undermined regional stability. By the end of the period, bilateral relations remained strained, with limited technical contacts on migration issues but no substantive diplomatic dialog. rch

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC – HAITI

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **2009**

Conflict parties: Dominican Republic vs. Haiti

Conflict items: resources, other

The non-violent crisis between the Dominican Republic (DR) and Haiti over immigration, racist sentiments, territory, and water resources continued.

While the crisis in Haiti worsened, DR's President Luis Abinader increased the border security to Haiti and furthered the crackdown on Haitian immigrants (→ Haiti (gangs)). On April 6, Abinader announced 15 measures targeting undocumented Haitian migrants, including the deployment of an additional 1,500 troops, adding onto the number of already 9,500 deployed border troops. Moreover, he approved the construction of a new section of the border wall in order to add a further 13 km. Another measure required DR healthcare personnel in public hospitals to notify authorities of the treatment of undocumented migrants. On April 21, the DR removed more than 130 Haitian women and children from public hospitals during operations targeting on undocumented migrants. According to an Amnesty International call for urgent action from April 21, the DR measures threatened the right to health, privacy, and physical integrity and could refrain Haitian immigrants from seeking necessary healthcare. eth

ECUADOR (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: ↗ | Start: **1980**

Conflict parties: opposition groups vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, resources

The non-violent crisis over resources and the orientation of the political system between various opposition groups, such as Indigenous movements, labor unions, peasant organizations, the Citizen's Revolution (RC), and some factions of the National Assembly, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, escalated to a violent crisis.

Throughout the year, confrontations between opposition groups and the government escalated from institutional disputes into violent mobilizations. From January to March, President Daniel Noboa and Vice President Verónica Abad engaged in an intensifying power struggle over executive authority while Noboa stepped away from governing to campaign ahead of the presidential election. For instance, on March 29, Noboa replaced the elected vice-president with an interim authority, deepening internal fragmentation within the executive.

On April 13, Noboa won the presidential election with 52,1 percent of the vote. Opposition candidate Luisa González and the Citizen Revolution (RC) movement challenged the results and demanded a recount. On May 6, Ecuador's Electoral Court dismissed the request from Gonzales and the nation's biggest opposition party RC contesting the results of April's presidential election. On September 12, the government announced the elimination of the diesel subsidy, triggering nationwide protests led by indigenous organizations, farmers, and transport workers. Opposition groups organized road blockades and demonstrations across several provinces. On September 28, members and supporters of the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) clashed with law enforcement officials amid protest, leaving one protester dead and twelve soldiers injured in the province of Imbabura. Authorities reported more than 80 arrests during the confrontations.

On October 6, Noboa declared a state of internal emergency due to an increase in violence, citing serious internal unrest in ten provinces, restricting civil liberties and deploying additional security forces. The affected provinces are regions with large indigenous populations where protests have been concentrated since September.

Finally, on October 14, Indigenous protesters and security forces clashed in Otavalo, Imbabura Province, leaving at least one demonstrator dead and more than 63 people injured, including 13 soldiers. Demonstrators used stones and improvised weapons, while authorities responded with tear gas and non-lethal ammunition. dll

EL SALVADOR (DRUG TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2003**

Conflict parties: drug trafficking organizations vs. government

Conflict items: subnational predominance

The violent crisis over subnational predominance and the

production, trade, and trafficking of illegal narcotics between drug trafficking organizations, on the one hand, and the government on the other, continued.

Throughout the year, authorities in El Salvador lowered crime rates tied to drug trafficking by further implementing the state of emergency initiated four years ago [→ El Salvador (maras), 2022]. The government intensified its enforcement operations through mass arrests and the imprisonment of suspects without due process. In 2025, the homicide rate fell to 1.3 per 100,000 residents, among the lowest in the region. In the annual report presented by El Salvador’s Security Cabinet, neither drug trafficking nor gang violence were mentioned as high-impact crimes.

On May 12, the national police captured two individuals attempting to distribute marijuana in Santa Cruz Canton, Ahuachapán District. A third suspect opened fire on the police during the confrontation and resulted injured. On October 03, the police and the public prosecutor’s office arrested 16 individuals linked to a drug trafficking ring operating in the cities of San Salvador and Ahuachapán. On December 16, law enforcement officers apprehended 16 suspected criminals involved in small-scale drug trafficking and contract killings in the departments of San Salvador, Sonsonate, and La Libertad. dll

EL SALVADOR (OPPOSITION)

Intensity:	2	Change:	•	Start:	2020
Conflict parties:	civil society groups, opposition parties vs. government				
Conflict items:	system/ideology, national power				

The non-violent crisis over the orientation of the political system and national power between oppositional parties and civil society groups, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued.

Violence against protesters took place as the conflict with oppositional workers’ unions, such as El Bosque and Cristosal, intensified throughout the year. On May 12, 300 persons from the El Bosque cooperative held a peaceful protest near the president’s private residence against their planned imminent eviction. The eviction was triggered by unpaid debts and a land dispute involving alleged fraud by a third party. Despite claims of exploitation, the court ruled against the farmers, leading to the foreclosure and planned auction of their land. The military and the national police violently dispersed the protest. The arrest of several opposition group leaders, including the president of El Bosque as well as lawyers and human rights lawyers from the group Cristosal, prompted human rights organisations such as Amnesty International to call for their release on July 4.

On May 20, the parliament passed a restrictive law for NGOs. This law imposed a 30 percent tax on foreign donations, raising concerns about human rights, civil society independence and freedom of expression in the country.

On October 3, the government of El Salvador banned the use of inclusive language in all public schools. That provoked many critics, for example by the LGBTQI collective of El Salvador which released a statement on October 11.

Following President Nayib Bukele’s circumvention of the constitutional term limit in 2024, which allowed him to be re-elected, the government established the legal basis for re-elections in 2025.

On January 29, the Salvadoran Legislative Assembly ratified

changes to the 1983 Constitution by a majority of all members of Bukele’s party reaching 57 out of 60 votes. This allowed the government to enact ‘express’ constitutional reforms without the approval from two separate legislative sessions. Following this amendment, the Legislative Assembly voted in favor of changing the re-election limit to permit unlimited re-elections on July 31. A representative of Arena’s party criticized the vote as a day “in which democracy died”.
ido

GUATEMALA (DRUG CARTELS)

Intensity:	3	Change:	•	Start:	2009
Conflict parties:	drug cartels vs. government				
Conflict items:	subnational predominance, re-sources				

The violent crisis over subnational predominance and resources between organized crime actors and the Guatemalan state continued.

Between July and September, documented incidents included at least twelve fatalities and multiple dozen arrests and raids; casualties and arrests were concentrated in urban areas like Guatemala City and border corridors such as La Mesilla. State actors (Policía Nacional Civil, SGAIA, Ejército and special units) mounted sustained operations, but persistent corruption and penetration of local institutions limited long-term disruption of criminal networks.

State enforcement actions were frequent and varied: maritime interdiction units captured a semi-submersible crew carrying cocaine on July 10; authorities processed extraditions of alleged traffickers on July 25; SGAIA and PNC executed crop eradication and local anti-narcotics raids on August 21-24; and a large-scale police operation carried out roughly 96 raids against MS-13 cells on September 6-9. Weapons and explosives were seized in several operations (e.g., grenades, rifles and pistols recovered from a Barrio 18 hideout in late August), and multiple suspects were detained or handed over for extradition.

Violent responses from gang activity remained acute. A high-fatality inter-gang attack on July 30 left seven dead and 13 wounded, while reprisal shootings in early September killed at least three more people in Zones three and nine of Guatemala City. Prison unrest involving MS-13 and Barrio 18 occurred on August 14, during which at least one prison guard was shot, and on September 24, a PNC investigations officer was killed by gang gunmen during an armed confrontation in La Mesilla.

The conflict produced displacement and cross-border spillover effects from Mexico border cities to Guatemala La Mesilla.

Additional arrests occurred throughout August and September, including the capture of five Barrio 18 members in Guatemala City and the detention of an extraditable trafficker in Ixcán on September 14. Several operations resulted in further seizures of firearms and explosives, and coca plantations were eradicated in Totonicapán. Prison riots in two Guatemala City facilities on August 14 resulted in several guards being injured. mpe

GUATEMALA (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **2** | Change: **•** | Start: **1985**Conflict parties: opposition groups vs. government
Conflict items: system/ideology

The non-violent crisis over the orientation of the political system in Guatemala between the reformist government led by President Bernardo Arévalo and opposition actors supporting the status quo continued. The Public Prosecutor's Office, as a key opposition actor, carried out several legal measures against activists and attorneys associated with the government and its supporters.

On March 10, the Office revoked a ruling that had granted journalist José Rubén Zamora house arrest, arguing that he posed a procedural risk. On July 30, the Office appealed a decision granting house arrest to lawyer Eduardo Masaya, whose criminal proceedings were related to the Movimiento Semilla party. On April 23, authorities arrested Luis Pacheco, a supporter of President Arévalo who had demanded the resignation of the attorney general, on charges including terrorism and illicit association. On August 26, the Constitutional Court blocked the Office's attempt to revive criminal proceedings against media workers. In November, the government filed numerous complaints against the Public Prosecutor's Office and emphasized the need for judicial accountability.

The President's party, Movimiento Semilla, was suspended following a decision by the Third Court of Appeals on July 31. President Arévalo and other Semilla representatives criticized Judge Fredy Orellana, who ordered the suspension, and accused him of attempting to undermine the constitutional order. On October 27, Blanca Alfaro, president of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, and Sergio Antillón of the Citizen Registry stated that the results of the 2023 general elections must be respected.

Several organizations voiced concerns regarding democratic governance in Guatemala. On July 22, ancestral authorities of Santiago Atitlán and justice officials criticized efforts to criminalize human rights activists. On October 29, the International Justice Mission stated that the judicial system was affected by corrupt networks used to target political opponents. *rch*

GUYANA – VENEZUELA

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↗** | Start: **2015**Conflict parties: Guyana vs. Venezuela
Conflict items: territory, resources

The non-violent crisis over resources and territory between the Venezuelan and Guyanese governments escalated to a violent crisis.

Tensions escalated along the border around the Venezuelan regional elections in the federal state of Guyana Esequiba on May 25. On February 17, unknown gunmen from the Venezuelan side shot at Guyanese soldiers in the Cuyuni River, injuring 6 soldiers. In response, Guyanese President Irfaan Ali denounced a Venezuelan incursion in disputed waters between the two countries on March 1. On May 15, the Guyana Defence Force (GDF) reported that armed civilians carried out three attacks on Guyanese patrols along the

Cuyuni River between Eteringbang and Makapa. On May 17, the Venezuelan government rejected these accusations, and claimed it was a "false flag operation". On August 31, unknown gunmen from the Venezuelan side attacked Guyanese police officers and election officials in Sifontes municipality, along the upper Curuni River in Bolivar State, on the eve of Guyana's general and regional elections.

The Guyanese foreign ministry requested for provisional measures from the UN International Court of Justice (ICJ) on March 6. On May 1, the ICJ declared that Venezuela must cease holding elections in the territory of Essequibo, which Venezuelan lawmakers, with the support of President Nicolás Maduro, designated as a new federal state called Guayana Esequiba on 21/03/24. On May 2, Venezuela declared it did not recognise the ICJ's jurisdiction and rejected the ruling. Despite the court's order, Venezuelan regional elections took place in Essequibo on May 25. In response, the chief of defense staff of the GDF warned that electoral participation by any Guyanese citizen living within the disputed territory would be charged as treason, on May 21.


Amidst the binational tensions, the U.S. expressed support for Guyana's territorial integrity. On March 26, the US secretary of state threatened Venezuela with retaliation by force if it attacked Guyana, which led Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro to call him an "imbecile", on March 27. Since early August, the US massed military assets in Puerto Rico to stop drugs, target the Tren de Aragua gang, the so-called Cartel de los Soles –an alleged drug cartel organization led by the Venezuelan president–, and pressure the Venezuelan president to leave power [→ USA – Venezuela]. On August 22, the secretary of state issued a joint statement with Guyana asserting that, was a threat to regional security under President Maduro's authority, on August 22. The accusation was formally rejected the same day by the Venezuelan president. On December 19, the Guyanese vice president stated that Washington was committed to the protection of the Caribbean country's sovereignty, including US oil assets within the disputed waters. *iva*

HAITI (GANGS)

Intensity: **5** | Change: **•** | Start: **2020**

Conflict parties: Gran Grif, Viv Ansanm vs. MSS, security forces, TPC vs. vigilante groups

Conflict items: subnational predominance, resources



The war over sub-national predominance and resources conflict between the Viv Ansanm gang coalition and the Gran Grif gang, the Haitian security forces including the UN Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission, and vigilante groups continued.

According to the UN, Viv Ansanm controlled more than 85 percent of the capital Port-au-Prince, Ouest department. Gangs of the Viv Ansanm coalition conducted attacks and ambushes throughout the Ouest department in retaliation to actions led by the Haitian National Police (PNH) and the Haitian armed forces (FAD'H), causing dozens of civilian

deaths and injuries as well as massive waves of displacement. Between February 19 and 23 in Port-au-Prince, for example, several civilians and at least one police officer were killed. In February alone, clashes displaced more than 60,000 people throughout the country. Gangs also continued to expand their territory through a series of attacks in the Artibonite and Centre departments, where, according to the UN Office in Haiti (BINUH), the number of intentional homicides saw a 210 percent increase compared to 2024. On March 30 and 31, Viv Ansanm led an attack in the towns of Saut d'Eau and Mirebalais, Centre department, killing 56, destroying homes, as well as the local police station and jail. It freed more than 515 inmates and displaced at least 51,000 residents. Local police special forces (SWAT), supported by the National Agency for Protected Areas (BSAP), a rogue governmental environmental unit, and local self-defense groups, repelled the initial attack. However, after successive waves of attacks, the gang coalition ultimately took control of Saut d'Eau and Mirebalais at the beginning of April.

Parallely, the northern departments witnessed an increase of clashes between the PNH and residents on the one hand, and Viv Ansanm and Gran Grif on the other. On May 10, the PNH arrested the chief of a local gang affiliated with Viv Ansanm, in Cap Haïtien, Nord department. In the night of September 18 and 19, gangs attacked the town of Bassin Bleu, Nord-Ouest department, and killed at least one civilian, injured several, destroyed houses and set the town hall and the police station on fire.

So-called self-defense groups – such as the Bwa Kalé movement – clashed with gangs on several occasions. For instance, on July 17 and 18, the so-called “Coalition”, a group of residents of the Artibonite department, killed at least ten members of the Kokorat San Ras gang which is part of Viv Ansanm, including its leader, with support from the PNH. The gang retaliated by attacking the town of l'Estère, Artibonite, killing at least seven civilians on July 19. On June 10, residents of Saint-Louis-du-Nord, Nord-Ouest department, also stopped an attempted kidnapping and killed one member of Kokorat San Ras.

Gangs of the Viv Ansanm coalition clashed with each other in Port-au-Prince at the end of the year. During one of them, between December 8 and 10, clashes left at least 49 people dead, among which adult gang members, children recruits and one civilian. This was deemed to be a sanction against a gang member who refused to obey orders of temporarily halting kidnappings.

2025 also saw a shift in the methods used to combat gangs. On June 21, Alphonse Fritz Jean, head of the Transitional Presidential Council (TPC), confirmed the presence of private military companies (PMC) in the country to assist the PNH, including PMC Vectus Global, whose CEO was also behind the now disappeared Blackwater PMC. Further, on March 21, the Haitian government confirmed the use of UAVs for anti-gang operations. Between May 20 and 25, the PNH led a series of drone attacks in the capital, targeting gangs' strongholds, killing dozens and injuring many others. According to the BINUH, UAVs killed at least 547 and injured another 489 people between March 1 and September 20. On September 20, at least 20 civilians, including 8 children, were killed in a drone strike conducted during the birthday celebration of a local Port-au-Prince gang leader, who escaped the attack unharmed. Gangs threatened to increase their kidnapping and ransom activities as a retaliation for the use of kamikaze drones. This response led to another round of massive PNH operations against gang strongholds in downtown Port-au-Prince throughout the second half of December and using

a large number of drones. Moreover, between July and September, 78 summary or arbitrary extrajudicial executions were reportedly committed by police officers.

MSS and the PNH were largely unable to prevent gangs from increasing their territorial control and targeting civilian populations. On February 23 and on March 25, for the first time since the deployment of the mission, the Gran Grif gang killed two Kenyan officers in the Artibonite department. At the beginning of October, the UN adopted resolution 2793 (2025), authorizing the deployment of a Gang Suppression Force (GSF), composed of 5,500 police and military personnel, set to replace the MSS. It started assisting the PNH in November and December during several anti-gang operations in Port-au-Prince. The new force was also expected to grant security to the planned elections on 08/30/26 [→ Haiti (opposition)].

Between January 1 and November 31, the UN Security Council reported at least 8,100 deaths due to gang violence. As a result, according to the IOM, 1.4 million people were internally displaced. [→ Dominican Republic – Haiti]. *abe*

HAITI (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1986**

Conflict parties: Inite / Montana Accord vs. Fanmi Lavalas vs. Struggling People's Organization vs. EDE / RED-Historic Compromise vs. 21 December Agreement vs. Platfòm Pitit Desalin vs. civil society representatives vs. FREN vs. anti-government protesters

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The violent crisis over national power and the orientation of the political system among opposition parties and civil society representatives, grouped in the Transitional Presidential Council (TPC) on the one hand, and between the TPC and civil society protesters, on the other, continued.

Anti-government protests denouncing the deteriorating security situation and increasing gang violence continued. On March 19, thousands of residents of the Canapé-Vert neighborhood of the capital of Port-au-Prince protested armed with machetes. The police responded by using tear gas and live ammunition, killing one protester and injuring at least another three. During another protest in the capital on March 26, the police killed at least two protesters and injured several others, when they fired live ammunition to disperse the crowd.

On May 4, dozens of people organized a protest in the capital, demanding the resignation of all TPC members. Subsequently, on May 13, and on June 17, residents from rural areas near the city of Mirebalais, Centre department, shut down the city electricity grid in protest against government inaction following the fall of the city under gang control in the first week of April [→ Haiti (gangs)].

In addition to ad hoc protests by citizens, numerous local and national civil society and political groups, such as Nou Pap Komplis, l'Initiative du 21 décembre 2022, l'Initiative du 24 avril 2025, and Lòd Demokratik, were created in response to the government's perceived inefficiency. Throughout the year, these groups publicly denounced the perceived lack of action of the TPC and CARICOM in tackling the country's security and economic issues and called for a national debate on governance – e.g. joint declaration of August 13 -,

threatening large scale actions if the TPC failed to meet their demands. On October 3, National Road 1 was cut during a protest led by the Syndicate of Visionary Planters of the Lower Artibonite (SPVBA) and other local organizations in Port-Sondé, Artibonite. On October 16, residents and local youth organizations blocked the road for a second time in l'Estère, Artibonite. Gang-related attacks continued to fuel the population's anger at the TPC and skepticism over its ability to organize Presidential elections expected to be held on 08/30/26 [→ Haiti (gangs)].

On October 9, shots of automatic weapons outside the national palace interrupted a high-level TPC meeting to decide next year's national budget. The meeting was also symbolic as it showcased TPC's resolution to reclaim an almost fully gang-controlled capital city. However, the TPC has been largely unable to take concrete measures, blocked by political disagreements between its members – some of which were accused of being co-opted by gangs. The United States, for example, announced visa restrictions to CPT members accused of co-optation with gangs on November 25. Further tensions arose at the end of the year between different factions of the TPC on the potential replacement of PM Alix Dider Fils-Aimé. The TPC was also criticized following the publication, without prior consent of the Provisional Electoral Council (PEC), of a modified version of the electoral decree on December 1. ^{abe}

HONDURAS (BAJO AGUÁN)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2009**

Conflict parties: peasants, peasants unions vs. government, land-owning companies

Conflict items: territory, resources

The violent crisis over resources between private landowners and companies, on the one hand, and local farmers' communities and environmental activists on the other, continued. In the first half of this year, paramilitary groups killed nine people and injured at least five persons in violent confrontations. The victims were environmental activists and leaders of farmers organizations. In the second half, unidentified armed men killed three additional individuals tied to peasant movements.

On January 2, four armed men killed a member of the Brisas del Aguán Cooperative in the Colón province. On January 27, a violent confrontation took place between residents of Quebrada Arena, in Tocoa, Colón, and organized farmers, which resulted in three people injured by firearms and an alleged kidnapping attempt. Four days later, on January 31, armed men shot dead two members of the Gregorio Chávez peasant cooperative in Colón.

In addition, on February 2, members of the paramilitary group "Los Cachos" killed a member of a peasant cooperative and his partner and injured a third person in Colón. On May 30, a shooting took place on the Pasó Aguán farm in Colón, a territory mostly controlled by irregular armed groups. A former partner of the El Chile Cooperative died as a result of the shooting. One day later, on May 31, armed men shot dead a member of a peasant cooperative from the community of Panama in the neighboring community of Rigos.

On July 17, armed men ambushed and killed two members of the cooperatives 'La Aurora' and 'Gregorio Chávez', and on August 11, unidentified men attacked and killed a member of the Unified Peasant Movement of Aguán with a wooden

object in Tocoa, Colón.

On October 28, representatives of the Aguán Agricultural Platform and the Coordinating Committee of Popular Organizations of the Aguán (COPA) submitted a legal complaint to the Office of the Attorney General against the Dinant Corporation. Its allegations included claims that the company was engaged in an active campaign of hate speech and digital harassment intended to provoke violence and justify the murders of peasant leaders in the Bajo Aguán. Finally, on December 8, members of "Los Cachos" attacked members from the Camarones Cooperative and other Agrarian Platform organizations, injuring at least 20 people, including a police officer and peasant leader Wendy Castro in Quebrada de Arena, Colón department. The attack unfolded while authorities carried out a judicial order to return displaced farmers to their lands. ^{dll}

HONDURAS (DRUG TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS, ORGANIZED CRIME)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2012**

Conflict parties: criminal organizations, drug trafficking organizations vs. government

Conflict items: subnational predominance, re-sources

The violent crisis over subnational predominance and the production, trade, and trafficking of illegal drugs between transnational gangs, such as Barrio18 and MS-13, as well as international drug trafficking organizations, on the one hand, and the government on the other, continued.

Throughout the year, Honduras further consolidated its position as a medium-scale cocaine producer country while remaining a strategic transit corridor for cocaine shipments from South America to the United States. On April 16, the Honduran National Police intercepted a container truck and seized 758 kilograms of cocaine in Chamelecón, in the department of Cortés. On July 14, customs officers seized almost half a kilogram of cocaine hidden inside a block of cheese destined for the United States at La Mesa checkpoint in the municipality of La Lima, Cortés department. During the reporting period, authorities confiscated at least 1.5 tons of cocaine, a marked decrease compared to the seizures made during the same period in the previous year [→ Honduras (drug trafficking organizations, organized crime)].

In 2025, the Armed Forces reported the location and elimination of over one million coca plants nationwide. On September 18, military authorities stated that antinarcotic operations have disrupted the production of at least 3,700 kilograms of cocaine. Eradication operations focused on states that have seen a rapid expansion of illegal plantations and clandestine laboratories in recent years, such as Gracias a Dios, Colón, Yoro, Atlántida, Olancho, and El Paraíso [→ Honduras (drug trafficking organizations, organized crime)].

Gang-related homicides and massacres remained a leading cause of violence in the country. For instance, on March 20, Barrio18 gang members killed three men and one woman belonging to the MS-13 in a hitman attack in Cerrito Lindo, San Pedro de Sula. On June 19, Police forces killed two Barrio18 gang members during an armed confrontation close to the León de Judá church in El Lolo village, in the state of Francisco Morazán. On July 17, The Police Directorate against Maras and Organized Crime (DIPAMPCO) killed one MS-13 gang member during an operation in the city of Choloma.

Two other gang members and one police officer were injured in the confrontation.

Other violent incidents involved dead officers and civilians as police units clashed with gangs. For example, on November 18, Barrio 18 gang members killed a police officer leading operations against organized crime in La Providencia neighborhood, in the city of San Pedro Sula. Police captured at least seven of the group. On December 24, MS-13 hitmen killed a man with ties to the criminal organization. His wife died trying to escape the attack. dll

HONDURAS (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↗** | Start: **2009**

Conflict parties: opposition government vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The non-violent crisis over orientation of the system and national power between the government and various opposition groups and parties escalated to a violent crisis.

On March 9, political parties held primaries to select candidates for the general election in November. However, due to logistical issues and extreme delays in distributing and retrieving electoral materials, such as ballot boxes, various opposition politicians accused President Xiomara Castro's government of orchestrating the chaos to influence the elections and suppress opposition votes. The delays also sparked peaceful protests in the capital, Tegucigalpa, led by dissatisfied voters..

On July 30, protesters attempted to enter the congress building injuring a congressman and clashing with the police while protesting the political gridlock regarding the choice of transmission of the election results in the November general elections.

On December 2, shortly after the November 30 General Election, U.S. President Donald Trump alleged online that the election results were falsified. On December 4, National Party candidate Nasry Asfura, whom Trump had endorsed, narrowly took the lead over Liberal Party candidate Salvador Nasralla in the vote count. Nasralla accused authorities of manipulating the vote, and on December 8, Rixi Moncada, presidential candidate for the Libre party denounced Trump's involvement and rejected the results.

On December 16, pro-Libre protestors clashed with police in front of the Election Logistics Center. Police used tear gas canisters against the protestors, and 15 people were injured. On December 17, delegates of the National Party threw sticks and stones at colleagues of the Libre and Liberal Party in a confrontation at the National Institute for Vocational Training. At least five people were injured during the encounter.

On December 24, Nasfura was declared the winner of the presidential elections by the national electoral council. Nasralla rejected the results and demanded a recount of the ballots, citing that not all of the tally sheets that had been marked as inconsistent had been scrutinized. President Castro announced that she would provide details for a peaceful transition of power in the following days and would leave office on January 27, 2026. dll

JAMAICA (DRUG GANGS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **2010**

Conflict parties: drug gangs vs. government

Conflict items: subnational predominance

The violent crisis over subnational predominance between various drug gangs and the security forces continued.

Throughout the year several shootings and clashes between police forces and gang members occurred. On January 14, the police killed a former member of the Jamaica Defence Force (JDF) in Portmore, St Catherine parish who was allegedly tied to the 440 Drive Gang. On January 22, the Joint Anti-Gang Task Force (JAGTF) fatally shot the leader of the One Order Gang in St Andrew parish. On February 19, during a confrontation in Grange Hill, Westmoreland, the police fatally shot three alleged members of the Ants Posse Gang.

In April, the police killed two alleged members of the 7s gang. On April 16, they shot a high-ranking member of said gang in Waltham Park Road, St Andrew parish. On April 17, the police shot another gang member during a confrontation in Red Hills, St Andrew.

On August 9, members of the Katon Defence Force Gang (KDF Gang) attacked a policeman and his family in the town of Reading, St James, killing one and injuring two persons. According to sources, the gang members were contracted to kill the policeman and his family. During police operations, which were undertaken to probe into the incident, the police shot the alleged leader of the KDF gang on August 11 in Shooters Hill, St Andrew.

Although The Jamaican Constabulary Force reports a total amount of 569 shooting incidents, which is a decrease of 33 per cent compared to the previous year, there was a significant rise in shootings with security forces being involved. According to the Independent Commission of Investigation (INDECOM), 311 police shootings were reported. In comparison, in 2023, security forces were involved in 235 fatal shootings. The number of officers being charged following an investigation by the Parliamentary oversight body amounts to 54. According to the Guardian, the human rights group Jamaicans for Justice (JfJ) raised concern about the increase in police shootings.

The continuous use of States of emergency (SOEs) by the government remained contentious. On May 16, the Supreme Court handed down a decision which declared that several SOEs that were imposed between January 2018 and February 2023 had been unconstitutional. The government has announced to appeal this court ruling. eth

MEXICO (CNTE)

Intensity: **2** | Change: **•** | Start: **2006**

Conflict parties: CNTE vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology

The non-violent crisis over the orientation of education policies between the National Coordination of Education Workers (CNTE) and the government led by Claudia Sheinbaum continued. CNTE, a dissident teachers' union, opposed government education policies it considered harmful to educators, in particular the 2007 ISSSTE law. The union remained primarily

active in Mexico City and the southern states of Guerrero, Chiapas, and Oaxaca. Throughout 2025, CNTE organized regular protests, blockades, rallies, and sit-ins that remained largely non-violent, although five incidents involved property destruction and clashes with authorities. No fatalities or shootouts were reported. In June, CNTE vandalized several government and union buildings over three consecutive days in Mexico City. On June 4, a CNTE faction, the State Coordinator of Education Workers of Guerrero (CETEG), attempted to force entry into the Ministry of the Interior using sledgehammers, sticks, and stones, and security forces responded with repelling gas. On the following day, CNTE set fire to the headquarters of the National Union of Education Workers (SNTE), a teachers' union traditionally aligned with government policies. Around twenty teachers breached security barriers and entered the building, and the fire damaged two floors, destroying furniture, documents, and interior facilities. On the next day, CNTE damaged the exterior of the Ministry of Welfare offices using large wooden sticks. On November 13, CNTE mobilized around the National Palace in Mexico City, reiterating demands for the repeal of the ISSSTE law. Protesters attempted to push through perimeter fencing and were met with repelling gas deployed by riot police. On November 22, a similar confrontation occurred in San Pedro y San Pablo Teposcolula, Oaxaca, where CNTE members forced entry into an event venue attended by the President, and security personnel pushed the crowd back. lei

MEXICO (DRUG CARTELS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2006**

Conflict parties:	drug cartels vs. vigilante groups vs. government
Conflict items:	subnational predominance, re-sources

The violent crisis over subnational predominance and the production, trade, and trafficking of illegal drugs and other illicit activities between various drug cartels and vigilante groups, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued. The most active cartels remained the Sinaloa Cartel (CDS), the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG), the Gulf Cartel (CDG), the Cártel del Noreste (CDN), La Nueva Familia Michoacana (LNFM), and their respective sub-groups. Under Claudia Sheinbaum, the government upheld a militarized security strategy relying on the armed forces and the National Guard. At the same time, the US administration under Donald Trump advanced the designation of major Mexican cartels, including CDS, CJNG, CDN, CDG, United Cartels, and LNFM, as terrorist organizations and pursued high-profile prosecutions such as that of Sinaloa leader Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada. These measures increased pressure on the Mexican government and prompted retaliatory cartel violence. Nationwide, reported killings declined, although very high numbers persisted in Guanajuato, Michoacán, and Guerrero. Police officers and security forces were frequent targets of attacks linked to local power struggles. In May, National Guard soldiers in Michoacán were among those killed in targeted explosions involving the emerging use of IEDs. In December, a soldier deliberately shot and killed three colleagues, indicating infiltration of security institutions. Confrontations between state forces and cartels persisted, partic-

ularly against CJNG in western Mexico. In March, authorities uncovered an extermination site in Teuchitlán, Jalisco, with crematoriums and mass graves attributed to CJNG and an estimated two hundred victims. Around the same time, suspected CJNG gunmen ambushed army and National Guard units along the Jalisco–Michoacán border, killing multiple soldiers, and later carried out coordinated roadblocks and arson attacks across municipalities in Michoacán, Jalisco, and Guanajuato, burning vehicles and businesses and killing police officers in response to federal operations. By September, observers estimated that roughly two thousand people had been killed and more than two thousand three hundred had gone missing in Sinaloa over a year of factional violence, with dozens of security personnel also killed. das

MEXICO (INTER-CARTEL RIVALRY, PARAMILITARY GROUPS)

Intensity: **4** | Change: • | Start: **2005**

Conflict parties:	CJNG et al. vs. CU et al. vs. CSRL et al. vs. CDS et al. vs. CDN et al. vs. CDG et al.
Conflict items:	subnational predominance, re-sources

Year	Month	Intensity
2005	Jan	3
2006	Feb	4
2007	Jan	4
2008	Jan	4
2009	Jan	4
2010	Jan	4
2011	Jan	4
2012	Jan	4
2013	Jan	4
2014	Jan	4
2015	Jan	4
2016	Jan	4
2017	Jan	4
2018	Jan	4
2019	Jan	4
2020	Jan	4
2021	Jan	4
2022	Jan	4
2023	Jan	4
2024	Jan	4
2025	Jan	4

The limited war over subnational predominance, the trade and trafficking of illegal drugs, and other illicit activities between various drug cartels and their respective splinter groups continued. The groups most visibly involved were the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG), Sinaloa Cartel (CDS), Northeastern Cartel (CDN), Santa Rosa de Lima Cartel (CSRL), Gulf Cartel (CDG), and the cartel alliance United Cartels (CU). As in previous years, the detention or killing of cartel leaders triggered internal succession struggles [→ Mexico (drug cartels)]. Between January and March, turf wars resulted in at least twenty-three deaths and several injuries. Shootouts and clashes occurred between rival groups, and senior cartel members affiliated with Los Chapitos were targeted. Two members responsible for security and logistics were killed in Culiacán in January, and another member was killed on February 2 in Calimaya. A shootout on February 13 left four people dead and two injured. On March 2, fighting between the Sinaloa Cartel factions Los Chapitos and La Mayiza resulted in eight people killed and injured and several houses burned. On April 7, a criminal cell linked to the Chapitos faction killed nine people and injured five others at a drug rehabilitation clinic in Culiacán, Sinaloa, while searching for members of the Mayitos faction. On May 2, a heavy gunfight near Tanques, Sinaloa, involving heavy firearms and burning vehicles used as roadblocks, left four men dead. On May 5, Los Mayos announced an alliance with the Beltrán-Leyva Cartel, and multiple gunfights across Sinaloa state left ten people dead. On May 18, Los Chapitos confirmed an alliance with CJNG against Los Mayos. On May 23, a shootout near Los Olivos, Michoacán, attributed to CJNG and Familia

THE AMERICAS

MEXICO (INTER-CARTEL RIVALRY, PARAMILITARY GROUPS)



January



February



March



April



May



June



July



August



September



October



November



December

Michoacana, left four bodies recovered by police.

On June 15, a shootout in Culiacán killed three cartel members and injured one. On June 24, a mass shooting during a religious festival in Irapuato, Guanajuato, killed eleven people and injured twenty, which authorities linked to the conflict between CJNG and CSRL. On the same day, a merger between CJNG and Carteles Unidos was announced. On June 29, authorities found an abandoned truck near Culiacán containing sixteen bodies, with four additional bodies hanging from a bridge; Los Mayos claimed responsibility.

Further incidents included the discovery of dismembered remains of six people on August 4 in Poza Rica, Veracruz; a shootout on September 4 in Culiacán killing a senior Los Chapitos member; shootings on November 15 in Hidalgo del Parral leaving eight people dead; a mass shooting on November 29 in Tula de Allende killing six and injuring eight; and clashes in December in Guanajuato and Sinaloa resulting in additional deaths and injuries, including the killing of a Los Chapitos security chief in Mexico City on December 21.

lei, mok, rch, spy

MEXICO (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2006**

Conflict parties: opposition groups vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology

The violent crisis over the orientation of the political system and national power between opposition groups and the government of President Claudia Sheinbaum from the National Regeneration Movement (Morena) continued.

On August 27, a legislative session in the Mexican Senate chamber in Mexico City escalated into a physical confrontation between the president of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and a senator from the ruling Morena party. The session focused on foreign policy and national security, including proposals concerning potential involvement of US military forces in Mexico to combat organized crime. During the debate, Morena and opposition lawmakers remained divided. The confrontation occurred at the end of the session, after the national anthem was sung, when the PRI president was denied the floor. The individuals involved pushed each other repeatedly, while other legislators attempted to separate them. A cameraman who intervened was pushed to the ground by the PRI president and later required a neck brace due to injuries sustained in the fall. No further violence was reported.

On December 15, a legislative session at the Congress of Mexico City was temporarily disrupted when two Morena congresswomen and two congresswomen from the National Action Party (PAN) engaged in a physical altercation. The session addressed proposed reforms and the potential dissolution of the Institute for Transparency, Access to Public Information, Protection of Personal Data and Accountability of Mexico City (infoCDMX). Opposition lawmakers argued that the proposed changes violated prior agreements and could undermine transparency. During the exchange at the podium, the congresswomen shoved, slapped, and pulled each other's hair, leading to a temporary suspension of the session. One PAN lawmaker reportedly required a neck brace following the incident. No further violence occurred.

The incidents reflected ongoing institutional tensions between the government and opposition actors over the direction of national politics. lei

MEXICO (PUBLIC SECURITY)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2014**

Conflict parties: normalistas, social movements vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology

The violent crisis over the orientation of the political system and the management of public security between teacher trainees from rural colleges, known as Normalistas, and allied movements, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued.

The September 26, 2014 disappearance of forty-three Normalista students, also known as the Iguala mass kidnapping, continued to shape tensions. On May 14, a Normalista who had been abducted in 2014 died in hospital from complications resulting from injuries sustained during the armed assault. His death, followed by that of another Normalista on May 16, triggered renewed protests.

On May 16, after attempting to seize a commercial bus and subsequently fleeing from Chiapas state police, one Normalista died during a vehicle pursuit. On May 19, Normalistas from the Mactumactzá Normal Rural School and other states staged protests to commemorate his death.

As in previous years, Normalistas organized demonstrations in front of government and federal buildings, expressing grievances through vandalism. Central to their demands remained accountability for the 2014 disappearance of the forty-three students. On March 11, Normalistas damaged facilities of the Ministry of Education in Ayotzinapa, Guerrero. Throughout the year, authorities arrested several individuals linked to the 2014 Iguala case. On January 21, a member of Guerreros Unidos was arrested in Mexico City. On February 28, Martín Alejandro "M," accused of participating in the shooting of the Normalistas, was detained in Mexico City. On March 25, a drug trafficker linked to Guerreros Unidos and the 2014 disappearances was arrested in Iguala, Guerrero. On May 14, a former magistrate and ex-president of the Guerrero Court of Justice, was arrested for her alleged involvement in the disappearance of security camera recordings from the Palace of Justice in Iguala. fza

MEXICO (WOMEN'S PROTESTS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: ↗ | Start: **2020**

Conflict parties: feminist groups, human rights activists, women's rights groups vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology

The non-violent crisis between feminist groups, human rights activists, mothers of the disappeared, and indigenous and local women's organizations, on the one hand, and governmental and judicial institutions at municipal, state, and federal levels, on the other, escalated to a violent crisis. Protesters focused on femicides, disappearances, reproductive rights, institutional impunity, and shortcomings in protection mechanisms, including the gender-violence alert system.

The largest mobilizations occurred on March 8, when tens of thousands participated in Mexico City and more than seventy people were injured, primarily during clashes with

security forces. While many demonstrations nationwide remained peaceful, some involved property damage or the use of non-lethal force by police. Reported incidents included the burning of documents at the Office for Gender Violence Crimes in Puebla, damage to judicial buildings in Sonora, and the use of tear gas and rubber bullets by police in Oaxaca and other parts of Mexico.

Throughout the year, additional issue-based protests occurred and generally involved limited or no violence. These included mobilizations linked to the Mafer Turrent case in April, an Abolitionist Feminist March in Mexico City in May, demonstrations concerning investigative failures in Chilpancingo, Culiacán, and Monterrey between June and July, and a large reproductive-rights march in September. jbe

MEXICO, USA (BORDER SECURITY)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **2005**

Conflict parties: Mexico, USA vs. illegal immigrants, refugees, smugglers

Conflict items: other

The violent crisis over border security between Mexico and the USA, on the one hand, and migrants and smugglers attempting to cross into the US, on the other, continued. During the year, reported unauthorized crossings at the US–Mexico border declined to their lowest level in decades, contributing to an overall decrease in violent incidents.

On March 31, one person died and another was injured while attempting to climb the border fence near San Diego, California. On August 11, US Customs and Border Protection officers opened fire on an individual attempting to flee an inspection at the Otay Mesa Port of Entry, leaving the suspect with minor injuries.

US and Mexican administrations increasingly oriented their policies toward reducing unauthorized crossings. On January 20, President Donald Trump declared a national emergency concerning the southern border of the USA. On January 21, he authorized the military to take control of designated areas along the border, granting armed forces authority to temporarily detain migrants or trespassers.

Throughout the first half of the year, the US military established four military zones along the border in New Mexico, Texas, and Arizona. On January 22, the US deployed several thousand additional active-duty troops to the southern border. On 5 February, President Claudia Sheinbaum ordered ten thousand additional members of Mexico's National Guard to the border following an agreement with the US administration. On March 3, the US deployed nearly three thousand additional troops.

On July 4, President Trump signed the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBA). On September 28, the US and Mexico launched a bilateral initiative to disrupt illicit firearms trafficking, expanding joint investigations, prosecutions, intelligence sharing, and Mexico's use of US tracing tools. elb

NICARAGUA (INDIGENOUS GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↗** | Start: **2015**

Conflict parties: Mayangna, Miskito groups, Rama, YATAMA vs. government, non-indigenous settlers

Conflict items: autonomy, resources

The non-violent crisis over resources and autonomy between the Nicaraguan government and non-indigenous settlers, on the one hand, and indigenous groups, mainly the Miskito, Mayagnas, Ramas as well as the indigenous party YATAMA, on the other, escalated to a violent crisis.

On April 25, armed settlers killed a member of both the army and the Miskito party. The Nicaraguan military omitted his indigenous identity in their report of the incident. On May 31, one person belonging to the indigenous organization Pri Laka denounced ongoing violence by settlers who were backed by criminal groups, to seize indigenous lands while the state failed to protect affected communities.

On September 10, settlers killed 42-year-old Miskito man Salvador Castillo Chang with a machete in Puerto Cabezas, in the Northern Caribbean Coast Autonomous Region.

The forced migration of indigenous minorities continued over the year. Some Miskito groups fled to Costa Rica. This was due to pro-government settlers who engaged in illegal land occupation, deforestation, agriculture, livestock farming, and unregulated mining, all of which contributed to environmental destruction and the displacement of indigenous communities. The conflict continued as the government protected the land seizures and violated indigenous rights. spy

NICARAGUA (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **2** | Change: **•** | Start: **2008**

Conflict parties: anti-government protesters, opposition groups vs. government, paramilitary groups

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The non-violent crisis over national power, the orientation of the political system and ideology in Nicaragua between various opposition groups and anti-government protestors, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued. The government continued to target oppositional figures, the press and religious freedom.

On January 15, a reform declared that individuals deemed “traitors to the homeland” would lose their nationality. On February 27, President Ortega announced Nicaragua's withdrawal from UNESCO, effective December 31, 2026, and ended participation in all Human Rights Council activities. On May 14, police arrested retired General Alvarado Baltodano, and at least 14 linked opposition figures were imprisoned three days later. On June 19, prominent exiled opposition leader Roberto Samcam was killed in San José, Costa Rica. On September 23, a UN report documented escalating transnational repression against Nicaraguans in exile, including loss of nationality, denial of passports, property confiscation, digital surveillance, threats, and intimidation of relatives in the country. On November 7, four political prisoners were released in poor health, one critically ill. On November 11,

2025, the government expanded internet censorship through a new telecommunications law, closing independent online spaces. On November 29, about 50 political prisoners were placed under house arrest. In December, NGOs documented ongoing human rights abuses, naming over 126 officials responsible since 2018. *spy*

PERU (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↗** | Start: **2008**

Conflict parties: opposition movements vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, resources

The non-violent crisis over the orientation of the political system and resources between various opposition movements on the one hand, and the government on the other, escalated to a violent crisis.

Since mid-February, one conflict line has unfolded as residents of Peru's Tambo Valley in Arequipa and Chumbivilcas province in Cusco have been holding indefinite strikes and blocking roads to protest the planned reopening of the Tía María and La Tapada copper mines by Southern Peru Copper Corporation, leading to clashes with police and several arrests and injuries among demonstrators.

In early July 2025, another wave of unrest emerged after Peru's government removed more than 50,000 informal miners from the REINFO program, leaving around 31,560 participants and citing inactivity among most excluded workers. The decision triggered nationwide protests as small-scale miners blocked major roads along the southern copper corridor in Cusco and disrupted operations in Pataz's gold-mining region. On July 11, during clashes between protesters and police in the town of Chala, Arequipa region, police killed one person amid demonstrations linked to the nationwide miners' strike. From September 22 to September 28, ongoing violent clashes between protesters and police in Lima resulted in at least 30 injuries. The National Journalists' Association (ANP) stated that police injured 18 journalists and joined other organizations in alleging excessive force. The protest wave further eroded Boluarte's already record-low approval ratings.

In October, Peru plunged deeper into political turmoil after months of anti-government unrest under president Dina Boluarte, whose administration faced widespread protests led by youth movements against corruption, crime, and a controversial pension reform. On October 10, Congress impeached her from office after investigating allegations of bribery and her role in a deadly 2022 crackdown on protesters, declaring "permanent moral incapacity" and appointing interim leader José Jerí. Days later, massive demonstrations led by Gen Z activists and transport workers erupted across Lima and other cities to denounce corruption, rising insecurity, and the new administration.

On October 15, protests escalated near Congress when police fired tear gas and rubber bullets at demonstrators who threw stones and fireworks. During the confrontations, a police officer shot and killed a 32-year-old man, and more than 100 people including 80 law enforcement officers as well as several journalists were injured. In response, the president declared a 30-day state of emergency in Lima and Callao starting October 16, authorizing military patrols in both cities and restricting civil liberties. The Peruvian government pledged sweeping police reforms and tougher security laws amid widespread skepticism that repeated emergency mea-

sures will curb crime or restore public trust in Peru's political institutions. *mgm*

PERU (SHINING PATH)

Intensity: **2** | Change: **↘** | Start: **1980**

Conflict parties: SL vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, subnational pre-dominance, resources

The violent crisis over regional dominance, control of resources, and the political system's direction between the left-wing Maoist insurgent group Shining Path (SL) and the government de-escalated to a non-violent crisis.

SL maintained its main presence in the Valley of the Apurímac, Ene, and Mantaro rivers (VRAEM), which constitutes Peru's principal coca-producing area and spans parts of the Ayacucho, Cusco, and Junín regions. The government accused SL of collaborating with coca cultivators and drug traffickers to safeguard their operations, and made efforts to expel SL from this territory.

On April 6, a joint operation by the Armed Forces' VRAEM Special Command and the National Police was conducted in Canayre district, Huanta province, Ayacucho region. During the intervention, authorities seized a cache containing 594 short-range ammunition cartridges, 194 sticks of dynamite, two grenades, and a Galil rifle belonging to remnants of the Shining Path terrorist group. For the first time in many years, there were no fatalities in the conflict between the SL and the Peruvian government.

Peruvian President Dina Boluarte has enacted a law pardoning soldiers, police officers, and civilian militias accused of committing atrocities during the country's armed conflict with Maoist rebels between 1980 and 2000. The measure, approved by Congress in July, will benefit hundreds of members of the security forces and self-defense groups facing trial for human rights violations. *mgm*

USA (RACIAL TENSIONS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **2014**

Conflict parties: anti-discrimination protesters vs. right-wing extremist groups vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology

The violent crisis over systematic and institutional racism, particularly within the justice system and law enforcement, between anti-discrimination protesters and civil society groups, on the one hand, and the US government and right-wing extremist groups, on the other, continued.

Over the course of the year, several violent and, in some cases, fatal confrontations occurred between law enforcement officers and Black individuals, predominantly following traffic stops and routine checks. Anti-discrimination groups and protesters criticized the use of force in these encounters as excessive and discriminatory. On August 8, a police officer fatally shot a sixty-eight-year-old Black woman in New Brunswick, New Jersey. On October 2, citizens staged a demonstration demanding accountability and justice for the victim. Similar protests followed other incidents of racialized

police violence, including a vigil held in Kansas City, Kansas, after a Black jail inmate died on July 5, following the use of prone restraint by a deputy.

Tensions between government authorities and anti-discrimination actors persisted and intensified following the change in administration. On September 8, a Supreme Court ruling in *Vasquez Perdomo v. Noem* permitted law enforcement to stop individuals based on race under specific circumstances, drawing criticism from anti-discrimination organizations. On October 14, the media outlet POLITICO reported on online communications by Young Republican groups that contained discriminatory language. Additionally, on August 19, the removal of a “Black Lives Matter” sign by Harvard University administrators prompted criticism regarding restrictions on expressions related to racial justice.

Racially motivated actions by right-wing extremist groups also occurred during the year. These included vandalism featuring white supremacist symbols as well as marches and demonstrations with racially charged messaging, with the group Blood Tribe among the most visible actors. hpl

USA (RIGHT-WING EXTREMISTS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **1990**

Conflict parties: right wing extremist groups vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology

The violent crisis over the orientation of the political system between various right-wing extremist groups, Christian nationalist groups on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued. The conflict saw a sustained decline in physical violence, as no deaths or injuries were recorded from September onward, while conflict activity shifted toward ideological, rhetorical, and organizational forms.

On October 14, right-wing extremist recruitment activity was observed during the Mechanicsburg Halloween Parade, where individuals associated with Women of the KKK distributed recruitment material. On October 17, reporting indicated that a Russia-based organization linked to US far-right networks supported coordination and communication, suggesting transnational ideological linkages. On the same day, the Young Republican National Federation faced public scrutiny following the leak of internal communications containing explicitly racist and pro-Nazi language among members of its leadership. On October 27, public controversy surrounding a media interview with far-right activist Nick Fuentes increased the visibility of extremist discourse, but remained confined to discursive amplification rather than mobilization.

Throughout November, right-wing extremist activity largely consisted of antisemitic rhetoric, ideological positioning, and online organization. The neo-Nazi accelerationist group The Base circulated propaganda videos on encrypted platforms depicting masked members conducting paramilitary-style firearms drills in forested areas within the United States. While the material displayed ideological persistence and symbolic readiness, no concrete targets, plots, or victims were reported.

In December, institutional responses focused on addressing antisemitism. On December 8, the US Senate introduced Senate Resolution 533 condemning antisemitism and white supremacist ideology. On December 20–21, debates at the Turning Point USA Annual Conference reflected ideological


contestation within conservative spaces. Throughout the period, right-wing extremist actors relied on propaganda and public discourse rather than violence, confirming the conflict’s classification as a non-violent crisis. hrl

USA – VENEZUELA

Intensity: **4** | Change: **↑** | Start: **2001**

Conflict parties: USA vs. Venezuela

Conflict items: system/ideology, international power



The non-violent crisis over ideology and international power between Venezuela and the USA escalated to a limited war. The year was marked by concerns on migration and oil, allegations of gangs threatening the US sovereignty, and pressure to depose Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro. By the end of the year, the US conducted air strikes against alleged drug boats either departing from Venezuelan shores bound north in the Caribbean or in international waters of the North Pacific Ocean, killing at least 126.

On January 10, the special envoy for Venezuela met president Nicolás Maduro to reportedly persuade the latter to accept deported migrants from the US and compel the government to free retained US citizens in Venezuela. On February 1, president Trump announced the liberation of six US citizens. On February 21, 177 Venezuelan migrants retained in Guantánamo Bay came to Venezuela via Honduras [→ Cuba – USA (Guantanamo)]. On March 15, this number increased to 238. In both instances, US authorities claimed that members of Tren de Aragua, a criminal gang [→ Venezuela (mega-gangs)], were deported, although not every single national had a criminal record.

Oil-related sanctions remained a source of contention. On February 26, the US president annulled the agreement on oil signed during the mandate of president Joe Biden on 11/26/22, claiming that the Venezuelan government did not agree to receive migrants as fast as desired by the US and neither “electoral conditions” to remove the Venezuelan Chavista-led government were met [→ Venezuela (opposition)]. On March 24, the US granted a two-month so-called “wind-down” period to US oil company Chevron to cease operations in Venezuela and announced 25% US “secondary tariffs” for those countries which kept trade ties with the Caribbean country. However, on May 28, the US administration granted an exception to Chevron to keep its assets and joint ventures with the Venezuelan state oil company PdVSA, but barred any disbursement to the Venezuelan state.

The US tied migration to security concerns and unilaterally escalated the conflict. President Trump argued that Venezuela sent “tens of thousands” of people of “very violent nature” to the US to back up the imposition of trade barriers. In response to the US pressure to deport noncitizens to Venezuela, president Maduro halted all deportations flights from the US on March 3. On March 15, the US president invoked the Alien Enemies Act of 1798, a law that grants power to the president for the expulsion of noncitizens during wartime, alleging that Tren de Aragua, supposedly invading the US,

followed Maduro's orders. On May 5, US intelligence agencies contradicted the president's claim, asserting that some members of the Venezuela government, but not Maduro himself, had ties to the gang. On May 24 and July 17, the US imposed sanctions on two top leaders of the Tren de Aragua gang and its associates. On July 25, it imposed sanctions on the so-called Cartel de los Soles, an alleged drug cartel being led by the president of Venezuela as well. It also designated both groups as terrorist organizations. On August 8, the US increased the bounty – set under the previous US administration on January 10 – for Nicolás Maduro's arrest from \$25 up to \$50 US million. On August 15, the US administration announced the deployment of three Arleigh-Burke class guided-missile destroyers, one Ticonderoga class guided-missile cruiser, one amphibious vessel, and one attack submarine, totalling about 4,500 troops allegedly on a counter narcotics mission to Caribbean international waters before the Venezuelan shores. In response, president Maduro declared on August 20 the mobilization of alleged 4.5 million militia members to contain the potential aggression. On September 1, when the presence of the fleet and two additional Ticonderoga cruisers was confirmed, Maduro declared a state of "maximum preparedness".

In this context, the US started a campaign of airstrikes against boats bound north allegedly transporting drugs on September 2 under the claim that Tren de Aragua or Cartel de los Soles, under the guidance of the Venezuelan president. The first strike at some point in the Southern Caribbean left 11 people killed. On October 22, the eighth airstrike hit another alleged drug-smuggling boat, this time in the North Eastern Pacific Ocean, killing two. On November 13, the US minister of defense declared the start of Operation Southern Spear with the goal of defending US territory, eliminating "narco-terrorists", and stopping the flow of narcotics into the country.

By the end of the year, the air campaign expanded. On November 2, the US military buildup expanded to 10,000 personnel and included the Gerald Ford aircraft carrier groups and military assets in Puerto Rico and Trinidad and Tobago besides air operations from the US mainland. On November 19, Donald Trump unilaterally declared the closure of Venezuela's airspace, an action condemned by Maduro as a "colonial threat" and a violation of Venezuela's sovereignty. Either on December 18 or December 24, a CIA-conducted airstrike destroyed a suspected "dock facility" or a "hut", used for the embarkation of drugs in Alta Guajira region, Zulia state [→ Colombia (ELN); Venezuela (FARC dissidents)]. Local media confirmed the existence of debris belonging to an AGM-114 Hellfire or an AGM 179 air-to-ground US-made precision missile.

Southern Spear airstrikes killed at least 126 people in fishing boats. 65 in the Caribbean and 61 in the Northern Pacific Ocean. The air campaign to the Pacific expanded to the Pacific after Colombian president Gustavo Petro declared that airstrikes in the Caribbean are an "act of tyranny" on September 25. Petro also called the members of the US armed forces to disobey Trump during a Palestinian rally in New York on September 27 [→ Israel – State of Palestine^o (PNA)]. hrl, run, mok

VENEZUELA (FARC DISSIDENTS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↗** | Start: **2020**

Conflict parties: FARC EMC vs. FARC Segunda Marquetalia vs. ELN, government

Conflict items: subnational predominance, re-sources

The non-violent crisis over subnational predominance and resources among FARC Central General Staff dissidents (EMC), FARC Segunda Marquetalia (SM), and the National Liberation Army (ELN), the latter with the support of the Venezuelan government on the other, escalated to a violent crisis.

On January 16, ELN Northeastern War Front members attacked dissidents of FARC 33th Front, killing at least 80 people and displacing at least 90,000 in El Catatumbo, Norte de Santander, Colombia [→ Colombia (inter-cartel rivalry, neo-paramilitary groups, left-wing militants)]. Colombian intelligence stated that at least 200 ELN Eastern War Front militants moved from Arauca to Norte de Santander through the Venezuelan states of Apure, Táchira, and Zulia to reinforce the Northeastern War Front which operates at the border zone in the Colombian department of Norte de Santander. On January 23, Colombian president Gustavo Petro stated that ELN guerrillas had crossed Venezuela from Arauca to El Catatumbo in plain clothes.

In response to the fighting in Colombia, the Venezuelan government deployed troops to Santa Bárbara del Zulia municipality, eponymous state, to provide aid to the refugees coming from Colombia on January 22. On January 31, Venezuela, in coordination with the Colombian government, launched operation "Catatumbo Lightning", involving 5,000 troops in the northern states of Zulia and Táchira states bordering the Colombian department of Norte de Santander [→ Colombia – Venezuela (border security)]. According to investigative portal Insight Crime, the operation targeted the 33rd front infrastructure, while leaving ELN assets at the border untouched.

However, on July 25, the national guard clashed with the ELN in García de Hevia municipality, Zulia. The confrontation left one guard and one guerilla killed, and another troop injured. On October 2, the minister of defense confirmed for the first time in public the presence of ELN and FARC dissidents in the country [→ Venezuela (mining); Colombia – Venezuela (border security); Colombia (inter-cartel rivalry, neo-paramilitary groups, left-wing militants)]. On October 22, an independent journalist denounced that the seizing by early October of an ELN-owned camp in the rural area of Udón Pérez parish, Catatumbo municipality, left 4 national guard members and one ELN dead and at least two injured.

ELN and FARC SM dissidents entered into an unprecedented confrontation. On August 5, SM announced the killing of the deputy chief of the faction under the leadership of alias Iván Márquez. Colombian military intelligence pinpointed the attack in the Venezuelan state of Apure. However, according to environmental NGO SOS Orinoco, based on local accounts and the statements of the mayor of Maroa town, Amazonas, the assassination and following skirmishes took place in the rural area of the municipality on August 3. The Colombian Ombudsman Office confirmed clashes not only in the Amazonas' municipalities of Autana, Atures, Atabapo, Maroa and Río Negro along the binational border, but also in Puerto Páez town and in the whole of Rómulo Gallego municipality,

Apure. According to the SM press release, the ELN killed a total of five and injured several in an ambush. The Colombian Ombudsman Office reported two injured in Apure who were hospitalized in neighbouring Puerto Carreño, Vichada. On August 5, FANB announced operations to reinforce the security in the affected Amazonas' municipalities without mentioning the clash. Further, on October 27, ELN and an unidentified FARC dissident group clashed in the Agropa zone, Atures municipality, Amazonas. The encounter left at least one militant and one civilian dead, and at least another injured. run

VENEZUELA (INDIGENOUS GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↗** | Start: **1988**

Conflict parties: indigenous groups vs. government, miners
Conflict items: subnational predominance, re-sources

The non-violent crisis over subnational predominance and resources between Indigenous groups, on the one hand, and miners, on the other, escalated to a violent crisis.

Indigenous communities protested against illegal miners throughout the year. On January 22, Ye'kwana villagers of Tencua community, Manapiare municipality, Amazonas state, appealed in a video to President Nicolás Maduro and demanded protection from illegal miners in the sector. The community reported retaliatory attacks on January 20 due to its opposition to mining activities in the sector [→ Venezuela (mining)]. Miners injured an undetermined number of indigenous and destroyed one boat. On January 22, alleged miners burned down a communal building and at least one house of the Ye'kwana community in Alto Ventuari, Manapiari municipality. On January 28, representatives from Ye'kwana and Sanema communities in Alto Ventuari, Manapiare municipality, demanded the intervention of State authorities against mining in the Parú River. On February 11, the governor of Amazonas announced an agreement with Ye'kwana and Sanema communities to preserve the environment from illegal mining. On November 23, a Yanomami community seized a boat at the shores of Padamo River, transporting supplies for a mining site in the Buena Vista area, Alto Orinoco municipality, Amazonas state.

Indigenous representatives highlighted at the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues that Venezuela did not recognize the voluntary isolation of some communities on April 23. The policy gap leaves such communities exposed to mining intrusions. Between September 10 and 12, more than 30 indigenous civil organizations met to demand the Venezuelan state to commit to its social and environmental responsibilities prior to the 30th United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, in Belém, Pará [→ Brazil (indigenous groups)].

Individuals believed to be connected to security forces arbitrarily detained in Caracas a human-rights defender known for his work on Indigenous land preservation, on January 7. On January 16, authorities released him [→ Venezuela (opposition)]. On July 1, the Regional Organization of the Indigenous Peoples of Amazonas (ORPIA) demanded justice for the assassination of Virgilio Trujillo Arana, shot in Puerto Ayacucho, Amazonas, on 06/30/22. Trujillo Arana was an Uwottüja environmental activist and leader of a territorial guard in Autana municipality.

Unregulated mining facilities across the so-called Orinoco

Mining Belt led to fatal accidents among workers. On October 14, at least 14 people died in an artisanal gold mine as heavy rain water poured into the shafts in the Cuatro Esquinas de Caratal mining complex south of El Callao town, eponymous municipality, Bolívar. On 02/24/24, a collapsing mine left at least 16 dead and eleven injured, near La Paragua city. Between January and August, 28 people died in mining-related activities in Bolívar and one in Amazonas, according to the environmental NGO SOS Orinoco. run, sgu

VENEZUELA (MEGA-GANGS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **2014**

Conflict parties: El Adriancito vs. El Conas vs. Tren de Aragua vs. Tren del Llano vs. Yeico Masacre vs. various gangs vs. government
Conflict items: subnational predominance, re-sources

The violent crisis over subnational predominance and resources such as drug and human trafficking, between various so-called mega-gangs and the government continued.

Throughout the year, the government targeted gangs across the country. In Miranda state, security forces killed alias El Wilaxis, the leader of the homonymous gang and one of the top 10 most wanted criminals in the country, in Sucre municipality, Petare parish, on January 21. On the same day, DAET, a national police special unit, killed four people associated with Los Pitufos in the Julián Blanco neighborhood. In Simón Bolívar municipality, another police special unit killed on March 23 two, among them, the successor of the Carlos Capa gang, another wanted criminal, assassinated on 3/7/24. In Caracas, the Capital District, the minister of interior announced on July 10 the killing of the alleged gang leader and presumed organizer of an "assault" against the Miraflores presidential palace in July/24 [→ Venezuela (opposition)]. The clash left two judicial cops injured. On September 19, the police deactivated one bomb set in El Valle metro station and another near the office of the attorney general. El Conas, a former Bolivarian National Guard non-commissioned officer, who also attacked with grenades the justice hall in Maracaibo, Zulia, on 3/25/2022, claimed responsibility.

In Zulia state, the Cabimas municipal police found an unexploded grenade close to the house of its deputy commander on March 31 attributed to El Adriancito gang.

In Guárico, authorities targeted the Tren del Llano gang. Its leader published on January 9 a video on Instagram depicting oppositional leader María Corina Machado speaking against Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro during his act of possession and announcing the beginning of a "new phase" in Venezuela. Local authorities saw in such a video a connection between the opposition and the mega-gangs in the country [→ Venezuela (opposition)]. On December 22, security forces killed four in Las Lajitas areas, Julián Mellado municipality. On December 31, authorities neutralized another four, among them the second-in-command of the group, in El Sombrero settlement, Julián Mellado municipality. On January 27, a confrontation between prison authorities and prisoners left one dead and 19 injured in San Juan de Los Morros, Juan Germán Roscio municipality. Authorities raided the prison on 12/07/24 and captured its director for alleged ties with the gang and transferred 76 to other penitentiary centers.

In Aragua, clashes between authorities and Tren de Aragua

erupted on April 3 after Los Chévrolet, a gang associated with the gang, clashed with a national police patrol, injuring two cops with light firearms and hand grenades in Villa del Cura town, Zamora municipality. On June 29, authorities killed four Chévrolet, among them the most wanted criminal in Aragua state. On October 10, police killed a gang member associated with the Chévrolet cell who assassinated a cop the same day in San Mateo town, Bolívar municipality. On November 15, the police targeted the leader of El Marihuano gang, a wanted gang member in that state, in El Topo hill, Bolívar municipality. On November 18, authorities took down an associated member of El Marihuano gang in Santiago Mariño municipality. Los Chévrolet and El Marihuano gangs were considered heirs of Tren de Aragua after the takeover of Tocarón Prison on 9/20/23, Aragua state. Nicolás Maduro claimed on January 22 that authorities dismantled both Tren de Aragua and Tren del Llano in Venezuela. He also claimed that the US used them as a “construct” to destabilize the country and topple his government [→ USA – Venezuela]. run

VENEZUELA (MINING)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2006**

Conflict parties: El Perú vs. 3R vs. Tren de Guyana vs. El Talao vs. Sindicato de Barrancas vs. ELN, FARC dissidents, government, Juancho / Las Claritas Syndicate, various gangs

Conflict items: subnational predominance, resources

The violent crisis over subnational predominance and resources such as gold and rare earths between mining gangs, such as El Perú, 3R, Tren de Guayana, El Talao, as well as Sindicato de Barrancas, and the government, alongside the National Liberation Army (ELN) and former Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army guerrillas, now dissidents, as well as various other gangs, in southern Venezuela continued.

Gang violence continued in Bolívar state. Gunmen shot and injured six in a guesthouse in El Dorado, Sifontes municipality, Bolívar state, on June 9. The attack took place as part of an alleged ongoing infighting as Negro Fabio gang leader’s brother split from the group and challenged his leadership. Despite an arrest warrant by the Venezuela authorities for human trafficking in June/18 against the leader of the gang, which is also known as Sistema de la F, Fabio is known for controlling the town of El Dorado and the neighboring gold mines along the Cuyuní and Yuruari rivers.

Authorities claimed to pursue gangs by seizing their assets. On December 1, authorities seized a caché of weapons, uniforms and drugs belonging to the 3R organization in Sifontes municipality, Bolívar. On October 2, the minister of defense announced ongoing operations against FARC dissidents in Bolívar state [→ Venezuela (FARC dissidents); Colombia – Venezuela (border security); Colombia (inter-cartel rivalry, neo-paramilitary groups, left-wing militants)]. However, NGO International Crisis Group claimed in a report on July 29 that ongoing operations in Amazonas are not containing mining activities – including those of Brazilian garimpeiros –, but profiting from them by directing operations against those who do not pay a quota for the right of exploitation or by directly involving themselves in the extraction of gold [→ Venezuela (indigenous groups)].

On March 1, the General Directorate of Military Counterintelligence, DGCIM, captured 36 workers of the State mining company MINITURVEN, a Venezuelan-Turkish joint venture, in El Callao municipality, Bolívar state, and dispatched them to Caracas on charges of terrorism, embezzlement and theft. Authorities accused the workers of not delivering a promised gold batch to a customer in the United Arab Emirates. run

VENEZUELA (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1992**

Conflict parties: opposition parties vs. government, pro-government militias

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The violent crisis over the orientation of the political system and national power between the government and pro-government militias, on the one hand, and members of the opposition, which operate mainly under the Unitary Platform (PUD), on the other, continued

Nicolás Maduro was sworn in as president on January 10, following the disputed presidential elections on 07/28/24 in Caracas. On January 9, María Corina Machado (MCM) called for nationwide protests against his inauguration, claiming that his victory was fraudulent. In response, security forces briefly detained Machado. Pro-government militias known as Colectivos opened fire at anti-government protestors, injuring two, in Tucupita municipality, Delta Amacuro state.

Before and after Maduro’s inauguration, irregular detentions were registered. On January 6, authorities arrested at least 125 foreign nationals accused of being “mercenaries”. On January 7, the government detained another 13 individuals all over the country. Among them was the son-in-law of exiled opposition leader Edmundo Gonzalez. On May 23, in the wake of the regional elections of May 25, the government arrested 50 alleged mercenaries, coming over from Colombia.

Government officials persecuted family members of oppositional figures. Throughout the year, authorities arrested a total of nine relatives of a prominent exiled former soldier involved in the toppling of the Venezuelan president. Authorities apprehended them on terrorism charges at their homes in Barinas, eponymous state, on January 24, April 13, September 18 and September 19. There were 887 political prisoners in Venezuela’s jails in January, according to NGO Foro Penal.

Venezuelan NGO Justicia, Encuentro y Perdón (JEP) stated that 91 political prisoners in Venezuelan jailhouses suffered from “serious illness”, calling their physical deterioration a consequence of structural violence. On December 6, a former governor of Nueva Esparta, jailed in 2024 for criticizing Maduro and attempting to leave the country, died of a heart attack. Opposition figures claim that his death was caused by negligence, underlining JEP’s claims.

At least two incidents of violence against opposition figures outside Venezuela were observed. On October 13, two shooters injured two exiled Venezuelan human rights activists in Bogotá, Colombia. On January 23, the Chilean office of the attorney general accused the Venezuelan minister of the interior as the intellectual author behind the assassination of a former soldier and opposition activist in Chile. The victim, kidnapped by Tren de Aragua gang members on 02/21/24 in Santiago de Chile, was found dead on 03/01/24 [→ Venezuela (mega-gangs)]. The Venezuelan government

denied the accusation.


On November 13, the US minister of defense announced Operation Southern Spear shortly after the arrival of an aircraft carrier to the Caribbean, a steady build up of troops in Puerto Rico since early August, and the start of airstrikes against alleged narco boats since September 1 [→ USA – Venezuela]. The Maduro administration increased the arrests of oppositional activists and heightened military readiness, framing the US presence as an imminent foreign invasion. While

Maria Corina Machado, who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize on October 10, aligned with the US aspiration for regime change, arguing that Maduro's government represents a direct threat to US national security, the opposition remained divided over the strategy. A faction led by Henrique Capriles publicly distanced itself from this stance and advocated for diplomatic talks between the US, Maduro's government and the opposition. mok


ASIA AND OCEANIA

VIOLENT CONFLICTS IN ASIA AND OCEANIA IN 2025
(SUBNATIONAL LEVEL)


INTENSITY




CONFLICT INTENSITIES IN ASIA AND OCEANIA IN 2025 COMAPRED TO 2024



CONFLICT INTENSITIES BY CONFLICT ITEM IN ASIA AND OCEANIA IN 2025



CONFLICT INTENSITIES BY CONFLICT TYPE IN ASIA AND OCEANIA IN 2025



REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT

With 100 active conflicts observed in 2025, Asia & Oceania continued to be the region with the highest number of conflicts. The number of active conflicts decreased by two compared to 2024. This year, 55 conflicts occurred on a violent level, which represents no change in comparison to past year. HIIK observed seven full wars, two more than in 2024. While five wars kept their intensity, two of them escalated from one limited war and from a dispute respectively. In contrast, the number of limited wars decreased by two, totaling three. While two limited wars escalated from violent crises, three de-escalated to violent crises. One limited war kept its 2024 intensity.

South Asia was marked by escalating militancy, political contestation, and renewed interstate tensions. In Pakistan, the limited war over national power, autonomy of the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and the orientation of the political system between Islamist militant groups, such as Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP) and Islamic State Khorasan Province (IS-KP), on the one hand, and the government and political parties, on the other, escalated to a war. Throughout the year, clashes between Islamist militants and government forces resulted in at least 1,067 people killed, at least 311 individuals injured, and more than 10,000 people displaced, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and increasingly in Balochistan [→ Pakistan (Islamist militant groups)]. Sectarian violence continued with targeted attacks on the Ahmadi and Christian communities in Sindh and Punjab Province, resulting in fatalities and injuries [→ Pakistan (religious groups - Sunni militants)].

Furthermore, the violent crisis over territorial secession and resources, such as gas, oil, coal, and minerals, between Baloch separatist nationalists, other militant groups, and the Chinese-supported government escalated to a limited war. Violent clashes and attacks left at least 623 people dead and 521 injured throughout the year [→ Pakistan (Balochistan)]. Meanwhile, the violent crisis over subnational predominance and resources in Sindh Province continued, with targeted political killings and protests against the federal government's Green Pakistan Initiative and planned Indus River canals after the February 15 irrigation project inauguration in Punjab [→ Pakistan (Sindh)].

In Bangladesh, the limited war over national power and the orientation of the political system between opposition parties, primarily the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Jamaat-e-Islami (Jel), on the one hand, and the Awami League (AL), on the other, de-escalated to a violent crisis following the establishment of state authorities operating under an interim government [→ Bangladesh (opposition)]. Nevertheless, tensions persisted over electoral timing, legitimacy, and political reform. On January 21, the interim government restricted anti-government activities nationwide, citing security concerns. In February, the authorities launched "Operation Devil Hunt", arresting more than 1,500 people by mid-month. Meanwhile, on February 15, the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) formally opened hearings against former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in Dhaka, before sentencing her and former Interior Minister Asaduzzaman Khan Kamal to death on November 17 [→ Bangladesh (opposition)].

The non-violent crisis over religious ideology and religious predominance between various Islamist organizations, on the one hand, and the interim government and religious minorities, such as Hindus, on the other, escalated to a violent crisis. Following the lifting of the ban on Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami on January 15 and the restoration of its electoral registration on June 1, incidents of communal violence and confrontations increased. On February 14, attacks on Hindu homes in Pirojpur District and Sylhet left one person dead and ten wounded, while rallies organized by Hizb ut-Tahrir Bangladesh in Dhaka between March 6 and 15, calling for an Islamic caliphate, resulted in clashes with police that left 15 people wounded [→ Bangladesh (Islamist groups)].

In India-administered Jammu and Kashmir, the violent crisis over autonomy or secession and ideology between militant groups and the government continued. Throughout the year, clashes between security forces and militants left at least 68 people dead, including at least 27 militants, at least 26 civilians, and at least 16 security personnel [→ India (Kashmir)]. The most significant incident occurred on April 22, when gunmen attacked tourists near Pahalgam in Jammu and Kashmir, killing at least 25 tourists and one resident and injuring at least a dozen others [→ India (Kashmir)]. The attack triggered a sharp escalation in the violent crisis over the status of the Kashmir region, international and regional power, and water distribution between India and Pakistan, which escalated into a limited war [→ India – Pakistan]. Between May 7 and 11, both countries conducted airstrikes, drone attacks, and fire exchanges along the Line of Control, killing 21 Indian and 52 Pakistani civilians and soldiers and injuring around 60 more people on each side before a ceasefire agreement was reached on May 10 [→ India – Pakistan].

In India, the federal government intensified its counterinsurgency operations against Maoist groups in Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha, Maharashtra, and Telangana state [→ India (Naxalites)]. Clashes between Kukis and Meiteis persisted in Manipur [→ India (Manipur)]. Caste-based violence continued, with upper-caste members injuring or killing Dalits. Tribe-based violence also persisted, with Adivasis being killed after having been accused of practicing witchcraft [→ India (Dalits – Adivasis)]. The Indian federal government continued its eviction campaign against, and intensified its efforts to deport, Bengali-origin Muslims [→ India (inter-communal rivalry / Assam)]. Christian and Muslim minorities continued to face discrimination from various Hindu groups, including killings motivated by religious identity [→ India (Hindus / Christians); India (Hindus / Muslims)]. Various actors continued to pursue autonomy or secession throughout the country. Over the course of the year, the NSCN-Khaplang Yung Aung (NSCN-KYA) faction engaged in violent confrontations with security forces, leaving multiple cadres dead. Moreover, peace talks between Naga groups and the government stalled, as the NSCN-IM continued to insist on its own constitution and a separate flag, both of which the government rejected [→ India (Nagalim)]. The violent conflict over natural resources, environmental protection, and subnational dominance involving the sand, coal, and timber mafias, on the one hand, and government and civil society actors, on the other, continued. This conflict resulted in multiple deaths and injuries, including among journalists [→ India (Mafia Raj)].

Nepal has seen an intensification of conflicts on its territory over the entire monitoring period. While opposition at first manifested through non-violent strikes by professional unions – such as a month-long medical doctors' strike in April and regular teachers' demonstrations over labor rights – a state attempt to block social media in early September triggered a youth-led "Generation Z" protest movement. This resulted in severe clashes with security forces in Kathmandu, causing at

least 19 deaths and over 1,000 injuries, widespread arson, and a mass countrywide prison break. The systemic shock forced the resignation of both the Prime Minister and the Home Minister, leading to temporary military control in the capital and the formation of an interim government [→ Nepal (opposition)]. The violent crisis with right-wing Hindu groups, primarily led by the Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP), demanding the reinstatement of the monarchy and a Hindu state, continued. This conflict saw violent clashes in March resulting in two deaths, as well as a cycle of mass rallies and regular arrests of political leaders throughout the spring and summer [→ Nepal (right-wing Hindu groups)]. Concurrently, the violent crisis over autonomy and identity between indigenous groups and the government continued, mainly shaped by a movement and clashes over the Pathibhara cable car project [→ Nepal (Kiratis / Kosi, Mechi, Sagarmatha)]. Meanwhile, the violent crisis over autonomy between the Janamat Party, JSPN, and JTMM, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, de-escalated to a dispute. Further West, in Central Asia, in Tajikistan, the violent crisis over the orientation of the political system, ideology, and national power between the government and Islamist groups like Jamaat Ansarullah continued, marked by a prison riot in Vahdat, and numerous counter-terrorism arrests [→ Tajikistan (Islamist groups)]. Furthermore, a new interstate conflict with Afghanistan over territory and resources emerged, escalating in August and October when Tajik and Afghan Taliban forces clashed over gold mining interests and the unilateral redirection of the Panj River [→ Afghanistan – Tajikistan]. Meanwhile, the non-violent crisis over autonomy and subnational predominance between the Pamiri people and the government in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast continued, characterized by further detentions, the obstruction of Ismaili religious commemorations, and the deaths of six Pamiri political prisoners [→ Tajikistan (Gorno-Badakhshan)].

In Kazakhstan, the non-violent crisis over national power and the orientation of the political system between opposition groups and activists on the one hand, and the government on the other, continued. Throughout the year, authorities sustained pressure through targeted detentions, alongside restrictive measures against independent media [→ Kazakhstan (opposition)]

In Kyrgyzstan, the non-violent crisis over national power and the orientation of the political system between the opposition and the government continued. The year was marked by multiple alleged coup plots and mass unrest designs surrounding the November parliamentary elections, leading to preemptive detentions of political figures, alongside an intensifying crackdown on foreign-funded independent media [→ Kyrgyzstan (opposition)]. Concurrently, the conflict over territory and international power in the Fergana Valley between Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan de-escalated to a dispute, as no violent incidents occurred and the respective heads of state finalized decades-long border demarcations through a landmark declaration in March [→ Kyrgyzstan – Tajikistan – Uzbekistan].

In East Asia, conflicts still follow a similar trend of escalation and de-escalation as in previous years. There, throughout the year, the People's Republic of China (PRC) remained a central actor in regional conflict dynamics. Economic tensions increased as both the USA and PRC reinforced tariffs and other restrictive measures on trade and technologies. On February 1, the US administration introduced an initial 10 percent tariff on PRC imports linked to fentanyl, followed on April 2 by a 34 percent "reciprocal" duty, rising to an effective rate of 145 percent by the end of April [→ China – USA]. Throughout the year, military drills remained a point of contention between the PRC and the Republic of China (ROC). The People's Liberation Army's (PLA) aerial incursions into the ROC's air defense zone increased from an average of around 120 a month to 300 a month after the inauguration of President Lai Ching-te in 2024 [→ China (Taiwan^o)]. In the South China Sea (SCS), the PRC maintained its territorial assertions, with tensions continuing against the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, the ROC, and Malaysia. Regional actors, like Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines, India, the USA, and Australia held talks throughout the year in different formations regarding the situation in the SCS [→ China – Vietnam et al. (South China Sea)]. Towards India, the PRC engaged in diplomatic talks on territorial disputes. Most notably, the defense ministers of both nations met on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit in Qingdao, Shandong Province, on June 27 [→ China-India]

Domestically, repression continued in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) through arbitrary imprisonment and restrictions on religious practices. Transnational repression against Uyghurs intensified across multiple regions. On February 27, Thailand forcibly deported at least 40 Uyghur men to the PRC [→ China (Uyghurs / Xinjiang)]. Hong Kong authorities continued to apply the national security law against pro-democracy activists, arresting two relatives of exiled pro-democracy activist Anna Kwok, marking the first known instance in which the city's national security law was applied to target family members of an overseas-based activist [→ China (Hong Kong)].

Conflict in the region still remained centered on the dispute over international power, ideology, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK) nuclear program between Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and the USA, on the one hand, and the DPRK, supported by the People's Republic of China (PRC), on the other, which escalated to a non-violent crisis after DPRK and ROK both held military exercises [→ North Korea – South Korea]. For example, on March 10, DPRK test fired several ballistic missiles from North Hwanghae Province, following a joint military drill conducted by ROK and the USA. Meanwhile, following DPRK's military demonstration, Japan, ROK, and the USA continued to increase their security cooperation by holding joint aerial drills, such as on June 18 [→ Japan, South Korea, USA – North Korea].

Similar developments also occurred in the East China Sea, as the non-violent crisis over maritime territory surrounding the Senkaku Islands between Japan, the People's Republic of China, and the Republic of China (Taiwan^o) continued by multiple border violations conducted by Chinese aircrafts and vessels. For example, on June 7, four China Coast Guard vessels entered the territorial waters off the Senkaku Islands, followed by another incursion on July 11, September 10, and December 5 [→ China – Japan (East China Sea)].

In the Philippines, violent conflicts between the government and various separatist and opposition groups continued. After a failed ceasefire in 2024, AFP operations against CPP-NPA continued this year, with firefights and other engagements resulting in 128 people killed and further 6,818 people displaced [→ Philippines (CPP, NPA)]. Similar internal displacement also happened in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as October 28 firefights in the Basilan Province temporarily displaced 12,000 civilians [→ Philippines (MILF)].

Most violence once again occurred in Myanmar this year. There, the anti-Junta and ethnic conflicts continued for the fourth year. Following an earthquake in March, the multiple Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) and the Junta announced

a ceasefire enabling unhindered humanitarian aid, but fighting frequently continued throughout the country. Despite the purely anti-Junta alliance between the National Unity Government and aligned localized People's Defense Forces (PDFs) [→ Myanmar (opposition)], many EAOs fought for regional independence based on ethnic boundaries, sometimes cooperating with PDFs. In this course, the Kachin Independence Army expanded its military operations and captured several strategic positions [→ Myanmar (KIA, KIO / Kachin State)], while the Arakan Army advanced in Rakhine State, challenging the Junta's control [→ Myanmar (Arakan Army / Rakhine State)]. In the states of Karen and Kayah, the situation seemed to be a stalemate [→ Myanmar (KNU, KNLA, KNDO et al. / Karen State, Kayah State)]. Nonetheless, the Junta continued to dominate the airspace, largely using it to target civilian residential areas. For instance, in January, airstrikes killed at least 40 people and destroyed more than 500 homes in Kyauk Ni Maw village, Kyaukpadaung District [→ Myanmar (Arakan Army / Rakhine State)]. Violence in Rakhine caused significant displacement, particularly among Rohingya civilians [→ Myanmar (Rohingya)]. Many of them sought refuge in Bangladesh, especially in the Cox's Bazar Camp, which itself remained a place of rivalry between the main militant groups Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) and Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO), as well as various competing gangs [→ Bangladesh (Rohingya / Cox's Bazar)]. Apart from the civil war, extensive resource extraction across the States of Kachin, Shan, Mon, and Karen, as well as in the Bago and Mandalay regions resulted in severe economic and environmental damage. For the first time, the Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai Provinces in northern Thailand were also affected. Further, in Myanmar, tensions between ethnic armed organizations, including the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP), and the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), persisted in northern Shan State [→ Myanmar (inter-militant rivalry / Shan State)]. Fighting between the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and the Myanmar military de-escalated following a Chinese-brokered ceasefire and internal fragmentation [→ Myanmar (MNDAA / Shan State)]. The conflict between Thailand and Cambodia turned violent for the first time since 2011, resulting in the Thai Royal Army and Airforce killing a confirmed minimum of 123 Cambodian soldiers and injuring 426, further killing 33 civilians and injuring 159. In turn, the Royal Cambodian Army killed at least 33 Thai soldiers and injured 145, while killing 15 civilians and injuring 44. Throughout the year, a confirmed total of around 720,000 Cambodian and 540,000 Thai civilians became internally displaced. A ceasefire was signed on December 27 [→ Cambodia – Thailand (border)]. In Vietnam, the oppression of the Christian minority of the Montagnards continued [→ Vietnam (Montagnards)]. Montagnard's lobby groups have been labelled as "terrorist groups", and affiliates frequently were sentenced to imprisonment. In Thailand, the violent crisis over ideology and secession of several southern border provinces between various Islamist separatist groups, such as Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) and Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO), on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued [→ Thailand (Islamist separatists / Southern border provinces)]. Simultaneously, the dynamics between the government and opposition have de-escalated, downgrading the conflict from a violent crisis to a non-violent crisis [→ Thailand (opposition)]. Further South, in Indonesia, a violent crisis over system and ideology erupted between student organizations and labor unions, on the one hand, and the central government, on the other. Protesters went to the streets to reject an increase of parliamentary allowances by ten times compared to the national minimum wage. Grievances also included the expulsion of the military from power and better living conditions. Protests escalated when the police ran over and killed a food delivery worker trapped in a clash in Jakarta on August 28. In response, protesters attacked state legislative bodies, police stations and set ablaze some of them. In response, the government deployed the military to repress the protests and stop the destruction of infrastructure. Violence took place in August and September, affecting Bengkulu, Jakarta, Jawa Barat, Kalimantan Tengah, Maluku, and Sulawesi Selatan provinces. Overall, the protests left at least ten people killed and 282 injured between August 25 and September 9 [→ Indonesia (social protests)]. At the same time, the non-violent crisis between Muslim and Christian communities escalated to a violent one. Violence was marked especially among children and teenagers and against schools. In Riau province two Muslim children killed a Christian one on May 19. On July 27, a group of Muslims stormed a Catholic prayer house and injured two children in West Sumatra. On November 7, a teenager set a bomb at a state school mosque in Kepala Gading district of the capital Jakarta, injuring at least 96 people. A recovered toy submachine gun belonging to the suspected perpetrator displayed white supremacist slogans. On March 21, the West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB) burned down a Catholic school, killed one teacher and injured seven people in Papua Highlands province. TPNPB claimed that the teachers and health workers were "undercover military personnel" [→ Indonesia (Christian – Muslims)]. The violent crisis between TPNPB and the Indonesia state over the former's secessionist goals, continued. The confrontations involved the killing of civilians. TPNPB executed 17 illegal miners and injured another three in Yahukimo, Papua, between April 6 and 8. The group also alleged that the workers were undercover soldiers. On May 13, the Indonesian military reported the killing of 18 suspected separatists in Central Papua province. This event caused the displacement of at least 1,000 people. A raid by the military on October 15 left at least 14 killed and raised accusations of killing of civilians and the torture and rape of a woman in Papua Tengah province. The military operation displaced at least 145 people [→ Indonesia (Papua)]. The international dispute between Indonesia and Timor-Leste escalated to a violent crisis. On August 24, Timorese border patrol officers fired and injured an Indonesian villager during an altercation in a disputed cultivated frontier area in East Nusa Tenggara province. Despite the clash, both states negotiated a first round of maritime boundaries in Dili in the same month [→ Indonesia – Timor-Leste].

Overview: Conflicts in Asia and Oceania in 2025

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
Afghanistan – Tajikistan*	Afghanistan vs. Tajikistan	territory, system/ideology, resources	2025	NEW	3
Bangladesh (Chittagong Hill Tracts)*	PCJSS, UPDF, UPDF-Democratic vs. KNF, MNP vs. Bengali settlers vs. government	autonomy, subnational predominance	1971	•	3
Bangladesh (Islamist groups)*	AAI, JMB vs. government, Hindus	system/ideology, subnational predominance	1971	↗	3
Bangladesh (opposition)*	ADSM, BNP, Hel, ICS, Jel, LDA, students vs. AL, BGB, CL, government, RAB	system/ideology, national power, other	1991	↘	3
Bangladesh (RMG workers)*	RMG workers vs. factory owners, government	other	2006	•	3
Bangladesh (Rohingya / Cox's Bazar)*	Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army vs. Rohingya Solidarity Organization vs. Bangladeshi police vs. various gangs	subnational predominance	2018	↘	2
Cambodia (opposition)*	opposition parties vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1997	•	2
Cambodia – Thailand (border)*	Cambodia vs. Thailand	territory, resources, other	2008	↑	5
China (Christians)*	Christians (PRC) vs. government	system/ideology	1949	•	1
China (Falun Gong et al.)*	Falun Gong vs. government	system/ideology	1999	•	2
China (Hong Kong)*	pro-democracy Groups, pro-independence Groups vs. HKSAR government, PRC government	secession, autonomy, system/ideology	1997	•	2
China (Hui)*	Hui vs. government	system/ideology	1949	•	1
China (Inner Mongolia)*	Mongolian ethnic minorities vs. government	autonomy, system/ideology, resources	1981	•	2
China (Taiwan ^o)*	PRC vs. ROC	secession, system/ideology	1949	•	2
China (Tibet)*	CTA, ethnic Tibetans vs. government	autonomy, system/ideology, resources	1950	•	3
China (Uyghurs / Xinjiang)*	Uyghurs, WUC vs. government	autonomy, system/ideology	1949	↘	2
China – India*	PRC vs. India	territory, international power, resources	1954	•	2
China – Japan (East China Sea)*	Japan vs. PRC vs. ROC	territory, international power, resources	1971	•	2
China – South Korea*	PRC vs. ROK	territory, international power, resources, other	2003	•	1
China – USA*	PRC vs. USA	system/ideology, international power	1949	•	2
China – Vietnam et al. (South China Sea)*	PRC vs. Vietnam vs. Brunei vs. ROC vs. Malaysia vs. Indonesia vs. Philippines vs. USA	territory, international power, resources	1951	•	3
Fiji – Tonga (Minerva Reefs)*	Fiji vs. Tonga	territory	2005	END	1
India (Christians – Hindus)*	BD, BJP, Hindu Munnani, Hindus, RSS, VHP vs. Christians	subnational predominance	1999	•	3
India (Dalits / Adivasis)*	Adivasis (Scheduled Tribes), Dalits (Scheduled Castes) vs. upper caste members	system/ideology, subnational predominance	1948	•	3
India (farmers' protests)*	farmer unions vs. government	system/ideology	2020	↘	2
India (GJM et al. / West Bengal)*	GJM vs. government	autonomy	1907	END	1
India (Hindus - Muslims)*	BD, BJP, Hindus, RSS, VHP vs. Muslims	subnational predominance	1947	•	3
India (inter-communal rivalry / Assam)*	AASU, AJYCP, Assamese vs. AAMSU, ABYSO, Bangladeshi immigrants vs. Adivasis et al. vs. government	subnational predominance, other	1979	•	3
India (Islamist militant groups)*	IS, JeM, JMB, LeT, PFI, SIMI, TRF vs. government	system/ideology	2000	↑	3
India (Kashmir)*	Al Badr, APHC, HM, JeM, LeT vs. government	secession, autonomy, system/ideology	1947	•	3
India (Kukis – Nagas)*	KIM, KLA, KNA, KNO, Kukis vs. Nagas, NNGP, NSCN-IM	subnational predominance	1992	↑	3
India (Mafia Raj)*	Coal Mafia, Sand Mafia, Timber Mafia vs. civil society actors, government	subnational predominance, resources, other	1986	•	3
India (Manipur)*	JCILPS, KCP, KNF, Kukis, KYKL, PLA, PREPAK, PREPAK-Pro, UKNA, UNLF, ZRO vs. government vs. Meiteis	secession, autonomy, system/ideology, subnational predominance	1964	•	3
India (Meghalaya)*	ANSC, HNLC vs. government	autonomy	1992	↘	2

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
India (Nagalim)*	NSCN-IM, NSCN-K, NSCN-K-Khango, NSCN-K-NS, NSCN-KK, NSCN-KYA, NSCN-NK, NSCN-R, NSCN-U vs. government	secession, autonomy	1947	•	3
India (Naxalites)*	Naxalites vs. government	system/ideology	1967	↘	3
India (Scheduled Tribes / Scheduled Castes et al.)*	Gujjars, Jats, Marathas, Moran-Motok, Rajputs vs. government	system/ideology	1981	•	2
India (Sikhs)*	Khalistan supporters, KTF, SFJ vs. government	secession	1947	•	2
India (ULFA-I et al. / Assam)*	AANLA, APLA, BLA, DNLA, KLO, KLO-KN, NLFB, ULFA, ULFA-I vs. government	secession, autonomy	1979	↗	3
India – Pakistan *	India vs. Pakistan	territory, international power, resources	1947	↗	4
Indonesia (Aceh)*	Aceh regional government, KPA, PA vs. Indonesian government	autonomy, resources	1953	•	1
Indonesia (Ahmadi)*	Ahmadi vs. Muslims	subnational predominance	1980	•	1
Indonesia (Christians – Muslims)*	Christians vs. Muslims	subnational predominance	1998	↗	3
Indonesia (Islamist militant groups)*	JAD vs. government	system/ideology	1981	•	1
Indonesia (Papua)*	OPM, ULMWP et al. vs. government	secession, resources	1961	•	3
Indonesia (social protests)*	labor unions, protesters, student organizations vs. government	system/ideology	2025	NEW	3
Indonesia – Timor-Leste*	Indonesia vs. Timor-Leste	territory, other	2002	↑	3
Japan – Russia*	Japan vs. Russian Federation	territory, international power, resources	1945	•	2
Japan – South Korea*	ROK vs. Japan	territory, other	1951	•	1
Japan, South Korea, USA – North Korea*	Japan, ROK, USA vs. DPRK	system/ideology, international power, other	1993	↗	2
Kazakhstan (opposition)*	opposition vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2004	•	2
Kyrgyzstan (opposition)*	opposition vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2005	•	2
Kyrgyzstan – Uzbekistan – Tajikistan (border communities / Fergana Valley)*	Kyrgyz border communities, Kyrgyzstan vs. Uzbek border communities, Uzbekistan vs. Tajik border communities, Tajikistan	territory, international power	2000	↓	1
Laos (Buddhists – Christians)*	Buddhists vs. Christians	system/ideology	1975	•	3
Laos (Hmong)*	Hmong vs. government	system/ideology	1975	↗	3
Malaysia (Chinese, Indian, indigenous Malaysians – Malays)*	Chinese Malaysians, Indian Malaysians, Indigenous Malaysian minorities vs. Malay Malaysians	system/ideology, subnational predominance	1946	•	1
Maldives (opposition)*	opposition vs. government	national power	2003	•	3
Myanmar (AA / Rakhine State)*	AA vs. Myanmar Army	autonomy	2015	•	5
Myanmar (Chin Brotherhood - Chinland Council / Chin State)*	Chin Brotherhood vs. Chinland Council	subnational predominance	2024	↘	2
Myanmar (inter-militant rivalry / Shan State)*	UWSA vs. Ta'ang National Liberation Army vs. Restoration Council of Shan State vs. SSPP	subnational predominance	2015	•	3
Myanmar (KIA, KIO / Kachin State)*	KIA, KIO vs. Myanmar Army	autonomy, resources	1961	•	5
Myanmar (KNU, KNLA, KNDO et al. / Karen State, Kayah State)*	Karenni Army, KNDF, KNDO, KNLA, KNPLF, KNU, People's Revolution Alliance (Magway) vs. Myanmar Army	autonomy	1948	•	5
Myanmar (MNDAA / Shan State)*	MNDAA vs. Myanmar Army	autonomy, subnational predominance	1989	↘	3
Myanmar (opposition)*	National League of Democracy, National Unity Government, People's Defense Forces vs. Myanmar Army, Pa-Oh National Organisation, Pyu Saw Htee militia	system/ideology, national power	1962	•	5
Myanmar (Rohingya) *	ARSA, Rohingya, RSO vs. Myanmar Army	subnational predominance, other	2012	•	4

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
Myanmar (socioeconomic protests)*	local protesters vs. ethnic armed organizations, Myanmar Army, PRC state-owned enterprises	resources	2007	•	3
Myanmar (SSA / Shan State)*	RCSS (SSA-S), SSPP (SSA-N) vs. Myanmar Army	autonomy	1952	↘	2
Myanmar (TNLA / Shan State)*	TNLA vs. Myanmar Army	subnational predominance, resources	2013	•	5
Myanmar (UWSA, NDAA / Shan State)*	NDAA, UWSA vs. Myanmar Army	autonomy	1988	END	1
Nepal (Kiratis / Kosi, Mechi, Sagarmatha)*	JSCI, indigenous groups vs. government	autonomy, subnational predominance	1992	•	3
Nepal (Madhesis, Tharus / Terai)*	Madhesis, Tharus vs. government	autonomy	2004	↓	1
Nepal (opposition)*	opposition vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2008	•	3
Nepal (right-wing Hindu groups)*	pro-monarchists, RPP, SNN vs. government	system/ideology	2006	•	3
North Korea – South Korea*	DPRK vs. ROK	territory, system/ideology, international power	1948	•	2
North Korea, China (defectors)*	defectors (network) vs. DPRK, PRC	system/ideology, other	2000	↗	2
Pakistan (Balochistan)*	BLA, BLF, BLT, BNA (militant group), BNA (political party), BNP-M, BRG vs. government	secession, resources	1948	↗	4
Pakistan (Islamist militant groups)*	al-Qaeda et al., IS-K, LeJ, TTP vs. government, political parties	autonomy, system/ideology, national power	2001	↗	5
Pakistan (opposition)*	opposition parties vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1973	•	3
Pakistan (Pashtuns / PTM)*	Pashtuns, PTM vs. government	autonomy	2018	•	3
Pakistan (religious groups – Sunni militants)*	IS-K, JuA, JUL-F, TTP vs. Ahmadis, Christians, Hindus, Shiites, Sufis	subnational predominance	1985	•	3
Pakistan (Sindh)*	MQM vs. PLM-N, PPP vs. PTI vs. ANP vs. Pakistan Rangers, Sindh Rangers	subnational predominance, resources	1947	•	3
Pakistan (SRA / Sindh)*	SRA vs. government	secession, resources	2020	•	3
Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)*	Autonomous Bougainville Government vs. national government	secession, resources	1964	•	1
Papua New Guinea (inter-communal rivalry)*	Aiyala vs. Hulis vs. Engans vs. Nomali vs. Min vs. Punano vs. Yauna vs. various other tribes	subnational predominance, resources	1975	•	3
Papua New Guinea (opposition)*	opposition vs. government, various electoral supporters	system/ideology, national power	2011	•	2
Papua New Guinea (socioeconomic protests)*	customary landowners vs. government, resource companies	autonomy, resources	1995	•	1
Philippines (BIFF)*	BIFF vs. government	secession, subnational predominance	2008	•	3
Philippines (CPP, NPA)*	CPP, NPA vs. government	system/ideology	1968	•	3
Philippines (drugs)*	cartels, drug syndicates vs. human rights activists vs. government	resources	2016	•	3
Philippines (Islamist militant groups)*	ASG, DI vs. government	system/ideology	1968	↘	2
Philippines (MILF – MNLF)*	MILF vs. MNLF	subnational predominance	2009	↘	2
Philippines (MILF)*	MILF vs. government	autonomy, system/ideology, resources	1977	•	3
Philippines (MNLF)*	MNLF vs. government	secession, system/ideology, resources	1969	•	1
Sri Lanka (inter-religious tensions)*	Sinhalese Buddhist Nationalists vs. Hindus, Muslims vs. Christians	system/ideology	1948	•	2
Sri Lanka (Northern Province, Eastern Province)*	BBS, JHU, JVP, Sinhalese Nationalists vs. Tamils, TNA vs. government	autonomy, system/ideology	2009	•	2
Sri Lanka (opposition)*	opposition groups vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2022	↗	3
Tajikistan (Gorno-Badakhshan)*	drug traffickers, Pamiris vs. government	autonomy, subnational predominance	1992	•	2
Tajikistan (Islamist groups)*	Islamist groups vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1997	•	3

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
Thailand (Islamist separatists / southern border provinces)*	BRN, PULO vs. government	secession, system/ideology	1902	•	3
Thailand (opposition) *	pro-democracy activists vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2006	↘	2
Uzbekistan (Karakalpakstan)*	Karakalpaks vs. government	autonomy	2022	•	1
Vietnam (Montagnards) *	Montagnard ethnic group, Montagnard Stand for Justice, Montagnard Support Group Inc. vs. government	system/ideology	1958	•	2
Vietnam (socioeconomic protests)*	environmental activists, factory workers, peasants vs. government, manufacturing companies	resources, other	1986	•	2

¹ Conflicts marked with * are without description

² Mentioned are only those conflict parties relevant for the period under review

³ Change in intensity compared to the previous year: ↑ or ↗ escalation by one or more than one level of intensity; ↓ or ↘ deescalation by one or more than one level of intensity; • no change

⁴ Levels of intensity: 5 = war; 4 = limited war; 3 = violent crisis; 2 = non-violent crisis; 1 = dispute

⁵ HIIK considers statehood to be non-contested if the state is an official UN members state.

Disputed statehood is marked with a * if a territory is recognized by at least one other official UN member state ("limited recognition")

BANGLADESH (CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **1971**

Conflict parties: PCJSS, UPDF, UPDF-Democratic vs. KNF, MNP vs. Bengali settlers vs. government

Conflict items: autonomy, subnational predominance

The violent crisis over autonomy and subnational predominance of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) between the indigenous Jumma, Chakma, Kuki-Chin, and Marma, and the government, as well as Bengali settlers, continued. While the Jumma and Chakma people demand the implementation of the 1997 CHT Peace Accord, the Kuki-Chin National Front (KNF) strives for the autonomy of this region.

Most violence occurred in the districts of Khagrachhari and Bandarban. For example, on January 27, the Bangladesh Army detained two members of the KNF during a military operation in the Keplongpara area of Ruma upazila, Bandarban district. The detained KNF members were reported to have been involved in terrorist activities targeting local communities and in armed operations against law-enforcement agencies.

On July 3, an operation by the Bangladesh Army in the Polpancha-Mulipara area of Bandarban district resulted in the deaths of two KNF commanders and the seizure of weapons and ammunition after KNF fighters abandoned their camp following intense fighting.

Sexual violence emerged as a critical issue. On September 23, three Bengali men abducted and gang-raped a Marma girl in Singinala upazila of Khagrachhari district. The attack ignited protests calling for justice. In the subsequent demonstrations in Guimara upazila, Khagrachhari district on September 28, the army, police, and Bengali settlers allegedly opened fire on protesters, killing at least three people and injuring numerous others. rbr

BANGLADESH (ISLAMIST GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↗** | Start: **1971**

Conflict parties: AAI, JMB vs. government, Hindus

Conflict items: system/ideology, subnational predominance

The non-violent crisis over religious ideology and religious predominance between various Islamist militant organizations, on the one hand, and the interim government and religious minorities, such as Hindus, on the other, escalated to a violent crisis.

At the political level, changes affecting Islamist actors occurred early in the year. On January 15, the ban on Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami was lifted after 12 years, allowing the party to mobilize more than 50,000 members in preparation for elections. Subsequently, on June 1, the Supreme Court restored Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami's electoral registration.

Alongside these developments, incidents of communal violence were reported. On February 14, 15–20 mob members attacked Hindu homes in Nazirpur upazila in the Pirojpur district and in Sylhet, leaving one person dead and ten wounded. Public mobilization by Islamist groups also continued. Between March 6–15, in Dhaka city, Hizb ut-Tahrir Bangladesh

organized two rallies with more than 2,000–3,000 participants each, calling for Islamic caliphate governance despite existing restrictions. Police used tear gas in Dhaka city during the confrontations, resulting in 15 people wounded. Later, on May 3, at Shapla Chattar in Dhaka city, Hefazat-e-Islam held a rally with approximately 20,000 participants opposing women's rights reforms. On November 20, Hefazat-e-Islam called for the dissolution of the Women's Affairs Reform Commission. On November 30, the organization demanded the reinstatement of the constitutional phrase "absolute trust and faith in Allah."

On December 12, in Paltan area, Dhaka city, two masked motorcyclist riding gunmen shot Sharif Osman Hadi, spokesperson of Inqilab Mancha. The latter died on December 18 in Singapore. From December 18–20, riots involving more than 1,000 people chanting "Nara-e-Takbeer" occurred in Dhaka. On December 19–20, in Central Dhaka, mobs attacked the cultural centers Chhayanaout and Bangladesh Udichi Shilpigoshti. Throughout November–December, more than 1,000 attacks against Hindu minorities were reported. On 22 December, counter-terrorism operations led to the arrest of multiple Ansar al-Islam (AQIS) cells. Authorities reported that encrypted communications indicated ongoing recruitment activities. shm

BANGLADESH (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↘** | Start: **1991**

Conflict parties: ADSM, BNP, Hel, ICS, Jel, LDA, students vs. AL, BGB, CL, government, RAB

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power, other

The limited war over national power and the orientation of the political system between opposition parties, primarily the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Jamaat-e-Islami (Jel) on the one hand, and the Awami League (AL) on the other, de-escalated to a violent crisis, following the establishment of state authorities operating under an interim government. While the interim government maintained a formally non-partisan mandate, confrontations involving political parties, student groups, and security forces persisted over electoral timing, legitimacy, and political reform.

The year began with judicial and security actions. On January 15, in Dhaka city, the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) filed war crimes charges against former President Abdul Hamid for allegedly ordering the July 2024 massacre. On January 21, the interim government restricted anti-government activities nationwide, citing security concerns. On January 30, in multiple districts, the Students for Sovereignty Group attacked Indigenous students during a march, injuring over 20 people. On the same day, youth rallies in Dhaka city and Chattagram city drew thousands demanding accountability for uprising-related killings.

In February, "Operation Devil Hunt" took place nationwide, with over 1,300 arrests by February 10, rising above 1,500 by mid-month. On February 15, ICT hearings against Sheikh Hasina formally opened in Dhaka city.

Through March to May, political and ideological tensions escalated alongside growing opposition mobilization. On March 15, in Ramna area, Dhaka city, Hizb ut Tahrir Bangladesh, an Islamist group advocating Sharia-based governance, held rallies amid the wider climate of unrest. On May 8, in Dhaka Metropolitan, student leaders announced campaigns to ban

the Awami League. On May 9, massive rallies occurred at Shahbagh Intersection, Dhaka city, and on May 11, the Awami League ban was officially declared nationwide. In June and early July, youth mobilization for elections coincided with uprising commemorations. On July 16, in Gopalganj District, proHasina AL supporters attacked a National Citizen Party rally, injuring over 50 and killing four to five. The following day, July 17, over 1,500 security forces were deployed in Gopalganj Division. On July 22, victims gathered at Parliament Area, Dhaka city, to protest for recognition.

On October 17, confrontations around the National Charter at the Dhaka Parliament Complex left more than 15 injured, with authorities deploying tear gas. Between November 12-14, violence escalated with multiple bomb attacks across Dhaka city and other districts. On November 17, the ICT court in Dhaka city sentenced Sheikh Hasina and Asaduzzaman Khan Kamal to death. On the political front, on November 17, the ICT court in Dhaka city sentenced Sheikh Hasina and Asaduzzaman Khan Kamal to death.

In December, unrest continued. On December 18-19, in Karwan Bazar area, Dhaka city, mobs attacked media outlets The Daily Star and Prothom Alo, injuring over five journalists. On December 19, arson attacks struck political homes across Lakshmipur district, Chittagong city, Rajshahi city, and Bandarban district, killing one child and injuring at least three others. shm

BANGLADESH (RMG WORKERS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **2006**

Conflict parties: RMG workers vs. factory owners, government

Conflict items: other

The violent crisis over working conditions and payment of wages between ready-made garment workers (RMG) and the government continued.

Throughout the year, RMG workers staged multiple large protests across Bangladesh, mostly due to sudden factory closures and unpaid wages. Many protests included the blocking of roads and highways by RMG Workers.

Protests that started on March 8 in Savar city, Dhaka division over unpaid wages, ended with the violent intervention of the factory management and police raids of union offices. On March 12, the police arrested the proposed president and general secretary of the factories' union following the arrest of multiple union members the day before.

On April 4, at least ten people were injured during protests over layoffs in the Chattogram City, Chattogram District. RMG workers from two factories in Kashimpur locality, Surabari area, Gazipur district, staged protests on May 10 over outstanding wages from the last 14 months, which led to at least five people being injured. Around 5,500 RMG Workers blocked a highway in Gazipur city on July 27 demanding payment of wages, which resulted in severe traffic congestion. RMG workers in Nilphamari, Rangpur division clashed with police after protesting for several days on September 2nd. Subsequently one person was killed and at least 15 injured. One of the biggest protests involved 41,000 workers in seven factories in Chattogram City, Chattogram District over a new police investigation into a protest in January.

On October 9 unrests started, by October 15 and 16, the protest had escalated further. Workers vandalized factories, assaulted officials, and blockaded gates. At least 27 people

were injured.

On October 23 the interim government dropped outstanding criminal cases against over 48,000 workers, who were arrested during protests two years earlier. On November 17, the interim government changed the Bangladesh Labour Act to simplify trade union formation and enhance the maternity benefits, among other things. On the same day Bangladesh also ratified several ILO Conventions. juz

BANGLADESH (ROHINGYA / COX'S BAZAR)

Intensity: **2** | Change: **↘** | Start: **2018**

Conflict parties: Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army vs. Rohingya Solidarity Organization vs. Bangladeshi police vs. various gangs

Conflict items: subnational predominance

The violent crisis over subnational predominance in the Rohingya refugee camps of Cox's Bazar district, Chittagong Division, Bangladesh, between the main militant groups Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) and Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO), as well as various rivaling gangs, de-escalated to a non-violent crisis.

On March 18, the Bangladeshi Rapid Action Battalion arrested ARSA leader Ataullah Abu Ammar Jununi and nine others in separate operations. The arrest disrupted ARSA's operational command. However, the group quickly reorganized under new leadership, with Maulana Borhan reportedly taking over as acting commander.

On October 11, police recovered firearms and ammunition from Camp-18, while reports confirmed illegal arms entering from Myanmar through seven identified smuggling routes. According to security forces, at least five arms trafficking groups involving Rohingyas were active in the camps, linked to ARSA, RSO, the Halim Group, among others.

Amidst the ongoing militarization, humanitarian conditions worsened. On February 20, a freeze in US aid suspended operations in multiple health facilities. On March 14, UN Secretary-General António Guterres visited the camps and warned of an impending humanitarian disaster. From April 1 on, UN food vouchers for refugees were halved and on June 3, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) suspended thousands of learning centers run by nongovernmental organizations in the refugee camps, due to lack of funding. pbu

CAMBODIA (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **2** | Change: **•** | Start: **1997**

Conflict parties: opposition parties vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The non-violent crisis over the orientation of the political system between the Cambodia National Rescue Movement (CNRM), and the government continued.

Power rivalry persisted between the ruling Cambodia People's Party (CPP) and the Candlelight Party (CP), comprising many former members of the Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP). Furthermore, issues concerning environmental matters became apparent.


Throughout the year, 14 members of the CNRM were arrested.

In addition, there were several convictions of CNRM members sentenced to prison. On January 7, a Cambodian opposition politician (CNRP) was shot dead. On July 11, the National Assembly approved a draft amendment to the constitution that allows for the revocation of Cambodian citizenship. According to the new law, Cambodia's authorities are able to revoke Cambodian nationality for treason or collusion with foreign powers. The final law passed on September 2. The UN criticized the new amendment, stating it constitutes a violation of human rights. lhu

CAMBODIA – THAILAND (BORDER)

Intensity: **5** | Change: **↑** | Start: **2008**

Conflict parties: Cambodia vs. Thailand
Conflict items: territory, resources, other



The border dispute over cultural heritage, territory, and resources between the government of Thailand and nationalists on the one hand and the government of Cambodia and nationalists on the other escalated into a war.

This year, the conflict turned violent for the first time since 2011, resulting in the Thai Royal Army and Airforce killing a confirmed minimum of 123 Cambodian soldiers and injuring 426, further killing 33 civilians and injuring 159. In turn, the Royal Cambodian Army killed at least 33 Thai soldiers and injured 145, while killing 15 civilians and injuring 44. 22 further Thai soldiers were injured by exploding landmines, allegedly planted by Cambodian troops in nine different incidents. Throughout the year, a confirmed total of around 720,000 Cambodian and 540,000 Thai civilians became internally displaced people (IDPs).

On May 28, Thai soldiers killed one Cambodian soldier during an exchange of gunfire at the Chong Bok border pass in Ubon Ratchathani Province, Thailand. The incident worsened relations between the two governments throughout June and July. On July 16 and 23, eight Thai soldiers were injured after stepping on landmines while patrolling the border in Ubon Ratchathani.

Between July 24 to 27, several skirmishes broke out between the armies of both countries, affecting the border regions of the Thai provinces Si Sa Ket, Surin, Ubon Ratchathani, Buriram, Sa Kaeo, and Trat, as well as the Cambodian provinces of Preah Vihear and Oddar Meanchey. Cambodian forces killed ten Thai soldiers and 14 civilians and injured at least 29 soldiers and 46 civilians. Thai forces killed at least five soldiers and 14 civilians and injured 20 soldiers and 51 civilians. The skirmishes temporarily displaced approximately 140,000 Thai and 90,000 Cambodian civilians. On July 24, Cambodian Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS) destroyed a petrol station and a convenience store in Kantharalak District, Si Sa Ket, killing eight Thai civilians. On July 25, Thai airstrikes destroyed a Buddhist temple in Banteay Ampil District, Oddar Meanchey, killing one Buddhist monk. In addition, Thai air and drone strikes damaged large parts of the UNESCO World Heritage site of Prasat Preah Vihear.

On July 28, both governments agreed to a ceasefire mediated by the Malaysian government in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

Within two days each side accused the other of violating the ceasefire through renewed attacks. Despite the ceasefire, tensions remained high throughout August. Cambodian soldiers allegedly planted additional landmines in Si Sa Ket and Surin provinces, injuring five Thai soldiers during incidents on August 9, 12 and 27. On September 23, Cambodian and Thai troops exchanged gunfire along the border in Thailand's Kantharalak and Phnom Dong Rak districts, Si Sa Ket and Surin provinces. Tensions escalated further on September 27 when a clash occurred at the Chong Arn Ma border crossing between Ubon Ratchathani and Oddar Meanchey provinces. At the 47th ASEAN-Summit in Kuala Lumpur on October 26, both sides, under US and Malaysian supervision, signed another resolving agreement. Following a landmine incident in Si Sa Ket province on November 10 that injured four Thai soldiers, the Thai government suspended the ceasefire.

Additionally, tensions escalated between Thai and Cambodian civilians living along the border. In mid-August, Thai soldiers started constructing barbed wire fences along the border in Sa Kaeo Province. On August 25, around 200 Cambodian civilians, supported by soldiers, protested at the Ban Nong Chan border crossing, damaging the fence and injuring one Thai soldier. On the following day, around 300 Thai civilians carried out a counterprotest. The Thai government stated the fences were to stop Cambodian civilians to encroach upon Thai territory, while the Cambodian government claimed that the disputed area was part of Chouk Chey and Prey Chan villages, Banteay Meanchey Province. On September 17, clashes between Thai police and Cambodian protesters escalated, with Thai police using rubber bullets and tear gas, injuring between 23 and 30 protesters. In response, the protesters threw rocks, injuring four Thai police officers. After a clash on November 12 in which Thai soldiers killed one Cambodian soldier and injured three, around 1,000 Cambodian villagers fled the disputed area.

Another clash on December 7, initiated an armed confrontation between both countries' armies that continued until a ceasefire was signed on December 27. Border skirmishes and intense artillery shelling directly affected Thailand's Ubon Ratchathani, Surin, Buriram, Si Sa Ket, Sa Kaeo, and Trat Provinces and Cambodia's Banteay Meanchey, Preah Vihear, and Oddar Meanchey Provinces while continuous Thai airstrikes additionally affected Pusat, Siem Reap, and Battambang Provinces. Cambodian MLRS destroyed at least dozens of houses in Thailand while Thai artillery and fighter jets reportedly destroyed at least 150 buildings, several roads, and bridges in Cambodia. 400,000 Thai and 630,000 Cambodian civilians were displaced. Cambodian soldiers killed 23 soldiers and injured 131, while Thai soldiers and aircraft killed at least 110 soldiers and injured 424. Cambodian artillery only killed one Thai civilian and injured twelve, while Thai artillery and airstrikes killed 25 civilians and injured 88. After the ceasefire was signed, another landmine injured one Thai soldier on December 29 in Si Sa Ket Province. tri

CHINA (HONG KONG)

Intensity: **2** | Change: **•** | Start: **1997**

Conflict parties: pro-democracy Groups, pro-independence Groups vs. HK SAR government, PRC government
Conflict items: secession, autonomy, system/ideology

The non-violent crisis over autonomy, secession, and the orientation of the political system in Hong Kong between pro-democracy groups, pro-independence groups and individuals on the one hand, and the governments of the People's Republic of China and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region on the other, continued.

On April 30, the Hong Kong authorities arrested two relatives of exiled pro-democracy activist Anna Kwok, marking the first known instance in which the city's national security law was applied to target family members of an overseas-based activist. On July 26, the Hong Kong judiciary issued arrest warrants for 19 pro-democracy activists living abroad. The activists are accused of having launched a referendum or run as candidates in the unofficial Hong Kong Parliament group, which authorities allege aims to achieve self-determination and draft a Hong Kong constitution. This escalated the extraterritorial enforcement of the national security law and drew sharp criticism from international human rights organizations.

On August 1, Hong Kong's National Security Police arrested a local citizen accused of pressuring media outlets to publish material promoting a fundraising website for wanted activists. Shortly after, on August 4, the government announced the cancellation of passports belonging to twelve activists designated as "absconders" under the National Security Law. The decision followed earlier arrest warrants and bounties, underscoring the government's growing efforts to target activists both domestically and abroad.

On October 30, the National Security Department announced the arrests of five Hong Kong citizens accused of manufacturing weapons during the 2019 pro-democracy protests and unrest. Authorities stated that the arrests were part of ongoing investigations into violent activities linked to the earlier protest movement.

On December 14, Hong Kong's largest remaining pro-democracy party, the Democratic Party, announced its dissolution, attributing the decision to the current "political environment". This follows the disbanding of another major pro-democracy group, the League of Social Democrats, in June of this year which said it faced "immense political pressure". mrm

CHINA (TAIWAN^o)

Intensity: **2** | Change: **•** | Start: **1949**

Conflict parties: PRC vs. ROC

Conflict items: secession, system/ideology

The non-violent crisis over the orientation of the political system and secession between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC), also referred to as Taiwan, continued.

Throughout the year, military drills remained a point of contention. For instance, on June 19, the PRC dispatched 74 military aircraft and six naval vessels in the Taiwan Strait with 61 aircraft crossing the median line. The military drill came one day after a British patrol vessel crossed through the Taiwan Strait, which was deemed provocative by the Chinese government. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) aerial incursions into Taiwan's air defense zone increased from an average around 120 a month to 300 a month after the inauguration of President Lai Ching-te in 2024.

Taiwan's role in the international system and its relationship

with the US remained a core dispute in cross-strait relations and US-China relations [→ China - USA]. Most notably, on February 17, the US Department of State removed a phrase stating that the US does not support Taiwanese independence in a fact sheet published on its website. The PRC in the following called on the US to rectify the statement. Similarly, the Taiwanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Lin Chialung visited the General Assembly of the United Nations on September 22, without formally participating. This marked the first ever visit of a Taiwanese foreign minister to the General Assembly since 1971.

Furthermore, the involvement of PRC funding in the 2024 elections in Taiwan remained a point of contention. For example, on October 16, the Taiwan High Court sentenced presidential candidate Ma Chih-wei to 32 months in prison for accepting campaign funds by PRC agents.

Lastly, regulatory laws on citizenship remained a point of contention in Taiwan. For instance, on May 11, hundreds of civilians gathered in Taipei, ROC, to protest a regulation by the ROC that requires Chinese spouses to submit proof of having renounced their Chinese household registration. lja

CHINA (UYGHURS / XINJIANG)

Intensity: **2** | Change: **↘** | Start: **1949**

Conflict parties: Uyghurs, WUC vs. government

Conflict items: autonomy, system/ideology

The violent crisis over secession and system/ideology between the Uyghur minority and the government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) de-escalated to a non-violent crisis.

In Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), repression continued through arbitrary imprisonment and restrictions on religious practices. On February 28, Yalkun Isa, the brother of former World Uyghur Congress (WUC) president Dolkun Isa, was sentenced to 20 years in prison on charges of inciting terrorism. During Ramadan, authorities required Uyghurs to provide video evidence that they were not fasting until Eid al-Fitr on March 29.

Transnational repression against Uyghurs intensified across multiple regions. On February 27, Thailand forcibly deported at least 40 Uyghur men to China after detaining them for over a decade, placing them at risk of enforced disappearance, long-term imprisonment, torture, and other severe mistreatment. In March, senior World Uyghur Congress (WUC) members in exile were targeted by a malware-based cyberattack, demonstrating continued efforts to monitor and intimidate Uyghurs in the diaspora. Concurrently, the Chinese government maintained strict travel restrictions by imposing extensive administrative conditions and surveillance measures on Uyghurs seeking to travel abroad. Turkish authorities increasingly applied "restriction codes" to cancel residency permits. On December 23, US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) planned to deport Chinese national Guan Heng who was detained since August 2025 after documenting detention facilities in Xinjiang.

On September 23, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Urumqi for the 70th anniversary of Xinjiang's founding, staging choreographed celebrations that state media framed as evidence of alleged. Uyghur groups, including the WUC, condemned the visit as propaganda aimed at masking ongoing abuses amid international scrutiny. tln, pad

CHINA – INDIA

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **1954**

Conflict parties: PRC vs. India
 Conflict items: territory, international power, resources

The non-violent crisis over territory, resources, such as water, and international power between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and India continued.

After a rapprochement in 2024, China and India further engaged in diplomatic talks on the territorial disputes. Most notably, the defense ministers of both nations met on June 27 on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Qingdao, Shandong Province, PRC with Indian representatives calling for a permanent solution to the border dispute.

The Indian-Pakistan Conflict remained a subject of contention between the two nations [→ India – Pakistan]. Most notably, Pakistani military deployed Chinese manufactured JF-17, J-10C and PL-15 fighter jets in an altercation with Indian fighter jets on May 7, shooting down at least one Rafale fighter jet. Indian military officials in the following accused China of providing live intelligence during the battle.

Natural resources, such as water, remained a point of dissent. On July 19, Chinese authorities began with the construction of the Motuo Hydropower Station at the Yarlung Tsangpo River, Tibetan Autonomous Region. The river continues as the Brahmaputra into India. Indian Minister of External Affairs Subrahmanyam Jaishankar subsequently raised the issue of water security on August 19 at the 24th round of the Special Representatives' Dialogue on the boundary question.

Further rapprochement between the two states happened in the realm of trade and travel. For example, on August 18, China lifted restrictions on the export of rare earth magnets and minerals as well as fertilizers to India. Furthermore, the Kailash Mansarovar yatra pilgrimage of Indian religious groups to Mount Kailash and Lake Mansarovar was accepted by the Chinese authorities for the first time in five years on June 30. Lastly, India resumed its tourist visa for Chinese nationals after a five year pause on July 24. lja

CHINA – JAPAN (EAST CHINA SEA)

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **1971**

Conflict parties: Japan vs. PRC vs. ROC
 Conflict items: territory, international power, resources

The non-violent crisis over maritime territory, resources and international power surrounding the Senkaku Islands between Japan, the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China (Taiwan) continued.

This year the People's Republic of China invaded the maritime territory and airspace surrounding the Senkaku Islands multiple times. For example on May 4, Japan protested a flight of a Chinese coast guard helicopter around the Senkaku Island Airspace. On May 26, Japan's Joint Staff Office reported that the People's Liberation Army Navy's Liaoning carrier strike group was operating roughly 124 miles north of the disputed islands in the East China Sea. On June 7, four China

Coast Guard vessels entered the territorial waters off the Senkaku Islands, according to the Japan Coast Guard's 11th Regional Headquarters in Naha, prompting standard monitoring and warning procedures. On July 11, Japanese authorities tracked two heavily armed China Coast Guard vessels navigating within what Tokyo designates as its territorial waters near the islands, further heightening tensions. On September 10, Japan's defense ministry identified three Chinese naval vessels, including the aircraft carrier Fujian, moving southwest approx. 200 kilometers northwest of one of the Senkaku Islands, indicating increased naval activity in the region. After Japanese PM Sanae Takaichi suggested that a naval blockade near Taiwan could qualify as a "survival-threatening situation," Chinese operational tempo in the East China Sea intensified. On December 1st, Beijing restated its sovereignty claims over the Diaoyu Dao (Senkaku Islands) amid persistent frictions with Tokyo regarding Taiwan. Finally, on 5 December 5, China deployed a substantial number of vessels across the East China Sea and in proximity to the Senkaku Islands, underscoring a further escalation in its presence. prs

CHINA – SOUTH KOREA

Intensity: **1** | Change: • | Start: **2003**

Conflict parties: PRC vs. ROK
 Conflict items: territory, international power, resources, other

The dispute over international power, resources, territory, and historical perceptions between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of Korea (ROK) continued. Territorial issues remained a point of contention throughout the year, particularly in the Yellow Sea.

The first half of the year is marked by a rise in Anti-Chinese sentiment following the President Yoon Suk-yeol's impeachment and arrest. For example, On January 7, two lawmakers from People Power Party (PPP) blamed Chinese residents in South Korea for supporting the impeachment. Another example is On January 20, when United States Forces Korea denied a rumor of the arrest of 99 Chinese spies by the US and South Korean military and alleged election rigging by China.

The second half of the year is marked by standoffs by ROK and PRC vessels and aircraft in and near the Yellow Sea. For example, On September 10, ROK reported that 7 Russian and 2 Chinese Aircraft entered its Air Defence Identification Zone (KADIZ), without breaching ROK's territorial airspace. On September 24, a South Korean research vessel and its coast guard escort entered the South Korea-China Provisional Measures Zone (PMZ) and approached one of China's aquaculture platforms, prompting a standoff with the Chinese coast guard. Diplomatic efforts between ROK and PRC also took place. On November 1, President Xi Jin Ping visited ROK in the first visit by a PRC president to ROK in 11 years. isw

CHINA – USA

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **1949**

Conflict parties: PRC vs. USA
 Conflict items: system/ideology, international power

The non-violent crisis over international power and ideology

between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the United States of America (USA) continued.

Economic tensions increased as both countries reinforced tariffs and other restrictive measures on trade and technologies. On February 1, the US administration introduced an initial 10 percent tariff on PRC imports linked to fentanyl, followed on April 2 by a 34 percent "reciprocal" duty, rising to an effective rate of 145 percent by the end of April. The US government also targeted China's shipbuilding and e-commerce industries and tightened export controls on AI chips and software, while adding several Chinese companies to the US Bureau of Industry and Security's (BIS) Entity List on January 15, March 25 and September 29 ("Affiliates Rule", suspended as of November 10).

In response, PRC ministries imposed retaliatory tariffs on US goods across several sectors, expanded export controls on critical materials, initiated antitrust investigations into US companies operating in the PRC and designated several as Unreliable Entities. Trade negotiations held in May and June led to a temporary easing of bilateral restrictions. In September, the BIS' introduction of the "Affiliates Rule", which covers entities that are at least 50 percent owned by Entity List or the Military End-Users, led to renewed escalation. China's Ministry of Commerce imposed wide-ranging export restrictions on rare earth items on October 9. Talks between U.S. President Trump and PRC President Xi in Busan and Kuala Lumpur led to a comprehensive trade truce announced on October 30. Throughout November, most bilateral trade restrictions were suspended for a one-year period.

The passage of the U.S. National Defense Authorization Act on December 18, which contained several provisions targeting Chinese entities, along with the announcement of a USD 11.1 billion arms sale to Taiwan, led to renewed tension. On December 26, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs imposed sanctions on 20 U.S. defense firms and ten senior executives in retaliation. fka

CHINA – VIETNAM ET AL. (SOUTH CHINA SEA)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1951**

Conflict parties: PRC vs. Vietnam vs. Brunei vs. ROC vs. Malaysia vs. Indonesia vs. Philippines vs. USA

Conflict items: territory, international power, resources

The violent crisis in the South China Sea (SCS) over territory, international power, and resources between the People's Republic of China (PRC), Vietnam, the Republic of China (ROC), Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, and the United States of America (USA), supported by Australia, remained at a level 3 intensity.

The PRC maintained its territorial assertions, with tensions continuing against the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, the ROC and Malaysia. Regional actors, like Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines, India, the US and Australia held talks throughout the year in different formations regarding the situation in the SCS. For instance, Japan and the Philippines started talks on two proposed defense pacts to further boost their security alliance, following which an Agreement ("Japan-Philippines Reciprocal Access Agreement") entered into force on September 11. At the same time, bilateral talks were held by the PRC with both Indonesia and the USA, aimed to increase maritime security in the SCS. Statements were made, for example by

Vietnam, regarding the activities by the PRC and the Philippines in the South China Sea.

Several joint military exercises took place throughout the year. For instance, the US and the Philippines conducted their annual joint Balikatan military exercise in May 2025. They also held joint patrols over the SCS in early February, as well as joint navy drills with Japan in March. The PRC conducted air and sea drills in March 2025 near Taiwan, as well as live fire exercises in February in the Gulf of Tonkin, responding to territorial claims by both the ROC and Vietnam. In August, India and the Philippines held their first joint drills in the South China Sea.

The tension between the PRC and the Philippines continued, with each country blaming the other for a vessel incident in the SCS on September 16 in which one Philippine crew member was injured as well as for an incident on October 12 between a Philippines government vessel and a Chinese ship. In another incident in December, the Philippines claim that three fishermen were injured, when Chinese Coast Guard Ships used water cannons against them. Further, the PRC approved the establishment of a nature reserve at Scarborough Shoal in September, which was condemned by both the Philippines and the US. lwi

INDIA (CHRISTIANS – HINDUS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1999**

Conflict parties: BD, BJP, Hindu Munnani, Hindus, RSS, VHP vs. Christians

Conflict items: subnational predominance

The violent crisis over religious predominance between various Hindu groups, such as Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) and Bajrang Dal (BD), on the one hand, and the Christian minority, on the other, continued.

Hindu groups continued to persecute Christians due to their religious beliefs. For instance, on January 26, members of BD stormed a Sunday church prayer and attacked the participants in Mowa town, Chhattisgarh state. The attackers vandalized the church and injured five. On February 23, the police stopped Sunday prayers in Sitapur district and Raebareli district, in Uttar Pradesh state and arrested nine Christians after a Hindu mob had interrupted the prayer by barging in. On March 3, members of BD and VHP demolished a church in Raipur city, Chhattisgarh. On June 26, a Hindu mob attacked Christians at a wedding in Raipur, Chhattisgarh, injuring three and destroying multiple cars and motorbikes. Later that month, on June 21, members of BD attacked Christians and tried to pressure them to convert to Hinduism, in Kotamateru village, Odisha state, injuring 27. On August 6, BD members attacked two priests and two nuns after a memorial prayer in Jaleswar village, Odisha, and injured two people. On August 10, members of BD attacked participants of a Sunday prayer in Katihar district, Bihar state, over the accusation of forced religious conversion, leading to five injured Christians. On September 14, members of BD attacked Christians in Raipur, Chhattisgarh, over the accusation of forced religious conversion. dju

INDIA (DALITS / ADIVASIS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1948**

Conflict parties: Adivasis (Scheduled Tribes), Dalits (Scheduled Castes) vs. upper caste members

Conflict items: system/ideology, subnational pre-dominance

The violent crisis over the Hindu caste system and subnational predominance between Dalits and Adivasis, recognized by the government as Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, on the one hand, and members of Upper Castes, on the other, continued.

Throughout the year, members of Upper Castes regularly denied Dalits access to locations as well as the practice of customs they deemed reserved for Upper Caste members. For example, on February 20, a group of around 40 Upper Caste members attacked the guests of a Dalit wedding procession, injuring six people in Bulandshahr district, Uttar Pradesh state. In a similar incident on April 16, in Agra district, Uttar Pradesh, villagers belonging to Upper Castes attacked a Dalit groom and wedding guests for playing music, leading to four injured people. Threats to Dalit weddings made police protection necessary on some occasions. For instance, on January 21, a Dalit groom's wedding procession had to be protected by 200 policemen in Ajmer district, Rajasthan state. Dalits continued to face discrimination and hostile behavior in their everyday life. On February 12, a group of three men attacked a Dalit student in Sivaganga district, Tamil Nadu state for riding a high-end motorcycle, stating that Dalits should not be allowed to drive these vehicles. On April 21, a Dalit was killed and five others were injured following a group of members from Upper Castes running them over with their car in Meerut district, Uttar Pradesh.

Dalits were regularly attacked for inadvertently offending members of Upper Castes. For example, on March 10, a group of three Upper Caste members severed the fingers of a Dalit student in Tirunelveli district, Tamil Nadu, allegedly due to the perceived humiliation after they were defeated in a sports competition. On May 16, a Dalit was attacked by eleven members of Upper Castes after he made a provocative statement, in Amreli district, Gujarat state. On May 22, he eventually died of his injuries.

In an instance of honor killing, a man attacked and killed a Dalit student for having an affair with his sister, on July 27, in Tirunelveli, Tamil Nadu. On October 30, a group of Upper Caste members attacked and killed a man following his son's marriage with a woman belonging to an Upper Caste in Ahmedabad district, Gujarat.

Throughout the year, Adivasis faced violence and discrimination. For example, on May 20, 60 Adivasi families started a protest demanding the distribution of public land in Malappuram district, Kerala state. On October 8, villagers killed three members of an Adivasi family after accusations of witchcraft in Lohardaga district, Jharkhand state. nkl

INDIA (FARMERS' PROTESTS)

Intensity: **2** | Change: ↘ | Start: **2020**

Conflict parties: farmer unions vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology

The violent crisis over guarantees on crop pricing and negotiations of international trade agreements between farmer unions, such as so-called Sanmyukta Kisan Morcha (non-political) (SKM (non-political)) and Kisan Mazdoor Morcha (KMM) on the one hand, and the Bharatiya Janata Party-led government, on the other, de-escalated to a non-violent crisis.

In February, farmer unions held several rounds of talks with the government about the Minimum Support Price (MSP) legal guarantee. While the talks were amicable, they ended without any agreement.

On March 19, police ended the year-long border blockage between Shambhu and Khanauri border points, in Punjab and Haryana state, by bulldozing temporary structures and detaining dozens of leaders of the farmer unions. In response, the SKM called for nationwide protests on March 28.

In July, the farmer unions' focus expanded to include opposition to international trade agreements. For example, on July 20, the SKM held a general body meeting in New Delhi capital, warning the government against a proposed Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the United States, fearing it would open up India's agriculture and dairy markets to foreign corporations and harm farmers' interests. On August 13, the SKM and ten central trade unions organized nationwide tractor rallies, where they burned effigies against the FTA.

On October 25, in Hubli city, Karnataka state, farmers dumped onions at a market gate to demand an MSP. yku

INDIA (HINDUS - MUSLIMS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1947**

Conflict parties: BD, BJP, Hindus, RSS, VHP vs. Muslims

Conflict items: subnational predominance

The violent crisis over religious predominance between various Hindu groups, such as Bajrang Dal (BD), on the one hand, and the Muslim minority, on the other, continued.

Throughout the year, Muslims were attacked on multiple occasions due to their religious beliefs. For instance, on January 20, members of BD forced a Muslim to chant "Glory to Lord Rama", which is a religious expression of Hinduism, after he tried to erase graffiti with the same slogan, in the Sadarghat area of Silchar district, Assam state. A similar incident took place on March 3, when Hindu extremists forced a group of Muslims to shout the same expression and threatened them with knives, in Ahmedabad city, Gujarat state, leaving three injured. On March 18, members of BD attacked Muslims, accusing them of cow smuggling in Ayodhya city, Uttar Pradesh state, injuring two. On April 23, Kshatriya Gau Raksha Dal members shot dead one Muslim and injured another in Agra city, Uttar Pradesh, claiming they did it as an act of revenge for the terrorist attack in Pahalgam city, Jammu and Kashmir state [→ India (Kashmir)]. On May 24, members of BD and Vishva Hindu Parishad injured four Muslims, after accusing them of smuggling cow meat in Aligarh city, Uttar Pradesh. On

June 7, members of BD and Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh attacked a Muslim and his brother over alleged misbehavior towards a girl in Sirnapally village, Telangana state, leading to three injured people. Later that month on June 10, a Hindu mob attacked a Muslim youth and forced him to chant "Glory to Lord Rama", injuring two people in Hyderabad city, Telangana. On August 1, members of BD attacked Muslims accusing them of cow smuggling in Durgapur city, West Bengal state, leading to two injured people. In a similar incident on September 16, Hindus assaulted a Muslim, accusing him of cattle smuggling in Bhilwara city, Rajasthan state. dju

INDIA (INTER-COMMUNAL RIVALRY / ASSAM)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **1979**

Conflict parties: AASU, AJYCP, Assamese vs. AAMSU, ABYSO, Bangladeshi immigrants vs. Adivasis et al. vs. government
Conflict items: subnational predominance, other

The violent crisis over subnational predominance and the issue of Bangladeshi immigration and Bengali-speaking Muslims in Assam state among various ethnic groups, notably those identifying as Indigenous versus perceived outsiders, and the government, continued.

Eviction drives to clear government land from illegal encroachment intensified across Assam in the second half of the year, targeting settlements largely inhabited by Bengali-origin Muslims. For instance, on June 30, Assam authorities demolished nearly 100 houses during an eviction operation in Nalbari district. In a similar incident on July 3, authorities cleared around 31,4 hectares of land in Lakhimpur district, affecting over 200 families. On July 8, an eviction drive to clear over 401,3 hectares of land in Dhurbi district and affecting over 1,200 families turned violent when residents clashed with police forces. No injuries were reported. On July 17, police and villagers clashed during an eviction drive in Goalpara district, killing one and injuring five. On August 3, an eviction drive in Goalghat district evicted over 350 families and cleared over 133,8 hectares of forest land. On August 21, an eviction drive in the Hojai district turned violent between police forces and residents, injuring at least one. Between December 22 and 24, violent unrest erupted once again between indigenous protesters and security forces in West Karbi Anglong district over the eviction of alleged encroachers from government-reserved lands for livestock grazing. At least two people were killed, and 45 were injured, including 38 security personnel. On December 1, the Assam government launched an eviction drive in Lutimari Reserve Forest, Nagaon district, clearing about 795 hectares of land and displacing over 1,500 Muslim families.

Throughout the year, the government intensified efforts to identify and deport suspected irregular immigrants, mostly Bangladeshi Muslims. On May 19, the Union Ministry of Home Affairs gave states and Union Territories a 30-day deadline to verify the identities of suspected Bangladeshi and Myanmar immigrants. On May 25 and 26, the Assam police arrested over 50 individuals suspected to be Bangladeshi nationals in Goalghat district. On May 28, the police arrested 30 suspected Bangladeshi nationals in Cachar district. On August 8, police deported ten suspected Bangladeshi nationals in Karimganj district. On August 25, Assam police once again deported 36 suspected Bangladeshi nationals in the Karimganj and South Salmara districts.

Discriminatory actions against Muslims continued throughout the year. On April 3, the government of India passed the Waqf (Amendment) Act, which the Chief Minister of Assam praised for restoring "civilizational roots". This led to multiple protests. For instance, on April 4, the All Assam Minorities Students' Union and allied groups staged protests in Bijni, Bongaigaon, and Sonitpur districts, calling the bill an attack on Muslim rights and Waqf ownership. On May 30, the All India United Democratic Front staged a protest in Dhubri district, opposing what it called harassment of Indian Muslims under the guise of identifying illegal foreigners. twm

INDIA (ISLAMIST MILITANT GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↑** | Start: **2000**

Conflict parties: IS, JeM, JMB, LeT, PFI, SIMI, TRF vs. government
Conflict items: system/ideology

The dispute over system and ideology of India escalated to a violent crisis between the Islamic State (IS), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), The Resistance Front (TRF), Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) escalated to a violent crisis.

Throughout the year, security forces continued to arrest persons suspected of ties to Islamist militant groups. For instance, following a militant attack in Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir on April 22 [→ India (Kashmir)], on April 23, police in Bokaro city, Jharkhand state, arrested one person allegedly for praising LeT for carrying out the attack. On November 9, the Gujarat AntiTerrorism Squad (ATS) arrested three suspected militants with alleged links to the Islamic State (IS) in Gandhinagar, Gujarat, who were reportedly planning attacks in India.

On November 10, a suicide bomber exploded a car in a densely populated part of Old Delhi, near the Red Fort (Lal Quila) Metro Station, killing at least thirteen people, including the driver of the car, and injuring at least 20. Following the incident, security forces announced they were investigating the blast under anti-terrorism law. On November 17, security forces identified the alleged suicide bomber as a doctor from Indian-administered Kashmir. sag

INDIA (KASHMIR)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **1947**

Conflict parties: Al Badr, APHC, HM, JeM, LeT vs. government
Conflict items: secession, autonomy, system/ideology

The violent crisis over autonomy or secession and ideology of the Indian-administered union territory of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) between The Resistance Front (TRF), Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC), People's Democratic Party (PDP), as well as Al-Badr, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued.

Throughout the year, clashes between security forces and militants left at least 68 people dead, including at least 27 militants, at least 26 civilians and at least 16 security per-

sonnel. Furthermore, at least 14 civilians and 17 security personnel were injured.

Security forces clashed with militants on multiple occasions. For instance, on February 11, an IED attack killed two persons in Akhnoor sector. On March 27, unidentified militants killed at least four security personnel and injured five others during a clash in Kathua district. In the same incident, security forces killed two militants. During clashes from August 1-9 in Akhal forest, Kulgam district, security forces killed two militants, while in turn militants killed two security personnel and injured nine others. Similarly, on September 8, clashes broke out between security forces and suspected militants during an anti-terror operation in Gudar forest, Kulgam district, leaving two soldiers and two militants dead and three soldiers injured.

Further, from November 7-9, security forces conducted raids across the region as part of an operation to dismantle militants' support network and detained at least 100 people for questioning.

Militant groups continued to attack civilians in Indian-administered J&K. Most notably, on April 22, gunmen shot and killed at least 25 tourists and one local and injured at least a dozen others at a resort in Baisaran meadow, close to Pahalgam town. The militant group TRF first claimed responsibility for the attack on social media, voicing discontent at "outsiders" who had settled in the region and causing a "demographic change." However, the group later denied involvement in the attack. India accused Pakistan of involvement in the attack, sparking diplomatic tensions and a military crisis [→ India – Pakistan]. On December 12, India's anti-terrorism agency charged LeT and TRF militant groups and six individuals with planning, facilitating and executing the attack. sag

INDIA (MAFIA RAJ)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1986**

Conflict parties:	Coal Mafia, Sand Mafia, Timber Mafia vs. civil society actors, government
Conflict items:	subnational predominance, resources, other

The violent crisis over natural resources, the protection of the environment, and subnational predominance in various states between the sand, coal and timber mafia, on the one hand, and the government and civil society actors, on the other, continued.

Throughout the year, the sand mafia had several violent encounters with security forces. For instance, on January 22, a police patrol team in the Dholpur district, Rajasthan state, chased a tractor loaded with illegally mined sand. The police vehicle was fired at by an escorting accomplice, injuring a policeman. In a similar incident, on March 7, a revenue team attempted to intervene against illegal sand-mining operations in Jalna district, Maharashtra state. The mafia assaulted the team, injuring one member and escaped from the site. Moreover, on May 12, a constable investigating illegal sand mining activities in Balrampur district, Chhattisgarh state, was run over and killed by a tractor carrying illegally excavated sand.

Incidents in which journalists and other civil society actors were targeted by the sand mafia continued. For instance, on January 21, the sand mafia used a truck to run over and kill a civilian who had raised complaints about illegal sand

and stone quarrying in Pudukkottai district, Tamil Nadu state. On June 10, alleged members of the sand mafia assaulted a group of journalists with metal rods who were trying to document illegal sand mining in Gariaband district, Chhattisgarh state, leading to one injured.

The coal mafia had some violent altercations with civil society actors throughout the year. For instance, on March 8, the coal mafia shot and killed a civilian working in the coal sector in Hazaribagh district, Jharkhand state. Police later detained six suspects linked to the coal mafia. mbb

INDIA (MANIPUR)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1964**

Conflict parties:	JCILPS, KCP, KNF, Kukis, KYKL, PLA, PREPAK, PREPAK-Pro, UKNA, UNLF, ZRO vs. government vs. Meiteis
Conflict items:	secession, autonomy, system/ideology, subnational pre-dominance

The violent crisis over either subnational predominance, autonomy, or secession of the Manipur state between militant groups, activist groups, Meiteis, Kukis, and the government continued.

On February 13, the Union Government imposed the President's Rule, thereby suspending the current state government and replacing it with the Union government. On February 20, the Governor of Manipur urged militant groups to voluntarily surrender their weapons within a seven-day window, which was extended to March 6. On April 5, the Ministry of Home Affairs held a meeting with representatives from Meitei and Kuki organizations in the capital, New Delhi, to resolve the ethnic conflict, but no solution was reached. On September 4, a renewed Suspension-of-Operations agreement between the government and Kuki-Zo insurgent groups was signed. On September 13, PM Modi visited Manipur for the first time since the start of ethnic clashes two years ago.

Violent clashes between security forces and ethnic groups continued. Between March 8 and March 9, Kuki protestors and security forces clashed in Kangpokpi district, killing one and injuring at least 40. On June 19, two clashes in Bishnupur and Churachandpur districts between security forces and Kuki and Meitei insurgents killed a Kuki and injured a Meitei civilian. On September 14, hundreds of youth protesters clashed with security forces outside the police station in Churachandpur district, demanding the release of two youths arrested on September 12.

Clashes between members of both the Kuki and Meitei communities persisted. On June 15, a clash erupted between Kuki and Meitei villagers in Sadu Lampak village, Imphal East-Kangpokpi area, when a Meitei farmer attempted to plough disputed land. At least three were injured before security forces intervened. On July 23, a clash between the United Kuki National Army (UKNA) and the Chin Kuki Mizo Army killed five in the Noney district. On October 29, suspected UKNA militants assaulted a village chief in Churachandpur district, who later died from his injuries.

Throughout the year, government agencies and security forces conducted militant arrests and recovered substantial amounts of illegal arms. For example, on July 9, police arrested nine militants belonging to Arambai Tenggol and Kangleipak Communist Party in Bishnupur district. On July 15, the security forces recovered 86 weapons and 974 rounds

of ammunition in the districts of Imphal East, Imphal West, Thoubal, Kakching, and Bishnupur. On July 18, police arrested two militants from People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak and National Revolutionary Front of Manipur in Bishnupur and Imphal East districts. twm

INDIA (MEGHALAYA)

Intensity: **2** | Change:  | Start: **1992**

Conflict parties: ANSC, HNLC vs. government
Conflict items: autonomy

The violent crisis over autonomy between militant Garo and Khasi groups, on the one hand, and the Indian government, on the other, de-escalated to a non-violent crisis. The Hyniewtrep National Liberation Council (HNLC) was the most active group.

Throughout the year, there were no violent confrontations. However, cadres of HNLC who reside in Bangladesh, tried to recruit new members. For instance, on June 26, two cadres of HNLC surrendered before the police in Eastern West Khasi Hills district. They reported to the police that they had gone to Bangladesh to join HNLC but were dissatisfied with the outfit and escaped back to Meghalaya. In addition, there were some cases of extortion. For instance, on May 3, police forces arrested two cadres of HNLC in connection with extortion attempts of local businessmen and government officials in East Jaintia Hills district.

On May 22, the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act Tribunal upheld the Union Ministry of Home Affairs' decision to extend the ban on the HNLC of Meghalaya for another five years, hereby rejecting the HNLC's petition from April 9. The petition challenged the decision of the government to extend the ban imposed on the outfit for another five years, which was issued on 11/14/24.

On October 12, police discovered and defused an IED at the Umsning market in Ri Bhoi district. On October 13, HNLC claimed responsibility and described the act as a symbolic protest against alleged corruption among local politicians and businessmen. On October 18, police forces arrested six workers linked to HNLC, in connection with the seizure of the IED. On December 18, police forces arrested two workers linked to HNLC, in connection with an IED blast at a Dhar Company site on December 15, in East Jaintia Hills district. jwn

INDIA (NAGALIM)

Intensity: **3** | Change:  | Start: **1947**

Conflict parties: NSCN-IM, NSCN-K, NSCN-K-Khango, NSCN-K-NS, NSCN-KK, NSCN-KYA, NSCN-NK, NSCN-R, NSCN-U vs. government
Conflict items: secession, autonomy

The violent crisis over either secession or autonomy between factions of the militant National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued. The Naga ethnic minority predominantly lives in the states of Nagaland, Manipur, Assam, and Arunachal Pradesh.

Throughout the year, the NSCN-Khaplang Yung Aung (NSCN-K YA) faction had violent confrontations with security forces. For instance, on April 27, security forces shot dead three cadres of the outfit in an operation to rescue a construction worker in Longding district, Arunachal Pradesh. According to the police, the NSCN-K YA had abducted two workers on April 25. On June 5, another violent encounter between the outfit and security forces emerged in Longding. The security forces killed two cadres, other cadres escaped across the international border into Myanmar. On October 15, cadres of NSCN-K YA attacked a camp of Assam Rifles in Changlang district, Arunachal Pradesh. During the incident, the cadres of the outfit injured four Assam Rifles. On October 21, security forces carried out a drone strike in the East Konyak Region, Arunachal Pradesh. The attacks targeted camps of NSCN-K YA and allegedly killed five and injured two cadres. According to the outfit, the drone strike killed two civilians and injured four.

On April 29, a confrontation between militants and security forces took place in Dima Hasao district, Assam. According to security forces, 300 policemen and Assam Rifles conducted a search operation following intelligence reports about militants involved in extortion activities. During the operation, security forces shot dead three cadres of the NSCN.

Throughout the first half of the year, tensions arose within the Unification faction of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-U) and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM). On March 22, the former leader of NSCN-U, who was impeached on 4/21/24, returned to the camp of the outfit in Khehoyi village, Nagaland and regained control. On April 18, the son of one of the two founders of NSCN-IM, left the outfit to go to Myanmar and join two dissident Naga leaders. On April 18, the Nagaland Post published his letter, in which he accused the NSCN-IM leadership of corruption and criticized the faltering peace process with the government. The peace talks between Naga groups and the government have stalled, as the NSCN-IM insists on their own constitution and a separate flag, which the government has so far rejected.

On September 22, the Ministry of Home Affairs announced the extension of the ban imposed on NSCN-K for five more years, beginning September 28. jwn

INDIA (NAXALITES)

Intensity: **3** | Change:  | Start: **1967**

Conflict parties: Naxalites vs. government
Conflict items: system/ideology

The limited war over the orientation of the political system between the left-wing extremist Naxalites, primarily organized in the Communist Party of India–Maoist (CPI-M), as well as in splinter groups such as the Jharkhand Jan-Mukti Parishad and the People's Liberation Front of India (PLFI), on the one hand, and the Government of India, on the other, de-escalated to a violent crisis. The government was supported by the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), particularly its Commando Battalion for Resolute Action (CoBRA), the District Reserve Guard (DRG), the Border Security Force (BSF), and state-level police units across the Red Corridor.

Throughout the year, the conflict was marked by an intensification of coordinated counter-insurgency operations under the banner of Operation Sankalp, launched in April. The operation spanned several states, that is, Chhattisgarh, Jhark-

hand, Odisha, Maharashtra, and Telangana, and represented one of the largest joint offensives against Maoist groups in recent years. On May 7, security forces killed at least 22 Maoists during an encounter in the Karregutta forests of Bijapur district, Chhattisgarh. Later, between May 21 and 23, a prolonged 50-hour encounter in Narayanpur and Bijapur districts resulted in 27 Maoists killed, including the CPI (Maoist) General Secretary. This marked one of the movement's most significant leadership losses in a decade. Several additional encounters occurred in Gadchiroli city, Maharashtra, Latehar district and Palamu district, Jharkhand, and Koraput city, Odisha, leading to dozens of casualties and multiple arrests. As in previous years, IED explosions and ambushes remained a major tactic. On January 6, a DRG vehicle was struck by an IED in Bijapur, killing eight personnel. Sporadic attacks targeting road-construction teams and forest-department workers were reported in Jharkhand and Odisha. On May 28, Maoist cadres hijacked a truck carrying four tonnes of explosives in Sundargarh city, Odisha, prompting a National Investigation Agency probe and demonstrating continuing access to significant weapons and logistical networks. Security forces conducted extensive search operations and weapon seizures during June–August. Numerous arms dumps, detonators, and communication equipment were recovered in forested areas of Bijapur and Dantewada in Operation Sankalp, which commenced in April. Drone-based reconnaissance and integrated police–military operations became increasingly common. Meanwhile, small-scale surrenders continued; in July alone, more than 20 suspected Maoist cadres surrendered in Dantewada district. [asl](#)

INDIA (SCHEDULED TRIBES / SCHEDULED CASTES ET AL.)

Intensity: **2** | Change: **•** | Start: **1981**

Conflict parties: Gujjars, Jats, Marathas, Moran-Motok, Rajputs vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology

The non-violent crisis over benefits under the reservation system between various communities, most prominently the Marathas and Madigas on the one hand, and the central government as well as the governments of the respective federal states on the other, continued. The reservation system allocates jobs in the public sector and access to public education based on a community's status as either Scheduled Caste (SC), Scheduled Tribe (ST) or Other Backward Castes (OBC). Protests by the Maratha community demanding OBC status by recognizing them as Kunbi, who already have OBC status continued. For instance, on January 25, a group of over 100 people belonging to the Maratha community, led by Manoj Jarange Patil, a prominent Maratha activist, started a hunger strike that lasted six days, in Jalna district, Maharashtra state with the goal of achieving OBC status. Protests continued throughout the year, culminating in a five day hunger strike by the same activist, starting on August 29 in Mumbai city, Maharashtra that saw a participation of more than 40,000 members of the Maratha community. The strike ended after the Maharashtra government partially fulfilled the protestors' demands of OBC recognition. On August 1, over a thousand members of the Madiga community, which already possesses SC status, held protests in Chitradurga district, Karnataka state, demanding the revision of internal quotas within the SC system.

Other communities staged protests to advocate for Special Tribe recognition. On September 15, several thousand members from the Banjara Community held protests in Beed and Jalna district, Maharashtra, demanding ST status. On July 28, the advocacy group for OBC rights OBC Mahasabha protested to raise the quota for OBC members in government jobs from 13 percent to 27 percent in Bhopal city, Madhya Pradesh state. [nkl](#)

INDIA (ULFA-I ET AL. / ASSAM)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **↗** | Start: **1979**

Conflict parties: AANLA, APLA, BLA, DNLA, KLO, KLO-KN, NLFB, ULFA, ULFA-I vs. government

Conflict items: secession, autonomy

The non-violent crisis over either secession or autonomy in Assam state between militant Assamese groups, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, escalated to a violent crisis. The conflict remained dominated by security operations against the United Liberation Front of Asom-Independent (ULFA-I), while militant violence occurred only sporadically.

Security forces conducted sustained counterinsurgency measures across Upper Assam throughout the year. On January 3, Assam Police arrested four alleged ULFA-I members in Duliajan city for extortion-related activities and recovered a pistol, ammunition, and an improvised explosive device. On January 30, security forces arrested a surrendered ULFA cadre in Tinsukia city on extortion charges. Further arrests and voluntary surrenders followed in February in Tinsukia and Pengeri region. On March 2, joint security forces recovered nearly 30 kilograms of explosives from Digboi Reserved Forest, reportedly buried by a ULFA-I cadre. Authorities continued arrests of ULFA-I linkmen and operatives in Charaideo city, Tinsukia, and surrounding districts during the year. On May 24, security forces arrested senior ULFA-I commander Rupam Asom near the Assam–Arunachal Pradesh border and seized arms and ammunition. Judicial and investigative measures also continued. On June 14, the National Investigation Agency charged ULFA-I leader and two other cadres in connection with a 08/15/24 IED conspiracy.

Throughout the year, ULFA-I carried out limited violent actions. For instance, on January 26, the group claimed responsibility for two bomb blasts at Lalmati market and Beharbari parking area in Guwahati city; the explosions caused no deaths or injuries. On July 13, ULFA-I alleged that drone strikes killed three of its cadres in camps located in Myanmar's Sagaing region near the India–Myanmar border. Indian authorities denied conducting any such operation, and the incident remained unverified. [eax](#)

INDIA – PAKISTAN

Intensity: **4** | Change: **↗** | Start: **1947**

Conflict parties: India vs. Pakistan

Conflict items: territory, international power, resources

ASIA AND OCEANIA


INDIA – PAKISTAN




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
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
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
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
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
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
October



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December



The violent crisis over the status of the Kashmir region, international and regional power and water distribution between India and Pakistan escalated into a limited war.

From January to early April, the conflict centered on Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) and Pakistan-administered Azad Jammu and Kashmir, with twelve violent encounters along the Line of Control (LoC), killing eight people and injuring seven during that timeframe.

During these first four months of the year, diplomatic tensions over the Kashmir region and accusations of state-sponsored terrorism remained high, with mutual accusations at United Nations debates on February 2, 27; March 15, 25; as well as other public forums.

Two diplomatic and military-level interactions took place on January 1 and February 21, described by both sides as efforts to honor the ceasefire agreement along the LoC.

In May, the conflict temporarily escalated into a four day war due to the Pahalgam attack on April 22, where terrorists attacked mostly Indian Hindu tourists near Pahalgam in India's J&K, killing 26 and injuring 20 civilians. On April 23, India unilaterally suspended the Indus Water Treaty, an act Pakistan criticized as an illegal form of "water warfare." Furthermore, both countries expelled each other's diplomats and closed their airspace to each other. India accused Pakistan of involvement, which Pakistan denied. This led to daily cross-border firings along the LoC from April 23 to May 5, killing two people on April 23. On May 7, India launched a military strike on Pakistan's J&K and Punjab Province. Hours later, Pakistan responded with military strikes on Indian border territories. From May 7 to 11, both countries used heavy weapons and drones, focusing on airstrikes against military targets. These actions, together with incidents along the LoC, killed 21 Indian and 52 Pakistani civilians and soldiers and injured around 60 more on each side. On May 10, the limited war ended with a ceasefire agreement.

Violent encounters along the LoC continued on May 24; June 15, 24, 29; August 11, 27, September 1 and November 7, killing nine individuals, most of them allegedly Pakistanis trying to cross the LoC into Indian-administered territory. On July 29, India claimed that it had killed three Pakistanis in J&K who were allegedly responsible for the Pahalgam terror attack in April and on December 16 charged two allegedly Pakistan-based terror organizations and three Pakistanis with criminal charges for their involvement in the attack.

Diplomatic tensions remained high, with both countries accusing each other of breaching the ceasefire agreement and of state-sponsored terrorism. For example, on May 25, Pakistan accused India of being involved in the bombing of a school bus in Pakistan and on November 11 of backing a deadly terror attack in Islamabad. Additionally, on June 16, India announced plans to halt participation in the Indus Water Treaty and redirect water flows. Pakistan objected, and on June 26 and August 8, the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled against India's unilateral suspension and flow restrictions. Still, India in December approved a new hydropower project on the Chenab river which led Pakistan to accusations about water restriction on December 19.

Both countries also expanded the monthly mutual closure of their airspaces, which remains in effect until January 24. Starting October 2, India and Pakistan also exchanged multiple verbal threats about a possible future conflict. ezu

INDONESIA (AHMADI)

Intensity: **1** | Change: • | Start: **1980**

Conflict parties: Ahmadi vs. Muslims

Conflict items: subnational predominance

The dispute over subnational predominance between the Ahmadiyah community, a minority Muslim religious group, and other Muslim groups continued.

Muslim community members, including state and non-state actors, committed systemic discrimination, occasional harassment, and restrictions against Ahmadiyah, especially in West Java.

On May 28, the Banjar Muslim Alliance, an ethnic Muslim community from Southern Kalimantan, pressured the Banjar City government to adopt a stricter stance against the Ahmadiyah. A book discussion on the Ahmadiyah faith scheduled for June 2 at the State Islamic Institute, a network of public higher education institutions focused on Islamic studies, was canceled due to pressure from the Ulema Council, Indonesia's top Islamic scholar's corporation. On June 5, authorities prevented Ahmadiyah members from worshiping at a sealed site in Tangjungsukur, Jawa Barat province, and declared it off-limits. The Banjar City government also sealed a mosque in Neglasari Village, Banten province.

According to a report by Setara, an Indonesian pro-democracy NGO, there were 260 incidents which violated the freedom of religion, and 402 acts of discrimination against the Ahmadiyah in Indonesia in 2024. iva

JAPAN, SOUTH KOREA, USA – NORTH KOREA

Intensity: **2** | Change: ↗ | Start: **1993**

Conflict parties: Japan, ROK, USA vs. DPRK

Conflict items: system/ideology, international power, other

The dispute over international power, ideology, and the Democratic People Republic of Korea's (DPRK) nuclear program between Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and the USA, on the one hand, and the DPRK, supported by the People's Republic of China (PRC), on the other, escalated to a non-violent crisis. This year North Korea escalated its military demonstrations and criticized the increasing security cooperation between the United States, Japan, and South Korea. North Korea carried out a series of weapons tests throughout the year. The first notable test occurred on January 6, with the launch of an intermediate-range ballistic missile. On January 14, short-range ballistic missile tests took place. Later in January, on the 26 and 27, North Korea launched long-range cruise missiles from sea-based platforms, which were assessed as potential nuclear delivery systems. On March 20, during joint military exercises between the United States and South Korea, North Korea tested a new surface-to-air missile system, reflecting efforts to strengthen its air defenses.

On April 28, North Korea displayed new destroyer-based missile launch platforms as part of its efforts to establish a credible naval deterrent. On May 8, short-range missile tests and artillery drills were conducted, simulating nuclear retaliation which increased regional tensions. After a warship launch by North Korea failed, North Korea carried out

a crisis-response cruise missile launch on May 21 and 22, demonstrating its capacity for rapid escalation. On June 18, South Korea, Japan and the US continued to show its presence in the region by conducting Joint Aerial drills. prs

KAZAKHSTAN (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **2** | Change: **•** | Start: **2004**

Conflict parties: opposition vs. government
Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The non-violent crisis over national power and the orientation of the political system and national power between opposition groups and individual activists, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued. Throughout the year, individuals and civil society groups have staged protests, often countered by authorities with detentions. On January 17, authorities arrested a satirical blogger for alleged incitement of interethnic hatred in Almaty, eponymous region. Protests in his support one day later led to fines and detentions in Almaty and Kostanay, eponymous region. On May 20, authorities arrested and fined protesters in Kostanay for an unauthorized demonstration, followed by a similar instance on May 23. The government also continued to target civil society groups and opposition political parties. For instance, on February 14, authorities detained and fined the co-founders of the female rights group Feminita in Almaty. On April 24, in a public statement, President Tokayev accused activists of promoting negative ideas with foreign support. Furthermore, on June 30, authorities arrested an activist in Qaraghandy, eponymous region, participating in a meeting connected to the banned Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan movement. On August 17, an activist in Almaty faced arrests for supporting imprisoned opposition figures. The conditions for journalism remained difficult throughout the monitoring period as well. On January 23, the City Court in the capital Astana rejected journalists' appeal against accreditation restrictions, and on April 10, police arrested a journalist in Oral, West Kazakhstan Region, for allegedly spreading false information. On December 1 and 2, authorities raided the offices of the independent media outlet Orda.kz in Almaty and Astana. jpe

KYRGYZSTAN (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **2** | Change: **•** | Start: **2005**

Conflict parties: opposition vs. government
Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The non-violent crisis over national power and the orientation of the political system between the opposition and the government continued. Throughout the year, national power has been challenged on several occasions, framed by the government as coups d'état. On April 9, the State Committee for National Security (SCNS) prevented an attempt to organize mass riots on ethnic grounds aimed at changing power. On April 14, the Main Department of Internal Affairs in the Chui Region detained two individuals for allegedly helping organize mass

unrest. Five days later, the SCNS announced the arrest of the group's leader on charges of undermining the constitutional order. On June 3, the Pervomaisky district court in Bishkek sentenced the former president Almazbek Atambayev, currently living in Spain, to over eleven years in prison for the Koy-Tash unrest of 08/19, which caused 136 casualties. On November 23, a few days before the early parliamentary elections on November 30, the Ministry of Internal Affairs detained Atambayev's son and nine other politicians. According to the investigation, the detainees planned a series of rallies throughout the country and seizures of administrative buildings and infrastructure after the publication of election results. During the searches, officers found weapons, ammunition, camouflage clothing, narcotic substances, instructions for organizing mass riots, and 150 thousand USD in cash. Regarding the ideological confrontation, President Sadyr Japarov continued to limit the influence of foreign donors on the civil and media landscape. On September 17, the Pervomaisky district court in Bishkek sentenced two cameramen of the outlet Kloop to five years in prison, later released on probation for three years, and two of its accountants to three years on probation. According to the authorities, the outlet, which received foreign funds, continued to publish manipulated information despite an official order of liquidation introduced in 02/24. Moreover, on October 27, the Oktyabrsky district court in Bishkek recognized all publications of Kloop, Temirov Live, and Ait Ait Dese, as well as the activities of their founders, as extremist. agl

KYRGYZSTAN – UZBEKISTAN – TAJIKISTAN (BORDER COMMUNITIES / FERGANA VALLEY)


Intensity: **1** | Change: **↓** | Start: **2000**

Conflict parties: Kyrgyz border communities, Kyrgyzstan vs. Uzbek border communities, Uzbekistan vs. Tajik border communities, Tajikistan
Conflict items: territory, international power

The violent crisis over territory and international power in the Fergana Valley border region between Kyrgyz, Tajik, and Uzbek border communities, backed by their respective governments, de-escalated to a dispute. No violent incidents have occurred throughout the year, while relations have steadily improved through agreements on border demarcation and economic cooperation. On January 8, Uzbek Prime Minister Abdulla Aripov, Kyrgyz Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers Adylbek Kasymaliyev, and Tajik Prime Minister Kokhir Rasulzoda, signed an agreement to finalize the demarcation of the Uzbek-Kyrgyz and Kyrgyz-Tajik borders. On March 13, Tajik President Emomali Rahmon and Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov formalized borders in the Kyrgyz capital Bishkek, reopening checkpoints and restoring trade and transport. On March 31, Rahmon, Japarov, and Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev met in Khujand, Sughd Province, Tajikistan. They agreed on the Junction Point of the State Borders and signed the Khujand Declaration of Eternal Friendship, finalizing border demarcation, furthering economic collaboration, and restoring peace. iva

MYANMAR (AA / RAKHINE STATE)

Intensity: 5 | Change: • | Start: 2015

Conflict parties: AA vs. Myanmar Army
Conflict items: autonomy

The war over autonomy in Rakhine State between the Arakan Army (AA) and the Myanmar military continued. Over the course of the conflict, at least 213 people were reportedly killed. In addition, widespread damage to civilian property and critical infrastructure was documented, including schools, residential areas, and transportation routes, significantly affecting the civilian population.

At the beginning of the year, fighting intensified as the military junta increasingly targeted civilians and local communities. For instance, on January 11, airstrikes carried out by the Myanmar military killed at least 40 people and destroyed more than 500 homes in Kyauk Ni Maw village, Kyaukpyu District. Further airstrikes followed on January 20 in Mrauk-U Township, leaving at least 28 civilians dead and 25 injured. As a result, by the end of January, more than 1,000 residents had fled their homes in the State's capital, Sittwe, and surrounding areas.

Hostilities continued into late February. On February 27, a major clash between AA forces and the Tatmadaw reportedly resulted in the deaths of approximately 80 junta soldiers. On March 21, fighting escalated across three villages in Ramree Township, forcing more than 3,000 civilians to flee. The clashes caused extensive destruction of civilian infrastructure and further contributed to internal displacement.

In April, the humanitarian consequences of the conflict became particularly evident among ethnic minorities. At least 25 Rohingya civilians were reportedly killed during clashes between the AA and the Tatmadaw in Buthidaung Township, underscoring the severe impact of the conflict on vulnerable communities.

During the summer months, violence persisted despite repeated international calls for de-escalation. On August 12, the Arakan Army publicly reiterated its intention to continue fighting until Rakhine State is fully liberated from junta control. On August 25, the Tatmadaw conducted further airstrikes against AA positions in Mrauk-U town, killing more than twelve people. On September 12, an airstrike by the junta in Thayet Thapin village, Kyauktaw Township, killed at least 18 civilians, most of them students, and destroyed critical infrastructure.

In the final months of the year, the conflict continued at a lower but sustained intensity. Sporadic clashes and military operations were reported across several townships, while airstrikes and artillery shelling persisted. In December, continued insecurity and access restrictions further undermined basic services, including healthcare and education. The deteriorating humanitarian situation contributed to the spread of diseases such as malaria and limited the delivery of aid.

Throughout the year, despite repeated calls for restraint by the United Nations, the Tatmadaw maintained its military

campaign, while the Arakan Army reaffirmed its commitment to armed resistance in pursuit of autonomy. *isf*

MYANMAR (INTER-MILITANT RIVALRY / SHAN STATE)

Intensity: 3 | Change: • | Start: 2015

Conflict parties: UWSA vs. Ta'ang National Liberation Army vs. Restoration Council of Shan State vs. SSPP

Conflict items: subnational predominance

The violent crisis over resources and subnational predominance in Shan State, involving various Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs), including the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP) and the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), continued.

Tensions between the TNLA and the KIA persisted in northern Shan State, particularly in Kutkai, Mantong, and Namkham townships. On January 26, TNLA troops forced KIA soldiers to withdraw from two military outposts in Namkham. Tensions escalated further on February 23, when TNLA troops raided KIA-held checkpoints in Mantong, citing KIA's unauthorized tax collection in TNLA-controlled areas. On March 7, more than 100 KIA troops entered Kutkai without notifying the TNLA-controlled administration. Furthermore, TNLA forces seized ten KIA-held camps between January and March and repeatedly arrested and beat KIA soldiers. On April 9, the KIA and TNLA held a meeting aimed at resolving tensions in preparation for further negotiations.

In Kutkai, the ongoing conflict between the KIA and the MNDAA escalated regarding the disputed control of gold mines in the Monesee Si area. On March 5, during a combined demonstration by local protesters and KIA soldiers [→ Myanmar (socioeconomic protests)], MNDAA forces fired into the crowd, killing four civilians and two KIA soldiers.

As in 2024, clashes broke out between the TNLA and MNDAA despite their alliance. On April 1, TNLA police officers stopped MNDAA soldiers collecting money from the local population in Kutkai. They engaged in a fistfight, seriously injuring several TNLA officers. Two days later, clashes erupted between troops of both EAOs in Lashio township.

Despite having agreed to refrain from hostilities in 2024, the conflict between the TNLA and the SSPP broke out again on March 23, when TNLA troops launched a military operation against a SSPP camp in Mongmit township. Further skirmishes were reported in Kyaukme and Momeik townships on June 16 and 23.

Skirmishes between the MNDAA and the SSPP continued, partly due to disputes over control of coal mines. Between April 28 and 30, MNDAA forces launched several attacks against SSPP positions in Lashio and Hsipaw townships, causing heavy losses of MNDAA soldiers and displacing several residents. Eight MNDAA soldiers were killed in Lashio township in another skirmish on June 1. Moreover, the MNDAA faced allegations of forcibly recruiting Shan civilians in SSPP territory. Supervised by the United Wa State Army (UWSA), both EAOs pledged to respect the other group's authority in the respectively controlled areas, including matters of forced civilian recruitment and tax collection in an agreement reached on June 17.


A China-brokered ceasefire agreement between the Myanmar Army and the TNLA led to the TNLA's handover of Mongmit and Mogoke Townships on November 29 [→ Myanmar (TNLA / Shan State)]. During this process, approximately 200–300 TNLA troops expelled KIA forces and allied local militias from both townships and blocked roads to halt their advances. tri

MYANMAR (KIA, KIO / KACHIN STATE)

Intensity: **5** | Change: **•** | Start: **1961**

Conflict parties: KIA, KIO vs. Myanmar Army

Conflict items: autonomy, resources



The war over autonomy and resources for Kachin State and resources between the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), politically represented by the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), and the Myanmar military junta, continued.

Throughout the year, fighting intensified across Kachin State. The KIA expanded its military operations, capturing several strategic positions and challenging the junta's control. The junta responded with heavy airstrikes and artillery bombardments, frequently hitting civilian areas leading to over 200 casualties and over 85 injured.

At the beginning of the year, on January 8, the KIA captured a junta's headquarters in Bhamo Township, eponymous district. On January 26, it cleared and captured three infantry battalions in Mansi Town, Bhamo District, causing more than 50 deaths. On February 19, the KIA seized another infantry battalion in Bhamo Township. On March 18, the junta shelled several villages in Bhamo District, killing seven civilians. On March 31, it attacked a KIA youth training camp in Mohnyin Township, eponymous district, killing 36 people and injuring more than 30.

On May 7, the junta attacked a monastery in Bhamo City, Bhamo District, killing 15 civilians and injuring over 30. On May 22, the KIA shot down two junta helicopters in Shwegu Township, Bhamo District, killing 19 soldiers including an officer.

The conflict is known as the "Resource War" primarily focused on rare earth minerals such as jade, making the jade mining areas such as Hpakant Township targets to attacks such as in June, where fighting intensified around jade mining areas. On June 12, junta forces opened fire during clashes over control of a jade mine in Hpakant Township, Mohnyin District, killing more than 30 civilians. On June 17, the KIA attacked junta forces in Hpakant with machine guns, causing over 20 casualties. On July 19, the KIA and other resistance forces attacked Junta Naval Convoys transporting military supplies and men on the Irrawaddy River with rifles, machine guns and drones. On August 5, using light weaponry (FPV drones), the junta captured the artillery battalion 336th in Bhamo City, Bhamo District. On September 14, the Junta attacked and detained two KIO officials in Myitkyina City, Myitkyina District. On September 17, Regime Jet Fighters conducted two air strikes on KIA training camp in Shwegu Township, Bhamo District, killing 20 and injuring 19. On October 9, KIA seized several frontline camps from Junta, strategically hubs

in the conflict located in Bhamo Township, Bhamo District and Waingmaw Township, Myitkyina District. On November 11, a mother died in Lone Khin Village during Junta airstrikes by Y-12 aircrafts being conducted in Hpakant Township. Civilians die during Junta bombings in their villages.

KIA activity spread outside Kachin State as well. On April 8, KIA-led forces seized the town of Indaw Town, Katha District, Sagaing Region, after eight months of fighting involving heavy weaponry.


Throughout the year, the conflict has remained intense, marked by the use of heavy weaponry such as missiles and bombs. The junta continued to target KIA-controlled areas with artillery and aerial attacks, killing civilians, burning homes, raiding villages, and destroying property and imposing curfews. The humanitarian situation in Myanmar is worsening, with the effects of the ongoing conflict compounded by the 7.7 magnitude earthquake on March 28 and subsequent monsoon rains, floods, and landslides. sei

MYANMAR (KNU, KNLA, KNDO ET AL. / KAREN STATE, KAYAH STATE)

Intensity: **5** | Change: **•** | Start: **1948**

Conflict parties: Karenni Army, KNDF, KNDO, KNLA, KNPLF, KNU, People's Revolution Alliance (Magway) vs. Myanmar Army

Conflict items: autonomy



The war over autonomy between the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), the armed-wing of Karen National Union (KNU), in alliance with the Karen National Defense Organization (KNDO), the Karenni Nationalities Defence Force (KNDF), the Karenni National People's Liberation Front (KNPLF), the Karenni Army (KA), the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA-5), and the Karen National Solidarity Organization (KNSO) on the one hand, and the Myanmar Army (Tatmadaw) as well as the Pa-O National Army (PNA), on the other, continued.

Besides the main areas of the conflict, the States of Karen and Kayah, Shan State South Division, Mon State North Division, as well as Myeik and Dawei Districts, Tanintharyi Region became part of the conflict.

Throughout the year, the conflict killed at least X people, injured X, and displaced X people. Both conflict groups used light and heavy firearms, missiles, mortars, and UAVs. However, the junta dominated the airspace with fighter jets. Clashes with the Myanmar Army involved mainly KNLA, KNDF, and DKBA forces, while the Myanmar Army primarily targeted civilians.

Accordingly, the airstrike shelling by the Myanmar Army caused collateral damage among civilians. Between April 13 and 16, the Myanmar Army targeted civil infrastructure in the villages of Naungtaman, Tharyarkone, Kawtwarle, and Myaukkanmayaik, Karen State, killing at least ten KNLA and PDF forces, 20 civilians, and injuring at least 22 civilians. (On April 15, the Myanmar Army shelled a monastery in Kanni

Village, Kawkareik Township, Karen State, with a fighter jet, killing at least six and injuring 17 civilians.) On August 17, the Myanmar Army killed at least 32 and injured 13 civilians shelling Mawchi Town, Kayah State, with fighter jets.

Following the earthquake on March 28, the Karen and Karenni Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) announced an unilateral ceasefire enabling unhindered humanitarian aid. For April 2 to April 30 the junta announced an unilateral ceasefire as well. However, the fighting continued with the Myanmar Army shelling civilians on the move. Subsequently, between April 13 and 16 KNLA and PDF forces attacked the Myanmar Army's MOC-12 military operations command in Kawkareik Township Karen State, killing approx. 20 soldiers. On April 30, KNLA-led forces clashed with the Myanmar Army near Kyondoe Town, Karen State, killing at least 30 soldiers and displacing at least 6,000 civilians from nearby villages. On May 28, KNLA-led forces ambushed a reinforcement column of the Myanmar Army on its way to Thay Baw Boe military base, Myawaddy Township, Karen State, killing approx. 18, injuring 20, and capturing 30 soldiers. At least 22 Myanmar Army forces fled to Thailand. On September 23, KNLA forces intercepted a Myanmar Army convoy in the villages of Hteemeiwahkhee and Pahikalaw, Karen State, and killed at least 35 soldiers, while the Myanmar Army killed at least 15 KNLA forces.

Clashes between the Myanmar Army, the PNA, and KNDF forces on February 28 killed at least five KNDF forces and five civilians, injuring at least eleven civilians, and destroying 60 buildings in Loikaw, Hpasaung, and Bawlakhae townships, Moby, and Lay Kay Kaw, Kayah State and Southern Shan State. On March 14, in a clash between KNDF forces and Myanmar Army together with PNA forces in Moebye Town, on the border between Shan and Karenni State, at least one KNDF fighter was killed and another two injured. The KNDF killed at least 15 Myanmar Army and PNA forces. On the same day KNLA forces captured the Pu Lu Tu military camp of the Myanmar Army in Karen State killing at least seven and injuring five Myanmar Army forces.

As for the DKBA, on July 19, the Myanmar Army shelled one of their positions in Waley Myaing Town, Karen State, with airstrikes killing at least three and injuring three. nif

MYANMAR (MNDAA / SHAN STATE)

Intensity: **3** | Change:  | Start: **1989**

Conflict parties: MNDAA vs. Myanmar Army
Conflict items: autonomy, subnational predominance

The limited war over autonomy and subnational predominance of the Kokang region, Shan State, between the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and the Myanmar Army de-escalated to a violent crisis.

Following the 2024 campaign of Operation 1027 along with the Three Brotherhood Alliance, consisting of the Arakan Army and Ta'ang National Liberation Army, fighting between the MNDAA and the Myanmar military de-escalated in 2025. This was due to a Chinese-brokered ceasefire and internal fragmentation.

A formal ceasefire was signed on January 18 between the MNDAA and the Myanmar Army in Kunming, Yunnan Province, People's Republic of China (PRC), ending the MNDAA's offensive in northern Shan State. In line with the agreement, the MNDAA withdrew from Lashio by April 21, enabling the Myan-

mar Army to re-enter the region's capital without reported violence.


Although hostilities between the MNDAA and the Myanmar Army ceased, on July 30, the Junta broke the ceasefire by airstriking a hotel on MNDAA controlled land, killing seven and injuring a further seven civilians. Talks negotiated by the PRC between the Junta and the MNDAA collapsed on August 14, as the Junta is reportedly refusing to recognize MNDAA territory as Shan State Special Region 1. Despite this, there were no further violent instances for the rest of 2025. pbu

MYANMAR (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **5** | Change:  | Start: **1962**

Conflict parties: National League of Democracy, National Unity Government, People's Defense Forces vs. Myanmar Army, Pa-Oh National Organisation, Pyu Saw Htee militia

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power



The war over national power and the orientation of the political system between the National League of Democracy (NLD) party, its interim government, the National Unity Government (NUG), and aligned localized People's Defense Forces (PDF) on the one hand, and the Myanmar Army (Tatmadaw) and affiliated militias on the other, continued.

The Myanmar Army continues to face several Ethnic Armed Organizations and aligned PDFs on multiple fronts [→ Myanmar (AA / Rakhine State); Myanmar (KIA, KIO / Kachin State); Myanmar (KNU; KNLA, DKBA et al. / Karen, Kayah State); Myanmar (TNLA / Shan State), and has intensified its offensives following the announcement of elections scheduled to begin on 28 December, in an effort to regain territorial control. In total the conflict has resulted in at least 1225 confirmed civilian deaths this year, including 147 children, and 1428 injured civilians.

On March 28, an earthquake struck central Myanmar, and according to UNICEF, killed more than 3,600 people, injured approximately 4,800, and destroyed critical infrastructure.

Following the earthquake, several conflict parties announced temporary ceasefires. Despite the ceasefire announcements, airstrikes and artillery attacks continued. In total, at least 1021 airstrikes were recorded, resulting in at least 1011 confirmed civilian deaths, including 112 children, and 1359 injured civilians. Airstrikes also displaced over 50,000 people, damaging and destroyed at least 1000 houses, at least 17 hospitals and health centers, 17 religious institutions, and 19 schools. The deadliest reported airstrike of the year occurred on January 9, when a Myanmar military aircraft bombed Kyauk Ni Maw village in Rakhine State, killing at least 41 people, injuring 50, and destroying more than 500 homes.

At least 60 airstrikes were reportedly carried out using paramotors, increasingly employed since the beginning of the year. The deadliest such incident occurred on October 6 in Chaung-U Township, Sagaing Region, when paragliders

bombed a candlelight vigil during Thadingyut celebrations, killing at least 32 civilians, including several children, and injuring 20 others.

On 31 July, the State Administration Council (SAC) ended the state of emergency and announced a 90-day plan for election preparations in at least 63 townships, primarily areas linked to reinforced military deployments. Following this announcement, aerial attacks intensified. Airstrikes were recorded both before and during the elections, with airstrikes, rocket attacks, and drone strikes recorded across Karen, Mandalay, and Sagaing Regions, on December, 28, the day of the election.

In parallel, the military also launched ground offensives in areas under opposition control ahead of the elections. Between November, 1 and 12 multiple military columns conducted raids and systematically burned villages in Wetlet Township, Sagaing Region, destroying at least 20 villages and displacing more than 40,000 people from Wetlet and neighboring Khin-U Townships.

Opposition forces also carried out offensive operations during the year. On 20 October, People's Defence Force units reported seizing several military bases in Ywathit Village, Yedashe Township, in Bago Region resulting in the deaths of 15 military personnel.


Sexual violence was also recorded. According to a United Nations report, military forces were responsible for executions, torture, and sexual violence against persons with disabilities. A further 17 political prisoners were reported to have been killed while in custody. jsu

MYANMAR (ROHINGYA)

Intensity: **4** | Change: • | Start: **2012**

Conflict parties: ARSA, Rohingya, RSO vs. Myanmar Army

Conflict items: subnational predominance, other



The limited war over subnational predominance between the Arakan Army (AA), operating under the United League of Arakan (ULA), and the Myanmar military junta continued throughout the year. The Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) and the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO) competed with the AA for influence in northern Rakhine State. Violence caused significant displacement, particularly among Rohingya civilians. Reported incidents during the year resulted in at least several dozen civilian deaths, more than 100 injuries, and the displacement of over 100,000 people from Rakhine State by mid-year.

In January and February, the military junta repeatedly conducted airstrikes against areas under AA control in Rakhine State, affecting Rohingya and other civilian populations. On January 8, junta aircraft struck Kauknimaw village in Ramree Township, Kyaukphyu District, killing at least 26 civilians, injuring more than 20 others, and destroying 379 houses. All reported casualties were civilians. Additional air and drone strikes targeted Mrauk-U Township in Mrauk-U District and Ma-ei Town in Taungup Township, forcing residents to flee

and damaging civilian infrastructure. These attacks followed a recurring pattern of aerial operations in populated areas rather than direct battlefield engagements.

Parallel to junta operations, the AA carried out measures directly affecting Rohingya civilians in areas under its control. On January 29, AA forces ordered Rohingya residents of Palei Daung village in northern Buthidaung Township, Rakhine State, to vacate their homes without providing explanations or relocation arrangements. In February, the AA expanded these actions by forcibly evicting Rohingya communities from Myint Nar, Zaydi Pyin, Dar Pyin Sa Yar, and nearby villages in northern Buthidaung Township, citing clearing operations. These measures left residents homeless and led to the confiscation and later reallocation of abandoned properties. Similar forced displacement continued in May, when the AA expelled Rohingya families from Dinnet Pyin village and resettled ethnic Rakhine families in Gutar Pyin and Sein Nyin Pyin villages.

Clashes between the AA and ARSA intensified in northern Maungdaw Township, Rakhine State, particularly along border areas near Bangladesh. On February 19, AA forces encountered ARSA fighters near Mee Taik village during a clearance operation. On March 29, ARSA ambushed an AA patrol traveling between Taungpyo and Mee Taik villages in Maungdaw Township, killing two AA members and seizing weapons. In response, the AA imposed a night curfew across northern Maungdaw Township on April 1 and launched expanded clearance operations. During this period, ARSA also carried out attacks against civilians, including the killing of four Khami minority villagers in Maungdaw Township in early April.

From March onward, hostilities expanded into Kyaukphyu and Sittwe townships. On March 6, junta drone strikes destroyed more than 200 homes in Kyaukphyu Township, Kyaukphyu District, and Sittwe Township, Sittwe District. Fighting intensified around strategic infrastructure linked to Chinese-funded projects. In May, the AA ambushed junta convoys near Kyaukphyu and seized regime outposts at Hnanpe Taung and Mintat Taung, capturing soldiers and weapons. Junta forces responded with sustained airstrikes on Kyaukphyu, Kyauktaw, and Rathedaung townships, causing additional civilian casualties and destruction of residential areas.

By June and July, the AA consolidated control over most of northern Rakhine State, including Maungdaw and Buthidaung townships, while the junta retained positions in Sittwe, parts of Kyaukphyu town, and Manaung Island. ARSA activity declined following arrests of its leadership in Bangladesh. From August to October, no verified large-scale battles were reported, though intermittent skirmishes and airstrikes continued. By the end of the year, humanitarian conditions remained severe as displacement persisted across the Bangladesh border and through maritime routes toward Malaysia and Indonesia. eax

MYANMAR (SOCIOECONOMIC PROTESTS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2007**

Conflict parties: local protesters vs. ethnic armed organizations, Myanmar Army, PRC state-owned enterprises

Conflict items: resources

The violent crisis over resources, such as the mining of gold, jade, and rare earths, as well as over infrastructure projects,

between local protesters on the one hand, and predominantly Chinese State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), backed by the Myanmar Army and Ethnic Armed Organizations (EOs), on the other hand, continued.

Throughout the year, extensive resource extraction was reported across Myanmar's Kachin, Shan, Mon, and Karenni States, as well as in the Bago and Mandalay Regions, resulting in severe economic and environmental damage, including water pollution, depletion of fish and forest resources, and the disruption of grazing lands and agricultural production. For the first time, Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai Provinces in northern Thailand were also affected. The transboundary environmental destruction prompted thousands of villagers, Buddhist monks, and ethnic minority members in both countries to stage at least eight distinct protests.

On March 14, 700 Thai protesters gathered along the Kok River in Chiang Mai Province, to raise their concerns about the pollution of Kok and Sai Rivers by mining activities in southern Shan State. A petition followed on April 25, urging the Thai government to address the matter with the Myanmar government. On June 5, over 1,000 Chiang Rai residents staged another protest.

The Kachin Independence Army (KIA) rapidly expanded rare earth mining operations in Chipwi Township, Kachin State, causing severe soil erosion that degraded agricultural land and led to serious health issues among residents. KIA soldiers reportedly issued death threats to village leaders to force them to surrender their land for mining expansion. On January 13, KIA's intense jade mining caused a landslide in Hpakant Township, Mohnyin District, leading to at least 32 casualties, dozens missing and the destruction of over 50 houses. On March 4, around 40 villagers protested gold mining operated by the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) in Hsipaw Township, Kyaukse District, Shan State. MNDAA forces opened fire on the protesters, killing four civilians and injuring six others. Two KIA soldiers were also killed [→ Myanmar (inter-militant rivalry / Shan State)]. The MNDAA suspended mining operations by July 1.


Beyond mining, socioeconomic tensions are rising in MNDAA-controlled areas due to increasing Chinese economic penetration. On April 30, MNDAA soldiers detained local vendors in Hsawens Township, Lashio District, after they protested the closure of their market in favor of a Chinese-built commercial complex.

Meanwhile, the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), intensified their mining operations in their territories. On May 5, hundreds of residents of Mansat village, Namhkam Township, Mu Se District, Shan State, protested TNLA-run silicon rock mining. Contrary to 2024 pledges, the TNLA significantly expanded ruby mining operations in Mogoke Township, Thabeikkyin District, Mandalay Region. On July 5, the TNLA reportedly granted large-scale ruby mining concessions to Chinese investors and other EOs, leading to the direct involvement of the MNDAA and the United Wa State Army (UWSA) in the area. Following a China-mediated ceasefire, the TNLA announced to hand over administrative control of Mogoke to the Myanmar Army on November 29 (SAC) [→ Myanmar (TNLA / Shan State)]. Consequently, ruby mining intensified further throughout November, leading to the complete destruction of the town's golf course.


Smaller EOs also conducted mining in Shan State. On May 2, hundreds of Kayan ethnic minority members protested a planned large-scale lead mining project in Pekon Township, Kalaw District, operated by the Kayan New Land Army (KNLA) and a Chinese SOE. The protesters blocked the road and threatened to seize mining equipment.

Following the official announcement to restart the suspended Myitsone Dam project on December 16, the Myanmar government criminalized all forms of protest directed at state-approved Chinese investment projects. tri

MYANMAR (TNLA / SHAN STATE)



NEPAL (OPPOSITION)



forces resulted in at least 19 deaths. Nationwide, more than 340 injuries were reported that day. However, the Ministry of Health later reported a significantly higher aggregate figure of 1,033 injuries. Available sources do not allow for a full regional disaggregation of these injuries, and event-level data accounts for only part of the total. The unrest spread rapidly, leading to attacks on government buildings, arson at the residences of former and incumbent officials, and a mass prison break involving more than 13,000 inmates country-wide. Amid mounting casualties and destruction, the Home Minister and Prime Minister resigned, the army assumed control of the capital, and an interim government formed on September 12 under former Supreme Court judge Sushila Karki scheduled new elections for 2026, marking a dramatic political shift. kve

NEPAL (RIGHT-WING HINDU GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **2006**

Conflict parties: pro-monarchists, RPP, SNN vs. government
Conflict items: system/ideology

The violent crisis over the political system and ideology between right-wing Hindu groups, mainly represented by the Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP), on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued. RPP leaders and supporters kept demanding the return of the constitutional monarchy and the declaration of Nepal as a Hindu state, directly challenging the secular system set up after 2006.

In January and February, the situation stayed calm without major incidents. However, on March 28, a protest in the capital Kathmandu turned violent. Clashes broke out between RPP supporters and police, leading to two deaths and an estimated 112 injuries, 77 among police. Authorities arrested several RPP leaders during this wave of protests as well. The RPP sustained its mobilisation in April and May, mainly through the organization of several peaceful rallies. For instance, a large demonstration at Tundikhel Grounds in Kathmandu, on May 29 showed strong public support for their demands.

On June 1, police arrested about six individuals affiliated with the RPP, including Chairman Kamal Thapa, during another protest in Kathmandu. Although no major violence followed, tensions persisted through regular arrests and demonstrations. On September 19, pro-monarchy activists demonstrated at Maitighar Mandala, a symbolic monument in Kathmandu, with supporters burning copies of the constitution while urging justice for Gen Z protesters impacted by large-scale protests during the same month [→ Nepal (opposition)]. Furthermore, on October 18, protesters attempted a motorcycle rally toward the Narayanhiti Palace, but police intervened and prevented it. kve

NORTH KOREA – SOUTH KOREA

Intensity: **2** | Change: **•** | Start: **1948**

Conflict parties: DPRK vs. ROK
Conflict items: territory, system/ideology, international power

The non-violent crisis over international power, ideology, and territory between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), supported by Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC), on the one hand, and the Republic of Korea (ROK), supported by the USA, on the other, continued.

As in 2024, tensions between DPRK and ROK remained on a high level with DPRK further developing its nuclear and military weapons program. In the first seven months of 2025 DPRK launched missiles in 12 instances. For example, on March 10, DPRK test fired several ballistic missiles from North Hwanghae Province following a joint military drill conducted by ROK and USA. On three occasions, ROK fired warning shots along the inter-Korean border. On October 19, two North Korean soldiers crossed the Military Demarcation Line, retreating after the ROK military issued warning broadcasts and fired warning shots.

Newly elected South Korean president Lee Myungjae stressed his commitment to trilateral security cooperation with the USA and Japan. Furthermore, he proposed a revised inter-Korean policy based on dialogue and cooperation. For instance, on June 11, ROK halted the loudspeaker broadcasts along the inter-Korean border that resumed sending political messages towards DPRK in June of last year. The next day, DPRK ceased their broadcasts along the demilitarized zone as well. However, on July 28, DPRK publicly rejected talks with ROK on denuclearization on the Korean peninsula.

On the contrary, DPRK strengthened its cooperation with Russia supplying both military personnel and weapons to Russian troops in Ukraine [→ Russia – Ukraine]. Furthermore, DPRK, Russia and PRC conducted multiple high-level talks. On September 3, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping made a joint public appearance on PRC's Victory Day military parade. During a summit on the following day, Kim and Putin reiterated their commitment to bilateral cooperation. akw

NORTH KOREA, CHINA (DEFECTORS)

Intensity: **2** | Change: **↗** | Start: **2000**

Conflict parties: defectors (network) vs. DPRK, PRC
Conflict items: system/ideology, other

The dispute over the orientation of the political system in form of North Korean defectors' (NKDs) right to migrate between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Russian Federation (RF) on the one hand, and NKDs and their support networks on the other, escalated to a non-violent crisis.

In August, it was reported that Chinese authorities tightened control over North Korean defectors in China with large-scale surveillance operations being carried out, predominantly in urban areas. Many defectors in China are registered with Chinese police through fingerprinting, voice, and facial data collection. One defector living in Shenyang, Liaoning province told Daily NK that police visited her twice a week to confirm her presence and to take photographs.

On August 19, it was reported that the South Korean government will stop publishing its report on human rights abuses in the DPRK. This further increases the scarcity of data available on defectors from the DPRK.

On October 15, Human Rights Watch published a report that China had returned at least 406 North Koreans since 2024, many of whom face torture, sexual violence, forced

labour, arbitrary detention, and even execution upon return .For instance, between December 2024 and July 2025, China forcibly returned 20 Women that have previously been detained in Inner Mongolia Province.


On September 16, South Korea Ministry of Unification stated that the number of defectors reaching South Korea in the first half of the year reached 96. The ministry also said that it will look into changing the South Korean term of North Korean defectors, given that the word carries negative connotations. On November 13, it was reported by Database Center for North Korean Human Rights (NKDB) that Chinese security agencies are gathering biometric data on North Korean defectors. This same technology is being shared with North Korea’s security services, increasing the risk of detection, family intimidation, and crossborder enforcement. hbn

PAKISTAN (BALOCHISTAN)

Intensity: 4 | Change: ↗ | Start: 1948

Conflict parties: BLA, BLF, BLT, BNA (militant group), BNA (political party), BNP-M, BRG vs. government

Conflict items: secession, resources



The violent crisis over territorial secession and the re-sources, such as gas, oil, coal, and minerals, between Baloch separatist nationalists, such as the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), and other militant groups, such as allegedly the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan [→ Pakistan (Islamist militant groups)], and the Chinese-supported government escalated to a limited war.

Violent clashes between Baloch separatists, other militants, and the government’s security forces, along with attacks directed at civilians, left a total of approximately 623 (713 disputed) people dead and 521 people injured. Among the dead were approximately 108 civilians, 483 militants and security forces, and 32 other people deaths; a further 182 civilians, 117 militants and security forces, and 222 further people were injured.

Throughout the year, Baloch militants attacked security forces and military installations as well as civilian infrastructure and industrial (CPEC) projects. In the months of March, July, August, and October, militants engaged in coordinated attacks across multiple regions of Balochistan. For example, between March 26 and 30, a total of 88 coordinated attacks were reported across the region. This period marks the anniversary of Pakistan’s acquisition of the Baloch territory.

The BLA engaged primarily in the use of IED explosives to target military and civilian areas. For instance, on May 21, a militant’s IED targeted a school bus carrying the children of military officers in Khuzdar city and district; six children and two adults were killed in the explosion, and 53 people were injured.

Baloch militants engaged in attacks on China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) infrastructure and rail networks. For instance, from March 11 to 13, BLA militants hijacked a train with 450 passengers traveling from Quetta to Peshawar by

detonating an IED in front of the train and engaging security forces in small arms fire. In the ensuing hostage crisis, at least 33 BLA militants, 18 security forces, three rail workers, and five civilians were killed. Two CPEC-related attacks occurred on February 3, when BLA and BLF militants used IEDs to target two convoys of security forces traveling along a CPEC road in the Hironk area of Kech district. The IED blast killed three security forces and resulted in an extended attack on militant positions from responding military helicopters. A further notable attack occurred on November 30, during which a female BLF suicide bomber (first recorded use of a female in this role by the BLF) and BLF militants attacked a CPEC mining complex. The BLF claimed a total of 76 people killed in the attack, although the figures remain disputed, with six BLF militants confirmed dead.


Security forces have also engaged in intelligence-based operations (IBOs) to target militant holdouts. For instance, from August 7 to 9, government security forces thwarted an incursion of TTP militants from Afghanistan in which at least 33 militants were killed. In a follow-up operation, an additional four TTP militants were killed by SF. Over the year, Pakistani-created group names such as the TTP-affiliated Fitna al Khwarij [→ Pakistan (Islamist militant groups)], as well as BLA-affiliated Fitna al Hindustan, have been used to frame the ongoing violence and increasing attacks as an influence/proxy war operation by India. chb

PAKISTAN (ISLAMIST MILITANT GROUPS)

Intensity: 5 | Change: ↗ | Start: 2001

Conflict parties: al-Qaeda et al., [S-K, Le], TTP vs. gov-ernment, political parties

Conflict items: autonomy, system/ideology, national power



The limited war over national power, autonomy of the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and the orientation of the political system between Islamist militant groups, such as Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP) and Islamic State Khorasan Province (IS-KP), on the one hand, and the govern-ment and political parties, on the other, escalated to a war.

Throughout the year, clashes between the Islamist militants and government forces resulted in at least 1067 people killed, at least 311 individuals injured, and more than 10,000 people displaced. Violence primarily took place in Khy-ber Pakhtunkhwa’s (KP) North Waziristan District, while an increasing number of measures took place in Balochistan province as well. The most significant Islamist militant group remained TTP, while IS-KP was involved in minor attacks only. The use of heavy weapons was recurrent.

Most casualties stemmed from clashes between TTP militants and Security Forces (SFs) in the context of border infiltra-tion attempts from Afghan territory, where TTP is allegedly harbored by the Afghan Taliban government [→ Pakistan – Afghanistan]. For instance, between April 25 and 27, at night, TTP fighters trying to cross the border in Bibak Ghar area, North Waziristan District, KP, were repelled by Pakistani Fron-

tier Corps SFs, resulting in the killing of at least 54 militants. A further 30 TTP Islamists were eliminated in a similar clash in the Hassan Khel area, North Waziristan District, KP, during the night of July 2 to July 3. SFs repelled an attempt by TTP militants to cross the border to Zhob District, Balochistan, Balochistan on August 8, killing at least 33 militants.

TTP recurrently used heavy weapons to attack. For example, on March 4, TTP militants used two explosive-laden vehicles to storm a SF cantonment in Bannu District, KP. This attack left five SFs, 13 civilians, and 16 Islamists dead and wounded another 25 civilians. On July 20, around 150 TTP fighters attacked a Frontier Corps convoy with heavy weapons, killing eight SFs and injuring another eleven while sustaining four casualties themselves. Similarly, TTP's ambush of a military convoy in South Waziristan, KP, on September 13, killed twelve SFs and injured another four. The increasing activity of TTP in Balochistan figured in major attacks. For instance, on September 30, the Islamists stormed the Frontier Corps headquarters of Quetta town, eponymous district, Balochistan, leading to ten casualties and 32 injuries. Similarly, on November 11 in the capital of Islamabad, a suicide bomber exploded outside the District and Sessions Court, killing 12 people and injuring a further 36.

Pakistani SFs parallelly raided TTP hideouts, regularly resulting in the killing of militants. These SF raids significantly increased in scope by the end of July when the Pakistani government, on July 29, launched a major military operation against TTP in Bajaur District, KP, killing at least 18 militants, two civilians, and injuring another 20 people. The clash led to the displacement of more than 10,000 people. Though the operation ended in August, Special Forces raided alleged TTP hideouts in Bajaur later that year, including a November 13 operation in which 22 militants were killed and at least two others injured. Similarly, on September 13, SFs killed 35 Islamists in two separate raids in the districts of South Waziristan and Bannu, both in KP. On October 8, a raid in Orakzai District, KP, left 19 militants and eleven SFs dead. The most significant SF measure against TTP took place on October 18, when the Pakistani army killed at least 70 alleged fighters by airstrikes near the Afghan border in the districts of South and North Waziristan.

IS-KP was less active than TTP. However, the group was responsible for several target killings of political leaders of parties such as Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazl (JUI-F) and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Sami (JUI-S). For example, on February 28, an alleged IS-KP militant killed six people, including a JUI-S leader, and injured at least 15 by a suicide bombing at an Islamic seminary in Nowshera District, KP. On April 24, a JUI-F leader was among three casualties when an IED explosion hit their vehicle in the Amiri area, Kalat District, Balochistan. ith

of the 2024 general [→ 2024 Pakistan (opposition)] elections, which they alleged were rigged. The government had previously denied permission for a major rally in Minar-e-Pakistan. The same day, several PTL party leaders were arrested in Islamabad.

On February 11, lawyers aligned with the PTL protested in Islamabad, Punjab province, against the elevation of six judges to the Supreme Court, resulting in clashes with security forces. On February 13, unidentified gunmen killed PTL leader Qamar Javed Gujjar in Pindi Bhattian, Punjab province. In March, the PTL accused Karachi police of raiding its city headquarters. On March 17, a PTL activist was arrested in Islamabad for allegedly spreading anti-state content, and on March 23, authorities reportedly obstructed a PTL rally in Karachi.

In April, PTL held protests across several provinces demanding Imran Khan's release. A rally in Swabi city, KP, on April 13 condemned an alleged military drone strike. On April 17, Rawalpindi police arrested Imran Khan's sisters and senior leader Omar Ayub in Punjab Province, and on April 28, police arrested PTL activist Sanam Javed and her husband in Lahore, Punjab province.

On May 12, PTL continued to protest for Khan's release in Karachi, Sindh province. On May 18, the police arrested two PTL workers in Swabi, KP for criticizing security forces on social media. On May 27, PTL held two protests in Islamabad and Peshawar city, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Protests continued into June. On June 12, PTL Sindh rallied outside Karachi City Court demanding the release of Imran Khan and his wife, Bushra Bibi. On June 16, several PTL leaders were arrested after this protest.

On July 24, an anti-terrorism court in Rawalpindi city, Punjab province, issued arrest warrants for former President Arif Alvi and other senior PTL figures over their alleged role in past protests. The same day, police arrested senior leader Raja Basharat outside the court premises in Islamabad.

On August 5, Lahore police arrested more than 240 PTL activists during protests marking the second anniversary of Imran Khan's imprisonment. On August 21, Pakistan's Supreme Court granted bail to Imran Khan in several cases related to the May 9, 2023, violence, though he remained in jail due to other convictions. On August 22, Punjab police in Lahore arrested Imran Khan's nephew, Shahrez Khan, in connection with the May 9 riots. On August 25, an Anti-Terrorism Court in Faisalabad sentenced senior PTL leaders Omar Ayub, Shibli Faraz, and others to 10 years in prison for their alleged involvement in the May 9 unrest.

On August 26, police in Karachi arrested 20 PTL activists on sedition and arson charges following clashes with law enforcement. On September 9, an anti-terrorism court in Islamabad sentenced several senior PTL aides to 10 years in prison in a related case. On October 11, Lahore police arrested PTL social media activist Falak Javed on charges of attacking police officers. Authorities continued to enforce Section 144 restrictions across Punjab province. On October 28, PTL workers protested in Peshawar, KP, while on November 6, police blocked KP Chief Minister Sohail Afridi and party members from protesting at the Islamabad High Court. In mid-November, the opposition organized marches in Lahore and Karachi against the 27th Constitutional Amendment. On November 19, police in Rawalpindi arrested Imran Khan's sisters, Aleema Khanum, Azma Khan, and Noreen Niazi, during a sit-in, sparking further nationwide protests on November 22. In December, unrest intensified following a ban on prison visits and rumors regarding Khan's health. Authorities imposed Section 144 in Islamabad and Rawalpindi on December 1 to curb demonstrations. On December 20, a court sentenced

PAKISTAN (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **1973**

Conflict parties: opposition parties vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The violent crisis over the orientation of the political system and national power between Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) and the government continued.

Talks between the government and the PTI persisted at the beginning of the year. On February 8, PTI and other opposition parties staged nationwide protests, including in Swabi city, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (KP), marking the anniversary

Khan and his wife to 17 years in prison in a corruption case, while four other PTI leaders received 10-year sentences in Lahore the following day. These developments triggered a renewed wave of rallies, including a protest in Dera Ismail Khan and a sit-in led by Aleema Khan outside Adiala Jail on December 23. *lhf*

PAKISTAN (PASHTUNS / PTM)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **2018**

Conflict parties: Pashtuns, PTM vs. government
Conflict items: autonomy

The violent crisis over autonomy between the Pashtuns, organized in groups such as the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM), and the government continued.

On March 15, unknown actors set off a bomb that killed a cleric affiliated with PTM in Peshawar city, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province (KP).

In March, PTM members organized a series of international protests. On March 18, PTM-affiliated groups held a protest in front of the UNHRC in Geneva, Switzerland, condemning the treatment of Pashtuns by the Pakistani government. Further protests followed on March 26 in the Capital city of Amsterdam, Netherlands.

In April the protests continued. On April 13, PTM's Germany chapter demonstrated in the Capital city of Berlin, Germany, against the forced deportation of Afghan migrants from Pakistan. On April 19, a similar protest occurred in the Capital city of Helsinki, Finland.

The Federal Investigation Agency arrested Hussain Afridi, a PTM leader from Khyber district, Peshawar division, KP, on April 17 under the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (PECA), for allegedly posting anti-state content online. The following day, Afridi publicly distanced himself from the PTM and declared allegiance to the Pakistani state.

On June 8, a PTM-affiliated cleric was killed by unknown actors in Mir Ali town, Waziristan district, KP.

On July 18, local tribes held widespread peace rallies across the districts of Mohmand, North Waziristan, and South Waziristan, in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, continuing their rejection of military operations in the region. The following day, on July 19, protests continued in Waziristan district.

Protests continued in August. On August 1, PTM's Peshawar coordinator Bilal Orakzai and other PTM supporters were arrested by the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa police following a rally.

The protests died down in September and no further protests were held in the following months. On November 12, 10 PTM activists were reportedly abducted in Peshawar city, KP. On November 21, the brother and nephew of former PTM senior activist Gilaman Wazir were arrested by Bannu police in Bannu, KP. *lhf*

PAKISTAN (RELIGIOUS GROUPS – SUNNI MILITANTS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **1985**

Conflict parties: IS-K, JuA, JUI-F, TTP vs. Ahmadis, Christians, Hindus, Shiites, Sufis
Conflict items: subnational predominance

The violent crisis over subnational predominance between the Sunni groups Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K), Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA), Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Fazl (JUI-F), and Thereek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP) on the one hand, and Ahmadis, Christians, Hindus, Shiites, Sufis, on the other hand, continued.

Throughout the year, members of the public continued to attack the Christian and Ahmadi community in Pakistan. For instance, on April 18, hundreds of TLP members stormed the Ahmadi community's place of worship in Karachi, Sindh province, resulting in the killing of one person with bricks and sticks, in an attempt to prevent them from offering Friday prayers.

On April 24, an unidentified gunman shot and killed one Ahmadi person in Bhuler, Kasur district, Punjab province. On May 16, another unknown actor shot and killed an Ahmadi doctor at a hospital in Sargodha, Punjab province. On October 10, an unidentified gunman opened fire on Ahmadi people at the Bait-ul-Mahdi mosque in Gol Bazaar, Punjab province. The attack was repelled by security personnel, resulting in the death of the attacker and injuries to at least four civilians. On several instances throughout January and February, places of worship of the Ahmadi community were attacked and partially demolished in Lahore, Sialkot, and Rahim Yar Khan districts in Punjab province. For instance, on February 20, a group associated with TLP destroyed the minarets and arch of the local Ahmadiyya mosque in Throoh Mandi, Sialkot district. On May 13, the TLP allegedly desecrated 100 graves belonging to the Ahmadi community in Khushab district, Punjab province.

Attacks against Christians continued as well. For instance, on September 7, unidentified Muslims shot at two Christians as they traveled on the Sheikhpura highway to a Marian pilgrimage site in Punjab province, killing one and injuring the other. On December 5, unidentified gunmen shot and killed a Presbyterian pastor outside his home in Gujranwala, Punjab province. The pastor had survived an attack on September 28 in Iqbal Town, Islamabad, where he was shot and injured. Following violent attacks in November 2024, sectarian fighting between Sunni and Shia Muslims continued in Kurram district, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, at the beginning of the year. On January 1, tribal elders mediated an agreement between the parties. On January 4, unidentified gunmen attacked a convoy bringing aid to the district, injuring seven persons. *sag*

PAKISTAN (SINDH)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **1947**

Conflict parties: MQM vs. PLM-N, PPP vs. PTI vs. ANP vs. Pakistan Rangers, Sindh Rangers
Conflict items: subnational predominance, resources

The violent crisis over subnational predominance and resources in the Sindh Province involving the Mohajirs, Balochs, Sindhis, Pashtuns, and government-aligned paramilitary forces continued. Each ethnic group was supported by politically active parties: the Mohajirs by the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), the Balochs and Sindhis by the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), and the Pashtuns by the Awami National Party (ANP).

Multiple targeted shootings involving political party mem-

bers occurred across Sindh. On March 16, gunmen attacked a PPP Senator's convoy, killing a guard and injuring three in the Khenjoo area, Ghotki District. On April 17, two unknown assailants shot a PPP union council chairman in Orangi Town, Karachi city. On June 5, four assailants on motorbikes killed an MQM-P worker and wounded three in Liaquatabad district, Karachi. On November 10, unknown gunmen shot a PPP worker in Orangi Town, Karachi city. On December 17, six armed assailants shot an MQM-P joint union council in-charge in Alam Pride in Surjani Town, New Karachi.

Tensions deepened over the federal government's Green Pakistan Initiative, which proposed six new canals on the Indus River. Many Sindhis feared the project would divert water and sell fertile land to outsiders. On January 12, the Grand Democratic Alliance, PTL, and nationalist groups staged the "Bedari March" to demand an immediate halt.

On February 15, Punjab Chief Minister and the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) inaugurated a major irrigation project in Cholistan, Punjab Province, triggering protests across Sindh and a state crackdown. The next day, hundreds of farmers rallied in Bhit Shah, warning that the canals would reduce Sindh's water share. On March 4, thousands protested again, leading to clashes and unknown casualties. On March 13, the Sindh Assembly unanimously rejected the canal projects, declaring them illegal under the 1991 Water Accord.

Despite assurances from Sindh Chief Minister Murad Ali Shah, protests intensified in April. From April 18–29, lawyers staged a 12-day sit-in at Babarloi Bypass, Khairpur city, paralyzing highways and railways until the Council of Common Interests announced a pause on the project. Yet violence persisted: on April 20, gunmen shot three protesters in Babarloi area; on April 27, clashes in Karachi injured eight, including two policemen and a lawyer.

On May 20 and 21, clashes between protesters and the police killed one person and injured six policemen in Moro city, Naushahro Feroze district. Moreover, protesters torched vehicles and stormed the home of Sindh's Home Minister, and the looting and arson left two more protesters dead and several wounded. On October 12, the PPP-led Sindh government imposed Section 144, a legal provision banning protests and public gatherings for one month across the province.

On December 7, police clashed with participants during a Sindh Culture Day rally near the FTC Flyover on Shahrahe-Faisal, Karachi East District, after attempting to divert the procession under Section 144. Police reported stone-pelting and alleged firing by participants, prompting tear gas and baton charges. Five police officers were injured, about 45 people were detained, and a terrorism case was registered. MQM-P later condemned the incident, accusing authorities of allowing a "state within a state" in Karachi city.

Throughout March, PPP and PML-N clashed over power-sharing, funds, and Punjab's local government law, though both pledged monthly reviews to preserve their alliance. Additionally, tensions between the PPP and MQM persisted over the canal project, as the PPP opposed the scheme even while backing Sharif's federal government in Islamabad. nmt

PAKISTAN (SRA / SINDH)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2020**

Conflict parties: SRA vs. government

Conflict items: secession, resources

The violent crisis over the secession of the Sindh province

and resources between the Sindhudesh Revolutionary Army (SRA) and the Pakistani government continued.

In early 2025, SRA primarily targeted law enforcement, Punjabi civilians, and infrastructure in Sindh. On January 3, SRA attacked two alleged state informants and officials of the extremist Sunni Rabita Council (Sipah-e-Sahaba) in Matli city, Badin district, Sindh. SRA claimed one died and the other was severely injured, and justified the attack as retaliation for promoting religious extremism and facilitating Punjabi settlement in the Badin district. On February 28, SRA launched a grenade attack on Karachi's Preedi Police Station, killing one officer and injuring three, citing retaliation for the enslavement of Sindhis and exploitation of Sindh's resources.

In April, SRA increased operations. For example, on April 13, SRA targeted National Logistics Corporation (NCL) oil tankers on the Naushahro Feroze National Highway Bypass, injuring several. On April 14, SRA attacked an oil tanker in Jatti Chowk on the Sujawal–Badin Road, Jati town, Sujawal district, Sindh, injuring two Punjabi contractors. On April 15, SRA launched a grenade on Jamshoro Police Station, Jamshoro district, Sindh, in retaliation for police and Counter-Terrorism Department (CTD) actions. On April 22, SRA attacked a passenger train in the Hussainabad area of Hyderabad District, shooting at Punjabi settlers, injuring several.

From August to December, the SRA carried out limited attacks. On August 18, the CTD foiled an SRA bomb attack on a railway track and arrested three SRA militants in the Qasimabad area of Hyderabad city, Sindh province, recovering hand grenades, explosives, detonators, and ball bearings. On October 20, the SRA carried out a hand grenade attack on the Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP) house in Dadu district, Sindh province, warning Sindh Police and CTD officers against participating in operations against the group.

Government projects fueled further reprisals. For example, on February 15, Punjab Chief Minister Maryam Nawaz Sharif and Army Chief Asim Munir inaugurated a large agricultural project in Cholistan, Punjab, sparking protests across Sindh and a forceful crackdown. SRA condemned such initiatives, including the Green Pakistan Initiative, as deepening exploitation and environmental degradation in Sindh.

The year also marked strengthened alliances. On March 2, SRA joined a high-level Baloch Raji Aajoi Sangar (BRAS) meeting with BLA, BLF, and BRG to unify military and diplomatic strategies against Pakistan and China in Balochistan and Sindh province under a single command.

Pakistani authorities continue counterterrorism efforts against the SRA in Sindh Province. On April 16, the CTD arrested an SRA militant plotting to bomb a railway track near the Ghaghar Phatak area, Karachi city. On June 30, a coordinated CTD operation in Shamir Shoro Goth, near Qasimabad area, Hyderabad district, captured three suspected SRA terrorists. On November 6, the CTD arrested an alleged India-backed SRA militant in the Anwar Villas Road area of Qasimabad town, Hyderabad city; two accomplices escaped. nmt

PAPUA NEW GUINEA (BOUGAINVILLE)

Intensity: **1** | Change: • | Start: **1964**

Conflict parties: Autonomous Bougainville Government vs. national government

Conflict items: secession, resources

The dispute over secession and resources between the Au-

onomous Bougainville Government (ABG), on the one hand, and the national government, on the other, continued. Throughout the year, ABG advanced its goal of attaining independence from the national government. Both actors agreed on the ratification of the results of the 2019 non-binding referendum, in which 97.7 percent chose full independence from Papua New Guinea. ABG rejected any alternative such as greater autonomy as proposed by the national government. On June 26, bilateral talks led to the Melanesian Agreement, in which both sides committed to a peaceful and constitutional pathway to potential independence. The agreement also acknowledged the referendum outcome and outlined the path for ratification at the National Parliament. On December 3, both governments agreed on a roadmap for the ratification at some point during the second half of 2026. Further, it stressed that this is a unique constellation, which should not be interpreted as a precedent for other ethnic-based political movements to pursue independence from Papua New Guinea.

On March 12, ABG set the date of the unilateral independence to 09/01/27. On the same day, the ABG House of Representatives was converted into the Constituent Assembly for the Republic of North Solomons. On September 5, Ishmael Toroama was re-elected president of ABG, granting continuity to the political agenda of Bougainville's push for independence. [som](#)

PHILIPPINES (CPP, NPA)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **1968**

Conflict parties: CPP, NPA vs. government
Conflict items: system/ideology

The violent crisis over the orientation of the political system between the Communist Party of the Philippines–New People's Army (CPP-NPA) and the government continued. After ceasefire efforts in 2024 failed, Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) operations and CPP-NPA responses persisted. Across 77 incidents, at least 128 were reported killed (115 CPP-NPA, twelve AFP, and one civilian) and 32 reported injured (22 AFP, eight CPP-NPA, one civilian, and one Citizen Armed Force Geographical Unit member). Clashes displaced 6,818 people. No ceasefire agreement or negotiations emerged by year's end.

Throughout 2025, AFP conducted clearing operations in Caraga, Bicol, Eastern Visayas, Western Visayas, and the Negros Island Region, often following alleged reports of CPP-NPA presence. The AFP framed several of these as operations against suspected commanders, including the reported killing of an alleged CPP-NPA leader in Guinobatan, Albay on January 17 and the reported killing of senior leader Myrna Sularte in Butuan City on February 12. During the same period, CPP-NPA fighters reportedly carried out ambushes and sabotage, including allegedly ambushing an AFP convoy in Matuguinao, Samar on February 2 that killed one AFP soldier and claiming responsibility for burning heavy construction equipment in La Libertad, Negros Oriental on February 8.

From March onward, reporting referenced more frequent, intense engagements and expansion into other regions, particularly across Mindanao. On March 4, AFP operations targeting CPP-NPA forces in the Pantaron Range near Cabanglasan, Bukidnon involved air support from a fighter jet (FA-50) that later crashed, leaving two pilots dead. AFP units also described recovering explosive material from encounter sites

with CPP-NPA fighters, including IEDs seized after a clash in Cabanglasan on March 10 and multiple IEDs recovered after clashes in Kabugao, Apayao on April 5. IED use was reported later in the year when a blast the AFP attributed to the CPP-NPA in Balatan, Camarines Sur killed two AFP soldiers and injured three more on December 19.

The latter part of the year also saw episodic but substantive civilian impacts. Fighting and follow-up operations in Kabugao displaced about 1,330 people between April 5 and 11, and fighting in Uson, Masbate displaced around 1,978 people between July 19 and 27. On August 12, an hour-long firefight between local CPP-NPA forces and the AFP in Baco, Oriental Mindoro reportedly killed three AFP personnel and injured three others, while about 2,115 people were displaced. Reported physical harm to civilians was rarer. On October 28, crossfire during an AFP and CPP-NPA firefight in Moises Padilla, Negros Occidental killed one child, and on December 3, AFP and CPP-NPA clashes in San Jose de Buan, Samar allegedly injured one civilian. Reporting in both cases did not clearly attribute responsibility for the civilian harm. [aha](#)

PHILIPPINES (MILF)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **1977**

Conflict parties: MILF vs. government
Conflict items: autonomy, system/ideology, resources

The violent crisis over the autonomy of the Bangsamoro Republic as well as the orientation of the political system and resources involving the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), unidentified armed groups and the government continued. Rising numbers of former MILF and MNLF combatants laid down their arms within the government-led normalization process in the beginning of the year, yet that development has since stagnated. Political changes in the leadership of the Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA) led to inner division within the MILF. The first Bangsamoro parliamentary elections have been postponed following a Supreme Court ruling, further undermining trust in the peace process. Security forces continued regionwide operations against armed violence, especially in light of the midterm elections in May 2025.

On January 23, MILF members shot and killed two soldiers and injuring twelve others in Basilan Province, while the soldiers were assigned to escort visiting UN staff. On May 11 and 12 security agencies reported several incidents, before and during the midterm elections. On May 11, for example, two gunmen shot and wounded two civilians. (add more measure) On October 28, 200 gunmen from the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF), the armed wing of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), stormed Tipo-Tipo Municipality, Basilan Province injuring four civilians and displacing others in relation to a clan conflict. 12,000 residents temporarily fled their homes for 24 hours until the tensions ended. [ajw](#)

TAJIKISTAN (GORNO-BADAKHSHAN)

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **1992**

Conflict parties: drug traffickers, Pamiris vs. government

Conflict items: autonomy, subnational predominance

The non-violent crisis over autonomy and subnational predominance in the Badakhshan Mountainous Autonomous Region (GBAO) between the Pamiri people, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued.

Throughout 2025, Tajik authorities continued its campaign of imprisonment and arrests of members of the Pamiri community. Six Pamiri political prisoners died in prisons in separate instances on January 13, February 25, June 9, June 23 and 25, and November 30. While some inmates allegedly had some pre-existing health problems, in other cases, sources close to the deceased reported a rapid decline in their health shortly before their death. International human rights organizations framed these deaths in the context of "systematic repression of Pamiri people", and stated that they had not received the necessary medical treatment in prison. Furthermore, authorities continued to detain Pamiri individuals, typically under the pretext of countering Islamist extremism. For example, on March 9, police detained around 20 residents of Pamiri origin in the Darvoz neighbourhood of Dushanbe. Authorities found them guilty of collaboration with the Islamist group Ansarullah.

In February, following the death of spiritual leader Aga Khan in Portugal, Tajik authorities allegedly obstructed the commemorative events carried out by predominantly Pamiri Ismailis both in the capital Dushanbe and Khorog, GBAO, on February 5 and February 11, respectively. mdp

TAJIKISTAN (ISLAMIST GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1997**

Conflict parties: Islamist groups vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The violent crisis over the orientation of the political system, ideology, and national power between the government, on the one hand, and Islamist groups like Jamaat Ansarullah, on the other, continued.

Violent encounters between Islamists and authorities occurred already early into the year. On February 3, an incident occurred in the high-security prison in Vahdat, Districts of Republican Subordination. Inmates associated with Islamist backgrounds allegedly attacked guards with improvised knives, prompting security forces to use live fire and killing between three and nine prisoners. While authorities described the event as a riot, civil society organizations and independent media raised concerns about possible deliberate killings.

Throughout the year, authorities imprisoned Islamists for planning or actually perpetrating terrorist attacks. On January 28, the prosecutor of the Kulob region announced the arrest of nine people in connection with an explosion on 05/01/24 in Kulob, Khatlon Province, which was officially classified as an act of Islamist terrorism. Furthermore, on February

14, the Prosecutor General's Office of the capital Dushanbe announced the arrest of around 30 in connection with an alleged plan to carry out an attack in Vahdat, part of Tajikistan's districts of Republican Subordination, in 2024. Officials had associated this plan with the terrorist group ISIS Khorasan.

As in the previous monitoring period, violent incidents occurred in proximity to the border with Afghanistan. For example, on November 26, a drone originating from Afghanistan attacked a mining compound near the border and killed three Chinese workers in Shamsiddin Shohin District, Khatlon Province. A few days later, on November 30, unidentified members of an armed group entered Tajik territory from Afghanistan and attacked Chinese employees of a road construction company in Darvoz District, Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region, killing two workers and injuring two others. Tajik authorities declared both incidents as terrorist attacks, with regional media alleging an affiliation with Islamist groups like ISIS. Subsequently, on December 24, gunmen allegedly affiliated with Jamaat Ansarullah entered Tajik territory from Afghanistan yet again, clashing with Tajik border guards in the Shamsiddin Shohin district. The confrontation killed two officers and three assailants. mdp

THAILAND (ISLAMIST SEPARATISTS / SOUTHERN BORDER PROVINCES)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1902**

Conflict parties: BRN, PULO vs. government

Conflict items: secession, system/ideology

The violent crisis over the orientation of the political system and the secession of several southern border provinces between various Islamist separatist groups, such as Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) and Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO), on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued.

After discussions in March and October regarding peace talks, the head of the government's Southern Peace Dialogue Panel, held talks in November with the BRN group in Malaysia, organized by a Malaysian facilitator.

Despite the ongoing peace talks, acts of violence between security forces and insurgents remained frequent in the four southern provinces of Yala, Pattani, Songkhla, and Narathiwat. On January 13, suspected insurgents killed two police officials in an ambush with an IED in Sri Banphot, Narathiwat province. Later that month, on January 23, a bomb explosion injured seven military rangers at a Buddhist monastery in Rangae district, Narathiwat province.

In March, the conflict heated up, with 32 persons injured and four persons killed. In one incident, on March 9, insurgents drove a truck and car to the Sungai district office, Narathiwat Province, and opened fire on volunteer defense officers, resulting in two fatalities and eleven injuries. On March 10, unknown gunmen ambushed and killed a defense volunteer in Krong Pinang district, Yala province. These dynamics continued up to May, such as on May 2, when six armed men on motorcycles attacked a house and killed three people, including a nine-year-old girl, and injured a further two in Tak Bae and Chanae districts, Narathiwat province. The southern police chief stated that the same insurgent groups were behind the 18 most recent attacks in Thailand's southern provinces, and that 17 suspects were detained as the investigations continued.

On June 16, six insurgents opened fire at two women in Thung Yang Daeng district, Pattani province, killing one and injuring the other. On June 20, three bombs exploded near a Red Cross Cultural fair in Pattani province, injuring seven individuals.

In August, multiple bomb attacks took place in Narathiwat, Pattani and Yala Provinces, injuring up to eight individuals and causing damage to vehicles. For instance, on August 21, a car bomb in Tak Bai district, Narathiwat province, injured three defense volunteers in a detonation near their security checkpoint. On August 31, insurgents detonated explosives and burned car tires in five districts of Narathiwat province and Muang district of Yala province, injuring two civilians.

On September 12, a police operation, intended to capture suspected insurgents, failed to do so despite a blockade around a village where gunfire was exchanged. This escape in Saba Yoi district, Songkhla province, injured at least one insurgent before fleeing into the nearby mountains.

Lastly, on October 16, suspected insurgents planted and detonated an IED in Yi-Ngo district, Narathiwat province, injuring up to 14 civilians and police officers and killing one civilian.

lwi

THAILAND (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **2** | Change:  | Start: **2006**

Conflict parties: pro-democracy activists vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The violent crisis between the opposition, including opposing parties and individuals, and the government, de-escalated to a non-violent crisis. Tensions revolved mainly around amnesty for persons charged under lèse-majesté legislation. During the course of the year, pressure by authorities persisted in the context of Section 112 of the Criminal Code, which explicitly foresees imprisonment for threats to and defamation of the king. On February 15, the National Anti-Corruption Commission indicted 44 Members of Parliament from the progressive People's Party, all formerly associated with the dissolved Move Forward Party, for breaching ethical standards in connection with their sponsorship of a bill to amend Section 112. On July 17, the House of Representatives passed three amnesty bills but rejected two versions submitted by civil society groups and the former Move Forward Party during their first readings. Unlike the two rejected bills, none of the three passed legislations offered amnesty for offenders of the lèse-majesté law. Furthermore, on August 22, a court in the capital Bangkok acquitted former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra of charges under the lèse-majesté law. Foreign relations have influenced domestic political dynamics as well. On August 29, the Constitutional Court removed Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra from office for an ethics violation, supposedly having taken place during a call to the Cambodian Senate President shortly before the armed border conflict between the two countries [→ Cambodia – Thailand]. On December 12, Thai Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul dissolved parliament, citing the deadly border dispute as one of the challenges of his minority government. General elections to the House of Representatives are scheduled for February 8 2026. lwi

UZBEKISTAN (KARAKALPAKSTAN)

Intensity: **1** | Change:  | Start: **2022**

Conflict parties: Karakalpaks vs. government

Conflict items: autonomy

The dispute between Karakalpaks and the government over the autonomy of the Republic of Karakalpakstan continued. Latent tensions and repression directed towards Karakalpak activists have remained. On February 11, a Karakalpak activist died in detention. Allegations of torture reinforce impressions from reports of sustained ill-treatment of Karakalpak detainees since the suppression of protests in 06/22. Furthermore, on April 29, authorities transferred a Karakalpak activist from pre-trial detention to four years and seven months of home imprisonment. This follows months of advocacy regarding his detention conditions. Throughout the year, courts in Uzbekistan sentenced several Karakalpaks on charges of attempting to overthrow the constitutional order or disseminating materials threatening public security and order. For instance, on April 17, the district court in Taxtakopir, Karakalpakstan, sentenced a Karakalpak activist who has been extradited from Kazakhstan under reported pressure by the Uzbek government, to two and a half years in prison. sde

VIETNAM (MONTAGNARDS)

Intensity: **2** | Change:  | Start: **1958**

Conflict parties: Montagnard ethnic group, Montagnard Stand for Justice, Montagnard Support Group Inc. vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology

The non-violent crisis between the Montagnards and the Vietnamese government continued.


On February 23, more than 60 Montagnard Christian refugees were arrested in Bangkok, Thailand, during a memorial service. Among those detained were members of the Montagnards Stand for Justice (MSFJ), a group previously labeled a terrorist organization by Vietnam. Many remained in detention due to unpaid fines. On March 6, Montagnard religious activist Ro Cham Grong was sentenced to seven years in prison by authorities in Gia Lai province. On May 24, Y Thinh Nie was sentenced to nine years in prison and four years of probation for alleged links to FULRO and MSFJ, both designated "terrorist organizations" by Vietnam, while on May 30, pastor Y Yich was released after serving 12 years in prison for promoting Degar Protestantism. On August 22, government authorities increased surveillance on house churches in Dak Lak Province following commemorations of the International Day Commemorating Victims of Violence Based on Religion or Belief. On October 8, Dak Lak police arrested Y Nuen Ayun, a pastor of the Montagnard Evangelical Church of Christ, on charges of "undermining national unity" and on October 9, at least six Montagnard Christians were summoned for questioning by local authorities. On November 25, Thailand's Court of Appeals upheld an order to extradite Y Quynh Bdap, co-founder of Montagnards Stand for Justice, to Vietnam. Vietnam continued its suppression of Montagnard religious communities through intimidation and arrests, extending to


ASIA AND OCEANIA

transnational repression as the Vietnamese government and Thai authorities increase cooperation targeting Montagnards asylum seekers. tln, pad


WEST ASIA, NORTH AFRICA, AND AFGHANISTAN

VIOLENT CONFLICTS IN WEST ASIA, NORTH AFRICA, AND AFGHANISTAN IN 2025 (SUBNATIONAL LEVEL)







CONFLICT INTENSITIES IN WEST-ASIA, NORTH-AFRICA, AND AFGHANISTAN IN 2025 COMPARED TO 2024



CONFLICT INTENSITIES BY CONFLICT ITEMS IN WEST-ASIA, NORTH-AFRICA, AND AFGHANISTAN IN 2025



CONFLICT INTENSITIES BY CONFLICT TYPE IN WEST-ASIA, NORTH-AFRICA, AND AFGHANISTAN IN 2025



REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT

In the region West Asia, North Africa, and Afghanistan, HIIK observed a total of 64 active conflicts in 2025, a decrease of two compared to the past year. Overall, 44 conflicts were on a violent level, representing no change with 2024. Altogether, six full-scale wars and three limited wars were observed in 2025. This represents an increase of one full war and a decrease of two limited wars, compared to the previous year.

By far the most violence occurred in the larger region of Israel, the State of Palestine (PNA°), Lebanon, and Jordan, which was dominated by several ongoing wars, following the escalation on 10/07/2023 with Hamas' attack on Israel.

Firstly, the war over the creation of a sovereign Palestinian state and resources between the State of Israel and Palestinian armed groups, most notably Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), continued [→ Israel (Hamas et al.)]. Throughout the year, both Hamas and the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), conducted air strikes and ground offensives. Most notably, the IDF killed Hamas leader Muhammed Sinwar, along with several other high-ranking officials. Hostages continued to be taken and released, with almost 2,000 Palestinians released by Israel on October 13. A ceasefire was also agreed upon in October, with both Israel and Hamas approving the first part of the US-proposed peace agreement for Gaza. However, both sides committed multiple ceasefire violations following the agreement.

Closely connected to the war between Israel and Hamas, the war over the creation and control of a sovereign Palestinian state, resources, decolonization, and the orientation of the political system between the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) and the Palestinian population, on the one hand, and the Israeli government, military, as well as Israeli settlers, on the other, continued [→ Israel - State of Palestine° (PNA)]. The IDF continued to conduct air strikes resulting in the deaths of Palestinian civilians, while settler attacks against Palestinian residents in the West Bank persisted. Diplomatic efforts also continued, reflecting ongoing attempts to reach a peaceful solution. For example, the UN General Assembly voted in support of a two-state solution on September 12.

The war-level conflict between Israel and Hamas remained closely linked to the conflict between Hamas' proxy Hezbollah and Israel [→ Israel (Hezbollah)], as well as to the war between the Lebanese government and Israel [→ Israel (Lebanon)], fueling inner Palestinian tensions in the country [→ Lebanon (Inter-Palestinian tensions)]. Following a ceasefire agreement on 11/27/2024, the war between Hezbollah and the Israeli government over ideological and territorial disputes de-escalated to a limited war. The agreed ceasefire entailed the disarmament of Hezbollah by the Lebanese government as well as the withdrawal of Hezbollah fighters from the south of the Litani river, as well as IDF forces from its posts in southern Lebanon. Both sides were directed to halt any offensive operations, however, neither fully complied with the agreement. Hezbollah refused to disarm and the IDF kept multiple military positions in southern Lebanon, continuing to deliver air strikes on Hezbollah operatives in southern Lebanon.

Inner-Palestinian tensions remained in Lebanon, but de-escalated into a non-violent crisis [→ Lebanon (inner-Palestinian tensions)]. However, the internal conflict between the opposition and the government of Lebanon [→ Lebanon (opposition)] escalated into a violent crisis, with a new election in January further intensifying tensions with Hezbollah regarding the power balance within Lebanese state institutions. Furthermore, the violent crisis over the orientation of the political system and subnational pre-dominance between the Lebanese government and Islamist militant group the so-called Islamic State (IS) de-escalated to a non-violent crisis [→ Lebanon (IS)], with only a few arrests of IS members having taken place in Lebanon.

Israel's neighboring country Jordan was also affected by the ongoing wars, as Jordan is host to around 2.2 million Palestinian refugees, and about half of its 12 million inhabitants are of Palestinian descent. The violent crisis over the political system between various civil and opposition groups, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued [→ Jordan (opposition)], with protests linked to the war in Israel and the Palestinian territories [→ Israel - State of Palestine° (PNA)]. Lastly, the violent crisis over the issue of drug trafficking from Syria between smuggler groups, on the one hand, and regional military and border forces – most notably from Jordan, Syria, and Iraq – on the other hand, continued [→ Syria, Jordan (Captagon)].

Further North-East, in Syria, the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024 marked a major political change. The new interim government under Ahmed al-Sharaa sought to consolidate authority across the country but faced resistance from several actors. Most notably, clashes between government forces and armed groups linked to the former regime escalated in the coastal region in March, resulting in thousands of fatalities and significant displacement [→ Syria (opposition)]. At the same time, negotiations over the integration of the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into Syrian state structures did not result in an agreement, and armed clashes resumed later in the year [→ Syria (Kurdish groups)]. In southern Syria, disputes over local authority and security arrangements escalated into a war between Druze factions, Bedouin armed groups, and government forces in Suwayda governorate, causing nearly 2,000 fatalities and large-scale displacement [→ Syria (Suwayda / Southern Syria)].

In relations with external actors, tensions with the USA decreased following the establishment of the new government [→ Syria - USA]. In northern Syria, hostilities between Türkiye and the SDF continued at a lower intensity than in the previous year [→ Syria (SDF - Türkiye / Northern Syria)]. Israel expanded its military operations through repeated airstrikes and ground incursions and conducted talks with the new leadership [→ Israel - Syria]. IS remained active at a comparatively low level in Syria and was targeted by Syrian, Kurdish, and international counterterrorism operations [→ Syria (IS)].

In Iraq, protests continued over unemployment, salaries, public services, electricity shortages, and water supply. Demonstrations led to clashes between protesters and security forces in federal Iraq and the Kurdistan region, where disputes over delayed salary payments under the Kurdistan Regional Government escalated into violent confrontations and restrictions on protest activity and media coverage [→ Iraq (opposition); Iraq (KRG - opposition)]. Rivalries among Shiite militant groups continued, while attacks on military installations and energy infrastructure in northern Iraq and the Kurdistan Region also continued [→ Iraq (Shiite militant groups)]. IS carried out sporadic attacks against civilians and security forces, while counterterrorism operations continued throughout the year [→ Iraq (IS)].

In the most Eastern part of this HIIK region, in Afghanistan, the violent crisis over the orientation of the political system

between the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP), on the one hand, and the Taliban-ruled Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA), on the other, continued, with ISKP carrying out attacks against IEA authorities and religious minorities throughout the year [→ Afghanistan (ISKP)]. The demarcation of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and mutual security allegations remained an issue between the IEA and Pakistan, leading to a particularly violent phase of the conflict in October [→ Afghanistan – Pakistan]. On its western border with Iran, the dispute over water rights to the Helmand river continued as a non-violent crisis between the two states [→ Afghanistan – Iran].

In Iran, the violent crisis over international power and ideology between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Israel escalated to a war, reaching a violent peak in June during twelve days of intense direct warfare between both states, with the overall respective death tolls reported by Israel as 33 and by Iran as at least 1,060 [→ Iran – Israel]. The USA joined the conflict on Israel's side, striking Iranian nuclear facilities during its "Operation Midnight Hammer", leading Iran to retaliate by striking a USA military base in Qatar [→ Iran – USA]. This so-called Twelve-Day War was further influenced by Israel's various interconnected conflicts with Iranian-backed groups in the region, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, the Houthis in Yemen, and militias in Syria and Iraq [→ Israel (Hezbollah); Israel (Hamas et al.); Israel, Yemen (al Houthi)]. The war also impacted Iranian opposition and civil society protests, leading to an increasing number of police raids and politically motivated executions with protests escalating across the country just a few days before the end of the year [→ Iran (opposition)]. Meanwhile, the violent crisis over autonomy between Iran and the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK) continued in the west of the country, with PJAK continuing to carry out attacks against Iranian security forces, while the Iranian government arrested several alleged PJAK members [→ Iran (PJAK)]. In Iran's southeastern Sistan and Baluchistan region, the violent crisis between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Sunni militant groups, such as Jaish al-Adl, continued, with numerous armed attacks and clashes between militants and security forces reported throughout the year, leading several Baluch separatist groups to merge under the name of Jabh-e Mobarizin-e Mardomi (JMM), or People's Resistance Front in December [→ Iran (Sunni Militant Groups / Sistan Baluchistan)].

On the Arabian Peninsula, In Bahrain, the violent crisis over national power and the orientation of the political system between various Shiite oppositional groups, such as Al-Wafaq, on the one hand, and the Sunni-majority government on the other, de-escalated to a non-violent crisis. Non-violent acts of protest occurred throughout the year [→ Bahrain (opposition)]. In Kuwait, the dispute over national power and the orientation of the political system between opposition groups such as the Bedouins and the Emir-led government continued. The parliament of Kuwait remained suspended, after the Emir had dissolved the legislative assembly on 10/05/2024 [→ Kuwait (opposition)].

In Saudi Arabia, the violent crisis over the orientation of the political system between various opposition groups and the Saudi Arabian government continued. On May 23, the Free Masked Man Movement emerged as a semi-organized online protest movement against government overspending, deteriorating living conditions and limited economic prospects. The non-violent crisis over ideology and international power between ISIS and affiliated militant groups on the one hand, and Saudi Arabia, supported by the USA and the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS (GCDI), on the other, continued [→ Saudi Arabia (AQAP)].

In Yemen, the violent crisis over the orientation of the political system between al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), on the one hand, and the internationally recognized Yemeni government, headed by the internally divided Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), which is comprised of the Southern Transitional Council (STC) and Saudi-backed forces of the former government, mostly affiliated with the Islah party, on the other, continued. On December 29, the STC reported the killing of a prominent AQAP leader [→ Yemen (AQAP)]. The dispute over subnational predominance and ideology between Ansar Allah, commonly known as al-Houthi, and AQAP saw no renewed violence [→ Yemen (al Houthi - AQAP)]. Furthermore, the violent crisis over secession of southern Yemen between al Hirak, also known as the Southern Movement and dominated by the STC, backed by the United Arab Emirates (UAE), on the one hand, and the government represented by the Saudi-backed PLC on the other, continued. Despite STC and the Islah party both being part of the internationally recognized Yemeni government and being represented in the PLC, violent infighting between the parties continued. The Southern Movement also remained internally divided between the STC and local Southern Yemeni tribes, with violent clashes occurring between tribal forces and the STC-affiliated Security Belt Forces throughout the year [→ Yemen (al Hirak)].

The limited war over national power between Ansar Allah, commonly known as the al-Houthi, supported by the Iranian government, on the one hand, and the PLC, supported by the Saudi Arabia-led coalition, anti-Houthi popular resistance, and tribal forces, on the other, de-escalated to a violent crisis [→ Saudi Arabia, Yemen (Al Houthi)]. Both conflict factions remained internally divided, with the PLC experiencing violent infighting [→ Yemen (Al-Hirak / Southern Yemen)], while al-Houthi struggled with severe losses of political leadership and infrastructure through air strikes by Israel [→ Israel, Yemen (al-Houthi)] and an USA-UK coalition [→ Yemen (Red Sea)].

The violent crisis over ideology and the State of Palestine^o between Israel and the Yemeni Ansar Allah, commonly known as al-Houthi, backed by Iran, continued. Starting on 10/19/23, the al-Houthi forces conducted missile and drone strikes targeted towards Israel, claiming the attacks as acts of protest against Israeli military action in Gaza [→ Israel (Hamas et al.)]. Israel bombed the Houthi-controlled capital of Sana'a throughout August and September, leading to several dozen casualties including the Prime Minister of the Houthi parallel-government. Communications between the al-Houthi group and Hamas leadership announcing a temporary end to the Houthis' campaign targeting Israel leaked on November 11 [→ Israel, Yemen (al-Houthi)].

The violent crisis over the State of Palestine^o between Ansar Allah, commonly known as al-Houthi, and the multinational cooperation between the USA, UK et al. escalated to a limited war in 2025.

The al-Houthi forces continued a maritime campaign they launched in late 2023, through which they sought to disrupt international shipping in the Red Sea as a protest against Western support for Israeli military action in the Gaza [→ Israel (Hamas et al.)]. After al-Houthi forces claimed UAV and missile attacks against US naval assets in international waters of the Red Sea, the USA launched a large-scale air campaign beginning in mid-March. In early May, Oman mediated an operational pause affecting al-Houthi Red Sea operations as well as air strikes by the multinational coalition [→ Yemen (Red Sea)].

All the way West, In Mauritania, the government oppressed IRA members, other activists, and Black Mauritians on multiple occasions. Authorities violently dissolved protests and conducted arrests and criminal convictions [→ Mauritania (anti-slavery activists)].

In Egypt, the government continued to use force against militants and regime critics on at least two occasions. Several regime critics died in prison [→ Egypt (opposition)]. Conflict between Christians and Muslims continued with violent attacks on Christian homes and abductions and forced conversions remaining a problem [→ Egypt (Christians – Muslims)].

In Algeria, the government continued to arrest and sentence members of trade unions, opposition parties, and the Hirak movement, including denying an opposition party access to adequate locations [→ Algeria (opposition)]. Moreover, the government pursued criminal cases against Kabyle activists, journalists, and unionists, all of whom were portrayed as linked to it. The government sustained judicial pressure and restrictions on assembly and association [→ Algeria (Berbers / Kabylia)]. Additionally, military authorities arrested and killed members of different Islamist factions, including the al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the IS, and other minor factions [→ Algeria (Islamist militant groups)]. Tensions between Algeria and Morocco remained unresolved [→ Algeria – Morocco].

In Morocco, violence in the first half of the year featured several reported Moroccan drone strikes east of the Merm, attacking Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro (POLISARIO), and at least two artillery incidents near a UN site. POLISARIO claimed attacks on the Moroccan military that remained unconfirmed [→ Morocco (POLISARIO / Western Sahara°)]. Notably, mass protests against the government incited by the collective Gen Z 212 during the second half of the year, escalated [→ Morocco (opposition)].

Throughout the year, Tunisia witnessed widespread protests and government crackdowns reflecting growing political tension, social unrest, and public discontent over governance, civil liberties, and economic conditions [→ Tunisia (opposition)]. Moreover, authorities continued to arrest alleged terrorists [→ Tunisia (Islamist militant groups)].

In Libya, while the violence crisis over tribal issues, the orientation of the political system, subnational predominances, and resources between, among other, the Tebu and Tuareg tribes as well as the Government of National Unity (GNU) and the National Liberation Army (LNA) continued [→ Libya (tribes)], one conflict intensified: The country saw increased activity from the so-called Islamic State (IS), putting the dispute to the non-violent crisis stage [→ Libya (IS)]. Besides, the violent crisis over national power, resources, and the orientation of the political system between the UN-backed GNU, on the one hand, and the rival Government of National Stability (GNS), on the other, continued [→ Libya (opposition)].

Türkiye witnessed three domestic violent crises this year, of which one de-escalated from a limited war. The violent crisis over the orientation of the political system, national power, and resources between the so-called Islamic State (IS) on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued [→ Türkiye (IS)]. Besides, the violent crisis over national power and the orientation of the political system, between the Republican People's Party (CHP), the Victory Party (ZP), and the Peoples' Democratic Congress (HDK), and the Turkish government run by the People's Alliance lead by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP), on the other, continued [→ Türkiye (opposition)]. Throughout the year, law enforcement authorities intensified legal action against the CHP, initiating investigations and ordering the arrest of numerous party officials, including at least 100 party members and 16 mayors. On March 19, police detained Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu on several charges including corruption and money laundering. He was arrested four days later and sent to Marmara Prison. Despite a four-day ban on public demonstrations issued by the government, country-wide protests erupted following the arrest. The largest rally took place in Istanbul with at least 200,000 participants. The demonstration lasted 30 days and is considered the biggest since Gezi Park protests in 2014. As a result, at least 1,800 people were arrested and at least 148 police officers got injured. Finally, last year's limited war over autonomy between the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and its alleged umbrella organization called the Kurdish Communities Union (KCK), on the one hand, and the Turkish government, on the other, de-escalated to a violent crisis. Although this year's conflict dynamic was shaped by intensified peace negotiations, between January and July, at least 78 people were killed throughout the country [→ Türkiye (PKK, KCK)].

WEST ASIA, NORTH AFRICA, AND AFGHANISTAN

Overview: Conflicts West Asia, North Africa, and Afghanistan

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
Afghanistan (IS)*	ISKP vs. government	system/ideology	2015	•	3
Afghanistan (opposition)*	AFF, ALM, NRF, other armed opposition groups vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2022	•	3
Afghanistan (sedentary communities – Kuchi)*	sedentary communities vs. Kuchi	subnational predominance, resources	1878	•	3
Afghanistan – Iran*	Afghanistan vs. Iran	resources, other	2021	•	2
Afghanistan – Pakistan*	Afghanistan vs. Pakistan	territory, international power, other	1949	•	3
Algeria (Berbers / Kabylia)*	Berbers vs. government	secession, autonomy, system/ideology	1963	•	2
Algeria (Islamist militant groups)*	Al-Mourabitoun, AQIM, Blood Signatories, IS, Jund al-Khalifa, MUJAO vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1998	•	3
Algeria (opposition)*	Hirak movement, labor unions, opposition parties vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2011	•	2
Algeria - Morocco*	Algeria vs. Morocco	international power	1963	•	1
Bahrain (opposition)*	opposition groups vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1975	↘	2
Egypt (Christians – Muslims)*	Christians vs. Muslims	subnational predominance	1952	•	3
Egypt (opposition)*	activists, journalists, opposition groups vs. government	system/ideology	1954	•	3
Egypt – Sudan*	Egypt vs. Sudan	territory, resources	1958	•	1
Iran (opposition)*	intra-systemic opposition, non-systemic opposition vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1993	•	3
Iran (People's Mujahideen)*	PMOI vs. government	system/ideology, national power	1979	↑	3
Iran (PJAK)*	PJAK vs. government	autonomy	1979	•	3
Iran (Sunni militant groups / Sistan Baluchistan)*	Ansar al-Furqan et al., Jaish al-Adl vs. government	secession	1979	•	3
Iran – Israel*	Iran vs. Israel	system/ideology, international power	1979	↑	5
Iran – Saudi Arabia*	Iran vs. Saudi Arabia	system/ideology, international power	1979	•	1
Iran – UAE*	Iran vs. UAE	territory	1971	•	2
Iran – USA*	Iran vs. USA	system/ideology, international power	1979	•	3
Iraq (IS)*	IS vs. government	system/ideology, national power, resources	2014	•	3
Iraq (KRG – opposition)*	KRG vs. opposition movement	system/ideology, subnational predominance	2011	↑	3
Iraq (Kurdistan Regional Government)*	Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) vs. government	autonomy, resources	1971	•	1
Iraq (opposition)*	opposition vs. government	system/ideology	2011	•	3
Iraq (Shiite militant groups)*	Ansar Allah al-Awfiya, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, Badr Organization, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, Islamic Resistance in Iraq, Kata'ib Hezbollah, Saraya al-Salam vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2004	•	3
Israel (Hamas et al.)*	Hamas, other Islamist groups, PIJ vs. government	secession, resources	1988	•	5
Israel – Lebanon*	Israel vs. Lebanon	territory, international power, resources	1948	•	5
Israel – State of Palestine ^o (PNA)*	Palestinian protesters, PNA vs. government, Israeli settlement movement	secession, decolonisation, system/ideology, resources	1948	•	5
Israel – Syria*	Israel vs. Syria	territory, international power, resources	1948	•	3
Israel, Lebanon (Hezbollah)*	Hezbollah vs. government	territory, system/ideology	1982	↘	4
Israel, Yemen (al-Houthi forces)*	al-Houthi vs. Israel	system/ideology, other	2023	•	3
Jordan (opposition)*	opposition groups vs. government	system/ideology	2011	•	3
Jordan, Syria (Captagon)*	drug traffickers vs. government	resources	2021	•	3
Kuwait (Bedouns)*	Bedouns vs. government	other	1959	•	1

WEST ASIA, NORTH AFRICA, AND AFGHANISTAN

Name of conflict ¹	Conflict parties ²	Conflict items	Start	Change ³	Int. ⁴
Kuwait (opposition)*	opposition movement vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2011	•	1
Lebanon (inner-Palestinian tensions)*	Ansar Allah et al. vs. Fatah vs. other Palestinian factions	subnational predominance	2006	↘	2
Lebanon (IS)*	IS vs. government	system/ideology, subnational predominance	2011	↘	2
Lebanon (opposition)*	opposition vs. government	system/ideology, national power, resources	2019	↗	3
Libya (IS)*	ISL vs. GNU	system/ideology, national power, resources	2014	↗	2
Libya (opposition)*	GNU vs. GNS	system/ideology, national power, resources	2011	•	3
Libya (tribes)*	Tebu vs. Tuareg vs. various other tribes vs. GNU, LNA	system/ideology, subnational predominance, resources, other	2012	•	3
Mauritania (anti-slavery activists)*	IRA, opposition groups vs. government	system/ideology	2015	•	3
Morocco (opposition)*	AMDH, Front Social, Justice and Spirituality, labor rights activists vs. government	system/ideology	2011	•	3
Morocco (POLISARIO / Western Sahara)*	POLISARIO, Sahrawis vs. government	secession, decolonisation, resources	1975	•	3
Saudi Arabia (IS)*	IS vs. government	system/ideology, international power	2015	•	2
Saudi Arabia (opposition)*	opposition vs. government	system/ideology	1992	•	3
Saudi Arabia (Shiites)*	Shiites vs. government	system/ideology	1979	•	3
Saudi Arabia, Yemen (AQAP)*	AQAP vs. PLC, STC	system/ideology	1990	•	3
Syria (IS)*	IS vs. government	system/ideology, subnational predominance, resources	2014	↘	3
Syria (Kurdish groups)*	KDPS vs. AANES vs. SDF vs. government	autonomy, subnational predominance, resources	1962	•	3
Syria (opposition)*	opposition groups vs. government	system/ideology, national power, resources	2011	•	5
Syria (SDF – Türkiye / Northern Syria)*	HRE, SDF, YPG vs. SNA, Türkiye	autonomy, subnational predominance, resources	2018	↘	4
Syria (Suwayda / Southern Syria)*	Druze armed groups vs. Bedouin armed groups vs. government	subnational predominance	2025	NEW	5
Syria – Türkiye*	Syria vs. Türkiye	territory, international power	1946	•	1
Syria – USA*	Syria vs. USA	system/ideology, international power	2003	↘	1
Tunisia (Islamist militant groups)*	AQIM, Jund al-Khilafah (IS) vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2011	•	2
Tunisia (opposition)*	civil society groups, opposition groups vs. government	system/ideology, national power	2010	•	2
Türkiye (IS)*	IS vs. government	system/ideology, national power, resources	2014	•	3
Türkiye (opposition)*	CHP, DEM Party vs. National Alliance (AKP, MHP)	system/ideology, national power	2013	•	3
Türkiye (PKK, KCK)*	KCK, PKK vs. government	autonomy	1978	END	3
Yemen (al-Hirak / Southern Yemen)*	STC vs. PLC	secession	2007	•	3
Yemen (AQAP – al-Houthi forces)*	al-Houthi forces vs. AQAP	system/ideology, subnational predominance	2010	•	1
Yemen (Red Sea)*	al-Houthi vs. UK, US et al.	other	2023	↗	4
Yemen, Saudi Arabia (al-Houthi forces)*	al-Houthis vs. PLC, Saudi Arabia, UAE	national power	2004	↘	3

¹ Conflicts marked with * are without description

² Mentioned are only those conflict parties relevant for the period under review

³ Change in intensity compared to the previous year: ↗ or ↗ escalation by one or more than one level of intensity; ↘ or ↘ deescalation by one or more than one level of intensity; • no change

⁴ Levels of intensity: 5 = war; 4 = limited war; 3 = violent crisis; 2 = non-violent crisis; 1 = dispute

⁵ HIIK considers statehood to be non-contested if the state is an official UN members state.

Disputed statehood is marked with a * if a territory is recognized by at least one other official UN member state ("limited recognition")

AFGHANISTAN (IS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2015**

Conflict parties: ISKP vs. government
 Conflict items: system/ideology

The violent crisis over the orientation of the political system between the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP), on the one hand, and the Taliban-ruled Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA), on the other, continued. The ISKP carried out attacks on the Taliban authorities and religious minorities, predominantly using improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and light firearms.

Throughout the first half of the year, violent attacks attributed to the ISKP, which resulted in deaths, highlighting the ongoing security challenges across Afghanistan. On January 7, ISKP gunmen attacked religious scholars with small arms in Baghlan-e-Markazi, Baghlan province, killing one and wounding another. The ISKP took responsibility for the attack, claiming its fighters had targeted the two men, whom it described as Taliban members. On January 21, ISKP gunmen attacked civilians with small arms in Katikjar area, Khawja Bahauddin district, Takhar province, killing one civilian. ISKP claimed responsibility for two suicide attacks in February, stating that the Taliban were the intended targets. First, on February 11, an ISKP suicide bomber detonated his vest among a group of police officers in Kunduz city, eponymous province, killing four civilians and 15 Taliban members and injuring seven others. Second, on February 13, an ISKP suicide bomber killed three and wounded ten others when he detonated his vest inside the de facto Ministry of Urban Development and Housing in the capital Kabul.

On June 9, a clash occurred overnight between ISKP and Taliban forces in Police District 15, Kabul. The gunfight lasted several hours and led to the deaths of two ISKP members, with no other injuries reported. lul

AFGHANISTAN – IRAN

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **2021**

Conflict parties: Afghanistan vs. Iran
 Conflict items: resources, other

The non-violent crisis over border security and water resources between the Taliban-ruled Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) and Iran continued. The ongoing dispute over the Helmand River's water allocation represents a critical element of the relationship between the two states, dating back to as early as the 1870s. Even though an agreement was reached on 08/06/22 on supplying Iran with water from the Helmand River, the agreement has not been implemented by Afghanistan yet.

Although there were regular diplomatic exchanges between the foreign ministers of the two countries, political tensions over water rights remained. On January 26, Iran's Foreign Minister met with the IEA Prime Minister. Both sides emphasized the need for resolving these issues to ensure regional stability and mutual prosperity. In March, the Taliban diverted water from the Helmand River, worsening the impact of drought conditions in Sistan and Baluchestan province, Iran. A further round of talks occurred on May 18 at the Tehran Dialogue

Forum between Afghan and Iranian officials. In August, Iran accused the Taliban of failing to meet its obligations under a decades-old treaty on water sharing from the Helmand River. In November, Iran again accused a Taliban official of misleading the public with contradictory statements regarding Afghanistan's obligation to provide Iran's treaty-guaranteed share of water from the Helmand River.

No violent incidents relating to the water and border dispute were recorded throughout this year. emr

AFGHANISTAN – PAKISTAN

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1949**

Conflict parties: Afghanistan vs. Pakistan
 Conflict items: territory, international power, other

The violent crisis over territory and international power between the Taliban-ruled Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) and Pakistan continued. Disputes over border demarcation and infrastructure, the status of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, and mutual security allegations were the principal drivers of tension, fueling a sustained pattern of cross-border attacks, mass deportations, and displacement. Intermittent agreements briefly reopened border crossings or paused fighting but failed to resolve core disputes, leaving bilateral relations volatile.

The first months of the year were dominated by exchanges of fire and mutual accusations. On February 16, Pakistan temporarily closed the Torkham crossing after a dispute over the construction of a border post by the IEA. Heavy clashes at Torkham between March 2–5 resulted in the deaths of four IEA fighters, two others injured, as well as three Afghan journalists and three Pakistani border guards wounded, keeping the crossing closed until March 19.

The dispute over Afghan refugees compounded diplomatic strains. On April 1, Pakistan announced large-scale repatriation phases and resumed forced deportations targeting around 800,000 Afghans, detaining many more during crack-downs in major cities. The IEA Ministry of Foreign Affairs repeatedly protested the expulsions and treatment of refugees. Despite periodic diplomatic engagement, including high-level visits between April and July, efforts to stabilize relations remained limited. Military skirmishes persisted intermittently, for instance, on May 29 in Bagram District, Helmand Province, when Taliban fighters near newly established outposts came under fire from Pakistani border guards, prompting an exchange of fire, though no casualties were reported. In Kunar Province, a firefight in Dangan District on June 12 resulted in the death of a local resident, while a clash in Shigal District on June 14 erupted when Pakistani forces attempted to establish a new security post, resulting in the deaths of two IEA members.

The conflict reached a particularly intense phase in October. After reported Pakistani airstrikes on October 9 in Kabul and claims that Pakistan targeted Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militant leaders [→ Pakistan (Islamist Militant Groups)], the Taliban announced retaliatory operations. Overnight clashes on October 12 along the Durand Line and in Spin Boldak District, Kandahar, and on October 14 in Shorabak District, Kandahar, as well as in Khost Province, saw dozens of border posts contested and significant casualties, including 37 civilians killed and 425 others injured according to UNAMA, prompting a short ceasefire on October 15 that was later extended.

Diplomatic efforts to address cross-border tensions continued through October–December but yielded limited progress. Talks between the sides in Doha, Qatar, and Istanbul, Türkiye, failed to resolve key issues, particularly Pakistan's demands to curtail TTP fighters, which the IEA rejected as outside their responsibility. By December 1, subsequent talks in Saudi Arabia concluded without breakthroughs and the border remained closed, leaving core security disputes unresolved.

mzr

ALGERIA (BERBERS / KABYLIA)

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **1963**

Conflict parties: Berbers vs. government
Conflict items: secession, autonomy, system/ideology

The non-violent crisis over the orientation of the political system, self-determination, autonomy and secession of the Kabyle region between Kabyle activists, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued.

Authorities maintained the terrorism designation of 05/18/21 of the Movement for the Self-Determination of Kabylie (MAK) and pursued criminal cases against activists, journalists, and unionists portrayed as linked to it. The government sustained judicial pressure and restrictions on assembly and association. On January 6, police officers in Béjaïa, eponymous province, arrested two local activists over social media posts that expressed solidarity with detainees. Courts issued and upheld prison terms across the first quarter. On January 2, a court issued a travel ban on a journalist who had frequently covered the Hirak movement and had questioned his travel ban in place since 2019 in a social media post. On March 27, a criminal court sentenced a Franco-Algerian writer to five years in prison after he was accused of having contacts with members of the MAK, which he denied.

UN experts and NGOs reiterated concerns about harassment of defenders and prosecutions under vague security provisions.

During the summer, courts issued further sentences that observers viewed as disproportionate. For example, on July 3, a historian received a five-year prison term after televised comments on Amazigh/Berber identity. On June 29, a French journalist was sentenced to seven years in prison in Tizi Ouzou, the eponymous province, for "glorifying terrorism" as he, according to Reporters without Borders, covered the history of a local Kabyle football club. The sentence was later affirmed on December 3.

Diaspora activity grew. On April 20, marches took place in the capital Paris, France, calling for Kabyle self-determination. On April 20 and October 19, respectively, MAK declared the independence of Kabylia in New York, USA, and Paris, France. On September 10 and 25, diaspora organizations in Paris announced preparations for a unilateral declaration of independence and published reference texts. Authorities rejected these declarations and upheld the terrorism framing. On December 14, the MAK held a private ceremony in Paris, and presented Ferhat Mehenni as president of the proclaimed entity. tku

ALGERIA (ISLAMIST MILITANT GROUPS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1998**

Conflict parties: Al-Mourabitoun, AQIM, Blood Signatories, IS, Jund al-Khalifa, MUJAO vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The violent crisis over system, ideology and national power between the Algerian government and different Islamist factions including the Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Islamic State (IS) and other minor factions continued.

The Algerian People's National Army (PNA) conducted counter-terrorism operations across the country, where they arrested at least 52 alleged terrorists. Furthermore, the PNA found terrorist-linked weapons and ammunition, mostly consisting of submachine Kalashnikov guns, but occasionally also pistols. From February to October, authorities seized two RPGs and four sniper rifles. In the provinces of Adrar, Bordj Badji Mokhtar, Guezzam, and Tamanrasset, at least 27 reported terrorists surrendered to military authorities.

On February 20, the PNA killed two reported terrorists in Medea Province, and killed two others in In Guezzam Province on March 21 near the Algerian-Mali-Niger border. In May, the PNA killed two other reported terrorists in Khenchela Province between May 15 and 20, one more in Ain Defla Province on May 20, two others in Khenchela Province on June 3 and four on August 9 in Ouargla Province. The PNA reported that in these operations, they found submachine guns on the terrorists except for the March 21 clash, where a sniper rifle, a vehicle, and a satellite phone were seized in a suspected border-smuggling terrorist plot. On September 8, a detachment of the PNA clashed with reported terrorists in Tipaza Province, with two gunmen and one PNA soldier killed. On September 23, another army raid in Tebessa Province killed six reported terrorists. In the same context, the PNA killed one reportedly remaining terrorist from the targeted cell in another raid on October 8 in the same province. mhe

ALGERIA (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **2** | Change: • | Start: **2011**

Conflict parties: Hirak movement, labor unions, opposition parties vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The non-violent crisis over the orientation of the political system and national power between trade unions, opposition parties, and the Hirak movement, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued.

The government continued its restrictions against opposition parties. The opposition party Rally for Culture and Democracy accused the administration of denying them adequate locations for their events on April 26 and in Algiers capital on May 22.

The government continued its repressive activities against Hirak activists, human rights advocates and journalists. On January 20, the Hirak activist, Mohamed Tadjadit, was sentenced to five years in prison for "publishing content harmful to national interest" among other charges in Algiers. On February 16, another activist was sentenced in Ouargla, the

eponymous province, to three years in prison for her social media activities. On March 27, a Franco-Algerian writer was sentenced to five years in prison for “an attack on national unity” in Algiers, causing increasing diplomatic tensions between France and Algeria. In mid-November, the government pardoned him. On August 7, after anonymous calls for protests were shared online, authorities arrested dozens of Hirak and Kabylia activists [→ Algeria (Berber/Kabylia)] across the country, who mostly were released after signing a document promising not to take part in any protests. On November 28, the journalist Saad Bouabka, accused of defaming the late President, was arrested. In response, several hunger strikes by detained activists took place throughout the year; for instance, on February 22, the detained Franco-Algerian writer began a hunger strike while awaiting trial in prison. On March 3, another activist began a hunger strike while detained by Algerian authorities in Algiers. cme

BAHRAIN (OPPOSITION)

Intensity:	2	Change:	↘	Start:	1975
Conflict parties:	opposition groups vs. government				
Conflict items:	system/ideology, national power				

The violent crisis over national power and the orientation of the political system between various Shiite oppositional groups, such as Al-Wafaq, on the one hand, and the Sunni-majority government of Bahrain on the other, de-escalated to a non-violent crisis. Acts of protest occurred throughout the year. On March 1, government forces detained a prominent human rights activist. In response, 24 human right groups published a joint statement, demanding his immediate release. On March 27, a royal pardon which caused the release of about 630 prisoners from Jau Prison was issued, which explicitly excluded political prisoners. A further royal decree pardoned an additional 209 prisoners on the occasion of Eid Al Adha on June 5. On July 7, reports about the ongoing hunger strike of activist Dr. Abduljalil Al-Singace emerged, alleging that he has been deprived of basic medical aid since July 2021. The activist, imprisoned since 2011, began his hunger strike four years ago in response to the confiscation of his research manuscripts. lst

EGYPT (CHRISTIANS – MUSLIMS)

Intensity:	3	Change:	•	Start:	1952
Conflict parties:	Christians vs. Muslims				
Conflict items:	subnational predominance				

The violent crisis over subnational predominance between Christians and Muslims continued. On October 25, a mob attacked Christian homes in Nazlet Gelf, Al Minya Governorate, after rumors spread that a Christian boy had a relationship with a muslim girl. The crowd destroyed several buildings with stones before local state authorities intervened. The Ministry of Interior stated that the incident was a conflict between two families that had been reconciled and denied a religious dimension to it.

Abductions and forced conversions, particularly of young women, remain an ongoing problem for the Coptic community in Egypt. For example, on February 23, a 19-year-old student was abducted from university in Suhaj, eponymous Governorate, forced to convert and to become a concubine of a muslim man. On March 6, she returned home to her family. On May 28, a court ruling that altered the property status of the Greek Orthodox Monastery of St. Catherine of Sinai, South Sinai Governorate, provoked tensions among Egyptian Christian communities, the Greek government, as the representative of the Greek Orthodox Church, and the Egyptian government [→ Egypt (opposition)]. Following diplomatic consultations, it was announced on June 5 that the monastery’s status quo would remain unchanged. On October 31, Greece and Egypt declared the conflict resolved and that the monastery’s religious character remains unchanged. The Egyptian government faced criticism afterwards, however, e.g., for changing the area around the monastery for tourist purposes, which could alter the monastery’s ancient surroundings. On July 15, a Christian convert to Russian Orthodox Christianity, who wanted to change his religious status at the administration, was arrested in Cairo and brought to court on July 22, accused of terrorism, inciting unrest, and disseminating false information. As an Egyptian citizen, he had sought asylum in Russia, where he publicly voiced criticism about Islam. His asylum was revoked in 2024, resulting in his deportation to Egypt. According to the US Commission on International Religious Freedom, he was physically and psychologically abused during his detention. sdr

EGYPT (OPPOSITION)

Intensity:	3	Change:	•	Start:	1954
Conflict parties:	activists, journalists, opposition groups vs. government				
Conflict items:	system/ideology				

The violent crisis over the orientation of the political system between the opposition and the government continued. Authorities used force against militants on at least two occasions. For instance, on January 1, a man in Al-Minya, the eponymous Governorate, was killed in an alleged anti-terrorism campaign, which was disputed by locals. On July 7, according to the Ministry of Interior, a police raid against the “Hasm” movement, a Muslim Brotherhood (MB) affiliated militant group, in Boulaq, Al Jizah Governorate, led to exchanged gunfire. The clash left two Hasm members and one bystander dead and one police officer injured. The government utilized the legal system to threaten, arrest, interrogate and trial opposition members, both Islamist and secular. At least five regime critics died while in prison across the country due to allegedly denied medical treatment. One example is the death of the brother of a former MB leader and assistant of former president Mohamed Morsi on February 1 due to deteriorating health with no treatment while in prison with no clear charges in Al-Ashir Prison in Cairo capital. Detainees, prisoners, or their families alleged the use of torture. From February 8 to February 12, about 59 online critics were prosecuted for crimes of inciting violence, with some reporting physical violence during their detention. Similarly, a regime critic arrested since 2016 died in a Cairo prison

on April 9 with signs of torture on his body, similar to two other political detainees on January 13 and July 31. On July 27, a 21-year-old student died due to torture while in police custody in Belqas, Al Daqahliyah Governorate. This led to protests against the police on the same day, as locals threw rocks at police vehicles while chanting against the government.

In Jazereet Al Warraq, Giza Governorate, a security blockade imposed in 2017 continued to restrict the entry of building materials and other essential resources. Residents continued protesting both the blockade and the expropriation of their homes for government development plans. On March 26, these protests led to the arrest of eleven residents. Clashes escalated again on April 12 with the deployment of riot police, leaving at least a dozen people injured. On November 13, the residents protested against the government's plans with the deployment of riot police. On November 26, residents besieged local government offices as the National Security Agency attempted to resolve the issue with the locals. mhe

IRAN (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1993**

Conflict parties: intra-systemic opposition, non-systemic opposition vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The violent crisis over ideology, the orientation of the political system, and national power between opposition groups, local civil groups, intra-systemic opposition as well as non-systemic opposition and the government continued. Since the uprising after 09/16/22 over the death of Mahsa Amini and its slow fade-out during 2023, the government maintained control and upheld public order by coercive measures and a sustained high number of executions. A significant decline in the value of the local currency, the rial, led to protests initiated by merchants and shop owners, spreading both geographically and socially.

On March 3, security forces attempted to raid the home of and arrest a civil rights activist who participated in the 2022 protests in Izeh, Khuzestan province. During the raid the suspect committed suicide. Furthermore, on June 6, legal authorities executed the death sentence of a "Mahsa Amini"-protester in the capital Tehran.

Due to the high number of executions, prisoners and their families continued the "No-Execution-Tuesday" campaign. Prisoners started hunger strikes, for instance on January 28 and October 5 in Karaj, Alborz province as well as on September 30 in Qarchak, Tehran province. On April 3 and May 27 family members of prisoners gathered in Tehran to protest. Furthermore, in the hometown of Mahsa Amini, Saqqez, Kurdistan province, people conducted a general strike on September 16, commemorating the third anniversary of her death.

People associated with the workers movement, retirees of several industrial branches, and farmers repeatedly protested throughout the year. Individuals criticized the persistent economic crisis in smaller and mostly locally organized protests. For example, on March 8, retirees demanded an increase of their social welfare payment in Isfahan, eponymous province. Similarly, on October 20, telecommunication retirees protested in Tabriz, East-Azerbaijan province. Demonstrations initially remained non-violent.

From the end of May to June, truck drivers upheld a nation-

wide strike due to increasing fuel prices and limited fuel distribution. For instance, on June 22, truck drivers went on strike in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan province. On May 26, truck drivers went on strike in at least nine other cities, including Tehran.

In June, Israeli and US attacks led to a temporary halt of ongoing oppositional protests and strikes, followed by an increasing number of police raids, executions and shootings [→ Iran – Israel; Iran – USA].

Protests escalated further ahead of the end of the year, spreading all over the country after they started in Tehran on December 28, initiated by merchants and market stand owners. On December 29, security forces clashed with protesters in Mashhad, Razavi-Khorasan province, beating them with batons. Protesters threw stones and other objects at security forces in return. On December 30, protesters killed at least one and wounded 13 members of the Basij militia in Khudasht, Lorestan province. emb

IRAN (PJAK)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1979**

Conflict parties: PJAK vs. government

Conflict items: autonomy

The violent crisis over autonomy between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK) continued. PJAK leaders state their long-term goal is to establish an autonomous Kurdish region within the Iranian state.

PJAK remained active, continuing to carry out attacks and engage in armed resistance against Iranian security forces, while the Iranian government persisted in its efforts to suppress the group through military, political, and judicial means. Throughout the first half of 2025, Iranian authorities carried out multiple arrests targeting alleged PJAK affiliates. On January 20, the Ministry of Intelligence arrested a man in Marivan, Kurdistan Province, followed by another arrest on June 8 in Shuyesheh, Kurdistan Province, and on July 2 in Bukan, West Azerbaijan Province.

Judicial pressure also intensified. On January 8, the Supreme Court upheld the death sentence of a Kurdish woman activist, followed by a rejection of her judicial review on February 5. In response, civil society actors launched a general strike across several Kurdish cities on January 22, including in Sanandaj, Marivan, Baneh, and Kermanshah. On May 5, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) denied temporary prison leave for another political prisoner, despite approval from prison authorities.

Tensions escalated further in the second half of the year. On July 19, an IRGC drone strike in the Shiwah Gwezan area of Sulaymaniyah Governorate, Iraq, killed one PJAK-affiliated Eastern Kurdistan Unit (YRK) fighter and seriously injured another. On September 23, IRGC members opened fire on a car in Marivan, Kurdistan Province, killing one PJAK member and a civilian. Despite these developments, PJAK maintained its organizational structures and continued to operate both politically and militarily within the border regions. cfb


IRAN (SUNNI MILITANT GROUPS / SISTAN BALUCHISTAN)

Intensity:	3	Change:	•	Start:	1979
Conflict parties:	Ansar al-Furqan et al., Jaish al-Adl vs. government				
Conflict items:	secession				

The violent crisis over secession of the Iranian region Sistan and Baluchistan between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Sunni militant groups, such as Jaish al-Adl, continued. Clashes included numerous armed attacks, using light weapons especially against government forces, including police, border patrol and military forces, resulting in at least 40 people being killed throughout the year. While there have been fewer incidents than in 2024, the situation remained tense. There were reports of incidents in which security forces fired on what appeared to be civilian vehicles. For instance, on February 25, a toddler was killed and his mother seriously injured while driving their car in the city of Chabahar. On July 26, in an attack on a courthouse in the provincial capital Zahedan by Jaish al-Adl, three militants and six security forces were killed and 22 others injured. Furthermore, at the end of August, a counterterrorism operation was carried out by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in the region, resulting in 13 militants being killed. On December 10, Jaish al-Adl, alongside other Baluch separatist groups and self-organized Baluch fighters, announced their merger and the establishment of Jabh-e Mobarizine Mardomi (JMM), or People’s Resistance Front. Operating under the JMM umbrella, and according to an official announcement and published manifesto, the group cited the systemic oppression of the Baluch people by the government and the necessity for greater coordination, stating that JMM will pursue “media, political, diplomatic, cultural, and social activities” alongside armed resistance. On the same day, JMM militants killed four IRGC members in an ambush on their military convoy near the city of Zahedan. atk

IRAN – ISRAEL

Intensity:	5	Change:	↑	Start:	1979
Conflict parties:	Iran vs. Israel				
Conflict items:	system/ideology, power international				



The violent crisis over international power and ideology between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the State of Israel escalated to a war. This intensification of hostilities was marked by a direct twelve-day military confrontation during the summer, further influenced by Israel’s various interconnected conflicts with Iranian-backed groups in the region, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, the Houthis in Yemen, and militias in Syria and Iraq [→ Israel (Hezbollah);

Israel (Hamas et al.); Israel, Yemen (al Houthi)]. The internal security situation in Iran was characterized by a rise in politically motivated executions, which reached their highest level in 15 years with over 1,000 individuals put to death [→ Iran (opposition)]. These measures were frequently tied to the conflict with Israel. For instance, on April 30 and May 28, Iranian authorities executed two men on charges of espionage for the Israeli state. This trend continued throughout the year; on June 22 and 23 two men were hanged for allegedly spying for the Israeli intelligence service Mossad, while three Kurdish men were executed on June 25 under similar accusations. The conflict reached a violent peak in June during a twelve-day period of intense direct warfare, initiated by Israel under the codename “Operation Rising Lion”. While precise casualty figures for each individual engagement remain difficult to verify independently, the overall toll for the twelve-day conflict was reported by Israeli authorities as 33 fatalities and over 3,200 injuries, while Iranian state sources and human rights organizations estimated their losses at a minimum of 1,060 individuals killed. The campaign commenced shortly after midnight on June 13, with Israeli forces deploying small explosive drones to strike radar defense systems and missile facilities across Iran, including near the cities of Kermanshah, eponymous province, Piranshahr, West Azerbaijan Province, and Tabriz, East Azerbaijan Province. Within minutes, the operation expanded as approximately 200 Israeli fighter aircraft conducted strikes against more than 100 nuclear and military installations in Isfahan Province, targeting sites in Natanz, Ahmadabad, and Isfahan City. Senior military leadership was also targeted in the capital, Tehran, with strikes reported across several districts including Tajrish. Further military infrastructure was struck in the provinces of Markazi, Qom, and Hamadan. In response, Iranian forces launched a series of attacks against Israel, primarily targeting the cities of Tel Aviv, eponymous district, and Jerusalem, eponymous district. While initial attacks on June 13 were intercepted, subsequent ballistic missile strikes on June 14 and 15 hit Rishon LeZion, Central District, killing two people and injuring 19, while another person was killed in Ramat Gan city, Tel Aviv District. Iran also extended its reach to northern Israel, for instance launching strikes against the port city of Haifa, eponymous province, injuring 15, and the city of Tamra, Northern District, killing four and injuring several others on June 15. On June 20, a strike on Soroka Hospital in Be’er Sheva, Southern District, injured 80 individuals. A subsequent attack on a residential building in the same city on June 24 killed four people and injured 22 others. Throughout the twelve-day campaign, Israel maintained its air superiority with daily strikes. On June 15, an Israeli airstrike in the Tajrish district of Tehran killed 18 people and injured 46. Additional targets included the Iranian Ministry of Defense and an aerial refueling aircraft at Mashhad Hashemi Nejad International Airport in Razavi Khorasan Province. On June 16, Israeli strikes damaged civil and military targets in Tehran, including an ambulance in the Shahid Bagheri district, killing three, and the IRINN television network building, killing one individual and injuring several others. The Israeli military also reported the killings of senior Iranian officials, most notably Ali Shadmani, the Iranian army’s war chief of staff, who was killed in Tehran on June 17. The latter half of the June escalation focused on degrading Iran’s nuclear and research capabilities. On June 18 and 19, Israeli forces struck centrifuge production facilities in Tehran and Karaj, Alborz Province, as well as the Arak Heavy

Water Reactor Facility in Markazi Province and the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant in Natanz, Isfahan Province. Further strikes on June 21 targeted nuclear sites in Lanjan and other installations in Isfahan, Mobarakeh and Shahreza, all in Isfahan Province, as well as a military installation in Shiraz, Fars Province.

On June 22, the US joined the conflict on Israel's side, striking Iranian nuclear facilities; Iran retaliated by striking a US military base in Qatar on June 23 [→ Iran – USA]. On June 24, a ceasefire between the sides went into effect, bringing the “twelve-day war” to a tentative conclusion.

Following the cessation of the fighting, the Iranian government continued its campaign of domestic executions linked to the conflict. Between August and October, at least 11 more individuals were hanged for alleged collaboration with Israel while tensions between the two states remained high. lul, cfb, cve

IRAN – USA

Intensity:	3		Change:	•		Start:	1979
Conflict parties:	Iran vs. USA						
Conflict items:	system/ideology, power			international			

The violent crisis over the orientation of the political system and international power between Iran and the USA continued. This year's developments were predominantly marked by the ongoing tensions between Israel and Iran [→ Israel–Iran]. Specifically, the “Twelve-Day War” and exchange of missiles between Israel and Iran in June exacerbated tensions in the region. Israel bombed Iranian nuclear facilities in a surprise attack, causing retaliation by Iran on Israeli cities through missile and drone attacks. At the beginning of the year, US President Donald Trump reactivated his “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran, levying a wide array of sanctions against the Islamic Republic with the aim of pressuring Iran to negotiate a new nuclear deal and to deter the country from further nuclear enrichment efforts. For instance, on March 20, the US sanctioned Iranian companies exporting oil to other nations, like the People's Republic of China.

After the Trump administration deemed that the nuclear negotiations had resulted in insufficient success, it carried out Operation “Midnight Hammer” on June 22, using B-2 stealth bombers to destroy Iranian nuclear facilities, namely the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant, Qom province, the Natanz Enrichment Complex, Isfahan province, and the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center, Isfahan province. In the attack, the US used fourteen GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator bombs. The attack was the first time this type of “bunker buster” bomb was used by the US military. While initially deemed a success by the US, later reports by the US government indicated that the bombings might have only destroyed one of the three targets. There were no reported casualties as a consequence of the strikes.

On June 23, Iran retaliated with a missile strike on Al-Udeid Air Base, Doha region, Qatar, a US military compound. There were no casualties due to evacuation measures following Iran's advance warning to Qatar. On July 24, Iran announced its willingness to participate in further nuclear negotiations. jha

IRAQ (IS)

Intensity:	3		Change:	•		Start:	2014
Conflict parties:	IS vs. government						
Conflict items:	system/ideology, national power, re-sources						

The violent crisis over ideology, national predominance and resources between the Islamic State (IS) on the one hand and the Iraqi government on the other hand continued. While attacks by IS declined compared to the previous year, the Iraqi government maintained its counterterrorism measures, including airstrikes, ground operations, and arrests. Operations were concentrated in 2025 particularly in the governorates of Anbar, Kirkuk, and Salah ad-Din. Overall, the number of fatalities fell, from at least 130 in 2024 to at least 70 in 2025. IS-fighters continued to carry out sporadic violent attacks against civilians and security personnel in Iraq. On April 1, an IS-affiliated assailant attacked a gathering of Syriac Christians celebrating the Akitu festival in central Duhok, eponymous governorate, injuring three civilians with an axe. On May 15, IS militants murdered a shepherd while he was tending his flock in the al-Tubaata area, Anbar governorate. Furthermore, attacks against state security forces were predominantly carried out using improvised explosive devices (IEDs). For instance, on September 13, three soldiers of the Iraqi Army were injured by an IED planted by IS fighters in Bahraz subdistrict, Diyala governorate. On November 4, one member of the Popular Mobilization Forces was killed and two others injured by an IED linked to IS militants during a technical operation in the capital Baghdad's Jurf al-Naddaf area.

Throughout the year, Iraqi forces continued to carry out sustained operations against IS fighters across multiple governorates, targeting hideouts, tunnels, and other operational infrastructure. Airstrikes conducted with F-16 fighter jets were the most effective component of these efforts. For instance, on May 30, an airstrike in Salah ad-Din governorate killed six IS fighters. On 23 November, another airstrike in Kirkuk governorate eliminated four IS militants and destroyed associated hideouts. Ground operations complemented the airstrikes by targeting specific militant cells on the ground. On January 22, Iraqi forces killed four IS fighters in the desert of Al-Anbar during a targeted ground operation. Furthermore, on March 19, a suicide bomber detonated his explosive vest during a clash with Iraqi army forces near Tuz Khurmatu in Salah ad-Din governorate, killing two IS militants, including the attacker, and injuring the remaining two militants.

Lastly, Iraqi authorities arrested at least 108 IS members and affiliates throughout the year. Notably, on February 28, the Counter-Terrorism Service captured a senior ISIS operative in Al-Anbar governorate, which the Service described as a significant blow to the group's activities. On October 28, Iraq's National Security Service apprehended an ISIS fighter accused of involvement in attacks that killed nearly 20 soldiers and who had previously participated in ambushes in al-Latifiya, Baghdad governorate.

In relation to these developments, Iraq's military command stated on August 23 that IS no longer poses a threat inside the country and that the group has been crippled by continuous security and intelligence operations. Nonetheless, sporadic IS attacks continued throughout the whole year, and Iraqi forces maintained operations against remaining militants, indicating that counterterrorism efforts remained necessary.

Ika

IRAQ (KRG – OPPOSITION)

Intensity: 3 | Change: ↑ | Start: 2011

Conflict parties: KRG vs. opposition movement
Conflict items: system/ideology, subnational pre-dominance

The dispute over subnational predominance and the orientation of the political system between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the local opposition movement escalated to a violent crisis.

Teacher strikes over delayed salaries, recurring since the mid-2010s due to budget disputes between the KRG and Baghdad, became one of the main arenas of opposition mobilization. After years of largely non-violent protest, these actions turned confrontational in 2025. For instance, from January 28 to February 11, 13 protesters in Sulaimaniyah, eponymous governorate, carried out a hunger strike in connection with the teacher protest movement. The action drew large crowds of supporters and ended with the hospitalization of all participants due to serious health consequences. Later that month, on February 24, hundreds of striking teachers and other public-sector employees staged a road blockade on the Sulaimaniyah–Arbat route in Sulaimaniyah governorate to protest delayed salary payments. The action led to clashes with oil tanker drivers attempting to pass the blockade, during which security forces intervened forcefully, resulting in multiple injuries among participants.

Although teacher and public-sector protests continued over the following months, government authorities progressively intensified measures to limit mobilization. On June 26, for instance, security forces in Sulaymaniyah, eponymous governorate, prevented a planned demonstration on unpaid salaries, detaining dozens of participants, including teachers, political figures, and protest organizers.

Similarly, socio-economic grievances such as electricity shortages and unemployment, which had long driven violent protest in the conflict between the Iraqi central government and opposition groups [→ Iraq (opposition)], escalated into violent contention within the Kurdistan Region in 2025. On July 13, protests over power outages in Warti, Rawanduz district of Erbil governorate, turned violent after demonstrators blocked a main road, prompting security forces to open fire and causing one death and at least three injuries. On November 29, protests over employment opportunities at a refinery near Lajan village in the Gwer subdistrict of Erbil governorate escalated into clashes between demonstrators and security forces, resulting in two civilian deaths and ten injuries. The incident was followed by retaliatory attacks on an office of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) by members of a local tribe, while security forces deployed to contain further unrest.

Lastly, the targeting of journalists and public media figures became a prominent feature of protest-related violence in 2025. For instance, on February 9 in Sulaimaniyah, eponymous governorate, journalists covering a teachers’ protest over unpaid salaries were attacked by security forces. At least 22 reporters were teargassed, two were arrested, and a television station was raided, while cameras and other equipment were confiscated or damaged. On July 9 in Rovia subdistrict, Bardarash area of Duhok governorate, three journalists covering clashes between security forces and tribal

fighters were arrested by Kurdish security forces. According to the journalists, they were severely beaten, blindfolded, and held in solitary confinement for more than 25 hours. tdi

IRAQ (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: 3 | Change: • | Start: 2011

Conflict parties: opposition vs. government
Conflict items: system/ideology

The violent crisis over the orientation of the political system between the opposition and the government continued.

Protests due to the unemployment crisis persisted this year. On February 7, security forces clashed with protesters demanding jobs and improved public services in front of the West Qurna 2 oil field in Basra Governorate, injuring three demonstrators. On June 1, clashes erupted between security forces and engineering graduates protesting for employment outside the Basra Oil Company headquarters in Basra Governorate, resulting in injuries to one protester and one security officer.

Additionally, between April 6 and 10, thousands of teachers staged protests across several governorates, including Basra, Dhi Qar, Diyala, Baghdad, Wasit, and Kirkuk, demanding better pay, job security, and improved working conditions. On April 8, clashes occurred in Nasiriyah, Dhi Qar Governorate, between riot police and hundreds of teachers, leaving 27 educators and 15 security personnel injured. Following the protests, the Iraqi Cabinet announced measures to address the teachers’ demands.

As in the previous year, protests over energy and water outages continued across the country. On July 24, riot police dispersed a protest over water shortages in the Al-Majriyah area of Babil Governorate, injuring four demonstrators and arresting ten. Between October 10 and 14, demonstrators across Basra Governorate protested worsening water conditions, including rising salinity and supply interruptions. On October 13, clashes occurred in Basra City neighborhoods such as Tamimiya and Hayyaniya, where security forces used live ammunition and tear gas, leaving multiple protesters as well as several officers injured.

Throughout the year, the persecution of journalists and public media figures continued. For example, on April 6, Iraqi authorities arrested Malek Hadi, head of the Teachers’ Strike Coordinating Committee, in the capital Baghdad amid nationwide protests over salaries and education sector reforms. Additionally, six years after the Tishreen protests of 2019, authorities continued to pursue former demonstrators: on March 8, an activist in Nasiriyah, Dhi Qar Governorate, was arrested under an old warrant and later sentenced to 15 years in prison, with supporters stating that his confession had been coerced under torture. Later in the year, on September 25, 2025, another former protester was arrested in the capital Baghdad after briefly leaving hiding to visit family, due to his participation in previous demonstrations. tdi

IRAQ (SHIITE MILITANT GROUPS)

Intensity: 3 | Change: • | Start: 2004

Conflict parties: Ansar Allah al-Awfiya, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, Badr Organization, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, Islamic Resistance in Iraq, Kata'ib Hezbollah, Saraya al-Salam vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The violent crisis over the orientation of the political system and national power between Shiite militant groups and the government continued. The Shiite militias were organized under the Popular Mobilization Front (PMF) and include the Badr Organization, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), Kata'ib Hezbollah (KH), Ansar Allah al-Awfiya as well as Saraya al-Salam, the former Mahdi Army, led by Moqtada al-Sadr. In addition, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI), which served as an umbrella term for various Shiite militias, remained active in attacks on US troops.

Clashes between Shiite militant groups and government forces continued at a low level, with one reported incident during the year. On July 27, KH fighters clashed with Iraqi police in the capital Baghdad's Dora district. The violence erupted over the leadership of the Karkh Agriculture Directorate, a strategic post controlling farmland near the capital, leaving two dead, including a civilian passerby, and twelve wounded. Following the incident, 14 KH members were arrested, and the militia announced it would suspend its role in Baghdad's security system, claiming the attack was a "trap" and criticizing the government's handling of the situation. Furthermore, the violent rivalry between the two Shiite militias Saraya al-Salam and AAH continued. For instance, on May 24, a member of Saraya al-Salam was killed by an AAH member in Abu al-Khasib district, Basra Governorate, reportedly over a dispute concerning farmland. Following the killing, security forces raided the home of an AAH leader in the nearby Abu Sakhir area, arresting three militia members. Later, on September 24, clashes broke out again in Abu al-Khasib district, Basra Governorate, between AAH and Saraya al-Salam fighters, leaving members of both groups injured. The violence followed a dispute over election campaign posters, with security forces taking precautionary measures to prevent further escalation.


Lastly, attacks on coalition-linked military installations and strategic energy infrastructure continued during the year, although none resulted in casualties. Most notably, on June 24, suicide drones struck al-Taji and Imam Ali base in Dhi Qar Governorate, destroying US-supplied radar systems used by the Iraqi military. Activity intensified in July, with at least 22 drone attacks recorded, primarily targeting military infrastructure as well as energy facilities in northern Iraq and the Kurdistan Region. For instance, between July 14 and 16, drone strikes targeted five oil and gas fields in Duhok and Erbil Governorates. The attacks caused substantial material damage and forced temporary shutdowns of production, thereby significantly reducing the region's energy output. Responsibility for the attacks remains contested, with Kurdish authorities blaming Iran-aligned Shiite militias while the federal government in Baghdad rejected these claims. tdi

ISRAEL (HAMAS ET AL.)

Intensity: 5 | Change: • | Start: 1988

Conflict parties: Hamas, other Islamist groups, PIJ vs. government

Conflict items: secession, resources



The war over the creation of a sovereign Palestinian state and resources between the state of Israel and Palestinian armed groups, most notably Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), continued. Following its escalation on 10/07/2023, fighting between the Israeli Military and Hamas (al-Qassam Brigades and other Palestinian armed factions) in the Gaza strip sustained, with some Hamas leaders reportedly being targeted abroad.

Airstrikes occurred in multiple episodes across the year. On March 18, the PIJ spokesman for the Al-Quds Brigades was killed, and reports also stated that his wife and other members of his family were killed, with other reports claiming that five other senior Hamas officials were also killed. On March 20, long-range rockets were fired from Gaza; one was intercepted, and two struck open areas, and Hamas claimed responsibility. On April 9, an alleged raid targeting a senior Hamas commander killed more than 35 people in an attack on a residential block in Gaza City's Shujayea. On April 12, Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) strikes hit a hospital that was alleged to be a Hamas command center and killed at least 21. On April 21, Ahmad Mansour, alleged to be a member of the Islamic Jihad, was killed in an air strike, and Gazans said 43 civilians were killed.

The IDF launched several strikes on leading Hamas officials during the year. On May 13, the IDF killed Muhammed Sinwar, the younger brother of Yahya Sinwar and until then the present leader of Hamas; Muhammad Shabana, commander of the Rafah Brigade; and Mahdi Quara, commander of the South Khan Younis Battalion, along with at least 25 other people, in a tunnel under the Europe Hospital in Khan Younis, eponymous governorate, and injuring at least 70 civilians. On June 17, the IDF killed Ibrahim Abu-Shamala, a senior financial official in Hamas' military wing. On July 8, Hamas killed at least five IDF forces and injured 14 during combat in northern Gaza's Beit Hanoon area. On July 14, IDF and Shin Bet allegedly killed multiple individuals from Hamas's Weapons Production Headquarters and Hamas's Military Intelligence Unit, including Muhammad al-Bayouk of the Islamic Jihad Weapons Production Apparatus.

On August 8, IDF confirmed it had killed the deputy commander of Hamas's Beit Hanoun Battalion, Murad Abu Jarad, and separately said it killed the head of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad's anti-tank missile unit in the terror group's Gaza City brigade, Mohammed Dardawasi. On August 20, three IDF soldiers were wounded in an assault on northern Gaza's Khan Younis post; ten militants were killed and eight others retreated underground. On September 9, Israel conducted an assassination attempt against key Hamas leaders in Doha, Qatar, by specifically targeting the office of Khalil al-Hayya,

the lead negotiator for Hamas in ongoing ceasefire discussions, along with other members of the negotiating team; the strike reportedly killed five Hamas officers and one Qatari security guard, and four others were wounded.

On September 13, IDF airstrikes killed at least eleven Hamas fighters in tunnels under Beit Hanoun, and the IDF continued to destroy houses and tunnels in the city. On September 18, an IDF airstrike killed a high-ranking Hamas officer identified as Sim Mahmoud Yusuf Abu Alkhir, the Deputy Head of Military Intelligence in Hamas' Bureij Battalion, along with nine other Hamas combatants. On October 19, the IDF launched strikes across Gaza after two soldiers were killed and one was wounded in Rafah; Hamas denied responsibility and stated it had had no contact with fighters in the area since March, while the strikes were reported as killing 45 civilians and injuring 13, with the IDF asserting the injured were Hamas targets. On October 29, the Israeli military launched strikes across Gaza, including Khan Younis and northern Gaza, targeting what it said were 30 "terrorist sites," killing 104 people including 46 children and wounding 253 others with the IDF stating 25 of those killed were Hamas militants. In early December, the IDF confirmed it struck a Hamas commander in the southern Gaza Strip in retaliation for clashes between militants who emerged out of a tunnel in Rafah and IDF troops, reporting five IDF soldiers were wounded including one seriously wounded, and it described the incident as a ceasefire violation.

Ground offensives also took place throughout the year. On March 31, IDF announced it had killed 50 Hamas fighters and destroyed a network of tunnels and a rocket-making location. On April 5, two IDF soldiers were killed by an explosion in a tunnel. On May 5, the Israeli Security Cabinet approved the ground offensive "Gideon's Chariots" by the IDF, aiming to take control of the Gaza Strip, push Palestinians to the south, and prevent Hamas from gaining control over humanitarian aid. On May 16, the IDF started the "Gideon's Chariots" ground offensive toward Deir al-Balah. On August 2, the IDF defeated the Beit Hanoun battalion of Hamas, killing at least one Hamas fighter and injuring at least three. On August 4, the operation Gideon's Chariot ended.

The military operations "Gideon's Chariots II" occurred alongside Hamas launching operations known as "Moses' Staff." Between September 3 and 4, hours after Israel announced the deployment of "Gideon II" vehicles, Hamas launched "Moses' Staff," with the Al-Quds Brigades, alongside Qassam, Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, the armed wing of the Fatah movement, and other factions, bombing an IDF post in the Zaytoun neighborhood in the central Gaza Strip using mortar shells. On September 5, "Gideon's Chariots II" was launched by the IDF. Between September 16 and 17, the IDF launched a ground offensive in Gaza City, Northern Gaza, accompanied by heavy strikes throughout the area, killing at least 98 civilians and wounding 385, with thousands of Palestinians fleeing the city, while between September 16 and 17, the Israeli military struck 150 targets described as housing alleged Hamas cells.

Other attacks were recorded as well. On March 3, a stabbing attack in a bus in Haifa was carried out by a member of the Druse community; Hamas welcomed the attack although it was not claimed by Hamas, the attacker was killed, and four were injured. On March 28, armed men affiliated with the Al-Qassam Brigades kidnapped, tortured, and killed a 22-year-old Palestinian man who participated in anti-Hamas protests. On April 3, a second Gaza clan accused Hamas of killing a relative during a fight at a food warehouse. On June 24, Hamas forces planted a bomb on a vehicle of the Israeli

Army in Khan Younis and hit it with anti-tank fire, causing it to catch fire and killing at least seven IDF soldiers. On July 25, an attack carried out by the al Qassam brigades on a tank killed five, and two were injured, and two further people were killed in a separate incident. On August 30, the IDF stated that Hamas spokesperson Abu Obeida was killed. On September 8, Hamas attacked by launching explosives at an IDF tank at an outpost between Jabaliya and the Sheikh Radwan neighborhood on the northern edge of Gaza City, killing four Israeli soldiers and one Hamas member, and wounding one combatant from each side. Between October 10 and 13, Hamas carried out internal strife and clan-related actions executing at least 33 individuals from different Palestinian clans in a crackdown, and it progressively returned its soldiers to Gaza's streets after the ceasefire started on October 10.

Control of humanitarian aid was also described with repeated episodes near Nasser hospital in Khan Younis. For example, On June 1, the IDF killed at least 21 and injured 179 civilians at an aid distribution site near Nasser hospital in Southern Gaza, blaming Hamas for endangering IDF forces at humanitarian distribution sites. IDF forces killed at least 48 more civilians and injured 179 in similar cases.

Hostages taken and released were listed throughout the year. On February 1, three hostages were released in exchange for 90-183 Palestinian prisoners. On February 8, three hostages were released in exchange for 183 Palestinian prisoners. On February 22, Hamas released six Israeli hostages early in three different locations throughout Gaza in exchange for more than 600 Palestinian prisoners and detainees freed from Israeli jails. On August 29, recovered and identified the dead bodies of two hostages, both killed on 10/7/2023, and abducted to Gaza. Reports described torture and sexual violence by former hostages. On October 13, Hamas released the last 20 living hostages in Gaza, and Israel released approximately 1968 Palestinian detainees and prisoners.

Peace talks and ceasefire discussions also took place. On March 1, Hamas rejected an Israeli proposal to extend the first phase of the ceasefire deal. On March 5, the US and Hamas held the first direct, secret talks as negotiations over the return of hostages and the ceasefire agreement. On April 13, Hamas rejected ceasefire deals. On July 24, negotiations ended as the US and Israel both recalled their negotiators from Qatar, accusing Hamas of selfishness and bad intentions in the hostage-ceasefire negotiations. On September 29, a ceasefire deal, the US 20 point plan was unveiled. On October 8, a ceasefire was agreed, with both Israel and Hamas approving the first part of the US-proposed peace agreement for Gaza.

Ceasefire violations were also recorded, including the killing of three IDF soldiers and 200 Hamas fighters in a tunnel. On March 18, Israel unilaterally ended the ceasefire and resumed fighting.


Other events included several political and legal developments and additional incidents. On March 2, Israel's government passed a bill allowing the military to call an additional 400,000 reserve soldiers amid delays in the start of the second phase of the ceasefire. On March 13, UN experts accused Israel of increasingly using sexual and gender-based violence against Palestinians and carrying out "genocidal acts" through the systematic destruction of maternal and reproductive healthcare facilities, Israel rejected the accusation. On April 20, the IDF ousted an officer responsible for an incident in which 15 rescue workers were killed in Gaza. On July 16, four soldiers had killed themselves two weeks after their deployment to Gaza, and a fifth was injured in what

seemed to be a suicide attempt. On July 28, Israel jailed three soldiers who refused to return to battle in Gaza. Between July 28–31, two more soldiers died by suicide. On August 20, the Israeli military stated it was calling up about 60,000 reservists ahead of a planned ground offensive to capture and occupy all of Gaza City. On August 21, IDF data suggested that 83 percent of those killed in Gaza were civilians, and it listed 8,900 alleged fighters as killed while stating 53,000 Palestinians in total were killed. On August 30, the 900th IDF soldier was reported killed in the Gaza War. mma

ISRAEL – LEBANON

Intensity: 5 | Change: • | Start: 1948

Conflict parties: Israel vs. Lebanon
Conflict items: territory, international power, resources




The war over territory, international power, and resources between Israel and Lebanon continued. The conflict was closely intertwined with the war between Hezbollah and the state of Israel [→ Israel (Hezbollah)], as well as part of the spillover of the Israel–Hamas war [→ Israel (Hamas et al.)]. It also affected inner Palestinian tensions within Lebanon [→ Lebanon (Inter-Palestinian tensions)]. The ceasefire agreed upon in 11/2024 between Israel and Hezbollah has not led to a complete cessation of hostilities [→ Israel (Hezbollah)]. Israel failed to meet the initial deadline of January 27, to withdraw from Southern Lebanon. On February 17, after the US facilitated an extension, Israel announced that it would only partially withdraw, citing ongoing security concerns. Israel retained positions at five strategic points near the border. Tensions remained high throughout the year. On January 26, the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) killed 22 civilians trying to return to their homes. Cross-border incidents continued, including repeated Israeli drone and artillery activity in Southern Lebanon. On May 13, UNIFIL peacekeepers came under gunfire in the Kfar Shouba area, Hasbaya District, raising concerns about operational safety. On May 29, a missile strike in Nabatieh, the eponymous governorate, reportedly killed a municipal worker and a civil defense employee. On September 21, a drone attack killed three American children. In November, Israel intensified its attacks, striking a Palestinian refugee camp on November 18 and a house in the capital of Beirut on November 23. According to the UN, 127 civilians have been killed since the ceasefire began. On April 30, Lebanese authorities reported that approximately 90 percent of Hezbollah’s military infrastructure south of the Litani River had been dismantled. On May 12, UNIFIL confirmed that it had transferred 225 weapons caches to the Lebanese Armed Forces. In its cabinet meeting from August 5-7, the Lebanese government adopted a US-proposal aimed at ensuring all weapons are transferred to the Lebanese state by December 31. However, Hezbollah declared that further disarmament would depend on a complete Israeli withdrawal, which has not yet occurred [→ Israel

(Hezbollah)]. Lebanon has also begun disarming Palestinian factions after an agreement between Joseph Aoun and the President of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas, on May 21, that, in the future, might grant Palestinians refugee rights in Lebanon. Efforts to stabilize the border region have produced mixed results. While international actors, including the US and France, have continued to engage diplomatically, intermittent hostilities have hindered long-term de-escalation. Although Lebanon’s President declared on November 28 that he would be open to negotiations for a permanent solution, the repeated escalation complicates this effort. UNIFIL’s mandate has been extended on August 28, amid intense debate, for one last time until 2026, with a planned withdrawal in 2027. While the ceasefire has resulted in a reduction of attacks, the Lebanese government has taken steps to fulfill Israeli demands to disarm Hezbollah, claiming on January 8 that Hezbollah South of the Litani River is disarmed, Prime Minister Netanyahu, on the other hand, claimed that the Lebanese efforts were not sufficient. Continued airstrikes and shelling on Lebanese territory, particularly in November, keep tensions between both sides elevated. However, on December 3 and 18, there have also been the first talks between civilian representatives of both states, as well as the US, France, and UNIFIL. apf

ISRAEL – STATE OF PALESTINE° (PNA)

Intensity: 5 | Change: • | Start: 1948

Conflict parties: Palestinian protesters, PNA vs. government, Israeli settlement movement
Conflict items: secession, decolonisation, system/ideology, resources



The war over the creation and control of a sovereign Palestinian state, resources, decolonization, and the orientation of the political system between the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) and the Palestinian population, on the one hand, and the Israeli government, military, as well as Israeli settlers, on the other, continued. The conflict is connected to the ongoing war between Hamas and the State of Israel, intensified by Hamas’ attack on Israel on 10/07/2023 [→ Israel (Hamas et al.)]. Throughout the year, the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) continued to launch airstrikes and ground attacks in the Gaza Strip. For example, on March 18, according to the Gaza Ministry of Health, IDF killed 404 people and injured 562, when Israeli airstrikes and bombardment intensified. On May 7, IDF airstrikes in Gaza City, Khan Younis, Jabalia, Deir al-Balah, and Al Bureij killed at least 145 Palestinians, many of whom sought refuge in school-turned-shelters holding around 2,000 IDPs. The IDF gave a statement that it carried out a strike on a school-turned-shelter, targeting individuals described as operating within a Hamas command-and-control center. Other airstrikes have not been commented on. On May 16, the IDF announced the start of its new mili-

tary campaign called “Operation Gideon’s Chariots”, thereby intensifying attacks throughout Gaza (to pressure Hamas to release Israeli hostages held in Gaza). On May 20, IDF airstrikes in Khan Younis, Deir al-Balah, Nuseirat, Jabalia, and Gaza City killed at least 140 Palestinians. Between June 6 and 7, Israeli airstrikes killed over 90 Palestinians and injured hundreds in Khan Younis, Jabalia, and Gaza City. The IDF gave no statements on the strikes. Between September 6 and 7, Israeli airstrikes killed over 200 Palestinians in various areas of the Gaza Strip, destroying residential buildings, tents, and shelters. The IDF gave no statement on the strikes. On October 28, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ordered the military to resume attacks on Gaza, claiming Hamas violated the terms of the ceasefire [Israel → (Hamas et al.)]. Humanitarian aid, while witnessing momentary breakthroughs, remained contested. On January 21, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported that, following the ceasefire deal, 2,400 aid trucks arrived in the enclave over the span of three days. In a statement on January 31, after halting its operations on Israeli grounds, UNRWA warned about the fragility of the ceasefire if aid supplies cannot be delivered, urging the Israeli government to cooperate with international partners. On February 4 and 7, both Hamas and the Gaza government reported deliberate delays of aid such as tents, prefabricated homes, fuel, and other equipment by the Israeli government, despite the ceasefire agreement [Israel → (Hamas et al.)]. Later on February 12, OCHA reported that 801 aid and fuel trucks entered Gaza during the ceasefire. Further aid was delivered on February 14 by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) at Egypt’s Rafah crossing, carrying food, medical provisions, children’s nutritional supplements, tents, and clothing. On 6 April, an Israeli airstrike on their home in Khan Younis killed two staff workers of the Palestine Red Crescent Society (PRCS), who worked at the PRCS Al Amal hospital in Khan Younis, along with their three children. On May 9, Israeli airstrikes hit an UNRWA food supply building at the Jabalia refugee camp, killing at least four people. On May 27, the US-Israeli-backed aid organization Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) started distributing aid in the Gaza Strip. Aid experts such as the United Nations criticized the organization, warning that the aid system is controlled by military actors and could risk further displacement for Palestinians. During an aid distribution in Tel al-Sultan, Rafah, thousands of Palestinians stormed a GHF aid center, prompting the IDF to fire warning shots. Over the course of the year, diplomatic relations surrounding the conflict continued to evolve, reflecting ongoing efforts and tensions among the involved states. For example, on September 7, Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar warned Western states in a statement that recognizing a Palestinian state could trigger unilateral decisions by Israel. On September 11, Netanyahu signed a plan to expand thousands of Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank. On September 12, the UN General Assembly in New York, USA, voted in support of a two-state solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict and urged Israel to commit to a Palestinian state. On September 16, the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory found that Israel was responsible for committing genocide in Gaza under the 1948 Genocide Convention. As of September 23, 157 of 193 UN member states have formally recognized the State of Palestine, including France, Luxembourg, the UK, Canada, Portugal, and Australia, although this recognition alone has no binding constitutive effect under international law.

Throughout the year, the IDF also launched air and ground attacks in the occupied West Bank. For instance, on January 14, Israeli airstrikes on the Jenin refugee camp, Jenin city, killed six Palestinians. On January 24, Israeli airstrikes in Qabatiya killed at least two Palestinians. On January 27, airstrikes on Tulkarem killed two Palestinians and injured at least three. On January 29, airstrikes in Jenin killed ten Palestinians. On February 2, during the Israeli military operation “Iron Wall”, the IDF destroyed around 20 buildings in Jenin, killing at least two people. On February 24, the IDF deployed tanks into Jenin and refugee camps, displacing around 40,000 Palestinians. On September 8, two Palestinian gunmen killed six Israeli civilians and injured 15 in East Jerusalem, following which the IDF intensified raids in towns such as Beit Awwa and Aqaba on September 9. These resulted in the demolition of homes of suspected Hamas affiliates [Israel → (Hamas et al.)]. Settler attacks against Palestinian residents in the West Bank persisted. For example, on February 20, Israeli settlers and troops attacked Palestinians in Hebron, Nablus, Ramallah, and the Jordan Valley, killing at least one, injuring at least four, and damaging properties and vehicles. On July 11, Israeli settlers killed two Palestinians and 58 others during an attack on the outskirts of Sinjil and Al Mazra’a ash Sharqiya towns, in the northern Ramallah governorate. On September 5, Israeli settlers in Khalelt al-Daba attacked Palestinian residents with pepper spray, injuring 13 people, including an infant. On September 7, Israeli settlers attacked Bedouin Palestinian homes in Taybehand in ash-Shuyukh, injuring at least two. nsh

ISRAEL – SYRIA

Intensity:	3	Change:	•	Start:	1948
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Conflict parties:	Israel vs. Syria
Conflict items:	territory, international power, resources

The violent crisis over territory, international power, and resources between Israel and Syria continued. Following the fall of the Assad regime on December 8, 2024, Israel expanded its military engagement in Syria, citing security concerns and the protection of the Druze population in southern regions [→ Syria (opposition); Syria (Suwayda / Southern Syria)]. Israeli operations targeted Syrian military infrastructure, security forces, and armed groups across Damascus Governorate, Latakia Governorate, As-Suwayda Governorate, Daraa Governorate, and Quneitra Governorate. Air and drone strikes remained the primary means of confrontation, concentrating between January and August and focusing mainly on Southern Syria (As-Suwayda and Daraa Governorates), and key military installations in central Syria. During this period, Israel conducted repeated strikes on Syrian military infrastructure, weapons depots, and security forces. Illustrative major incidents included a drone strike on January 15 in Quneitra Governorate that killed two members of Syria’s Military Operations Department and one civilian; airstrikes on April 3 on a military airport in Hama Governorate and the T4 airbase in Homs Governorate, killing four and injuring twelve; and a large-scale strike on July 16 targeting Syrian military headquarters in Damascus Governorate, killing at least three and injuring 34. Additional strikes occurred on February 2 and February 25 against weapons depots in Damascus

Governorate and Daraa Governorate, on March 17 in Daraa Governorate causing three civilian deaths and 19 wounded, and on March 25 in Koya, Daraa Governorate, killing six people. Further strikes on August 26 in As-Suwayda Governorate killed one civilian, while a drone strike on August 27 in Damascus Governorate killed six Syrian soldiers.


Ground operations complemented air activity. On August 3, Israeli forces carried out a ground incursion with twelve military vehicles into Quneitra Governorate. Further incursions followed on October 23 and 26, and on November 5 Israeli forces established a checkpoint in Quneitra Governorate. On November 28, an Israeli special operation in Beit Jin, Rif Dimashq Governorate, left at least 13 people dead and 25 injured.

Diplomatic engagement occurred alongside military operations. On July 25, Syrian and Israeli officials held US-mediated talks in Paris addressing security concerns related to sectarian violence in As-Suwayda Governorate. Negotiations over a bilateral security arrangement remained ongoing at year's end. ebr

ISRAEL, LEBANON (HEZBOLLAH)

Intensity: 4 | Change: ↘ | Start: 1982

Conflict parties: Hezbollah vs. government
Conflict items: territory, system/ideology



The war between Hezbollah and the Israeli government over ideological and territorial disputes de-escalated to a limited war following the ceasefire agreement of 11/27/2024. The violent conflict between Hezbollah and Israel had escalated to war in the wake of 10/7/2023, and the subsequent Israel– Hamas war [→ Israel (Hamas et al.)] The ceasefire entails the disarmament of Hezbollah by the Lebanese state [→ Israel (Lebanon)], the withdrawal of Hezbollah fighters from the south of the Litani, the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) from its posts in southern Lebanon, as well as halt of offensive operations from both sides. However, as of 2025, Hezbollah refused to disarm, while the IDF kept five military positions in southern Lebanon and carried out near-daily strikes on alleged Hezbollah positions and Hezbollah operatives in southern Lebanon. The IDF attacks killed 228 and injured 264 people in Lebanon in 2025. On January 12, one woman in Nahariya, Israel succumbed to her injuries sustained during a Hezbollah rocket attack in November 2024. No further casualties on the Israeli side were reported. On March 22, six rockets were fired from Lebanon into Israel, marking the first rocket attack on Israel since the beginning of the ceasefire. Hezbollah did not claim responsibility. In response, the IDF launched large-scale attacks on villages in the governorates of South Lebanon, Nabatiyeh, and Baalbek-Hermel. The IDF also attacked Tyre, South Lebanon, for the first time since the ceasefire, killing three people and injuring 8 in strikes on residential buildings allegedly serving as Hezbollah infrastructure. On June 5, the IDF launched a series of warning strikes and subsequent air and drone strikes on Beirut's southern

suburbs (Dahiye) in Mount Lebanon governorate. Using 15 drones and six fighter jets, Israeli forces targeted eight buildings in four densely populated neighborhoods allegedly used by Hezbollah, destroying around 100 housing units and injuring three people. The attack marked the largest escalation since the ceasefire. On June 27, the IDF carried out its second-largest aerial attack since the ceasefire near the villages of Ali al-Taher, Kfar Reman, Kfar Tebnit, and Nabatiyeh al-Fawqa in the Nabatiyeh governorate. The attack targeted an alleged Hezbollah fire array and injured eleven people.

On November 23, the IDF killed Hezbollah's de facto chief of staff Haitham Ali Tabatabai, along with four other Hezbollah operatives, and injured 28 people in an airstrike on a residential building in Beirut's southern suburbs. It was the first strike on Beirut's suburbs since June 5.

Besides frequent air and drone strikes on the south of Lebanon, the IDF conducted three ground operations in 2025. On February 13, the IDF stated that its 769th Brigade was active in the governorate of South Lebanon targeting alleged Hezbollah weapons-storage facilities. On July 9, IDF brigades conducted a ground operation in the Labbounneh area and in Jabal Blat to allegedly prevent Hezbollah from re-establishing in the area, claiming to have destroyed a wide array of weaponry and weapon storage facilities. On September 3, the IDF's 810th HeHarim Brigade reportedly destroyed former Hezbollah outposts near Shebaa Farms in the Nabatiyeh area.

The IDF was criticized by human rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International for allegedly targeting civilian infrastructure, civilians, and equipment used in reconstruction, while claiming that all targets were affiliated with Hezbollah. While the ceasefire reduced hostilities and de-escalated the conflict to a limited war, it remained fragile and did not prevent renewed escalation. may

ISRAEL, YEMEN (AL-HOUTHI FORCES)

Intensity: 3 | Change: • | Start: 2023

Conflict parties: al-Houthi vs. Israel
Conflict items: system/ideology, other

The violent crisis over ideology and the state of Palestine between Israel and Ansar Allah, commonly known as al-Houthi, backed by Iran, continued.

Starting on 10/19/23, the al-Houthi forces conducted missile and drone strikes on commercial vessels in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden [→ Yemen (Red Sea)] as well as direct attacks targeted towards Israel, claiming the attacks as acts of protest against Israeli military action in Gaza [→ Israel (Hamas et al.)]. An US and UK-led alliance took military action by conducting air strikes in Yemen and negotiating with the al-Houthi forces without Israeli participation or approval, causing al-Houthi attacks on commercial vessels to slow in 2025 [→ Yemen (Red Sea)], while drone and missile attacks on Israel continued.

On January 3, debris from an intercepted Houthi missile fell in central Israel, causing a stampede that injured 12. The Israel Defense Force (IDF) announced several further intercepted Houthi missiles throughout the year, which targeted infrastructure such as Ben Gurion Airport near Tel Aviv and Ramon Airport near Eilat. On May 4, air traffic to Ben Gurion halted for several hours as a Houthi missile impacted near the airport. On September 9, a Houthi drone exploded near Ramon airport, injuring several civilians. On September 24,

WEST ASIA, NORTH AFRICA, AND AFGHANISTAN


ISRAEL, LEBANON (HEZBOLLAH)




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
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
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
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
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November



December

a Houthi-controlled drone breached Israeli air space in Eilat and exploded, injuring 22. Israel also engaged in heavy retaliatory air strikes, targeting Houthi leadership, military positions and Houthi-controlled infrastructure. On January 22, as well as throughout May, June and July, Israel bombed al-Hudaydah port, killing one and injuring 35 during an air strike on May 5 and killing one and injuring nine during an air strike on May 16. Israel also bombed Sana'a Airport throughout May, killing 3 and injuring 35 during an air strike on May 6. Israel bombed the Houthi-controlled capital of Sana'a extensively throughout August and September. IDF air strikes killed 10 and injured 92 on August 24, and a strike targeting a meeting of high-ranking Houthi leadership killed twelve including the Prime Minister of the Houthi parallel-government on August 28. On September 10, air strikes in Sana'a killed at least 35, including several journalists, and injured over 130 people. On September 25, further air strikes in Sana'a injured 170. After the announcement of a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas in Gaza in November [→ Israel (Hamas et al.)], communications between the al-Houthi group and Hamas leadership announcing a temporary end to the Houthis' campaign targeting Israel leaked on November 11. On November 22, the al-Houthi forces announced the execution of 18 alleged Israeli spies. awo

JORDAN (OPPOSITION)

Intensity:	3		Change:	•		Start:	2011
Conflict parties:	opposition groups vs. government						
Conflict items:	system/ideology						

The violent crisis over the political system between various civil and opposition groups, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued. Large-scale protests were linked to the conflict in neighboring Israel and the Palestinian territories [→ Israel – State of Palestine (PNA)]. Jordan is host to around 2.2 million Palestinian refugees and about half of its 12 million inhabitants is of Palestinian descent. Jordan authorities initially loosened restrictions on protests organized by Islamic actors. No violence was observed during the first three months of the year. On April 8, several protesters were injured, when the police used batons to beat up protesters in the capital Amman. On April 12, pro-Palestinian protests were forcibly broken-up in the Jordan Valley. On April 18, several persons were arrested under the allegation of producing weapons for sabotage acts in Amman. Jordan authorities linked the group to the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), officially dissolved by a court in 2020 over an unsettled legal status, but has remained active since. Jordan authorities issued a ban on the MB and raided the group's headquarters on April 23. The MB was the main organiser of near-weekly pro-Palestinian Friday protests in Amman. Subsequent protests were cancelled by the authorities. In July, Jordan authorities banned organisations, like charities, with alleged affiliations with the MB, accusing them of illegal monetary transactions. The main oppositional party, the Islamic Action Front, which won 31 out of the 138 seats in the 2024 elections, surprising some analysts, is commonly referred to be affiliated with the MB as its political arm. Several activists and opposition politicians were reported to be detained, notably the Coordinator of the pro-Palestinian

Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions group on May 7 and the Deputy General Secretary of the Jordanian Democratic Popular Unity Party on June 4. Allegations of torture were issued by protesters after the death of a prisoner on July 23, which was followed by protests and clashes with authorities in Bani Obeid District, Irbid province. Members of eight political parties entered a hunger strike on September 16. tsk

JORDAN, SYRIA (CAPTAGON)

Intensity:	3		Change:	•		Start:	2021
Conflict parties:	drug traffickers vs. government						
Conflict items:	resources						

The violent crisis over the issue of drug trafficking from Syria between smuggler groups on the one hand and regional military and border forces – most notably from Jordan, Syria and Iraq – on the other hand, continued. After the ousting of the Assad regime in Syria in 12/2024, systemic involvement in the drug trade was revealed. Smugglers were also linked with regional Iranian proxies. Drug routes usually started from Syria or Yemen with Saudi-Arabia as a major destination. Whereas most smuggling attempts at the Syrian-Jordan border consisted of armed groups until mid-2024, cross-border trafficking via drones and vehicles has become the primary modus operandi since. On January 12, Jordan security forces (SF) killed one drug smuggler and injured at least one other in a clash. In response to this, on January 14, the Jordan military conducted airstrikes in Suweyda, eponymous governorate, Syria, destroying or damaging several accommodation buildings. In another incident, on March 6, Jordan forces killed four drug smugglers Jordan SF intercepted drones carrying drug shipments on several occasions. On March 17, Iraqi SF seized more than a ton of Captagon on its border to Türkiye. The drugs were stated to come from Syria. Other attempts were thwarted by the Iraqi SF on April 1 and April 7. Regional governments, especially Syria and Jordan, widened their cooperation in limiting drug trade. On June 28, forces of the Syrian Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham government seized drugs near the border to Lebanon, resulting in a clash with a group of smugglers. On May 19, Syrian authorities seized a drug shipment in the port of Latakia, eponymous governorate, Syria. On October 20, Syrian forces seized 12 million captagon pills in Al-Dumayr, Rif Dimashq governorate, Syria. On June 18 and July 20, large quantities of Captagon were seized by Yemeni SF, linked to the Houthi militia or affiliated groups by authorities. On September 17 and 18, Lebanese SF led raids against alleged drug smugglers, resulting in at least one casualty and an unknown number of injured. On September 21, Lebanese SF killed a smuggler during an attempt to cross the border near Nahlé village, Baalbek Hermel governorate. On December 1, one smuggler was killed and one Jordan Border guard were injured during a thwarted smuggling attempt. Later that month, on December 23, three distinct locations in As-Suwayda governorate were hit by Jordan airstrikes. No casualties were reported, while the compounds, mostly likely warehouses, were destroyed. tsk

LEBANON (INNER-PALESTINIAN TENSIONS)

Intensity: **2** | Change:  | Start: **2006**

Conflict parties: Ansar Allah et al. vs. Fatah vs. other Palestinian factions

Conflict items: subnational predominance

The violent crisis over subnational predominance between various Palestinian groups, including Fatah, Palestine Islamic Jihad, Asbat al-Ansar, Al-Shabab Al-Muslim, Ansar Allah and Hamas, supported by the government of Iran, de-escalated to a non-violent crisis.

On May 21, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Palestinian National Authority's President Mahmoud Abbas announced efforts to disarm Palestinian groups in Lebanese refugee camps. On June 17, a Palestinian official announced the postponement of the scheduled weapon collection due to recent escalations of Israeli-Lebanese violence in the region Israel - Lebanon. On August 21, Fatah handed over a truckload of weapons. ksc

LEBANON (IS)

Intensity: **2** | Change:  | Start: **2011**

Conflict parties: IS vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, subnational pre-dominance

The violent crisis over the orientation of the political system and subnational pre-dominance between the Lebanese government and Islamist militant group IS de-escalated to a non-violent crisis.

There were only a few arrests of IS members in Lebanon made. Despite concerns over violent attacks, like in Syria, there was no escalation of the conflict. On June 26, the Intelligence Directorate of the Lebanese army arrested a member of IS in Beirut, following a series of security, surveillance and monitoring operations. The army found weapons, ammunition, electronic devices, and equipment during the raid. Another arrest was made by the General Security Directorate in Beirut on June 30. It was unclear, whether the target of the operation was a member of ISIS.

In general, IS activity has significantly diminished as the members of the Lebanese army and members of the parliament stated in July. lka

LEBANON (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change:  | Start: **2019**

Conflict parties: opposition vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power, resources

The non-violent crisis over national power, resources and the orientation of the political system between the opposition and the government escalated to a violent crisis.

On January 9, the Lebanese parliament elected Joseph Aoun as new president which intensified tensions with Hezbollah regarding security policy and the balance of power within

Lebanese state institutions. On February 14, Hezbollah supporters blocked the road to the international airport of Lebanon. During the protest, a vehicle of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was set on fire, and an officer was injured. The Lebanese Army intervened, resulting in 25 arrests, while at least 23 soldiers were injured.

Protests against the planned disarmament of Hezbollah also took place during the year and led to several arrests, reflecting ongoing tensions between the government's efforts to assert a monopoly on the use of force and the opposition's resistance to disarmament. For example, on August 8, Hezbollah supporters protested against the disarmament in Beirut.

Demonstrations concerning the economic crisis, poor working conditions as well as delayed salaries of civil servants continued, with protests and sit-ins at government sites. On March 25, the committee of contract teachers in public basic education went on a strike against insufficient working conditions outside the Ministry of Education and Higher Education headquarters. On September 17, civil servants and retired members of the Lebanese military blocked roads in Beirut, protesting living conditions. tzo

LIBYA (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change:  | Start: **2011**

Conflict parties: GNU vs. GNS

Conflict items: system/ideology, national power, resources

The violent crisis over national power, resources, and the orientation of the political system between the UN-backed Government of National Unity (GNU), on the one hand, and the rival Government of National Stability (GNS), on the other, continued.

The presence of armed groups allied with the GNU in the capital of Tripoli regularly led to fighting. For instance, on May 12, following the killing of the head of one of the militias supporting GNU, rival militias controlling different areas of Tripoli clashed, leaving eight people dead. A day after the clashes, GNU announced a string of executive orders seeking to dismantle Tripoli-based armed groups but excluding the 444 Brigade, a group loyal to GNU. Clashes also spread beyond the capital, with fighting between Tripoli-based groups and rival militias from Misrata, eponymous district. Authorities imposed a temporary curfew.

For the following three weeks, the clashes sparked protests in Tripoli, demanding the departure of GNU, all political bodies, and the dismantling of armed militias. On May 16, hundreds protested in Martyrs' Square and in front of the Prime Minister's Office in Tripoli, leading to the killing of one security force member. On May 23, thousands protested in Tripoli, Misrata, Sabratha, Zawiya district, and other areas in western Libya. On May 30, protests continued in Tripoli.

The political stalemate between the GNU and GNS continued as well throughout the year. For instance, on May 27, GNS inaugurated a new military installation as a strategic hub for armed forces under the name "Marshal's Military City Khalifa Haftar" in the Qaminis area, west of Benghazi, eponymous district. On July 10, the Tripoli-based High Council of State (HCS) rejected a budget approved by the eastern-based parliament, warning of more partition and wasting of public money. On July 29, the HCS condemned the House of Representatives' decision to open candidacy for a new Prime Minister as a

unilateral move.

The UN continued to monitor developments closely. On August 21, UNSMIL presented a political roadmap for Libya to the Security Council, outlining steps to holding presidential elections, unifying government institutions, and holding a structured dialogue. On December 14, UNSMIL launched its structured dialogue with 124 participants in Tripoli. sag

MAURITANIA (ANTI-SLAVERY ACTIVISTS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2015**

Conflict parties: IRA, opposition groups vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology

The violent crisis over the orientation of the political system between the Initiative for the Resurgence of the Abolitionist Movement (IRA) as well as other opposition groups, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued. Throughout the year, the government oppressed IRA members, other activists and Black Mauritians on multiple occasions. Authorities violently dissolved protests and conducted arrests and criminal convictions.

For example, on June 11, authorities violently dispersed a welcome gathering for opposition leader and anti-slavery activist Biram Dah Abeid returning from an international tour, resulting in several people being injured at Nouakchott-Oumtounsy International Airport, Nouakchott-Ouest province.

Most of the arrests happened in April. On April 1, authorities imprisoned Warda Ahmed Souleimane, a journalist and IRA activist in Nouakchott capital following a complaint since she expressed her opinion. Consequently, on April 7, several activists protested in front of the Ministry of Justice in Nouakchott capital, Nouakchott-Ouest province, to demand the release of the arrested activist. In the aftermath, authorities arrested the IRA activist and deputy mayor of Teyarett in Nouakchott, Nouakchott-Nord province, who had participated in the protest and had criticized the government in a video. The IRA also claimed that he had previously discovered the retention of 450,000 identity cards suspected to be an attempt by the government to keep the Haratine ethnic group from voting. Haratine constitute as much as 40 percent of the Mauritians.

Additionally, on April 23, an IRA activist was arrested in Boutilimit, Trarza province, after he criticized the judicial system for not enforcing a verdict on a slave master and was consequently sentenced to one year in prison. Further, on April 26, authorities arrested an activist in Nouakchott capital, Nouakchott-Ouest province, for a social media video in which he called the Minister of the Interior to end arrests of irregular immigrants, Mauritians, and their expulsion from the country. On June 12, authorities found him guilty of incitement to hatred and sentenced him to one year in prison. Another activist was arrested on September 18 in Nouakchott capital after he hosted a gathering of activists at his house. On October 31, Warda Ahmed Souleimane was arrested in Nouakchott for the second time this year after publishing a social media post calling for peaceful mobilization against systemic discrimination and impunity. On November 28, a peaceful commemoration held in Nouakchott by IRA members and associations of widows and orphans of victims was interrupted by police forces. According to the organization, several participants were injured and arrested. On December

25, Abeid received a death threat that had been posted on Facebook. sst

MOROCCO (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **2011**

Conflict parties: AMDH, Front Social, Justice and Spirituality, labor rights activists vs. government

Conflict items: system/ideology

The violent crisis over the orientation of the political system between opposition groups, including the parliamentary opposition led by the Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires (USFP), labor unions and labor rights activists, on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued.

From February 5 to 6, five labor unions organized a nationwide general strike to protest a new regulation limiting labor rights and the right to strike that was passed by parliament. The labor union Confédération Démocratique du Travail (CDT) called for a national strike from September 9 to 11 to protest against a bill substantially reforming public universities. The CDT considered the autonomy and identity of public universities under attack. The union Syndicat National de L'enseignement Supérieur called for a nationwide strike from September 17 to 18 to address the same bill.

After the death of at least eight pregnant women in a public hospital in Agadir, Souss-Massa-Drâa region, the recently formed collective Gen Z 212 started a 14-day-long protest on September 27 across several cities, such as Rabat capital, Casablanca, Casablanca-Settat region, Tangier, Tanger-Tétouan-Al Hoceima region, Agadir, Tetouan, Tanger-Tétouan-Al Hoceima region, and Marrakech, Marrakech-Safi region. Supported by opposition parties and the Association Marocaine des Droits Humains (AMDH), they denounced the state of public services, misplaced political priorities, and demanded the resignation of the government. On the night of September 30, protests escalated with 263 police officers and 23 protesters injured. On the night of October 1, police forces killed three protesters, injured 350, and detained 400 in Lqliâa, Souss-Massa-Drâa region. In Salé, Rabat-Salé-Kénitra region, protesters set two police cars and a bank on fire and damaged 271 police cars, 175 civil cars, as well as 80 public buildings across the country. 2400 are awaiting trial for their participation in the movement. cme

MOROCCO (POLISARIO / WESTERN SAHARA^o)

Intensity: **3** | Change: • | Start: **1975**

Conflict parties: POLISARIO, Sahrawis vs. government

Conflict items: secession, decolonisation, resources

The violent crisis over the secession, resources, and decolonization of the former Spanish regions of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro, commonly known as Western Sahara, between the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro (POLISARIO), supported by Algeria, on the one hand, and the Moroccan government on the other, continued. Violence in the first half of the year featured several reported Moroccan drone strikes east of the berm and at least two artillery incidents near a UN site. Moroccan and regional out-

lets reported strikes on January 11 south of Bir Lahlou city and on January 18 in Haouza city, allegedly killing a sector commander. On April 24, Moroccan media reported a drone strike on POLISARIO vehicles near Mijek, Río de Oro region. The UN Secretary-General's report also noted that on April 6, a projectile landed about two kilometers from MINURSO's mine-action site near Tifariti. On June 4, a Moroccan drone destroyed an Algerian-registered truck east of the berm near Bir Lahlou [→ Algeria – Morocco]. On June 27, four POLISARIO rockets launched from east of the berm exploded near Smara, Laâyoune-Sakia al Hamra region, including one about 200 meters from a MINURSO team site. On December 17, 23, and 28, POLISARIO claimed attacks on Moroccan army bases in the sectors of Guelta, Farsia, and Mahbas, which remained unconfirmed. POLISARIO reported bombardments in sectors such as Mahbes, Guelmim-Oued Noun region, Farsia and Hawza, Laâyoune-Sakia El Hamra region. Diplomatically, several States moved closer to Morocco's position. For the first time, France sent a cabinet-level minister to Laayoune, in the Saguia el-Hamra region, and Dakhla, in the Dakhla-Oued Ed-Dahab region, on February 17. On June 6, the UK publicly endorsed Morocco's autonomy plan. On August 2, the US publicly reaffirmed support for Moroccan sovereignty. On October 31, the UNSC renewed MINURSO for a period of twelve months, calling on the parties to engage in negotiations based on Morocco's autonomy proposal. The UN Secretary-General urged the parties to restore the ceasefire and renew engagement with the UN process. anonymous

SAUDI ARABIA (IS)

Intensity:	2	Change:	•	Start:	2015
Conflict parties:	IS vs. government				
Conflict items:	system/ideology, international power				

The non-violent crisis over ideology and international power between ISIS and affiliated militant groups on the one hand, and Saudi Arabia, supported by the USA and the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS (GCDI) on the other, continued. In 2025, Saudi Arabia executed approx. 356 people, citing terrorism-related charges in at least 34 cases. Several cases concerned alleged terrorism or IS affiliation, including the execution of a journalist on June 14 on charges of treason and "funding terrorism." On August 21 and October 20, Saudi Arabia executed at least two individuals for terrorism-related offenses allegedly committed as minors. On October 2, Saudi Arabia executed two individuals for allegedly establishing a terrorist organization and manufacturing explosives. On November 9, authorities executed two individuals for joining IS and allegedly planning attacks on places of worship and security facilities. In reporting, Saudi Arabia's "terrorism" designation also covered non-violent acts (e.g., protest participation, social media activity). No confirmed IS attacks on Saudi territory were reported in 2025; the last major IS attack on Saudi soil was recorded in July 2016. tcr

SAUDI ARABIA (OPPOSITION)

Intensity:	3	Change:	•	Start:	1992
Conflict parties:	opposition vs. government				
Conflict items:	system/ideology				

The violent crisis over the orientation of the political system between various opposition groups and the Saudi Arabian government continued. Between January and April, the Saudi authorities released approximately 44 individuals previously detained for political dissent or human rights activism. Abdulaziz Al-Howairini, head of the Presidency of State Security, stated that opposition leaders abroad could return, provided they face no charges of theft, homicide, or assault. On May 23, the Free Masked Man Movement emerged, sparked by social media posts featuring young masked men criticizing deteriorating living conditions and limited economic prospects. They condemned state spending on entertainment and megaprojects. While lacking centralized organization and mainly grouping through hashtags, a group using the same name appeared online, claiming to have both peaceful civil and "rebellious military" wings. On May 27, security forces arrested a senior Iranian cleric affiliated with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's office in Medina after he released a video critical of liberal reforms, especially an alleged plan to legalize alcohol. He was released and deported to Iran on May 29. On June 14, the Interior Ministry announced the execution of a prominent opposition journalist in Riyadh for high treason and alleged collaboration with foreign actors. Human rights organizations report over 100 executions in Saudi Arabia since the start of 2025, primarily for drug-related offenses, and linked over 22 cases to politically motivated charges. On June 16, Saudi security forces evicted the last residents of Al-Khuraiba village, Tabuk province, to clear land for the Neom megaproject, and raided private residences, including that of a prominent deceased opposition figure. kne

SAUDI ARABIA, YEMEN (AQAP)

Intensity:	3	Change:	•	Start:	1990
Conflict parties:	AQAP vs. PLC, STC				
Conflict items:	system/ideology				

The violent crisis over the orientation of the political system between al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), on the one hand, and the internationally recognized Yemeni government, headed by the internally divided Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) which is comprised of the Southern Transitional Council (STC) and Saudi-backed forces of the former government, on the other, continued. Momentum shifted repeatedly. On January 3, STC operations in Wadi Atsabab, Abyan Governorate, seized AQAP positions and vehicles. AQAP responded on January 31 with an assault on an STC 2nd Backup & Support Brigade site in Wadi Oman that was ultimately repelled. On April 14, AQAP deployed an IED against an STC patrol in Abyan, injuring three, and on May 17 deployed drones during a raid on STC military installations in Hadhramaut, causing at least one casualty. Throughout July

and August, AQAP employed several roadside bombs. An IED damaged an STC vehicle in Shabwah on July 9 and another near Urmah junction in Abyan on August 7. Another allegedly AQAP-linked IED killed a STC soldier and injured another in Al-Wadea district, Abyan governorate, on November 14. On December 6, a roadside IED on the Al-Khasha'ah–Al-Abr road near Ma'rib city killed four STC soldiers. The STC raided strategic locations east of Mudiyah district in Abyan governate throughout the year while AQAP elements withdrew toward the Abyan–Al-Bayda mountains. On October 1, STC forces repelled an AQAP assault on a government complex in Abyan. On October 21, another AQAP assault on STC holdings in Abyan resulted in the deaths of 5 militants and 4 STC soldiers. Repeated AQAP attacks on STC positions in Abyan governate during December 6-7 killed one soldier and injured another. On December 29, the STC reported the killing of a prominent AQAP leader as well as several affiliates in Ghayl Bin Yamin, Hadhramaut governorate, during Hadrami Elite Forces security operations. aal

SYRIA (IS)

Intensity:	3	Change:	↘	Start:	2014
Conflict parties:	IS vs. government				
Conflict items:	system/ideology, subnational pre-dominance, resources				

The limited war over ideology, subnational pre-dominance, and national resources between so-called Islamic State (IS), on the one hand, and the Syrian government, on the other, de-escalated to a violent crisis. In the first half of the year, IS activity in Syria was concentrated primarily in Deir ez-Zor Governorate, with additional incidents in Al-Raqqah Governorate, Al-Hasakah Governorate, and Aleppo Governorate. During this period, the group's operations mainly targeted Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) personnel, alongside occasional confrontations with Internal Security Forces (Asayish). The year began with a military operation on January 10, when International Coalition Forces conducted a drone strike in Markadah, Al-Raqqah Governorate, killing a senior IS member. Two days later, on January 12, the SDF carried out an operation against IS in Al-Hasakah Governorate, killing four militants. On March 19, IS planted an IED on an SDF vehicle in Al-Jarthei, Deir ez-Zor Governorate, injuring two SDF members. IS also attacked Asayish forces, notably on July 2 in Muheimidah town, Deir ez-Zor Governorate, when an Asayish member was injured in a drive-by shooting by IS fighters. Throughout the year, IS attacks on civilians persisted. For instance, on April 17, IS killed a civilian accused of practicing witchcraft in Abu Hardoub, Deir Ezzor Governorate. On July 8, IS injured a civilian with a grenade for allegedly refusing to pay zakat in Al-Jerthi, Deir Ezzor Governorate. In July, counter-IS operations by coalition forces continued, maintaining sustained pressure on IS positions. For instance, on July 25, US forces conducted a raid in Al-Bab, Aleppo Governorate, killing three IS members, including a senior IS leader. In the following months, from August to November, IS activity in Syria remained primarily directed against SDF and associated local security structures in northeastern Syria, especially in Al-Raqqah and Deir ez-Zor Governorates. On October 15, IS members attacked a checkpoint belonging to Internal Secu-

rity Forces in Al-Raqqah Governorate, resulting in at least one IS fighter being killed. On October 20, IS launched another attack on SDF personnel in Deir ez-Zor Governorate, involving an IED that killed one and injured three SDF members. zey

SYRIA (KURDISH GROUPS)


Intensity:	3	Change:	•	Start:	1962
Conflict parties:	KDPS vs. AANES vs. SDF vs. government				
Conflict items:	autonomy, subnational predominance, resources				

The violent crisis over autonomy, subnational predominance, and resources between the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and Kurdish dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), affiliated militias, as well as the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Syria (KDPS), on the one hand, and the Syrian government and pro-government forces, continued. Following the fall of President Bashar al-Assad on December 8, 2024, relations were initially shaped by political negotiations and confidence-building measures [→ Syria (Opposition)]. The Syrian transitional government under Ahmed al-Sharaa, formally installed on April 1, announced constitutional reforms and elections within a five-year transition period. The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) rejected the draft constitution as authoritarian and insufficiently inclusive, reiterating its demand for a decentralized democratic system with guaranteed Kurdish rights while rejecting secession. Despite these differences, both sides signed an agreement on March 10 providing for the gradual integration of AANES institutions and the SDF into state structures by the end of 2025, although the SDF sought collective integration while the government demanded the dissolution of its units. However, from August 2025 onward, the conflict re-escalated as repeated armed clashes undermined the agreement. Fighting focused along the Euphrates contact line in Deir ez-Zor Governorate and around Dayr Hafir in eastern Aleppo Governorate. Clashes on August 2 near Dayr Hafir and al-Khafsah, Aleppo Governorate, injured four Syrian Army soldiers and three civilians, marking the first major breakdown of the ceasefire. This was followed by continued violence in August and September, including clashes on September 23 near Zubeida village in the Dayr Hafir area of Aleppo Governorate, when Syrian government forces shelled the area with artillery, seriously wounding four children, while later the same day kamikaze drone strikes killed one SDF fighter and injured another. Escalations peaked in early October during clashes and a siege of the Kurdish-majority neighborhoods of Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyah in Aleppo city. On October 6, government forces imposed a full blockade on the neighborhoods, triggering protests by local residents that were met with live ammunition and tear gas. Subsequent clashes killed at least one civilian and one government fighter and injured dozens. Despite intermittent ceasefires, clashes, shelling, and coercive measures persisted throughout the remainder of 2025. For instance, on December 22, fighting in Aleppo Governorate escalated into artillery exchanges and heavy gunfire, killing civilians and injuring more than twenty others, while key roads were closed. These continued hostilities demonstrated that the promised integration process had stalled. The

dynamics were further shaped by the parallel confrontation between Kurdish forces and Türkiye and Türkiye-backed factions in northern Syria, which continued to influence AANES security priorities and negotiations with Damascus [→ Syria (Türkiye – SDF / Northern Syria)]. som

SYRIA (OPPOSITION)

Intensity:	5	Change:	•	Start:	2011
Conflict parties:	opposition groups vs. government				
Conflict items:	system/ideology, national power, resources				



The war over national power, resources and the orientation of the political system between opposition groups and the government continued. Before December 2024, the opposition primarily comprised the Syrian National Army (SNA) backed by Türkiye, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), and the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (NC), including its armed wing, the Free Syrian Army (FSA), confronting the Syrian government and its Syrian Arab Army (SAA), supported by Russia, Iran, and allied Shiite militias, most prominently Hezbollah. Following the fall of the Assad regime on December 8 2024, the conflict constellation shifted: HTS and the NC were integrated into a new interim government under Ahmed al-Sharaa in early 2025. Since then, violence has primarily involved the new government and residual oppositional actors, including remnants of the former regime and other armed groups, such as some SNA factions. In addition, the government engaged in recurrent clashes with Druze and Bedouin armed groups in southern Syria, particularly in and around As-Suwayda governorate [→ Syria (Suwayda / Southern Syria)].


In the immediate aftermath of the regime change, violence remained comparatively limited as the new interim government focused on consolidating control and restructuring security institutions through localized security operations against suspected former regime affiliates. For instance, on January 1, the Military Operations Administration conducted a large-scale arrest campaign in Tartous governorate targeting former regime military, security personnel, and collaborators, resulting in at least 587 arrests without reported fatalities. On January 14, government security forces launched coordinated security operations in Latakia, Homs, and Rif Dimashq governorates, during which armed resistance was reported, leading to six fatalities, around 40 arrests, and the burning of seven houses. On February 28, Internal Security Forces carried out a security operation in Hama governorate against individuals accused of supporting the former regime, killing five civilians and arresting approximately 60 people. This lower-intensity phase ended abruptly in March 2025, when violence escalated sharply in Syria's coastal region, centered on Latakia governorate and the adjoining coastal and mountain areas, with spillover into Tartus governorate. Beginning on March 6, armed attacks and coordinated ambushes by gunmen affiliated with former regime networks targeted checkpoints and units of the Ministries of Defence

and Interior. The government responded with large-scale security operations, deploying military reinforcements and conducting extensive raids across cities, villages, and mountainous terrain in the coastal zone. Between March 6 and March 10, the ensuing clashes and security campaigns resulted in at least 2,611 fatalities, including members of the security forces, armed attackers linked to the former regime, and a large number of civilians, the majority of whom were from the Alawite community and were accused of collaborating with former regime loyalists. Many civilians were killed during raids and mass executions. The violence also triggered significant displacement, with more than 21,000 people fleeing western Syria into neighboring Lebanon during March. The operations were accompanied by widespread destruction, including the cutting of telecommunications networks, the burning of civilian homes, and forest fires in coastal and mountainous areas. The scale and intensity of the violence in Latakia and Tartus marked a decisive escalation in the post-regime-change phase of the conflict and significantly destabilized the security environment in western Syria.

Following the March escalation, the conflict entered a phase characterized by sustained counter-insurgency measures and widespread repression, with violence increasingly directed at civilians suspected of loyalty to the former regime. Government security forces conducted broad operations across the coastal region and adjacent areas, including raids, mass arrests, and security sweeps that frequently affected civilian populations beyond active armed networks. For instance, on June 4, general security forces carried out an operation in Hama governorate during which eight Alawite civilians were extrajudicially executed and five others injured amid ongoing security chaos. On July 29, five civilians from the Alawite community died under torture in detention facilities run by the interim government in Homs governorate. On October 5, general security forces arbitrarily arrested nearly 50 young men and women in Latakia governorate, who were reportedly subjected to physical and psychological abuse. In parallel, the new government also faced continued low-intensity violence from unidentified armed groups and criminal or semi-organized gunmen, particularly in urban peripheries and contested rural areas. These incidents included ambushes on checkpoints, attacks on patrols, and localized clashes, reflecting persistent insecurity rather than coordinated opposition campaigns. For instance, on April 29, clashes erupted in Jaramana, Damascus governorate, between Interior Ministry forces and armed groups over checkpoint control, resulting in six fatalities and multiple injuries. On May 27, confrontations occurred in the Ras al-Ain countryside, Al-Hasakah governorate, when Military Police clashed with fighters of the Al-Hamzat faction at a checkpoint, leaving several people killed and injured. On December 29, attacks by groups described by authorities as "outlaws" against residents and security forces in Latakia governorate prompted the deployment of government forces to Latakia and Tartus, during which 3 people were killed, 60 injured, and security vehicles and ambulances damaged. esu

SYRIA (SDF – TÜRKIYE / NORTHERN SYRIA)

Intensity:	4	Change:	↘	Start:	2018
Conflict parties:	HRE, SDF, YPG vs. SNA, Türkiye				
Conflict items:	autonomy, subnational predomi- nance, resources				



The war over subnational predominance, autonomy, and natural resources between Türkiye and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) on one hand, and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and affiliated groups, such as the People’s Protection Units (YPG) and Afrin Liberation Forces (HRE), on the other, de-escalated to a limited war. While the overall intensity and number of attacks declined compared to 2024, hostilities persisted throughout the year. Turkish and SNA forces continued to target SDF positions, civilian villages, and critical infrastructure, while the SDF and affiliated groups carried out retaliatory strikes against SNA positions. Violence remained concentrated in northern governorates, particularly Aleppo, Raqqa, and Al-Hasakah, with the majority of casualties occurring in the early months of the year. Overall, the conflict in 2025 resulted in at least 285 reported fatalities and 298 injured.

Turkish forces and allied Syrian National Army (SNA) factions relied primarily on airpower and artillery to target strategically significant sites in Aleppo Governorate, particularly infrastructure linked to mobility and energy supply. For instance, on January 1, Turkish warplanes, UCAVs, and artillery fire struck the Qereqozaq Bridge and the Tishrin Dam in the Tishrin area, Aleppo Governorate, both of which are critical for regional transportation and electricity generation. The Tishrin Dam area in Aleppo Governorate was targeted again on January 21, when SNA forces carried out an aerial attack, killing two civilians and injuring at least twenty others, as well as later in the year, on September 1, when a Turkish state drone bombed the vicinity of the Tishrin Dam, resulting in two additional fatalities. Beyond Aleppo, Turkish-backed forces also carried out lethal strikes against populated areas in SDF-adjacent zones. For instance, on January 28, SNA mercenaries shelled and bombed the village of Um Hermel in the Zirgan district, Al-Hasakah Governorate, using warplanes, UCAVs, artillery, and heavy weapons, killing three civilians and injuring eight.


Ground-based operations by SNA factions remained limited in scale but continued to cause fatalities in contested areas of Aleppo Governorate. For instance, on January 15, SNA mercenaries attacked civilian areas in Silük (Tal Abyad countryside), killing two women and injuring two children. Later in the year, on November 7, SNA mercenaries killed two civilians in the villages of Burc Ebdalo and Keferzita, near the Sherawa district, Aleppo Governorate.

In response, the SDF conducted targeted retaliatory strikes against SNA positions, primarily using drones, artillery, and localized ground engagements. These operations aimed to limit SNA mobility and deter further advances rather than to seize large territories. For instance, on January 3, fighters of the Manbij Military Council (MMC), an SDF-affiliated coalition, engaged SNA mercenaries in villages around Manbij, Aleppo Governorate, killing 72 SNA fighters and injuring dozens. This was followed on January 12 by heavy clashes between SDF and SNA forces in Aleppo Governorate involving warplanes and UCAVs, which resulted in 23 SNA fighters killed and 36 injured. On January 18, the SDF carried out an artillery and UCAV operation against SNA fighters in Ar-Raqqah Governorate, killing 17 fighters and injuring 21. The pattern

continued on March 8, when SDF and YPJ forces conducted a retaliatory operation against SNA factions on the Qereqozax front, Al-Hasakah Governorate, killing 18 fighters. Lastly, displacement remained a significant feature of the conflict dynamics in 2025, particularly in Manbij, Aleppo Governorate, following the late-2024 Turkish-led “Dawn of Freedom” operation. According to local estimates cited by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, at least 3,824 Kurdish families were displaced from Manbij city and its surrounding countryside during 2025. Using a conservative estimate of four to five persons per household, this corresponds to approximately 15,000 to 19,000 displaced individuals. These figures reflect documented cases only and therefore likely represent a minimum estimate, as unregistered and individually displaced persons were not fully captured. cba

SYRIA (SUWAYDA / SOUTHERN SYRIA)

Intensity:	5	Change:	NEW	Start:	2025
Conflict parties:	Druze armed groups vs. Bedouin armed groups vs. government				
Conflict items:	subnational predominance				



A new war over subnational predominance in As-Suwayda Governorate between local Druze “National Guard” factions, General Security Forces of the Syrian Interim Government, and Bedouin armed groups, erupted. The conflict broke out in early January following the abduction of a Druze truck driver, which triggered retaliatory attacks and rapidly escalated amid the absence of effective state authority and unresolved local power struggles. In addition, Israeli airstrikes against Syrian government targets in southern Syria, justified by Israel as protective measures for the Druze population, further shaped the security environment [→ Israel – Syria].

Throughout the first half of the year, from January until June, clashes between these armed groups remained limited in scale and intensity. For instance, on January 31, in As-Suwayda Governorate, clashes between local Druze factions and Bedouin tribal fighters resulted in two Bedouin tribesmen killed and twelve others injured, several of them seriously, following exchanges of fire. On April 30, violence related to the conflict briefly extended beyond As-Suwayda Governorate into Rif Dimashq Governorate, reflecting tensions over access routes and checkpoint control. On the Damascus–As-Suwayda highway, clashes between Druze gunmen and forces affiliated with the Ministries of Defence and Interior resulted in at least 24 fatalities and 25 injuries across multiple incidents. On May 4, armed confrontations in As-Suwayda Governorate between local Druze gunmen and forces affiliated with the Syrian Ministries of Defence and Interior led to the death of one government-affiliated fighter, who later succumbed to wounds sustained during the clashes, which included the use of mortar shells.

A decisive escalation occurred in July, when large-scale fighting erupted between local Druze factions, Bedouin tribal fighters, and Syrian government forces. The most intense clashes took place between July 13 and 20, during which

the violence reached unprecedented levels. The clashes resulted in at least 1,972 people killed and around 900 injured. These totals include combatants and civilians from all involved groups and cover deaths and injuries caused by direct combat, extrajudicial killings, and attacks on civilian infrastructure. Homes in multiple villages were completely burned down, with at least 30 villages damaged by arson and destruction, including housing, infrastructure, and religious or culturally significant sites. More than 93,000 people were displaced during this period. The clashes involved the use of heavy weapons, including mortars, heavy machine guns, as well as weaponized drones.

Following the July escalation, multiple attempts were made to contain the violence through negotiated ceasefires and mediation efforts. From mid-July onwards, ceasefire agreements were brokered with the involvement of international and regional actors, including the United States, Turkey, and several Arab governments, alongside local notables and religious figures. These arrangements aimed to halt hostilities, enable humanitarian access, facilitate the withdrawal of armed groups from civilian areas, and establish security checkpoints under negotiated control. However, unresolved disputes over local authority, accountability for July atrocities, and the return of displaced populations limited the effectiveness of these initiatives, preventing the emergence of a sustainable political or security settlement.

In the months that followed, armed incidents continued despite the existence of ceasefire arrangements. Sporadic clashes, targeted attacks, and exchanges of fire occurred between Druze militias, General Security units, and residual Bedouin armed groups, particularly in contested rural areas and along access routes. For instance, on August 3, clashes erupted between local Druze factions and Bedouin tribal fighters after Druze forces took control of Tel al-Hadid and Tel al-Aqra, As-Suwayda Governorate, two strategic hills that had previously been held by Internal Security Forces acting as buffer zones. The fighting resulted in five fatalities and several injuries, illustrating the fragility of post-July security arrangements. Further incidents occurred in October, when tensions between local Druze “National Guard” factions and government-affiliated forces resurfaced. On October 8, violent clashes broke out in As-Suwayda Governorate between Interior Ministry-affiliated security forces and members of the National Guard, involving the use of heavy and medium machine guns. The confrontation left one person dead and seven others injured. Similar dynamics were observed on 14 November, when renewed clashes between Internal Security Forces and local Druze factions resulted in at least seven injuries, amid mutual accusations regarding ceasefire violations and responsibility for initiating the fighting.

Toward the end of the year, armed confrontations continued despite repeated attempts to stabilize the situation. On December 22, exchanges of fire between National Guard forces and General Security units in As-Suwayda Governorate escalated into machine-gun fire and mortar shelling, killing two National Guard members and injuring seven others. Fighting resumed the following day, 23 December, when further clashes involving mortar shells, heavy machine guns, and drones led to the deaths of two Internal Security personnel and one National Guard fighter, while eight additional individuals were injured. These late-year incidents underscored the persistence of localized violence and the inability of ceasefire mechanisms to prevent recurring armed confrontations in Suwayda. esu

SYRIA – USA			
Intensity:	1	Change:	Start: 2003
Conflict parties:	Syria vs. USA		
Conflict items:	system/ideology, power	international	

The non-violent crisis over international power, system and ideology between Syria and the USA de-escalated to a dispute.

In December 2024, the Assad regime collapsed and was replaced by a government under President Ahmed al-Sharaa [→ Syria (opposition)]. Following the regime change, the USA lifted large parts of the sanctions imposed on the former Syrian government, including the repeal of the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act.

In May, US President Trump and al-Sharaa met for the first time since 2000, and in November al-Sharaa became the first Syrian president in nearly 80 years to visit the White House. Both leaders signaled growing economic and counter-terrorism cooperation, and Syria was invited to join the international coalition against the Islamic State (IS).

Despite broad sanctions relief and political rapprochement, targeted US sanctions against former regime figures and Syria’s formal designation under US counter-terrorism listing frameworks remained in place. Syrian officials described remaining restrictions as obstacles to reconstruction, while US authorities maintained conditionality linked to security and transitional justice. This left unresolved disagreements over the scope and timing of full normalization.

After IS killed two US soldiers and one US citizen interpreter in December, the US launched Operation Hawkeye with airstrikes against IS targets in Syria, with US President Trump stating that the Syrian government supported the operation [→ Syria (IS)]. Cooperation against IS thus continued alongside ongoing negotiations over sanctions, legal status and foreign military presence. cne

TUNISIA (OPPOSITION)			
Intensity:	2	Change:	Start: 2010
Conflict parties:	civil society groups, opposition groups vs. government		
Conflict items:	system/ideology, national power		

The non-violent crisis over the orientation of the political system and national power between the government and various opposition and civil society groups continued.

Throughout the year, Tunisia witnessed widespread protests and government crackdowns reflecting growing political tension, social unrest, and public discontent over governance, civil liberties, and economic conditions.

On January 14, hundreds of protesters gathered in Tunis capital, criticizing President Kais Saied and demanding the release of detained opposition members. On February 5, a court in Tunis charged 41 individuals for undermining state security. Following the death of three students due to a school wall collapse on April 14, in Mezzouna, Sidi Bou Zid Governorate, several hundred people protested against poor infrastructure the day after. On May 1, the Tunisian General Labor Union organized nationwide protests with thousands

protesting in Tunis. On June 12, the leader of the Free Constitutional Party was sentenced to two years in prison for criticizing electoral procedures. On August 21, thousands protested in Tunis for union rights and civil liberties. On October 15, thousands protested in Gabès, the eponymous Governorate, against pollution from a public company, which they blame for harming the environment and public health. Security forces responded with tear gas and arrested dozens of demonstrators. Throughout November and December, the number of demonstrations increased. On November 22, over two thousand people protested in Tunis to demand democracy. On November 28, around 40 people involved in opposition activities were sentenced to prison. On December 6, and again on December 13, hundreds protested in Tunis against the government, calling for the release of political detainees. sst

TÜRKİYE (IS)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **2014**

Conflict parties: IS vs. government
Conflict items: system/ideology, national power, resources

The violent crisis over the orientation of the political system, national power, and resources between the so-called Islamic State (IS) on the one hand, and the government, on the other, continued.

The Turkish government conducted raids against members of the so-called Islamic State (IS) as part of counterterrorism operations across the country, including in Syrian border regions, throughout the year.

In the first half of the year, Turkish security forces arrested at least 1148 persons for suspected ties to the IS. For instance, on January 28, Turkish authorities detained 100 suspects linked to the Daesh terrorist organization in nationwide raids code named "Gürz-41-42" across 24 cities, including Istanbul, the capital of Ankara and southeastern Diyarbakır. The suspects were charged with providing funds to IS and spreading propaganda on social media platforms. On April 25, at least 210 suspects were detained in operations carried out in 49 provinces, including Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir. On May 21, Turkish authorities announced they detained 298 suspects in operations across 47 provinces over a period of two weeks.

In the second half of the year, Turkish security forces arrested at least 1480 persons for suspected ties to the IS. For instance, on September 12, the Turkish Minister for Interior announced the arrest of 161 suspects in simultaneous raids in 38 provinces over the course of one week. In December, security forces intensified their operations and detained at least 1,000 suspects throughout the month. For example, in the first two weeks of December security forces detained at least 170 suspects in operations across 32 provinces. On December 29, clashes between security forces and IS suspects during an operation in Elmalık village, Yalova province, left six suspects and three security officers dead and eight more officers injured. Following this incident, on December 30, security forces arrested 357 suspects across 21 provinces, including 110 in Istanbul, and 125 suspects across 25 provinces on the following day of December 31.

Furthermore, Türkiye intensified cross-border cooperation. On May 29, the Turkish Defense Ministry stated that a coordination unit, composed of Türkiye, Syria, and Jordan, began its mission to combat IS in Syria on May 19. The unit operates

under an agreement between Türkiye, Iraq, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon to establish a joint operations center to support Syria's fight against terrorism, especially IS. On June 1, in a joint operation between Turkish and Pakistani intelligence services, one wanted IS suspect was arrested by Pakistani intelligence services on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and handed over to Turkish authorities. On September 28, in a joint operation with Syrian authorities in the Idlib-Atme region, security forces arrested four IS members linked to the killing of a Turkish minibus driver. During clashes with the suspects, security forces killed eight suspects and injured two. sag

TÜRKİYE (OPPOSITION)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **2013**

Conflict parties: CHP, DEM Party vs. National Alliance (AKP, MHP)
Conflict items: system/ideology, national power

The violent crisis over national power and the orientation of the political system between the Republican People's Party (CHP), the Victory Party (ZP), and the Peoples' Democratic Congress (HDK), and the Turkish government run by the People's Alliance lead by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP), continued.

Throughout the year, law enforcement authorities intensified legal action against the CHP, initiating investigations and ordering the arrest of numerous party officials, including at least 100 party members and 16 mayors.

On March 19, police detained Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu on several charges including corruption and money laundering. He was arrested four days later and sent to Marmara Prison. Despite a four-day ban on public demonstrations issued by the government, country-wide protests erupted following the arrest. The largest rally took place in Istanbul with at least 200,000 participants. The demonstration lasted 30 days and is considered the biggest since Gezi Park protests in 2014. As a result, at least 1800 people were arrested and at least 148 police officers were injured. On July 16, the court sentenced Imamoglu to one year and eight months in prison on a separate charge of insulting and threatening a public official.

On September 8, police forces erected barricades around the CHP's provincial headquarters in Istanbul following a court decision to remove the party's local leadership. CHP MPs piled tables and chairs at the doors to block entrance while protestors gathered outside the building. Security forces used tear gas and force, resulting in multiple injuries and detentions.

On January 21, a court ordered the VP's leader Umit Ozdag to be held in custody pending trial on charges of inciting public hatred. He was released five months later.

On February 18, police detained at least 282 suspects accused of ties with the PKK [→ Türkiye (PKK)], including members of the HDK and allied smaller parties. goy

TÜRKİYE (PKK, KCK)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **END** | Start: **1978**

Conflict parties: KCK, PKK vs. government

Conflict items: autonomy

The limited war over autonomy between the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and its alleged umbrella organization called the Kurdish Communities Union (KCK), on the one hand, and the Turkish government, on the other, de-escalated to a violent crisis.

PKK and the government continued the peace negotiations initiated the previous year. On 10/01/24, the leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader, a coalition partner of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's Justice and Development Party (AK Party), called on PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan to disarm and dissolve the organization.

On February 27, Öcalan called on the organization to convene its congress, pursue integration with the state and broader society, and formally dissolve. On March 1, the PKK leadership based in the Qandil Mountains in northern Iraq declared an immediate ceasefire, stating that none of its forces would engage in armed operations unless provoked. On May 12, the PKK officially announced its dissolution, a decision Erdoğan welcomed two days later during a parliamentary group meeting of AK Party. On July 9, Öcalan addressed the Grand National Assembly (the Turkish Parliament), reiterating his call for the PKK to disband and urging the Parliament to establish a commission to oversee the disarmament process. On July 11, thirty PKK members, including senior cadres, laid down and destroyed their weapons inside the Jasana cave in Dukan, Sulaymaniyah Governorate, Iraq. Erdoğan responded on July 12 by announcing the establishment of an intra-parliamentary commission to address the legal requirements for advancing the peace process. On July 27, the Parliament established the 51-member National Solidarity, Brotherhood, and Democracy Committee, tasked with proposing a legislative framework following the PKK's dissolution. Between August 5 and October 30, the Committee held sixteen sessions. On October 26, the PKK announced the withdrawal of its forces from Türkiye to Iraq, followed on November 17 by the withdrawal from the Zap camp in Dahuk Governorate. On November 24, representatives of the AK Party, the MHP, and the Peoples' Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party) visited Öcalan at Imralı High Security Prison. On December 3, Öcalan reaffirmed his commitment to prior agreements and urged the government to establish the legal foundations necessary for the peace process.

Between January and July, at least 78 people were killed. Of these, 66 were members of the PKK who died during armed clashes with the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF). Additionally, on July 7, twelve TAF soldiers died from methane gas exposure during a search operation conducted in caves in Dahuk Governorate. TAF soldiers were looking for the body of a soldier who had died three years earlier during "Operation Claw Lock". sak

YEMEN (AL-HIRAK / SOUTHERN YEMEN)

Intensity: **3** | Change: **•** | Start: **2007**

Conflict parties: STC vs. PLC

Conflict items: secession

The violent crisis over secession of southern Yemen between al Hirak, also known as the Southern Movement and dominated by the Southern Transitional Council (STC), backed by the United Arab Emirates (UAE), on the one hand, and the government represented by the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), backed by Saudi Arabia, on the other, continued.

Despite STC and the Islah party both being part of the internationally recognized Yemeni government, infighting between the parties continued. On October 1, tribal gunmen from the Al-Zarayqa clan in Taiz clashed with security personnel loyal to the Islah Party-affiliated factions, killing the Deputy Commander of the Security Campaign and injuring some for both sides. In Taiz tensions between UAE-backed forces and local tribes caused the withdrawal of the forces.

Despite the de facto STC authority in the southern regions exercised through Security Belt Forces (Abyan, Aden, Lahj, southern Hadramaut, and parts of Shabwa), issues arose between STC factions and local tribes, particularly in the regions of Abyan, Aden, Hadramaut, and Lahj over territorial control, throughout the year. On April 16, in Hadramaut, thousands of STC-affiliated fighters mobilized towards the coast in an attempt to undermine the Hadramaut alliance's self-governance claims. In June and July, tensions over oil resources culminated in STC forces besieging the Hadramaut Parliamentary Committee in a hotel in the city of Mukalla. In Hadramaut clashes over resources between STC, backed by the UAE, and the PLC, backed by Saudi Arabia, intensified in December. On December 12, 32 soldiers from Hadramaut Tribal Alliance were killed and 45 injured during STC takeover of Hadramaut and Mahra Governorates. On December 26, Saudi Arabia bombed STC positions in Hadramaut following STC refusal to withdraw.

On May 8 in Abyan, violent clashes broke out involving STC factions and Al Waleed tribesmen. STC forces stormed houses of the Tribesmen, resulting in one death and three injured. On October 29 in Shabwa Governorate, clashes occurred between Laqmoush tribesmen and UAE-backed armed factions over territorial control. In October, the STC signaled intentions to normalize ties with Israel in an attempt to earn regional and international recognition.

Civilians remained an integral part of the conflict. For example, on February 3 the STC abducted a civilian, citing his alleged involvement with terrorism [→ Saudi Arabia, Yemen (AQAP)]. On October 11, STC forces abducted two civilians in Aden city. In several instances, civilians protested against STC governance in the interim capital of Aden, where tensions escalated on February 5-8, when Security Belt Forces dispersed a protest related to deteriorating public services in Mansoura district, mobilizing military vehicles. On August 2, violent clashes in the Abyan Governorate among protestors and STC forces resulted in an unreported number of deaths and wounded. ebr

YEMEN (AQAP – AL-HOUTHI FORCES)

Intensity: 1 | Change: • | Start: 2010


Conflict parties: al-Houthi forces vs. AQAP
Conflict items: system/ideology, subnational pre-dominance

The dispute over subnational predominance and ideology between Ansar Allah, commonly known as al-Houthi, and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) continued. Although both parties remain ideological and doctrinal adversaries, no violent measures between these two parties have been reported since 2023. Throughout the year, the Houthis and AQAP maintained their undeclared non-aggression pact and have established an opportunistic relationship. On April 4, the Yemeni Information Minister announced that al-Houthi forces had released several Al-Qaeda members as part of a prisoner exchange between the two organizations. lss

YEMEN (RED SEA)

Intensity: 4 | Change: ↗ | Start: 2023

Conflict parties: al-Houthi vs. UK, US et al.
Conflict items: other



The violent crisis over the State of Palestine^o between Ansar Allah, commonly known as al-Houthi, and the multinational cooperation between US, UK et al. escalated to a limited war. The al-Houthi forces continued a maritime campaign they launched in late 2023, through which they sought to disrupt international shipping in the Red Sea as a protest against Western support for Israeli military action in the Gaza [→ Israel (Hamas et al.)]. On January 17, al-Houthi forces claimed a UAV drone attack targeting the aircraft carrier USS Harry S. Truman in the Red Sea. On January 22, al-Houthi authorities released the 25-member crew of the MV Galaxy Leader, which al-Houthi forces had seized in November 2023, and the crew arrived in Oman. In February, Yemeni Coast Guard forces intercepted a dhow carrying advanced weapon components, including UAV-related parts and communications equipment bound for al-Houthi-controlled areas. After al-Houthi forces claimed further UAV and missile attacks against US naval assets in international waters of the Red Sea, the US launched a large-scale air campaign beginning in mid-March. On March 15, US forces conducted airstrikes on missile, radar, and UAV-related sites in the capital Sanaa, leaving at least 31 people dead and more than 100 injured. In April, US forces intensified strikes against infrastructure assessed as supporting Red Sea operations in Yemen's territorial areas. On April 17, US airstrikes hit the Ras Isa oil terminal in Al Hudaydah Governorate, killing at least 80 people and injuring about 170, with sources reporting different totals. On April

22, US forces struck coastal missile launch sites in Hajjah Governorate, killing at least twelve people and injuring about twenty. On April 28, US forces struck a detention facility in Saada Governorate, killing at least 68 people and injuring dozens; international organizations reported varying figures and called for investigation. Geographically, most al-Houthi attack claims and interceptions occurred in international waters of the Red Sea, while US measures took place in Yemen's coastal and inland territorial areas, particularly Al Hudaydah, Hajjah, Saada, and the capital Sanaa. In early May, Oman mediated an operational pause affecting al-Houthi Red Sea operations as well as air strikes by the multinational coalition. aal

YEMEN, SAUDI ARABIA (AL-HOUTHI FORCES)

Intensity: 3 | Change: ↘ | Start: 2004

Conflict parties: al-Houthis vs. PLC, Saudi Arabia, UAE
Conflict items: national power

The limited war over national power between Ansar Allah, commonly known as the al-Houthi, supported by the Iranian government, on the one hand, and the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), partly comprised by former government factions, and supported by the Saudi Arabia-led coalition, anti-Houthi popular resistance, and tribal forces, on the other, de-escalated to a violent crisis. Both conflict factions remained internally divided with the PLC experiencing violent infighting between its dominant forces, the Saudi Arabia-backed Islah party and the United Arab Emirate-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) [→ Yemen (Al-Hirak / Southern Yemen)]. Armed clashes continued in contested regions such as Al-Dali and Lahij Governorates. For example, on January 17, al-Houthi forces attacked military installations on the Tursah front in al-Dali, killing five and wounding three. On January 19, al-Houthi forces launched a surprise attack on military installations along the Hanash front in Lahij, killing one. PLC forces reported an attempt by al-Houthi forces to infiltrate military installations in the Batar area on April 3. Another al-Houthi attack on military installations in the Bab Ghalag area of al-Dali, Gled Governorate of Ma'rib. PLC forces repelled three al-Houthi attacks on military installations near the Raghwan front on February 8 and two others south of Ma'rib city on March 8 on March 10. On September 6, an alleged Houthi-operated drone struck a military facility in al-Falihah area of Ma'rib Governorate, killing a PLC commander and several military escorts. Frequent al-Houthi attacks in PLC-controlled Taizz Governorate occurred throughout the year. Al-Houthi forces ambushed PLC forces near the Western Taizz front on February 8, leaving 5 casualties. On March 10, al-Houthi forces attacked PLC military installations, causing four casualties. On July 3 the forces launched a drone that impacted a gas station, killing one civilian. On October 22, an IED-attack damaged a convoy carrying STC-affiliated PLC forces. In response, several media outlets released conflicting statements blaming either al-Houthi forces or affiliates of the Islah party for the bombing. The PLC remains deeply divided. On January 14, forces loyal to the STC stormed the presidential office at Al-Maashiq Palace in the city of Aden. On May 25, Islah party officials threatened to escalate the territorial dispute over Socotra Island. On July 9, military forces loyal to the Islah party sur-

WEST ASIA, NORTH AFRICA, AND AFGHANISTAN

rounded STC military encampments in Abyan Governorate. After the STC takeover of Hadhramaut and Mahra Governorates on December 12, Saudi Arabia bombed STC holdings

in Hadhramaut on December 26. On December 30, a PLC presidential decree ordered UAE forces to leave Yemen [→ Yemen (Al-Hirak / Southern Yemen)]. awo

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July 8, 2026

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CITATION

Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK) (2026): Conflict Barometer 2025, Heidelberg.

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ISSN 1616-31X